Digested Cases PR Final

Sanchez v.
Rigos
G.R. No. L-25494, 14 June 1972
FACTS:
Nicolas Sanchez and Severina Rigos executed an instrument entitled “Option toPurchase” wherein
Mrs. Rigos agreed, promised and committed to sell to Mr. Sancheza parcel of land for the amount of
P1, 510. 00 within two years from the date of the instrument, with the understanding that the said
option shall be deemed terminated and elapsed if Mr. Sanchez shall fail to exercise his right to buy
the property within the stipulated period.
Mrs. Rigos agreed and committed to sell and Mr. Sanchez agreed and committed to buy. But there
is nothing in the contract to indicate that her agreement, promise and undertaking is supported by a
consideration distinct from the price stipulated for the sale of the land. Mr. Sanchez has made
several tenders of payment in the said amount within the period before any withdrawal from the
contract has been made by Mrs. Rigos, but were rejected nevertheless.
ISSUE:
Can an accepted unilateral promise to sell without consideration distinct from the price be withdrawn
arbitrarily?
RULING:
No. An accepted promise to sell is an offer to sell when accepted becomes a contract of sale.
Since there may be no valid contract without a cause or consideration, the promisor is not bound by
his promise and may, accordingly, withdraw it. Pending notice of its withdrawal, his accepted
promise partakes, however, of the nature of an offer to sell which, if accepted, results in a perfected
contract of sale. This view has the advantage of avoiding a conflict between Articles 1324 – on the
general principles on contracts – and 1479 – on sales – of the Civil Code.
Article 1324 – When the offeror has allowed the offeree a certain period to accept, the offer may be
withdrawn at any time before acceptance by communicating such withdrawal, except when the
option is founded upon a consideration, as something paid or promised.
Tañedo v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 104482, 22 January 1996
FACTS:
Lazardo Tañedo executed a notarized deed of absolute sale in favor of his eldest brother, Ricardo
Tañedo, and the latter’s wife, Teresita Barera. Private respondents recorded the Deed of Sale in
their favor in the Registry of Deeds and the corresponding entry was made in Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 166451.
On January 13, 1981, Lazaro executed another notarized deed of sale in favor of private
respondent. In February 1981, Ricardo learned that Lazaro sold the same property to his children,
petitioners herein, through a deed of sale dated December 29, 1980.
Petitioners on July 16, 1982, filed a complaint for rescission (plus damages) of the deeds of sale
executed by Lazardo in favor of private respondents covering the property inherited by Lazaro from
his father. Petitioners claimed that their father, Lazaro, executed an “Absolute Deed of Sale” dated
December 29, 1980.
ISSUES:
1. Is the sale of a future inheritance valid?

2. Was the subsequent execution on January 13, 1981 (and registration with the Registry of
Property) of a deed of sale covering the same property to the same buyers valid?
RULING:
1. No.
We hereby categorically rule that, pursuant to Article 1347 of the Civil Code, “(n)o contract may be
entered into upon a future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law.”
Consequently, said contract made in 1962 is not valid and cannot be the source of any right nor the
creator of any obligation between the parties.
Hence, the “affidavit of conformity” dated February 28, 1980, insofar as it sought to validate or ratify
the 1962 sale, is also useless and, in the words of the respondent Court, “suffers from the same
infirmity.” Even private respondents in their memorandum concede this.
2. Yes.
Article 1544 of the Civil Code governs the preferential rights of vendees in cases of multiple sales,
as follows:
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be
movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good
faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first
in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided
there is good faith.
The property in question is land, an immovable, and following the above-quoted law, ownership shall
belong to the buyer who in good faith registers it first in the registry of property. Thus, although the
deed of sale in favor of private respondents was later than the one in favor of petitioners,
ownership would vest in the former because of the undisputed fact of registration. On the
other hand, petitioners have not registered the sale to them at all.
Gabriel v. Monte de Piedad and CA
G.R. No. L-47806, 14 April1941
FACTS:
Petitioner Gabriel was employed as an appraiser of jewels in the pawnshop of Monte de Piedad. He
executed a chattel mortgage to secure the payment of the deficiencies which resulted from his
erroneous appraisal of the jewels pawned to the appellee, amounting to P14,679.07, with six percent
(6%) interest from said date. In this chattel mortgage, Gabriel promised to pay to Monte de Piedad
P300 per month until the sum of P14,679.07, with interest, is fully paid. In case of default to
effectuate the chattel mortgage, an action was instituted against Gabriel by Monte de Piedad in the
CFI. Gabriel denied the genuineness of the execution of the said chattel mortgage. By way of special
defense, he alleged:(1) the chattel mortgage was void because a) it is contrary to law, morals and
public policy; (b) he was made to sign it against his will and through misrepresentation where E.
Marco(Director-General) signed in behalf of Monte de Piedad without the latter’s authority,(c) the
subject matter and considerations of the mortgage do not exist, and(d) the payments already made
allegedly for the mortgage were in fact his salaries;(2) his acquittal in a criminal case that used the
chattel mortgage as evidence of his liability was a bar to the present civil case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the chattel mortgage executed by Gabriel is against public policy, law, or morals?
RULING:
No. The Chattel Mortgage does not violate the law, morals or public policy.
A contract is to be judge by its character, and courts will look to the substances and not to the mere
form of the transaction. The freedom of contract is both a constitutional and statutory right and to
uphold this right, courts should move with all the necessary caution and prudence in holding
contracts void. The term “public policy” is vague and uncertain in meaning, floating and changeable
in connotation. It may be said, however, that, in general, a contract which is neither prohibited by law
nor condemned by judicial decision, nor contrary to public morals, contravenes no public policy. In
the absence of express legislation or constitutional prohibition, a court, in order to declare a contract
void as against public policy, must find that the contract as to the consideration or thing to be done,
has a tendency to injure the public, is against the public good, or contravenes some established
interests of society, or is inconsistent with sound policy and good morals, or tends clearly to
undermine the security of individual rights, whether of personal liability or of private property.
Petitioner also contends that the chattel mortgage in question is void because it lacks consideration.
A consideration, in the legal sense of the word, is some right, interest, benefit, or advantage
conferred upon the promisor, to which he is otherwise not lawfully entitled, or any detriment,
prejudice, loss, or disadvantage suffered or undertaken by the promisee other than to such as he is
at the time of consent bound to suffer.
Examining the contract at bar, it was executed voluntarily to guarantee the deficiencies resulting
from the erroneous appraisals of the petitioner. A pre-existing admitted liability is a good
consideration for a promise. The fact that the bargain is a hard one will not deprived it of validity. The
exception to this rule in modern legislation is where the inadequacy is so gross as to amount to
fraud, oppression or undue influence, or when statutes require the consideration to be adequate.
The instant case does not fall within the exception.
Hence, the petition is hereby dismissed and the judgment sought to be reviewed is affirmed, with
costs against the petitioner.

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Sanchez v.

1. Is the sale of a future inheritance valid?

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