Looking for the philosophy of the law is like looking for a black

cat in a dark room: at times you hear the cat meow, at times you feel its
fine fur, at times you see its gleaming eyes, but most of the time you don~
know where to look for it. The concept of philosophy of law is itself iII-
defined. It certainly is not jurisprudence, whether this be understood to
be sociological, psychological, historical, or any other form advocated
by any school. It is also not ethics, although this may be a part of the
law itself. Since words like "philosophy" or "law" are themselves
susceptible of varied interpretations, it is not surprising that
philosophy of law is hardly capable of an accurate definition.

Defining the legal philosophy of the Civil Code can hardly be

accomplished with the clean accuracy of a rifle shot; we can only point
at the direction of the target and shoot with the errant and unsure
explosion of a shotgun shell. In other words, we can only point at the
black cat by:

2) connecting the law with the society that evolved it and the
circumstances of the time in which it originated; or

3) relating the importance of the law under the influence of

economic, social and other conditions; or

.Paper submitted to the First Conference on the Civil Code Revision

..
sponsored by the Institute of Government and Law Reform, (J.P. Law Center.
Dean, College of Law, University of the Philippines; LL.B. (1960), U.P.
College of Law; LL.M. (1963); l.S.D. (1965), Yale Law School.
 The above tasks, according to Sir John Macdonnell, are the tasks
of an investigator of the philosophy of law. It is like shooting in the
dark, hoping that a wild shot may, by accident, hit the unseen and
elusive target.

To study the philosophy of the Civil Code is therefore to go

back to the history of Spain, for our Civil Code is founded on the laws of
Spain. But to go back to the history of Spain is not enough, for we find
that the laws of Spain were based largely on Roman law, dating as far
back a~ the Institutes of Justinian. So we go back to the corpus juris
civilis only to find that this tome of rigid conservatism is merely an
accumulation of old Roman law, as modified by the tenets of orthodox
Christianity. Going back to the old Roman law does not end our quest for
the statting point of the philosophy of our Civil Code, as we find that
Roman! law was greatly influenced by Greek philosophy. And so we
find confirmation of the historical truth that we are but pygmies
standing on the shoulders of giants, even in the matter of the
philosophy of our Civil Code.

But to start from the ancient Roman state, it has been noted that
this was initially composed of hardy tillers of the soil. These were
sturdy and hardworking peasants, and they fashioned their laws
according to their lifestyle. Their laws did not have any explicit
philosophy, except those with religious foundations. Thus, ancient
Roman law was but a combination of tribal customs, royal edicts, and
priestly commands. This was the time when the law could not be
distinguished from the Roman religion, as ancient Rome was under the
rule of priests. Thus, early Roman Law

was both lex and jus, command and justice; it was a relation not
only between man and man but between man and the gods. Crime
was a disturbance of that relation, of the pax deorum or peace of the
gods; law and punishment were in theory designed to maintain or
restore that relation and peace.l

The same observation holds true for the theory of injury and
liability. Ancient Roman thought proscribed injuring one's neighbor as
this might affront the gods and prompt them to hit back at the
malefactor and imperil the whole community, by indiscriminately
unleashing lightning or casting pestilence, which would affect the
guilty and innocent alike.2 Even the theory of contracts invoked the
name of the gods. In making a promise, a person was called to witness
the promise, and the politically organized society had to give a legal
remedy to the promise lest he invoke the aid of the gods and jeopardize
the security of the community.3

Since priests were the dominant class, they shaped the law to
suit their religious ends. They declared what was right and wrong;
decided questions of marriage or divorce, celibacy or incest, wills or
transfers, or rights of children and parents.4 The law was surrounded
with solemn oaths and sacred sanctions, and the law books were so
securely hidden from the plebeians that the priests were suspected of
altering the texts on occasion to suit their ecclesiastical objectives.s

But there is no point in tarrying at this junction in Roman

history, except to note that the philosophy of ancient Roman law was
grounded on religion. Where law is based mainly on religious rituals,
the philosophy of the law stagnates. The processes of thought are
frozen by the countervailing thought of eternal damnation for those who
think too much; the substance of the law is eclipsed by oaths and rituals
administered by witch doctors or medicine men masquerading as priests.
Between salvation and damnation the ancient Roman tribesman did not
have much leeway for independent thought, much less for questioning
the whys or wherefores of the rules laid down by the priestly class.
While law is inextricably interwoven with religion, morals, and custom,
it is only when law becomes distinguishable from these that its
philosophy, i.e., the ethical basis for its norms, becomes discernible. In
the case of the Romans, this distinction became most obvious in the last
two hundred years of the Republic, in the first three hundred years of
the imperial era, and towards the end of the empire up to the age of
Justinian.6

And what was the philosophy of private Roman law during

those later periods? Schulz puts it thus:

2
PoUND, ANlNTRODUcnON TO mE PHILoSOPHY OF LAw 26 (1954).
3/d.
4
DURANT, supra note I, at 33.
SId.
6
SCHULZ, PRINCIPLES OF ROMAN LAW 4 (1936).
 Often the jurists' statements almost give the impression of a
mathematical treatise or rather of a treatise on a law of Nature, a
law, however, not so generally applicable as was claimed for the
Stoical law of Nature, but one within the framework of Roman
Legislation and retaining certain traditional principles and axioms
... in short, a Roman law of Nature?

As Pound observed, among the Romans, law was conceived as a

philosophically discovered system of principles which express the
nature of things, to which, therefore, man ought conform his conduct.8

Almost all commentators agree that philosophy of the law was

not a strong point with the Romans; the original ideas in law were
borrowed from the Greek philosophers. A German writer notes that the
classic and enduring Roman model for the philosophy of law may be
represented by the establishment of the bonus paterfamilias as the
standard relation for development of private law during the first
period, and of the jus aequum, corresponding to the principle of equity,
during the second period.9 Needless to say, both principles still
constitute the pillars of our Civil Code today.

The one distinguishing mark of Roman law during this period,

compared with later codes, lies in the absence of an ethical element.
Here was law before it was married to ethics. The concept of
paterfamilias, for example, represented absolutism of the early civil
law: the paterfamilias was the absolute monarch in the family, over
which he had complete control.

The other distinguishing mark of Roman law was its

simplicity. In private law, the Romans recognized only two forms of
human association - the societas and the corporation. There was only
one type of communio, whether this was a community of heirs, of
patrons, or any other communio. There was only one form of property, as
no distinction was made between real and personal property. There was
only one form of security, whether possessory or not. Contracts for work
and labor and contracts for hire and lease were massed together in the
same type of contract. In family law, the property law of husband and
wife recognized only two kinds: where the wife had no property (manus
marriage), and separation of property (free marriage).IO

7
Id., at 35.
8
POlJND, supra note 2.
9
REROI.71tE1MER,TilE WORLD'S LEGAl. PIllLOSOPII1ES82-83 (R. Jastrow trans.
 There are other legal rules borrowed from Roman Law which,
while still extant in our Civil Code today, have undergone some changes
in terms of their philosophical underpinnings. Take, for instance, the
law of contracts and of bailments. While in ancient Roman law contracts
and agreements were not initially cognizable by the tribunals, it was
soon realized that someone who broke his oath, aside from displeasing
the ~ods, was also a social danger. As observed by Pound, when the law
replaced religion as the main regulating agency, the old religiously-
sanctioned promise became a formal legal contract which created a legal
duty enforced by the government.ll The legal symbols replaced the
symbols of magic, and the contract became the source of the obligation.
To borrow from Pound again, new categories of contracts arose which
were, however, rationalizations of previous formal transactions, e.g.,
the consensual contract of sale rationalized transfer by tradition, the
real contract of depositum rationalized fiducia cum amico, and mutuum
rationalized pecunia credita.12 All of these contracts, even if derived
from formal transactions, were agreements clothed in legal form, and it
was this legal form that formed the causa for enforcing the agreement.
It was only much later, under the influence of the Germans during the
medieval period, that the concept of causa debendi, or reason for owing
the promised performance, evolved, probably due to pressure from the
church which was at that point establishing a jurisdiction over
promises. All of these Roman concepts on contracts originally traced the
source of obligation in the form itself, for it was earlier thought that
"faith in legal forms belongs to the same order of thought as faith in
forms of incantation, and that legal forms are frequently symbols to be
classed psychologically with the symbols of magic",13

If there is anyone common thread of Roman private law, it

is the philosophy of individualism. In the relationship of husband and
wife, for example, marriage and divorce were accomplished without
government intervention. No restrictions were placed on divorce - a
unilateral declaration sufficed.14 There was no question of the right of
the wife to contract, of the duty of the husband to support his wife, or of
the wife to work for the husband. There was no community of property;
each remained sole owner of his or her property,1s The Roman laws of
ownership were extremely individualistic; their principle was that
ownership is to be as realistic as possible and the greatest possible

11
POUND, supra note 2, at 138.
12
Id., at 140-141.
13
Id., at 139-140.
14
SCHULZ, supra note 6, at 147.
1SId.
latitude given to individual action and initiative.16 The same
observation holds true for the law of obligations, as well as the law of
succession.17 Testamentary disposition by individual will was the rule,
and the statutory rules of succession were of minor importance. 1here was
generous freedom of disposition accorded to the testator; it was only in 40
B.C. that the lex Falcidia secured to the heir 1/4 of the estate. 1B

However, two principles of Roman law operated to moderate

the excessive individualism and rigidity of the law: aequitas and
humanitas.

It was only later in the development of Roman law that the

principle of aequitas evolved as a "practical concession as the
directive principle of a progressive legal development which finds
itself in opposition to the strict civillaw",19 It represented a departure
from the austere, rigid and unyielding nature of Roman law.

Aside from aequitas, the Romans created the concept of

humanitas, which contemplated not only moral and intellectual
educapon, but also kindness, goodness, sympathy, and consideration for
others. Under this concept evolved the other form of marriage, the free
marriage, in which the wife was not subjected to the husband's manus.
In a manus marriage, on the other hand, the wife was really under the
power of the husband in the same way as a daughter. But under the
influence of humanitas, the husband's usucapio was abolished, as this
rule applied to chattels and not to human beings.20 Thus, the sale of a
wife was considered a delict, community of property between husband
and wife was recognized, and the wife could then succeed.to the estate
of the husband.21 Humanitas likewise softened the relationship
between parent and child; under Christianity after Valentinian, the
paterfamilias was deprived of his right to put his child to death.22
But Justinian permitted the sale of children in case of poverty, in which
case the child became a slave.23

If we trace the history of Roman law from the ancient Romans

from 451 B.C. up to the Institutes of Justinian in 533 A.D. , we find that it

16
Id., at 153.
17
Id., at 155-156.
18
Id., at 156-157.
19
BEROLZHElMER, supra note 9, at 85.
20
SCHUlZ, supra note 6, at 192.
21
Id., at 195-196.
22
Id., at 198.
23
Id., at 200.
ended in almost the same way that it began: entwined and warped in
religion and dogma. For example, we find that the Corpus juris civilis,
which we know as the Code of Justinian, enacted orthodox Christianity
into law, and proclaimed as law the basic tenets of the orthodox
church.24 Thus, after declaring the Trinity of God and ordering all
Christians to submit to 'the religious leadership of the Roman Church,
the Code embodies the doctrines of the church even in the area of social
relations: the legalization of slavery and serfdom, the oppression and
Persecution of heretics and dissenters, the preservation of the distinction
between classes, capital pUnishment for sexual irregularities like
homosexuality, fornication, adultery, and rape, the prohibition against
divorce, inheritance of property through the cognate line in descending
order, inalienability of the property of the Church, attachment of
freemen and serfs to the feudal estate, and imprisonment for debt.2S The
Code of Justinian, as Durant observes, "differs from earlier codes by its
rigid orthodoxy, its deeper conservatism, and its vengeful severity."26
Justinian, as Durant put it, could not escape his environment and his
time, for in his ambition to unify everything, he codified the
superstition and barbarity, as well as the justice and charity, of his
ageP

It was in the fifth century that the Visigoths over-ran Spain,

and they ruled the country from 456 A.D. until the coming of the Moors.
The Visigoth rulers later changed their' faith and were converted to
orthodox Christianity. The bishops and the priests became the chief
power in the state. Thus, it was the clergy that promulgated a system of
laws in Spain which was considered the most competent but the least
tolerant of the barbarian codes.28 While the code imposed the rules of
evidence and established the principle of equality before the law,
applying the law to Romans and Visigoths alike, it rejected freedom of
worship for non-ehristians, imposed Christianity on all inhabitants,
and sanctioned persecution of Jews.29 From this point, there was an

24
4 DuRANT, THE STORY OF CIvn1ZAnoN 112 (1950).
2S
/d., at 113.
26
/d., at 114.
'r1/d.
28
/d., at 95.
29/d.
attempt to apply universal Christian ethics to the practical problems of
personal relations, society and government.

Two of the tribal customs brought by the Visigoths to Spain is

the system of community property in marriage and of advancement to
heirs, which are still features of our Civil Code. Compare this with the
concept of self-acquired or individual property in Roman law, forms of
which we still retain in our Code.

In early fifth century, the leader of the Goths, Alaric, invaded

Italy and the heart of the Western empire, including Spain. This
conquest led to the promulgation of the Code of Alaric in 506, which
introduced the tribal customs of the barbarians to Roman law.3o This
opened the way in Spain for the introduction of Germanic custom law, so
that when the first great code of Spain, Fuero Juzgo, was enacted, it
contained three categories of law: Roman law, various German customs,
and canons of ecclesiasticalcouncils. A commentator considers this one of
the most advanced codes of the time and so highly regarded that it was
given precedence over later compilations. Our own civil law expert,
Prof. Ruben Balane, in his "Spanish Antecedents of the Civil Code,"
enumerates the features of the Fuero Juzgo, as follows:

(1) A major change reflecting the social forces at work

towards unity was the provision allowing intermarriages between
Goths and Hispano-Romans.

(2) Two kinds of persons are recognized - the natural or

physical, and the jUridical, following the Roman law maxim that not
all human beings are persons (for slavery was recognized) and not all
persons are human beings.

(3) For a natural person to be considered legally born, he must

have lived for at least 10 days and been baptized.
 (a) differencein status - i.e., between a freeman
and a slave;

(d) relationship - to the seventh degree, computed

in the same way we do today;

(e) prior existing marriage;

(f) crimes against chastity, specifically abduction

and rape, the effect of which (and we would find this
strange) was to make it legally impossible for the felon to
marry the victim;

(g) the temporal impediment; i.e. one year

following the dissolution of the woman's previous marriage.

(6) There was no minimum age requirement for marriage;

anyone could marry who had reached the age of puberty.

(7) The prescribed ceremony for marriage is charmingly

described by SanchezRoman:

. . . the bride wore a veil, symbol of her virginity. They were

then blessed by the priest, and were lmited by the deacon with a
white-and-red-cord, the cord symbolizing the matrimonial tie. and
the color signifying purity and feamdity.

(8) The concept of conjugal property is clearly discernible in

the Fuero ]uzgo, which recognizes as common property of the spouses
whatever is earned by the effort of both, dividing such property in
proportion to the contributionof each one.

(9) Patria potestas was acquired solely by reason of

marriage, the Roman concept of legitimation and adoption being
unknown or unacceptable to the Goths. On the other hand, the extent of
the patria potestas was not nearly as absolute or as fearsome as in
Roman law, the jus necis being available only when either parent
caught the daughter in the act of carnal indulgence (in flagrante
delicto). The rights of infants, and even of fhe unborn, were
scrupulously protected: infantidde and abortion were punished either
by death, or, more leniently, by the gouging out of one's eyes; the
mother who procured an abortion was reduced to slavery.

(10) The mother exercised substitute parental authority in the

event of the father's death but this was lost if she remarried.

(11) A kind of adventitious property (similar to our Article

321) is recognized.

(1) The modes of acquiring ownership were: a) occupation;

b) accession; c) prescription; and d) succession. Occupation occurred by
conquest, hunting and fishing. Accession, by building, planting, and
sowing (the same as our accession industrial, except that accession in our
law is not a mode of acquiring ownership). Prescription was either
ordinary (for 30 years) or extraordinary (for SO), the first governing all
cases save the division of lands between Goths and Romans and property
of minors.

(3) Servitudes were classified into personal and real, the

latter referring to pasture lands.

(1) Succession was either testamentary or intestate - the

former occurred by virtue of an attested or a holographic will (an oral
declaration of testamentary intention being allowed only in a very rare
situation, which we need not advert to here). Only freemen could be
witnesses (again except in one rare instance).

(2) The minimum age for making wills was 14, and 10 for
those in periculo mortis.

(3) The reserved portion was large: 4/5 of the father's

property and 3/4 of the mother's, with a portion allowed as mejora,
and a preferential order of heirs.

(4) Disinheritance was limited to certain specific grounds.

 (6) In Book IV, Title I, law 6, we see the beginnings of the
reserva which later developed into the reseroa tronCill.

(1) Contractual capacity was acquired at the age of 14,

inconsistently with the provision making 15 the age of majority.

(2) Minority, insanity, slavery, and force or fear vitiated a

contract.

(3) The following contracts were regulated: a) sale; b) lease;

c) mutuum; d) commodatum; e) deposit; f) mortgage; and g) pledge31

In 711, the Moors invaded and occupied most of Spain, an

occupation that lasted twice as long as the Spanish rule over the
Philippines. This retarded the development of Spanish law, but it did
not wipe out the gains in previous eras. This was because the conquered
Spaniards were governed, in their internal affairs, by their own laws
and by their own officials. Thus, the Visigothic-Roman law
compilations continued to apply to the Spaniards. Various cities were
given or assumed their own codes during the Reconquista. The Fuero
]uzgo was given to the city of Cordova in 1241.32 The situation in this
period was that there were separate law codes for each state, and for
each class in each state.

After the Reconquista, Fernando III began, and Alfonso X

completed, a new system of Spanish law, which, because it was
divided into seven parts, became known as Siete Partidas. This was a
compilation of law and a treatise of jurisprudence, based on the law of
the Spanish Visigoths but patterned after Justinian's Institutes. This
code was advanced for that age; it was ignored for 70 years, but in 1338 it
became the law of Castille, and by 1492, of all Spain.33 At this time,
Spain felt the need for a common law; the Visigothic concept of law
designed only to keep the peace would not do; it needed a code to
preserve the social status quo.

This was because Spain had been stimulated by its victory over
the Moors, although it could not deny the partial absorption of modem

31Balllle, TM SpaNs" A"'ecede",s 01 1M PlIilippiM Civil Code, 54 PhiL

L.J. 11-14 (1979).
32
4 DuRANT, Slipi'll DOte 24, at 299.
33
Id., 11699.
culture into Spanish civilization. There was growth of industry and
wealth, evolution of manners and tastes, and intellectual ferment with
the establishment of universities.34 Spain also led the medieval world
in developing free cities and representative institutions. The Siete
Partidas served the function of developing a common law for all of the
principal cities of Spain. The first Partida refers to natural law, usages
and customs, and to the Catholic Church and religious laws. The second
Partida is mainly administrative law, including the rights of the
Crown, the reciprocal duties of the King and the people, military
captives, and public education. The third Partida deals with court
organization and procedure, and also with land ownership, possession,
and servitudes. The fourth Partida deals with family matters and
personal relations arising under feUdalism. The fifth Partida, which is
the most important, deals with obligations and contracts, including
bailments, mortgages and pledges; concepts copied literally from Roman
law. The sixth Partida deals with succession, intestacy, heirship, and
guardianship. The seventh Partida is the penal code.35

Prof. Balane lists down the prominent civil law features of the
third, fourth, fifth, and sixth Partidas as follows:

1) The principle of territoriality is preserved - all juridical

acts done within the realm, whether by natives or by foreigners, are to
be governed by the law of the land.

2) Ignorance of the law is admitted as an excuse for peasants,

soldiers, and women.

2) Legitimation occurs in three ways: a) subsequent

marriage, b) the will of the king, or c) the performance of some service
to the king.

3) Adoption - called porfijamiento - is completely Roman in

derivation, as to kind, as to requisites, and as to effects.

34Id.
35
Introduction. CIvIL CODE OF MEXICO.
 4} The mother is given no share in the patria potestas;
rather (as in the Roman law) it is granted to the ascendant of the
highest degree.

1) Ownership is acquired by occupation, accession,

prescription, tradition, and hereditary succession.

2) The Roman law rules on possession and servitudes -

classified into real and personal - are reproduced.

1) Many features of the Roman law of succession are

borrowed, like the necessity of instituting an heir and the legal
impossibility of dying partly testate and partly intestate.

2} Capacity to inherit from ascendants is denied

sacrilegious, adulterous, and incestuous children - all of whom are
designated fornecinos.

3) The legitimary system undergoes drastic changes: from

the 4/5 of the Fuero !uzgo, the legitimes of descendants were reduced to
either 1/2 or 1/3, depending on the number of children.

6) Substitutions are classified into: vulgar, pupilar,

ejemplar, and fideicomisaria.

7) Representation is made to operate ad infinitum in the

direct descending line, and to the second degree in the collateral.

8) Succession in the collateral line is allowed to the 4th

degree; in default of relatives within these degrees, the surviving
spouse; and in his or her default, the King.
 1) In its effort to borrow from the Roman law, the Partidas
changed the already simplified law on contract, which had generally
required only consent; the new Code emphasized form once more, a
change which Sanchez Roman characterizes as "completelyarbitrary,
gross, materialistic, formalistic, artificial, capricious, which
subordinates the spiritual element to the observances of puerile
rubrics ... "

2) Contracts are either real or consensual - among the

former are: mutuum, commodatum, deposit, and pledge; and among the
latter: sale. lease, partnership, and agency.36

To understand the philosophy of medieval law during the

early period (up to 800 A.D.), we have to understand the communal
nature of medieval society. The community was rigidly organized in a
close hierarchy, with medieval society divided into various classes and
orders. There were three basic orders divided according to function - the
religious, the military, and the workers. Hierarchy implied
inequality; in fact, medieval scholars thought that hierarchy and
inequality on earth were ordained by heaven for it reflected the angelic
hierarchy up above.

The hierarchical system revolved around the relationship

between lord and vassal. This was a pattern of trust and responsibility
between the lord and his vassals, a pattern that permeated the whole
of society. Thus, society was composed of families whose members
served their respective functions for the master. The ties that brought
them together were personal and emotional bonds of friendship and
intimacy, covered by a web of mutual rights and obligations. Vassalage
was not a legalistic concept that would approximate a social compact; it
was more of an emotionalbond between lord and servant.

So even if the religious and moral doctrines which produced a

profound change in the concept of law and of state preached clarity,
equality and brotherhood of men, these did nothing to change the
established social order, for those were directed towards life hereafter
and not to the here and now. In fact, the fathers of the Church

36
Balane, supra note 31, at 25-26.
 considered slavery a propitious occasion for the slaves to practice
patience and obedience toward their masters, and for the masters to
practice kindness toward their slaves.37 The philosophy of law during
this period, according to Berolzheimer, was a philosophy of
compromise.

But the rise of Christianity did have an effect on the

philosophy of law during this period. First, it drew the law closer to
theology in the sense that since a personal God governs the world, law
is thereforefounded on the will and wisdom of God. Second,there arose
a legal relationship between church and state; with the church
- asserting itself above the state.38

These views are presented very clearly in the works of St.

Augustine, De Civitate Dei. While he extols the church as the
communion of the faithful in God, who constitute a divine city, he looks
down on the state as the kingdom of the impious - a necessary evil that
is needed only to maintain peace and order among men, and which will
wither away upon the reestablishment of the kingdom of God. St.
Augustine's contribution was the concept of "pax" as a regulating
principle, which is not peace, but that which brings peace -- the
blissful,sacred order which is harmony among rational beings.39

The late medieval period had a slight shift in philosophical

thought with the partial return of classic philosophy in scholasticism.
Thus, Aristotle was resurrected in a different light: his teachings were
studied from the prism of religious dogma. The result is a philosophy
that develoPed religious dogmas with a rational analysis within the
framework of the Catholic faith.

The legal philosophy of the Middle Ages culminate<! in the

Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas Aquinas. Here he distinguished
three orders of laws: lex aeterna, or divine reason, which governs the
world; lex naturalis, or natural law, which men know through reason;
and lex humana, or positive law, which is man-made application of the
natural law to particular situations.

Just as the ancient Romans used the bonus paterfamilias as the

norm of their system, St. Thomas Aquinas used the average nature of

37
DEL VECClDO, PHILosoPHY OF LAw 46 (1953).
38
ld., at 47.
39'
BEROUHEIMER., sIIpra note 9, at 96.
man as the limitation of legal restraint. He thus established a penal
principle, and determined its application.40 The Aquinian definition of
"justice" is borrowed from Roman law, which is either justitia generalis,
comprising all earthly virtues, or justitia particularis, likewise
divided into justitia commutativa or the obligation of restitution to
prevent unjust enrichment, or justitia distributiva or distributive justice,
which is the application of the proceeds of justice in geometrical
proportions.41 The theory of punishment is also discussed in the Summa,
and usury is denounced.

The priests who .revived Roman private law in Italy and

carried it to Spain, France and Germany saw in it a kind of law of
nature, and were in favor of its practical application.42

It was in Spain where the influence of the scholastic

philosophy continued long after the medieval period. In fact, among
the countries of Western Europe, Spain was one of the few which was
uninfluenced by the Renaissance, as the term is understood to mean a
general detachment from the religious dogmatism of the Middle Ages.
Spain's version of the Renaissance, in fact, was a renaissance of
scholasticism.43 Thus, its legal philosophers, like Francisco de Victoria
and Dominico de Soto, who were both Dominicans, elaborated on the
Thomistic doctrines, eSPeCiallyon natural law. Others were Jesuits,
like Luis de Molina, Juan de Logo, Juan Mariana, and Francisco Suarez,
who elaborated and develoPed the principles of scholasticism. It was
only in the 19th century that Spain felt the influence of the various
currents of thought in other European countries, but the scholastic, or
neo-scholastic tradition, always remained dominant.44

It was thus inevitable that the revision of the laws in Spain at

the time (l4th century) reflected the strong influence of medieval
philosophy. In the field of contracts, for example, the Ordenamiento de
Alcala emphasized the spiritual aspect of contracts, that is, the
concurrence of wills, practically ignoring .the element of form stressed in
the Partidas. The concept of lesion in sales was introduced, which was
defined as inadequacy amounting to more than one-half the price. The
taking of interest was also prohibited.4s

40
Id., at 99.
41
Id., at 100.
42
SCHULZ, supra note 6, at 37.
43
DEL VECClDO, supra note 37, at 215.
44
Id., at 215-216.
4S
Balane, supra note 31, at 28.
 In 1502, the Spanish Cortes promulgated the Leyes de Toro,
consisting of 83 laws, to supplement existing laws. The salient civil law
features of this law are:

A. The law of persons and {amIty:

(1) Juridical capacity is possessed by the naturalmente nacido

with the following requisites: a) the child must be born alive; b) it must
survive at least 24 hours; and c) it must be baptized. If any of these
requisites was absent, the child was not naturalmente nacido but
abortivo.

(2) Marriage was recognized as a cause of emancipation from

parental authority, and the usufruct of any adventitious property
passed to the child from the time of marriage.

(3) An interesting feature of this legislation was the so-called

ley de osculo - if the marriage did not materialize, the woman had the
right to retain one-half of whatever the man had given her, if he had
already kissed her.

(4) The wife could not renounce inheritance without the

husband's consent

(5) The wifecould neither contractnor go to court without the

husband's consent

(6) The conjugal regime was more minutely regulated, various

provisions being devoted thereto.

(7) Natural children were defined as those born of parents

who, at the time of the child's conception or birth, could have married
lawfully and without dispensation.

C. The law of descent:

(1) Persons subject to the penalty of death were, unlike the

rule in the Partidas, allowed to make wills.
 (2) The minimum age for will-making was fixed at 14 for
males and 12 for females.

(3) Legitimate ascendants were made compulsory heirs in

default of children or descendants; as heirs, these ascendants excluded
collateral relatives of the decedent.

(4) In default of descendants and ascendants, brothers and

sisters inherited by intestacy; and in the representation of predeceased
brothers or sisters, nephews and nieces inherited per stirpes, not per
capita.

(5) All kinds of illegitimate children were excluded by

legitimate descendants from the succession of the mother, but in the
absence of legitimate descendants, these illegitimates - whether
natural or spurious - succeeded to the mother's estate to the exclusionof
legitimate ascendants; on the other hand, the father and the mother
could each give illegitimate children of all kinds legacies for support
not exceeding one-fifth of their respective estates, but a man without
legitimate children could give a natural child any amount he wished.

(6) Mejoras could be given either by will or by contract. In

addition to this, several other rules governing mejoraswere laid down.

(7) Mayorazgos - already an established practice throughout

the land but theretofore unregulated in the Codes - were there
regulated.

Donations of the universality of the donor's patrimony

were prohibited, even if only present property was included therein. 46

Later, in 1567, a compilation of all laws published since the

Fuero Real and the PtlTtidas was published by order of Philip n under
the name of Nueva Recopilacion. In 1805,another compilation entitled
Novisimtl Recopiltlcion was published, which was also a
supplementary code which failed to abrogate earlier laws.

In 1799, Napoleon Bonaparte came to power in France, and

promulgated the Code Napoleon in 1805.The Ovil Code became the
model in a number of European countries, including Spain. In 1899,the

46
Id., at 31:~.
Civil Code of Spain was promulgated, consisting of four books like our
Civil Code: Book I is Persons; Book II is Property, Ownership, and its
Modifications; Book III is Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership;
and Book IV is Obligations and Contracts. In the same year, the Civil
Code was extended to the Philippines by royal decree.47

w. Philosophy of Innovations in
the Present Civil Code

Cast in the mold of the Code Napoleon, 53%of our present Civil
Code provisions were textually lifted from the Spanish Civil Code of
1889, the philosophical elements and antecedents of which had been
discussed above. The main philosophical strand of our civil law is the
Romano-Germanic element, to which were added the concepts and
principles of equity in England and of torts in America.

But even the innovations of the Code Commission reflect the

strains of the jus civile and of the scholastic philosophy. Like the
Corpus juris civilis, our Civil Code enacted the morals of the Catholic
religion into law, and perpetuated the institutions of Catholicism. Thus,
the over-riding philosophy of our Code is that of natural law.

The framers of our Code looked at law as a collection of rules

derived into a system, and classified it according to subject matter so as
to be easily remembered and readily applied. This can be seen from the
Report of the Code Commission, explaining the rationale for new
provisions on morality, which declared for natural law:

... in the last malysis, every good law draws its breath of life
from morals, from those principles which a'e written with words of
file in the conscience of man. If this premise is admitted, then the
proposed rule is a prudent eU'Dest of justice in the face of the
impossibility of enumerating, one by one. all the wrongs which
cause damage. When it is reflected that while codes of law and
statutes have changed from age to age, the conscience of man has
remained fixed to its ancient moorings, one cannot but feel that it
is safe and salulU'y to transmute. as fa' as may be, moral norms
into legal rules, thus imparting to every legal system that enduring
quality which ought to be one of its superlative attributes.48

This is a restatement of the Aquinian concept of natural law,

from which men derive the knowledge of good and evil. This natural
law is the participation of mankind in lex eterna derived from the
divine reason, and much higher than positive law. Positive law,

47
RIvERA, THE FATHER OF nm FIRsT BROWN RACE CIVIL CODE 6-7 (1978).
4B
REPoRT OF nm CODE COMMISSION 40.
according to St. Thomas, must follow the dictates of natural law; it
should be founded upon justice, should be in harmony with morality;
concordant with the natural order; adapted to what is feasible; and
considerate of local customs and traditions.49

This explains the moral orientation of our Civil Code,

illustrated by Art. 21 on violation of morals, Art. 22 on unjust enrichment,
Arts. 1423, 1424, 1428, and 1429 on natural obligations. Our articles on
natural obligations remind us of the jurists of the 17th and 18th centuries
who made no distinction between natural and civil obligations, since
according to them, all natural obligations must be also legal for the very
reason that they are natural. On the other hand, Art. 19 on right
conduct, i.e., every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, give everyone his due, and observe honesty
and good faith, is a reflection of one of the moral precepts of the
Institutes of Justinian: "The precepts of the law are: To live honestly,
to hurt no one, to give everyone his due." These are our legal rules that
embody eternal truths.

The philosophy of individualism that characterizes the

innovations in our Civil Code is not that of the old Roman law; it is the
individualism of American common law, from which some of the new
provisions were borrowed. These are the provisions on (1) independent
civil actions, similar to the American law on torts, and (2) actions for
damages for violation of the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights, or
for violation of privacy. Thus, we have Art. 32 on damages for violation
of constitutional rights, Art. 33 on damages arising from defamation,
fraud, and physical injuries, Art. 26 for violation of privacy, Art. 29 on
civil actions independent of criminal actions, Art. 27 on refusal to
perform official duty, and Art. 3S on refusal or failure to institute
criminal proceedings. Explaining the philosophy behind these
innovations, the then Chairman of the Code Commission, Dean Jorge
Bocobo, underscored the need for individualism in the Filipino
character:

The thought of the Code Commission is that democracy draws

its breath of life from the spirit of rugged individualism, IJld should
not derive its effectiveness from the action of public officials. The
philosophy of the Anglo-American torts is that private wrongs
should be redressed in a private civil action. When this principle
shall have seeped into the generat consciousness of our people,
there will arise IJld develop a spirit of individual ~ on
which, when all is said IJld done, popular government rests.So

49
BEROUJIEIMER, supra note 9, at 98-99.
sOBocobo, in RIvERA,supra note 47, at 191.
 Even the new Family Code in some parts is a throwback to the
Middle Ages. It adopted the medieval attitude on marriage as a
contract between families, instead of one between individuals. Thus,
under the Family Code, parental consent is required for couples between
the ages of 18 and below 21, and parental advice for those who are
between 21 and 25. The new Code likewise requires, as a prerequisite for
the issuance of a marriage license, a certificate from a priest, minister,
or an accredited marriage counsellor that a party who is at least 18 but
below 25 has undeFgone marriage counselling. These provisions are
reminiscent of the Christian theory of marriage under Justinian in the
6th century which reqUired a formal negotiated property settlement
between the two families as the minimum requisite for marriage.
Marriage was considered a family affair, and it still is.

The role of individual consent in marriage is still virtually

subordinated to social values. While the Family Code now defines
marriage as a "special contract", it retains the provision of the Civil
Code that it is "an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation". Again, this is a vestige of the medieval outlook on
marriage, which was primarily to assure the wealth and continuity of
families. It was a matter of concern for the whole community and the
families involved, hence the Church later prohibited divorce. In the
medieval period, marriage was looked upon, not as the fruit of love and
courtship between two individuals, but as a strategy for a family to
obtain military, financial or property alliance with another family.
Thus, the prospective wife's family would bargain for fealty and
financial support from the husband's family in exchange for higher
social standing offered by the socially superior daughter. It was in this
sense that marriage was anti-individualistic in philosophy, and it
became a social institution at the level of the extended family system
and the feudal bond. Negotiations for marriage were conducted not only
among the family generally but also with the family's lords, retainers,
and counselors.51 Our Civil Code provision that the wife shall manage
the household is actually a vestige of the medieval custom making the
wife or lady of the manor in charge of all feminine matters in the
household.52

The participation of priests in our marriage rituals dates back to

the eleventh century, when the Gregorian Reformists realized that
clerical supervision of marriage was an opportunity for the Church to
increase its power over the feudal lords. After this, the Church gained
exclusive jurisdiction over all issues pertaining to marriage and divorce.
By the end of the 12th century, the Church developed a comprehensive
canon law of marriage, which became our secular theory of marriage as
well.53 One of the provisions of canon law, on annulment of marriage
based on psychological incapacity of one of the parties, became Art. 36
of our Family Code. The requirements for validity of marriage are
imported from Spain which, in turn, copied these from canon law.
Prohibition of absolute divorce is dictated by Church edicts, not to
mention the invalidity of agreements for personal separation of husband
and wife, or for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains or
absolute community of property, or for annulment of marriage.
Fortunately, in other areas like marital relations, emancipation of
married women, and property relations between husband and wife, the
Family Code made some advances over the present Civil Code.

In property law and succession, the present Code is cast in

economic individualism. The sovereignty of the property owner and the
property rights of the family are still the basic tenets of our law on
property. Succession is centered on conservation of property in the
family, and the share of the forced heirs have been amply protected by
the Code. Indeed, the provisions of the present Code on property
ownership go against the grain of the stewardship of property principle
in the Constitution. It hardly mentions the social functions of property,
except for provisions on easements and servitudes. Its provisions on
ownership all point to possessive individualism. The rights to possess,
use, manage, and receive income; the powers to transfer, convey, exclude,
and waive; the privilege to consume, alienate, or destroy; and the
liability for execution of a court judgment - these are all the traditional
incidents of property ownership protected and preserved by the present
Code. All of these are founded on natural law theories derived from the
old Roman law and handed down to us by the scholastics.

The transferability of property and property rights is also well-

recognized in the Civil Code. Gratuitous transfers through gifts,
bequests, and succession, as well as transfers for value are protected-for
the owner and his family. The power of bequest has been limited by the
Code in favor of consolidation of property in the family, while intestate
succession achieves the same purpose. The principles of transfers for
value have been imported from American law, but the principles hew to
the· basic philosophy of absolute liberty of the contracting parties, and
their corresponding responsibility in case of breach of contract.
 The Civil Code provisions on contracts and obligations are also
grounded on the natural law philosophy. According to Dean Pound, "the
idea of deduction from the nature of man as a moral creature and of legal
rules and legal institutions was put to work upon existing materials and
the result was a reciprocal influence of the conception of enforcing
promises as such because morally binding" .54 It was only later in the
19th century, with the creation of more wealth and property, that man
became more interested in freedom to contract than about enforcement of
promises. " The important institution was a right of free exchange and
free contract, deduced from the law of equal freedom as a sort of freedom
of economic motion and locomotion," continues Pound, so that jurists
"saw freedom as a civil or political idea realizing itself in a progress
from status to contract in which men's duties and liabilities came more
and more to flow from willed action instead of from the accident of
social position recognized by law" .55 It was at this point that the
drafters of our Civil Code borrowed from the Spanish Civil Code of 1889
the Roman and the scholastic philosophy of the law of contracts,
bonded it with Anglo-American elements of individualism, and
produced a hybrid which is recognizable in natural law.

Our Romanized will theory of contract gave birth to our theory

of obligations. It is based on the premise that agreements legally formed
take the place of the law, and, according to Planiol, the obligatory
force of a contract rested on "a moral idea, the respect for the given
word, and economic interest, the necessity of credit." While equity
principles have crept into our law on obligations and contracts, its basic
core still harks back to the metaphysical theory of the 19th century
that individual will is the high point in the philosophy of law.

54
POUND, supra note 2, at 143.
5S
Id., at 149-150.