Where Were

Those Argentine
Subs?
By Robert L. Scheina

••••••

The maze offathom lines didn't lead the war would be appointed Commander of South Atlantic
Rritish to the Argentine Navy's eight-year-old Theater Operations. Both "Guppys" suffered from the
effects of old age. The Santiago del Estero(ex-USS Chivo
conventional submarine which operated for [SS-3411) had been decommissioned in September 1981.
almost six weeks against the ASW-oriented She was stationed at the submarine base at Mar del Plata
Royal Navy. Much of the story of the Argen- and was being used for static training. The operational
tine submarine war in the South Atlantic has capabilities of the Santa Fe (ex-USS Caffish [SS-339])
were considerably reduced. In particular, the sensors were
been hearsay until now. unreliable, and the batteries could take only a limited
charge. Argentine efforts to keep these boats operational
umors persist concerning Argentine submarine had been severely hampered by the U. S. arms embargo,

R operations during the Malvinas War. What follows which had been in effect since 1976.
is based primarily on interviews with Argentine The strength of the Argentine submarine force was its
submariners who fought in the war and who spoke freely two "Type-209" submarines. The Salta was undergoing
and without notes—or a senior officer looking over their major yard work, and she was scheduled to undergo trials
Shoulders. A few dates used here are approximated and in mid-April in Golfo Nuevo. The work may have been
stated as such. rushed, possibly because of the events in the Georgias,
These interviews underscore some political truths con- and on 2 April, the Salta sailed from Mar del Plata to
eriling Argentine naval operations in the South Atlantic Golfo Nuevo for evaluation operations. The Salta made
war. First, the submarine command—like the marine excessive noise on her trials, which rendered her unfit for
e°rPs and naval aviation—was not ordered to prepare for combat operations. The Salta could not be made ready
the recapture of the Malvinas until well into 1982. In fact, before the end of the conflict. The San Luis, the second
the Argentine submarine force was in a state of transition. "Type-209," was technically fully operational, but her
,
tt was preparing for the arrival of new boats being built in crew had only recently been assembled.
West Germany, and many of its experienced personnel
Were in Europe. The first new boat was scheduled to be- The Santa Fe, the only submarine to be used in the
come operational early in 1984. Second, Argentine forces recapture of the Malvinas, departed Mar del Plata on 26
Were ordered to avoid inflicting casualties in the recapture March under orders to put a small group of commandos
of the islands. Only one submarine took part in the recap- ashore off Cape Pembroke Lighthouse at the entrance of
lire of the Malvinas, and she did not have permission to Port Stanley. The lighthouse had been equipped as a look-
Ilse her torpedoes. out post with a direct telephone line to police headquar-
When Argentine naval commands were told to prepare ters. The commandos were to capture the position without
or the recapture of the Malvinas, the Commander of the inflicting casualties, if possible. The Santa Fe did not
ubrnarine Force controlled four boats, two old U. S. have permission to attack any shipping, and she was or-
„Guppy" units and two modern, German-designed dered to break contact with any ships that made contact
, Type-209s." The commander was directly responsible with her. She was ordered to remain undetected. The
`o the Commander of Naval Operations, who during the Santa Fe initially traveled on the surface; but as she neared

Pr
oceedings / March 1984 115
the islands, she submerged to snorkel depth. The boat ar- British surface ships and submarines. Two approaches to
rived off the Malvinas on 29 March and monitored British the Georgias appeared possible. The first was to run
activity. During that night, the Santa Fe detected a ship straight in and reduce the time in transit. The second was
leaving Port Stanley on a northern course. Based on her to circle the islands to the north and approach Grytviken
sound signature, those on board the submarine believed from the south. This route greatly increased the transit
this to be HMS Endurance. However, they were wrong. time but possibly reduced detection. Following consulta-
The Endurance had sailed on 21 March for South Georgia. tion on board, the direct route was chosen. The approach
The Argentines may have detected a survey ship, which was made submerged—part of the time using the snorkel
carried 40 Royal Marines for the routine relief of the de- in order to conserve the battery. As the submarine passed
tachment on the Malvinas. east of the islands, she reached waters that were more
During the evening of 31 March, the Santa Fe received protected from the heavy seas. At about this time, the
a radio message stating that the element of surprise had Santa Fe detected the transmission of a high-frequeneY
been lost and that the lighthouse was now fortified. The sonar, about ten or 12 kilocycles. The decision was made
commandos were now ordered to land more to the north to continue the mission. At about 2200 on 24 April, the
and secure the beach for amphibious vehicles. The sub- Santa Fe surfaced in front of Cumberland Bay. The night
merged submarine moved to within 200 meters of the was dark, cloud covered, and without a moon. The sub-
beach and surfaced at 0200 on 2 April; the commandos marine entered Cumberland Bay on the surface. In front of
paddled ashore in three Zodiac boats. They carried out Grytviken, very high-frequency communications were es-
their task without incident. The Santa Fe submerged and tablished. Launches from Grytviken transported the ma-
proceeded to a position to the east of Port Stanley. Follow- rines and supplies to the island. The transfer began at
ing the recapture of the islands by Argentine forces, the about 0230 or 0300 and took about two hours to complete.
submarine patrolled the area for five days before being The Santa Fe departed Grytviken sailing along the
ordered to return to Mar del Plata on about 8 April. shoreline of Cumberland Bay in order to be less visible
The Santa Fe was ordered to prepare for a 60-day pa- and looking for a favorable location to submerge. As she
trol. Fuel,food, and torpedoes—U. S. Mk-14s and Mk-37 was departing, the Santa Fe was attacked by a helicopter
Mod. 3s—were loaded. The Mk-14 is an antisurface tor- coming from the land side. The helicopter fired missiles or
pedo with a maximum range of 9,000 yards, although its rockets, and at least two hit the submarine. A second heli-
optimum range is between 1,500 and 3,000 yards. The copter joined in the attack. Rifles in the submarine's ar-
torpedo entered service in 1938 and has a top speed of mory—the only weapons on board except torpedoes--
approximately 46 knots. The Mk-37 Mod. 3 is an antisub- were passed up to the bridge and used against the helicop-
marine torpedo which entered service around 1960. Since ters. A third helicopter teamed up with the other two, are
it does not run in a straight line, the maximum range is the Santa Fe was damaged further. At least one torpedo
dependent upon the movement of the target. Given the was dropped by a helicopter believed by the Argentines to
ages of Santa Fe's fire control system and sensors, the be from HMS Endurance. However, this caused Ito
Mk-37 could not be used effectively beyond 2,000 yards damage and may have failed because of the very shallow
or possibly a shorter distance, depending upon such condi- water. The Santa Fe, now in a sinking condition, returned
tions as water temperature. The Santa Fe was not capable to Grytviken where she was abandoned and later captured
of firing the newer wire-guided torpedoes. by British forces.
The Santa Fe's immediate task was to transport 20 men During the attack, Petty Officer Alberto Macias, the
to the Georgias. Eleven of these individuals were techni- mess steward, was passing up rifles and ammunition frorn
cians needed to restore services on the islands, and nine inside the sub's sail when a rocket amputated his foot.
were marines. The Argentine Marines who captured the Without anyone's help, he climbed down the ladder, sat in
islands on 3 April had only small arms. These marine the control room, and told his shipmates, "I know what
reinforcements were personnel trained in antitank weap- has happened, never mind, go on fighting, just send Me
onry. The submarine also carried communications equip- the medic." He was later decorated for valor. Some days
ment and Bantam antitank missiles. The passengers em- later, when the crew members were already prisoners of
barked during the night at Mar del Plata, and the Santa Fe the British, Chief Petty Officer Felix Artuso was killed bY
departed. The submarine headed for the principal island, a sentry in an episode described by the British as an "un-
San Pedro (South Georgia), and initially ran on the sur- fortunate incident." These were the only casualties suf-
face. Shortly after departing, the Santa Fe encountered a fered by the Argentine submarine force during the war:
winter storm typical in these waters with winds between Had the Santa Fe escaped the attack in Cumberlano
40 and 50 knots from the south-southwest. On 21 April, Bay, it seems likely that she would have been used against
the submarine submerged and continued her approach, ei- the British supply lines between Ascension and the GNP.
ther completely submerged or snorkeling. However, the gias. Argentine naval intelligence had predicted the
intensity of the storm increased, and the Santa Fe could should negotiations fail, the British would first move
not snorkel because of the height and force of the waves; against the Georgias and that this would happen in late
so the submarine continued her transit on the surface. April. The Santa Fe and her torpedoes were obsolete and
On 23 April, when within 100 nautical miles of San would have been at a real disadvantage against a British,
Pedro Island, the Santa Fe received a message from Mar carrier task force. However, the Santa Fe would have he'
del Plata stating that she could expect opposition from a better chance of success against the unescorted British

116 Proceedings / March 1984

 The Santa Fe participated in the recapture of the Malvinas,
but later was caught on the surface off South Georgia and
disabled. Here she is being towed out to sea by the British
tug Salvageman, escorted by the Yorkshireman, where the
ex-U. S. sub was scuttled.

solely on the San Luis. This boat, like her sister Salta, had
been built in Germany and assembled in Argentina in the
mid-1970s. The following is an interview with her com-
manding officer, Commander Fernando Maria Azcueta,
conducted on 20 September 1983.

Author: What is the size of the San Luis's crew?

Azcueta: There are 28 men and seven officers.
Author: What is the operational time limit of the
"209s"?
Azcueta: In general, approximately 60 days.
Author: What type of torpedoes were used on the
"209s" during the war?
Azcueta: Fundamentally, the primary torpedo is the
SST-4 of AEG-Telefunken, and the antisubmarine tor-
pedo is the U. S. Mk-37 Mod. 3.
Author: Did you have both types of torpedoes on
board during your war patrol?
Azcueta: Yes, because the SST-4 has only an antisur-
face capability. It does not have an antisubmarine ca-
pacity.
Author: What date did you depart on your patrol dur-
ing the Malvinas War?
Azcueta: We sailed from Mar del Plata at the begin-
ning of April—the second week.
Author: Did you return to port, or was your patrol
continuous?
,TRY OF DEFENCE (COURTESY OF WORLD SHIP
SOCIE
, )
Azcueta: Continuous.
LIPPly lines, and at a minimum, likely would have com- Author: Can a "Type-209" remain submerged during
Plicated British naval operations and plans. an entire patrol?
The sinking of the Santa Fe by British forces escalated Azcueta: Yes, normally.
the crisis, perhaps to the point of no return. Those who Author: Did you surface at all during the patrol?
speculate that the sinking of the Argentine cruiser General Azcueta: On one occasion we had to surface to make a
8e1grano on 2 May ruined any possibility of peace are repair.
Wrong. That the Argentine carrier group with its A-4 air- Author: What were your orders?
craft, as well as the Super Etendards flying from shore Azcueta: The orders were classical for a submarine: to
oases, attempted an attack on 1 May and that the subma- act offensively, attacking enemy naval units. But at the
rine San Luis also attacked a British task force on that day time we sailed we had restrictions because of the politi-
support the belief that the early morning British bombing cal nature of the crisis.
cif Puerto Argentino (Port Stanley) on 1 May or possibly Author: You were in constant touch with Mar del
the sinking of the Santa Fe on 26 April had ended the Plata?
Possibility of a diplomatic settlement. Azcueta: Yes, we had no trouble with communications.
By late April, the Argentines believed that Great Britain Naturally, I did not transmit; however, I could receive.
;1vas receiving satellite intelligence from the United States. During the conflict, I broke radio silence three times.
In an attempt to keep the British guessing, the Santiago Author: How many attacks did you make against the
;del Estero, the "Guppy" being used as a static training British—and on what dates? What tactics did you use?
°oat, sailed to a hideout in Puerto Belgrano. She had to Azcueta: Your article ["The Malvinas Campaign"] in
travel on the surface since she could not submerge. The Proceedings [May 1983] is very accurate.
Argentines hoped that the British would learn of her ab- Author: I speculated that the San Luis was stationed to
sence from the submarine base and believe she was on the north of the islands in a free-fire zone. The subma-
Patrol. rine snorkeled primarily at night very close in near the
The hopes of the Argentine submarine force now rested islands. This operations area is about 800 nautical

l'roceedings / March 1984 117

ARMADA ARGENTINA

There are many stories about life in a submarine on war-

time patrol—and most of them are true. On board the San
Luis on patrol during the war, sailors steal a few minutes'
rest, and the CO, Fernando Maria Azcueta, prepares to
climb the conning tower the only time his sub surfaced in
the combat zone.

miles from the submarine base. Was this correct?

Azcueta: You are right.
Author: Your first attack, would you describe it? What
type of ship did you attack—large or small? Did you
use the periscope?
Azcueta: We did not have a periscope sighting [on 1
May] because the visibility was very poor. We used the
periscope but could not see the target. But we had very
good sonar contacts. The classification of the target
was incomplete, but we could determine that the targets
were medium-sized warships operating helicopters.
Author: What types of sonars were you listening to? ARMADA
Azcueta: British Types 2016 and 184. The targets were
medium size: perhaps "Type-42s" and possibly some one fire control computer. If the computer doesn't
"Type-21s" or "Type-22s." work, the only chance that we have is to calculate the
Author: What was the range? firing information manually. After firing, we had the
Azcueta: You were wrong in your article. The correct capacity to guide only one torpedo at a time in manual
range was about 10,000 yards. This is a good distance mode. After the torpedo is launched in manual mode,
for this type of torpedo. the torpedo is guided manually, and we had control of
Author: What type of torpedo did you fire? the torpedo. When the signal indicated that the wire
Azcueta: An SST-4. was cut, we lost all control.
Author: Is this wire guided? Author: Was there a counterattack by the British
Azcueta: Yes. forces?
Author: What went wrong? Did it leave the sub? Azcueta: Yes, there was an attack by helicopters. The
Azcueta: Yes, it left. However, we had two problems. ships, it was our impression, opened the distance from
First, the fire control computer was out of service. Sec- us, and the helicopters worked on us.
ond, we received the signal that the wire broke about Author: For how long?
three minutes after being fired. Azcueta: For 20 hours, the helos searched and attacked'
Author: How many torpedoes did you fire? Author: What weapons did they use?
Azcueta: One. Azcueta: They dropped many depth charges, but manY
Author: I have heard a rumor that the backup com- of these must have been for psychological effect be-
puter to the main fire control computer also failed. cause some were far away.
That when this backup computer was installed the Author: Were you attacked with torpedoes?
wires were reversed. Therefore, when the torpedo was Azcueta: They fired at least one. We heard one tor-
fired it would obey a signal 180° in error. pedo immediately after an emission from a helicopter's
Azcueta: No, that's not true. The submarine had only sonar at 10 KHz.

118 Proceedings / March 1984

 The Salta, the San Luis's sister, was not combat ready
during the war. Her problems—as well as the Argentine
Navy's problems with its torpedoes—have been corrected.
Her torpedo array (left), control room with fire control
computer, passive rangefinding sonar, and sonar spectrum
analyzer (below, left), and control room (below) are like
those of the San Luis'.

L SOIEINA

tion in front of and between the destroyers. With the

same computer limitation that existed during the first
attack but with very good firing information and a
close range, we attacked the target near the islands. We
knew the course and speed of the target, plus the dis-
tance. But we had problems with the torpedo. The tor-
pedo was fired, but the wire broke after two-and-one-
half minutes. After six minutes, we heard a small ex-
plosion from the bearing of the target; it sounded
Author: Was the torpedo launched by the helicopter? metallic, or it could have been a small training
Azcueta: Yes. charge. By the time we positioned the submarine to
Author: How deep was the water there? fire at the second target, it was too late. The high
Azcueta: Shallow—about 100-120 meters. speed of the target put it out of range.
Author: In general, the water north of the islands is Author: What was the distance to the target?
between 100 and 150 meters? Azcueta: The distance cited in your article was right,
Azcueta: It's not very regular. 5,000 yards.
Author: Was the counterattack very intense? Author: Did the British counterattack?
Azcueta: I cannot say, it was my first; I have nothing Azcueta: No.
to Compare it to. Author: Did you use the periscope?
Author: Did you receive any damage? Azcueta: No, it was at night and very dark. Actually,
Azeueta: No. it was about 1:30 a.m. on the 11th.
Author: You attacked another surface target. Can you Author: Was there another attack?
Provide details? Azcueta: There was another attack [on 8 May] against
Azeueta: The other attack against a surface target oc- a target that was very difficult to classify. The attack
curred on the 10th of May against two destroyers navi- was made with a Mk-37 torpedo. Obviously, the target
Pring in approximately a line abreast. They were leav- was not a surface ship.
ing the vicinity of the Strait of San Carlos. One of Author: How many torpedoes did you use?
them I suspect had sunk the Isla de Estados. That ship Azcueta: One.
Was coming northward out of the strait and the other Author: What happened?
s
.outhward from north of the islands. They joined up Azcueta: Twelve minutes after launching, we heard
ihilst north of the strait and headed in the direction of the explosion of the torpedo's warhead from the bear-
ruerto Argentino. The San Luis occupied a firing posi- ing of the target.

Proceedings / March 1984 119

Author: Could the torpedo have exploded against the been able to sink a few key naval units, the British would
coast or bottom? have been faced with a longer and increasingly more diffi-
Azcueta: It could have. cult task. But with only one modern submarine available,
Author: Where was this attack on the suspected sub? the odds were not very favorable for the Argentine subma-
Azcueta: More or less in the same area as the other rine force. The Argentine submariners must take pride in
two. the fact that the San Luis with a relatively inexperienced
Author: What time of day was it? crew attacked modern warships of a navy specializing in
Azcueta: About 7 p.m. antisubmarine warfare and evaded its counterattack. The
Author: How far was the target? fact that the San Luis was hurriedly being prepared for a
Azcueta: It was very near—about 3,000 yards. second patrol demonstrates that the Argentine submariners
Author: Could you determine if your target was a con- were frustrated but not defeated.
ventional or a nuclear submarine? Argentine submarine operations raise questions for
Azcueta: Well, it is very difficult to know because the many world navies. For Argentina, the question must now
classification is very difficult. It is much easier to clas- be how to improve efficiency. In a frank discussion, Ad-
sify surface targets than submarines. We didn't have miral Ruben Franco, then-Commander in Chief of the
enough experience against nuclear submarines. Argentine Navy, told the author that the Argentine NavY
Author: It wasn't moving at 28 or 30 knots? must create a wartime environment during training. This
Azcueta: No, not at all—it was traveling at six or will be very expensive; however, the admiral stated that
eight knots. But the target didn't have any cavitation the work has already begun. Firing one torpedo in practice
noise. costs $10,000 if one recovers it. Exploding a live torpecl°
Author: What does that mean? against a target costs hundreds of thousands of dollars. It
Azcueta: That the target was moving very slowly, but is rumored that an Argentine submarine fired a combat
had intelligent movement. We obtained all the targeting torpedo against an old ex-U.S. destroyer hulk in Novem-
information, including the distance from sonar and ber 1983.
passive telemetry. A question for medium-sized navies is: Can a small
Author: Is it hard to maintain high spirits on such a submarine force of four or less boats be adequately main-
patrol? tained to warrant its high cost? For the Argentines, it Is
Azcueta: Yes it is, but, naturally, it is the life of a clear that they have to gear the maintenance of their new
submariner. The most important thing is to control your submarines in such a way as to be unaffected by political
nerves. Our personnel performed very well. They embargoes of foreign supplies.
passed their first attack against an enemy in complete For the British, the question is: Did the British fleet
calmness. We did not have any discipline problems. effectively deal with the San Luis, or did the failure of the
They were always alert and anxious for action. It is Argentine torpedoes make the difference? Had the San
very important to be persistent, and I believe with but Luis successfully penetrated the British ASW defenses on
this brief combat exercise, our personnel learned they 1 May before firing? Were the surface ships attacked on
had what it takes. 10-11 May aware of their opponent? If so, why didn't theY
Author: What date did you return from the patrol? counterattack? Did the San Luis attack a British submarine
Azcueta: At the end of May. on 8 May. If so, did the British sub even detect the Argen-
Author: Why was the decision made to return to Mar tine submarine?
del Plata? Was it because of the torpedoes? For the United States, a question is: Does the U. S.
Azcueta: Naturally. The decision was not mine. After Navy need modern, conventional submarines? The next
each attack, I had radioed a report. I was ordered to torpedo to slam into a U. S. warship might well be fired bY
come back in. a conventional submarine belonging to a Libya or a North
Author: Have the mechanical problems been solved? Korea. Admittedly, nuclear submarines are superior to
Azcueta: Yes they have, but not until after the fighting conventional ones; however, the conventional submarines
had ended. We did not have time to send the San Luis can have a few important tactical advantages. First, theY
on a second patrol. When Puerto Argentino fell on 14 are much quieter except when snorkeling. Also, they are
June, the San Luis was almost ready to sail on a sec- much smaller and thus hard to detect, which allows thein
ond patrol. All of our problems had been corrected. to go places where a nuclear-powered submarine would
not venture. Perhaps the United States needs modern con-
Thus, when Puerto Argentino fell to the British on 14 ventional submarines for training if for one other reason.
June, not one Argentine submarine was operating against Is the United States ready to deal with the conventional
the enemy. The San Luis was preparing for a second pa- submarine?
trol. The Salta's noise problems had not yet been solved.
The Santiago del Estero was inoperative at Puerto Bel-
grano, and the Santa Fe had been lost in the Georgias. Dr. ScheMa is currently writing Latin America and Sea Power: 1810"
The Argentine submariners must have both a feeling of 1985, to be published by the Naval Institute Press. In addition, he Wu;
ally prepares the Latin American regional roundup sections which apPea'
frustration and pride. They alone among the naval forces in the International Navies Special Issues of the Proceedings. He re.
might have been able to turn the British fleet from its ceived his doctorate in Latin American history in 1976 from Catholic
attack on the Malvinas. Had the Argentine submariners University in Washington, D.C.

120 Proceedings / March PO