Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

EN BANC

G.R. No. 180016 April 29, 2014

LITO CORPUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, dated November 5, 2007, of petitioner Lito Corpuz (petitioner), seeking to reverse
and set aside the Decision1 dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution2 dated September 5,
2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed with modification the Decision3
dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, San Fernando City,
finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article
315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code.

The antecedent facts follow.

Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the Admiral Royale Casino in
Olongapo City sometime in 1990. Private complainant was then engaged in the business
of lending money to casino players and, upon hearing that the former had some pieces of
jewelry for sale, petitioner approached him on May 2, 1991 at the same casino and
offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry on commission basis. Private complainant
agreed, and as a consequence, he turned over to petitioner the following items: an 18k
diamond ring for men; a woman's bracelet; one (1) men's necklace and another men's
bracelet, with an aggregate value of ₱98,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt of even date.
They both agreed that petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to
return the same items, within a period of 60 days. The period expired without petitioner
remitting the proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces of jewelry. When private
complainant was able to meet petitioner, the latter promised the former that he will pay
the value of the said items entrusted to him, but to no avail.

Thus, an Information was filed against petitioner for the crime of estafa, which reads as
follows:

That on or about the fifth (5th) day of July 1991, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, after
having received from one Danilo Tangcoy, one (1) men's diamond ring, 18k, worth
₱45,000.00; one (1) three-baht men's bracelet, 22k, worth ₱25,000.00; one (1) two-baht
ladies' bracelet, 22k, worth ₱12,000.00, or in the total amount of Ninety-Eight Thousand
Pesos (₱98,000.00), Philippine currency, under expressed obligation on the part of said
accused to remit the proceeds of the sale of the said items or to return the same, if not
sold, said accused, once in possession of the said items, with intent to defraud, and with
unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, and far from complying with his aforestated
obligation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate,
misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit the aforesaid jewelries (sic) or
the proceeds of the sale thereof, and despite repeated demands, the accused failed and
refused to return the said items or to remit the amount of Ninety- Eight Thousand Pesos
(₱98,000.00), Philippine currency, to the damage and prejudice of said Danilo Tangcoy in
the aforementioned amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

On January 28, 1992, petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, entered a plea of not
guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution, to prove the above-stated facts, presented the lone testimony of Danilo
Tangcoy. On the other hand, the defense presented the lone testimony of petitioner, which
can be summarized, as follows:

Petitioner and private complainant were collecting agents of Antonio Balajadia, who is
engaged in the financing business of extending loans to Base employees. For every
collection made, they earn a commission. Petitioner denied having transacted any
business with private complainant.

However, he admitted obtaining a loan from Balajadia sometime in 1989 for which he
was made to sign a blank receipt. He claimed that the same receipt was then dated May 2,
1991 and used as evidence against him for the supposed agreement to sell the subject
pieces of jewelry, which he did not even see.

After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged
in the Information. The dispositive portion of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, finding accused LITO CORPUZ GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of

the felony of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph one (1), subparagraph (b) of the
Revised Penal Code;

there being no offsetting generic aggravating nor ordinary mitigating circumstance/s to

vary the penalty imposable;

accordingly, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of deprivation of liberty
consisting of an imprisonment under the Indeterminate Sentence Law of FOUR (4)
YEARS AND TWO (2) MONTHS of Prision Correccional in its medium period AS
MINIMUM, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS AND EIGHT (8) MONTHS of Reclusion
Temporal in its minimum period AS MAXIMUM; to indemnify private complainant
Danilo Tangcoy the amount of ₱98,000.00 as actual damages, and to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

The case was elevated to the CA, however, the latter denied the appeal of petitioner and
affirmed the decision of the RTC, thus:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Judgment dated July 30,
2004 of the RTC of San Fernando City (P), Branch 46, is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION on the imposable prison term, such that accused-appellant shall suffer
the indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as minimum,
to 8 years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus 1 year for each additional ₱10,000.00, or a
total of 7 years. The rest of the decision stands.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner, after the CA denied his motion for reconsideration, filed with this Court the
present petition stating the following grounds:

A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONFIRMING THE

ADMISSION AND APPRECIATION BY THE LOWER COURT OF PROSECUTION
EVIDENCE, INCLUDING ITS EXHIBITS, WHICH ARE MERE MACHINE COPIES,
AS THIS VIOLATES THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE;

B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER

COURT'S FINDING THAT THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION FOR ESTAFA WAS
NOT FATALLY DEFECTIVE ALTHOUGH THE SAME DID NOT CHARGE THE
OFFENSE UNDER ARTICLE 315 (1) (B) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE IN THAT
-

1. THE INFORMATION DID NOT FIX A PERIOD WITHIN WHICH THE

SUBJECT [PIECES OF] JEWELRY SHOULD BE RETURNED, IF UNSOLD, OR
THE MONEY TO BE REMITTED, IF SOLD;

2. THE DATE OF THE OCCURRENCE OF THE CRIME ALLEGED IN THE

INFORMATION AS OF 05 JULY 1991 WAS MATERIALLY DIFFERENT FROM
THE ONE TESTIFIED TO BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT WHICH WAS 02
MAY 1991;

C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER

COURT'S FINDING THAT DEMAND TO RETURN THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF]
JEWELRY, IF UNSOLD, OR REMIT THE PROCEEDS, IF SOLD – AN ELEMENT OF
THE OFFENSE – WAS PROVED;

D. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER

COURT'S FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION'S CASE WAS PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT ALTHOUGH -

1. THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TESTIFIED ON TWO (2) VERSIONS OF

THE INCIDENT;

2. THE VERSION OF THE PETITIONER – ACCUSED IS MORE

STRAIGHTFORWARD AND LOGICAL, CONSISTENT WITH HUMAN
EXPERIENCE;

3. THE EQUIPOISE RULE WAS NOT APPRECIATED IN AND APPLIED TO

THIS CASE;

4. PENAL STATUTES ARE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST THE STATE.

In its Comment dated May 5, 2008, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) stated the
following counter-arguments:

The exhibits were properly admitted inasmuch as petitioner failed to object to their
admissibility.

The information was not defective inasmuch as it sufficiently established the designation
of the offense and the acts complained of.

The prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of the crime charged.

This Court finds the present petition devoid of any merit.

The factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive, and carry even more
weight when said court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the
findings are totally devoid of support in the records, or that they are so glaringly
erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.4 Petitioner is of the opinion that the
CA erred in affirming the factual findings of the trial court. He now comes to this Court
raising both procedural and substantive issues.

According to petitioner, the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the trial court, admitting
in evidence a receipt dated May 2, 1991 marked as Exhibit "A" and its submarkings,
although the same was merely a photocopy, thus, violating the best evidence rule.
However, the records show that petitioner never objected to the admissibility of the said
evidence at the time it was identified, marked and testified upon in court by private
complainant. The CA also correctly pointed out that petitioner also failed to raise an
objection in his Comment to the prosecution's formal offer of evidence and even admitted
having signed the said receipt. The established doctrine is that when a party failed to
interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such
objection shall be considered as waived.5
Another procedural issue raised is, as claimed by petitioner, the formally defective
Information filed against him. He contends that the Information does not contain the
period when the pieces of jewelry were supposed to be returned and that the date when
the crime occurred was different from the one testified to by private complainant. This
argument is untenable. The CA did not err in finding that the Information was
substantially complete and in reiterating that objections as to the matters of form and
substance in the Information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. It is true that the
gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the
RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of
the owner6 and that the time of occurrence is not a material ingredient of the crime,
hence, the exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the crime, as
reflected in the Information, do not make the latter fatally defective. The CA ruled:

x x x An information is legally viable as long as it distinctly states the statutory

designation of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. Then Section 6,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that a complaint or information is sufficient if it
states the name of the accused;

the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the
commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. In the case
at bar, a reading of the subject Information shows compliance with the foregoing rule.
That the time of the commission of the offense was stated as " on or about the fifth (5th)
day of July, 1991" is not likewise fatal to the prosecution's cause considering that Section
11 of the same Rule requires a statement of the precise time only when the same is a
material ingredient of the offense. The gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is the appropriation or conversion of
money or property received to the prejudice of the offender. Thus, aside from the fact that
the date of the commission thereof is not an essential element of the crime herein
charged, the failure of the prosecution to specify the exact date does not render the
Information ipso facto defective. Moreover, the said date is also near the due date within
which accused-appellant should have delivered the proceeds or returned the said [pieces
of jewelry] as testified upon by Tangkoy, hence, there was sufficient compliance with the
rules. Accused-appellant, therefore, cannot now be allowed to claim that he was not
properly apprised of the charges proferred against him.7

It must be remembered that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Estafa under Article
315, paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC, which reads:

ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
means mentioned hereinbelow.

1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:

xxxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any
other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to
return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond;
or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property; x x x

The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that money, goods or
other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to
return the same; (b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or
property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; (c) that such
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) that there
is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.8

Petitioner argues that the last element, which is, that there is a demand by the offended
party on the offender, was not proved. This Court disagrees. In his testimony, private
complainant narrated how he was able to locate petitioner after almost two (2) months
from the time he gave the pieces of jewelry and asked petitioner about the same items
with the latter promising to pay them. Thus:

PROS. MARTINEZ

q Now, Mr. Witness, this was executed on 2 May 1991, and this transaction could have
been finished on 5 July 1991, the question is what happens (sic) when the deadline came?

a I went looking for him, sir.

q For whom?

a Lito Corpuz, sir.

q Were you able to look (sic) for him?

a I looked for him for a week, sir.

q Did you know his residence?

a Yes, sir.

q Did you go there?

a Yes, sir.

q Did you find him?

a No, sir.
q Were you able to talk to him since 5 July 1991?

a I talked to him, sir.

q How many times?

a Two times, sir.

q What did you talk (sic) to him?

a About the items I gave to (sic) him, sir.

q Referring to Exhibit A-2?

a Yes, sir, and according to him he will take his obligation and I asked him where the
items are and he promised me that he will pay these amount, sir.

q Up to this time that you were here, were you able to collect from him partially or full?

a No, sir.9

No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand.10 Demand need not
even be formal; it may be verbal.11 The specific word "demand" need not even be used to
show that it has indeed been made upon the person charged, since even a mere query as to
the whereabouts of the money [in this case, property], would be tantamount to a
demand.12 As expounded in Asejo v. People:13

With regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with the CA that demand under this
kind of estafa need not be formal or written. The appellate court observed that the law is
silent with regard to the form of demand in estafa under Art. 315 1(b), thus:

When the law does not qualify, We should not qualify. Should a written demand be
necessary, the law would have stated so. Otherwise, the word "demand" should be
interpreted in its general meaning as to include both written and oral demand. Thus, the
failure of the prosecution to present a written demand as evidence is not fatal.

In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about the money
entrusted to the accused, we held that the query was tantamount to a demand, thus:

x x x [T]he law does not require a demand as a condition precedent to the existence of the
crime of embezzlement. It so happens only that failure to account, upon demand for funds
or property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. The same way,
however, be established by other proof, such as that introduced in the case at bar.14

In view of the foregoing and based on the records, the prosecution was able to prove the
existence of all the elements of the crime. Private complainant gave petitioner the pieces
of jewelry in trust, or on commission basis, as shown in the receipt dated May 2, 1991
with an obligation to sell or return the same within sixty (60) days, if unsold. There was
misappropriation when petitioner failed to remit the proceeds of those pieces of jewelry
sold, or if no sale took place, failed to return the same pieces of jewelry within or after
the agreed period despite demand from the private complainant, to the prejudice of the
latter.

Anent the credibility of the prosecution's sole witness, which is questioned by petitioner,
the same is unmeritorious. Settled is the rule that in assessing the credibility of witnesses,
this Court gives great respect to the evaluation of the trial court for it had the unique
opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and their deportment on the witness
stand, an opportunity denied the appellate courts, which merely rely on the records of the
case.15 The assessment by the trial court is even conclusive and binding if not tainted
with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence,
especially when such finding is affirmed by the CA.16 Truth is established not by the
number of witnesses, but by the quality of their testimonies, for in determining the value
and credibility of evidence, the witnesses are to be weighed not numbered.17

As regards the penalty, while this Court's Third Division was deliberating on this case,
the question of the continued validity of imposing on persons convicted of crimes
involving property came up. The legislature apparently pegged these penalties to the
value of the money and property in 1930 when it enacted the Revised Penal Code. Since
the members of the division reached no unanimity on this question and since the issues
are of first impression, they decided to refer the case to the Court en banc for
consideration and resolution. Thus, several amici curiae were invited at the behest of the
Court to give their academic opinions on the matter. Among those that graciously
complied were Dean Jose Manuel Diokno, Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria, Professor
Alfredo F. Tadiar, the Senate President, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
The parties were later heard on oral arguments before the Court en banc, with Atty. Mario
L. Bautista appearing as counsel de oficio of the petitioner.

After a thorough consideration of the arguments presented on the matter, this Court finds
the following:

There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties that the
courts continue to impose on crimes against property committed today, based on the
amount of damage measured by the value of money eighty years ago in 1932. However,
this Court cannot modify the said range of penalties because that would constitute judicial
legislation. What the legislature's perceived failure in amending the penalties provided for
in the said crimes cannot be remedied through this Court's decisions, as that would be
encroaching upon the power of another branch of the government. This, however, does
not render the whole situation without any remedy. It can be appropriately presumed that
the framers of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) had anticipated this matter by including
Article 5, which reads:

ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which
are not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. - Whenever a court has
knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable
by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive,
through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said
act should be made the subject of penal legislation.

In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of
Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of
the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the
imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice
and the injury caused by the offense.18

The first paragraph of the above provision clearly states that for acts bourne out of a case
which is not punishable by law and the court finds it proper to repress, the remedy is to
render the proper decision and thereafter, report to the Chief Executive, through the
Department of Justice, the reasons why the same act should be the subject of penal
legislation. The premise here is that a deplorable act is present but is not the subject of
any penal legislation, thus, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive of the need
to make that act punishable by law through legislation. The second paragraph is similar to
the first except for the situation wherein the act is already punishable by law but the
corresponding penalty is deemed by the court as excessive. The remedy therefore, as in
the first paragraph is not to suspend the execution of the sentence but to submit to the
Chief Executive the reasons why the court considers the said penalty to be non-
commensurate with the act committed. Again, the court is tasked to inform the Chief
Executive, this time, of the need for a legislation to provide the proper penalty.

In his book, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code,19 Guillermo B. Guevara opined
that in Article 5, the duty of the court is merely to report to the Chief Executive, with a
recommendation for an amendment or modification of the legal provisions which it
believes to be harsh. Thus:

This provision is based under the legal maxim "nullum crimen, nulla poena sige lege,"
that is, that there can exist no punishable act except those previously and specifically
provided for by penal statute.

No matter how reprehensible an act is, if the law-making body does not deem it necessary
to prohibit its perpetration with penal sanction, the Court of justice will be entirely
powerless to punish such act.

Under the provisions of this article the Court cannot suspend the execution of a sentence
on the ground that the strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would cause
excessive or harsh penalty. All that the Court could do in such eventuality is to report the
matter to the Chief Executive with a recommendation for an amendment or modification
of the legal provisions which it believes to be harsh.20

Anent the non-suspension of the execution of the sentence, retired Chief Justice Ramon
C. Aquino and retired Associate Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino, in their book, The
Revised Penal Code,21 echoed the above-cited commentary, thus:

The second paragraph of Art. 5 is an application of the humanitarian principle that justice
must be tempered with mercy. Generally, the courts have nothing to do with the wisdom
or justness of the penalties fixed by law. "Whether or not the penalties prescribed by law
upon conviction of violations of particular statutes are too severe or are not severe
enough, are questions as to which commentators on the law may fairly differ; but it is the
duty of the courts to enforce the will of the legislator in all cases unless it clearly appears
that a given penalty falls within the prohibited class of excessive fines or cruel and
unusual punishment." A petition for clemency should be addressed to the Chief
Executive.22

There is an opinion that the penalties provided for in crimes against property be based on
the current inflation rate or at the ratio of ₱1.00 is equal to ₱100.00 . However, it would
be dangerous as this would result in uncertainties, as opposed to the definite imposition of
the penalties. It must be remembered that the economy fluctuates and if the proposed
imposition of the penalties in crimes against property be adopted, the penalties will not
cease to change, thus, making the RPC, a self-amending law. Had the framers of the RPC
intended that to be so, it should have provided the same, instead, it included the earlier
cited Article 5 as a remedy. It is also improper to presume why the present legislature has
not made any moves to amend the subject penalties in order to conform with the present
times. For all we know, the legislature intends to retain the same penalties in order to
deter the further commission of those punishable acts which have increased tremendously
through the years. In fact, in recent moves of the legislature, it is apparent that it aims to
broaden the coverage of those who violate penal laws. In the crime of Plunder, from its
original minimum amount of ₱100,000,000.00 plundered, the legislature lowered it to
₱50,000,000.00. In the same way, the legislature lowered the threshold amount upon
which the Anti-Money Laundering Act may apply, from ₱1,000,000.00 to ₱500,000.00.

It is also worth noting that in the crimes of Theft and Estafa, the present penalties do not
seem to be excessive compared to the proposed imposition of their corresponding
penalties. In Theft, the provisions state that:

Art. 309. Penalties. — Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:

1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of
the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, but if
the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount the penalty shall be the
maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each
additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed
shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory
penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case
may be.
 2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the
value of the thing stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.

3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the
value of the property stolen is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos.

4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period,
if the value of the property stolen is over 50 pesos but does not exceed 200 pesos.

5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos but does not exceed
50 pesos.

6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value does not exceed
5 pesos.

7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is committed under
the circumstances enumerated in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article and the
value of the thing stolen does not exceed 5 pesos. If such value exceeds said amount,
the provision of any of the five preceding subdivisions shall be made applicable.

8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos, when the
value of the thing stolen is not over 5 pesos, and the offender shall have acted under
the impulse of hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of earning a livelihood for the
support of himself or his family.

In a case wherein the value of the thing stolen is ₱6,000.00, the above-provision states
that the penalty is prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods (6 months
and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). Applying the proposal, if the value of the thing stolen
is ₱6,000.00, the penalty is imprisonment of arresto mayor in its medium period to
prision correccional minimum period (2 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months). It
would seem that under the present law, the penalty imposed is almost the same as the
penalty proposed. In fact, after the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law under
the existing law, the minimum penalty is still lowered by one degree; hence, the
minimum penalty is arresto mayor in its medium period to maximum period (2 months
and 1 day to 6 months), making the offender qualified for pardon or parole after serving
the said minimum period and may even apply for probation. Moreover, under the
proposal, the minimum penalty after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is arresto
menor in its maximum period to arresto mayor in its minimum period (21 days to 2
months) is not too far from the minimum period under the existing law. Thus, it would
seem that the present penalty imposed under the law is not at all excessive. The same is
also true in the crime of Estafa.23

Moreover, if we apply the ratio of 1:100, as suggested to the value of the thing stolen in
the crime of Theft and the damage caused in the crime of Estafa, the gap between the
minimum and the maximum amounts, which is the basis of determining the proper
penalty to be imposed, would be too wide and the penalty imposable would no longer be
commensurate to the act committed and the value of the thing stolen or the damage
caused:

I. Article 309, or the penalties for the crime of Theft, the value would be modified but the
penalties are not changed:

1. ₱12,000.00 to ₱22,000.00 will become ₱1,200,000.00 to ₱2,200,000.00, punished

by prision mayor minimum to prision mayor medium (6 years and 1 day to 10 years).

2. ₱6,000.00 to ₱12,000.00 will become ₱600,000.00 to ₱1,200,000.00, punished by

prision correccional medium and to prision correccional maximum (2 years, 4
months and 1 day to 6 years).24

3. ₱200.00 to ₱6,000.00 will become ₱20,000.00 to ₱600,000.00, punishable by

prision correccional minimum to prision correccional medium (6 months and 1 day
to 4 years and 2 months).

4. ₱50.00 to ₱200.00 will become ₱5,000.00 to ₱20,000.00, punishable by arresto

mayor medium to prision correccional minimum (2 months and 1 day to 2 years and
4 months).

5. ₱5.00 to ₱50.00 will become ₱500.00 to ₱5,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor

(1 month and 1 day to 6 months).

6. ₱5.00 will become ₱500.00, punishable by arresto mayor minimum to arresto

mayor medium.

x x x x.

II. Article 315, or the penalties for the crime of Estafa, the value would also be modified
but the penalties are not changed, as follows:

1st. ₱12,000.00 to ₱22,000.00, will become ₱1,200,000.00 to ₱2,200,000.00,

punishable by prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum (4 years, 2
months and 1 day to 8 years).25

2nd. ₱6,000.00 to ₱12,000.00 will become ₱600,000.00 to ₱1,200,000.00,

punishable by prision correccional minimum to prision correccional medium (6
months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months).26

3rd. ₱200.00 to ₱6,000.00 will become ₱20,000.00 to ₱600,000.00, punishable by

arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional minimum (4 months and 1 day to 2
years and 4 months).

4th. ₱200.00 will become ₱20,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor maximum (4

months and 1 day to 6 months).
An argument raised by Dean Jose Manuel I. Diokno, one of our esteemed amici curiae, is
that the incremental penalty provided under Article 315 of the RPC violates the Equal
Protection Clause.

The equal protection clause requires equality among equals, which is determined
according to a valid classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is
that of reasonableness,27 which has four requisites:

(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;

(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.28

According to Dean Diokno, the Incremental Penalty Rule (IPR) does not rest on
substantial distinctions as ₱10,000.00 may have been substantial in the past, but it is not
so today, which violates the first requisite; the IPR was devised so that those who commit
estafa involving higher amounts would receive heavier penalties; however, this is no
longer achieved, because a person who steals ₱142,000.00 would receive the same
penalty as someone who steals hundreds of millions, which violates the second requisite;
and, the IPR violates requisite no. 3, considering that the IPR is limited to existing
conditions at the time the law was promulgated, conditions that no longer exist today.

Assuming that the Court submits to the argument of Dean Diokno and declares the
incremental penalty in Article 315 unconstitutional for violating the equal protection
clause, what then is the penalty that should be applied in case the amount of the thing
subject matter of the crime exceeds ₱22,000.00? It seems that the proposition poses more
questions than answers, which leads us even more to conclude that the appropriate
remedy is to refer these matters to Congress for them to exercise their inherent power to
legislate laws.

Even Dean Diokno was of the opinion that if the Court declares the IPR unconstitutional,
the remedy is to go to Congress. Thus:

xxxx

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Now, your position is to declare that the incremental penalty should be struck down as
unconstitutional because it is absurd.

DEAN DIOKNO:

Absurd, it violates equal protection, Your Honor, and cruel and unusual punishment.
JUSTICE PERALTA:

Then what will be the penalty that we are going to impose if the amount is more than
Twenty-Two Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos.

DEAN DIOKNO:

Well, that would be for Congress to ... if this Court will declare the incremental penalty
rule unconstitutional, then that would ... the void should be filled by Congress.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

But in your presentation, you were fixing the amount at One Hundred Thousand
(₱100,000.00) Pesos ...

DEAN DIOKNO:

Well, my presen ... (interrupted)

JUSTICE PERALTA:

For every One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos in excess of Twenty-Two

Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos you were suggesting an additional penalty of one (1) year,
did I get you right?

DEAN DIOKNO:

Yes, Your Honor, that is, if the court will take the route of statutory interpretation.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Ah ...

DEAN DIOKNO:

If the Court will say that they can go beyond the literal wording of the law...

JUSTICE PERALTA:

But if we de ... (interrupted)

DEAN DIOKNO:

....then....

JUSTICE PERALTA:
Ah, yeah. But if we declare the incremental penalty as unsconstitutional, the court cannot
fix the amount ...

DEAN DIOKNO:

No, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

... as the equivalent of one, as an incremental penalty in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand

(₱22,000.00) Pesos.

DEAN DIOKNO:

No, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

The Court cannot do that.

DEAN DIOKNO:

Could not be.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

The only remedy is to go to Congress...

DEAN DIOKNO:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

... and determine the value or the amount.

DEAN DIOKNO:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

That will be equivalent to the incremental penalty of one (1) year in excess of Twenty-
Two Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos.

DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

The amount in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos.

Thank you, Dean.

DEAN DIOKNO:

Thank you.

x x x x29

Dean Diokno also contends that Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment. Citing Solem v. Helm,30 Dean Diokno avers that the United
States Federal Supreme Court has expanded the application of a similar Constitutional
provision prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment, to the duration of the penalty, and
not just its form. The court therein ruled that three things must be done to decide whether
a sentence is proportional to a specific crime, viz.; (1) Compare the nature and gravity of
the offense, and the harshness of the penalty; (2) Compare the sentences imposed on
other criminals in the same jurisdiction, i.e., whether more serious crimes are subject to
the same penalty or to less serious penalties; and (3) Compare the sentences imposed for
commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.

However, the case of Solem v. Helm cannot be applied in the present case, because in
Solem what respondent therein deemed cruel was the penalty imposed by the state court
of South Dakota after it took into account the latter’s recidivist statute and not the original
penalty for uttering a "no account" check. Normally, the maximum punishment for the
crime would have been five years imprisonment and a $5,000.00 fine. Nonetheless,
respondent was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole under
South Dakota’s recidivist statute because of his six prior felony convictions. Surely, the
factual antecedents of Solem are different from the present controversy.

With respect to the crime of Qualified Theft, however, it is true that the imposable
penalty for the offense is high. Nevertheless, the rationale for the imposition of a higher
penalty against a domestic servant is the fact that in the commission of the crime, the
helper will essentially gravely abuse the trust and confidence reposed upon her by her
employer. After accepting and allowing the helper to be a member of the household, thus
entrusting upon such person the protection and safekeeping of the employer’s loved ones
and properties, a subsequent betrayal of that trust is so repulsive as to warrant the
necessity of imposing a higher penalty to deter the commission of such wrongful acts.

There are other crimes where the penalty of fine and/or imprisonment are dependent on
the subject matter of the crime and which, by adopting the proposal, may create serious
implications. For example, in the crime of Malversation, the penalty imposed depends on
the amount of the money malversed by the public official, thus:

Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation. — Any

public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or
property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent,
through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public
funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the
misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:

1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the
amount involved in the misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two
hundred pesos.

2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount
involved is more than two hundred pesos but does not exceed six thousand pesos.

3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its
minimum period, if the amount involved is more than six thousand pesos but is less
than twelve thousand pesos.

4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods, if the
amount involved is more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two
thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.

In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual
special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to
the total value of the property embezzled.

The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with
which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie
evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use.

The above-provisions contemplate a situation wherein the Government loses money due
to the unlawful acts of the offender. Thus, following the proposal, if the amount
malversed is ₱200.00 (under the existing law), the amount now becomes ₱20,000.00 and
the penalty is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2 years 4 months
and 1 day to 6 years). The penalty may not be commensurate to the act of embezzlement
of ₱20,000.00 compared to the acts committed by public officials punishable by a special
law, i.e., Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, specifically
Section 3,31 wherein the injury caused to the government is not generally defined by any
monetary amount, the penalty (6 years and 1 month to 15 years)32 under the Anti-Graft
Law will now become higher. This should not be the case, because in the crime of
malversation, the public official takes advantage of his public position to embezzle the
fund or property of the government entrusted to him.
The said inequity is also apparent in the crime of Robbery with force upon things
(inhabited or uninhabited) where the value of the thing unlawfully taken and the act of
unlawful entry are the bases of the penalty imposable, and also, in Malicious Mischief,
where the penalty of imprisonment or fine is dependent on the cost of the damage caused.

In Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or uninhabited), if we increase the value of
the thing unlawfully taken, as proposed in the ponencia, the sole basis of the penalty will
now be the value of the thing unlawfully taken and no longer the element of force
employed in entering the premises. It may likewise cause an inequity between the crime
of Qualified Trespass to Dwelling under Article 280, and this kind of robbery because the
former is punishable by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2
years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years) and a fine not exceeding ₱1,000.00 (₱100,000.00
now if the ratio is 1:100) where entrance to the premises is with violence or intimidation,
which is the main justification of the penalty. Whereas in the crime of Robbery with force
upon things, it is punished with a penalty of prision mayor (6 years and 1 day to 12 years)
if the intruder is unarmed without the penalty of Fine despite the fact that it is not merely
the illegal entry that is the basis of the penalty but likewise the unlawful taking.

Furthermore, in the crime of Other Mischiefs under Article 329, the highest penalty that
can be imposed is arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods (2 months and 1
day to 6 months) if the value of the damage caused exceeds ₱1,000.00, but under the
proposal, the value of the damage will now become ₱100,000.00 (1:100), and still
punishable by arresto mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6 months). And, if the value of the
damaged property does not exceed ₱200.00, the penalty is arresto menor or a fine of not
less than the value of the damage caused and not more than ₱200.00, if the amount
involved does not exceed ₱200.00 or cannot be estimated. Under the proposal, ₱200.00
will now become ₱20,000.00, which simply means that the fine of ₱200.00 under the
existing law will now become ₱20,000.00. The amount of Fine under this situation will
now become excessive and afflictive in nature despite the fact that the offense is
categorized as a light felony penalized with a light penalty under Article 26 of the
RPC.33 Unless we also amend Article 26 of the RPC, there will be grave implications on
the penalty of Fine, but changing the same through Court decision, either expressly or
impliedly, may not be legally and constitutionally feasible.

There are other crimes against property and swindling in the RPC that may also be
affected by the proposal, such as those that impose imprisonment and/or Fine as a penalty
based on the value of the damage caused, to wit: Article 311 (Theft of the property of the
National Library and National Museum), Article 312 (Occupation of real property or
usurpation of real rights in property), Article 313 (Altering boundaries or landmarks),
Article 316 (Other forms of swindling), Article 317 (Swindling a minor), Article 318
(Other deceits), Article 328 (Special cases of malicious mischief) and Article 331
(Destroying or damaging statues, public monuments or paintings). Other crimes that
impose Fine as a penalty will also be affected, such as: Article 213 (Frauds against the
public treasury and similar offenses), Article 215 (Prohibited Transactions),

Article 216 (Possession of prohibited interest by a public officer), Article 218 (Failure of
accountable officer to render accounts), Article 219 (Failure of a responsible public
officer to render accounts before leaving the country).

In addition, the proposal will not only affect crimes under the RPC. It will also affect
crimes which are punishable by special penal laws, such as Illegal Logging or Violation
of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended.34The law treats cutting,
gathering, collecting and possessing timber or other forest products without license as an
offense as grave as and equivalent to the felony of qualified theft.35 Under the law, the
offender shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 31036 of
the Revised Penal Code, which means that the penalty imposable for the offense is, again,
based on the value of the timber or forest products involved in the offense. Now, if we
accept the said proposal in the crime of Theft, will this particular crime of Illegal Logging
be amended also in so far as the penalty is concerned because the penalty is dependent on
Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC? The answer is in the negative because the soundness of
this particular law is not in question.

With the numerous crimes defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code and
Special Laws, and other related provisions of these laws affected by the proposal, a
thorough study is needed to determine its effectivity and necessity. There may be some
provisions of the law that should be amended; nevertheless, this Court is in no position to
conclude as to the intentions of the framers of the Revised Penal Code by merely making
a study of the applicability of the penalties imposable in the present times. Such is not
within the competence of the Court but of the Legislature which is empowered to conduct
public hearings on the matter, consult legal luminaries and who, after due proceedings,
can decide whether or not to amend or to revise the questioned law or other laws, or even
create a new legislation which will adopt to the times.

Admittedly, Congress is aware that there is an urgent need to amend the Revised Penal
Code. During the oral arguments, counsel for the Senate informed the Court that at
present, fifty-six (56) bills are now pending in the Senate seeking to amend the Revised
Penal Code,37 each one proposing much needed change and updates to archaic laws that
were promulgated decades ago when the political, socio-economic, and cultural settings
were far different from today’s conditions.

Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way that it
shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such
application or construction, it should not make or supervise legislation, or under the guise
of interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the
law a construction which is repugnant to its terms.38 The Court should apply the law in a
manner that would give effect to their letter and spirit, especially when the law is clear as
to its intent and purpose. Succinctly put, the Court should shy away from encroaching
upon the primary function of a co-equal branch of the Government; otherwise, this would
lead to an inexcusable breach of the doctrine of separation of powers by means of judicial
legislation.

Moreover, it is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a Fine;
hence, it can be increased by the Court when appropriate. Article 2206 of the Civil Code
provides:

Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at
least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In
addition:

(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased,
and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in
every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of
permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at
the time of his death;

(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of Article
291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of
testate or intestate succession, may demand support from the person causing the
death, for a period not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the
court;

(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the
deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of
the deceased.

In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary
restitution or compensation to the victim for the damage or infraction that was done to the
latter by the accused, which in a sense only covers the civil aspect. Precisely, it is civil
indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a person dies, in addition to the penalty of
imprisonment imposed to the offender, the accused is also ordered to pay the victim a
sum of money as restitution. Clearly, this award of civil indemnity due to the death of the
victim could not be contemplated as akin to the value of a thing that is unlawfully taken
which is the basis in the imposition of the proper penalty in certain crimes. Thus, the
reasoning in increasing the value of civil indemnity awarded in some offense cannot be
the same reasoning that would sustain the adoption of the suggested ratio. Also, it is
apparent from Article 2206 that the law only imposes a minimum amount for awards of
civil indemnity, which is ₱3,000.00. The law did not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although
the minimum amount for the award cannot be changed, increasing the amount awarded as
civil indemnity can be validly modified and increased when the present circumstance
warrants it. Corollarily, moral damages under Article 222039 of the Civil Code also does
not fix the amount of damages that can be awarded. It is discretionary upon the court,
depending on the mental anguish or the suffering of the private offended party. The
amount of moral damages can, in relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted so long as it
does not exceed the award of civil indemnity.

In addition, some may view the penalty provided by law for the offense committed as
tantamount to cruel punishment. However, all penalties are generally harsh, being
punitive in nature. Whether or not they are excessive or amount to cruel punishment is a
matter that should be left to lawmakers. It is the prerogative of the courts to apply the law,
especially when they are clear and not subject to any other interpretation than that which
is plainly written.

Similar to the argument of Dean Diokno, one of Justice Antonio Carpio’s opinions is that
the incremental penalty provision should be declared unconstitutional and that the courts
should only impose the penalty corresponding to the amount of ₱22,000.00, regardless if
the actual amount involved exceeds ₱22,000.00. As suggested, however, from now until
the law is properly amended by Congress, all crimes of Estafa will no longer be punished
by the appropriate penalty. A conundrum in the regular course of criminal justice would
occur when every accused convicted of the crime of estafa will be meted penalties
different from the proper penalty that should be imposed. Such drastic twist in the
application of the law has no legal basis and directly runs counter to what the law
provides.

It should be noted that the death penalty was reintroduced in the dispensation of criminal
justice by the Ramos Administration by virtue of Republic Act No. 765940 in December
1993. The said law has been questioned before this Court. There is, arguably, no
punishment more cruel than that of death. Yet still, from the time the death penalty was
re-imposed until its lifting in June 2006 by Republic Act No. 9346,41 the Court did not
impede the imposition of the death penalty on the ground that it is a "cruel punishment"
within the purview of Section 19 (1),42 Article III of the Constitution. Ultimately, it was
through an act of Congress suspending the imposition of the death penalty that led to its
non-imposition and not via the intervention of the Court.

Even if the imposable penalty amounts to cruel punishment, the Court cannot declare the
provision of the law from which the proper penalty emanates unconstitutional in the
present action. Not only is it violative of due process, considering that the State and the
concerned parties were not given the opportunity to comment on the subject matter, it is
settled that the constitutionality of a statute cannot be attacked collaterally because
constitutionality issues must be pleaded directly and not collaterally,43 more so in the
present controversy wherein the issues never touched upon the constitutionality of any of
the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.

Besides, it has long been held that the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is
generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in
respect of duration or amount, and applies to punishments which public sentiment has
regarded as cruel or obsolete, for instance, those inflicted at the whipping post, or in the
pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like. Fine
and imprisonment would not thus be within the prohibition.44

It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a
penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. The fact that the punishment authorized by
the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual. Expressed in other terms, it has
been held that to come under the ban, the punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly
oppressive," "wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral
sense of the community."45

Cruel as it may be, as discussed above, it is for the Congress to amend the law and adapt
it to our modern time.

The solution to the present controversy could not be solved by merely adjusting the
questioned monetary values to the present value of money based only on the current
inflation rate. There are other factors and variables that need to be taken into
consideration, researched, and deliberated upon before the said values could be accurately
and properly adjusted. The effects on the society, the injured party, the accused, its socio-
economic impact, and the likes must be painstakingly evaluated and weighed upon in
order to arrive at a wholistic change that all of us believe should be made to our existing
law. Dejectedly, the Court is ill-equipped, has no resources, and lacks sufficient personnel
to conduct public hearings and sponsor studies and surveys to validly effect these changes
in our Revised Penal Code. This function clearly and appropriately belongs to Congress.
Even Professor Tadiar concedes to this conclusion, to wit:

xxxx

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Yeah, Just one question. You are suggesting that in order to determine the value of Peso
you have to take into consideration several factors.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

Yes.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Per capita income.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

Per capita income.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Consumer price index.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

Yeah.

JUSTICE PERALTA:
Inflation ...

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

Yes.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

... and so on. Is the Supreme Court equipped to determine those factors?

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

There are many ways by which the value of the Philippine Peso can be determined
utilizing all of those economic terms.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Yeah, but ...

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

And I don’t think it is within the power of the Supreme Court to pass upon and peg the
value to One Hundred (₱100.00) Pesos to ...

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Yeah.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

... One (₱1.00.00) Peso in 1930.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

That is legislative in nature.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

That is my position that the Supreme Court ...

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Yeah, okay.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:
... has no power to utilize the power of judicial review to in order to adjust, to make the
adjustment that is a power that belongs to the legislature.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Thank you, Professor.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

Thank you.46

Finally, the opinion advanced by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno echoes the
view that the role of the Court is not merely to dispense justice, but also the active duty to
prevent injustice. Thus, in order to prevent injustice in the present controversy, the Court
should not impose an obsolete penalty pegged eighty three years ago, but consider the
proposed ratio of 1:100 as simply compensating for inflation. Furthermore, the Court has
in the past taken into consideration "changed conditions" or "significant changes in
circumstances" in its decisions.

Similarly, the Chief Justice is of the view that the Court is not delving into the validity of
the substance of a statute. The issue is no different from the Court’s adjustment of
indemnity in crimes against persons, which the Court had previously adjusted in light of
current times, like in the case of People v. Pantoja.47 Besides, Article 10 of the Civil
Code mandates a presumption that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to
prevail.

With due respect to the opinions and proposals advanced by the Chief Justice and my
Colleagues, all the proposals ultimately lead to prohibited judicial legislation. Short of
being repetitious and as extensively discussed above, it is truly beyond the powers of the
Court to legislate laws, such immense power belongs to Congress and the Court should
refrain from crossing this clear-cut divide. With regard to civil indemnity, as elucidated
before, this refers to civil liability which is awarded to the offended party as a kind of
monetary restitution. It is truly based on the value of money. The same cannot be said on
penalties because, as earlier stated, penalties are not only based on the value of money,
but on several other factors. Further, since the law is silent as to the maximum amount
that can be awarded and only pegged the minimum sum, increasing the amount granted as
civil indemnity is not proscribed. Thus, it can be adjusted in light of current conditions.

Now, with regard to the penalty imposed in the present case, the CA modified the ruling
of the RTC. The RTC imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional in its medium period, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years
and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal in its minimum period, as maximum.
However, the CA imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum,
plus one (1) year for each additional ₱10,000.00, or a total of seven (7) years.
In computing the penalty for this type of estafa, this Court's ruling in Cosme, Jr. v.
People48 is highly instructive, thus:

With respect to the imposable penalty, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 315 Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:

1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed 22,000
pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph
shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000
pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such
case, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the
purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or
reclusion temporal, as the case may be.

The penalty prescribed by Article 315 is composed of only two, not three, periods, in
which case, Article 65 of the same Code requires the division of the time included in the
penalty into three equal portions of time included in the penalty prescribed, forming one
period of each of the three portions. Applying the latter provisions, the maximum,
medium and minimum periods of the penalty prescribed are:

Maximum - 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years

Medium - 5 years, 5 months, 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, 20 days

Minimum - 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, 10 days49

To compute the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, prisión correccional

maximum to prisión mayor minimum should be divided into three equal portions of time
each of which portion shall be deemed to form one period in accordance with Article
6550 of the RPC.51 In the present case, the amount involved is ₱98,000.00, which
exceeds ₱22,000.00, thus, the maximum penalty imposable should be within the
maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor. Article
315 also states that a period of one year shall be added to the penalty for every additional
₱10,000.00 defrauded in excess of ₱22,000.00, but in no case shall the total penalty
which may be imposed exceed 20 years.

Considering that the amount of ₱98,000.00 is ₱76,000.00 more than the ₱22,000.00
ceiling set by law, then, adding one year for each additional ₱10,000.00, the maximum
period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor minimum would be
increased by 7 years. Taking the maximum of the prescribed penalty, which is 8 years,
plus an additional 7 years, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty is 15 years.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, since the penalty prescribed by law for the
estafa charge against petitioner is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor
minimum, the penalty next lower would then be prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods.

Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere from 6
months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months.

One final note, the Court should give Congress a chance to perform its primordial duty of
lawmaking. The Court should not pre-empt Congress and usurp its inherent powers of
making and enacting laws. While it may be the most expeditious approach, a short cut by
judicial fiat is a dangerous proposition, lest the Court dare trespass on prohibited judicial
legislation.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 5, 2007 of

petitioner Lito Corpuz is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision dated March 22,
2007 and Resolution dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed
with modification the Decision dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
46, San Fernando City, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code, are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed is the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment ranging from THREE (3) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and
ELEVEN DAYS of prision correccional, as minimum, to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS of
reclusion temporal as maximum.

Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a Copy of this Decision be furnished
the President of the Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of Justice.

Also, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the President of the Senate and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

See Concurring and Dissenting Opinion

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

See Dissenting Opinion PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,

ANTONIO T. CARPIO JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
 See: Concurring Opinion
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

I take no part due to prior action in the CA I join the Dissent of J. Abad
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN* MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

See Dissenting Opinion

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

No Part
BVIENVENIDO L. REYES ESTELA M. PERLAS-
Associate Justice BERNABE*
Associate Justice

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

C E R T I F I CAT I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

* No part.

1 Penned by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (now a member of the

Supreme Court), with Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Lucas P. Bersamin
(now a member of the Supreme Court), concurring; rollo, pp. 31-41.

2 Rollo, p. 43.

3 Id. at 48-52.
4 Libuit v. People, 506 Phil. 591, 599 (2005).

5 Blas v. Angeles- Hutalla, 482 Phil. 485, 501 (2004).

6 Quinto v. People, 365 Phil. 259, 270 (1999).

7 Rollo, p. 37. (Citations omitted.)

8 Diaz v. People, 585 Phil. 318, 332 (2008), citing Pangilinan v. Court of Appeals,
378 Phil. 670, 675 (1999).

9 TSN, December 17, 1992, pp. 9-10. (Emphasis supplied.)

10 Tan v. People, 542 Phil. 188, 201 (2007).

11 Id., citing Lee v. People, 495 Phil. 239, 250 (2005).

12 Id.

13 555 Phil. 106 (2007).

14 Id. at 114. (Citations omitted.)

15 Cosme, Jr. v. People, 538 Phil. 52, 66 (2006), citing People v. Garillo, 446 Phil.
163, 174-175 (2003).

16 Id., citing Sullon v. People, 500 Phil. 39, 45 (2005) ; People v. Bulan, 498 Phil.
586, 598 (2005).

17 Id. at 67, citing People v. Gaspar, 376 Phil. 762, 779 (1999).

18 Emphasis supplied.

19 Third Edition, 1940.

20 Id. at 16. (Emphasis supplied)

21 1997 Edition.

22 Id. at 93, citing United States v. Valera Ang Y, 26 Phil. 598 (1914); People v.
Salazar y Gabriel, 102 Phil. 1184 (1958); Tiu Ua, 51 O.G. 1863; Limaco, 99 Phil. 35
(1956), and People v. Del Rosario y Natividad, 62 Phil. 824 (1936). (Emphasis
supplied.)

23 Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall defraud another by any of
the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
 1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000
pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the
latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its
maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the
total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such
cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed
under the provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor
or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.

2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium

periods, if the amount of the fraud is over 6,000 pesos but does not exceed
12,000 pesos;

3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision

correccional in its minimum period if such amount is over 200 pesos but
does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and

4th. By arresto mayor in its maximum period, if such amount does not
exceed 200 pesos, provided that in the four cases mentioned, the fraud be
committed by any of the following means:

1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:

(a) By altering the substance, quantity, or quality or anything of value which

the offender shall deliver by virtue of an obligation to do so, even though
such obligation be based on an immoral or illegal consideration.

(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money,

goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving
the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such
obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having
received such money, goods, or other property.

(c) By taking undue advantage of the signature of the offended party in

blank, and by writing any document above such signature in blank, to the
prejudice of the offended party or of any third person.

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed

prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:

(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power,

influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary
transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
 (b) By altering the quality, fineness or weight of anything pertaining to his
art or business.

(c) By pretending to have bribed any Government employee, without

prejudice to the action for calumny which the offended party may deem
proper to bring against the offender. In this case, the offender shall be
punished by the maximum period of the penalty.

(d) [By post-dating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation

when the offender therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the
check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount
necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice
from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has been
dishonored for lack of insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence
of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act. (As amended by R.A.
4885, approved June 17, 1967.)]

(e) By obtaining any food, refreshment or accommodation at a hotel, inn,

restaurant, boarding house, lodging house, or apartment house and the like
without paying therefor, with intent to defraud the proprietor or manager
thereof, or by obtaining credit at hotel, inn, restaurant, boarding house,
lodging house, or apartment house by the use of any false pretense, or by
abandoning or surreptitiously removing any part of his baggage from a
hotel, inn, restaurant, boarding house, lodging house or apartment house
after obtaining credit, food, refreshment or accommodation therein without
paying for his food, refreshment or accommodation.

3. Through any of the following fraudulent means:

(a) By inducing another, by means of deceit, to sign any document.

(b) By resorting to some fraudulent practice to insure success in a gambling

game.

(c) By removing, concealing or destroying, in whole or in part, any court

record, office files, document or any other papers.

24 May be entitled to Probation.

25 May be entitled to Probation if the maximum penalty imposed is 6 years.

26 May be entitled to Probation.

27 Quinto v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010, 613
SCRA 385, 414.
28 People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12, 18 (1939).

29 TSN, Oral Arguments, February 25, 2014, pp. 192-195.

30 463 U.S. 277 (1983)

31 Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of

public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute
corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

(a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act

constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent
authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or
allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit such
violation or offense.

(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share,

percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection with
any contract or transaction between the Government and any other part, wherein
the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.

(c) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present or other

pecuniary or material benefit, for himself or for another, from any person for
whom the public officer, in any manner or capacity, has secured or obtained, or
will secure or obtain, any Government permit or license, in consideration for the
help given or to be given, without prejudice to Section thirteen of this Act.

(d) Accepting or having any member of his family accept employment in a

private enterprise which has pending official business with him during the
pendency thereof or within one year after its termination.

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving
any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall
apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged
with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

(f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient

justification, to act within a reasonable time on any matter pending before him
for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in
the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, or for the purpose of
favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or discriminating
against any other interested party.

(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction

 manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public
officer profited or will profit thereby.

(h) Director or indirectly having financing or pecuniary interest in any business,

contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his
official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law
from having any interest.

(i) Directly or indirectly becoming interested, for personal gain, or having a

material interest in any transaction or act requiring the approval of a board, panel
or group of which he is a member, and which exercises discretion in such
approval, even if he votes against the same or does not participate in the action
of the board, committee, panel or group.

Interest for personal gain shall be presumed against those public officers
responsible for the approval of manifestly unlawful, inequitable, or irregular
transaction or acts by the board, panel or group to which they belong.

(j) Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit, privilege or benefit in

favor of any person not qualified for or not legally entitled to such license,
permit, privilege or advantage, or of a mere representative or dummy of one who
is not so qualified or entitled.

(k) Divulging valuable information of a confidential character, acquired by his

office or by him on account of his official position to unauthorized persons, or
releasing such information in advance of its authorized release date.

The person giving the gift, present, share, percentage or benefit referred to in
subparagraphs (b) and (c); or offering or giving to the public officer the
employment mentioned in subparagraph (d); or urging the divulging or untimely
release of the confidential information referred to in subparagraph (k) of this
section shall, together with the offending public officer, be punished under
Section nine of this Act and shall be permanently or temporarily disqualified in
the discretion of the Court, from transacting business in any form with the
Government.

32 R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 9.

33 Art. 26. When afflictive, correctional, or light penalty. — A fine, whether imposed
as a single of as an alternative penalty, shall be considered an afflictive penalty, if it
exceeds 6,000 pesos; a correctional penalty, if it does not exceed 6,000 pesos but is
not less than 200 pesos; and a light penalty if it less than 200 pesos.

34 Revised Forestry Code, as amended by E.O. No. 277, Series of 1987.

35 Taopa v. People, 592 Phil. 341, 345 (2005).

36 Art. 310. Qualified theft. — The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties
next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding
article, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if
the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of
coconuts taken from the premises of the plantation or fish taken from a fishpond or
fishery, or if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic
erruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.

37 TSN, Oral Arguments, February 25, 2014, p. 167.

38 People v. Quijada, 328 Phil. 505, 548 (1996).

39 Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral
damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are
justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted
fraudulently or in bad faith.

40 AN ACT TO IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY ON CERTAIN HEINOUS

CRIMES, AMENDING FOR THAT PURPOSE THE REVISED PENAL LAWS, AS
AMENDED, OTHER SPECIAL PENAL LAWS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

41 AN ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY IN THE

PHILIPPINES.

42 Section 19.

1. Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman

punishment inflicted. x x x.

43 Gutierrez v. Department of Budget and Management, G.R. No. 153266, 159007,

159029, 170084, 172713, 173119, 176477, 177990, A.M. No. 06-4-02-SB, March
18, 2010, 616 SCRA 1, 25.

44 People v. De la Cruz, 92 Phil. 906, 908 (1953); People v. Tongko, 353 Phil. 37, 43
(1998).

45 People v. Estoista, 93 Phil. 647, 655 (1953); People v. Dionisio, No. L-15513,
March 27, 1968, 22 SCRA 1299, 1301-1302.

46 TSN, Oral Arguments, February 25, 2014, pp. 183-185.

47 No. L-18793, October 11, 1968, 25 SCRA 468.

48 Supra note 15.

49 Id. at 71-72.
 50 ART. 65. Rule in Cases in Which the Penalty is Not Composed of Three Periods.
– In cases in which the penalty prescribed by law is not composed of three periods,
the courts shall apply the rules contained in the foregoing articles, dividing into three
equal portions the time included in the penalty prescribed, and forming one period of
each of the three portions.

51 People v. Temporada, G.R. No. 173473, December 17, 2008, 574 SCRA 258, 284.

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