Philippine Basketball Association Vs Court of Appeals: Facts

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Ejusdem Generis

PHILIPPINE BASKETBALL
ASSOCIATION vs COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 119122. August 8, 2000

FACTS:

On June 21, 1989, the petitioner received an assessment letter from the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue for the payment of deficiency amusement tax amounted to
P5,864,260.84.

Petitioner contested the assessment by filing a protest who denied the same by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue.

On January 8, 1990, petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals
whom on December 24, 1993, dismissed petitioner’s petition, holding petitioner to
pay P5,864,260.84 as deficiency amusement tax for the year 1987 plus 20% annual
delinquency interest from July 22, 1989 pursuant to the provision of Sec.248 & 249

Petitioner presented a motion for reconsideration of the said decision but the same was
denied by CTA.

Petitioner appealed the CTA decision to the Court of Appeals. Affirming the decision of
the CTA and dismissing petitioner’s appeal. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of said decision but to no avail, the same was denied by the Court of Appeals.

Petitioner filed a petition to the SC contending that the power and authority to levy and
collect amusement taxes from the sale of admission tickets to places of amusement
was transferred from the national government to the local government by virtue of the
Local Tax Code of 1973.

ISSUE:

W/N the amusement tax on admission tickets to PBA games a national or local tax?

RULING:
The laws on the matter are succinct and clear and need no elaborate
disquisition. Section 13 of the Local Tax Code indicates that the province can only
impose a tax on admission from the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters,
cinematographs, concert halls, circuses and other places of amusement.
The authority to tax professional basketball games is not therein included, as the same
is expressly embraced in PD 1959, which amended PD 1456  provides that that the
“proprietor, lessee or operator of x x x professional basketball games” is required to
pay an amusement tax equivalent to fifteen per centum (15%) of their gross
receipts to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, which payment is a national tax. The said
payment of amusement tax is in lieu of all other percentage taxes of whatever nature
and description.
While Section 13 of the Local Tax Code mentions “other places of amusement,”
professional basketball games are definitely not within its scope. Under the principle
of ejusdem generis, where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things,
by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be
construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things
of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned. Thus, in determining the
meaning of the phrase “other places of amusement,” one must refer to the prior
enumeration of theaters, cinematographs, concert halls and circuses with artistic
expression as their common characteristic. Professional basketball games do not fall
under the same category as theaters, cinematographs, concert halls and circuses as
the latter basically belong to artistic forms of entertainment while the former caters to
sports and gaming.

Noscitor a Sociis

Aisporna v CA (DIGEST)
Aisporna v Court of Appeals and the People of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-39419

12 April 1982

TOPIC: Statutory Construction, Doctrine of Associated Words (Noscitur a


Sociis)

FACTS:
Petitioner Aisporna was charged for violation of Section 189 of the Insurance
Act.

Petitioner’s husband, Rodolfo S. Aisporna (Rodolfo) was duly licensed by


the Insurance Commission as agent to Perla Compania de Seguros. Thru
Rodolfo, a 12- month Personal Accident Policy was issued by Perla with
beneficiary to Ana M. Isidro for P50,000. The insured died by violence
during lifetime of policy.

Subsequently, petitioner was charged because the aforementioned policy was


issued with her active participation, which is not allowed because she did not
possess a certificate of authority to act as agent from the office of the
Insurance Commission.

Petitioner contended that being the wife of Rodolfo, she naturally helped him
in his work, and that the policy was merely a renewal and was issued because
her husband was not around when Isidro called by telephone. Instead,
appellant left a note on top of her husband’s desk.

The trial court found petitioner guilty as charged. On appeal, the trial court’s
decisions was affirmed by respondent appellate court, finding petitioner
guilty of a violation of the first paragraph of Sec 189 of the insurance act.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a person can be convicted of having violated the first


paragraph of Section 189 of the Insurance Act without reference to the
second paragraph of the same section.

RULING:

The petition is meritorious. Petition appealed from is reversed, and accused


is acquitted of the crime charged.
A perusal of the provision in question shows that the first paragraph thereof
prohibits a person from acting as agent, sub-agent or broker in the solicitation
or procurement of applications for insurance without first procuring a
certificate of authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner, while its
second paragraph defines who an insurance agent is within the intent of this
section and, finally, the third paragraph thereof prescribes the penalty to be
imposed for its violation.

The definition of an insurance agent as found in the second paragraph of


Section 189 is intended to define the word “agent” mentioned in the first and
second paragraphs of the aforesaid section. More significantly, in its second
paragraph, it is explicitly provided that the definition of an insurance agent is
within the intent of Section 189.

Applying the definition of an insurance agent in the second paragraph to the


agent mentioned in the first and second paragraphs would give harmony to
the aforesaid three paragraphs of Section 189. Legislative intent must be
ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular
words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in
fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce harmonious
whole. A statute must be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to all
its provisions whenever possible. More importantly the doctrine of
associated words (Noscitur a Sociis) provides that where a particular word
or phrase in a statement is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of
various meanings, its true meaning may be made clear and specific by
considering the company in which it is found or with which it is associated.  

Considering that the definition of an insurance agent as found in the second


paragraph is also applicable to the agent mentioned in the first paragraph, to
receive compensation by the agent is an essential element for a violation of
the first paragraph of the aforesaid section.

In the case at bar, the information does not allege that the negotiation of an
insurance contracts by the accused with Eugenio Isidro was one for
compensation. This allegation is essential, and having been omitted, a
conviction of the accused could not be sustained. It is well-settled in Our
jurisprudence that to warrant conviction, every element of the crime must be
alleged and proved.

The accused did not violate Section 189 of the Insurance Act.

Mens Legislatores

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