THE PRIMACY OF EXISTENCE IN THOMAS AQUINAS A Commentary in Thomistic Metaphysics by Dominic Banez TRANSLATION WITH AN INTRODUCTION AND NOTES BY BENJAMIN S. LLAMZON 20] THIS 1S THE PROPERTY OF Southern Evangelical Seminary Library Henry Regnery Company ChicagoTranslated from Scholastica Commentaria in Primam Partem Angelici Doctoris ad Sexagesimam Quarte i Salmanticae 1584, : t qe een © Translation Copyright by Henry Regnery C 19 Regnery Logos edition 1966 Beco cua A Paperback Original Library of Congress Catalog Card No. 66-26972 INTRODUCTION 1. Life. Dominic Banez was born February 29, 1528. While one can find references to both Medina del Campo and Valladolid in Spain as Banez’ birthplace, it is fairly certain that the latter is the correct place. Dominic was the youngest of seven children born to Juan Banez and Francisca Lopez. Not long after the birth of her youngest child, Francisca Banez died. Dominic’s father remarried, and the family settled at Medina del Campo. There Juan Banez. came to be called “The Mondragonnian,” * an appellation which his son Dominic seemed happy to inherit. In 1542, Banez, already well-versed in Latin at the age of fifteen, began his liberal arts studies in Salamanca. His fellow-students there were men of outstanding talents, many of whom eventually achieved eminence. When he completed his studies in 1546, Dominic joined the Order of Preachers, a step he had anticipated since boyhood. He made his profession at St. Stephen, the Dominican house of studies at Salamanca, on May 3, 1547. He thought himself fortunate to have studied here under such brilliant teachers as Melchior Cano, Dominic de Soto, and other thinkers who in turn had studied 56 PRIMACY OF EXISTENCE IN THOMAS AQUINAS under the renowned Francisco de Vitoria, Eventually ~ Banez himself formed a link in the line of tradition from Vitoria. After profession, Banez spent some years at St. Stephen. He and the gifted Bartholomew de Medina served as tutors to the younger members of the Order. under the supervision of an optimus praeceptor, prob- ably Diego de Chaves. On October 23, 1549, Banez qualified to be a member of Students of Cajetan, an elite organization at Salamanca. He became Master of Students in St. Stephen and lectured on St. Thomas’ Summa Theologiae. He was appointed a substitute for absent professors, a recognition of pro- fessional ability then. In 1561, he lectured on the Master of the Sentences pro forma et gradu magisterié after which he received his doctorate in Sacred Theol- ogy at the University of Siguenza, He went to Avila in January, 1565, and taught there until 1567. From 1567 to 1569, he was a substitute teacher in theology at the University of Alcala, where he was promoted to Prefect of Studies in 1569. At the end of the fol- lowing year he returned to Salamanca to lecture on the third part of the Summa. In June, 1571, the Dominican general chapter in Rome granted a re- quest submitted by the provincial chapter in Santa Maria de Nieva that Banez be given the Magistracy in Sacred Theology. The next year he was elected Vice-Rector of the University of Salamanca. Be- 4 : INTRODUCTION 7 tween 1573 and 1577 he also held an administrative position in the Inquisition. More than once he was elected to head other Dominican houses even when it seemed physically impossible for him to assume another post. On April 20, 1577, he won appoint- ment to the chair of Durandus at the University of Salamanca. Finally, upon the death of Bartholomew de Medina, he succeeded to the highest chair of the University. He held this prestigious post continually until 1600. In accordance with orders from the Dominican general, Banez began formal publication of his writings in 1584. He died at the Dominican convent in Medina on November 12, 1604, at the age of seventy-six. At the peak of his career Banez’ influence was felt in almost every position of importance in Spain. He is known to historians chiefly as the formidable foe of the Jesuit Molina on the question of divine causal- ity and human freedom. This controversy, however, was only a segment of a whole spectrum of interests, which Banez pursued intensely throughout his life. He profited from the rugged constitution typical of his fellow Basques as he maintained his activities at fever pitch. He was adviser and confidant of Philip II and a member of the Inquisitorial commission. St. Teresa of Avila had complete confidence in Banez as her spiritual guide. Besides assuming the vice-rectorship and the top academic post at Salamanca, he was2 8 PRIMACY OF EXISTENCE IN THOMAS AQUINAS. superior at St. Stephen, He was invited to the im- portant chapters of his order and engaged energeti- . cally in the De Auxiliis controversy. In the midst of these activities he produced a deskful of books on various branches of theology and philosophy and wrote a recommendation for the establishment of a world court to settle international disputes. He also helped in drawing up the Gregorian calendar. He was known in Spain as praeclarissimum jubar, his country’s brightest light. TI, Works. Banez’ works are, for the most part, com- mentaries on St. Thomas’ Summa Theologiae. They are as follows:* 1571-72 InIIl, QQ. 1-42. 1579-80 In I, QQ. 60-62; 8-16; Supple- ment. Also the tracts: De Censuris in Communi; De Potestate Clavium; De Excommunicatione. 1582 Contra Reliquia Pelagianorum Cen- surae. 1583-84 In -IL, QQ. 1-18. 1584 In I, QQ. 1-64; In ILI, (De Fide, Spe, et Charitate). 1585 Commentary De Generatione et Corruptione. 1588 In], OQ. 65 on. INTRODUCTION 9 1589-90 In IH, QQ. 1-8. 1590-91 In Il, QQ. 9-19. 1590 Relectio de Merito et Augmento Charitatis. 1591-93 In I, QQ. 62-68. 1593-94 In HI, QQ. 84-90; Supplement QQ. 1-8. 1594 Commentary De Iusitia et lure. 1598-99 In I-II, QO, 81-89. 1599 Institutiones Minoris Dialecticae. 1599-1600 In I-II, QQ. 109-114. IIL. Bane’ Metaphysics of Existence in the XVI Century. If we consider the shift in perspective from object to the thinking subject and into the conditions which structure subjective consciousness as the high- light of the “Copernican revolution” of modern philosophy, we can readily appreciate the significance of Suarezian metaphysics as the metaphysics Des- cartes and Kant knew prior to their own moments of creative originality.® Against Suarez and his school (to which Molina, whom Banez opposed in the De ‘Auxiliis controversy, belonged) Banez insisted on a return to the authentic teaching of Aquinas on the primacy of the act of existing over the so-called eternal, immutable, and necessary essences. In point of fact, the struggle over the question of divine cau- sality and human freedom, with all attendant risks10 PRIMACY OF EXISTENCE IN THOMAS AQUINAS and assurances, imagined or real, involved a differ- ence on a profounder level, in the metaphysics out of which the conflicting positions issued.* Banez felt sure, and said so repeatedly, that his doctrine re- flected Aquinas’ teaching. The claim was dismissed, however, and the alternative consequences of an existence metaphysics could not be effectively ex- ploited later on at several turning points in modern Philosophy. Instead, an essentialistic scholasticism gained general acceptance and pushed its tide to- wards La Fléche and Kénigsberg. In the metaphysical treatise translated here, we see an effort in the late sixteenth century to pit an esse metaphysics against an essence metaphysics which even then had overwhelming historical forces on its side. A long line of schoolmen had prepared the way for Suarez. Duns Scotus’ understanding of being in terms of forms loomed large in Suarez’ mind. Before Scotus, the controversy between Giles of Rome and Henry of Ghent gave birth to what Fabro has called “bastard expressions in Thomism,” esse essentiae and esse existentiae. As though the mere > coupling of the words were not ghastly enough, the expressions solidified into stock phrases of meta- =), physical discourse and remained in general use for an unbelievably Jong time.> As this essentialistic ac- ~ count of being shaped itself into a tradition, Aquinas’ » understanding of being as the first and fundamental INTRODUCTION 11 act by which every other metaphysical principle is made real was forgotten. At best, existence was taken for the bare fact, the being-there, the state of actual ‘essence as distinguished from the state of possible essence through the intervention of efficient causal- ity.® At worst, existence was tolerated as a trouble- some intruder which nevertheless had to be shown in, assigned a place, and then quickly “reduced” to the status of essences, Nor is that view any happier which would avoid these extremes by holding a parity between essence and esse or would understand an esse metaphysics as an “inverted essentialism.” Philo- sophical reflection which is riveted upon the act of being eventually grasps epistemology, philosophy of man, ethics, etc., from a perspective irreducibly dif- ferent in method from that of a system centered on the limits and kinds of being as first principles. Even Banez himself made a concession regarding the real distinction between essence and existence. His use of the distorted phrases we just discussed tends to “give pause” even to one inclined to credit him with the “deepest understanding” of St. Thomas’ doctrine among all the commentators.’ Nevertheless, a reading of the definitive position which is presented here shows that he unequivocally rejected the es- sentialistic interpretations of Aquinas’ metaphysics prevailing in his day. Here he records his dissatisfac- tion with the deceptive notion propounded by Caje-12 PRIMACY OF EXISTENCE IN THOMAS AQUINAS tan of esse as “ultimate act.” He insists on Aquinas’ “ teaching that esse is first act by which anything is real at all. Esse, he says, is not substance, nor is it an accident. It is not an essential constituent, nor in any way to be understood as a classification among the predicaments, Esse transcends all these; it is the act by which any of these causes are causes. Thus, in a finite being, esse, though extrinsic to the creature’s essence, is yet the most internal to it of all the prin- * ciples. Essence relates to esse only as a limit, and the very reality of that limit is from esse. Clearly, we are encountering here a metaphysics of a far different cut from that of Aristotle or Suarez. « Unheeded in his times, Banez’ commentaries are now considered the best presentation of Aquinas’ teaching and “indispensable reading” for anyone who wishes to orient himself along Aquinas’ view of be- ing.® It is interesting to see contemporary thinkers who draw inspiration from Aquinas probe the reali- ties of person, freedom, responsibility, knowledge, ctc.,® in continuity with a metaphysics first thought out in the 1200's, then gradually lost, then briefly and unsuccessfully upheld at a critical moment in the history of metaphysical thought in the late 1500's. * * * Here it may be well to mention the purpose of © this translation, When a teacher uses the historical INTRODUCTION 13 approach in his metaphysics classes, at the same time that his own persuasions tend to synthesize along the ines of an esse metaphysics, there is the problem of getting a text that is effective, yet brief enough to balance out with selections from other schools of thought. This Banez commentary can pethaps be such a text when the time comes to discuss the meta- physical tradition from Aquinas. The translation was done with this possibility in mind. After drafting a literal translation, each sentence was recast to make it as readable as possible to present-day studeats. No book in classroom use today uses the schoolman’s mode of presentation which Banez used, namely, point to be proven, followed by the syllogistic proof, followed in turn by another syllogism proving the major premise, the minor, etc. Hence, I have not followed that structure in all its technicalities. Need- less to say, I am not unmindful of corrections or al- ternate renditions Latin scholars could suggest for various parts of this difficult commentary. However, I feel that, for all its imperfections, the translation bears the insights of the original without betrayal. For their assistance in various ways I am grateful to the following: Reverend Maurice R. Holloway, S.J., Reverend Louis Peinado, S.J., Sister Mary Anne, B.V.M., my wife Shirley; the librarians at Cudahy Library, Loyola University, at Albertus Magnus Lyceum, River Forest, Illinois, and at St. Mary of14 PRIMACY OF EXISTENCE IN THOMAS AQUINAS the Lake Seminary, Mundelein, Illinois; Janice Good- man and Mary Ann Makowski of the Henry Regnery Company. BENJAMIN S. LLAMZON Loyola University Chicago THE PRIMACY OF EXISTENCE IN THOMAS AQUINASTHE TEXT OF THOMAS AQUINAS + WHETHER ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE ARE THE SAME IN GOD Perhaps essence and existence (esse) are not the same in God for the following reasons: First, if they are the same, then nothing is added to the divine existence. Now the existence to which no addition is made is existence as commonly predi- cated of all things. God then would be existence as commonly predicable of all things. But this is false. “Men gave an incommunicable name to stones and wood,” says the Book of Wisdom, XIV, 21. Second, as was said above (q. 2, 4.2), we can know whether God exists, but we cannot know what He is. Therefore, God's existence is not the same as His es- sence, whatness, or nature. On the contrary, Hilary says in Book VIL On The Trinity (PL 10,208) “Existence is not an accident in + Translated from the Leonine edition of Summa Theologiae, q. 3, att. 4 of St. Thomas Aquinas, by Ben- jamin S. Llamzon. 1718 PRIMACY OF EXISTENCE IN THOMAS AQUINAS God, but subsistent truth.” What subsists in God then is His existence. I answer that God is not only His own essence, as was shown, but also His own existence. This can be shown in many ways, First, anything in a being that is not included in its essence must be caused either by the intrinsic principles of its essence or by some extrinsic principle. An instance of the former is the proper accidents which accompany a species, as the power to laugh is proper to man and is caused by ‘- the intrinsic principles of the species. An instance of the latter is heat in water as caused by fire. Thus, if the very existence of a thing be other than its es- sence, then it must be caused either by an extrinsic principle, or by that thing's own essential principles. Now it is impossible for existence to be caused only by the essential principles of a being, since no being its own existence. It follows that a being whose exist- ence is other than its own essence has that existence as caused by another. Now this cannot be said of God since we say that God is the first efficient cause, It is 4 impossible, therefore, that in God existence is other than His essence. Second, existence is the actuality of every form or nature, for goodness and humanity are understood as actual only when they are understood as existing. Existence itself then must be compared to an essence which is other, as act to potency. But THE TEXT OF THOMAS AQUINAS 19 since in God there is no potentiality, as was shown above, it follows that in Him essence is not other than His own existence. His essence, therefore, is His existence. Third, just as something which has fire but is not fire itself is on fire through participation, so, a being which has existence but is not existence itself is a being through participation. Now God, as was shown, is His own essence. Therefore, if He is not His own existence, He will not be essential but par- ticipated being. In that case, He will not be first be- ing—which is absurd. Therefore, God is His own existence and not merely His own essence. The answer to the first reason is that « being to which no addition is made may be understood in two ways. One, it may be of a thing's very nature that an addition could not come to it. For instance, it is of the yery nature of an irrational animal that it be without reason. Two, it may be proper to a certain intelligibility not to require addition. For instance, animal-in-general does not include reason, since it is not within the intelligibility of animal-in-general to have reason; but neither does its intelligibility pre- clude reason. The divine existence then is without addition in the first way, whereas existence as a com- mon term is without addition in the second way. ‘The answer to the second reason is that existence can have two meanings. One, it can mean the act of existing. Two, it can mean the composition of a | | \ |PRIMACY OF EXISTENCE IN THOMAS AQUINAS proposition which the mind forms when attaching a predicate to a subject. Taking existence in the first meaning, we cannot know the existence of God as we cannot know His essence. Only in the second mean- ing of existence can we know God, for we know that the proposition which we form about God when we say “God exists” is true. This we know from His effects, as was shown above. THIS IS THE PROPERTY OF Southern Evangelical Seminary Library THE COMMENTARY THEOLOGIAN hold this article’s conclusion certain on the basis of faith. Their textual proof is Exodus 3: “Lam Who Am, and He Who IS sent me to you.” In this text, God, by saying that HE IS, signifies his substance; otherwise, creatures also are, and God would not have given any unique and proper char- acterization of himself in saying I AM. Compared to Him, creatures are said not to be, v.g., Isaias 40: “All the nations are as nothing, thus are they before Him.” The Holy Fathers unanimously affirm this conclusion, and in the text cited in the preceding article, the Master of the Sentences refers to their pronouncements." If this conclusion were not true, it would follow that the divine essence is not infinite simply and absolutely, for the divine essence would not then intrinsically include existence itself, which is the greatest perfection. See St. Thomas’ many other demonstrations of this point in Contra Gentes, 1, ¢. 22-23. Now someone may say: if this is a conclusion of faith, how is it demonstrated? The same question can be raised about all of the conclusions of the preceding and the following articles, and thus one 2pra PRIMACY OF EXISTENCE IN THOMAS AQUINAS and the same answer will apply to them all. We do not understand those conclusions. of faith as belong- ing immediately to faith. Rather we take them as belonging to faith in the same way as the conclusion “God exists” is said to belong to faith, even though it is demonstrated, for if such a conclusion is denied, a clear denial of a truth which belongs to faith im- mediately follows. Conclusions of this kind are thus said to belong to faith. A denial of them would in- dicate that the authority of the Scriptures is not infallible, and that an article of faith is not true, for one who denies the existence of God would deny all the articles of faith. We say the same thing with re- gard to the other divine attributes which are demon- strated by natural reason. If they are denied, God’s existence, which is the basis of our entire faith, would be denied. * * ® This article contains a subtle and metaphysical position, very different, as Cajetan says, from that of modern writers? who think that essence and existence are identified, not only in God, but in every being. This is why I want to examine and clarify this matter carefully. eras Before proceeding, we have to look at a few points in order to understand St, Thomas’ reasons and position in this article 5 THE COMMENTARY 23 Notice in his first reason how he says that proper accidents are caused by the principles of the species. One correctly asks by what kind of causality they are said to be caused by such principles. The answer is that we are talking here about a certain kind of efficient cause from which there is a certain simple emanation of effects, but through the one act by which it produces a substance, not through another act effecting a new change. Examples of this would be the light of the sun, which is caused by the es- sential principles of the sun's substance, and the cold which comes from the substance of water. This cold may be impeded, but, once the impediment is removed, the cold comes forth immediately. This is said to be from the generative principle of water. Again, a stone is said to have a sort of efficient cause of its natural motion, since by a certain simple emanation it straightway follows a downward motion when impediments are removed.” In the same way proper accidents and powers of the soul emanate from the soul itself. Secondly, notice the proposition St. Thomas holds in his first reason, namely, that no being is sufficient to be a cause of its own being, as long as it has a caused existence, One wonders why this is so, since man, for instance, has the power to laugh, which is a caused power. However, man sufficiently accounts for his power of laughter by himself, since the veryPRIMACY OF EXISTENCE IN THOMAS AQUINAS definition of man shows that he is indeed able to laugh. Thus, there is no contradiction in saying that a being has an efficient cause of its esse and yet is the sufficient cause of its own existence through its own essential principles. This is precisely where the difficult and mysterious problem we are about to examine begins, namely, with the existence and es- sence of creatures. Meanwhile, it should be pointed out that there is quite a difference between proper- ties in relation to their essential principles in a species, and these same essential principles in rela- tion to the act of existing itself.* For a property, v.g. risibility, already presupposes an actual essence, and, thus, it emanates as an accident, which is a being of a being. On the other hand, esse itself, since it is formally® that by which essence is, cannot possibly presuppose essence as the cause from which it flows since this would imply the prior existence of that same essence—a clear contradiction. For instance, since a thing is formally white by whiteness, it would be a contradiction to suppose a thing white even before it had whiteness. In the same way it is alto- gether unintelligible how anything which has a caused existence can be a sufficient cause of its own exist- ence, Now one could perhaps ask why, according to our reasoning, a being with a caused existence can in no way be a sufficient cause of its own existence, whereas THE COMMENTARY 25 St. Thomas scems to imply in the article that indeed esse is somehow caused by a being’s essential prin- ciples. The answer is that essential principles are a material cause of esse since they themselves can re~ ceive the act of existing through which they are first actuated. Indeed, these essential principles are under- stood only to the extent that they are ordered to esse, just as transparency is a cause of light in the sense that it makes the reception of light possible. And although esse itself, as received in an essence com- posed of essential principles, is specified by them, still it (esse) receives no perfection from such a specification. Rather esse is constricted and brought down to being of a certain kind, for existence as a man or as an angel is not absolute and unqualified perfection, Now this is exactly what St. Thomas has often insistently proclaimed, although Thomists will not listen: namely, that esse is the actuality of every form or nature. Look at the second reason given in this article. Here he says that esse is not received in a subject as a recipient and as something perfectible, but rather as that which is received and is perfecting that in which it is received. Insofar as esse itself is received, it is contracted and, if 1 may so put it, “imperfected.” We shall say more on these points later. ‘There is also a problem regarding how precisely this second reason should be understood, for St.PRIMACY OF EXISTENCE IN’ THOMAS AQUINAS Thomas says that goodness and humanity are not referred to as actual unless they are precisely exist- ing. This seems to be false since, when I know a rose and name it, I refer to its actuality without signifying that it is existing, as, for instance, when I say that a rose is a very lovely flower, etc. To this difficulty, one could answer from Cajetan’s teaching on St. Thomas’ second reason, namely, that any quiddity or nature, no matter how actual in the line of quiddity, still is potential in relation to esse, * for wisdom and goodness are taken as actual pre- cisely when taken as existing, and so too with hu- manity, equinity, etc. Hence, esse is the actuality of every form, and no nature is said to be completely actualized until it is actually exercising existence. So far this is Cajetan’s position. Now, this solution ap- pears to be less than satisfactory, for the way we understand a thing through a proper concept is also the way we express that thing.? Now we understand quite clearly the nature of a triangle, even though it may not exist actually, and so we express quite clearly the nature of a triangle. Cajetan’s comment on St. Thomas’ statement that goodness or humanity is not understood as actual unless signified precisely as cxisting is thet existence should be understood as the last actuality. This does not seem to be the correct - way to put it; for esse is the first act of any being, not the last. Clearly this is so, since being is what is first THE COMMENTARY 27 understood and in this is included esse, or an intrinsic order to esse as to the first act. Thus, it seems to me that, when St. Thomas says that no form is signified as actual unless we signify it as being, we must under- stand him to mean form in relation to esse, for this is the way we understand form, whether that being exists actually or potentially. This position is based on being as the object of the intellect. * However, I admit that when a thing is understood as actually existing it has a greater perfection than when it is understood as in potency. For the rest, the quiddity of things other than God says nothing about their actuality or non-actuality. Thus abstractly under- stood, the quiddity can be perfectly defined. Cajetan points to a textual difficulty about the second argument. The answer seems to involve two contradictions, If, after demonstration, we affirm that this proposition, “God exists,” is true, then we know it is objectively true that God exists. Now this is to know God's esse. So, we know not only that the proposition “God exists” is true, but we also know the act of existing as belonging to God Himself, es- pecially since a proposition is said to be true or false depending on whether the thing it talks about is or is not.* * An asterisk indicates that translations of pertinent passages from other works by Banez are given in that note28 PRIMACY OF EXISTENCE IN THOMAS AQUINAS See Cajetan’s 2 Post. c. 1, on this difficulty. He has a brief and good answer, however, in his commentary on this article.* He points out that this is the differ- ence between God’s esse and the esse of other beings, namely, that God's esse is identically God's very substance, quod quid est, for the proposition “God exists” is in the first mode of direct predication.'” The esse of other beings, by contrast, is found dif- ferently, namely, by distinguishing from their quiddi- ties, This is the basis for the other difference, namely, that the esse of God is, strictly speaking, the precise object of the question: what is He. Only indirectly is He the object of the question: IS He; namely, insofar as He is the basis for the truth of the proposition. Now the esse of other beings docs not in any way relate to this question “what is it,” but simply and objectively to the question “is it.” Thus, when we know that any of these other beings is, we not only know the esse which indicates the truth of the propo- sition, but we also know the very existence of that being since it is known precisely as it is knowable. It is otherwise with God. When we know that He is, we are said to know the actual truth of the proposi- tion, not the absolute esse of God as it is knowable, namely, as of His very essence. This latter we know only indirectly, insofar as it suffices to ground the truth of this proposition: God exists. Thus, in the proposition “God exists,” our knowledge attains not THE COMMENTARY 29 only the truth of the proposition, but also the exist- ence itself of God insofar as it relates to the truth of the proposition. One can press the point of these demonstrations even further, for through proofs not only do we reach the esse of God insofar as it relates to the truth of the proposition “God exists,” but we also know that it is of the very essence of God, and that God is sub- sistent esse Himself. The preceding answer would thus be false. The answer is that, although we come to know this truth through rational proofs, namely, that esse belongs to the very essence of God and that He is subsistent esse Himself, and infinite, im- mutable, eternal, and many other attributes, which are of His very essence, we nevertheless know all these vaguely and through a certain negation or analogy to creatures. We do not know them through a proper concept which expresses His quiddity just as it is. This is what St. Thomas wants to bring out in this solution to the second argument. In other beings we can know the essence itself, even though we may not know their actual existence, since this latter is extrinsic to their essence. But we cannot have a distinct knowledge of God's quiddity unless wwe explicitly and distinctly know the subsistent esse of God Himself. This sort of knowledge cannot be drawn out of our knowledge of creatures, no matter how distinct our knowledge is. Let what has been30° PRIMACY OF EXISTENCE IN THOMAS AQUINAS said about essence and existence as they pertain to God suffice at this point, Now, in order to understand how it is true only of God that esse is His essence and how every creature is related as something po- tential to the act of existing, I think it is worthwhile f) If then existence is not any one of these, it is not to examine closely what the act of existing is in creatures. To which things and how does it relate? What is its cause? These points are often employed in theological discussions, yet few take the trouble to clarify them, First question: what is existence? To begin, let us look at the word “existence.” Existence is that by which a thing is understood pre- cisely as actually existing outside its causes. Perhaps too we can say that existence means ex-sistens, that is, an actuality “outside” potentiality. Our question here is not about this or that particular existence, but in general about the existence of a creature. What precisely is its intelligibility? On this point there are various opinions. * * * One opinion is that existence is nothing but a cer- tain kind of accident received in creatures by which they stand outside nothingness.” The first reason for saying this is that existence THE COMMENTARY 31 is neither the matter nor form of a natural being, nor is it the whole composite. Therefore, it is an accident. ‘The premise is clear enough and is found in St. Thomas. The conclusion is proved in that substance is cither matter or form or the composite from both. substance. Secondly, existence informs and actualizes the whole essence of the substance to which it is referred. Thus, it is entirely distinct from substance, just as act is distinct from potency. If then it is neither substance nor something substantial, it will be an accident. Besides, whatever comes to a thing already consti- tuted of matter and form is an accident. Should it be said that it is the act of substance without being re- ceived in substance, this would seem to be rionsense. How can a substance exist through an existence which is not within it? Also, if that were true, there could be no reason why Peter exists through this rather than that other existence through which Paul exists, since neither existence is received in Peter. Thirdly, existence is not distinct from the duration of a being, just as motion is not distinct from time, which is the measure of motion. Now the duration of a being is an accident pertaining to the predicament of quantity or to the predicament when. Thus, exist- ence too is an accident. Furthermore, duration seems to be nothing more than the continuation of esse.32. PRIMACY OF EXISTENCE IN THOMAS AQUINAS| Now a being’s continued existence is not distinct| from itself. Again, the durations of things are distin-| guished according to the diverse modes of existence. Tor instance, an aevurn is the duration of an exist ence intrinsically unchangeable, though extrinsically| changeable; time is the duration of a being intrinsi-| cally changeable both successively and continuously; eternity is said to be the measure of a being altogether unchangeable, whose existence is His essence.!? Thus, existence and duration are identical and belong to| the same predicament. The other opi on S.T., I, d. 8, q. 1, a. 1, conel, 3% (and of Gerard commenting on the same question, a. 3, ad 3 against the first conclusion), who holds that existence is the actuality and the form, as it were, of every created, thing by which everything is said formally to exist. |. He says that existence in itself is neither a substance nor an accident, yet that the existence of substance is reduced to the predicament of substance and the existence of an accident is reduced to the predicament of accident. According to Capreolus then, existence | does not belong directly to any predicament, In his De Ente et Essentia, c. 5, q. 11, ad 8, Cajetan too says that the existence of a substance is a substance, and the existence of an accident is an accident. He says that the existence of a substance is reduced to the genus of a substance as the last formal principle n is that of Capreolus commenting}. THE COMMENTARY 33 of that substance, since a being is put in the genus of substance because it is capable of being substantial. To come now to a decision on this question. Let this be our first conclusion: existence in its precise intelligibility cannot be an accident, for the precise intelligibility of existence is that of a pure perfection. As such, it cannot be an accident, for no accident, no matter how perfect, is in its intelligibility a pure perfection. Furthermore, existence is found formally in God, and thus it cannot formally be an accident. Second conclusion. Created existence, the existence of a created thing, does not as such signify an acci- dent. First, the intelligibility of an accident presup- poses a being in which it inheres. But to really exist, the existence of a substance does not presuppose a being already actual. Thus, it is not an accident. The major premise is clear since an accident is a being of a being. The proof of the minor premise is that sub- stance itself cannot be understood as existing before it has existence. Thus, existence does not come to an existing substance but rather is that by which sub- stance precisely exists. Furthermore, the very sub- stance itself, whether created or creatable, is not intelligible without an intrinsic and transcendental order to esse or existence. Hence, existence cannot be an accident, for a substance in its own intelligibility does not depend on an accident. Since a substancePRIMACY OF EXISTENCE IN THOMAS AQUINAS is understood as a being, namely, insofar as it has or "is apt to have esse in itself (and not in another), it cannot then be understood without an intrinsic order to the act of existing itself, for this act, while not a quiddity of substance (hence, substance is seen pre- cisely as created), is nevertheless that by reason of which substance is understood as a being in itself. ‘The final proof is that, if esse itself were an accident, then all the predicaments would be accidents. This is so since the predicaments are distinguished through the diverse modes of being. Thus, if esse itself were an accident, every mode of being would be an ac- cident. The third conclusion. The act of existing is some- thing real and intrinsic to the existent, for esse is that by which a thing is constituted as outside noth- ingness. Now, I do not understand esse to be intrinsic to the existent in such a way as to be a part of it or its essence, or as though it were something essential (we shall take this point up in the next section), but I do say that esse is intrinsic to the existent insofar +4 as that thing is not said to exist by an extrinsic de- nomination as, for instance, when place is predicated of it. Esse is said of a thing as something within it though received from another, as personality" or even accidents are said to be intrinsic to substance; whiteness, for instance, is said to be intrinsic to some body. Existence is the first actuality, by which a thing THE COMMENTARY 35 is posited outside nothingness, and therefore it has to be within the thing, It is unintelligible how a thing could be constituted as outside nothingness by some- thing which is not internal to it. Furthermore, if the first actuality of a thing were extrinsic to it, then no other actuality could be intrinsic to it. The first ac- tuality is the root of every other actuality. Now since all the other actualities constrict the act of existing itself to some mode or kind of existing, this implies that the other actualities are intrinsic to the existent, while esse remains extrinsic. Finally, were esse not intrinsic to a thing, then in that existent it would be unreceived. That thing then would be self-existing and infinite like the divine existence. Fourth conclusion, The general consideration of the intelligibility proper to esse, though it involves being intrinsic to an existing being, does not require that it be received as in a subject. This is clear since, otherwise, existence would not formally belong to God. The fact is that it is most intrinsic to Him since it is His quiddity. A parallel to this would be the way we understand wisdom in its own formal intelligibility as not requiring reception in a subject. Such a recep- tion means an imperfection in wisdom, and this is true of created wisdom, not because it is wisdom formally, but because it is created and participated. Fifth conclusion. The intelligibility of created exist- ence consists more and chiefly in this, that it is a36 PRIMACY OF EXISTENCE IN THOMAS AQUINAS termination which fulfills the potency of substance to become real and to be outside nothingness, rather than in that existence itself be received in the sub- stance as in a limiting subject. For this point there is theological proof, According to the more probable opinion and that of St. Thomas, the humanity in Christ our Lord does not have an existence that is created and received in a subject; rather it exists out- side nothingness through the existence of the divine word, which terminates and completes the order of that humanity to actuality. Thus, we understand the formal, direct and proper intelligibility of esse as that by which a being exists outside nothingness. Beyond this, the reception and limitation of esse in a being is really a case of existence as material and imperfect, for if this latter belonged to the formal intelligibility of esse, a creature's existence could not be substituted for by divine existence without this latter being lim- ited by the former. For instance, God would be unable through His own existence, instead of through whiteness, to make something white exist. Hence, the preceding conclusion holds. An excellent illustration confirms the point, for the reason why theologians (and we too will hold this later on in g. 12, a. 2) say that the divine essence can function in place of an intelligible species lies in its unifying function be- tween object and power. The fact that in us intelligible species are accidents inhering in the intellect is due THE COMMENTARY 37 to our intellect’s own imperfection. So also, we say here that the proper and formal intelligibility of exist- ence does not include any dependence upon that which through it exists, but consists only in this, that it thoroughly actualizes the order of substance or essence to being and away from nothingness. Sixth conclusion. Existence which fulfills the po- tentiality of substance, not only so it is outside nothingness, but also so that substance may exist in itself (not in a subject), is reduced as such to the predicament of substance, not as potentiality nor as proper difference, but as first act, completing the intrinsic mode of substance which exists in itself; that is to say, it is that by which substance primarily exists in itself, Now if [ may put this more accurately, the act of existing itself is above all of the categories and is not reduced to any of the categories as to ng more noble than esse itself. Rather, this reduction to a category is more a limitation of exist- ence and an imperfection than an entrance into some- thing more perfect. In this reduction the parts of substance are assigned to the category of substance as to something better, which also is the case when differences are set beside a predicament. However, existence realizes genus, difference, and everything in the predicaments, Therefore, in my judgment, it is incorrect to say that esse is reduced to a predicament; rather it is participated in and limited by all of the aaa ayargon 38 PRIMACY OF EXISTENCE IN THOMAS AQUINAS predicaments. Esse itself does not participate in any of the predicaments but is participated in by all of them, as St. Thomas teaches often, especially in Quaestio Unica De Anima a. 6, ad 2.1 A confirma- tion of this is that no one would claim that being is reduced to a predicament. We say rather that finite being is divided into predicaments through diverse modes, by which it is limited as a principle internal to every genus and every predicamental difference. Since being means that which has esse, as a potency which has its act, how can one hold consistently that the potency itself is not reduced to a predicament while the act itself is thus reduced? These are points which require extremely refined, not slipshod, metaphysical inquiry. From here then we proceed to the last conclusion. The existence of an accident, by a natural propor- tion, belongs to an accident, just as the existence of a substance belongs to substance. We go along on this point with the generally accepted opinion, which may also be seen in St. Thomas and which Cajetan explains very well in q. 28, a. 2, ad 2,"° namely, that the in-existence of any accidental form is really dis- tinguished from the essence of an accident and the esse of the subject. To me, however, it does not seem improbable that the same existence of the substance which directly actualizes substance also actualizes the accidental form." This is a good conclusion since THE COMMENTARY 39 the reality of an accidental form is to the esse of an accident as the esse of a substance is to substance. Hence, the existence of an accident belongs directly to an accident even as the existence of substance be- longs to substance. ‘We now counter the arguments for the first opinion Ip. 30 above]. The consequence in the first argument is denied. An accident presupposes the esse of sub- stance in its intelligibility in order that it may be truly said to be a being in a being. As for the proof of the consequence, it is conceded that existence is neither matter nor substantial form nor the substan- tial composite. It is the first actuality, completing and terminating the intrinsic mode of substance. Thus, it is reduced in some way, as we said, to sub- stance, not as participating substance, but as some- thing directly participated in by it. In the second argument the antecedent and main consequent are admitted, but what follows is denied, namely, that, since it is neither substance nor some- thing substantial, esse is therefore an accident. This is an incorrect conclusion, for existence itself, ac- cording (o its proper intelligibility, even in created things, is neither a substance nor an accident. It is the first actuality and realization of substance or accident. The well-known saying that there is no third between substance and accident is true if it is under- stood correctly. It is true that there will be no being,40 PRIMACY OF EXISTENCE IN THOMAS AQUINAS that is, something that has esse, which will be neither substance nor accident. So, esse itself or existence is not the being which has esse but is that by which or through order to which something has esse. Thus, we should not wonder that existence itself is neither substance nor a part of substance, nor an accident nor of the essence of an accident. For the rest, by an improper meaning of “reduction,” we admit that sometimes it is reduced to substance, sometimes to accident, depending on whether it actuates a sub- stance or an accident, Every time an addition comes to a thing constituted through matter and form, that addition is understood to come to a being in act, cither according to actuality or according to reason, Thus, esse is presupposed either according to actuality or according to reason. But prior to existence, either according to actuality or according to reason, there exists nothing and nothing is understood, since being is the object of the intellect. Hence, existence is never understood to be superadded to a being already composed of matter and form, for such a composite, if it excludes an order to existence, is nothing. What has been said in the third, fourth, fifth and sixth conclusions also holds for the retort, Now for the answer to the third argument.* First, I reject the minor, for to perdure is intrinsically and THE COMMENTARY 4. formally to remain in existence, a kind of an absolute. This does not entail a relation to anything extrinsic. Even though it may be explained and known through order to time, this order still does not belong to its formal intelligibility, for esse is prior in the natural order, and so it is more fundamental for a thing to remain in its own existence than for it, while so per- during, to be in time. Similarly, the having of a quantitative mode of being is more basic to a thing than its being localized. Secondly, I deny the major, for, over and above existence, duration adds permanence and continua- tion. Hence, to exist by the clock is not simply to exist, that is to say, simply and absolutely, for this latter is nothing more than to have existence zetually outside one’s causes. Existence in a measure of time, or duration, is not included in the absolute meaning of existence. Hence, existence is absolutely distin- guished from the duration of a thing, and this also contains the answer to the confirmation given above. Though the continuation of a thing and the thing itself are not distinguished as one thing from another, still they are distinguished as a thing and its mode. ‘The answer to the Jast confirmation is that it proves only that duration has a certain dependence on the existence of a thing, not that it is formally identical with esse.42 PRIMACY OF EXISTENCE IN THOMAS AQUINAS With regard to the opinion of Capreolus and Cajetan [p. 32], two remarks have to be made. First, how are both of them to be understood when they say that esse or existence is reduced to substance in- sofar as it actuates substance? !or this reduction, as we said, is not that of an imperfect to a more perfect thing, but rather that of the most perfect actuality, the very act of existing in itself, to the best receptive potency. The other point is that they call esse the ultimate actuality of a thing. This requires an explanation. Esse or existence is the first actuality, not only as iegards the goal of the one generating, but also in its formal intelligibility, since nothing is understood unless it either has esse or an intrinsic order to esse. Thus, it seems false to say that esse itself is the end intended by the one generating and hence is the ul- timate actuality of a thing, This point is confirmed in that in the process of generation, while a man is generated, there can be no embryo prior to its own existence. The very fact that we say “it is an embryo” shows we already understand existence. Indeed, something potential cannot be understood unless it be already understood that esse itsclf can actualize that potency. Hence, I am dissatisfied with Cajetan’s explanation of the above point, namely, that existence is called the ultimate actuality of a thing because THE COMMENTARY 43 generation ends with it, Certainly this business of calling esse ultimate actuality is rarely found in St. Thomas. In the Quaestio Unica De Anima a. 6, ad 2, you will find that he says that esse itself is the last act, which can be participated in by all. In this very place, however, if you continue reading, you will see how esse is called last act, namely, as the supreme, most excellent act, which indeed perfects all other acts, for every other form relates to esse as potency to act. Perhaps to be more acceptable we can say that esse is the first and last actuality of any being: first in the order of intellectual composition, last how- ever in the order of intellectual resolution. For in- stance, when the intellect selates its idea of being, which is its proper object, down to man, what it understands is first to be in itself, which indicates substance, then to be body, to be living, tobe rational. In all these steps esse itself is seen as first act. Now if one wishes resolutively to retrace his steps upward to what is simpler, he will arrive at esse itself. Be- yond this he cannot go. This shows how esse itself js first and last act. In the last analysis it is so purely and simply a perfection that no composition whatever can be found in it, although all things except God are composed of esse and essence as of act and potency. Our discourse up to this point then has been on the intelligibility of esse itself.44 PRIMACY OF EXISTENCE IN THOMAS AQUINAS Second question: the distinction between esse and essence in created things, namely, whether esse is, distinguished from essence. Let us first consider the arguments for the nega- tive side. If esse is really distinct from essence, it follows that God can separate esse from essence, and con- serve both, for, when two things are really distinct, nothing can make it impossible for God to conserve one without the other. Here the falsity of the conse- quent is immediately evident, for, if essence is con- served and exists and on the other hand we suppose that God separates esse from essence, we end in two contradictories: it does and does not have esse. By a similar reason, St. Thomas says, in q. 66, a. 1, that matter cannot be without form or else matter would exist actually without act, which is impossible. Secondly, if esse is really distinct from essence, it follows that it would be pure act and thus would be God, for if esse is really distinct from essence, it is an act which does not include any potentiality. Thus, it is pure act, The antecedent is proved in that esse itself has no potency whatever, unless such a po- tency comes from esse being identified with essence; otherwise, if esse itself were to be composed of act and potency, there would be an infinite series. Thirdly, if esse is really distinct from essence, it THE COMMENTARY 45 follows that it exists by itself, for the act of existing, since it includes no potency, cannot exist through an- other act. Thus, it exists through itself. This, how- ever, is true of God alone. Fourthly, if esse is really distinct from essence, it follows that immaterial substances are composed of esse and essence. The consequent is false, therefore, ‘The proof here is that whatever includes distinct things is a composite of them. The minor’s proof is that it is impossible for an unum per se to result from two components, unless one of these components relates to the other as potency to its act, for from two actually existing things we do not get an unum per se, as Aristotle teaches in his second book of De Anima and the seventh book of the Metaphysics, text 49. Now in immaterial substances, clearly the esse cannot be the potency; nor can the essence, since this will then either be absolute or only relative po- tency. Now it cannot be absolute potency, since this would make it pure potency as prime matter; nor can it be relative potency, since what is relatively a potency, simply has to be actual. In that case the essence of an angel, apart from esse and precisely as distinct from esse, would simply be in actuality. Fifthly, if there is a real distinction between esse and essence, it follows that the distinction obtains between two fundamentally real things. Now this con- sequent is false; therefore. . . . The proof of this is