Naxalbari and After-A Frontier Anthology - Vol 2
Naxalbari and After-A Frontier Anthology - Vol 2
Naxalbari and After-A Frontier Anthology - Vol 2
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Volume Two
NAXALBARI
AND AFTER
a frontier
anthology
Edited by
Samar Sen
Debabrata Panda
Ashish Lahiri
Kathashilpa
CALCUTTA 700 073
"We acknowledge with thanks the cooperation
extended to us by the Board of Directors,
Germinal Publications (Pvt.) Ltd., and all
friends of FRONTIER and KATHASHILPA,
without whose help the publication of these
volumes would not have been possible.
December 1978
Jacket designed by
PRABIR SEN
DEBATES
Appraisal
Naxalbari : between yesterday and to-morrow
—Sumanta Banerjee *« 100
CPI(ML) : the twilight hour—A Correspondent 109
Naxalbari and After : An appraisal
—Prabhat Jana ••• 117
The Main danger—Baburaj ••• 129
‘The Main danger’—Prabhat Jana ••• 137
‘The Main danger’—Arun Goswami ... 145
What’s to be done'—K. G. 148
Class Struggle—Moni Guha •. • 152
Letter—Arun Goswami ... 155
The main dangers and the main errors
—Rafikul Hassan ... 157
Continuity of Naxalbari—Bhabani Chowdhuri ... 169
DOCUMENTS
Appendix
One Divides into Two
—Subroto Datta (Jahar) ... 419
Index
DEBATES
Strategy And Tactics
MALLIKARJUNA RAO
Letter
Vol II—2
18 NAXALBARI AND AFTER VOL IP
Letter
Letter
Vol II—3
34 NAXALBARI AND AFTER VOL II
the Agency area armed struggle and the PC) which they them¬
selves had dissolved. “The two leaders gave a call to fornv
rival party committees in the State and thus caused a split in
the party”.
The PC solemnly declared that they would fight till the end1
and carry forward the armed agrarian revolution until the rea¬
lisation of the great hopes of ‘our martyr comrades’—the esta¬
blishment of New Democracy—and the PC would steadfastly
adhere to and follow Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tsetung
Thought and implement the people’s war path.
January 27, 1973
etc. are not slogans that would polarise the people for the
higher struggle ahead. It may be noted that there is a funda¬
mental difference between India and Pakistan. In a Marxist
definition of a nation, as clearly stated by Stalin, Pakistan can
not be a nation because of the geographical discontinuity ;
and so, the sooner it disintegrates the better for the develop¬
ment of the revolutionary forces. So there regional autonomy
would focus the revolutionary cause, and a struggle for auto¬
nomy would soon change into a liberation struggle. But this
is not the case with India where it will only strengthen the
hands of the reactionaries by inciting regionalism.
The only slogan that can put this vote to the cause of revo¬
lution is the call to the people to reject the Constitution based
on the right to property as the fundamental right and to
substitute it by one based on the right to work as the
fundamental right. This will bring forth a revolutionary
polarisation : on the one side people with property, and on
the other people without work. All the political parties will be
exposed. As the Naxalites have divided Indian politics into
two—Vote or Revolution—the issue of private property would
divide the parliamentary politics into two—Vote for Revolu¬
tion or Vote for Reform—and would turn this election into a
referendum.
March 6, 1971'
Letter
Vol 11—4
50 NAXALBARI AND AFTER VOL lit
SUDARSHAN CHATTERJEE
April 3, 1971 ' Calcutta
COMMUNISTS—SIMPLE,
MARXIST AND REVOLUTIONARY
Fertiliser Industry
Total Investment Foreign Exchange
31 Five year Plan 47 crores 17-5 crores
Trombay 25 55 13 55
Gorakhpur 18 55 8 55
Nahar Katiya 12 55 7 55
Barauni 35 55 18-40
Cochin 31-25 55 11-05 55
DEBATES AND DOCUMENTS
59
Vol II—5
CPI(M)’S REVOLUTIONARY TEACHING
DIGVI JAY
A SHIM MITRA
Letter
19th century and in Russia during the early part of the 20th
century, at a time when Marxism was being developed in
practice, cannot be compared with terrorism today, after the
experience of so many successful revolutions. In the Indian
situation a tremendous scope is opening up not only in West
Bengal and Kerala but in all the States to develop mass
movement, more effective and broadbased, on a scale not
witnessed before.
During half a century in India we have seen the activities
of terrorists ; they showed their mettle in devotion, idealism,
self-sacrifice and heroism drawing admiration from and applause
of the educated people but they could not arouse the masses
or build up revolutionary bases. The stuff of the Naxalites is
much inferior even though they profess to follow a superior
•ideology. In fact, they are nowhere near the ideology they
claim to follow. They professed rejection of the parliamentary
path and gave the ‘boycott election’ call but in practice they
joined hands with the CPI, Congress (O) and Congress (R) to
defeat the CPI(M) in the elections. And how could Mr
Mitra show his reliance on elections where he said, “the
Congress debacle in West Bengal in the 1967 elections, the
minority Left CPI victory in Kerala and West Bengal (were)
sure signs that the mass movement had reached the point of
armed struggle” ? If the fundamental premise is wrong, one
mistake leads to successive mistakes. “Boycott of elections”
is a wrong slogan and it will be equally wrong to rely on the
election results as an indication of the maturity of the revolu¬
tionary situation.
Naxalites do not understand in what situation Lenin
formulated “boycott of election” as a correct policy and in
what situation he advised participation in the Duma elections.
For the same misconception the advancement of the struggling
people in West Bengal and Kerala is taken as a surer sign of
the maturity of the revolutionary situation for the whole of
India. This misconception is due to a mechanical approach
do try to repeat the experiences of other countries in India
Vol II—6
82 NAXALBARI AND AFTER VOL ID
ABHIJNAN SEN
power has been done by the party unit, small guerilla bands
would be formed in a completely conspiratorial way for striking
down the most hated class enemies. After the first action has
taken place, political cadres would start whispering around
innocently about the advantages to be obtained when the
oppressors have left the area in fear or have been liquidated.
Then the peasants could enjoy undisturbed the land and wealth
of the village. Many peasants would now be shaken out of
their inertia and encouraged to join the struggle. “When
quite a number of offensive ‘actions’ have taken place and the
revolutionary political line of annihilating the class enemies has
been firmly established, only then the political cadres would
give the general economic slogan ‘seize the crop of the class
enemy’. This slogan will achieve miracles. Even the most
backward peasant would now join the struggle”.
The long way that has been travelled by the revolutionaries
since the Naxalbari struggle can best be guessed by comparing
Kanu Sanyal’s report with that of the Bengal-Bihar-Orissa
Border Regional Committee of the CPI(ML) on the Debra-
Gopiballavpur struggle published in Deshabrati, April 23,
1970. As the report self-critically admits, initially the revolu¬
tionaries of the area had a vague notion about a Naxalbari-type
of armed peasant uprising and they hoped that guerilla bands
would emerge out of armed clashes for the seizure of crops.
But in practice they could not adopt any specific programme
other than propagate the politics of seizure of power through
armed struggle. Rather by resorting to pure economism and
public demonstrations at places they exposed the organization
and invited repression. The movement for the time being
was in the doldrums. It was only after Charu Majumdar had
given the line of starting guerilla warfare through annihilation
of class enemies that they could break out of their inertia, it
was stated. On August 21, 1969, the Regional Committee of
the CPI(ML) met at Soormuhi and decided upon launching an
annihilation campaign against class enemies. As the report
said, the very first armed action which was not even successful
(DEBATES AND DOCUMENTS 87
October 3, 1970
Letters
TWO DEATHS
Vol II—7
98 NAXALBARI AND AFTER VOL IF
NAXALBARI :
SUMANTA BANERJEE
But still one has to start somewhere and the leaders of the
Naxalbari uprising deserve praise on that score. Their
followers in Calcutta are perhaps only parodying their heroism.
These splinter groups owe their popularity not to the fact that
they are more consistently revolutionary, but to the fact that
the situtation is not. Besides, how do they explain away the
fact that the Naxalites showed very little activity during the
hated PDF-Congress regime or Governor’s rule in West Bengal,
but as soon as the U.F. assumed power they have come back
to the arena ? Why are they reluctant to launch militant
actions, with the exception of Srikakulam in Andhra Pradesh,
in States run by Congress governments ? Their slogan of
boycott of election and choice of U.F.-run States for staging
uprisings may be ideologically motivated, but do they not
objectively help the bourgeois-landlord ruling clique at the
Centre ?
But despite all this, Naxalbari will remain an important
landmark in the annals of Indian revolution which is still
journeying through purgatory. For one thing, it has served
as a catalytic agent by compelling the complacent communist
parties, and the U.F. Government of West Bengal in particular,
to recognize the basic conflict in the country and to shed the
illusion of solving it through peaceful transition to socialism.
It is yet to be seen, however, whether they have courage to
follow up this realization by action.
The two communist parties in West Bengal are in an over¬
whelming majority in the Government. The “red spectre”
continually conjured up by the bourgeois-landlord clique has
finally appeared in West Bengal. But it has appeared not in
blood-tattered dress, across the barricades, but in the uniform
of ‘order’, in spotlessly white dhoti and kurta, in the plush
chamber of the Legislature. Therein lies the rub.
Will the communists in the Government continue to be
reluctant to upset the Indian apple cart and prefer the comfor¬
table parliamentary road, or will they try to accentuate the
polarization ?
108 NAXALBARI AND AFTER VOL IE
Vol II—8
114 NAXALBARI AND AFTER VOL IE
BABURAJ
PRAVAT JANA
ARUN GOSWAMI
Vol II—10
146 NAXALBARI AND AFTER VOL IB
for the setback is the mistakes not of the party line, but of the
party cadres. It is doubtful whether a total setback through¬
out the country can result only from the mistakes of the cadres.
But it is equally doubtful whether a party can be made so
rigid that the cadres can translate its central directives into
work absolutely without any distortion. The central authority
usually maintains its contacts with low levels through
intermediate chain which, in the case of an underground party
in a vast country like India, is very long. So, distortions
are bound to occur as a natural law. There may be even
political swindlers in intermediate positions who distort the
party’s directives willingly and submit false reports to the
centre. A party requires some time to recover from these
difficulties. Not to realise this is idealism. Even in a strong
party like the CPC, Liu Shao Chi and other swindlers did
great harm to the party and the people in the name of the party
(before they were kicked out. What, according to Mr Jana,
should be the view of a revolutionary about these ? Should
he hate Liu & Co. for the misdeeds, or should he blame
Chairman Mao for his ‘overall responsibility’ ? Whether there
are mistakes committed by the central leadership of the CPI
(ML) is another question. But how cap one rule out the
possibility that there may be evils and errors committed at
intermediate and lower levels even if the central line is abso¬
lutely correct ?
August 11, 1973
WHAT’S TO BE DONE ?
K. G.
CLASS STRUGGLE
MONI GUHA
Letter
Vol II—11
162 NAXALBARI AND AFTER VOL IF
CONTINUITY OF NAXALBARI
BHABANI CHAUDHURI
Vol 11—12
178 NAXALBARI AND AFTER VOL IB
people’s armed forces and the rule of the liberation front which
is being followed in Naga, Mizo and Kashmir areas. So the
working class will have to be called upon and told that it must
lead India’s democratic revolution and the working class will
have to carry out this task by providing leadership to the
struggle of its most firm ally, the peasantry. So, it is the
responsibility of the working class to organize the peasant
movement and raise it to the stage of armed struggle. The
vanguard of the working class will have to go to the villages
to participate in armed struggle. This is the main task of the
working class. “Collect arms and build up bases of armed
struggle in rural areas”—this is called the politics of the
working class, the politics of seizure of power. We shall have
to rouse the working class on the basis of this politics. Orga¬
nize all the workers in trade unions—this slogan does not raise
the political consciousness of the working class. This does
not certainly mean that we shall not organize any more trade
unions. This means that we shall not get the Party’s revolu¬
tionary workers bogged in trade union activities—it would be
their task to carry on political propaganda among the working
class i.e., to propagate the politics of armed struggle and gun-
collection campaign, and build up Party organization. Among
the petty-bourgeoisie also our main task is political propa¬
ganda and propagation of the significance of peasant struggle.
That is to say, on every front the responsibility of the party
is to explain the importance of peasant struggle and call for
participation in that struggle. To the extent we carry out this
task, we shall reach the stage of conscious leadership in the
democratic revolution. Opposition to this basic Marxist-
Leninist path of the Party is coming not only from revisionists.
The revisionists are taking the path of class-collaboration
straightaway, so it is easy to expose them. But there is, within
the Party, another kind of opposition ; they admit that revo¬
lution can be made only through armed struggle. But they
envisage that the path of armed struggle can be taken only by
spreading the democratic mass movement throughout India-
186 NAXALBARI AND AFTER VOL II
Before that, small or even big clashes can take place, but seizure
of power is not possible. They hope that as regards seizure
of power, India will go through some version of October
revolution. In regard to India they mechanically apply their
bookish knowledge of how the October revolution became
successful. They forget that there was the February revolution
before the October revolution ; the bourgeois parties had come
to power and there was power in the hands of workers’,
peasants’ and soldiers’ soviets also. Because of the existence of
this dual power, leadership of the working class became effective
and only when in these soviets the petty-bourgeois parties
handed over power to the bourgeoisie did it become possible
for the working class to accomplish the October revolution.
They do not analyse the objective conditions of India.
They do not take lessons from the struggles that are being
waged in India. The main cause of success of the Russian
revolution was the correct application of the tactics of the
united front. The question of united front tactics is equally
important in India too. But the tactics of India’s democratic
revolution will be different in form. In India also, in Naga,
Mizo, Kashmir and other areas, struggles are being waged
under petty-bourgeois leadership. In the democratic revolution,
therefore, the working class will have to march forward by
forming a united front with them. Struggles will break out
in many other new areas under the leadership of bourgeois
or petty-bourgeois parties. The working class will also enter
into alliances with them and the main basis of this alliance will
be anti-imperialist struggle and the right to self-determination.
The working class necessarily admits this right, together with
the right to secession.
Although those who dream of revolution in India along the
path of October revolution are revolutionaries, they are not
capable of providing a bold leadership because of their doctri¬
naire outlook. They do not realize the significance of peasant
struggles and thus unconsciously become propagandists of
cconomism within the working class. They are unable to assi-
DEBATES AND DOCUMENTS 187
SECOND DECLARATION
May 14, 1968
RESOLUTION ON ELECTIONS
(A statement issued by the AICCCR.)
May 14, 1968
[Translated from the Bengali version of the Resolution]
seen with their own eyes how the betrayer Dange clique and
the neo-revisionists have preached class collaboration while
mouthing revolutionary jargons, how they have tried to give a
fresh lease of life to the parliamentary path and have tried to
create illusions anew in the minds of the people regarding that
path. At the behest of their masters they have sought to
destroy the revolutionary peasant struggle of Naxalbari—not
only the Naxalbari struggle but also the struggles of all workers,
peasants and other toiling masses. In the background of the
past twenty years of the satanic Congress rule, people have
learnt from their past ten months’ experience that the betrayer
Dange clique, the neo-revisionists and other left parties are,
in fact, part of the reactionary ruling classes of India—all of
them are their faithful agents and have been safeguarding their
interests. Because they have donned the garb of ‘leftists’, they
have been performing all the more effectively this task of
safeguarding their interests. But our people have begun to
learn from their own experience. Their illusion regarding
the parliamentary path—their illusion regarding elections and
ministries is being quickly shattered. Their revolutionary
consciousness is continuously on the rise.
“After the great Chinese Revolution, we are living in a
revolutionary era of rapid collapse of imperialism ; we are now
in the midst of a great revolutionary upsurge. The traitors
have betrayed the great struggle of Telengana. But today
Naxalbari has made its appearance on the horizon. Naxalbari
came as a turning point in the history of India’s revolution.
Naxalbari has dug the grave of parliamentarism in India.
People of India had so long been submerged in the mire of
parliamentarism. Now they have seen the light. Now they
have realised that the path of Naxalbari is the only path of
their liberation. The reactionary ruling classes and their agents
—the betrayer Dange clique and neo-revisionists, have under¬
standably become panicky over Naxalbari. So, lest the spark
of Naxalbari turn into a prairie fire they are desperately
peddling elections.
DEBATES AND DOCUMENTS 203
KANU SANYAL
The struggle made it clear that, like the Congress party, the
leaders of the 14 ‘left’ parties, including the Dangeite clique
and Sundarayya & Co., are enemies of India’s democratic
revolution, that is, agrarian revolution. The struggle of the
terai peasants proved that the agrarian revolution can be led
to success only by waging a relentless and uncompromising
struggle against them.
The struggle of the terai peasants acted as a midwife in
the revolutionary situation prevailing in India. That is why
a single spark of the Naxalbari struggle is kindling widespread
forest-fire everywhere. In a word, the struggle of the heroic
peasants has brought to the forefront quite forcefully the role
of the peasants in India’s democratic revolution overcoming
the fierce and active opposition put up by all the reactionaries
and revisionists.
Vo 1 11—14
210 NAXALBARI AND AFTER VOL II
Vol 11—15
226 NAXALBARI AND AFTER VOL II
edge of the class struggle both during and after the struggle.
The revolutionary peasants accomplished two tasks through
mass mobilisation. They are : formation of central and zonal
revolutionary peasant committees and distribution of land.
And we turned exactly these two things into a most formal
affair. Our petty-bourgeois day-dreaming was at the root of
it. We never seriously considered how deeply significant were
these two tasks.
Had we treated these two tasks seriously and carried on
political explanation campaign among the masses about their
significance, had we been able to develop the initiative of the
people to participate in carrying out these two tasks by educa¬
ting them, they would have remembered for a long time the
gains which they themselves had won through struggle and
would have fought unflinchingly in order to retain these gains.
As regards distribution of land, our policy was to confis¬
cate the land fully and distribute the same entirely.
We did not give any importance to this work also. As a
result, in many cases the rich peasants prevented this task from
being carried out under various pleas. In many other cases,,
the top section of the middle peasants, being in the leadership
in some cases, managed to divert the emphasis from the confis¬
cation of land to making raids on jotedars’ houses, and thus
deprived this work of its importance. In some cases again,
there developed acute contradictions between the poor peasants
and the middle peasants in matters of distribution of land.
In spite of all these mistakes, the people have been defen¬
ding heroically the fruits they won through their struggle.
Therefore, we have taken the decision that, of the ten great
tasks of the peasants, we must attach the greatest importance
to these two tasks and turn them into a weapon for our
propaganda.
IMMEDIATE PROGRAMME
The fertile lands and the fruit gardens that were grabbed
from the Girijans are in the hands of the landlords. The
people are very eager to take them back. We should prepare
the people for occupation of these lands. The occupation of
land should commence with the commencement of monsoon.
By allotting the land needed by the Girijans for podu
cultivation, we should create opportunities for their cultivation.
The government, grabbing away the lands from the Girijan
peasantry, is raising coffee and other big plantations. We
should study the problem of these plantations. We should
examine this problem, taking into account the extent of
these gardens that needs to be distributed, in order to
solve the land problem of the peasantry.
All the corporations set up for the purpose of purchasing
forest produce are nothing but a means for the exploitation of
the people and for filling the pockets of the officials with the
people’s wealth. They should, therefore, be abolished and the
Girijans should be given the opportunity of freely selling to
whomever they wish to.
We should not, while implementing this programme, per¬
mit Girijan and non-Girijan discrimination. Rallying all the
non-Girijans, including poor and middle peasants, a United
Front with the Girijans should be formed and the struggle
carried on. The division on the basis of Girijans and non-
Girijans would only prove helpful to the enemy. This applies
equally to different tribes among the Girijans themselves.
The tips, forced labour (vetti) and bribes to the forest
officials and employees have ceased by now. We should not
permit them in any form or to any extent.
Plains Areas
There are dry and wet lands in the plains areas. To this
day, the exploitation and atrocities of the landlords continue
to be a serious problem in the dry lands. The food problem
is a serious problem here. Vast areas of banjar lands are
available for distribution. There are opportunities in these
DEBATES AND DOCUMENTS 241
Wet Lands
In view of social conditions and geographical features, there
are no possibilities for immediate development of guerilla
resistance here in these areas. Yet from these areas cadres,
funds and other help should be sent to the areas of resistance.
Ceaseless class struggle against the exploitation of the people
should be carried on in these areas. These areas should also
he liberated gradually.
Here, among the struggles of the agricultural labour as well
as the struggle against the general domination of the landlords,
we should mainly concentrate on the struggles of the agricul¬
tural labour and the tenant-farmers. We should launch strug¬
gles for the abolition of Government Farming Societies and for
the distribution of lands under their control among the poor
peasants and agricultural labour. We should study where the
possibilities for developing such struggles exist and make
efforts to develop the struggles there.
Political Propaganda
We should propagate, while implementing the above pro¬
gramme, that the people are waging struggles for their liberation,
Vol 11—16
242 NAXALBARI AND AFTER VOL II
Volunteer Squads
With the mobilisation of people on the boycott of elections,
on food problem and the problem of forest areas, the problem
of people’s self-defence would arise. For this we should build
the volunteer squads. In the forest areas where the people
have already been mobilised into struggles, the volunteer
squads should be organised on a large scale. All the youth of
the villages should be the members of these squads. One
squad if it is a small village, and as many squads as necessary
depending upon the feasibility of work if it is a large village,
can be organised. Each of these squads should have a com¬
mander and an assistant commander. They should be politi¬
cally conscious and disciplined. They should be elected for
these posts. For the purpose of self-defence the ordinary
volunteers can use any weapon that is locally available. They
can have sticks only if they cannot procure any other weapon.
These squads should assist the Village Soviets and People’s
Committees in the implementation of their decisions. In case
of attacks from the armed police and military, these squads
must assist the people in all possible ways.
DEBATES AND DOCUMENTS 245
Local Squads
The government armed police attacks would begin with the
implementation of agrarian revolutionary programme. With
this the resistance should also begin. For this it would be
better to have local squads along with the regular squads.
Depending upon defence needs, these squads could consist of
seven members. They can arm themselves with bows and
arrows, spears and axes.
Usually the local enemies are terrified by the very sight of
the people and the volunteer squads. These bullies are still
more terrified if there are local squads. It should be the task
of local squads to deal with the people’s enemies, who cannot
be dealt with by the people and volunteer squads. The local
squads should provide leadership in the mass actions against
the landlords. They should render necessary assistance to the
regular squads. They should be given good military training
and political education.
Mass Organisations
of hands decide as to who are willing and who are not willing
to join. We should take all those who are willing to join.
All those people who join thus should elect the People’s
Committees and Village Soviets.
We should also hold meetings among the women and
organise them. This task would be easy where there are
female comrades. The women should also join the men and
fight in the agrarian revolutionary struggle. For this they
should be recruited into the women organisations in the same
manner as above. They should also be gradually recruited
into the volunteer squads, local squads and the regular squads.
In a situation when there is severe repression, and when it is
not possible to openly recruit the people into the mass
organisations, the cadres should go door to door and recruit
the members secretly.
Work in Cities
Vol 11—17
258 NAXALBARI AND AFTER VOL II
Background
Democratic Centralism
PROGRAMME
of the
Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist)
Adopted at the PARTY CONGRESS held in May 1970
oppression of the landlord class and its State but also liberates
them from the shackles of backward ideas and removes from
the minds of the people poisonous weeds of self-interest, clan
interest, localism, casteism, religious superstitions, etc. Thus
this battle of annihilation can bring the East Wind of splen¬
dour and glory of Man.
The politics of seizure of political power can alone rouse
bitter class hatred among landless and poor peasants and only
by putting this politics in command, the battle of annihilation
can be raised to a new height.
The revisionists all the world over are trying to unite the
•groups who are parading the name of Chairman Mao and
fighting Mao Tsetung Thought in the name of Mao Tsetung
by seeking to arrest and denounce this battle of annihilation.
■So any idea of unity with these groups means the liquidation
•of the main plank of our struggle and submerging the entire
Party in the morass of revisionism.
Our comrades must keep in mind that entirely through
■our own efforts we have been able to create a new situation
in India when the ruling classes and their parties are openly
quarrelling with one another in a downright dog-bite-dog
manner, when stable governments have become a thing of the
past and when vast masses of people are coming into the
arena of struggle and creating a new and better situation for
the revolutionaries to carry on their struggles. Our Party’s
call : “China’s Chairman is our Chairman, China’s path is our
path”, our call against any aggressive war against China and
our call to turn the ’70’s into the decade of liberation have
gripped the imagination of the masses, particularly, of the
revolutionary youth and won a victory over national-chauvi¬
nism and revisionism and have opened up a new era of greater
victories. Our battle of annihilation has linked together our
two sacred tasks—the task of liberating our country and the
people and the international task of ending imperialism and
imperialist war—and has created the material basis, that is, the
■emergence of the new man, for fulfilling these great tasks.
Vol 11—19
290 NAXALBARI AND AFTER VOL II
{November, 1970)
[Translated by us from the original in Bengali ]
Comrade Lin Piao has given the first place to the task of
building the united front.
It is on the basis of this teaching that we have determined
the allies and enemies of our revolution. The enemies are
imperialism, social-imperialism, big comprador bourgeoisie
and the big landlord class.
In our Programme we have defined the objective of our
revolution : “This revolution will establish the dictatorship of
the working class, the peasantry, the petty-bourgeoisie and
even a section of the small and middle bourgeoisie under the
leadership of the working class.” As regards these classes
we have said : “They, together, constitute the ovewhelming
majority of the Indian people.” As the condition for the
success of revolution, we have stated in the Programme :
“Thus, in order to carry the democratic revolution through to
the end it is necessary that a democratic front of all these
classes is built up under the leadership of the working class.”
The united front does not develop overnight. The forma¬
tion of the front is but a process. As conditions for the suc¬
cessful building of the democratic front we have correctly
stated : “This front, however, can only be built up when
worker peasant unity is achieved in the course of armed
struggle and after Red political power is established at least in
some parts of the country.”
Chairman Mao teaches us that the aim and object of the
revolution are at one with the general principle which will
regulate all the activities of the revolutionary party. This is
known as the political line. This general principle must have
to be reflected in all the policies of the party.
Then it is clear that from the beginning to the end the
policies cannot be allowed to go against the Party’s general
principle. Otherwise a deviation from the political line occurs.
But what sort of attitude is being taken towards the ally classes
in our activities ? “They will be forced to come to us”.
“We need not bother about them.” Frequently without any
second thought such policies are being adopted as are hitting
302 NAXALBARI AND AFTER VOL IE
Vol 11—20
306 NAXALBARI AND AFTER VOL II
class enemies and the state machinery. All this was said in
the name of the new international and national situation,
denying the character of uneven development of the revolu¬
tionary situation. The sensitive students were exhorted to
accomplish the democratic and cultural revolution simultane¬
ously ; the ‘Luddite”-type action of destroying educational
institutions, libraries and laboratories, in the name paralysing
the educational system was begun. Needless to say, there was
no discussion in the Central Committee on the subject before
introducing this method in urban areas.
It has already been mentioned how the necessity of the
perspective of protracted war was belittled and how the idea
gained currency that quick result should be aimed at. This line of
thinking was encouraged by the wrong assessment regarding the
Third World War. The U.S. aggression against Cambodia was
regarded as the mark of the beginning of the Third World War.
It was Comrade Majumdar who gave this thesis. Of
course the Party and the Party Congress were influenced by
this assessment. But it is also a fact that after Chairman
Mao’s statement of May 20 * had been broadcast, Comrade
Satyanarain Singh of Bihar drew our attention to the wrong
assessment and wrote a few letters to the General Secretary for
rectifying the mistake—the Report of the Congress was yet to
be published. He had requested not to publish the relevant
portion. The General Secretary did not act as requested.
The Marxists’ assessment of the international or national
situation is not unrelated to their practical tasks. The style of
work was influenced by the assessment as regards the begin¬
ning or otherwise of the Third World War.
The Party’s politics and organisation are closely inter¬
related. Wrong politics is inevitably reflected in organisational
CHARU MAJUMDAR
among the working class and the poorer classes and must
repeatedly try to form Party units by propagating our politics
among them. Our object is to form Party units among the
working class and to help develop Party organizers from
among workers. Of course, we shall always support the
workers and co- operate with them in their struggles. If there
are a large number of politically conscious Party units, the
working class will, on its own, conduct many struggles. Thus
the Party’s task is to form more and more units among the
working class and to raise the workers’ political consciousness.
The influence of revisionism on the working class is still great.
It is our task to free the working class from that influence.
The working class is ceaselessly conducting struggles, big and
small. Our political work among them will help them in
those struggles and draw the broad sections of the working
class into the fold of our politics. The class-conscious worker
will then voluntarily go to the villages and participate in the
peasants’ armed struggle. It is in this way that the firm unity
between the workers and the peasants will be established.
(Liberation, July 1971—January 1972, Yol. 5, No. 1)
CHARU MAJUMDAR
Vo! 11—21
322 NAXALBARI AND AFTER VOL IF
OPEN LETTER
Comrades,
We convey our revolutionary greetings to all. We feel
that we are not competent to send you these suggestions,,
but owing to abnormal situation inside the Party now, we are
compelled to take this course.
By this time, we hope, you all know that the great glorious
and correct Chinese Communist Party had sent us most
valuable fraternal suggestions in respect of our liberation stru¬
ggle in India in the month of November, 1970.
We are citing certain excerpts of the valuable suggestions
for our convenience. The suggestions are :
(1) The Chinese Party grew and developed by fighting
alien trends—both left adventurism and right deviation.
(2) The Chinese Revolution became successful with three
magic weapons : (a) the Party (b) the People’s Army (c) the-
United Front.
DEBATES AND DOCUMENTS 323'
KANU SANYAL
(April 1973)
This stir, on the one hand, created panic within the ruling
classes and on the other, enhanced the process of disintegra¬
tion amongst the reactionary, revisionist and neo-revisionist
parties. Why this new indication of vast possiblities brought
about by the Naxalbari peasant uprising suddenly failed, from
the beginning of 1969, needs thorough re-examination.
The peasant uprising of Naxalbari acted as a decisive factor
in uniting the Communist Revolutionaries all over India.
After the formation of the AICCCR, some of its correct steps
also opened up new possibilities. As the AICCCR did not
make a proper and correct evaluation of the Naxalbari peasant
uprising, Naxalbari was reduced simply to an image. Over
and above, the Co-ordination Committee, not being able to
discuss and reach a clear decision on the ‘Terai Report’ (even
with its shortcomings), hampered the cause of developing itself
into a leading team. On the other hand, for unknown reasons,
no discussion took place on the ‘Terai Report’ in the Darjeeling
district ; as a result, the Communist Revolutionaries of
Darjeeling district failed to give a correct and complete history
of Naxalbari peasant uprising before the Communist Revolu¬
tionaries of the country. This helped a clique of political
careerists, who were trying to utilise Naxalbari for their narrow
group ends from the outset to come in the limelight of leader¬
ship. The All India Co-ordination Committee failed to realise
the mischief of this political careerist group even after the
publication of the article “Spring Thunder Breaks Over India”
by the Chinese Communist Party. The net result of this was
that this clique of political careerists utilised the glorious role of
Naxalbari uprising to project a single individual as the creator
of Naxalbari within the Co-ordination Committee. Taking
the opportunity of confinement in jails, their living under¬
ground and the exclusion from the Co-ordination Committee
for unknown reasons, of the Naxalbari Communist Revolu¬
tionaries, this clique of political careerists established Charu
Majumdar as the leader-creator of Naxalbari with the plea of
"“Lessons of Naxalbari” and “Evaluation of Naxalbari.” The
328 NAXALBARI AND AFTER VOL IE
Vol 11—22
338 NAXALBARI AND AFTER VOL II
• Ul. . • f l j \Jk ■ : ' f, l '« ■*
NEW CONTROVERSIES
IN THE NAME OF ‘MORE ABOUT NAXALBARI’
also, it was not the intention to hold the others responsible for
the failure and to escape themselves from being blamed. The
criticism contained in the ‘letter’ was not designed to advance
criticism for the sake of criticism alone.
It had not only invited criticism from among the revolution¬
ary ranks, but also held out prospect of self-critical analysis by
admitting their mistakes. Therefore, the unity appealed for in
the letter is the unity among the revolutionary ranks based on
the principles of criticism and self-criticism. This letter sug¬
gested a basis acceptable to all who subscribe to Marxism-
Leninism and Mao’s thought for forging this unity. The basis
suggested was the article—‘Spring Thunder over India’,
which summed up correctly the experiences of Naxalbari
liberation struggle, the revolutionary experiences and the
Terai Report, excluding the shortcomings therein. That is
why the letter called upon the party members to forge new
unity by summing up the experience of the movement in vari¬
ous parts of the country and by realising the mistakes on the
basis of the article, ‘Spring Thunder over India’, and their
suggestions. From the view-point of Marxism-Leninism and
Mao’s thoughts, this letter suggested correct principles, basis
and method for achieving this unity among the party members
and revolutionary ranks. Whatever be the shortcomings in the
submission of this letter, it is quite proper and correct.
But the article published in the name of Com. Kanu
Sanyal differs wholly with the letter on all important issues.
The difference between the two is that between heaven and
earth.
While the letter by the six comrades was mainly aimed at
encouraging unity in CPI(ML), the article by Com. Sanyal
tends to incite disunity among the Party ranks. While the
letter placed before the comrades focussed the method of
developing peasant struggles like Naxalbari and Srikakulam
to the stage of guerilla struggles in the light of ‘Spring
Thunder over India’ and the revolutionary experiences as
the basis for unity, Com. Sanyal’s article makes proposals
352 NAXALBARI AND AFTER VOL II
1973, and why he sent his article to the press without discus¬
sing with comrades who signed the letter along with him.
Whatever it may be, there is no identity or similarity between
the letter he signed and the article published in his name.
Counter-revolutionary Negotiations
If negotiations with the Government are unprincipled,
then they are quite contrary to the uprisings of the people.
Com. Sanyal has made this type of negotiations as the
material basis of his article. By the first week of May
1967, the Naxalbari peasant struggle was assuming the
highest form. Com. Sanyal recalled in his article that in
a public meeting organised on 7. 5. ’67, a “proposal was put
forth calling for negotiation with the United Front Govern¬
ment to which Com. Charu Majumdar was opposed.”
■“This”, Com. Sanyal says, “was mental unpreparedness”
and “subjective tactical mistake.” Though firm on principles,
he concluded, “Absence of flexible approach in the policy
led to doom the cause of Naxalbari struggle.” Indeed, the
very refusal by Com. Charu Majumdar and other Naxalbari
cadres in that public meeting of the proposal for holding
negotiation was only responsible for giving life to the Naxal¬
bari struggle and the peasant liberation struggle which stood
up valiantly earning encomiums from the national and inter¬
national revolutionary forces.
This proposal for negotiations had not descended from
heavens. The neo-revisionist leadership that held the sway over
the United Front Government published this proposal in order
to nip the peasant liberation struggle in the bud. The then
neo-revisionist leadership had also reported to the Provincial
Committee that they made the proposal whereby the struggle
be confined to the land problem and negotiations initiated
with the Government. Some Naxalbari comrades who fell
victim to that propaganda might have made such proposal.
People’s uprising is a revolt against the reactionary
social order and against the Government preserving such
Vol II—23
354 NAXALBARI AND AFTER VOL II?
Vol 11—24
370 NAXALBARI AND AFTER VOL 18
April 6, 1974
militants from the working class, the peasantry and the urban
intelligentsia. Our experience teaches further that attempt to
build a people’s army by killing indiscriminately landlords and
other exploiters in a conspiratorial manner through a campaign
of annihilation of class ‘enemies’ alienates the fighters from
politics, people and party and causes disaster. It is only a
terrorist band that we get and not a people’s army out of the
theory and practice of individual terrorism. The party must
integrate with the landlesss and poor peasants, firmly unite with
the middle peasants, it must politically arouse broad masses of
the peasantry on the basis of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung
Thought ; it must arm peasant masses and disarm the land¬
lords, it must form village defence corps and armed guerilla
squads from among the peasantry. It must form revolutionary
peasant committees and develop them as organs of people’s
rule. It must lead the peasant masses to seize landlords’ land
and other properties for distribution among the peasants as it
is the key issue of the agrarian revolution, and it must punish
the despotic landlords, usurers, local bullies and corrupt
officials. And in course of carrying out the above-mentioned
tasks it must recruit and train innumerable militants born out
of class struggles and make them good soldiers and comman¬
ders of the people’s army and lead them to attack and smash
the armed forces of the enemy following the strategy and the
tactics of people’s war formulated by Comrade Mao Tsetung.
The working class which leads the New Democratic revolu¬
tion, while fighting class battles on economic and political
issues, will act as the inspirer and unifier of other revolutionary
classes by launching solidarity mass actions in support of then-
struggles, specially the struggles of the peasantry.
Special attention will be given to organising the working
class employed in the strategic industries.
They must utilise the contradictions in the camp of their
enemies at a given time and unite all the forces that can be
united and develop revolutionary struggles of the people in
the country while retaining their independence and initiative.
■DEBATES AND DOCUMENTS 385
Vol 11—25
HOLD HIGH THE GENUINE LESSONS OF
NAXALBARI
(30 November, 1975)
ASHIM CHATTERJEE
■—Editors J
DEBATES AND DOCUMENTS 399'
These base areas are also the bases of our cultural revolu¬
tion. So, the People’s Liberation Army will have to be
transformed into a cultural army as well, repudiating, on
the cultural question, all revisionist points of view opposed
to class outlook—opposed to armed struggle. In this way
alone the struggle initiated by the revolutionary youths and
students against the feudal-imperialist culture will be united
with the revolutionary struggles of the peasants and our
people’s anti-imperialist and anti-feudal culture will develop
vigorously.
[Source : Liberation (Bengali), a mouthpiece of this
group, Vol. 1 No. 1, February 1976.]
Vol 11—26
402 NAXALBARI AND AFTER VOL II'
1905, Lenin observed thus : “At that time the boycott proved
correct, not because non-participation in reactionary parlia¬
ments is correct in general, but because we correctly gauged
the objective situation which was leading to the rapid trans¬
formation of the mass strikes into a political strike, then
into revolutionary strike and then into uprising. Moreover,
the struggle at that time centred around the question whether
to leave the convocation of the first representative assembly to
the tsar, or to attempt to wrest its convocation from the hands
of the old regime. When there was no certainty, nor could
there be, that the objective situation was analogous, and like¬
wise no certainty of similar trend and rate of development, the
boycott ceased to be correct.”
[Lenin : Ibid, Pp. 20-21]
Bolsheviks linked the question of participation or boycott of
Duma or elections to a particular combination in the situation.
The boycott was correct when revolutionary strikes were
turning into an uprising, when Soviets as people’s organ of
power had begun appearing and when revolution was on the
verge of breaking out. The revolutionary tide was reaching
its zenith.
Similarly, pointing out the reasons justifying participation
in bourgeois parliament, Lenin observed : “Even if not ‘milli¬
ons’ and ‘legions’, but only a fairly large minority of industrial
workers follow the Catholic priests—and a similar minority of
rural workers follow the landlords and kulaks (Grossbauern)—
it undoubtedly follows that parliamentarism in Germany is
not yet politically obsolete, that participation in parliamentary
elections and in the struggle on the parliamentary rostrum is
obligatory for the party of the revolutionary proletariat
precisely for the purpose of educating the backward strata,
of its own class, precisely for the purpose of awakening and
enlightening the undeveloped, downtrodden, ignorant rural
masses. As long as you are unable to disperse the bourgeois
parliament and every other type of reactionary institution, you
must work inside them precisely because there you will still
404 NAXALBARI AND AFTER VOL II
find workers who are doped by the priests and by the dreari¬
ness of rural life, otherwise you risk becoming mere babblers.”
[Lenin : Ibid, Pp. 52-53]
Thus, Lenin points out the conditions in which it is obliga¬
tory on the part of the revolutionary proletariat to utilise
elections and the bourgeois parliaments to work within them.
As long as revolutionaries lack the strength to do away with
bourgeois parliaments and every other type of reactionary
institutions, they must work within them.
However, the CC ignored the scientific tactics laid down
by Lenin and adopted a disastrous tactic of boycotting all
elections irrespective of the level of the revolutionary move¬
ment, the level of consciousness of the people and the degree
of their organised strength.
The CC, in order to justify its departure from Leninist
tactics, used all sorts of arguments to defend its “Left” slogan
of general boycott. The CC in its various documents {Revisi¬
onist Onslaught, The Indian Revolution and Its Path and
other documents) laboured hard to prove that Leninist tac¬
tics with regard to participation in bourgeois parliament was
no longer applicable to the present day India. The CC took
shelter behind the argument that world capitalism was no
longer in the stage of decennial crises but in the stage of per¬
manent crisis, that the Indian p'eople had already sufficient
experience of the elections since 1952 or even earlier and were
convinced that in India elections were based on bogus votes
and not on real votes, that there existed no lull in the revolu¬
tionary struggles and that it was in the phase of incline. The
CC, in one of its documents, categorically stated that parlia¬
mentary democracy was not only historically obsolete but also
politically obsolete in India. Hence the decision of the Party
to boycott elections. There has never arisen a situation in
which the boycott could be a correct slogan. Overwhelming
majority of people have yet to get disillusioned from the
elections, their struggle has yet to reach the stage when they
could have the strength to sweep away the bourgeois parlia-
DEBATES AND DOCUMENTS 405
ON UNITED FRONT
EDITORIAL, DESHABRATI
Yol 11—27
APPENDIX
‘ONE DIVIDES INTO TWO’
(February 1, 1974)
day we should attack not only the enemy’s standing force but
the mobile enemy also : that is, annihilation, rifle snatching,
shooting and attack on the mobile enemy. This is develop¬
ment, this is the dialectics between one ‘right’ and another
‘right’. Revolutionary line is not a static thing. It is a science
which proceeds towards dialectics, and develops. We all
should understand this.
The experience of our practice is also ‘one divides into
two’ : the experience of victory or moving forward, and the
experience of defeat. If we isolate ourselves from the revolu¬
tionary line of Charu Majumdar we will be defeated. And if
we follow the revolutionary line of Charu Majumdar whole¬
heartedly we can move forward and would gain victory.
That is why Charu Majumdar has directed us to grasp the
outlook of dialectical materialism and to refute the outlook
of dogmatism and metaphysics. We should grasp ‘one divides
into two’ and refute ‘combine two into one’.
The future of the revolutionary line of Charu Majumdar is
also ‘one divides into two’. The victory of the revolutionary
line is certain. But it should proceed by destroying the revi¬
sionist line of various hues.
Our future is also ‘one divides into two’. “Future is.
bright but the way is tortuous.”
[Received through Post—sent by The Red Guards]
INDEX
AICCCR : 3, 23, 26, 99, 109, 78, 81, 88, 95, 99, 108,
. 118, 119, 126, 128, 147, 118, 120, 124, 127, 130,
171, 197, 200, 201, 203, 150, 151, 161, 172, 174,
227, 264, 326, 328, 333, 177, 193, 196, 333-35, 337,
388-90 339, 344, 413, 416
Albania : 61 Cambodia: 285, 291, 306,
annihilation ( khatam ) : 10, 307, 313, 394
11, 71, 72, 86, 94, 95, 98, Chatterjee, Ashim : 99, 149,
110, 111, 113, 121, 122, 413, 414, 420
123, 124, 126, 133-36, 145, Communist Party of China : 2,
152, 154, 155, 156, 164, 12, 18, 31, 74, 115, 118,
166, 167, 288-90, 293-95, 122, 148, 187, 195, 250,
304, 305, 315, 323, 328, 253, 258, 274, 284, 285,
388-90 295, 298, 313, 322, 324,
APRCC : 2-10, 28, 29, 32, 326, 327, 333, 372, 379,
34, 131, 231 383, 387, 394, 395, 407
APRCP : 371,372, 381 comprador-bureaucratic capi¬
Basavapunniah, M. : 66-71 talism : 5, 21, 51, 52, 67, 97,
Basu, Jyoti : 71, 203, 218,414, 108, 125, 158, 159, 163,
415 167, 168, 189, 197, 198,
Birbhum : 118, 166 204, 205, 206, 214-17, 228,
Biswakarmakar, Babulal : 204, 232, 251, 252, 254, 257,
221, 223, 299, 375, 392 260, 276, 277, 278, 280,
Bose, Souren : 117, 413, 414 301, 323, 375, 377, 381,
boycott of elections : 7, 8, 37- 382, 410, 411
50, 62-64, 70, 71, 81, 107, Congress : 33, 63, 64, 65, 78,
126, 203, 228, 242, 243, 81, 99, 102, 107, 150, 158,
287, 292, 400-409 159, 163, 177, 178, 188,
C.P.I : 1, 12, 27, 50-52, 61, 189, 192, 204, 206, 207,
62, 65, 66, 67, 69, 81, 120, 213-18, 257, 277, 320,332,
126, 161, 259, 276, 277, 333, 344, 372, 395, 399
330 Cultural Revolution : 80, 94,
C.P.I ( M ) : 2, 3, 12, 51, 53, 97, 117, 174, 183,230,231,
61, 62, 64, 65, 66-71, 77, 253, 284, 296, 394, 412
Dange, S. A [Dangeites] : 51, Konar, Harekrishna : 177,.
192, 193, 197, 198, 202, 178, 203, 218
203, 207, 258, 259, 272, Lakhimpur-Kheri : 9, 110
'Datta, Saroj : 308, 375, 422 118, 227, 254, 265, 287'
Datta, Subroto : 419 375
Debra-Gopiballavpur : 9, 71, Lenin, V.I. : 1, 37-43, 45, 47,.
86, 87, 110, ill, 113, 118, 49, 50, 53, 63, 69, 76, 77,
375, 389 78, 80, 81, 122, 127, 151,
Desai, Morarji : 50, 51 154, 180, 184, 187, 193,
Deshabrati : 19, 82, 84, 85, 208, 262, 329, 341, 343,
86, 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 109- 364, 402-409
112,114,136,149,201,203, Liberation : 11, 21, 88, 89,
300, 302, 303, 305, 308, 112, 130, 133, 136, 145,
309, 311, 315, 320, 411 192, 196, 230, 319, 323,
Dimitrov, G : 49 324, 400
Engels, F : 1,47, 48, 79, 80, Lin Piao : 13, 15, 17, 82, 85,
154, 328, 342, 364 194, 261, 267, 282, 284,
Gandhi, M.K [ Gandhi-ism ] : 288, 299, 300, 301, 306,
93,154, 158,161, 190, 276, 323, 368, 379, 386, 391,
286 393, 411, 413
Gandhi, Mrs. Indira : 30, 31, Liu Shao-chi : 148
32,46, 50, 51, 160, 168, Lok Yudh : 136
204, 207, 208, 372, 395, Majumdar, Ashu : 96-99
396 Maoist Communist Centre :
Ghatana Prabaha : 6, 90 313,318
Ghosh Suniti : 374 Marx, Karl : 1, 39, 44, 47, 48,
Guevara, Che : 6, 187 79, 101, 152, 154, 156, 160
Immediate Programme : 5, 7, Misra Vinod : 393
8, 9, 28, 29, 32, 131, 231- Mukherjee, Mahadeb: 412,416
*' 250 Musahari : 9, 110, 115, 118,
Indian Express (The) : 349 122, 136, 166, 227, 254,
Janashakti: 4, 349 287, 375
Karimnagar : 30, 33, 36,131, Nagi Reddy, T : 9, 23, 26-
234, 239, 247 36, 292, 372, 374
Khammam : 30„ 33, 36, 131, Namboodiripad, E.M.S. : 102
* 234, 235, 239, 246, 249, Nehru, J. L : 161, 168, 258
373 New Left: 41/ 42
Patnaik; D. B. M : 347 122, 136, 166, 227, 234,.
Patnaik, N.B : 347 239, 247, 248, 265, 287,.
Peking Radio : 25, 156 294, 295, 356, 375, 376
Peking Review : 19, 114 Stalin, J.V. : 1, 22, 38-42, 47,.
Plekhanov, G. Y. : 76, 79 49, 50, 79, 80, 256, 258,.
principal contradiction : 5, 9, 276, 329, 364
15, 16, 274, 279, 373, 382, Tebhaga movement : 106,
410 161, 342
Pulla Reddy, C. : 28, 371,385 Telengana : 1, 23, 27-29, 32,
Ranadive, B. T. : 1, 257, 259 35, 131, 162, 174, 175,
Rao, Chowdhary Tejeswara : 202, 238, 241, 257, 259,
326 263, 277, 328, 359, 376,
Rao, D. V. : 30-36 386
Red Flag : 410 Tito, Marshall : 1, 168, 194
Roy Chowdhury, Sushital : Trotsky, L [ Trotskyite ] : 45,.
96, 98, 99, 112, 325, 415 257-59, 367, 369
Sanyal, Kanu : 4, 10, 82-84, UCCRI(ML) : 410
86, 88, 104, 106, 110, 130, U.S. Imperialism : 5, 17, 21,
145, 203, 347-49, 351-53, 30,31,67, 168, 189, 192,
357-60, 363, 370,386, 387, 197-200, 206, 218, 227,
390, 413, 414 230, 231, 250,252-54, 259-
Singh, Satyanarain [SNS] : 260, 262, 277-81, 285, 286,
307, 385, 400, 410, 414 291, 292, 300, 301, 307,
social-imperialism : 5, 21, 30, 313, 372-73, 375-77, 380-
31, 67-70, 109, 117, 163, 382, 393, 416
168, 227, 230, 251-254, Venkaiah, Kolia : 326
260, 262, 277-81, 285-87, Vietnam : 53, 54, 61, 70, 80,
290, 292, 300, 301, 372- 132, 184, 199, 214, 231,
382, 393, 395, 415 252, 280, 291, 394
Srikakulam : 7, 8, 9, 20, 23- Warangal : 30, 33, 36, 131,.
28, 95, 107, 110, 113, 118, 234, 239, 246, 249, 373
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FOUNDED IN 1968, by
SAMAR SEN,
FRONTIER
was unique in its daring
open but critical
support for the
Naxalite movement.
Through all these
ten event-packed years
of its existence,
FRONTIER
has played a significant
role in fusing
brilliant journalism
with an unfailing concern
for progress. * 1
A KATHASHILPA PUBLICATION