Republic of the Philippines

Region III
Tarlac State University-Lucinda Extension Campus
College of Criminal Justice Education
Criminology Department

ABU SAYAFF
GROUP
(ASG)

Baluyot, Lovely Jay S.

Caranto, Anne Karyll
Celebre, Ian Belle
Guevarra, Beverly
Macalino, Jaimee Rose R.
Maniego, Reina Mae S.

BSCriminology2-C
 I. OVERVIEW
The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) is an Islamic separatist organization in the Philippines founded by
Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani in 1991. Heavily influenced by Al Qaeda in its early stages, the ASG
started as a splinter group of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and seeks an independent
Muslim state in the southern Philippines. In the early 2000s, the ASG attracted attention through
highprofile bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, and attacks. The ASG renewed its campaign to
establish an Islamic state in June 2017, when it gained control of parts of Marawi, a city in the southern
Philippines. It is regarded as the most dangerous militant group in the Philippines.

II. NARRATIVE SUMMARY

The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) is an Islamic separatist organization based in the southern
Philippines. It seeks an independent Islamic state for the Filipino Muslim minority, known as the Moro
people, who live primarily in the Philippines’ Mindanao region. The ASG has carried out several high-
profile assassinations and bombings in pursuit of its goal, developing a reputation as the most violent
Islamic separatist group in the Philippines. While many of the ASG’s activities center on Mindanao and
the Sulu Archipelago in the predominantly Moro south, the ASG also engages less frequently in terrorist
acts in the Filipino capital of Manila.
The ASG formed in 1991 by Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani, who had studied in the Middle East
with the support of a fundamentalist organization called the Islamic Tabligh. Janjalani became radicalized
after traveling in Saudi Arabia, Libya, and other Muslim countries. While studying the Iranian Revolution
in 1988, Janjalani reportedly met with Osama bin Laden in Pakistan and may even have fought alongside
him during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, after which Janjalani developed his mission to transform
the southern Philippines into an Islamic state.
Janjalani was at one point a member of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), but upon
permanently returning to the Philippines from the Middle East, he recruited other disenfranchised MNLF
members into what would become the ASG. These ex-MNLF members held more radical views on how
to establish an independent Islamic state than did their former parent organization. 5 Despite the efforts of
the existing MNLF and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), persistent political and economic
inequality between the Moros and other Filipinos strengthened the ASG’s emergence as an alternative to
those organizations. The ASG also benefited from poor economic conditions in the Philippines at the
time, allowing the group to recruit new members who had relatively few economic opportunities.
Throughout the 1990s, the ASG gained recognition by turning to violence, engaging in bombings,
kidnapping, assassinations, and other attacks with a special focus on Christians and foreigners. The ASG
also targeted the Philippine military, consistent with the organization’s professed goal of resisting the
Philippine government and establishing an independent Moro state.

While the MNLF and the MILF distanced themselves from the ASG and its extremely violent
tactics, the ASG’s loose relationship with Al Qaeda—stemming from Janjalani’s connection to bin Laden
—continued. Al Qaeda supported the ASG with funding and training; in addition, Mohammad Jamal
Khalifa, a wealthy Saudi businessman and bin Laden’s brother-in-law, also provided early funding to the
ASG. In 1991 and 1992, Al Qaeda member Ramzi Yousef—a major participant in the 1993 World Trade
Center bombing—traveled to the Philippines several times and, in 1994, allegedly provided training for
ASG operatives. During this time, Yousef and other Al Qaeda members, including Khalid Shaikh
Mohammed, collaborated with the ASG in the Bojinka plot, in which twelve airplanes were to be bombed
over the Pacific Ocean. The Bojinka plot was never executed; operatives botched the manufacturing of
explosives in Yousef’s Manila apartment, leading to a fire and the discovery of the plot in January 1995.
The Al Qaeda-ASG relationship weakened after Pakistan arrested Yousef and the Philippines blocked
Khalifa from entry after the discovery of his connection to the plot.
After Philippine police forces killed Janjalani in a 1998 shootout, the ASG fractured into two
factions. Khadaffy Janjalani, brother of the deceased ASG founder, led one group, while a commander
named Galib Andang led the other. Fragmentation and deterioration of discipline within the ASG,
combined with the loss of Al Qaeda’s assistance, pushed the organization to substitute its terrorist
activities for kidnappings. These kidnappings were conducted specifically to obtain ransom, which was
necessary for the group’s financial survival.
In 2000, the ASG conducted its first international attack, kidnapping twenty-one people from a
Malaysian resort.
 In the aftermath of Al Qaeda’s September 11, 2001 attacks against the United States, the ASG
was targeted by U.S. forces and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) under the wide-ranging
Operation Enduring Freedom, which included a 2002 U.S. deployment of 1,650 troops to the Philippines.
The reinvigoration of counterterrorism efforts damaged the ASG. Galib Andang, for example, was
captured in 2003. While the ASG did suffer losses, the elimination of certain key figures like Andang also
decreased fragmentation.
Consequent to the decrease in fragmentation, the ASG was once again able to consolidate, and
carried out several major attacks in the early 2000s. These included the ASG’s deadliest attack, the 2004
Superferry 14 bombing in Manila Bay that killed 116, and the 2005 “Valentine’s Day Bombings.” New
U.S.-AFP counterterrorism efforts followed these high-profile attacks, and Khadaffy Janjalani was killed
in 2006. As before, the ASG’s leadership losses and subsequent decentralization resulted in an end to
mass bombings and a return to kidnapping for ransom in 2007.
From 2007 onward, the ASG has mainly engaged in kidnapping activities, often threatening to
behead hostages unless a ransom is paid. Most kidnapping victims are Filipinos, although the ASG also
targets foreigners in the southern Philippines, including tourists at resorts and foreign workers. The
ASG’s kidnapping activities themselves appear to be profit-driven rather than politically motivated,
although the ransoms fund weapons and other supplies. 16 Because of the ASG’s small size and focus on
using kidnapping and extortion to make money, some analysts and officials now describe the ASG as
more of a criminal gang than an ideologically driven organization. The ASG still targets the Philippine
military, but its attacks have been smaller in scale and it has been unable to execute large-scale bombings
since the early 2000s.
The ASG is the smallest and most radical of the Philippines’ Islamic separatist groups, and the
Philippine government does not consider it a legitimate negotiating partner. Likewise, because the ASG
purportedly aims to create an independent state through violent resistance rather than negotiation, it has
shown little inclination towards peace talks with the Philippine government. The ASG has instead sought
to undermine the latest round of peace negotiations between the government and the MILF, conducting
attacks to destabilize ceasefire agreements and discourage further dialogue. In July 2014 on the island of
Jolo, the ASG killed at least 21 Muslims celebrating the end of Ramadan, reportedly in retaliation for
their support of the peace process.
Currently, the ASG has at least a nominal link to the Islamic State (IS). On July 23, 2014, Isnilon
Hapilon—an ASG leader—and a group of unidentified men appeared in a YouTube video pledging
allegiance to IS and to its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Days later in another video, a group of men
identifying themselves as ASG members also pledged allegiance to IS and Baghdadi. In September 2014,
the ASG threatened the lives of two German hostages, demanding that Germany pay a ransom and
rescind its support for U.S. attacks on IS.
Scholars and officials, including Lieutenant General Rustico Guerrero of the Philippine Army,
believe that the ASG has pledged allegiance to IS solely to promote its own interests, rather than those of
IS.
The ASG had earlier demanded only a ransom for the German hostages, and in October 2014, it
released the hostages and reported that the ransom had been paid; there were no reported changes in
German policy toward U.S. attacks on IS. Beyond the videos declaring an oath of allegiance, the ASG and
IS have not demonstrated any links between them. IS does not seem to have given funds or other material
support to the ASG.
In 2016, IS released a video showing four “battalions” of militants pledging allegiance to IS, who
followed up with a video accepting the pledges from militant groups in the Philippines. IS claims
responsibility for attacks by the ASG and called for IS followers to go fight in the Philippines. Following
their declaration of allegiance to IS, ASG tactics were still primarily kidnapping for ransom and civilian
attacks.
On May 23, 2017, the ASG launched an aggressive series of attacks in Marawi, a Muslim
majority city in Mindanao. Fighting began after government forces tried to capture Isnilon Hapilon in
Marawi based on some actionable intelligence. Other jihadist groups supported the ASG battle in Marawi,
particularly the new IS-affiliated Maute Group. By June they had claimed parts of the city. Attacks also
occurred elsewhere in the region.
In August 2017, an estimated 60 to 100 members of the ASG attacked a town called Maluso,
killing nine people and injuring 10 others. Some fighters refer to the state they sought to create in the
Mindanao region as the “East Asia Wilayat” or “Wilayah al-Filibin”, a name IS neither officially
supported or denounced. Filipino president Rodrigo Duterte declared martial law and the U.S. provided 50
to 100 special operations forces soldiers for training and technical assistance.
 On October 17, 2017, the Philippine government declared Marawi reclaimed after 5 months of
fighting. In total, the battle for Marawi resulted in the deaths of more than 1,000 people (including an
estimated 900 militants), and the displacement of an estimated 200,000 people. According to President
Duterte and the Philippines military, Hapilon died during the final push to reclaim Marawi. The high
death toll of ASG fighters and the loss of key leadership leaves the future of the ASG uncertain. In recent
years, the existence of many ASG factions—often based on clan or familial ties—has made it hard for
group leader Radulan Sahiron to exert central command and control. Instead, the ASG is increasingly
decentralized with different deputy leaders carrying out their own operations as they see fit.
On July 24, 2018, the Philippine House of Representatives passed the Bangsamoro Organic Law
(BOL), the final name of the former Bangsamoro Basic Law which would establish a new autonomous
region for Moro Muslims in the south. With President Rodrigo Duterte’s signing the bill into law, a
Muslim regional entity was created in Mindanao. With the bill’s passing, the MILF, representatives of
which were present during the signing of the bill in Manila, declared its support. MILF leader Ebrahim
declared that 30-40,000 fighters would be decommissioned. President Duterte signed the law into effect
on July 26, 2018, although Misuari and the MNLF remain opposed to the BOL and want the government
to honor the 1996 ARMM agreement and place Misuari in the position of governor of the autonomous
region.
On July 31, 2018, a car bomb exploded at a checkpoint in Basilian’s Lamitan City, killing at least
10 people, including the driver, a Philippine Army Special Forces sergeant, four Philippine Army-led
local militiamen, and several civilians including a woman and child. 39 The AFP has assigned blame on
militants linked to the ASG.

III. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

A. LEADERSHIP
The ASG's leadership is currently fragmented, especially after the deaths of several of the group’s
leaders in 2006-2007. It is unknown whether one key figure leads the ASG, but the existence of many
factions, often based on clan or family, and loose associations within the group suggests that a central
leadership is unlikely at this time. Instead, the ASG has several leadership figures who carry out their own
operations.

 Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani (1991 to December 18, 1998): Janjalani was the founder and
first key leader of the ASG. He was killed by police in a 1998 gunfight on the island of Basilan.
 Khadaffy Janjalani (1998 to September 4, 2006): After Abdurajak Janjalani’s death, his
younger brother Khadaffy assumed a key leadership role. Khadaffy was killed in a 2006
confrontation with Philippine troops.
 Alhamser Limbong (Unknown to March 30, 2002): Limbong, also known as Commander
Kosovo, led the ASG’s Manila cell, according to Philippine police. 44 He was likely plotting a
bombing involving 180 pounds of TNT at the time of his March 30, 2002 arrest during a raid in
Manila. Limbong was killed in 2005 during an attempted jailbreak, along with ASG leader Galib
Andang.
 Galib Andang (1998 to December 2003): Andang, also known as Commander Robot, led one
ASG faction after Abdurajak Janjalani’s death. Andang was captured in a 2003 clash with the
military and was killed in 2005 during an attempted jailbreak, along with ASG leader Alhamser
Limbong.
 Abu Sulaiman (Unknown to January 16, 2007): Abu Sulaiman, born as Jainal Antel Sali, Jr., was
a high-ranking ASG leader and spokesman. Together, Abu Sulaiman and Khadaffy Janjalani
reportedly unified six or more ASG factions. 48 Abu Sulaiman was considered by the Philippine
military to be one of Khadaffy Janjalani’s successors, and he was killed by the army in 2007.
 Abdul Basir Latip (Unknown to 2009): Latip is an ASG co-founder and served as a key
financial officer, moving funds from Al Qaeda to the ASG. He also allegedly established ties
between the ASG and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). 50 In 2009, Latip was detained in Indonesia and
deported to the Philippines for arrest.
 Albader Parad (Unknown to February 2, 2010): Parad was a military commander and ranking
leader of the ASG.52 He led an ASG cell on the island of Jolo and was killed by the Philippine
military in 2010.
 Gumbahali Jumdail (Unknown to February 2, 2012): Jumdail, also known as Doc Abu, was an
ASG regional leader. 54 He was killed by the Philippine air force in 2012.
 Yasser Igasan (2007 to Present): Igasan, also known as Kumander Diang, is a current leader of
the ASG. Although the Philippine military reported that Igasan was elected to succeed Khadaffy
Janjalani in 2007, that claim was later retracted.
  Radulan Sahiron (Unknown to Present): Sahiron, also known as Commander Putol, became a
key leader of the ASG after Khadaffy Janjalani’s death. He had previously held top leadership
and advisory positions within the ASG. Sahiron continues to be an important ASG public figure
and operational commander.
 Isnilon Totoni Hapilon (Unknown to Present): Hapilon, also known as Abu Musab, Sol, Abu
Tuan, Esnilon, Salahudin, and The Deputy, is considered one of the ASG’s key current leaders,
along with Radulan Sahiron. Before assuming this role, Hapilon served as an ASG deputy
commander. 60 In June 2016, IS released a video declaring Hapilon as the group's emir of the
Philippines.

B. NAME CHANGES

 1989: Mujahedeen Commando Freedom Fighters (MCFF). The was Abdurajak Janjalani's first
group, composed of disillusioned MNLF members. It was established within the MNLF, but it
became the ASG in 1991, when Janjalani officially split from the MNLF.
 1991: Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). Abdurajak Janjalani renamed the group after Professor Abdul
Rasul Sayyaf, a resistance leader in Afghanistan. The name translates to “father of the
swordsman.”
 Unknown: Al Harakat Al Islamiyyah (AHAI). This name translates to “The Islamic Movement”
and is an alternative name for the ASG, reportedly preferred by the ASG’s earliest members.

C. SIZE ESTIMATES

 2008: 200-500 (According to the US State Department)

 April 2010: 445 (According to the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point)
 July 2013: 380 (According to Xinhua News)
 May 2015: 400 (According to Associated Press)

D. RESOURCES

The ASG has received money or training from other Islamist militant groups in the past,
including Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah. Today, the ASG’s main source of funding is criminal activity,
to which the group increasingly turned after the decline of funding from foreign sources in the mid-1990s.
The ASG is best known for engaging in kidnapping, demanding ransom from wealthy families and
Western governments, generating up to several million dollars per ransom. The ASG also finances itself
through blackmail, extortion, smuggling, and sales of marijuana.

Besides financially supporting its members, the ASG uses its money primarily to buy weapons
and communications equipment. A 2005 Philippine military estimate suggested that the ASG held about
480 weapons, in addition to equipment for night vision capabilities, thermal imaging, speedboats, and
more. The ASG has reportedly bought weapons from the AFP, indicating the possibility of local military
corruption. The ASG has also allegedly obtained weapons from the Infante Organization, a U.S.-
Philippines illegal drug and weapons supply group whose leader was arrested in 2003, and from Viktor
Bout, an international arms trafficker who also supplied Al Qaeda and Hezbollah before his 2008 arrest.

E. GEOGRAPHIC LOCATIONS

The ASG originated in the southern region of the Philippines. It continues to train and operate
mainly on the island of Mindanao, in particular the Zamboanga Peninsula, and the Sulu Archipelago,
which includes the islands of Basilan, Jolo, and Tawi-Tawi. Less frequently, the ASG also conducts
operations in the Manila area. Additionally, the ASG has conducted kidnappings and attacks in nearby
Malaysia, beginning in 2000 by kidnapping visitors to a resort.

IV. STRATEGY
A. IDEOLOGY & GOALS
 The ASG aims to establish an independent Salafist Sunni Islamic state in the Mindanao region for
the Filipino minority known as the Moros. This goal is shaped by the historical narrative of the
“Bangsamoro” struggle, in which Filipino Muslims—concentrated in the southern Philippines where
Muslim merchants arrived in the 1300s or earlier—have long clashed with the Spanish, American, and
Filipino governments that they believe have sought to oppress them.

The ASG also aims to expel the Christian settlers who migrated to Mindanao from other regions
in the Philippines such as Luzon and the Visayas. These Christian settlers began migrating to the southern
Philippines with government encouragement in the 1910s; they now comprise 75% of the region. Despite
the ASG’s stated goals, the organization shows signs of becoming motivated more by material gain than
by ideological struggle. Some analysts and officials now liken the ASG to a criminal gang.

B. POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

The ASG has never engaged in peace talks or any other form of nonviolent political activity. It
specifically promotes armed struggle as the means of achieving an independent Moro state. The ASG has
conducted attacks to destabilize ceasefire agreements and discourage peace negotiations between the
government and the MILF. In July 2014 on the island of Jolo, the ASG killed at least 21 Muslims
celebrating the end of Ramadan, reportedly in retaliation for their support of the peace process.

C. TARGETS & TACTICS

As part of its struggle for an independent Islamic state in the southern Philippines, the ASG
emphasizes the targeting of Philippine military forces, foreigners, and Christians. The ASG also targets a
much larger variety of individuals, including local politicians, business people, and ordinary Filipinos.

The ASG has used such tactics as assassinations, armed attacks, beheadings, bombings, murder,
robbery, kidnappings, and monetary extortion of businesses and individuals. While the ASG conducted
several high-profile political bombings in the early 2000s, kidnapping for ransom is the ASG’s current
major activity, and the ASG seems to use this tactic with little regard for ideology. The rise of the ASG’s
profit driven criminal activities, coupled with the decline of clearly political attacks like mass bombings,
suggests a shift from a principally religious or ideological rationale to material motivations.

D. MAJOR ATTACKS

Disclaimer: These are some selected major attacks in the militant organization’s history. It is not a
comprehensive listing, but captures some of the most famous attacks or turning points during the
campaign.

1. April 4, 1991: The ASG conducted a grenade attack in Zamboanga City, killing two U.S. Christian
evangelists. (2 killed, unknown wounded).

2. August 1991: The ASG bombed a Christian missionary ship, M/VDoulos. (2 killed, 40 wounded).

3. April 14, 1995: The ASG attacked the Christian town of Ipil. (53 killed, 48 wounded, 30 hostages).

4. April 23, 2000: The ASG conducted its first attack in Malaysia, kidnapping twenty-one people from a
tourist resort in Sipadan. These hostages were all released or escaped. (0 killed, unknown wounded, 21
hostages).

5. May 27, 2001: ASG gunmen kidnapped tourists, including three Americans, from the Dos Palmas
resort in Palawan. Six days later, ASG members brought at least some of these hostages to a hospital in
Lamitan, where they took more hostages, resulting in Philippine troops laying siege to the hospital. 89 After
the kidnapping, the U.S. and the Philippines conducted massive military operations against the ASG in an
attempt to rescue the hostages. Some hostages escaped or were released while others—including two of
the Americans—were killed. (2 killed, unknown wounded, 20 hostages)

6. March 4, 2003: A bomb exploded in a shed outside the main terminal building of the Davao
International Airport. An ASG spokesman called a national radio station the following day, claiming
responsibility for the attack. (21 killed, 148 wounded).

7. February 27, 2004: A member of the Rajah Solaiman Movement (RSM), a group closely tied to the
ASG, detonated a bomb on Superferry 14, a passenger ferry carrying 900 passengers out of Manila. The
ASG claimed responsibility for planning the attack, which was confirmed by a subsequent government
investigation. The Superferry 14 bombing was the Philippines' deadliest terrorist attack and the world's
deadliest terrorist attack at sea. (116 killed, unknown wounded).

8. February 14, 2005: ASG operatives simultaneously detonated two bombs in Mindanao’s General
Santos City and Davao City, closely followed by a third bomb in Makati City. These attacks became
known as the "Valentine's Day Bombings," after the ASG’s Abu Sulaiman claimed that the bombs were a
"gift" to then-President Gloria MacapagalArroyo. (8 killed, 147 wounded).

9. November 13, 2007: A bomb outside the Philippine House of Representatives killed a congressman
and two congressional employees. This operation was attributed to the ASG and was the first bombing
attack on the Philippine Congress. (3 killed, 11 wounded).

10. December 5, 2011: The ASG kidnapped Warren Richard Rodwell, a 53-year-old retired Australian
soldier. Rodwell was released in March 2013, reportedly for a $120,000 ransom that has not been
acknowledged by the Philippines or Australia. (0 killed, 0 wounded, 1 hostage).

11. May 23, 2017: Government forces clashed with militant group members in a firefight in Marawi City
during an attempted capture of ASG leader Isnilon Hapilon. (unknown killed, unknown wounded)

12. October 17, 2017: President Duterte declared the liberation of Marawi during his seventh visit to the
city. The military reported total casualties of 163 government troops, 57 civilians and 847 militants during
the siege on Marawi. (1067 killed, unknown wounded)

13. October 18, 2017: The ASG and supporting militant groups injured 10 soldiers in their last defenses
against the Philippines military’s push to reclaim the city of Marawi. This came the day after President
Duterte declared Marawi liberated, and it marked the last days of a five-month long siege on Marawi, a
populous city in the region of Mindanao. (0 dead, 10 injured)

14. July 31, 2018: a car bomb exploded at a checkpoint in Basilian’s Lamitan City, killing at least 10
people, including the driver, a Philippine Army Special Forces sergeant, four Philippine Armyled local
militiamen, and several civilians including a woman and child. The AFP has assigned blame on militants
linked to the ASG. (at least 10 killed, unknown wounded).

V. INTERACTIONS
A. COMMUNITY RELATIONS

Public support for the ASG across the Philippines is limited, with most Filipinos condemning the
group’s activities. The ASG does enjoy some support from Muslims in Mindanao’s Jolo and Basilan
regions, but this support has declined in response to the ASG’s violent tactics. Moderate Muslim leaders
similarly reject the group. The ASG relies on its members’ families, friends, and other ties to the
community for local support and recruitment, and it also channels funds to local communities to augment
support. ASG operatives blend easily into the surrounding populations, complicating government
operations against them.

B. RELATIONS WITH OTHER GROUPS

From the beginning, AQ materially and ideologically influenced the ASG. Abdurajak Janjalani’s
relationship with Osama bin Laden shaped Janjalani’s decision to establish the ASG and led to its
affiliation with AQ. Mohammad Jamal Khalifa, bin Laden’s brother-in-law and a wealthy Saudi
businessman, further strengthened the affiliation by supporting the ASG financially and logistically
during the group’s early stages. In the early 1990s, AQ member Ramzi Yousef traveled to the Philippines
several times and allegedly provided training for the ASG, becoming one of several foreign AQ members
to cooperate with the ASG in training operatives and plotting attacks.

The ASG’s relationship with AQ weakened in the mid-1990s after the Philippines barred Khalifa
from entering the country and Yousef was arrested in Pakistan. The extent of the ASG-AQ relationship
after the mid-1990s remains unclear, although a 2000 Philippine military intelligence report alleged that
Al Qaeda had still given the ASG training, weapons, and other support.

Today, the ASG-AQ relationship may have been effectively ended by the ASG’s potential new
link to IS, a prominent Al Qaeda rival. On July 23, 2014, ASG leader Isnilon Hapilon and a group of
unidentified men pledged allegiance to IS and to IS leader Baghdadi in a YouTube video. In another
video released days later, a group of men identifying themselves as ASG members also pledged
allegiance to IS and Baghdadi. In September 2014, the ASG threatened the lives of two German hostages,
demanding that Germany pay a ransom and rescind its support for U.S. attacks on IS.

However, most scholars and officials believe that the ASG has pledged allegiance to IS solely to
promote its own interests, rather than those of IS. The ASG had initially demanded only a ransom for the
German hostages, and in October 2014, it released the hostages and reported that a ransom had been paid;
yet, there was no reported change in German policy toward U.S. attacks on IS. Beyond the oath of
allegiance videos, no links between the ASG and IS have been demonstrated. IS does not seem to have
given funds or other material support to the ASG nor acknowledged its oath of allegiance.

In concrete terms of material support and operational cooperation, the ASG has the strongest ties
with Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), a regional Islamist militant group, from which it receives funds, logistical
support, and training. Some Southeast Asian military analysts say that JI and the ASG are so intertwined
that they virtually function as a single organization, especially in the area of the Sulu Archipelago.

The ASG’s relationship with its fellow Filipino separatist groups is more ambiguous, although
the MNLF and the MILF both officially condemn the ASG and its tactics. The ASG was originally a
faction of the MNLF that broke away in the 1990s, just as the MILF began as an offshoot of the MNLF in
the 1970s. Of the Philippines’ three Islamic separatist groups, the ASG is the smallest and most extreme.
Unlike the MNLF and the MILF, the ASG has never engaged in peace talks with the Philippine
government. Instead, the ASG has conducted attacks to undermine current peace negotiations between the
government and the MILF, which is larger and stronger than the ASG. The MNLF still officially
denounces the ASG, even though both groups oppose the current negotiations from which they are
excluded. In 2013, MNLF chairman Nur Misuari condemned the ASG’s terrorization of Sulu, where the
MNLF is headquartered, and announced his intention to rid the area of the ASG’s criminal activities.
There are, however, signs of collaboration between the ASG, the MNLF, and the MILF on an individual
level. The three groups have overlapping memberships, shared operational areas, and the common goal of
establishing an independent Moro state This suggests the possibility of cooperation among lower-level
operatives or individual commanders, despite the organizations’ official positions. Cooperation is
especially likely between the ASG and the other groups’ more extreme or dissatisfied members, who, like
the ASG, reject all peace talks and autonomy agreements negotiated with the Philippine government.
Some of those extreme or dissatisfied members have also gone on to join the ASG.

C. STATE SPONSORS & EXTERNAL INFLUENCES

The ASG may have been secretly supported by Libya during the rule of Muammar el-Qaddafi.
Qaddafi had previously demonstrated support for the Moro separatist movement in general, for example
by sending funds and arms to the MILF. Acting as negotiator, Libya was instrumental in securing the
August 2000 release of six hostages who were kidnapped by the ASG, including three French citizens, a
German and a South African. In return for the release, a charitable foundation led by Qaddafi’s son gave
$25 million in supposed development aid to the Philippines’ southern region, although this money may
have actually gone to the ASG. 122 Additionally, despite claims that no ransom was ever given, Qaddafi
himself may have paid the ASG $6 million for the six hostages. While Libya officially denounced the
ASG’s kidnapping operations, the ASG reportedly received Libyan money multiple times during 10
Qaddafi’s rule, under the guise of charitable or humanitarian donations. Mosques and Islamic schools in
the region also received Libyan money.