MAGLUCOT-AW v. MAGLUCOT

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MAGLUCOT-AW v.

MAGLUCOT
G.R. No. 132518. March 28, 2000.
Kapunan, J.

DOCTRINE: Parties to a partition proceeding, who elected to take under partition, and who took
possession of the portion allotted to them, are estopped from questioning the title to partition
allotted to another party.

FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for the recovery of possession and damages alleging that
they are the owners of lot no. 1639-D which was originally part of lot no. 1639 which was
covered by OCT no. 67 issued in the names of Hermogenes Olis, Pascual Olis, Bartolome
Maglucot, Anselmo Lara, and Tomas Maglucot. Subsequently, Tomas and respondent's
predecessor-in-interest filed a petition to subdivide the lot into six portions and was granted.
Then in 1963, respondents rented portions of lot 1639-d paying rentals therefore. They likewise
built houses on their corresponding leased lots. However, in 1992, they stopped paying rentals
claiming ownership over the subject lot. Petitioners maintained that there was a valid partition
and that the respondents are stopped from claiming to be co-owners of the subject lot in view of
their agreement in 1946 and ruled that the sketch plan and tax declarations relied upon by
petitioners are not conclusive evidence to partition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents are estopped from questioning the title to partition.

HELD: YES. Parties to a partition proceeding, who elected to take under partition, and who took
possession of the portion allotted to them, are estopped from questioning the title to partition
allotted to another party. Here, respondents already occupied the lots in accordance with the
sketch plan. This occupation continued until this action was filed. They cannot now be heard
to question the possession and ownership of the other co-owners who took exclusive
possession of lot 1639-d also in accordance with the sketch plan. Also, the payment of rentals
reveals that respondents' possession of the land is that of a holder and not as owner thereof.
One who possess as a mere holder acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes
to be ownership. Hence, petitioners were in possession of the subject lot in the concept of an
owner from 1952 up to the time the present action was commenced. Petition was granted.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 132518. March 28, 2000]

GAVINA MAGLUCOT-AW, CATALINA ORCULLO, RICHARD ESTANO,


NIDA MAGLUCOT, MELANIA MAGLUCOT-CATUBIG, EMILIANO
CATUBIG, LADISLAO SALMA, petitioners, vs. LEOPOLDO MAGLUCOT,
SEVERO MAGLUCOT, WILFREDA MAGLUCOT-ALEJO and
CONSTANCIO ALEJO, respondents.

DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision, dated 11 November 1997, of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48816 which reversed and set aside the
Decision, dated 13 December 1994, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30 of
Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental in an action for recovery of possession and damages.

The core issue in this case is whether a partition of Lot No. 1639 had been effected in
1952. Petitioners contend that there was already a partition of said lot; hence, they are
entitled to exclusive possession and ownership of Lot No. 1639-D, which originally
formed part of Lot No. 1639 until its partition. Private respondents, upon the other hand,
claim that there was no partition; hence, they are co-owners of Lot No. 1639-D. Notably,
this case presents a unique situation where there is an order for partition but there is no
showing that the sketch/subdivision plan was submitted to the then Court of First
Instance for its approval or that a decree or order was registered in the Register of
Deeds.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows: Korte

Petitioners filed with the RTC a complaint for recovery of possession and damages
alleging, inter alia, that they are the owners of Lot No. 1639-D. Said lot was originally
part of Lot No. 1639 which was covered by Original Certificate Title No. 6775 issued in
the names of Hermogenes Olis, Bartolome Maglucot, Pascual Olis, Roberto Maglucot,
Anselmo Lara and Tomas Maglucot on 16 August 1927.  On 19 April 1952, Tomas
[1]

Maglucot, one of the registered owners and respondents predecessor-in-interest, filed a


petition to subdivide Lot No. 1639. Consequently, on 13 May 1952, then CFI of Negros
[2]

Oriental issued an order  directing the parties to subdivide said lot into six portions as
[3]

follows: Rtcspped

a) Hermogenes Olis - lot 1639-A

b) Pascual Olis - lot 1639-B

c) Bartolome Maglucot - lot 1639-C

d) Roberto (Alberto) - lot 1639-D

Maglucot

e) Anselmo Lara - lot 1639-E

f) Tomas Maglucot - lot 1639-F. [4]

Sometime in 1963, Guillermo Maglucot rented a portion of Lot No. 1639-D (subject lot).
Subsequently, Leopoldo and Severo, both surnamed Maglucot, rented portions of
subject lot in 1964 and 1969, respectively, and each paying rentals therefor. Said
respondents built houses on their corresponding leased lots. They paid the rental
amount of P100.00 per annum to Mrs. Ruperta Salma, who represented the heirs of
Roberto Maglucot, petitioners predecessor-in-interest. In December 1992, however,
said respondents stopped paying rentals claiming ownership over the subject lot.
Petitioners thus filed the complaint a quo. Sdaadsc

After trial, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. The RTC found the
existence of tax declarations in the names of Hermogenes Olis and Pascual Olis
(purported owners of Lot Nos. 1639-A and 1639-B, respectively)  as indubitable proof
[5]

that there was a subdivision of Lot No. 1639. It likewise found that Tomas Maglucot,
respondents predecessor-in-interest, took active part in the partition as it was he, in fact,
who commenced the action for partition.  The court a quo cited Article 1431 of the Civil
[6]

Code which states that "[t]hrough estoppel an admission or representation is rendered


conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the
person relying thereon." Applying said provision of law, it held that while there was no
court order showing that Lot No. 1639 was partitioned, its absence could not be used by
Tomas Maglucot, or respondents as his successors-in-interest, to deny the existence of
an approved partition against the other co-owners who claim that there was one.  Said [7]

court, likewise, ruled that the tax declarations  over the houses of respondents,
[8]

expressly stating that the same are constructed on the lots of Roberto Maglucot,
constitute a conclusive admission by them of the ownership of the subject lot by the
latter.
[9]

The dispositive portion of the lower courts decision reads as follows:  Missdaa

WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing discussion, judgment is


hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs against the defendants ordering
the latter:

1. To demolish their houses inside lot 1639-D, vacate the premises thereof
and deliver the possession of the same to Plaintiffs;  Slxmis

2. To jointly and solidarily pay plaintiffs the sum of P15,000.00 for


attorneys fees;

3. To each pay plaintiffs the sum of P100.00 every year from 1993 for
actual damages representing the amount of unpaid rentals up to the time
they actually vacate the premises in question; Sclaw

4. To pay the costs. [10]

On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The appellate court ruled that the
sketch plan and tax declarations relied upon by petitioners are not conclusive evidence
of partition. The CA likewise found that the prescribed procedure under Rule 69 of the
[11]

Rules of Court was not followed. It thus declared that there was no partition of Lot No.
1639. Slxsc
Petitioners filed this petition for review on certiorari alleging that the CA committed the
following reversible errors:

IN VIOLATING THE LAW ON ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION


PLAINTIFFS HAVING POSSESSED LOT 1639-D SINCE 1946;

II

IN VIOLATING THE LAW ON ESTOPPEL; THE FACT OF PAYMENT OF


RENTALS AND OFFER TO BUY BY THE DEFENDANTS IS ADMISSION
THAT THE AREA IN LOT 1639-D, HAD LONG BEEN ADJUDICATED TO
PLAINTIFFS;

III

IN DECLARING THAT THERE WAS NO PRIOR PARTITION,


CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT, AND AGAINST
THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD, OF WHICH IF PROPERLY
CONSIDERED WOULD CHANGE THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE;

IV

IN DECLARING THAT THERE IS NO LAW OR JURISPRUDENCE


APPLICABLE UNDER THE PREMISES; THIS WOULD ONLY SHOW
THAT THE RECORD OF THE CASE WAS NOT PROPERLY
SCRUTINIZED, AND THE LAW WAS NOT PROPERLY STUDIED;
ESPECIALLY IN THE CASE AT BENCH THAT THE ORAL AND MUTUAL
PARTITION HAPPENED DURING THE REGIME OF THE OLD RULES
OF PROCEDURE; [12]

Petitioners maintain that Lot No. 1639 was mutually partitioned and physically
subdivided among the co-owners and that majority of them participated in the actual
execution of the subdivision. Further, the co-owners accepted their designated shares in
1946 as averred by Tomas Maglucot in his petition for partition.  Petitioners opine that
[13]

in 1952, Tomas Maglucot himself initiated a court proceeding for a formal subdivision of
Lot No. 1639. In said petition, he averred that only Hermogenes Olis and the heirs of
Pascual Olis were not agreeable to the partition.  Petitioners further contend that
[14]

respondents admitted in their tax declarations covering their respective houses that they
are "constructed on the land of Roberto Maglucot." Simply put, petitioners vigorously
[15]

assert that respondents are estopped from claiming to be co-owners of the subject lot in
view of the mutual agreement in 1946, judicial confirmation in 1952, and respondents
acquiescence because they themselves exclusively exercised ownership over Lot No.
1639-A beginning 1952 up to the present. [16]
For their part, respondents posit three points in support of their position. First, they
emphasize that petitioners failed to show that the interested parties were apprised or
notified of the tentative subdivision contained in the sketch and that the CFI
subsequently confirmed the same.  Second, they point to the fact that petitioners were
[17]

unable to show any court approval of any partition.  Third, they maintain that Lot No.
[18]

1639 remain undivided since to date, OCT No. 6275 is still an existing and perfectly
valid title, containing no annotation of any encumbrance or partition whatsoever. [19]

After a careful consideration of the pleadings filed by the parties and the evidence on
record, we find that the petition is meritorious. As stated earlier, the core issue in this
case is whether there was a valid partition in 1952.  Scslx

Preliminarily, this Court recognizes that "the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought
before it from the Court of Appeals via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to
reviewing errors of law. Findings of fact of the latter are conclusive, except in the
following instances: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd,
or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6)
when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or
its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7)
when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record."  This [20]

case falls under exceptions (7), (8) and (10) in that the findings of facts of the CA are in
conflict with that of the RTC, are mere conclusions without citation of specific evidence
on which they are based and are premised on absence of evidence but are contradicted
by the evidence on record. For these reasons, we shall consider the evidence on record
to determine whether indeed there was partition.  Slx

In this jurisdiction, an action for partition is comprised of two phases: first, an order for
partition which determines whether a co-ownership in fact exists, and whether partition
is proper; and, second, a decision confirming the sketch or subdivision submitted by the
parties or the commissioners appointed by the court, as the case may be.  The first
[21]

phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of whether
or not a co-ownership in fact exists, (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be
made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase
may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because
a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It may end, upon the
other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is
proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant
from the real estate in question is in order. In the latter case, the parties may, if they are
able to agree, make partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance,
and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon. In either case i.e., either the
action is dismissed or partition and/or accounting is decreed the order is a final one, and
may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. The second phase commences when
it appears that "the parties are unable to agree upon the partition" directed by the court.
In that event, partition shall be done for the parties by the court with the assistance of
not more than three (3) commissioners. This second stage may well also deal with the
rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the court after the parties have
been accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by the
party or parties thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of the real
estate in question. Such an order is, to be sure, final and appealable. [22]

The present rule on the question of finality and appealability of a decision or order
decreeing partition is that it is final and appealable.  The order of partition is a final
[23]

determination of the co-ownership over Lot No. 1639 by the parties and the propriety of
the partition thereof. Hence, if the present rule were applied, the order not having been
appealed or questioned by any of the parties to the case, it has become final and
executory and cannot now be disturbed.  Mesm

The true test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final
is: Does it leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the
case? If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does not, it is final. The key test to what is
interlocutory is when there is something more to be done on the merits of the case.  An[24]

order for partition is final and not interlocutory and, hence, appealable because it
decides the rights of the parties upon the issue submitted. [25]

However, this Court notes that the order of partition was issued when the ruling
in Fuentebella vs. Carrascoso,  which held that the order of partition is interlocutory,
[26]

was controlling. In addition, the reports of the commissioners not having been confirmed
by the trial court are not binding.  In this case, both the order of partition and the
[27]

unconfirmed sketch plan are, thus, interlocutory. Nevertheless, where parties do not
object to the interlocutory decree, but show by their conduct that they have assented
thereto, they cannot thereafter question the decree, especially, where, by reason of
[28]

their conduct, considerable expense has been incurred in the execution of the
commission.  Respondents in this case have occupied their respective lots in
[29]

accordance with the sketch/subdivision plan. They cannot after acquiescing to the order
for more than forty (40) years be allowed to question the binding effect thereof.

This case is to be distinguished from the order in the action for partition in Arcenas vs.
Cinco.  In that case, the order was clearly interlocutory since it required the parties " to
[30]

submit the corresponding deed of partition to the Court for its approval." Here, the order
appointed two commissioners and directed them merely to approve the sketch plan
already existing and tentatively followed by the parties.  Calrky

Under the present rule, the proceedings of the commissioners without being confirmed
by the court are not binding upon the parties.  However, this rule does not apply in case
[31]

where the parties themselves actualized the supposedly unconfirmed sketch/subdivision


plan. The purpose of court approval is to give effect to the sketch/subdivision plan. In
this case, the parties themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest implemented
the sketch plan made pursuant to a court order for partition by actually occupying
specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in 1952 and continue to do so until the present until
this case was filed, clearly, the purpose of the court approval has been met. This
statement is not to be taken to mean that confirmation of the commissioners may be
dispensed with but only that the parties herein are estopped from raising this question
by their own acts of ratification of the supposedly non-binding sketch/subdivision
plan. Kycalr

The records of the case show that sometime in 1946 there was a prior oral agreement
to tentatively partition Lot No. 1639.  By virtue of this agreement, the original co-owners
[32]

occupied specific portions of Lot No. 1639.  It was only in 1952 when the petition to
[33]

subdivide Lot No. 1639 was filed because two of the co-owners, namely Hermogenes
Olis and heirs of Pascual Olis, refused to have said lot subdivided and have separate
certificates of title. Significantly, after the 1952 proceedings, the parties in this case by
themselves and/or through their predecessors-in-interest occupied specific portions of
Lot No. 1639 in accordance with the sketch plan. Such possession remained so until
this case arose, or about forty (40) years later.

From its order in 1952, it can be gleaned that the CFI took notice of the tentative
subdivision plan by oral partition of the parties therein. Further, it appears that said court
was aware that the parties therein actually took possession of the portions in
accordance with the sketch/subdivision plan. With this factual backdrop, said court
ordered the partition and appointed two (2) commissioners to approve the tentative
sketch/subdivision plan. It would not be unreasonable to presume that the parties
therein, having occupied specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in accordance with the
sketch/subdivision plan, were aware that it was that same sketch/subdivision plan which
would be considered by the commissioners for approval. There is no showing that
respondents by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest raised any
objections. On the contrary, the records show that the parties continued their
possession of the specific portions of Lot No. 1639 pursuant to the sketch/subdivision
plan. Kyle

It has been previously held that a co-owner, who, though not a party to a partition
accepts the partition allotted to him, and holds and conveys the same in severalty, will
not be subsequently permitted to avoid partition.  It follows that a party to a partition is
[34]

also barred from avoiding partition when he has received and held a portion of the
subdivided land especially in this case where respondents have enjoyed ownership
rights over their share for a long time.

Parties to a partition proceeding, who elected to take under partition, and who took
possession of the portion allotted to them, are estopped to question title to portion
allotted to another party.  A person cannot claim both under and against the same
[35]

instrument.  In other words, they accepted the lands awarded them by its provisions,
[36]

and they cannot accept the decree in part, and repudiate it in part. They must accept all
or none.  Parties who had received the property assigned to them are precluded from
[37]
subsequently attacking its validity of any part of it.  Here, respondents, by themselves
[38]

and/or through their predecessors-in-interest, already occupied of the lots in accordance


with the sketch plan. This occupation continued until this action was filed. They cannot
now be heard to question the possession and ownership of the other co-owners who
took exclusive possession of Lot 1639-D also in accordance with the sketch plan.  Exsm

In technical estoppel, the party to be estopped must knowingly have acted so as to


mislead his adversary, and the adversary must have placed reliance on the action and
acted as he would otherwise not have done. Some authorities, however, hold that what
is tantamount to estoppel may arise without this reliance on the part of the adversary,
and this is called, ratification or election by acceptance of benefits, which arises when a
party, knowing that he is not bound by a defective proceeding, and is free to repudiate it
if he will, upon knowledge, and while under no disability, chooses to adopt such
defective proceeding as his own.  Ratification means that one under no disability
[39]

voluntarily adopts and gives sanction to some unauthorized act or defective proceeding,
which without his sanction would not be binding on him. It is this voluntary choice,
knowingly made, which amounts to a ratification of what was theretofore unauthorized,
and becomes the authorized act of the party so making the ratification. [40]

The records show that respondents were paying rent for the use of a portion of Lot No.
1639-D. Had they been of the belief that they were co-owners of the entire Lot No. 1639
they would not have paid rent. Respondents attempted to counter this point by
presenting an uncorroborated testimony of their sole witness to the effect that the
amount so paid to Roberto Maglucot and, subsequently, to Ruperta Salma were for the
payment of real property taxes. We are not persuaded. It is quite improbable that the
parties would be unaware of the difference in their treatment of their transactions for so
long a time. Moreover, no evidence was ever presented to show that a tax declaration
for the entire Lot No. 1639 has ever been made. Replete in the records are tax
declarations for specific portions of Lot 1639. It is inconceivable that respondents would
not be aware of this. With due diligence on their part, they could have easily verified this
fact. This they did not do for a period spanning more than four decades.

The payment of rentals by respondents reveal that they are mere lessees. As such, the
possession of respondents over Lot No. 1639-D is that of a holder and not in the
concept of an owner. One who possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in another a
superior right which he believes to be ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong.
 Since the possession of respondents were found to be that of lessors of petitioners, it
[41]

goes without saying that the latter were in possession of Lot No. 1639-D in the concept
of an owner from 1952 up to the time the present action was commenced.  Msesm

Partition may be inferred from circumstances sufficiently strong to support the


presumption.  Thus, after a long possession in severalty, a deed of partition may be
[42]

presumed.  It has been held that recitals in deeds, possession and occupation of land,
[43]

improvements made thereon for a long series of years, and acquiescence for 60 years,
furnish sufficient evidence that there was an actual partition of land either by deed or by
proceedings in the probate court, which had been lost and were not recorded.  And[44]
where a tract of land held in common has been subdivided into lots, and one of the lots
has long been known and called by the name of one of the tenants in common, and
there is no evidence of any subsequent claim of a tenancy in common, it may fairly be
inferred that there has been a partition and that such lot was set off to him whose name
it bears. [45]

Respondents insist that the absence of any annotation in the certificate of title showing
any partition of Lot No. 1639 and that OCT No. 6725 has not been canceled clearly
indicate that no partition took place. The logic of this argument is that unless partition is
shown in the title of the subject property, there can be no valid partition or that the
annotation in the title is the sole evidence of partition.  Esmso

Again, we are not persuaded. The purpose of registration is to notify and protect the
interests of strangers to a given transaction, who may be ignorant thereof, but the non-
registration of the deed evidencing such transaction does not relieve the parties thereto
of their obligations thereunder.  As originally conceived, registration is merely a species
[46]

of notice. The act of registering a document is never necessary in order to give it legal
effect as between the parties.  Requirements for the recording of the instruments are
[47]

designed to prevent frauds and to permit and require the public to act with the
presumption that recorded instruments exist and are genuine. [48]

It must be noted that there was a prior oral partition in 1946. Although the oral
agreement was merely tentative, the facts subsequent thereto all point to the
confirmation of said oral partition. By virtue of that agreement, the parties took
possession of specific portions of the subject lot. The action for partition was instituted
because some of the co-owners refused to have separate titles issued in lieu of the
original title. In 1952, an order for partition was issued by the cadastral court. There is
no evidence that there has been any change in the possession of the parties. The only
significant fact subsequent to the issuance of the order of partition in 1952 is that
respondents rented portions of Lot No. 1639-D. It would be safe to conclude, therefore,
that the oral partition as well as the order of partition in 1952 were the bases for the
finding of actual partition among the parties. The legal consequences of the order of
partition in 1952 having been discussed separately, we now deal with oral partition in
1946. Given that the oral partition was initially tentative, the actual possession of
specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in accordance with the oral partition and the
continuation of such possession for a very long period indicate the permanency and
ratification of such oral partition. The validity of an oral partition is already well-settled.
In Espina vs. Abaya,  we declared that an oral partition is valid. In Hernandez vs.
[49]

Andal,  reiterated in Tan vs. Lim,  this Court has ruled, thus:
[50] [51]

On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds,


courts of equity have enforce oral partition when it has been completely or
partly performed. Esmmis

Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid


and enforceable at law, equity will proper cases where the parol partition
has actually been consummated by the taking of possession in severalty
and the exercise of ownership by the parties of the respective portions set
off to each, recognize and enforce such parol partition and the rights of the
parties thereunder. Thus, it has been held or stated in a number of cases
involving an oral partition under which the parties went into possession,
exercised acts of ownership, or otherwise partly performed the partition
agreement, that equity will confirm such partition and in a proper case
decree title in accordance with the possession in severalty.

In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partition may be
sustained on the ground of estoppel of the parties to assert the rights of a
tenant in common as to parts of land divided by parol partition as to which
possession in severalty was taken and acts of individual ownership were
exercised. And a court of equity will recognize the agreement and decree
it to be valid and effectual for the purpose of concluding the right of the
parties as between each other to hold their respective parts in severalty.

A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties
thereto have acquiesced in and ratified the partition by taking possession
in severalty, exercising acts of ownership with respect thereto, or
otherwise recognizing the existence of the partition.

A number of cases have specifically applied the doctrine of part


performance, or have stated that a part performance is necessary, to take
a parol partition out of the operation of the statute of frauds. It has been
held that where there was a partition in fact between tenants in common,
and a part performance, a court of equity would have regard to enforce
such partition agreed to by the parties.  Esmsc

Two more points have constrained this Court to rule against respondents. First,
respondents Wilfreda Maglucot-Alejo and Constancio Alejo offered to buy the share of
Roberto Maglucot. Second, the tax declarations contain statements that the houses of
respondents were built on the land owned by Roberto Maglucot.  Esm

On the first point, petitioners presented Aida Maglucot who testified that after
respondents were informed that petitioners were going to use Lot No. 1639-D belonging
to Roberto Maglucot, respondents Wilfreda Maglucot-Alejo and Constancio Alejo went
to the house of said witness and offered to buy the share of Roberto Maglucot.  Aida
[52]

Maglucot further testified that they refused the offer because they also intend to use the
lot for a residential purpose.  This testimony of Aida Maglucot is unrebutted by
[53]

respondents, and the CA did not touch upon this finding of fact. Hence, the offer to buy
has been established by the unrebutted evidence of the petitioners. Why would they
give such offer if they claim to be at least a co-owner of the said lot? In effect,
respondents impliedly admit the title of the petitioners and that they are not co-owners,
much less the sole owners, of Lot No. 1639-D. Chief
On the second point, the existence of Tax Declaration No. 04-557 in the names of
Constancio Alejo and Godofreda Maglucot,  Tax Declaration No. 04-87-13 in the
[54]

names of Leopoldo Maglucot and Regina Barot,  Tax Declaration No. 04-593 in the
[55]

names of Severo Maglucot and Samni Posida  showing that the houses of the above-
[56]

mentioned persons are constructed on the land of Roberto Maglucot  constitute [57]

incontrovertible evidence of admission by the same persons of the ownership of the


land by Roberto Maglucot. Tax Declarations are public documents. Unless their veracity
is directly attacked, the contents therein are presumed to be true and accurate.  The [58]

lone testimony of Severo Maglucot that Roberto Maglucot was only made to appear as
owner of the land in their respective declarations because he was the administrator of
Lot No. 1639 is uncorroborated and not supported by any other evidence.  Jksm

No injustice is dealt upon respondents because they are entitled to occupy a portion of
Lot No. 1639, particularly Lot No. 1639-A, in their capacity as heirs of Tomas Maglucot,
one of the original co-owners of Lot No. 1639 in accordance with the sketch plan of said
lot showing the partition into six portions.
[59]

Finally, this Court takes notice of the language utilized by counsel for petitioners in their
petition for review on certiorari. Thrice in the petition, counsel for petitioners made
reference to the researcher of the CA. First, he alluded to the lack of scrutiny of the
records and lack of study of the law "by the researcher."  Second, he cited the
[60]

researcher of the CA as having "sweepingly stated without reference to the


record"  that "[w]e have scanned the records on hand and found no evidence of any
[61]

partition." Finally, counsel for petitioners assailed the CA decision, stating that "this will
only show that there was no proper study of the case by the researcher." [62]

Any court when it renders a decision does so as an arm of the justice system and as an
institution apart from the persons that comprise it. Decisions are rendered by the courts
and not the persons or personnel that may participate therein by virtue of their office. It
is highly improper and unethical for counsel for petitioners to berate the researcher in
his appeal. Counsel for petitioner should be reminded of the elementary rules of the
legal profession regarding respect for the courts by the use of proper language in its
pleadings and admonished for his improper references to the researcher of the CA in
his petition. A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive, or menacing language or
behavior before the courts. [63]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED The decision of the Court of Appeals is SET
ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby REINSTATED.  h Y

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santaigo, JJ., concur.


[1]
 Exhibit "J," Records, p. 89.
[2]
 Exhibits "A-4," "A-4-a" to "A-4-c" and "B," Records, pp. 48-50.
[3]
 Exhibit "A," id.. at 45-47.
[4]
 Rollo, p. 24.
[5]
 Exhibits "K" and "L," Records, pp. 90-91.
[6]
 RTC Decision, 13 December 1994, p. 10; Rollo, p. 42.
[7]
 Ibid..
[8]
 Exhibits "G" to "I," Records, pp.87-88.
[9]
 See note 5 at 9, Rollo, p. 41.
[10]
 Id., at 12-13; Rollo, pp. 44-45.
[11]
 CA Decision, pp. 6-7, Rollo, pp. 28-29.
[12]
 Petition, p. 4; Rollo,. p. 8.
[13]
 Memorandum for Petitioners, p. 6; Rollo, p. 61.
[14]
 Ibid..
[15]
 Id. at 10; Rollo, p. 65.
[16]
 Id. at 12; Rollo, p. 67.
[17]
 Memorandum for Respondents, p. 2; Rollo. p. 79.
[18]
 Ibid.
[19]
 Id. at 3,6; Rollo. pp. 81, 83.
[20]
 Sta. Maria vs. Court of Appeals, 285 SCRA 351 (1998); Medina vs. Asistio, 191 SCRA 218, 223-224 (1990).
[21]
 See Sections 2 and 6, Rule 69, Rules of Court. See also Herrera, Comments on the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
as Amended, 768-770 (1997).
[22]
 Municipality of Bian vs. Garcia, 180 SCRA 576 (1989).
[23]
 See Miranda vs. Court of Appeals, 71 SCRA 295 (1976) reiterated in Valdez vs. Bagaso, 82 SCRA 22 (1978);
Lagunzad vs. Gonzales, 92 SCRA 476 (1979); Garbo vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 616 (1984);
Fabrica vs. Court of Appeals, 146 SCRA 250 (1986).
[24]
 Miranda vs. Court of Appeals, supra.
[25]
 Id., at 9; See also Valdez vs. Bagaso, supra.; Fabrica, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, supra.
[26]
 G.R. No. 48102, May 27, 1942.
[27]
 RULE OF COURT, Rule 69, Sec. 2, par. 1 and Sec. 6.
[28]
 Godwin v. Banks, 43 A. 863, 89 Md. 679.
[29]
 Corbett vs. Fleming, 119 N.Y.S. 543, 134 App. Div. 544.
[30]
 74 SCRA 118 (1976).
[31]
 Notably, the provision applied by the Cadastral Court in its Order of Partition in 1952 was section 22 of the
Cadastral Act. (The Cadastral Court was actually referring to section 19 of the law.) A perusal of this provision
would show that the appointed commissioners are empowered to make partition such part and proportion of the
lands as the court shall order. Significantly, in contrast to the procedure under the Rules of Court, there is no
requirement of confirmation of the report of the commissioners by the Cadastral Court. It is not, however, necessary
to make any declaration on this matter since whatever rule may have been applicable, the defendants are now
estoppped from raising this question.
[32]
 Exhibit B for petitioners, Rollo, p. 51.
[33]
 Exhibit A-4; Rollo p. 49.
[34]
 Hampshire County Trust Co. of North Hampton, Mass., et al. v. Stevenson et al., 150 N.E. 726 citing Freeman,
Cotenancy and Partition p. 710, Section 535.
[35]
 Jeffries vs. Hignite et al., 206 Ky. 50, 266 S.W. 901.
[36]
 Christen et al. vs. Christen et al., 184 Ky. 822, 213 S.W. 189.
[37]
 Clarke et al. vs. Charles et al., 55 Neb 202, May 19, 1898.
[38]
 Torres vs. Encarnacion, 89 Phil. 678 (1951).
[39]
 Hampshire County Trust Co. of North Hampton, Mass., et al. v. Stevenson et al., 150 N.E. 726.
[40]
 Ibid.
[41]
 A.M. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, 245 (Vol. II, 1995).
[42]
 Hunt vs. Rabitoay, 125 Mich. 137, 84 NW 59.
[43]
 Hepburn & Dundas vs. Auld, 9 US 262, 3 L Ed. 96.
[44]
 Hunt vs. Rabitoay, 125 Mich. 137, 84 NW 59.
[45]
 Jackson ex dem. Williams vs. Millr (NY) 6 Wend. 228.
[46]
 Casica vs. Villanueva, G.R. No. L-9590, April 30, 1957.
[47]
 Pena, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, 9 (1994 Revised Ed., 1997 Reprint).
[48]
 See 26 C.J. 313.
[49]
 196 SCRA 313 (1991).
[50]
 78 Phil. 196, 203 (1974).
[51]
 296 SCRA 455 (1998).
[52]
 T.S.N. p. 5, August 18, 1994.
[53]
 Ibid.
[54]
 Exhibit "G" , Records, p. 87.
[55]
 Exhibit "H", Id., at 88.
[56]
 Exhibit "I", Id. at 89.
[57]
 Exhibits "G-1," "H-1" and "I-1", Id. at 87-88.
[58]
 Rules of Court, Rule 131, Sec. 3 (m), (q), (y) and (ff).
[59]
 Exhibits "B" and "B-1", Rollo, p. 5.
[60]
 Rollo, p. 9.
[61]
 Id., at 10.
[62]
 Id.. at 16.
[63]
 Rule 11.03, Code of Professional Responsibility.

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