EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-14634. September 29, 1962.]

ARTURO NIETO , plaintiff-appellant, vs. BARTOLOME QUINES and

MIGUEL P. PIO , defendants-appellees.

Justiniano P. Cortes for plaintiff-appellant.

Miguela P. Pio for and in his own behalf as defendant-appellee.

RESOLUTION

BARRERA , J : p

In the decision of this Court in the herein case, promulgated on January 28, 1961,
the following facts were considered duly established:
"Sometime in 1917, Bartolome Quines led with the Bureau of Lands a
homestead application covering a tract of land situated in the municipality of
Abulug, province of Cagayan. Upon the approval of his application in the
following year, he began clearing and cultivating the land.
"In the years 1923 to 1925, cadastral surveys were made by the Bureau of
Lands in the municipality of Abulug, during which the tract of land applied for as
a homestead by Bartolome Quines was designated as Lot No. 3044 of the Abulug
Cadastre. After the surveys were completed, cadastral proceedings were initiated
in 1927 by the Director of Lands in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan. Relying
upon the assurances made by the employees of the Bureau of Lands that they
would take care of his homestead in the cadastral proceedings, Bartolome Quines
did not le any answer claiming several lots including Lot No. 3044. After hearing,
the cadastral court, on August 16, 1930, rendered its decision wherein Maria
Florentino was awarded the lots claimed by her. Lot No. 3044 was included in the
award, apparently because neither the Director of Lands nor any of his
representatives appeared during the hearing to inform the court that it was under
homestead application. On August 29, 1930, pending the issuance of the nal
decree of registration and the original certi cate of title to Maria Florentino, a
homestead patent covering Lot No. 3044 was granted to Bartolome Quines, and
pursuant thereto, the Registrar of Deeds of Cagayan, on September 15, 1930,
issued Original Certi cate of Title No. 623 in his name. Six months thereafter, or
on March 12, 1931, the same Register of Deeds issued Original Certi cate of Title
No. 11982 in the name of Maria Florentino covering the lots awarded to her by the
cadastral court including Lot No. 3044."

Upon the foregoing, it was declared that Quines, "having complied with all the
terms and conditions which would entitle him to a patent . . . has unquestionably
acquired a vested right on the land and is to be regarded as the equitable owner
thereof." The title of appellee Quines to the land, consequently, was held superior to that
of Maria Florentino, predecessor-in-interest of herein appellant Arturo Nieto. This
Resolution is prompted by appellant's motion for reconsideration of our
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 abovementioned decision.
For purposes of resolving the issues raised in the instant motion for
reconsideration, attention must be given to the following signi cant facts appearing in
the records: After the approval of appellee's application for homestead of the tract of
land involved herein, but before a patent therefor could actually be issued, cadastral
proceedings were instituted by the Director of Lands in the Court of First Instance of
Cagayan, wherein said land was designated as Lot No. 3044 of the Abulug Cadastre;
that in this cadastral proceeding, only Maria Florentino appeared and led a claim of
ownership of Lot No. 3044, as a result of which, the cadastral court, on August 16,
1930, "awarded and decreed said non-contested Lot No. 3044" in favor of claimant
Florentino; and that there having been no appeal interposed, the award and decree
became nal on September 15, 1930; that on August 29, 1930; a homestead patent
over the same lot was issued by the Bureau of Lands to appellee Quines, and Original
Certi cate of Title No. 623, based on said patent was issued by the Register of Deeds
in his name on September 15, 1930; that Original Certi cate of Title No. 11982, in the
name of Maria Florentino de Villanueva, on the other hand, was issued on March 12,
1931.
In the case of De la Merced v. Court of Appeals, et al. (L-17757, promulgated on
May 30, 1962), it was held:
"Confronted with the question of when title to the land in a cadastral
proceeding is vested, this Court, in the case of Government of the Philippines
Islands v. Abural (39 Phil. 997), said:

"After trial in a cadastral case, three actions are taken. The rst adjudicates
ownership in favor of one of the claimants. This constitutes the decision — the
judgment — the decree of the court, and speaks in a judicial manner. The second
action is the declaration by the Court that the decree is nal and its order for the
issuance of the certi cates of title by the Chief of the Land Registration O ce.
Such order is made if within thirty days from the date of receipt of a copy of the
decision no appeal is taken from the decision. This again is judicial action,
although to a less degree than the first.

'The third and last action devolves upon the General Land Registration
O ce. This o ce has been instituted "for the effectuation and accomplishment
of the laws relative to the registration of land." (Administrative Code of 1917, sec.
174.) . . ..

'The judgment in a cadastral survey, including the rendition of the

decree, is a judicial act. As the law says, the judicial decree when nal is
the base of the certi cation of title. The issuance of the decree by the Land
Registration O ce is a ministerial act. The date of the title prepared by the
Chief Surveyor is unimportant, for the adjudication has taken place and all
that is left to be performed is the mere formulation of the technical
description. . . .

'As a general rule, registration of title under the cadastral system is

nal, conclusive, and indisputable, after the passage of thirty-day period
allowed for an appeal from the date of receipt by the party of a copy of the
judgment of the court adjudicating ownership without any step having
been taken to perfect an appeal. The prevailing party may then have
execution of the judgment as of right and is entitled to the certi cate of
title issued by the Chief of the Land Registration O ce. The exception is
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 the special provision for fraud.'

"Under the foregoing pronouncement, the title of ownership on the land is

vested upon the owner upon the expiration of the period to appeal from the
decision or adjudication by the cadastral court, without such an appeal having
been perfected. The certi cate of title would then be necessary for purposes of
effecting registration of subsequent disposition of the land where court
proceedings would no longer be necessary.

"As we have here a decree issued by the cadastral court, ordering the
issuance of Inocencio de los Santos of the certi cate of title over Lot No. 395
after the decision adjudicating ownership to him of said property had already
become nal, and there being no imputation of irregularity in the said cadastral
proceedings, title of ownership on the said adjudicate was vested as of the date
of the issuance of such judicial decree. The land, for all intents and purposes, had
become, from that time, registered property which could not be acquired by
adverse possession."

In line with the foregoing ruling, the land, for all legal intents and purposes, became
registered in the name of the adjudicate Maria Florentino after the decision of the
cadastral court became nal, i.e., 30 days from August 16, 1930 or on September 15,
1930 (Sec. 11, Act 2259). As the certi cate of title based on the patent was also issued
to appellee Quines on the same day, it is clear that Lot No. 3044 was registered in the
names of 2 different persons, on the same day, pursuant to 2 different proceedings.
This peculiar situations gibes rise not to the question of who is rightfully entitled to
registration of the property, but which of the two registrations already effected and
secured, should prevail.
It is true, as claimed by appellee Quines, that in the case of Aquino v. Director of
Lands (39 Phil. 850), this Court declared a decree of registration issued under the
Public Land Law to be "conclusive and nal", and that "once registered, a patent
becomes irrevocable and enjoys the same privileges as Torrens titles issued under Act
496" (Manalo v. Lukban, 48 Phil. 973; El Hogar Filipino v. Olviga, 60 Phil. 17). The
pronouncement in the Aquino case, however, was based on the conclusion that
"proceedings under the Land Registration Law and under the provisions of Chapter VI
of the Public Land Law (recon rmation of imperfect titles) are the same in that both are
against the whole world, both take the nature of judicial proceedings"; 1 while in the
Manalo and El Hogar Filipino cases, the issue involved was the e cacy of duly issued
certi cates of title based on patents, as against titles obtained through cadastral
proceedings instituted subsequent to the granting of such patents. Whatever rulings
and pronouncements may have been made in said cases, therefore, would have no
application to the case at bar, because the title obtained by appellee Quines was not
under Chapter VI of Act 926, but pursuant to the provisions of the same law on
homestead (Chap. I, Act 926), and the question herein presented involves the validity
and enforceability of 2 different registrations that took effect on the same day. An
Analysis of the 2 proceedings under which they were obtained is, consequently,
imperative and in order.
Under Act 926 which is the law governing this case, the Director of Lands, upon
receipt of homestead application shall summarily determine whether the land
described is prima facie subject to homestead settlement, and should be nd nothing
to the contrary, the applicant shall be permitted to enter the land speci ed (Sec. 2). In
not less than ve nor more than eight years from the ling of the application, nal proof
of residence and cultivation may be made by the applicant (Sec. 2), of which, the public
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 shall be noti ed, and any person may contest the same on any of the grounds
enumerated in the law (Sec. 8). Should the applicant successfully proved that he has
complied with all the requirements of the law, a patent, under the name of Government,
shall be issued to him (the applicant), upon payment of the necessary fee (Sec. 3). The
procedure, initiated by the applicant and acted upon by the grantor (the Government), is
purely administrative. 2 As this Court observed:
". . . while provision is made for notice to the public of the intention of the
homestead to apply for a patent upon nal proof of occupation and cultivation of
the land, and for the hearing of objections to the application upon various
grounds, including the contention that the land in question was not 'unoccupied'
at the time of filing the application, the statute nowhere undertakes to declare that
the decision of the Director upon such contest shall be conclusive, or that the
failure of the real owner to contest the application shall have the effect of
forfeiting his title by making the director's decision as to the public character of
the land final and conclusive." (De los Reyes v. Razon, supra.)

Upon the other hand, the proceedings under the Cadastral Act, at the initiative of
the Government (Sec. 1, Act 2259), are judicial. Process is served by publication upon
all persons who may have interest on the land, including the Government, to appear and
prove or oppose the claims of ownership that may be led therein (Secs. 8 and 9). The
action is one in rem and any decision rendered therein by the cadastral court is binding
against the whole world, (Sec. 11) including the Government.
The decision of the cadastral court, recognizing Maria Florentino's right of
ownership over the land, was rendered on August 16, 1930. There being no charge,
much less proof, of irregularity of the cadastral proceeding, the Government, on which
said decision of the cadastral court is also binding and which is supposed to have
knowledge thereof, had actually no more right to convey by homestead grant on August
29, 1930, said parcel of land to appellee Quines. The fact that the decision of the
cadastral court became nal only on September 15, 1930, after the patent was issued,
does not alter the situation that when such patent was obtained, there was already a
court adjudication in favor of Maria Florentino, binding upon the government itself,
predecessor-in-interest of Quines.
Furthermore, a certi cate of title based on a patent, even after the expiration of
one year from the issuance thereof, is still subject to certain conditions and
restrictions. 3 As a matter of fact, in appropriate cases and after prior administrative
investigations by the Director of Lands, proper actions may be instituted by said o cial
which may lead to the cancellation of the patent and the title, and the consequent
reversion of the land to the Government. 4 On the other hand, a certi cate of title issued
pursuant to Act 2259, after the lapse of 1 year, becomes incontrovertible. 5 The
inescapable conclusion, therefore, is that, while with the due registration and issuance
of a certi cate of title over a land acquired pursuant to the Public Land Law, said
property becomes registered in contemplation of Act 496, 6 in view of its nature and
manner of acquisition, such certi cate of title, when in con ict with one obtained on the
same date through judicial proceedings, must give way to the latter.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of January 28, 1961 is hereby reconsidered; the
judgment of the lower court reversed and set aside, and another one is entered
declaring Original Certi cate of Title No. 11982 in the name of Maria Florentino de
Villanueva, and Transfer Certi cate of Title No. 140 in the name of plaintiff-appellant
Arturo Nieto, subsequently issued upon cancellation of the former, as the true and valid
titles over Lot No. 3044 of the Abulug Cadastre. Appellant's claim for damages,
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 however, is denied there being no sufficient justification for awarding the same. Without
costs. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Concepcion, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., reserve their votes.
Regala and Makalintal, JJ., did not take part.

Footnotes

1. Claims and applications for registration of imperfect titles are to be led in the court of Land
Registration for investigation and hearing. The parties and the general public, including
the Government (represented by the Attorney-General) are noti ed thereof. In such
hearings, the procedure prescribed for hearings and in the matter of appeal under Act
496 shall be observed. (Secs. 59, 60, Act 926).
2. De los Reyes v. Razon, 38 Phil. 480.

3. Secs. 118, 119, 121, 122, Com. Act 141; Sec. 35, Act 926; Campanero v. Coloma, L-11908,
Jan. 30, 1960.

4. Secs. 123 and 124, Com. Act 141; Rellin v. Cabigas, L-15926, Oct. 31, 1960.
5 Sec. 11, Act 926, in connection with Sec. 38, Act 496.
6. Sec. 122, Act 496.

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