Kant Critique of Judgement

Carlon Robbins
Michael Kelly
PHILS 6050-090
Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Judgment
In The Critique of Judgment, Immanuel Kant discerns that beauty is a symbol of morality
through assent to universal validity. Kant builds this argument by demonstrating that the
judgment of taste is an aesthetic, not a cognitive or logical judgment. This aesthetic judgment
refers to the pleasure or displeasure one has when experiencing a pleasing object. The pleasure
(delight) or displeasure however, cannot be a characteristic of the object experienced. Pleasure or
displeasure can only be subjective responses one might have as a result of experiencing the
object. Beauty is an experience in the subject’s cognitive faculties, and as it generates assent to
the commonality and universality of human beings and the cognitive faculties, it is analogous to
morality which in-turn produces the same cognitive discernments.
To demarcate “the beautiful” from the agreeable, or that which pleases, Kant introduces
the notion of “disinterestedness.” When one makes a judgment of something delightful, some
sensual effect the object provides, it is said to be gratifying. For example, if someone says, “I
think this pizza is delicious,” he/she is making a judgment about the object (pizza) and to how it
pleases his/her senses (i.e. the appearance, smell, and taste of the pizza is good). This type of
judgment is unlike the aesthetic judgment of beauty in that it is both merely subjective and
demonstrates interest. For the person in question, pizza gratifies, and in this sense his/her
comment, “Pizza is delicious,” is a referent to the agreeableness of the object to their palate. In
that this person thinks pizza is delicious, he or she will likely want more pizza as it operates in
stimulating the sensual pleasures and appetite. Hence, the interest is in the continued existence of
the object.
1
The aesthetic judgment of beauty however, is disinterested in the object. If another
person were to say, “This flower is beautiful,” the judgment of beauty in such a case is not
dependent upon the object or in sensual delight or pleasure produced in the subject as it does not
conform to a sense of gratification of the subject. The subject does not become desirous to
possess or consume the object for his or her own delight; rather it is acknowledged as beautiful
by the experience it produces in the subject via its representation. The beautiful cannot be a
quality or characteristic in the object itself. It must be an aesthetic experience within the subject,
(i.e. the cognitive or reflective faculties). As Kant says,
[We] will speak of the beautiful as if beauty were a quality of the object and the
judgment logical (forming a cognition of the object by concepts of it); although it
is only aesthetic, and contains merely a reference of the representation of the
object to the subject; because it still bears this resemblance to the logical
judgment, that it may be presupposed to be valid for all men.1
Although humans feel free in making judgments of objects as beautiful imply the necessity of a
universal compliance, the “free play” of the cognitive faculties stems from the notion of sensus
communis or “common sense.”2 Even though two or more people might not agree that X is
beautiful, that the possibility is recognized, supports the claim that beauty is the symbol of
morality in that it is universal.
This underscores the universality and commonality of humankind. This appeal to
universality must be free of concepts due to the delimiting effect of concepts on the cognitive
faculties.3 Thus, beauty is not a quality in an object but refers to the experience in the subject by
representation of the object (i.e. the common, universal cognitive faculties). This autonomy and
commonality substantiates beauty as the symbol of morality.
1
Kant, Immanuel, The Critique of Judgement, trans. James Creed Meredith, (Stilwell, KS: Digiread, 2005), 31-32.
2
Ibid., 48
3
Ibid., 35
2
In this faculty, judgment does not find itself subjected to a heteronomy of laws of
experience as it does in the empirical estimate of things—in respect of the objects
of such a pure delight it gives the law to itself, just as reason does in respect of the
faculty of desire. Here, too, both on account of this inner possibility in the subject,
and on account of the external possibility of a nature harmonizing therewith, it
finds a reference in itself to something in the subject itself and outside it, and
which is not nature, nor yet freedom, but still is connected with the ground of the
latter.4
Both beauty and morality please immediately but also apart from interest. The freedom of the
imagination in relation to judgments of beauty is to the freedom of the will in relation to
judgments of morality, and both the reflective judgment of beauty and the conceptual judgment
of morality are subjective experiences. Thus, the universality of the subjective communicability
rests in the “free play” of the imagination and the understanding. That is, the freedom of the
imagination as well as the will engage the representations of object (or concepts in the case of
morality) from cognitive interaction “underlying their agreement in estimating the forms under
which objects are given to them.”5
4
Ibid., 121
5
Ibid., 44

Kant Critique of Judgement

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Kant Critique of Judgement

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Kant Critique of Judgement

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

How does Kant distinguish between judgments of taste and judgments of the agreeable?

What is the relationship between beauty and morality according to Kant?

Carlon Robbins

Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Judgment

(delight) or displeasure however, cannot be a characteristic of the object experienced. Pleasure or

morality which in-turn produces the same cognitive discernments.

(i.e. the cognitive or reflective faculties). As Kant says,

morality in that it is universal.

This underscores the universality and commonality of humankind. This appeal to

commonality substantiates beauty as the symbol of morality.

imagination in relation to judgments of beauty is to the freedom of the will in relation to

which objects are given to them.”5

You might also like