SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 213679. November 25, 2015.]

JAY H. LICAYAN , petitioner, vs. SEACREST MARITIME MANAGEMENT,

INC., CLIPPER FLEET MANAGEMENT, A/S and/or REDENTOR
ANAYA , respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA , J : p

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the March 4, 2014 Decision
2 and the July 23, 2014 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
130891, which reversed and set aside the March 27, 2013 Decision 4 of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), af rming the August 31, 2012 Decision 5 of the
Labor Arbiter (LA), in a complaint for disability and claim for sickness bene ts,
damages and attorney's fees.
The Antecedents
Petitioner Jay H. Licayan (Licayan) was hired as Fitter for the vessel, MT Clipper
Ann, by its local manning agent, respondent Seacrest Maritime Management, Inc.
(Seacrest), for and in behalf of its foreign principal Nordic Tankers Marine. They
executed a Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)-approved Contract
of Employment which provided for the Standard Terms and Conditions governing the
Employment of Filipino Seafarers On Board Ocean-Going Vessels. Licayan underwent a
pre-employment medical examination (PEME) and, thereafter, was declared t for sea
service.
On March 23, 2011, Licayan boarded the vessel for his duties as Fitter for a
period of seven (7) months with a basic salary of US$698.
In addition to his main duties as Fitter, Licayan was also tasked to install water
and oil separation xtures and the safety equipment of the engine and the steel
platforms which served as the path walk of the crew whenever the vessel was loaded
with chemicals.
On September 7, 2011, Licayan suddenly felt a severe headache. He called the
attention of the Master who recommended that he be examined by a doctor at the next
port of call. For the time being, he was given Tylenol to relieve the pain. The Master also
referred the matter to the health provider of the principal so that he could be examined
by a psychiatrist.
Upon reaching the port of Cartagena, Colombia, on September 15, 2011, he was
brought to Medihelp Hospital where he underwent laboratory examinations. He was
initially diagnosed to be suffering from vertigo and anxiety disorder. Consequently, he
was given medicines, Betazok and Zolpiden.
On September 16, 2011, the attending physician made a de nitive nding that
Licayan was suffering from Trastorno or Panic Disorder. Accordingly, he was
recommended to be repatriated.

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 Upon arrival in Manila on September 20, 2011, Licayan was advised by his agency
to report to the company-designated doctor, Dr. Natalio Alegre (Dr. Alegre), for
treatment and management. He was directed to undergo a series of tests at St. Luke's
Medical Center, to wit: blood test, hematology, x-ray on his cervical spine, 2D echo with
Doppler, stress test, and ECG.
On January 25, 2012, or after more than 120 days from his initial treatment, Dr.
Alegre issued a certi cation with his conclusion that Licayan was suffering from Panic
Disorder, Muscular Spasm-Cervical and Hypertension and that he was "unfit to work." 6
Licayan then underwent a more comprehensive treatment at the National Center
for Mental Health. He was given medications for his illness, but his condition did not
improve. CAIHTE

In the hope of recovering from his mental illness, Licayan sought the opinion of
Dr. Elias Adamos (Dr. Adamos), a clinical psychologist of the Perpetual Succor Hospital
in Manila, who certi ed, on July 2, 2012, that he was incapacitated to work permanently
as a seafarer. Dr. Adamos' medical findings were as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Axis I: Generalized Anxiety Disorder (Work-related); Anxiety
Disorder associated with or secondary to toxic chemical exposure;
Axis II: None;
Axis III: None;
Axis IV: Seafare job; Excessive anxiety and worry (apprehensive
expectation) occurring in persistence over the last 10 months;
Work stress;
Axis V: Clinical course and prognosis is unpredictable.
His serious medical, mental and psychological condition is equivalent to
Grade 1 under the Standard Contract of POEA. He is therefore permanently
incapacitated to work as a seafarer. 7
[Emphasis Supplied]
On account of the ndings of the company-designated physician together with
the above-mentioned ndings of Dr. Adamos, Licayan led a case for payment of total
and permanent disability benefits.
Seacrest rejected the said claims because the injury or illness sustained by
Licayan was not the result of an accident and was not work-related.
On August 31, 2012, the LA granted Licayan's claim for permanent total disability
in the amount of $89,100.00 as provided for in the Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA).
Seacrest appealed to the NLRC.
On March 27, 2013, the NLRC af rmed the ndings of the LA. In a Resolution,
dated May 15, 2013, the NLRC denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Seacrest.
Aggrieved, Seacrest led with the CA a special action for certiorari assailing the
decision of the NLRC.
On March 4, 2014, the CA reversed and set aside the NLRC decision, stating that
the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing claimant to recover in the
absence of factual proof of entitlement. The CA found that Licayan failed to prove by
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 substantial evidence that his illness could be attributed or closely connected to his line
of work. It wrote:
At this juncture, We would like to point out the utterly misplaced
assumption of the Labor Arbiter and public respondent that private respondent's
diagnosis of Panic Disorder can be likened to that of the medical condition
called schizophrenia or psychosis which the High Court declared to be
compensable in Cabuyoc v. Inter-Orient Navigation, et al. The NLRC and the
Labor Arbiter exceeded their authority in similarly attributing private
respondent's state to a special mental condition such as schizophrenia when no
declaration had ever been espoused by the company-designated physician and
even by private respondent's own doctor who were both in the dominance to
posit a peculiar medical analysis such as psychosis. Also, there had been no
indication in private respondent's position paper of particular incidents on board
the vessel which might have contributed to private respondent's head trauma
and later on, the same developed as panic attacks, except for the sweeping and
general statements that he was constantly exposed to perilous chemicals in
installing water and oil separation fixtures. 8
Accordingly, the CA disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Decision dated March 27, 2013 and the Resolution dated May
15, 2013 of the National Labor Relations Commission, Sixth Division, in LAC No.
OFW-M-11-001035-12 [NLRC-OFW-M-04-05890-12] are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The complaint led in the proceedings below for recovery of total
permanent disability benefits is dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 9

After his motion for reconsideration was denied, Licayan led this petition for
review, submitting for consideration the following:
GROUNDS:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT LICAYAN HAS NOTHING
TO SUPPORT HIS CLAIM OF WORK RELATEDNESS;
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE
THAT LICAYAN SUFFERED AN INCIDENT THAT CONTRIBUTED TO HIS
PANIC ATTACK;
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING TO LICAYAN THE PERMANENT
TOTAL DISABILITY COMPENSATION AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. 10
Petitioner Licayan argues that between the ndings of Dr. Adamos, a clinical
pyschologist and that of Dr. Alegre, a general surgeon, the ndings of work-relatedness
of Dr. Adamos deserve more credence; and his conclusion that Licayan suffered
Generalized Anxiety Disorder (Work-related); Anxiety disorder associated
with or secondary to toxic chemical exposures is more credible and correct. 11
Regarding the CA conclusion that he failed to show any incident that could have
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 contributed to his illness, Licayan pointed out that, rst, he was initially declared to be
t to work when he boarded the vessel to work as Fitter. Second, due to the long hours
of laborious and strenuous work and also homesickness, he felt stressed and fatigued.
Third, his regular stresses and fatigue were aggravated when he was given the special
assignment of installing water and oil separation xtures while the vessel was on the
high seas. It turned out to be very stressful since any movement of the vessel might
endanger the seaworthiness of the vessel and consequently the lives of the crew. The
panic disorder was but a manifestation of the fact that his emotional makeup could no
longer endure the stresses that the special assignment entailed. 12
Seacrest, in its Comment, 13 countered that the CA did not err in concluding that
the record was wanting of proof, even substantial at the very least, that Licayan's
mental/psychological condition was caused or aggravated by the performance of his
functions on board the vessel. Seacrest pointed out that Licayan failed to establish the
reasonable linkage between his illness and his work so as to persuade a rational mind
to conclude that his work could have contributed to the establishment or, at the very
least, aggravation of any preexisting condition he might have had. DETACa

The Court's Ruling

The core issue for resolution of the Court is whether or not the CA erred in
dismissing Licayan's complaint for recovery of permanent total disability on the ground
that he failed to support his claim by substantial evidence.
The Court finds merit in the petition.
Panic disorder occurs when one lives in fear of having a panic attack; and one is
suffering from panic attack when he feels a sudden, overwhelming terror that has no
obvious cause. Among the physical symptoms of panic attack are: a racing heart,
breathing dif culties, and sweating. 14 During the attack, the fear response is out of
proportion for the situation, which often is not threatening. Over time, the patient will
develop a constant fear of having another panic attack, which can affect daily
functioning and general quality of life. 15
In resolving the subject controversy, it is well to examine anew the 2000 POEA-
Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) which is deemed incorporated in the
contract of employment between Seacrest and Licayan. Section 20 (B) thereof
provides:
xxx xxx xxx
B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS
The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or
illness during the term of his contract are as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
6. In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seafarer caused by either
injury or illness the seafarer shall be compensated in accordance with the
schedule of bene ts enumerated in Section 32 of this Contract. Computation of
his benefits arising from an illness or disease shall be governed by the rates and
rules of compensation applicable at the time the illness or disease was
contracted.
"Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, two elements must concur for an injury
or illness to be compensable. First, that the injury or illness must be work-related; and
second, that the work-related injury or illness must have arisen during the term of the
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 seafarer's employment contract." 16
The 2000 POEA-SEC de nes work-related injury as "injury resulting in disability or
death arising out of and in the course of employment" and as "any sickness resulting to
disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of
this contract with the conditions set therein satisfied." Section 32-A thereof provides:
Section 32-A. OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES
For an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death to be
compensable, all of the following conditions must be satisfied:
1. The seafarer's work must involve the risks described herein;
2. The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to the
described risks;
3. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such
other factors necessary to contract it; and
4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.
It must be borne in mind, however, that the list of illness/diseases in Section 32-A
does not exclude other illnesses/diseases not so listed from being compensable. The
POEA-SEC cannot be presumed to contain all the possible injuries that render a
seafarer un t for further sea duties. 17 So much so that Section 20 (B) (4) of the same
explicitly provides that "[t]he liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-
related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows: (t)hose illnesses
not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed as work-related." In
other words, a disputable presumption is created in favor of compensability. Illnesses
not listed in Section 32 are disputably presumed as work-related. This means that even
if the illness is not listed under Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC as an occupational
disease or illness, it will still be presumed as work-related, and it becomes incumbent
on the employer to overcome the presumption. 18
This disputable presumption, however, does not signify an automatic grant of
compensation and/or bene ts claim. 19 "Concomitant with this presumption is the
burden placed upon the claimant to present substantial evidence that his work
conditions caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the disease and only a
reasonable proof of work-connection, not direct causal relation is required to establish
compensability of illnesses not included in the list of occupational diseases." 20
In the case at bench, Licayan was able to prove by substantial evidence that his
work conditions caused his panic disorder. He stated in his position paper that:
xxx xxx xxx
7. Complainant was always exposed to the harsh conditions of the
elements, the perils at sea, severe stress while being away from his
family and fatigue while doing his duties and responsibilities on
board the vessel.
8. This demanding nature of his job was his routine since he
boarded the vessel. For this reason, he was not able to have proper rest. He
has also an irregular sleep pattern since he is on call by his supervisor 24 hours
a day.
9. Notwithstanding the extraordinary work load, Mr. Licayan was given an
overall assessment of a conscientious worker with good engineering knowledge
and experience on sea trade. A copy of the evaluation is hereto attached as
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 ANNEX "C" and "C-1."
10. In addition to the principal functions and duties as Fitter, Mr.
Licayan [would] perform and install the water and oil separation
fixtures. This job can only be done normally when the vessel is on dry dock so
that the equipment are properly installed and xed. However, due to excellence
skill and dexterity of Mr. Licayan, he is asked by his superiors to do the same
while the vessel was on voyage.
11. He also would install the safe equipment of the engine. He
would also install the steel platforms which serve as the path walk of
the crew when the vessel is loaded with chemicals.
12. This extraordinary dif cult job [of] Mr. Licayan unduly put him
into pressure resulting to loss of sleep, loss of appetite and emotional
disorder.
xxx xxx xxx 21
[Emphases Supplied]
Licayan also presented Dr. Adamos' diagnosis to prove that his illness was work-
related and, therefore, compensable. The reasonable connection between the nature of
his work and the medical condition he acquired during his stint as Fitter in the vessel
was substantially proven. As such, pursuant to Section 20 (B) (4) of the POEA-SEC, the
disputable presumption that the panic disorder he contracted was work-related arose.
This condition, although not listed under Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC as an
occupational disease or illness, is presumed to be work-related. It is now incumbent
upon the employer to overcome this presumption. aDSIHc

A reexamination of the evidence presented by Seacrest, however, fails to

overcome the presumption. This Court nds that the October 28, 2011 medical report
of Dr. Alegre, the company-designated doctor, was too sweeping and inadequate to
support a conclusion. His assessment that Licayan's panic disorder was not work-
related was without basis. He did not consider the varied factors to which Licayan was
exposed while on board the vessel. In fact, in the same report, he alleged:
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Licayan is diagnosed with Panic Disorder. Panic disorder is a type of anxiety
disorder in which one has repeated attacks of intense fear that something bad
will occur when not expected. The cause is unknown but genetics may
play a role . . . . . 22
It can be deduced from the foregoing statement that the cause of panic disorder
was not known and that genetics might only be one of the many causes. This nding
resonates the fact that researchers until now have not determined a speci c cause of
this condition. Many doctors believe that it is a combination of environmental and
genetic factors. 23 Thus, the assessment of Dr. Alegre is not conclusive to defeat
Licayan's claim for compensation.
There is the possibility that work stress may be a cause and Licayan presented
substantial evidence to prove work-connection.
Jurisprudence is indeed replete with pronouncements that it is the company-
designated physician's ndings which should form the basis of any disability claim of
the seafarer. 24 It is worthy to note, however, that neither the claimant nor the labor
tribunals and the courts are automatically bound by the medical report issued by the
company-designated physician. The inherent merit of the said report would still have to
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 be weighed and duly considered by the Court. 25
In view of the above, the Court nds that the CA erred in declaring that the NLRC
gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in declaring
that the illness suffered by Licayan was not work-related.
Finally, anent the nature of disability caused by his work-related illness, the Court
notes that Licayan was declared unfit to work by the company-designated physician, Dr.
Alegre. This nding was af rmed by the medical assessment made by Licayan's
physician, Dr. Adamos, as he declared Licayan to be permanently incapacitated to work
as a seafarer. Thus, the Court is inclined to rule that Licayan suffered from a permanent
total disability because he was unable to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work
of similar nature that he was trained for or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work
which a person of his mentality and attainment could do. 26
WHEREFORE , the petition is GRANTED. The March 4, 2014 Decision and the
July 23, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 130891 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The March 27, 2013 Decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., * Brion, ** Del Castillo and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
* Per Special Order No. 2282, dated November 13, 2015.
** Per Special Order No. 2281, dated November 13, 2015.

1. Rollo, pp. 23-49.

2. Id. at 50-60; Penned by Associate Justice Franchito N. Diamante and concurred in by
Associate Justices Celia C. Librea-Leagogo and Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles.
3. Id. at 61-62.
4. CA rollo, pp. 44-51.
5. Id. at 224-231. Penned by Labor Arbiter Eduardo J. Carpio.
6. Id. at 143.

7. As quoted in the petition, rollo, p. 38.

8. Id. at 17.
9. Id. at 18-19.
10. Id. at 39.

11. Id. at 42.

12. Id. at 44-45.
13. Id. at 67-77.
14. <http://www.healthline.com/health/panic-disorder#Overview1.> Last visited on October
22, 2015.
15. <http://www.webmd.com/anxiety-panic/guide/mental-health-panic-disorder.> Last visited
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 on October 22, 2015.
16. Centennial Transmarine, Inc. v. Quiambao, G.R. No. 198096, July 8, 2015.

17. Magsaysay Mitsui Osk Marine, Inc. v. Bengson, G.R. No. 198528, October 13, 2014.
18. Racelis v. United Philippine Lines, Inc., G.R. No. 198408, November 12, 2014.
19. Jebsen Maritime, Inc. v. Ravena, G.R. No. 200566, September 17, 2014, 735 SCRA 494,
511.
20. DOHLE-PHILMAN Manning Agency, Inc. v. Gazzingan, G.R. No. 199568, June 17, 2015.
21. CA rollo, pp. 97-98.
22. Id. at 94.

23. <http://www.livescience.com/45553-panic-disorder.html.> Last visited on October 22,

2015.

24. Magsaysay Maritime Corp. v. Velasquez, 591 Phil. 839, 849-850 (2008).
25. Ison v. Crewserve, Inc., G.R. No. 173951, April 16, 2012, 669 SCRA 481, 493-494.
26. Krestel Shipping Co., Inc. v. Munar, G.R. No. 198501, January 30, 2013, 689 SCRA 795,
816.

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