30 CASES (A) Asda

A.
THE LAWYER AND SOCIETY
1. SPS CONCEPCION VS ATTY. DELA ROSA

A.C. No. 10681, February 03, 2015
SPOUSES HENRY A. CONCEPCION AND BLESILDA S. CONCEPCION, Complainants, v. ATTY. ELMER A.
DELA ROSA, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is an administrative case that stemmed from a Verified Complaint1 filed by complainants Spouses Henry
A. Concepcion (Henry) and Blesilda S. Concepcion (Blesilda; collectively complainants) against respondent
Atty. Elmer A. dela Rosa (respondent), charging him with gross misconduct for violating, among others, Rule
16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
The Facts
In their Verified Complaint, complainants alleged that from 19972 until August 2008,3 respondent served as
their retained lawyer and counsel. In this capacity, respondent handled many of their cases and was consulted
on various legal matters, among others, the prospect of opening a pawnshop business towards the end of
2005. Said business, however, failed to materialize.4chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Aware of the fact that complainants had money intact from their failed business venture, respondent, on March
23, 2006, called Henry to borrow the amount of P2,500,000.00, which he promised to return, with interest, five
(5) days thereafter. Henry consulted his wife, Blesilda, who, believing that respondent would be soon returning
the money, agreed to lend the aforesaid sum to respondent. She thereby issued three (3) EastWest Bank
checks5 in respondent’s name:6chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Check No. Date Amount Payee
0000561925 03-23-06 P750,000.00 Elmer dela Rosa
0000561926 03-23-06 P850,000.00 Elmer dela Rosa
0000561927 03-23-06 P900,000.00 Elmer dela Rosa
Total: P2,500,000.00
Upon receiving the checks, respondent signed a piece of paper containing: (a) photocopies of the checks; and
(b) an acknowledgment that he received the originals of the checks and that he agreed to return the
P2,500,000.00, plus monthly interest of five percent (5%), within five (5) days.7 In the afternoon of March 23,
2006, the foregoing checks were personally encashed by respondent.8chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On March 28, 2006, or the day respondent promised to return the money, he failed to pay complainants. Thus,
in April 2006, complainants began demanding payment but respondent merely made repeated promises to pay
soon. On July 7, 2008, Blesilda sent a demand letter9 to respondent, which the latter did not heed.10 On August
4, 2008, complainants, through their new counsel, Atty. Kathryn Jessica dela Serna, sent another demand
letter11 to respondent.12 In his Reply,13 the latter denied borrowing any money from the complainants. Instead,
respondent claimed that a certain Jean Charles Nault (Nault), one of his other clients, was the real debtor.
Complainants brought the matter to the Office of the Lupong Tagapamayapa in Barangay Balulang, Cagayan
de Oro City. The parties, however, failed to reach a settlement.14chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On January 11, 2010, the IBP-Misamis Oriental Chapter received complainants’ letter-complaint 15 charging
respondent with violation of Rule 16.04 of the CPR. The rule prohibits lawyers from borrowing money from
clients unless the latter’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent
advice.16chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In his Comment,17 respondent denied borrowing P2,500,000.00 from complainants, insisting that Nault was the
real debtor.18 He also claimed that complainants had been attempting to collect from Nault and that he was
1
A. THE LAWYER AND SOCIETY
engaged for that specific purpose.19chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In their letter-reply,20 complainants maintained that they extended the loan to respondent alone, as evidenced
by the checks issued in the latter’s name. They categorically denied knowing Nault and pointed out that it
defies common sense for them to extend an unsecured loan in the amount of P2,500,000.00 to a person they
do not even know. Complainants also submitted a copy of the Answer to Third Party Complaint21 which Nault
filed as third-party defendant in a related collection case instituted by the complainants against respondent.22 In
said pleading, Nault explicitly denied knowing complainants and alleged that it was respondent who incurred
the subject loan from them.23chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On November 23, 2010, the IBP-Misamis Oriental Chapter endorsed the letter-complaint to the IBP-
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD),24 which was later docketed as CBD Case No. 11-2883.25 In the course of
the proceedings, respondent failed to appear during the scheduled mandatory conferences.26 Hence, the same
were terminated and the parties were directed to submit their respective position papers.27 Respondent,
however, did not submit any.cralawred
The IBP Report and Recommendation
On April 19, 2013, the IBP Investigating Commissioner, Jose I. de La Rama, Jr. (Investigating Commissioner),
issued his Report28 finding respondent guilty of violating: (a) Rule 16.04 of the CPR which provides that a
lawyer shall not borrow money from his clients unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of
the case or by independent advice; (b) Canon 7 which states that a lawyer shall uphold the integrity and dignity
of the legal profession and support the activities of the IBP; and (c) Canon 16 which provides that a lawyer
shall hold in trust all monies and properties of his client that may come into his
possession.29chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Investigating Commissioner observed that the checks were issued in respondent’s name and that he
personally received and encashed them. Annex “E”30 of the Verified Complaint shows that respondent
acknowledged receipt of the three (3) EastWest Bank checks and agreed to return the P2,500,000.00, plus a
pro-rated monthly interest of five percent (5%), within five (5) days.31chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On the other hand, respondent’s claim that Nault was the real debtor was found to be implausible. The
Investigating Commissioner remarked that if it is true that respondent was not the one who obtained the loan,
he would have responded to complainants’ demand letter; however, he did not.32 He also observed that the
acknowledgment33 Nault allegedly signed appeared to have been prepared by respondent himself.34 Finally,
the Investigating Commissioner cited Nault’s Answer to the Third Party Complaint which categorically states
that he does not even know the complainants and that it was respondent alone who obtained the loan from
them.35chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In fine, the Investigating Commissioner concluded that respondent’s actions degraded the integrity of the legal
profession and clearly violated Rule 16.04 and Canons 7 and 16 of the CPR. Respondent’s failure to appear
during the mandatory conferences further showed his disrespect to the IBP-CBD.36 Accordingly, the
Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be disbarred and that he be ordered to return the
P2,500,000.00 to complainants, with stipulated interest.37chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Finding the recommendation to be fully supported by the evidence on record and by the applicable laws and
rule, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioner’s Report in Resolution
No. XX-2013-617 dated May 11, 2013,38 but reduced the penalty against the respondent to indefinite
suspension from the practice of law and ordered the return of the P2,500,000.00 to the complainants with legal
interest, instead of stipulated interest.
Respondent sought a reconsideration39 of Resolution No. XX-2013-617 which was, however, denied in
Resolution No. XXI-2014-29440 dated May 3, 2014.cralawred
The Issue Before the Court
The central issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for violating
the CPR.
2
The Court’s Ruling
The Court concurs with the IBP’s findings except as to its recommended penalty and its directive to return the
amount of P2,500,000.00, with legal interest, to complainants.cralawred
I.
Respondent’s receipt of the P2,500,000.00 loan from complainants is amply supported by substantial
evidence. As the records bear out, Blesilda, on March 23, 2006, issued three (3) EastWest Bank Checks, in
amounts totalling to P2,500,000.00, with respondent as the payee.41 Also, Annex “E”42 of the Verified Complaint
shows that respondent acknowledged receipt of the checks and agreed to pay the complainants the loan plus
the pro-rated interest of five percent (5%) per month within five (5) days.43 The dorsal sides of the checks
likewise show that respondent personally encashed the checks on the day they were issued.44 With
respondent’s direct transactional involvement and the actual benefit he derived therefrom, absent too any
credible indication to the contrary, the Court is thus convinced that respondent was indeed the one who
borrowed the amount of P2,500,000.00 from complainants, which amount he had failed to return, despite their
insistent pleas.
Respondent’s theory that Nault is the real debtor hardly inspires belief. While respondent submitted a
document purporting to be Nault’s acknowledgment of his debt to the complainants, Nault, in his Answer to
Third Party Complaint, categorically denied knowing the complainants and incurring the same obligation.
Moreover, as correctly pointed out by complainants, it would be illogical for them to extend a P2,500,000.00
loan without any collateral or security to a person they do not even know. On the other hand, complainants
were able to submit documents showing respondent’s receipt of the checks and their encashment, as well as
his agreement to return the P2,500,000.00 plus interest. This is bolstered by the fact that the loan transaction
was entered into during the existence of a lawyer-client relationship between him and complainants,45 allowing
the former to wield a greater influence over the latter in view of the trust and confidence inherently imbued in
such relationship.
Under Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, a lawyer is prohibited from borrowing money from his client unless
the client’s interests are fully protected:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
CANON 16 – A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his clients that may come into his
possession.
Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by
the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in
the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.”
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with
trust and confidence. And as true as any natural tendency goes, this “trust and confidence” is prone to abuse.
The rule against borrowing of money by a lawyer from his client is intended to prevent the lawyer from taking
advantage of his influence over his client.46 The rule presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer’s
ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation.47 In Frias v. Atty. Lozada48 (Frias) the Court
categorically declared that a lawyer’s act of asking a client for a loan, as what herein respondent did, is
unethical, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Likewise, her act of borrowing money from a client was a violation of [Rule] 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of
the case and by independent advice.
A lawyer’s act of asking a client for a loan, as what respondent did, is very unethical. It comes within those
acts considered as abuse of client’s confidence. The canon presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the
lawyer’s ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on her obligation.49 (Emphasis supplied)As above-
discussed, respondent borrowed money from complainants who were his clients and whose interests, by the
lack of any security on the loan, were not fully protected. Owing to their trust and confidence in respondent,
3
complainants relied solely on the former’s word that he will return the money plus interest within five (5) days.
However, respondent abused the same and reneged on his obligation, giving his previous clients the
runaround up to this day. Accordingly, there is no quibble that respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the CPR.
In the same vein, the Court finds that respondent also violated Canon 7 of the CPR which
reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
In unduly borrowing money from the complainants and by blatantly refusing to pay the same, respondent
abused the trust and confidence reposed in him by his clients, and, in so doing, failed to uphold the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession. Thus, he should be equally held administratively liable on this score.
That being said, the Court turns to the proper penalty to be imposed and the propriety of the IBP’s return
directive.cralawred
II.
The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the
surrounding facts.50chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In Frias, the Court suspended the lawyer from the practice of law for two (2) years after borrowing P900,000.00
from her client, refusing to pay the same despite court order, and representing conflicting
interests.51 Considering the greater amount involved in this case and respondent’s continuous refusal to pay
his debt, the Court deems it apt to suspend him from the practice of law for three (3) years, instead of the IBP’s
recommendation to suspend him indefinitely.
The Court also deems it appropriate to modify the IBP’s Resolution insofar as it orders respondent to return to
complainants the amount of P2,500,000.00 and the legal interest thereon. It is settled that in disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to
continue as a member of the Bar.52 In such cases, the Court’s only concern is the determination of
respondent’s administrative liability; it should not involve his civil liability for money received from his client in a
transaction separate, distinct, and not intrinsically linked to his professional engagement. In this case,
respondent received the P2,500,000.00 as a loan from complainants and not in consideration of his
professional services. Hence, the IBP’s recommended return of the aforementioned sum lies beyond the ambit
of this administrative case, and thus cannot be sustained.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Elmer A. dela Rosa is found guilty of violating Canon 7 and Rule 16.04,
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of three (3) years effective upon finality of this Decision, with a stern warning that a
commission of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. This Decision is immediately
executory upon receipt.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
and the Office of the Court Administration for circulation to all the courts.
SO ORDERED.
4
2. PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COURT EMPLOYEES V ATTY EDNA DIAZ

A.C. No. 10134 November 26, 2014
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COURT EMPLOYEES (PACE), represented by its President, ATTY.
VIRGINIA C. RAFAEL, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EDNA M. ALIBUTDAN-DIAZ, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This resolves the complaint for suspension or disbarment filed by the Philippine Association of Court
Employees (PACE) through its president, Atty. Virginia C. Rafael (Atty. Rafael), on July 17, 2008 against Atty.
Edna M. Alibutdan-Diaz (Atty. Diaz), former National Treasurer of PACE, before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP).1
PACE, the umbrella association of 1st and 2nd level court employees in the Judiciary held its 11th National
Convention/Seminar in Davao City from October 6 to 8, 2005. As then National Treasurer of PACE, Atty. Diaz
was entrusted with all the money matters of PACE.
The complainant alleged that the liquidation for the 11th PACE national convention was submitted by Atty. Diaz
only on March 29, 2007, during the 12th PACE national convention in Iloilo City2; that during the 12th
convention, an election of officers was conducted and Atty. Diaz ran for the position of National Treasurer, but
she was not elected; that on the last day of the convention or on March 31, 2007,the outgoing Board of
Directors, including Atty. Diaz, passed and approved Resolution No. 1-2007 appropriating the amount of
30,000.00as term-end bonus for each PACE official qualified thereto; that Atty. Diaz did not submit a liquidation
report for the 12th convention; that there was no turn over of monies belonging to the association as a matter
of procedure despite a letter of demand, dated June 20, 2007 sent to Atty. Diaz;3 and that the new set of PACE
officers issued Board Resolution No. 00-07 directing past president, Rosita D. Amizola; and past treasurer,
Atty. Diaz, to explain why they failed to liquidate the finances of PACE for the Davao and Iloilo conventions.4
In her defense, Atty. Diaz countered that she had filed the Statement of Liquidation for the 11th national
convention in Davao in less than a week after the said convention; that it was duly audited by the national
auditor, Letecia Agbayani; that the net proceeds of that convention was "fully accounted, liquidated and entirely
deposited to PACE accounts;"5 that she also filed the Statement of Liquidation for the 12th national convention
on May 22, 2007; that the report, together with the cash, checks and original receipts, were received by Rosita
Amisola and witnessed by former PACE officers;6 that she denied running for re-election as PACE national
treasurer during the Iloilo convention as she had already filed her certificate of candidacy for Board Member of
the First District of Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay;7 that the approval of the ₱30,000.00 term-end bonus did not rest
with her solely, rather, it was approved by the previous board of directors; and that she never sponsored the
bonus, as it was initiated by Aliven Maderaza and seconded by Atty. Lourdes Garcia and Sarah Ampong.
On her part, Atty. Garcia averred that she was not privy to the disbursement of the said term-end bonus.8
Initially, the case was assigned to IBP Commissioner Elpidio G. Soriano. After an exchange of pleadings, the
mandatory conference was held. Afterwards, the protagonists were directed to submit their respective position
papers. Thereafter, the case was re-assigned to IBP Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez (Commissioner
Fernandez).9
The lone issue here is whether or not Atty. Diaz violated Chapter 1, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR), which reads:
"A lawyer should not engage in an unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
In his Report and Recommendation, dated June 28, 2010, Commissioner Fernandez recommended the
dismissal of the case against Atty. Diaz for lack of merit. Atty. Diaz offered documentary evidence to show that
she was able to submit the liquidation reports for the two aforementioned conventions of PACE. He also took
note that Atty. Rafael herself acknowledged the liquidation report made by Atty. Diaz with respect to the Davao
City convention.10 As to the sufficiency and completeness of these reports, this would be better
resolvedthrough an audit rather than in disbarment proceedings.1âwphi1 Besides, Commissioner Fernandez
did not consider the position of Atty. Diaz as national treasurer of PACE to have any connection with her being
5
as a lawyer. Thus, according to him, she should be sanctioned in accordance with the by-laws of PACE
instead of a disbarment case.11
As regards the accusation that Atty. Diaz ran for re-election in the PACE elections even though she was no
longer connected with the Judiciary and therefore disqualified, Commissioner Fernandez opined that the best
evidence, which was the "certificate of candidacy," was never offered,12 and that Atty. Diaz, being a lawyer,
knew that her bid for re-election would be a useless exercise since she would not beable to assume office if
she won.13
Finally, Commissioner Fernandez believed Atty. Diaz’s assertion that she never sponsored the appropriation of
the 30,000.00 term-end bonus and that the approval of Resolution No. 1-2007 was a collegial action among
the Board of Directors. Again, Commissioner Fernandez was of the view that her participation in the passage
of the questioned board resolution was not connected to her being a lawyer.14
On November 19, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) passed a resolution adopting and approving
the report and recommendation of Commissioner Fernandez, and dismissed the complaint against Atty. Diaz.15
On reconsideration, the IBP-BOG issued the Extended Resolution,16 dated June 21, 2013, granting the
complainant’s motion for reconsideration. It reversedand set asideits earlier resolution and suspended Atty.
Diaz from the practice of law for one (1) year.17
The IBP-BOG explained that the questions regarding (i) Atty. Diaz’ liquidation of PACE funds;(ii) her running
for re-election when she was no longer with the Judiciary; and (iii) her entitlement to the term-end bonus when
she was no longer working in the Judiciary, constituted a "triple -whammy" of questionable actions18 committed
by Atty. Diaz in contravention of Rule 1.01 of the CPR.
The Court’s Ruling
This Court agrees with the IBP-BOG and adopts its June 21, 2013 Extended Resolution. Everyone should
keep in mind that the practice of law is only a privilege. It is definitely not a right. Inorder to enjoy this privilege,
one must show that he possesses, and continues to possess, the qualifications required by law for the
conferment of such privilege.
One of those requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. Candor in all their dealings is the very
essence of a practitioner's honorable membership in the legal profession. Lawyers are required to act with the
highest standard of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the conduct of litigation and in their relations with their
clients, the opposing parties, the other counsels and the courts. They are bound by their oath to speak the truth
and to conduct themselves according to the best of their knowledge and discretion, and with fidelity to the
courts and their clients.19 Time and again, the Court has held that the practice of law is granted only to those of
good moral character. The Bar maintains a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Thus, lawyers must
conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times, whether they are dealing with their clients or the public at
large, and a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the
appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment.20
It bears stressing that Atty. Diaz is a servant of the law and belongs to that profession which society entrusts
with the administration of law and the dispensation of justice. For this, he or she is an exemplar for others to
emulate and should not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Necessarily, this Court
has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character from members of the Bar. They are
always expected to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and to refrain from any act or
omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and
integrity of this noble profession.21
Atty. Diaz' delay in the liquidation of the finances of PACE; her running for re-election, including her non-
admission that she ran for said election as shown not by her certificate of candidacy but by the affidavits of
former PACE officers; and her involvement in the approval or passage of the questioned term-end bonus of
PACE officers, including herself even though she was no longer working in the Judiciary, were definitely not
the candor the Court speaks of. There was much to be desired in Atty. Diaz' actions/ inactions.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Edna M. Alibutdan-Diaz is found GUILTY of violating Chapter 1, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
three (3) months.
This decision shall be immediately executory.
6
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Court Administrator for its distribution to all courts of the land; the
IBP; and the Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered into respondent's personal records as a member of the
Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.
7
3. ATTY. ALONSO VS ATTY. RELAMIDA

A.C. No. 8481 August 3, 2010
[Formerly B.M. No. 1524]
ATTY. JOSABETH V. ALONSO and SHALIMAR P. LAZATIN, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. IBARO B. RELAMIDA, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a Complaint1 dated October 13, 2005 for disciplinary action against respondent Atty. Ibaro B.
Relamida, Jr. filed by Attys. Josabeth V. Alonso and Shalimar P. Lazatin, counsel of Servier Philippines,
Incorporated for violating the rules on forum shopping and res judicata.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
In March 2001, Jennifer Ebanen filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against Servier Philippines, Incorporated
(Servier) docketed as NLRC-NCR-Case No. 30-03-01583-01, alleging constructive dismissal with prayer for
reinstatement or payment of separation pay, backwages, moral and exemplary damages.
On July 5, 2002, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Servier.2 It held that Ebanen voluntarily resigned from
Servier and was, therefore, not illegally dismissed.
Ebanen appealed at the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). On March 31, 2003, the NLRC-Third
Division affirmed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter.3
Thus, Ebanen moved for reconsideration. However, the NLRC denied the same in a Resolution4 dated May 5,
2003.
Unsatisfied, Ebanen filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals which was docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 77968. In a Decision5 dated January 16, 2004, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the findings of the
NLRC that Ebanen voluntarily resigned and that there was no constructive dismissal. Ebanen moved anew for
reconsideration, but was denied in a Resolution6 dated April 30, 2004.
Unrelenting, Ebanen filed a Petition for Review before the Supreme Court. However, in a Resolution7 dated
August 4, 2004, the Court found no reversible error on the part of the CA, thus, denied said petition. Ebanen
filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied with finality in a Resolution8 dated October 11, 2004.
Ebanen filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolutions dated August
4, 2004 and October 11, 2004, respectively. On January 19, 2005, the Court denied her motion.9
Persistent, Ebanen filed a Motion to Admit a Third Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated January
19, 2005. On April 20, 2005, the Court denied her motion for being a prohibited pleading and noted without
action Ebanen’s third motion for reconsideration.10
On July 27, 2005, the Second Division of the Supreme Court noted without action Ebanen’s Motion for Leave
to Admit Supplemental Third Motion for Reconsideration dated June 1, 2005, in view of the entry of judgment
on February 17, 2005.11
On February 17, 2005, the Court’s Resolution dated August 4, 2004 has already become final and executory;
thus, a corresponding Entry of Judgment12 has been issued.
However, despite said entry of judgment, Ebanen, thru her counsel, Atty. Relamida, filed a second complaint
on August 5, 2005 for illegal dismissal based on the same cause of action of constructive dismissal against
Servier, now docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-08-07222-05.
Thus, on October 13, 2005, Servier, thru counsel, filed a letter-complaint addressed to the then Chief Justice
Hilario Davide, Jr., praying that respondents be disciplinary sanctioned for violation of the rules on forum
shopping and res judicata.
Subsequently, in a Resolution13 dated November 15, 2005, the Court required both Ebanen and Atty. Relamida
to comment on the letter-complaint against them.
8
On January 16, 2006, respondents filed their Comments.14 Both respondents admitted the filing of the second
complaint against Servier. They claimed that the judgment rendered by the Labor Arbiter was null and void for
want of due process, since the motion for the issuance of subpoena duces tecum for the production of vital
documents filed by the complainant was ignored by the Labor Arbiter. They opined that the dismissal did not
amount to res judicata, since the decision was null and void for lack of due process. As a result, they claimed
that there was also no violation of the rule on forum shopping.15
On February 7, 2006, the Court referred the instant bar matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.16
On January 22, 2007, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the second complaint on the grounds of res judicata and
forum shopping. It further reiterated that Ebanen voluntarily resigned from employment and was not
constructively dismissed.
On March 14, 2008, during the mandatory conference before the IBP, complainants failed to appear. Ebanen
manifested that she is not a lawyer.
Both parties were required to submit their respective position papers.
Atty. Relamida reiterated that Ebanen is not a lawyer and that she is the daughter of Atty. Leonardo Aurelio
(Atty. Aurelio), the senior partner of A.M. Sison Jr. and Partners Law Offices where he is employed as
associate lawyer.
He narrated that on March 28, 2001, Ebanen filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against Servier. He claimed
that in the beginning, Atty. Aurelio was the one who prepared and reviewed all the pleadings and it was Atty.
Lapulapu Osoteo who stood as counsel for Ebanen in the said labor case. Atty. Relamida admitted, however,
that during the filing of the second complaint he took over as counsel of Ebanen, as requested by Atty.
Aurelio.17 He also admitted that during the pendency of the first complaint, he occasionally examined pleadings
and signed as counsel for Ebanen.18
Atty. Relamida reasoned out that as a courtesy to Atty. Aurelio and Ebanen, he had no choice but to represent
the latter. Moreover, he stressed that his client was denied of her right to due process due to the denial of her
motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum. He then argued that the decision of the Labor Arbiter was
null and void; thus, there was no res judicata.19 He maintained that he did not violate the lawyer’s oath by
serving the interest of his client.
Servier, on the other hand, argued that the filing of the second complaint is a violation of the rights of Servier,
since the issue has already attained finality. It contended that Atty. Relamida violated the rules on forum
shopping for the same act of filing a second complaint. As a consequence, they are being made to defend
themselves in a case that has been settled before the labor tribunals and courts. Likewise, Servier insisted that
the filing of the second complaint was also a blatant violation of the rule on res judicata. Hence, Servier prayed
that Atty. Relamida be disciplinary dealt with due to his abuse of the processes of the courts.
On April 19, 2008, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) recommended that respondent Atty.
Relamida be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months. It imposed no sanction on Ebanen for
being a non-lawyer.
In its Report, the IBP found that by filing the second complaint, Atty. Relamida was guilty of violating the rules
on res judicata and forum shopping. It concluded that Atty. Relamida abused his right of recourse to the courts
by filing a complaint for a cause that had been previously rejected by the courts.
On June 5, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve with modification as to penalty
the report of the IBP-CBD. Instead, it recommended that Atty. Relamida be suspended from the practice of law
for one (1) month for his violation of the rules on res judicata and forum shopping.
On December 7, 2009, the Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that the instant complaint be re-docketed
as a regular administrative case against Atty. Relamida.
We sustain the findings of the IBP-CBD.
All lawyers must bear in mind that their oaths are neither mere words nor an empty formality. When they take
their oath as lawyers, they dedicate their lives to the pursuit of justice. They accept the sacred trust to uphold
the laws of the land. As the first Canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility states, "[a] lawyer shall
uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes."
9
Moreover, according to the lawyer’s oath they took, lawyers should "not wittingly or willingly promote or sue
any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid or consent to the same."20
In the instant case, it is clear that Atty. Relamida is guilty of forum shopping and violation of the rule on res
judicata. Atty. Relamida should have refrained from filing the second complaint against Servier. He ought to
have known that the previous dismissal was with prejudice, since it had the effect of an adjudication on the
merits. He was aware of all the proceedings which the first complaint went through as by his own admission,
he participated in the preparation of the pleadings and even signed as counsel of Ebanen occasionally.21 He
knew that the decision in the subject case had already attained finality. Atty. Relamida was well aware that
when he filed the second complaint, it involved the same parties and same cause of action, albeit, he justified
the same on the ground of nullity of the previous dismissal.
His allegation that he was not the original counsel of Ebanen and that his intention was only to protect the
rights of his clients whom he believed were not properly addressed in the prior complaint deserves scant
consideration. He should know that once a case is decided with finality, the controversy is settled and the
matter is laid to rest. The prevailing party is entitled to enjoy the fruits of his victory, while the other party is
obliged to respect the court’s verdict and to comply with it.22
The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of
action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. It exists when,
as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another, or when he
institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause to increase the chances of
obtaining a favorable decision. An important factor in determining its existence is the vexation caused to the
courts and the parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases to claim substantially the same reliefs. Forum
shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will
amount to res judicata in another. Thus, the following requisites should concur:23
x x x (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions, (b) identity
of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and (c) the identity of the
two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party
is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, but not at the expense of truth and the administration of justice.
The filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the court’s processes and improper conduct that tends to
impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of justice and will be punished as contempt of court. Needless
to state, the lawyer who files such multiple or repetitious petitions (which obviously delays the execution of a
final and executory judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary action for incompetence (for not knowing any
better) or for willful violation of his duties as an attorney to act with all good fidelity to the courts, and to
maintain only such actions as appear to him to be just and are consistent with truth and honor.24
The filing of another action concerning the same subject matter, in violation of the doctrine of res judicata, runs
contrary to Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires a lawyer to exert every effort
and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. By his actuations,
respondent also violated Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04 of the Code, as well as a lawyer’s mandate "to delay no
man for money or malice."25
The Court has, time and again, warned lawyers not to resort to forum shopping for this practice clogs the court
dockets. Their primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration of justice. Any conduct which tends to
delay, impede or obstruct the administration of justice contravenes such lawyer’s duty.26 This we will not
tolerate.1avvphi1
In cases of similar nature,27 the penalty imposed by this Court was six (6) months suspension from the practice
of law. Thus, consistent with the existing jurisprudence, we find that, in this case, the suspension of six (6)
months from practice of law is proper.
WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-286, dated June 5, 2008, of the IBP, which found respondent Atty.
Ibaro B. Relamida, Jr. guilty of violating the Rules on Res Judicata and Forum Shopping, is AFFIRMED. Atty.
Relaminda is hereby SUSPENDED for six (6) months from the practice of law, effective upon the receipt of this
Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy
of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the personal record of Atty.
Relamida as a member of the Bar; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court
Administrator, for circulation to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
10
This Decision shall be immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
11
4. OVERGAARD VS ATTY. VALDEZ

[A.C. NO. 7902 : September 30, 2008]
TORBEN B. OVERGAARD, Complainant, v. ATTY. GODWIN R. VALDEZ, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Complainant seeks the disbarment of Atty. Godwin R. Valdez from the practice of law for gross malpractice,
immoral character, dishonesty and deceitful conduct. The complainant alleges that despite receipt of legal fees
in compliance with a Retainer Agreement, the respondent refused to perform any of his obligations under their
contract for legal services, ignored the complainant's requests for a report of the status of the cases entrusted
to his care, and rejected demands for return of the money paid to him.
On December 16, 2005, the complainant, Torben B. Overgaard, a Dutch national, through his business partner
John Bradley, entered into a Retainer Agreement1 with the respondent, Atty. Godwin R. Valdez. For the
amount of PhP900,000.00, the complainant engaged the services of the respondent to represent him as his
legal counsel in two cases filed by him and two cases filed against him, all pending in Antipolo City; including a
dismissed complaint which was appealed before the Department of Justice. The Agreement stipulated that
fees would cover acceptance and attorney's fees, expenses of litigation, other legal incidental expenses, and
appearance fees.2
The cases filed by the complainant included a complaint for Estafa, Grave Threats, Coercion, Unjust Vexation
and Oral Defamation3 pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Antipolo and a civil case for
Mandamus, Injunction with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Damages4 which is on trial at Branch
71, Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City. On the other hand, the cases filed against the complainant included a
criminal case for Other Light Threats at Branch 2 of the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, 5 and violation of
Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 9262, the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of
20046 before the Family Court of Antipolo City. A complaint for Illegal Possession of Firearms was also filed
against Torben Overgaard which was dismissed by the City Prosecutor of Antipolo City. This was appealed to
the Department of Justice by way of Petition for Review.7
Upon the execution of the Retainer Agreement, the complainant paid the respondent USD16,854.00 through
telegraphic bank transfer,8 as full payment for the services to be rendered under the Agreement. The
respondent then assured the complainant that he would take good care of the cases he was handling for the
complainant.9
On April 11, 2006, four months after the execution of the Retainer Agreement, the complainant, through his
business partner John Bradley, demanded from the respondent a report of the action he had taken with
respect to the cases entrusted to him. However, despite his continued efforts to contact the respondent to
inquire on the status of the cases, he was unable to reach him; his phone calls were not answered and his
electronic mails were ignored.10
The complainant had no knowledge of the developments of the cases that the respondent was handling for
him. Upon his own inquiry, he was dismayed to find out that the respondent did not file his entry of appearance
in the cases for Other Light Threats and Violation of Section 5(a) of the Anti-Violence Against Women and
Children Act.11 The respondent also did not inform him that he was entitled to prepare a Counter-Affidavit to
answer the complaint for Other Light Threats. The complainant had no knowledge that there had already been
arraignments for the criminal cases against him, and that there were already warrants of arrest12 issued for his
failure to attend the arraignments. He was constrained to engage the services of another lawyer in order to file
a Motion to Lift the Warrant of Arrest in the case for Other Light Threats,13 and an Omnibus Motion to Revive
the Case and Lift the Warrant of Arrest in the case for Violation of Section 5(a) of the Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act.14
The complainant alleges that the respondent did not do a single thing with respect to the cases covered under
the Retainer Agreement. Not only did the respondent fail to enter his appearance in the criminal cases filed
against the complainant, he also neglected to file an entry of appearance in the civil case for Mandamus,
Injunction and Damages that the complainant filed. The respondent also did not file a Comment on the
complaint for Illegal Possession of Firearms which was dismissed and under review at the Department of
Justice.15
12
Due to the above lapses of the respondent, on November 27, 2006, the complainant wrote the respondent and
demanded the return of the documents which were turned over to him, as well as the PhP900,000.00 that was
paid in consideration of the cases he was supposed to handle for the complainant.16 However, complainant
was unable to get any word from the respondent despite repeated and continuous efforts to get in touch with
him.
Hence, on December 28, 2006, Torben Overgaard was constrained to file an administrative complaint against
Atty. Godwin R. Valdez before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that the respondent engaged in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct.17 Despite the order to submit an Answer to the complaint
against him,18 the respondent failed to comply. A Mandatory Conference was set on September 21, 2007,19 but
the respondent failed to attend despite being duly notified.20 This prompted the Commission on Bar Discipline
to issue an Order declaring the respondent in default for failure to submit an Answer and failure to attend the
Mandatory Conference.21 The investigation proceeded ex parte.
The complainant submitted his position paper on October 5, 2007,22 with a prayer that the respondent be
disbarred from the practice of law, and to be ordered to return the amount of PhP900,000.00. A Clarificatory
Hearing was scheduled on December 11, 2007,23 and again, it was only the complainant who was in
attendance; the respondent failed to attend the hearing despite notice. The case was then submitted for
resolution based on the pleadings submitted by the complainant and the hearings conducted.24
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner Antonio S. Tria, to whom the instant
disciplinary case was assigned for investigation, report and recommendation, found the respondent guilty of
violating Canon 15, Canon 16, Rule 16.01, Canon 17, Canon 18, and Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. In his Report dated January 29, 2008, he recommended that respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for a period of three (3) years. The IBP Board of Governors, through Resolution No. XVIII-
2008-126, dated March 6, 2008, approved the recommendation of Commissioner Tria, and further ordered the
complainant to return the PhP900,000.00 to the complainant within 60 days from receipt of the notice.
We agree. We find the respondent Atty. Godwin R. Valdez to have committed multiple violations of the canons
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The appropriate penalty to be imposed on an errant attorney involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion
based on the facts of the case. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides, viz:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. - A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice,
or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or
suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; (3)
grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer's oath;
(6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willful appearance as an attorney for a
party without authority. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or
private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor, or
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
The respondent has indubitably fallen below the exacting standards demanded of members of the bar. He did
not merely neglect his client's cause, he abandoned his client and left him without any recourse but to hire
another lawyer. He not only failed to properly handle the cases which were entrusted to his care, he refused to
do a single thing in connection with these cases. He did not file any pleading to defend his client; he did not
even enter his appearance in these cases. Moreover, he disregarded the complainant's letters and electronic
mails and rejected the complainant's phone calls. All the complainant was asking for was a report of the status
of the cases but the respondent could not be reached no matter what the complainant did to get in touch with
him. After receipt of the full amount of fees under the Retainer Agreement, he simply disappeared, leaving the
client defenseless and plainly prejudiced in the cases against him. Warrants of arrest were even issued against
the complainant due to the respondent's gross and inexcusable negligence in failing to ascertain the status of
the case and to inform his client of the arraignment. It was not a mere failure on the respondent's part to inform
the complainant of matters concerning the cases, it was an unmistakable evasion of duty. To hide from the
13
complainant, avoid his calls, ignore his letters, and leave him helpless is unforgivable; and to commit all these
acts and omissions after receiving the full amount of legal fees and after assuring the client of his commitment
and responsibility violates the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Deceitful conduct involves moral turpitude and includes
anything done contrary to justice, modesty or good morals.25 It is an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in
the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen or to society in general, contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals.26 Representing to the complainant that he would take care of the cases filed
against him,27 assuring the complainant that his property involved in a civil case would be safeguarded,28 and
then collecting the full amount of legal fees of PhP900,000.00, only to desert the complainant after receipt of
the fees, were manifestly deceitful and dishonest.
The relationship of an attorney to his client is highly fiduciary. Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that "a lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his client." Necessity and public interest enjoin lawyers to be honest and truthful when
dealing with his client. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.29 However, instead of devoting himself to the client's cause, the respondent
avoided the complainant, forgot about the cases he was handling for him and ostensibly abandoned him. The
client reposed his trust in his lawyer with full faith that the lawyer would not betray him or abscond from his
responsibilities. By assuring the complainant that he would take care of the cases included in the Retainer
Agreement, and even accepting fees, the respondent defrauded the complainant when he did not do a single
thing he was expected to do.
A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.30 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.31 Respondent should
indeed be held liable, for he was not just incompetent, he was practically useless; he was not just negligent, he
was indolent; and rather than being of help to the complainant, he prejudiced the client. Respondent's inaction
with respect to the matters entrusted to his care is obvious; and his failure to file an answer to the complaint for
disbarment against him and to attend the hearings in connection therewith, without any explanation or request
for resetting, despite proper notice from the IBP, is clear evidence of negligence on his part.
The Code of Professional Responsibility further provides that a lawyer is required to keep the client informed of
the status of his case and to respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.32 The
respondent did the opposite. Despite the complainant's efforts to consult him and notwithstanding numerous
attempts to contact him, simply to ask for an update of the status of the cases, the respondent was able to
avoid the complainant and never bothered to reply.
After months of waiting for a reply from the respondent, and discovering that the respondent had been remiss
in his duties, the complainant demanded the return of the documents he had turned over to the respondent. He
also demanded the return of the money he had paid for the legal services that were not rendered and
expenses of litigation which were not incurred. However, the respondent rejected the complainant's demands.
Rule 16.01, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, provides that "a lawyer shall account for all
money and property collected or received for and from the client." The complainant paid $16,854.00 to the
respondent via telegraphic bank transfer. This was considered as complete payment for the PhP900,000.00
that was stipulated as the consideration for the legal services to be rendered. However, since the respondent
did not carry out any of the services he was engaged to perform, nor did he appear in court or make any
payment in connection with litigation, or give any explanation as to how such a large sum of money was spent
and allocated, he must immediately return the money he received from the client upon demand. However, he
refused to return the money he received from the complainant despite written demands, and was not even able
to give a single report regarding the status of the cases.
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of
fidelity to the client's cause. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose - such as for filing fees - but not
used for failure to file the case, must immediately be returned to the client on demand.33
In Sencio v. Calvadores,34 the respondent lawyer Sencio was engaged to file a case, which he failed to do. His
client demanded that he return the money which was paid to him but he refused. Sencio similarly failed to
answer the complaint and disregarded the orders and notices of the IBP on many occasions.35 The respondent
lawyer was ordered to return the money that he received from the complainant with interest at 12% per annum
from the date of the promulgation of the resolution until the return of the amount.36
14
The practice of law is not a right, but a privilege. It is granted only to those of good moral character.37 The Bar
must maintain a high standard of honesty and fair dealing.38 Lawyers must conduct themselves beyond
reproach at all times, whether they are dealing with their clients or the public at large,39 and a violation of the
high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty, including
suspension and disbarment.40
The respondent demonstrated not only appalling indifference and lack of responsibility to the courts and his
client but also a wanton disregard for his duties as a lawyer. It is deplorable that members of the bar, such as
the respondent, betray not only the trust of their client, but also public trust. For the practice of law is a
profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is entrusted to those who are qualified and who
possess good moral character.41 Those who are unable or unwilling to comply with the responsibilities and
meet the standards of the profession are unworthy of the privilege to practice law. We must protect the
administration of justice by requiring those who exercise this function to be competent, honorable and reliable
in order that the courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in them.
In this case, we find that suspension for three years recommended by the IBP is not sufficient punishment for
the unacceptable acts and omissions of respondent. The acts of the respondent constitute malpractice and
gross misconduct in his office as attorney. His incompetence and appalling indifference to his duty to his client,
the courts and society render him unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in him as a member of the
bar. We could not find any mitigating circumstances to recommend a lighter penalty. For violating elementary
principles of professional ethics and failing to observe the fundamental duties of honesty and good faith, the
respondent has proven himself unworthy of membership in this noble profession.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Godwin R. Valdez is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ordered
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. He is ORDERED to immediately return to Torben B. Overgaard the
amount of $16,854.00 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency at the time of actual payment, with legal interest
of six percent (6%) per annum from November 27, 2006, the date of extra-judicial demand. A twelve percent
(12%) interest per annum, in lieu of six percent (6%), shall be imposed on such amount from the date of
promulgation of this decision until the payment thereof. He is further ORDERED to immediately return all
papers and documents received from the complainant.
Copies of this Decision shall be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant
and all courts.
SO ORDERED.
15
5. GUEVARRA VS EALA
A.C. No. 7136 August 1, 2007
JOSELANO GUEVARRA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for Disbarment1 before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a.
Noli Eala (respondent) for "grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath."
In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:
He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainant's) then-fiancee Irene Moje (Irene) introduced
respondent to him as her friend who was married to Marianne (sometimes spelled "Mary Ann") Tantoco with
whom he had three children.
After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed that from January to March 2001, Irene
had been receiving from respondent cellphone calls, as well as messages some of which read "I love you," "I
miss you," or "Meet you at Megamall."
Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the morning of the
following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked about her whereabouts, she replied
that she slept at her parents' house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work.
In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent together on two occasions. On the second
occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house.
On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irene's birthday celebration at which he saw her and
respondent celebrating with her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left the
venue immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all her personal
belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share of the household appliances.
Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a folded social card bearing the words "I Love You" on its
face, which card when unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of his wedding
to Irene, reading:
My everdearest Irene,
By the time you open this, you'll be moments away from walking down the aisle. I will say a prayer for you that
you may find meaning in what you're about to do.
Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find fleeting happiness but experience eternal pain?
Is it only for us to find a true love but then lose it again? Or is it because there's a bigger plan for the two of us?
I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have done everything humanly possible to love
you. And today, as you make your vows . . . I make my own vow to YOU!
I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time I laid eyes on you, to the time we spent
together, up to the final moments of your single life. But more importantly, I will love you until the life in me is
gone and until we are together again.
Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough memories of us to last me a lifetime. Always
remember though that in my heart, in my mind and in my soul, YOU WILL ALWAYS
. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!
BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE YOURS AND YOURS ALONE!
I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS I'M LIVING MY TWEETIE YOU'LL BE!"2
16
Eternally yours,
NOLI
Complainant soon saw respondent's car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B 11th Street, New
Manila where, as he was to later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was already residing. He also learned still
later that when his friends saw Irene on or about January 18, 2002 together with respondent during a concert,
she was pregnant.
In his ANSWER,3 respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU card on which the above-quoted letter
was handwritten.
On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:
14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP as they attended
social functions together. For instance, in or about the third week of September 2001, the couple attended the
launch of the "Wine All You Can" promotion of French wines, held at the Mega Strip of SM Megamall B at
Mandaluyong City. Their attendance was reported in Section B of the Manila Standard issue of 24 September
2001, on page 21. Respondent and Irene were photographed together; their picture was captioned: "Irene with
Sportscaster Noli Eala." A photocopy of the report is attached as Annex C.4 (Italics and emphasis in the
original; CAPITALIZATION of the phrase "flaunting their adulterous relationship" supplied),
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
4. Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in
paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being that their relationship was low profile and known
only to the immediate members of their respective families, and that Respondent, as far as the general public
was concerned, was still known to be legally married to Mary Anne Tantoco.5 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:
15. Respondent's adulterous conduct with the complainant's wife and his apparent abandoning or neglecting of
his own family, demonstrate his gross moral depravity, making him morally unfit to keep his membership in the
bar. He flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage, calling it a "piece of paper." Morally reprehensible
was his writing the love letter to complainant's bride on the very day of her wedding, vowing to continue his
love for her "until we are together again," as now they are.6 (Underscoring supplied),
respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:
5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 15 of the Complaint regarding
his adulterous relationship and that his acts demonstrate gross moral depravity thereby making him unfit to
keep his membership in the bar, the reason being that Respondent's relationship with Irene was not under
scandalous circumstances and that as far as his relationship with his own family:
5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful relationship with [his wife] Mary Anne as in fact
they still occasionally meet in public, even if Mary Anne is aware of Respondent's special friendship with Irene.
xxxx
5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage by calling the
institution of marriage a mere piece of paper because his reference [in his above-quoted handwritten letter to
Irene] to the marriage between Complainant and Irene as a piece of paper was merely with respect to the
formality of the marriage contract.7 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Respondent admitted8 paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading:
18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the Constitution and obey the laws. The Constitution
regards marriage as an inviolable social institution and is the foundation of the family (Article XV, Sec. 2).9
And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:
19. Respondent's grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution and the laws he, as a lawyer, has
been sworn to uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit love for the complainant's wife, he mocked the
institution of marriage, betrayed his own family, broke up the complainant's marriage, commits adultery with his
wife, and degrades the legal profession.10 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
17
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the Complaint, the reason being
that under the circumstances the acts of Respondent with respect to his purely personal and low profile special
relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral
conduct as would be a ground for disbarment pursuant to Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of
Court.11 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
To respondent's ANSWER, complainant filed a REPLY,12 alleging that Irene gave birth to a girl and Irene
named respondent in the Certificate of Live Birth as the girl's father. Complainant attached to the Reply, as
Annex "A," a copy of a Certificate of Live Birth13 bearing Irene's signature and naming respondent as the father
of her daughter Samantha Irene Louise Moje who was born on February 14, 2002 at St. Luke's Hospital.
Complainant's REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION TO DISMISS14 dated January 10, 2003 from
respondent in which he denied having "personal knowledge of the Certificate of Live Birth attached to the
complainant's Reply."15 Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint due to the pendency of a civil case filed
by complainant for the annulment of his marriage to Irene, and a criminal complaint for adultery against
respondent and Irene which was pending before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office.
During the investigation before the IBP-CBD, complainant's Complaint-Affidavit and Reply to Answer were
adopted as his testimony on direct examination.16 Respondent's counsel did not cross-examine complainant.17
After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, in a 12-page REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION18 dated October 26, 2004, found the charge against respondent sufficiently proven.
The Commissioner thus recommended19 that respondent be disbarred for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility reading:
Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Underscoring
supplied),
and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading:
Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
(Underscoring supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner and accordingly dismissed the case for lack of merit, by Resolution dated January 28, 2006
briefly reading:
RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06
CBD Case No. 02-936
Joselano C. Guevarra vs.
Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala
a.k.a. Noli Eala
RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, the Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner, and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of
merit.20 (Italics and emphasis in the original)
Hence, the present petition21 of complainant before this Court, filed pursuant to Section 12 (c), Rule 13922 of
the Rules of Court.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner and dismissing the case for lack of merit, gave no reason therefor as its above-quoted 33-word
Resolution shows.
Respondent contends, in his Comment23 on the present petition of complainant, that there is no evidence
against him.24 The contention fails. As the IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner observed:
While it may be true that the love letter dated October 7, 2000 (Exh. "C") and the news item published in
the Manila Standard (Exh. "D"), even taken together do not sufficiently prove that respondent is carrying on an
18
adulterous relationship with complainant's wife, there are other pieces of evidence on record which support the
accusation of complainant against respondent.
It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002, respondent through counsel made the following
statements to wit: "Respondent specifically denies having [ever] flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene
as alleged in paragraph [14] of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being [that] their relationship was low
profile and known only to immediate members of their respective families . . . , and Respondent specifically
denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the complaint, the reason being that under the circumstances the
acts of the respondents with respect to his purely personal and low profile relationship with Irene is neither
under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct . . ."
These statements of respondent in his Answer are an admission that there is indeed a "special" relationship
between him and complainant's wife, Irene, [which] taken together with the Certificate of Live Birth of
Samantha Louise Irene Moje (Annex "H-1") sufficiently prove that there was indeed an illicit
relationship between respondent and Irene which resulted in the birth of the child "Samantha". In the Certificate
of Live Birth of Samantha it should be noted that complainant's wife Irene supplied the information that
respondent was the father of the child. Given the fact that the respondent admitted his special relationship with
Irene there is no reason to believe that Irene would lie or make any misrepresentation regarding the paternity
of the child. It should be underscored that respondent has not categorically denied that he is the father of
Samantha Louise Irene Moje.25 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Indeed, from respondent's Answer, he does not deny carrying on an adulterous relationship with Irene,
"adultery" being defined under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code as that "committed by any married woman
who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who has carnal knowledge of
her, knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be subsequently declared void."26 (Italics supplied) What
respondent denies is having flaunted such relationship, he maintaining that it was "low profile and known only
to the immediate members of their respective families."
In other words, respondent's denial is a negative pregnant,
a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not
squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated otherwise, a negative
pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it in affirmation or at least an implication of some
kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in
the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as
so qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied
while the fact itself is admitted.27 (Citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A negative pregnant too is respondent's denial of having "personal knowledge" of Irene's daughter Samantha
Louise Irene Moje's Certificate of Live Birth. In said certificate, Irene named respondent – a "lawyer," 38 years
old – as the child's father. And the phrase "NOT MARRIED" is entered on the desired information on "DATE
AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE." A comparison of the signature attributed to Irene in the certificate28 with her
signature on the Marriage Certificate29 shows that they were affixed by one and the same person. Notatu
dignum is that, as the Investigating Commissioner noted, respondent never denied being the father of the child.
Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Luke's Medical Center, in his January 29, 2003
Affidavit30 which he identified at the witness stand, declared that Irene gave the information in the Certificate of
Live Birth that the child's father is "Jose Emmanuel Masacaet Eala," who was 38 years old and a lawyer.31
Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and Irene has been sufficiently proven by more
than clearly preponderant evidence – that evidence adduced by one party which is more conclusive and
credible than that of the other party and, therefore, has greater weight than the other32 – which is the quantum
of evidence needed in an administrative case against a lawyer.
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may
proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.
. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; in
an administrative case for disbarment or suspension, "clearly preponderant evidence" is all that is
required.33 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because his relationship with Irene was not, under
Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, reading:
19
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. ─ A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice,
or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do.
The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other disciplinatory
agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment
or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of
the ground for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
under scandalous circumstances.34
The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for disbarment or suspension uses the phrase
"grossly immoral conduct," not "under scandalous circumstances." Sexual intercourse under scandalous
circumstances is, following Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code reading:
ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or, shall have
sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with
her in any other place, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
x x x x,
an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual intercourse with a woman elsewhere.
"Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be
characterized as 'grossly immoral conduct' depends on the surrounding circumstances."35 The case at bar
involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial
whether the affair was carried out discreetly. Apropos is the following pronouncement of this Court in Vitug v.
Rongcal:36
On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital affair with complainant,
albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not "so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree" in order to merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree.
xxxx
While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between
two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so with
respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable
under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it
manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution
and affirmed by our laws.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:38
The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not the respondent did contract a bigamous
marriage . . . It is enough that the records of this administrative case substantiate the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of Governors, i.e., that indeed respondent has
been carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, a grossly immoral conduct and indicative of an
extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession. This detestable behavior renders him
regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which his license confers upon
him.39 (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission to practice law which goes:
I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear
that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
20
groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or
malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good
fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any
mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God. (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the Constitution reading:
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by
the State.
In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this constitutional provision,
obligates the husband and the wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support."40
Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03
of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any "conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law."
Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the investigation of the case before the IBP
Commissioner, filed a Manifestation41 on March 22, 2005 informing the IBP-CBD that complainant's petition for
nullity of his (complainant's) marriage to Irene had been granted by Branch 106 of the Quezon City Regional
Trial Court, and that the criminal complaint for adultery complainant filed against respondent and Irene "based
on the same set of facts alleged in the instant case," which was pending review before the Department of
Justice (DOJ), on petition of complainant, had been, on motion of complainant, withdrawn.
The Secretary of Justice's Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting complainant's Motion to Withdraw Petition
for Review reads:
Considering that the instant motion was filed before the final resolution of the petition for review, we are
inclined to grant the same pursuant to Section 10 of Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, which
provides that "notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal, the petitioner may withdraw the same at any time
before it is finally resolved, in which case the appealed resolution shall stand as though no appeal has been
taken."42 (Emphasis supplied by complainant)
That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently declared void ab initio is immaterial. The
acts complained of took place before the marriage was declared null and void.43 As a lawyer, respondent
should be aware that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed, unless
proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.44 In carrying on an extra-marital affair with
Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage with complainant was null and void, and despite
respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law. And he
betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.
As for complainant's withdrawal of his petition for review before the DOJ, respondent glaringly omitted to state
that before complainant filed his December 23, 2003 Motion to Withdraw his Petition for Review, the DOJ had
already promulgated a Resolution on September 22, 2003 reversing the dismissal by the Quezon City
Prosecutor's Office of complainant's complaint for adultery. In reversing the City Prosecutor's Resolution, DOJ
Secretary Simeon Datumanong held:
Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by complainant would, in the fair estimation of the Department,
sufficiently establish all the elements of the offense of adultery on the part of both respondents. Indeed, early
on, respondent Moje conceded to complainant that she was going out on dates with respondent Eala, and this
she did when complainant confronted her about Eala's frequent phone calls and text messages to her.
Complainant also personally witnessed Moje and Eala having a rendezvous on two occasions. Respondent
Eala never denied the fact that he knew Moje to be married to complainant[.] In fact, he (Eala) himself was
married to another woman. Moreover, Moje's eventual abandonment of their conjugal home, after complainant
had once more confronted her about Eala, only served to confirm the illicit relationship involving both
respondents. This becomes all the more apparent by Moje's subsequent relocation in No. 71-B, 11th Street,
New Manila, Quezon City, which was a few blocks away from the church where she had exchange marital
vows with complainant.
It was in this place that the two lovers apparently cohabited. Especially since Eala's vehicle and that of Moje's
were always seen there. Moje herself admits that she came to live in the said address whereas Eala asserts
21
that that was where he held office. The happenstance that it was in that said address that Eala and Moje had
decided to hold office for the firm that both had formed smacks too much of a coincidence. For one, the said
address appears to be a residential house, for that was where Moje stayed all throughout after her separation
from complainant. It was both respondent's love nest, to put short; their illicit affair that was carried out there
bore fruit a few months later when Moje gave birth to a girl at the nearby hospital of St. Luke's Medical Center.
What finally militates against the respondents is the indubitable fact that in the certificate of birth of the girl,
Moje furnished the information that Eala was the father. This speaks all too eloquently of the unlawful and
damning nature of the adulterous acts of the respondents. Complainant's supposed illegal procurement of the
birth certificate is most certainly beside the point for both respondents Eala and Moje have not denied, in any
categorical manner, that Eala is the father of the child Samantha Irene Louise Moje.45 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be prosecuted de oficio and thus leaves the
DOJ no choice but to grant complainant's motion to withdraw his petition for review. But even if respondent and
Irene were to be acquitted of adultery after trial, if the Information for adultery were filed in court, the same
would not have been a bar to the present administrative complaint.
Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,46 viz:
x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar to these [administrative]
proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to
escape the penalties of x x x criminal law. Moreover, this Court, in disbarment proceedings is acting in an
entirely different capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal case47 (Italics in the original),
this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,48 held:
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they
may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-06 passed on January 28, 2006 by the
Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct, violation of his oath
of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of the records of respondent in the
Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines. And let copies of the Decision be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.
22
6. DONTON VS ATTY.TANSINGCO
[A.C. NO. 6057 : June 27, 2006]
PETER T. DONTON, Complainant, v. ATTY. EMMANUEL O. TANSINGCO, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a disbarment complaint against respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco ("respondent") for serious
misconduct and deliberate violation of Canon 1,1 Rules 1.012 and 1.023 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility ("Code").
The Facts
In his Complaint dated 20 May 2003, Peter T. Donton ("complainant") stated that he filed a criminal complaint
for estafa thru falsification of a public document4 against Duane O. Stier ("Stier"), Emelyn A. Maggay
("Maggay") and respondent, as the notary public who notarized the Occupancy Agreement.
The disbarment complaint arose when respondent filed a counter-charge for perjury5 against complainant.
Respondent, in his affidavit-complaint, stated that:
5. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT dated September 11, 1995 was prepared and notarized by me under the
following circumstances:
A. Mr. Duane O. Stier is the owner and long-time resident of a real property located at No. 33 Don Jose Street,
Bgy. San Roque, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City.
B. Sometime in September 1995, Mr. Stier - a U.S. citizen and thereby disqualified to own real property in his
name - agreed that the property be transferred in the name of Mr. Donton, a Filipino.
C. Mr. Stier, in the presence of Mr. Donton, requested me to prepare several documents that would guarantee
recognition of him being the actual owner of the property despite the transfer of title in the name of Mr. Donton.
D. For this purpose, I prepared, among others, the OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT, recognizing Mr. Stier's free
and undisturbed use of the property for his residence and business operations. The OCCUPANCY
AGREEMENT was tied up with a loan which Mr. Stier had extended to Mr. Donton.6
Complainant averred that respondent's act of preparing the Occupancy Agreement, despite knowledge that
Stier, being a foreign national, is disqualified to own real property in his name, constitutes serious misconduct
and is a deliberate violation of the Code. Complainant prayed that respondent be disbarred for advising Stier to
do something in violation of law and assisting Stier in carrying out a dishonest scheme.
In his Comment dated 19 August 2003, respondent claimed that complainant filed the disbarment case against
him upon the instigation of complainant's counsel, Atty. Bonifacio A. Alentajan,7 because respondent refused to
act as complainant's witness in the criminal case against Stier and Maggay. Respondent admitted that he
"prepared and notarized" the Occupancy Agreement and asserted its genuineness and due execution.
In a Resolution dated 1 October 2003, the Court referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In her Report dated 26 February 2004 ("Report"), Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan ("Commissioner San
Juan") of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent liable for taking part in a "scheme to
circumvent the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of land in the Philippines." Commissioner
San Juan recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for two years and the cancellation
of his commission as Notary Public.
In Resolution No. XVI-2004-222 dated 16 April 2004, the IBP Board of Governors adopted, with modification,
the Report and recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for six months.
On 28 June 2004, the IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided under Section
12(b), Rule 139-B8 of the Rules of Court.
23
On 28 July 2004, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration before the IBP. Respondent stated that he was
already 76 years old and would already retire by 2005 after the termination of his pending cases. He also said
that his practice of law is his only means of support for his family and his six minor children.
In a Resolution dated 7 October 2004, the IBP denied the motion for reconsideration because the IBP had no
more jurisdiction on the case as the matter had already been referred to the Court.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code.
A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client which will involve defiance of the laws
which he is bound to uphold and obey.9 A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives
in violating the law commits an act which justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer. 10
By his own admission, respondent admitted that Stier, a U.S. citizen, was disqualified from owning real
property.11 Yet, in his motion for reconsideration,12 respondent admitted that he caused the transfer of
ownership to the parcel of land to Stier. Respondent, however, aware of the prohibition, quickly rectified his act
and transferred the title in complainant's name. But respondent provided "some safeguards" by preparing
several documents,13 including the Occupancy Agreement, that would guarantee Stier's recognition as the
actual owner of the property despite its transfer in complainant's name. In effect, respondent advised and
aided Stier in circumventing the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of lands14 by preparing said
documents.
Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his oath and the Code when he prepared
and notarized the Occupancy Agreement to evade the law against foreign ownership of lands. Respondent
used his knowledge of the law to achieve an unlawful end. Such an act amounts to malpractice in his office, for
which he may be suspended.15
In Balinon v. De Leon,16 respondent Atty. De Leon was suspended from the practice of law for three years for
preparing an affidavit that virtually permitted him to commit concubinage. In In re: Santiago,17 respondent Atty.
Santiago was suspended from the practice of law for one year for preparing a contract which declared the
spouses to be single again after nine years of separation and allowed them to contract separately subsequent
marriages.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco GUILTY of violation of Canon 1 and Rule
1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Emmanuel O.
Tansingco from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent's
personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts
in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
24
7. RODICA VS LAZARO
[A.C. NO. 9259 - August 23, 2012]
JASPER JUNNO F. RODICA, Complainant, v. ATTY. MANUEL "LOLONG" M. LAZARO, ATTY. EDWIN M.
ESPEJO, ATTY. ABEL M. ALMARIO, ATTY. MICHELLE B. LAZARO, ATTY. JOSEPH C. TAN, and JOHN
DOES, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
"The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive
principle, with great caution and only for the most weighty reasons."1Ï‚rÎ½ll
This is a Complaint2 for disbarment filed by Jasper Junno F. Rodica (Rodica) against Atty. Manuel "Lolong" M.
Lazaro (Atty. Manuel), Atty. Edwin M. Espejo (Atty. Espejo), Atty. Abel M. Almario, (Atty. Almario), Atty.
Michelle B. Lazaro (Atty. Michelle), and Atty. Joseph C. Tan (Atty. Tan) for gross and serious misconduct,
deceit, malpractice, grossly immoral conduct, and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Factual Antecedents
On May 5, 2011, William Strong (Strong), an American, was arrested and detained by the operatives of the
Bureau of Immigration. Strong sought the assistance of Philip3 G. Apostol (Apostol), a friend and neighbor, to
secure the services of a lawyer. Apostol referred him to Atty. Manuel, who is a partner at the M.M. Lazaro and
Associates Law Office (Lazaro Law Office).
Atty. Manuel initially declined because his law office only handles cases of its retained clients and those known
to him or any of the associate lawyers.4 However, he was eventually prevailed upon by Apostol who would
consider it as a special favor if Atty. Manuel would handle Strong s case. Hence, Atty. Manuel, together with
Atty. Almario and Atty. Espejo, senior and junior associates, respectively, at the Lazaro Law Office, agreed to
meet Strong at the Taguig Detention Center of the Bureau of Immigration.5Ï‚rÎ½ll
During the meeting, Atty. Manuel explained to Strong the terms of the Lazaro Law Office s engagement as well
as the fees. Strong assured him of his capacity to pay and offered to pay a success fee of US$100,000.00
should the said law office be able to expedite his release from detention as well as his departure from the
Philippines.6 Finding Strong to be believable and trustworthy, Atty. Manuel agreed to handle his case.7Ï‚rÎ½ll
During the course of their meeting, Strong casually mentioned that he has a property in Boracay and that he
suspected his neighbors as the persons who caused his arrest. According to Strong, his live-in partner Rodica
filed a Complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan, for recovery of possession and
damages8 (against Hillview Marketing Corporation9 (Hillview),
Stephanie Dornau (Dornau) as President of Hillview, the Alargo Park Neighborhood Association, Inc. and
spouses Robert and Judy Gregoire) in connection with the 353-square meter property they bought in Boracay.
He disclosed that he and Rodica had been trying to sell the Boracay property to rid themselves of the problems
but could not find buyers because of the said case. They even offered the property to Apostol but the latter was
hesitant because of the said pending case. Atty. Manuel averred that towards the end of the interview with
Strong, Rodica arrived. Strong described Rodica as his "handyman" who will act as his liaison in the case.
Upon inquiry with the Bureau of Immigration, it was discovered that Strong s arrest was made pursuant to an
Interpol Red Notice; and that Strong is wanted in Brazil for Conspiracy to Commit Fraud, Setting Up a Gang
and Other Related Crimes. Specifically, Strong is being indicted for his alleged involvement in "an international
gang involved in shares fraud which led to the creation of hundreds of millions of dollars in illegal
securities."10 Strong denied any participation in the alleged crime. Strong then pleaded with Atty. Manuel to
expedite his deportation to any country except Brazil and reiterated his willingness to pay the success fee of
US$100,000.00.
In her Complaint, Rodica alleged that in one of her meetings with the lawyers of the Lazaro Law Office, she
hinted that Atty. Tan, a senior partner at the Marcos Ochoa Serapio Tan and Associates (MOST Law) and who
is also the lawyer of Hillview and Dornau, was instrumental in the immigration case of Strong. According to
Rodica, Atty. Manuel called up Atty. Tan. Thereafter, Atty. Manuel allegedly informed Rodica that Atty. Tan
admitted having initiated the immigration case resulting in the detention of Strong; that Atty. Tan threatened to
25
do something bad against Rodica and her family; and that Atty. Tan demanded for Rodica to withdraw the RTC
case as part of a settlement package.
On May 25, 2011, the Bureau of Immigration, rendered its Judgment11 granting the motion of Strong to
voluntarily leave the country. On May 31, 2011, Strong left the Philippines. Subsequently, or on June 6, 2011,
Rodica filed with the RTC a motion effectively withdrawing her complaint.
Rodica alleged that after the deportation of Strong and the withdrawal of the RTC case, she heard nothing from
the Lazaro Law Office. She also claimed that contrary to her expectations, there was no "simultaneous over-all
settlement of her grievances x x x [with] the defendants [in the RTC] case.12 Thinking that she was deceived,
Rodica filed the instant administrative case. In sum, she claimed that:Ï‚Î·Î±Ã±rÎ¿blÎµÅ¡ Î½Î¹râ€ Ï…Î±l lÎ±Ï‰
lÎ¹brÎ±rÃ¿
21. RESPONDENT ATTORNEYS (MANUEL, MICHELLE, EDWIN and ABEL) of M.M. LAZARO &
ASSOCIATES, furthermore, committed GRAVE MISCONDUCT & DECEIT to complainant and the courts when
(among other things):Ï‚Î·Î±Ã±rÎ¿blÎµÅ¡ Î½Î¹râ€ Ï…Î±l lÎ±Ï‰ lÎ¹brÎ±rÃ¿
(a.) they mis-represented to complainant that the withdrawal of her case at the Regional Trial Court at Kalibo
(Branch VI-Civil Case No. 8987) was only the first step in an over-all settlement package of all her differences
with her legal adversaries (i.e. Hillview Marketing Corporation and the latter s officials / Stephanie Dornau /
Atty. Joseph Tan etc.), which respondent Manuel M. Lazaro had allegedly already taken care of;
(b.) they extorted from her more than P7 MILLION for alleged professional / legal fees and PENALTIES
involved in William Strong s immigration case, when what actually happened was -
(c.) as complainant came to know later, almost all of said amount was allegedly used as "pay-off" to
immigration, police and Malaca[Ã±]ang officials as well as Atty. Joseph Tan, and as graft money / kotong /
lagay / "tong-pats", for the expeditious approval of Mr. William Strong s voluntary deportation plea with the
Bureau of Immigration;
(d.) they even shamelessly denied the status of the complainant as their client, just so that they can evade their
responsibility to her;
(e.) they even submitted concocted stories (re Mr. Apostol s purchase bid for the Boracay villa of complainant;
Atty. Espejo s attempt to cover-up for Lolong Lazaro and accept sole responsibility for signing the questioned
manifestation and withdrawal documents last May 24, 2011, and many others) with the Regional Trial Court of
Kalibo (Branch VI) just so that they can hide the truth, hide their crimes and go scot free;
chanrobles virtual law library
22. RESPONDENT Atty. JOSEPH C. TAN on the other hand performed as a willing partner of ATTY. MANUEL
M. LAZARO by acting as conduit to his MalacaÃ±ang patron ("JOHN DOE") in causing the arrest of William
Strong last May 5, 2011, and in packaging with Lolong Lazaro of the magic formula regarding William Strong s
voluntary deportation bid and the conditions attached thereto as sufficiently explained;
xxx
23. RESPONDENTS also violated THEIR OATH AS x x x ATTORNEYS, especially with the phrases ". . . I will
obey the laws . . . I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; . . . I will delay no man for
money or malice . . . with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients . . . ";13Ï‚rÎ½ll
Otherwise stated, Rodica claimed that she is a client of the Lazaro Law Office and that she was deceived into
causing the withdrawal of the RTC case. Further, she claimed that the Lazaro Law Office collected exorbitant
fees from her.
In their Comment, Atty. Almario and Atty. Espejo admitted being present in the May 13, 2011 meeting with
Rodica. They denied, however, that Atty. Manuel talked with Atty. Tan during the said meeting, or conveyed
the information that Atty. Tan and the group of Dornau were the ones behind Strong s arrest and detention.
Atty. Almario and Atty. Espejo disputed Rodica s assertion that the withdrawal of the RTC case was a condition
sine qua non to Strong s departure from the country. They pointed out that the Manifestation with Motion to
Withdraw Motion for Reconsideration14 was filed only on June 3, 2011,15 or nine days after the May 25, 2011
Judgment of the Bureau of Immigration was issued, and three days after Strong left the country on May 31,
26
2011. They insisted that Rodica withdrew the RTC case because it was one of the conditions set by Apostol
before buying the Boracay property.
As to the preparation of Rodica s Motion to Withdraw Motion for Reconsideration relative to the RTC case,
Atty. Espejo claimed that the former begged him to prepare the said motion. Since the two already became
close friends, Atty. Espejo accommodated Rodica s request. He admitted to acceding to Rodica s requests to
put the name of the Lazaro Law Office, the names of its partners, as well as his name, in the motion and into
signing the same, without the prior knowledge and consent of the other senior lawyers of the firm. Atty. Espejo
claimed that he did all of these out of his good intention to help and assist Rodica in making the Boracay
property more saleable by freeing it from any pending claims.
In his Comment,16 Atty. Manuel contended that none of the lawyers of the Lazaro Law Office communicated
with Atty. Tan relative to the deportation proceedings or the RTC case. He claimed that it was highly
improbable for the Lazaro Law Office to impress upon Rodica that it will coordinate with Atty. Tan for the
withdrawal of the RTC case to expedite the deportation proceedings as the RTC case was already dismissed
as early as March 29, 2011 for failure to state a cause of action. Atty. Manuel averred that the two cases are
incongruous with each other and one cannot be used to compromise the other.
Atty. Joseph Tan s Arguments
For his part, Atty. Tan asserted that the allegations against him are "double hearsay" because the same were
based on information allegedly relayed to Rodica by Atty. Manuel, who, in turn, allegedly heard it from Atty.
Tan.17 He denied any participation in the withdrawal of the RTC case and the arrest and deportation of Strong.
Atty. Tan stressed that Strong was deported on May 31, 2011. Three days thereafter, or on June 3, 2011,
Rodica, with the assistance of her counsel of record, Atty. Joan I. Tabanar-Ibutnande (Atty. Ibutnande), filed
the Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw Motion for Reconsideration. He averred that if it is indeed true, as
Rodica alleged, that the filing of the said motion was a pre-condition to Strong s voluntary deportation, then the
filing of the same should have preceded Strong s deportation. However, it was the reverse in this case.
Atty. Tan also pointed out that it would be inconceivable for him to participate in Strong s arrest as he had
already obtained a favorable ruling "on the merits" for his clients in the RTC case even before Strong was
arrested and incarcerated. Besides, Strong is not a party and had nothing to do with the RTC case. Atty. Tan
likewise denied having any dealings with the rest of the respondents insofar as the arrest and voluntary
deportation of Strong are concerned. Neither did he receive any phone call or message from his co-
respondents nor did he communicate with them in any manner regarding Strong s case.
Issue
The sole issue to be resolved is whether the allegations in Rodica s Complaint merit the disbarment or
suspension of Respondents.
Our Ruling
In Siao v. Atty. De Guzman, Jr.,18 this Court reiterated its oft repeated ruling that in suspension or disbarment
proceedings, lawyers enjoy the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant
to clearly prove her allegations by preponderant evidence. Elaborating on the required quantum of proof, this
Court declared thus:Ï‚Î·Î±Ã±rÎ¿blÎµÅ¡ Î½Î¹râ€ Ï…Î±l lÎ±Ï‰ lÎ¹brÎ±rÃ¿
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has
greater weight than that of the other. It means evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of
belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. Under Section 1 of Rule 133, in determining whether or
not there is preponderance of evidence, the court may consider the following: (a) all the facts and
circumstances of the case; (b) the witnesses manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and
opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the
probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses interest or want of interest, and also their
personal credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number of witnesses,
although it does not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the greater number. (Citations omitted.)
In the absence of preponderant evidence, the presumption of innocence of the lawyer continues and the
complaint against him must be dismissed.19Ï‚rÎ½ll
27
In the present case, the totality of evidence presented by Rodica failed to overcome the said presumption of
innocence.
Rodica s claim of "settlement package"
is devoid of merit.
Rodica s assertions that Atty. Tan orchestrated Strong s arrest and that Atty. Manuel proposed the withdrawal
of the RTC case to facilitate the deportation of Strong, are mere allegations without proof and belied by the
records of the case. "The basic rule is that mere allegation is not evidence, and is not equivalent to
proof."20 Aside from her bare assertions, Rodica failed to present even an iota of evidence to prove her
allegations. In fact, the records belie her claims. The documents issued by the Bureau of Immigration showed
that Strong was the subject of the Interpol Red Notice for being a fugitive from justice wanted for crimes
allegedly committed in Brazil.21 His warrant of arrest was issued sometime in February 2008. Significantly,
even before Strong was arrested and eventually deported, Atty. Tan had already obtained a favorable
judgment for his clients.
We also agree that it is highly inconceivable for Atty. Tan and the Lazaro Law Office to concoct the scheme of
"pressuring" Rodica to withdraw the RTC case for the purpose of expediting the deportation proceedings of
Strong. The following facts are undisputed: (1) Rodica s counsel of record in the RTC is Atty. Ibutnande; (2) the
RTC case was already dismissed in the Order22 of March 29, 2011 for failure to state a cause of action; (3) on
April 18, 2011, Rodica through her counsel of record filed a Motion for Reconsideration; (4) on May 5, 2011,
Strong was arrested and detained pursuant to an Interpol Red Notice; (5) Strong hired the Lazaro Law Office
to handle his deportation case; (6) on May 19, 2011 Strong filed a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion to
voluntarily leave the country; (7) the Bureau of Immigration rendered a Judgment23 dated May 25, 2011
granting Strong s motion to voluntarily leave the country; (8) Strong left the country on May 31, 2011; (9)
Rodica s Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw the Motion for Reconsideration was filed on June 6, 2011; and,
(8) acting on the said Manifestation with Motion, the RTC on June 14, 2011 issued an Order24 granting the
same.
Given the chronology of events, there appears no relation between the deportation case and the withdrawal of
the RTC case. Thus, it would be specious if not far-fetched to conclude that the withdrawal of the RTC case
was a pre-condition to Strong s deportation.
As regards the alleged participation of Atty. Manuel in the "settlement package" theory of Rodica, suffice it to
say that Atty. Manuel has in his favor "the presumption that, as an officer of the court, he regularly performs the
duties imposed upon him by his oath as a lawyer and by the Code of Professional Responsibility."25 Hence,
absent any competent evidence to the contrary, Atty. Manuel, as Strong s counsel, is presumed to have
worked out the release and subsequent deportation of his client in accordance with the proper procedures.
Preponderance of evidence shows that
Rodica caused the withdrawal of the
RTC case to facilitate the sale of the
Boracay property to Apostol.
We cannot lend credence to Rodica s allegation that she was deceived by Atty. Manuel, Atty. Espejo, Atty.
Almario and Atty. Michelle, another senior associate at the Lazaro Law Office, into believing that the
withdrawal of the RTC case was part of a settlement package to settle her differences with her legal
adversaries. We accord more credence to the explanation of the respondents, particularly Atty. Espejo, that in
the course of rendering legal services to Strong, he had become close to Rodica so much so that he
accommodated Rodica s request to cause the withdrawal of the RTC case to facilitate the sale of the Boracay
property to Apostol.
In their Joint Comment,26 respondents Attys. Almario, Espejo and Michelle debunked the opinion of Rodica s
"well-meaning lawyer friends" that the withdrawal of the RTC case "absolve[d] all defendants from any wrong-
doing" and made "the contents of her original complaint practically meaningless." Atty. Almario and Atty.
Espejo opined that since the dismissal of Rodica s complaint was based on her failure to state a cause of
action and without prejudice, the same may simply be re-filed by revising her complaint and ensuring that it
states a cause of action.
As argued by Atty. Manuel, he and his lawyers only acted in the best interest of their client Strong and
rendered services in accordance with the latter s objective of leaving the country and not being deported to
Brazil. The Lazaro Law Office cannot be faulted for the dismissal of the RTC case because it had already been
28
dismissed even before the Lazaro Law Office was engaged to handle Strong s immigration case. Besides,
Rodica admittedly agreed to withdraw her RTC case to meet Apostol s condition and to make the property
marketable.
Apostol corroborated Atty. Manuel s statement in his Affidavit27 of July 21, 2011. He affirmed that he told
Rodica that he would only consider purchasing the Boracay property if it is cleared of any pending case so that
he can protect himself, as a buyer, from any possible issues that may crop up involving the said property.
According to him, Rodica assured him that she would work for the termination of the RTC case and consult her
lawyers in Boracay on the matter so she could already sell the property.
It is difficult to imagine that Rodica was deceived by some of the respondent lawyers into believing that the
withdrawal of the RTC case was only the initial step in the settlement of her differences with her
adversaries.28 We went over the said Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw the Motion for
Reconsideration29 and we note that paragraph 6 thereof specifically states:Ï‚Î·Î±Ã±rÎ¿blÎµÅ¡ Î½Î¹râ€ Ï…Î±l lÎ±Ï
‰ lÎ¹brÎ±rÃ¿
6. However, the Plaintiff respectfully manifests that after much serious thought and deliberation, and
considering the anxieties caused by the pendency of the instant case, Plaintiff is no longer interested in
pursuing the case. Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully moves for the withdrawal of the Motion for
Reconsideration dated April 14, 2011 of the Order dated March 29, 2011 dismissing the instant Complaint filed
on April 18, 2011.30Ï‚rÎ½ll
As already noted by the RTC, Branch 6, Kalibo, Aklan in its Order31 dated April 4, 2011, in the case for
recovery of possession with damages:32Ï‚Î·Î±Ã±rÎ¿blÎµÅ¡ Î½Î¹râ€ Ï…Î±l lÎ±Ï‰ lÎ¹brÎ±rÃ¿
This Manifestation was signed by plaintiff, her Manila lawyers and Atty. Joan Ibutnande, plaintiff s counsel on
record. From the statements made by plaintiff in her Manifestation to Withdraw Motion for Reconsideration that
she had made serious thoughts and deliberation she cannot now say that she was manipulated and forced in
signing the same. The Court perceives plaintiff to be an intelligent woman not to be swayed of her principles
and beliefs and manipulated by others, she may have a fickle mind when it comes to other things but definitely
it can not be applied to the Court.
The Court does not see the connection between the instant case and that of William Strong as alleged by the
plaintiff. Mr. Strong is not a party in this case, even plaintiff s counsel thought so too. From the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by Atty. Joan Ibutnande, it was stated in paragraph 5: "That the undersigned counsel
was baffled as she did not see any connection [between] the incident surrounding the arrest of Mr. William
Strong and the above-entitled case filed [by] the [plaintiff], and told the plaintiff about it x x x." As Mr. Strong is
not a party in the instance case, his affairs whatever they are can not dictate the outcome of this case.33Ï‚rÎ½ll
Moreover, it would appear from her own narration that Rodica is not someone who is naÃ¯ve or ignorant. In
her complaint, she claimed to be an astute businesswoman who even has some business in Barcelona,
Spain.34 Thus, the more reason we cannot lend credence to her claim that she was tricked into believing that
the withdrawal of the RTC case was only preliminary to the complete settlement of all her differences with her
perceived adversaries. If such had been the agreement, then a Compromise Agreement enumerating all the
terms and conditions should have been filed instead of the Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw the Motion
for Reconsideration. In addition, the withdrawal should not have been limited to the RTC case as it appears
that there are other cases pending with other tribunals and agencies35 involving the same parties. If Rodica is
to be believed, then these cases should likewise have been dismissed in order to achieve the full and complete
settlement of her concerns with her adversaries.
From the above and by preponderance of evidence, it is clear that Rodica s purpose in withdrawing the RTC
case is to pave the way for Apostol to purchase the Boracay property. In fact, Rodica eventually executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Apostol over the Boracay property.36Ï‚rÎ½ll
Rodica s claim of paying more than P7
million to the Lazaro Law Office is not
substantiated.
29
There is likewise no merit in Rodica s allegation that the Lazaro Law Office extorted from her more than P7
million for alleged professional and legal fees and penalties relative to Strong s immigration case. To support
her claim, Rodica attached four statements of account issued by the Lazaro Law Office for US$2,650.00 under
Statement of Account No. 13837,37 US$2,400.00 under Statement of Account No. 13838,38 US$1,550.00 under
Statement of Account No. 1383939 and US$8,650.00 under Statement of Account No. 13835,40 or for a total
amount of US$15,250.00. She likewise presented photocopies of portions of her dollar savings account
passbook to show where the aforesaid funds came from.
Considering the prevailing exchange rate at that time, the Court notes that the sum total of the
abovementioned figures in its peso equivalent is far less than P7 million. In fact, the statements of account
even support the contention of Atty. Manuel that Strong failed to fully pay the amount of US$100,000.00 as
success fee. Anent the alleged withdrawals from Rodica s dollar savings account, the same merely established
that she made those withdrawals. They do not constitute as competent proof that the amounts so withdrawn
were indeed paid to Lazaro Law Office.
Rodica was not the client of the Lazaro
Law Office.
Rodica also faulted the Lazaro Law Office lawyers for disclaiming that she is their client. However, Rodica
admitted in paragraph 5 of her unnotarized Sworn Affidavit41 that Atty. Manuel and his lawyer-assistants were
"engaged by William Strong to handle his case with the Philippine immigration authorities." Thus, this Court is
more inclined to believe that the Lazaro Law Office agreed to handle only the deportation case of Strong and
such acceptance cannot be construed as to include the RTC case. In fact, all the billings of Lazaro Law Office
pertained to the immigration case, and not to the RTC case. To reiterate, the RTC case has nothing to do with
Strong s deportation case. Records also show that the RTC case was filed long before Strong was arrested
and detained. In fact, it had already been dismissed by the trial court long before Strong engaged the legal
services of the Lazaro Law Office. More importantly, Strong is not a party to the RTC case. Also, the counsel of
record of Rodica in the RTC case is Atty. Ibutnande, and not the Lazaro Law Office. There is nothing on record
that would show that respondent Attys. Manuel, Michelle, and Almario had any participation therein.
Atty. Espejo s participation in the RTC
case.
However, we cannot say the same as regards Atty. Espejo. He admitted drafting Rodica s Manifestation and
Motion to Withdraw Motion for Reconsideration indicating therein the firm name of the Lazaro Law Office as
well as his name and the names of Atty. Manuel and Atty. Michelle without the knowledge and consent of his
superiors, and in likewise affixing his signature thereon.
Atty. Espejo acknowledged committing the abovementioned acts as a way of assisting Rodica who had already
become his close friend. Atty. Espejo s admissions are as follows:Ï‚Î·Î±Ã±rÎ¿blÎµÅ¡ Î½Î¹râ€ Ï…Î±l lÎ±Ï‰
lÎ¹brÎ±rÃ¿
11. Atty. Espejo further recounts that after being advised to simply withdraw her Motion for Reconsideration
("MR"), Rodica pleaded with Atty. Espejo to prepare the documents required to be filed with the RTC x x x to
spare her Boracay lawyers from preparing the same. Atty. Espejo accommodated Jasper and drafted the
Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw Motion for Reconsideration ("Motion to Withdraw MR") to be given to
Rodica s Boracay counsel, Atty. Joan I. Tabanar-Ibutnande, who is in a better position to evaluate the merit of
the withdrawal of the MR.
11.1. Upon seeing Atty. Espejo s initial draft, Rodica requested Atty. Espejo to include x x x the name of the
Lazaro Law Office as signatory allegedly to give more credence and weight to the pleading and to show the
defendants in the RTC case her sincere intention to terminate the case.
Due to Rodica s pleas and insistence, Atty. Espejo, who among all lawyers of the Lazaro Law Office, became
the most familiar and "chummy" with Rodica, agreed to include the Lazaro Law Office and put his name as the
signatory for the Office. Still not satisfied, Rodica pleaded with Atty. Espejo to further revise the Motion to
Withdraw MR to include the names of Atty. Manuel and Atty. Michelle as signatories and represented that she
herself will cause them to sign it. Relying on Rodica s representations that she would speak to Atty. Manuel
about the matter, Atty. Espejo obliged to include the name of Atty. Michelle and Atty. Manuel. Rodica
repeatedly reminded Atty. Espejo not to bother Atty. Manuel on the matter and that she herself will take it up
with Atty. Manuel at the proper time.
30
11.2 Atty. Espejo has a soft heart. He signed the pleading only with good intentions of helping and assisting
Rodica, the common law wife of a client, whom he had learned to fancy because of being constantly together
and attending to her. He never thought ill of Rodica and believed her when she said she would speak to Atty.
Lazaro about the matter as represented. Atty. Espejo only agreed to sign the pleading for purposes of
withdrawing Rodica s MR to attain Rodica s purpose or desired result and objective to convince or facilitate the
sale to Apostol and/or to make the property more marketable to interested buyers and to attain peace with the
defendants in the RTC case. Evidently, Rodica took advantage of Atty. Espejo s youth and naivete and
manipulated him to do things on her behalf, and deliberately excluded Atty. Almario the senior lawyer. Rodica
preferred to discuss matters with Atty. Espejo than with Atty. Almario as the latter often contradicts her views.
Atty. Espejo apologized to Atty. Manuel for allowing himself to be manipulated by Rodica.42Ï‚rÎ½ll
At the outset, Atty. Espejo was well aware that Rodica was represented by another counsel in the RTC case.
As a practicing lawyer, he should know that it is the said counsel, Atty. Ibutnande, who has the duty to prepare
the said motion. In fact, he himself stated that it is Atty. Ibutnande who is in a better position to evaluate the
merit of the withdrawal of the Motion for Reconsideration.
Atty. Espejo s claim that he drafted and signed the pleading just to extend assistance to Rodica deserves scant
consideration. It is true that under Rules 2.01 and 2.02, Canon 2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a
lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons, the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed, and in such
cases, even if he does not accept a case, shall not refuse to render legal advise to the person concerned if
only to the extent necessary to safeguard the latter s right. However, in this case, Rodica cannot be considered
as defenseless or oppressed considering that she is properly represented by counsel in the RTC case.
Needless to state, her rights are amply safeguarded. It would have been different had Rodica not been
represented by any lawyer, which, however, is not the case.
Moreover, the Court wonders why Atty. Espejo, knowing fully well that Rodica is not their law firm s client and
without the knowledge and consent of his superiors, gave in to Rodica s request for him to indicate in the said
motion the names of his law firm, Atty. Manuel and Atty. Michelle for the purpose of "giving more weight and
credit to the pleading." As a member of the bar, Atty. Espejo ought to know that motions and pleadings filed in
courts are acted upon in accordance with their merit or lack of it, and not on the reputation of the law firm or the
lawyer filing the same. More importantly, he should have thought that in so doing, he was actually assisting
Rodica in misrepresenting before the RTC that she was being represented by the said law firm and lawyers,
when in truth she was not.
It is well to remind Atty. Espejo that before being a friend to Rodica, he is first and foremost an officer of the
court.43 Hence, he is expected to maintain a high standard of honesty and fair dealings and must conduct
himself beyond reproach at all times.44 He must likewise ensure that he acts within the bounds of reason and
common sense, always aware that he is an instrument of truth and justice.45 As shown by his actuations. Atty.
Espejo fell short of what is expected of him. Under the circumstances, Atty. Espejo should have exercised
prudence by first diligently studying the soundness of Rodica s pleas and the repercussions of his acts.
We note that on August 5, 2011, or even before the filing of the disbarment complaint, Atty. Espejo already
caused the filing of his Motion to Withdraw Appearance46 before the RTC. Therein, Atty. Espejo already
expressed remorse and sincere apologies to the RTC for wrongly employing the name of the Lazaro Law
Office. Considering that Atty. Espejo is newly admitted to the Bar (2010), we deem it proper to warm him to be
more circumspect and prudent in his actuations.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Complaint for disbarment against respondents Atty. Manuel
"Lolong" M. Lazaro, Atty. Edwin M. Espejo, Atty. Abel M. Almario, Atty. Michelle B. Lazaro and Atty. Joseph C.
Tan is DISMISSED. Atty. Edwin M. Espejo is WARNED to be more circumspect and prudent in his actuations.
SO ORDERED.
31
8. BENGCO VS BERNARDO
Fidela Bengco and Teresita Bengco, Complainants, v. Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo, Respondent
A.C. No. 6368, 13 June 2012
Facts:
Fidela Bengco and Teresita Bengco filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Pablo S.
Bernardo for deceit, malpractice, conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar, and violation of duties
and oath as a lawyer. From 15 April 1997 to 22 July 1997, the respondent – with the connivance of
Andres Magat – willfully and illegally committed fraudulent act with intent to defraud against the
complainants by using false pretenses and deceitful words to the effect that he would expedite the
titling of land belonging to the Miranda Family of Tagaytay City, who are the acquaintance of the
complainants.
It started when the respondent convinced the complainants to finance and deliver to him PhP
495,000.00 as advanced money to expedite the titling of the subject land. He further committed
misrepresentation by presenting himself as the lawyer of William Gatchalian, the prospective buyer of
the land. He also led complaints to believe that he has contracts at NAMRIA, DENR, CENRO and the
Register of Deeds which representation he well knew were false, fraudulent and were only made to
induce the complainants to give and deliver the said amount. Upon receipt of the money, he did not
comply with his obligation to expedite the titling of the land but instead use the money for personal
use. The complainants demanded the return of the money to no avail.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent violated the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR)?
Held:
The Supreme Court held that the respondent committed the acts complained of. He, himself,
admitted in his answer that his legal services were hired by the complainants through Magat
regarding the purported titling of land supposedly purchase. He used his position as a lawyer in order
to deceive the complainants into believing that he can expedite the titling of the subject properties. He
never denied that he did not benefit from the money given by the complainants in the amount of PhP
495,000.00.
The Supreme Court find the respondent in violation of the Rule 2.03, Canon 2 and Rule 3.01,
Canon 3 of the CPR. The respondent was suspended from practice of law for one year and return the
amount of PhP 200,000.00 to Fidela Bengco and Teresita Bengco with 10 days upon receipt of
decision. The respondent is required to submit to the Supreme Court proof of compliance.
32
9. CATALAN VS SILVOSA
Facts:
Thee Sandiganbayan convicted Atty. Silvosa for direct bribery for bribing his then colleague prosecut
or.
Attyy Silvosa claimed that “it is not the lawyer in respondent that was convicted, but his capacity as a
public officer, the charge against respondent for which he was convicted falling under the category of
crimes against public officers.
Issue: won Atty. Silvosa should be disbarred considering that the crime for which he was convicted w
as in his capacity as public officer.

Ruling:
Yes.
Disbarment follows as a consequence of Atty. Silvosa’s conviction of the crime.
His excuse that his conviction was not in his capacity as a lawyer, but as a public officer, is unaccepta
ble and betrays the unmistakable lack of integrity in his character. The practice of law is a privilege, a
nd Atty. Silvosa has proved himself unfit to exercise this privilege.
Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa was DISBARRED.
33

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A.

THE LAWYER AND SOCIETY

1. SPS CONCEPCION VS ATTY. DELA ROSA

Check No. Date Amount Payee

0000561925 03-23-06 P750,000.00 Elmer dela Rosa

0000561926 03-23-06 P850,000.00 Elmer dela Rosa

0000561927 03-23-06 P900,000.00 Elmer dela Rosa

engaged for that specific purpose.19chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Court’s Ruling

2. PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COURT EMPLOYEES V ATTY EDNA DIAZ

3. ATTY. ALONSO VS ATTY. RELAMIDA

This Decision shall be immediately executory.

4. OVERGAARD VS ATTY. VALDEZ

respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

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