t CHAPTER 1 Introduction I, GENERAL NOTION OF METAPHYSICS + IN philosophic idiom the word metaphysics de- notes the higher branch of philosophy, the part that seeks after the most basic principles of things, their ultimate ground and nature. The word itself was first suggested by ‘Andronicus of Rhodes (2nd century B.C.), the first redactor of Aristotle's complete works. Under the heading of Meta ta Phusika (lit. “after the Physcals”) Andronicus placed a group of fourteen books (long “chapters,” in modern de- scription) whose content seemed to follow logically after the books of the Physics. Yet Aristotle himself had never spoken of these fourteen books or of their content as “meta- physics” but always as “first philosophy” or as “theology.” ‘The proper object of metaphysics, or its special reference of inquiry, in Aristotelian thought is, we shall see, being as being together with its properties. But the proper object, or at east this determination of it, is not clearcut from the outset; indeed, a first survey of the Metaphysics reveals what amounts to three successive conceptions of the science,2 Philosophy of St. Thomas: Metaphysics yet on the face of it there is no firm indication how they are to be integrated. St. Thomas, who accepts the Aristote- lian view of the proper object, was aware that the threefold conception lay, or so it seemed, unresolved and went to some pains to clarify it; which he does in the Prologue to his Commentary. Among the points made are these: First, in contrast to other sciences, which explore only the more immediate principles and causes, metaphysics stands forth as the science of first causes and first principles. This definition echoes the general notion of science, for in the Aristotelian tra- dition it is axiomatic that science, all true science, consists in knowledge through causes: cognitio per causas. It is from this point of view that metaphysics is properly called “first philoso- phy,” the conception that predominates in Book A of Aristotle's treatise, Secondly, metaphysics can also be envisioned as the science of being as being and of the attributes (or properties) of being as being, a view of the science which points to the comprehen- siveness of its object. Unlike other sciences, each of which con- siders only a particular province of being, metaphysics, the science of being as being, embraces all being. ‘This conception is developed in Book r and appears to be upheld in the sequel. It is the conception which corresponds to the word “metaphysics” in its proper sense, ‘Thirdly, metaphysics can be defined as the science of the im- mobile (i.e. the motionless or unchanging) and the separate (i. from matter). In this it differs from the philosophy of nature or physics in the Aristotelian sense and from mathematics; for the proper object of these sciences always retains some mode of materiality. Moreover, among beings that are separate (ie. free) from matter must be reckoned God, who is indeed furthest removed. Consequently, metaphysics understood as the science Introduction 3 of the separate includes the study of God and is not improperly spoken of as “theology,” the conception that preponderates in Book B and thereafter. St. Thomas’ Prologue is, however, too important to be dismissed with passing summary; it should be read clear through with close attention. Note especially his analysis of the primacy that metaphysics enjoys among the sciences. Metaphysics, he observes, governs and dicects all other sciences, and this in virtue of the principle that the most intellectual science is the ruling science. But then, why should metaphysics be the most intellectual science? The answer is because its object are the “most intelligibles,” beings and modes of being of the highest intelligibility. This notion “most intelligible” admits, however, of a three- fold sense; and thereby hangs the threefold conception. For the explanation, here is St. Thomas himself: First, [“most intelligible” can be understood) from the view- point of the order of knowing; for those things from which the intellect derives certitude seem to be more intelligible. ‘There- fore, since the certitude of science is acquired by the intellect knowing causes, a knowledge of causes seems to be intellectual in the highest degree, Hence that science which considers fist causes also seems to be the ruler of the others in the highest degree. Second, this phrase can be understood by comparing the intellect with the senses; for while sensory perception is a Knowledge of particulars, the intellect seems to differ from sense by reason of the fact that it comprehends universals. Hence that science is pre-eminently intellectual which deak with the most universal principles. These principles are being and those things which naturally accompany being, such as unity and plurality,4 Philosophy of St. Thomas: Metaphysics potency and act. Now such principles should not remain en- tirely undetermined, since without them a complete knowledge of the principles which are proper to any genus or species can- not be had, Nor again should they be dealt with in any one particular science, for, since a knowledge of each class of beings stands in need of these principles, they would with equal reason be investigated in every particular science. It follows, then, that such principles be treated by one common science, which, since it is intellectual in the highest degree, will govern the others. ‘Third, this phrase can be understood from the viewpoint of the intellect’s own knowledge. For since each thing has intellec- tive power by virtue of being free from matter, those things must be intelligible in the highest degree which are altogether separate from matter. . . . Now those things are separate from matter in the highest degree which abstract not only from signate matter . . . but from sensible matter altogether; and these are separate from matter not only in their intelligible con- stitution [ratio], as the objects of mathematics, but also in being, as God and the intelligences [spirits]. ‘Therefore the science which considers such things seems to be the most intellectual and the ruler and master of the others ‘These, then, are the various aspects to metaphysics: sci- ence of first principles and first causes (which is to say, wisdom), science of being as being, and science of what is utterly separate from matter. Our next step will be to ex- amine these formulations in some detail, and thus provide a better understanding of the underlying notion in each case. To this end we shall, among other things, trace their development in Greek thought and observe how they align * Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, Prologue. English Gitations from this Commentary will be, throughout the present volume, in the translation of John P. Rowan, published in two vol- umes by Henry Regnery Company: Chicago, 1961. (Copyright Henry Regnery Company, 1961) Introduction 5 themselves with the course of that thought as a whole, So doing, we shall be reminded that Aristotle is not without ancestry, that though his metaphysical accomplishment is a triumph of discovery and elaboration in its own right, it may also be seen as the culminating synthesis of a meta- physical enterprise stretching back three centuries before him. Il, METAPHYSICS AS WISDOM 1. General Notion of Wisdom In the first book of the Metaphysics * Aristotle recounts the most commonly accepted notions regarding the quali- ties of philosophical wisdom. Thus, wisdom is thought to be the most universal (ie, the most inclusive) science, and the most difficult, and the most deserving of being taught. Aistotle does not cast these notions aside, but to him the truest characteristic of wisdom is this: it is science of first causes and first principles. Pursuing this thought, he ob- serves that man has an inborn curiosity about things, a natural desire to know their causes, and this desire is not satisfied until the ultimate cause is reached, beyond which no other is to be found and which must therefore be self- sufficing. Whatever science delivers the ultimate explana- tions, which is to say the ultimate or first causes, that science is wisdom, And since metaphysics does this, it is rightfully called wisdom, 2. The Several Kinds of Wisdom a) ‘The notion of wisdom is as little the exclusive property of Atistotelianism as it is of Christianity. Every philusoph- ical system worthy of the name purports to be wisdom, Yet * Metaph. A, 2.6 Philosophy of St. Thomas; Metaphysics there are wide differences within philosophical wisdom itself, depending on the goal pursued and the means and method employed* In earliest Greek usage the word “wisdom” (sophia) had a decidedly utilitarian connotation, being synonymous with skill or excellence in any craft. So, Polycleitus was wise be- cause of his exceptional competence as sculptor. But “sophia” also meant a certain mastery in the conduct of one’s life. In this superior sense Socrates speaks of it. Wise, he said, is he who knowing himself well, knows how to govern himself truly. Plato, making the moral heritage of Socrates his own, carried it a step further, acclaiming wis- dom the art of governing, by the norms of justice and prudence, not merely oneself but the whole city or state. Philosopher of the Ideas, Plato went on to discover new paths to wisdom for the human soul. By its intellectual element called Nous, this soul was said to be in com- munication with the true realities, those same intelligible forms or Ideas pinnacled by the Good, highest of them all. Wisdom, by this stroke, assimilates to theoria or contempla- tion—contemplation of the Ideas and, in the final phase, of God. Aristotle and Plotinus, the most eminent disciples of Plato, followed their master in seizing upon and espous- ing this intellectual ascent toward the highest being. All told, then, among its most dedicated followers and within + Indeed, as the author suggests, not only does one philosophical system differ from another, but within the same system one branch ‘may differ greatly from another in intention, in manner of demon- stration, in degree of certitude attainable, etc. Tt is on these and similar counts that speculative philosophy, to take a broad example, differs from practical philosophy and that each of these divisions admits of differences within itself —Translator’s note. Introduction 7 the limits placed on sole human access, philesophic wisdom did espy its true source and principle. But one essential continued to elude it; for though this wisdom had dis- cerned, however dimly, the path to God, it was and re- mained ignorant of the means to secure him effectively. In the Judeo-Christian revelation, contemplation of God is likewise the ultimate goal of wisdom, but there is a com- plete turnabout of perspective. No longer is wisdom to be attained from below as by mere human effort. It issues from above, from heaven. In short, it is salvation, bestowed by God at his pleasure and through his grace, Wisdom in this light is from its very inception something that exceeds philosophy, though even under the sovereignty of grace it is perfectly possible for an authentic philosophic wisdom to be constituted. Squarely opposed, however, to the wisdora that is God's dispensation is that attitude which the gospel labels the wisdom “of this world,” warming us against it. Basically, this consists in the refusal of the transcendent, of anything that is not authored by man himselE. It betrays itself in the studied determination to administer all the affairs of the world along sccularistic lines, with no thcught to supra- mundane man and his wants, To the Christian this is, of course, no more than the pretense of wisdom, false and de- ceitful, like the ideals its professes. b) In the foregoing paragraphs we spoke of wisdom from an historical aspect. Considering it doctrinally, or as to con- tent, we find that St. Thomas together with Catholic theologians in general, acknowledges three possible forms of wisdom for the human soul, wisdoms which, though essentially different, are not opposed to each other but8 Philosophy of St. Thomas: Metaphysics related in hierarchical fashion, They are: infused wisdom (gift of the Holy Ghost), theology, and metaphysics, which differ each from the other on two counts; for each has its special light of understanding and cach its own formal object. By infused wisdom the soul judges in the light of con- natural knowledge, connatural by grace with God’s ‘knowledge; its foundation is the love that is charity (in the gospel sense), and its object is God as he is in himself but attained through a suprahuman mode of acting, or rather of being acted on. Theological wisdom is, like the preced- ing, under the rule of supernatural faith, and its object is also God as he is in himself; but its immediate foundation is revelation and not charity, and its mode of activity is essentially the human mode of reason, Metaphysics, on the other hand, is a purely human wisdom; its only light is natural reason, and though it also secks to know God the supreme principle of things, it knows him only as inferred cause (hence indirectly), and not as he is in himself (as an object directly apprehended). Christian thought knows of yet another meaning for wisdom when it uses the term to designate that essential attribute of God which is his substantial Wisdom and which the theology of the Blessed Trinity refers to the Person of the Son. This Wisdom, it should be noted, is the common origin of the three wisdoms spoken of above, which enlighten the human soul in ascending manner and measure; it is also, and for that very reason, the principle by which, in the last analysis, each finds itself in perfect ac- cord with the other. Far from being opposed, therefore, the three wisdoms accessible to the Christian complement each Introduction 9 other in perfect harmony, and for a man to be most truly wise is to grow unceasingly in all three of them; for each is a participation, one more perfect than the other, in that highest wisdom which is God's own measure and mani- festation of the universe. 3. Wisdom, Science, and Understanding Having spoken, though but broadly, of wisdom as to its object or content, we have now to consider it from the standpoint of the subject, the person possessing it. Also brought up for review, by way of comparison, will be the allied notions of science and understanding. Taken in its subject, wisdom according to St. ‘Thomas is a habitus or virtue of the intellect. Since any virtue is a per- fection, this one is a perfection of intellect. And in what does this perfection consist? In making it possible for the intellect to perform its activity, or at least same part of its activity, with ease and exactitude. Here a few words on the basic classification of virtues will be in order. According to Aristotelian doctrine human virtues are of two general kinds: moral virtues, which reside in and perfect the appetitive powers; and intellectual vir- tues, which reside in and perfect the intellect. Our present concem is with the intellectual virtues. Of these according to Aristotle,‘ and St, Thomas agrees there are five distinct species. Three of them—science, understanding, and wis- dom—pertain to the speculative intellect; the other two— prudence and art—to the practical intellect. If, then, along with wisdom there are two other virtues (‘abitus) of the + Cf, Ethica Nie. Book VI. ® C£. Summa theol. Ia Hae, q. §7, 28. 2~4.10 Philosophy of St. Thomas: Metaphysics speculative intellect, namely science and understanding, in what do they differ? ‘The answer lies in the following considerations. ‘The proper perfection of the speculative intellect is the true, which may, however, he attained in two ways: either as known in itself, immediately (per se notum), or as known in another, mediately (per aliud notum). Keeping this distinction in mind, we go a step further. ‘What is known in itself is by way of a principle (as against a conclusion) and, to repeat, is grasped immediately by the intellect. To this end the intellect is perfected by the virtue called intellectus or understanding.* On the other hand, what is known in another is in the nature of a terminus (as against a principle or starting-point). Here again we find two possibilities. Either the truth that is known stands as term or conclusion of a particular branch of knowledge, in which case the intellect is perfected by the virtue called science; or the truth in question represents the ultimate term of all human knowledge, in which case the intellect is perfected by the virtue called wisdom. Wisdom, accordingly, is a habitus (virtue or quality) which perfects the speculative intellect. But this does not yet distinguish it from the other speculative intellectual virtues, science and understanding, What is unique to wis- dom is that it perfects the intellect in its quest of knowl- edge that is absolutely universal, the quest to proceed from principles and reasons which in their own order are ultimate or highest—“in their own order,” because theological wis- dom, for example, uses different principles and reasons from © This use of “understan more popular sense of “ ig” should not be confused with the iseemment” or “comprehension.”—[Tr.] Introduction a metaphysical wisdom. One important conclusion to be drawn from all this is the following. If science, as an intel- lectual virtue, pertains to a particular branch of knowledge and there are many such branches, or at least more than one, obviously there can be more than one intellectual virtue of science; but of wisdom, which judges of things universally, there can be but one virtue urder the same formal light, be this reason, revelation, or divine infusion, Further questions, however, suggest themselves, to which we shall next give attention, a) Is it correct to draw an irreducible distinction, as we have done, between wisdom on the one hard and science and understanding on the other? There are really two, if not three, questions involved here. For one, wisdom is said to explain things through their causes; but so does science, which in general is defined as knowledge through causes. Is wisdom, then, a science? The answer is yes, if we take science in the more general sense of knowledge through ‘causes; no, if we apply the term strictly, which limits science to one of the intellectual virtues explained above.* Secondly, for the knowledge of first principles St. ‘Thomas, as we have seen, posits a separate virtue called intellectus, generally rendered “understanding.” Is such a separate virtue necessary or justified, considering that the principles in question must also be known by science and wisdom, since all their reasoning is based or. them, Never- theless, the distinction between understanding on one side and science and wisdom on the other is not thereby erased; for they do not know the principles in exzctly the same "CE, Summa theol. Ia Uae, q. 575. 2, ad 1.12 Philosophy of St. Thomas: Metaphysics way. The virtue of understanding is reserved for the pure apprehension of the principles, no account taken of their application; whereas by science and wisdom the principles are apprehended in their relation to the truths which flow from and depend on them. But this answer casts up another doubt. If, in other words, the virtue of wisdom holds its basic principles from understanding, which grasps them in themselves, it would seem that wisdom is not, after all, the highest of the in- tellectual virtues. St. Thomas, in reply, notes that wisdom is in a privileged position as regards first principles; it not only knows and uses them, as does every science, but to it falls the higher function of evaluating and defending them against their critics. As knowledge of conclusions (rather than principles) wisdom resembles the intellectual virtue of science, yet is higher than science because its conclusions are of a higher order; whereas in declaring and defending, and not simply knowing, the first principles wisdom excels, the mere habit of the principles, or understanding. Wisdom, in fine, is the highest intellectual virtue.” b) Is wisdom purely speculative, or is it also practical? Generally speaking, the present tendency is to attribute both qualities to wisdom, namely, to regard it as at once speculative (knowledge for its own sake) and practical (knowledge regulating conduct). St. Thomas, for whom the matter is not quite so simple, answers as follows. Wisdom that is directly under the rule of faith is both speculative and practical; it establishes both the order of knowledge and the order of human activity. Such is the * Cf. ibid. ad 2, ° CE. Summa theol. Ia Tae, q. 66, a. 5, ad 4. Introduction a3 wisdom that is the gift of the Holy Ghost."* Such, too, is supernatural theology, for though primarily speculative, it is also a practical science." Metaphysics, on the other hand, is by Aristotelian tradition placed among the purely specu- lative virtues. Indeed, Aristotle himself sddom if ever passes an opportunity to underscore its utterly disinterested character, always grouping it with physics and mathematics to form the triad of theoretical (j.¢. speculative) sciences, which differ by their end from the practical sciences.” Supreme theoretical wisdom of the natural order, meta- physics in short is a purely speculative, meaning contem- plative, science—not, you remember, the virtue “science,” but in the more general sense of knowledge through causes. c) The proper acts of wisdom, St. Thomas regularly refers two types of intellectual acts to wisdom, viz. to judge and to order. As he remarks on numerous occasions, ad sapientem pertinet judicare et ordinare, “to the wise man does it belong to judge and to order.” How are we to understand this judging and this ordering? ‘The “judgment” in question, to speak of this first, is not just any kind but one that is enunciated by the intellect on the highest evidence, ultimately on the evidence of the supreme principles; it is a judgment of apical validity, a definitive determination of right order so final and authori- tative that there is no going beyond it. Similarly, while to order is in general to bring things in line with an end of one kind or another, in respect of 2 Cf, Summa theol. Ha Hae, 4. 45) a. 3. 3 GF Summa theol. a, 4. 1, 8. 4. CE Metaph. E, 114 Philosophy of St. Thomas: Metaphysics wisdom this end can only mean the highest one of all. Consequently, for a wise man to order consists in referring all things back to God. In its full application, moreover, to order is not only to discover or to contemplate an existing order but also to create an order by will and other powers of action, Nevertheless, the mere intellectual consideration of an existing order may also, in a modified sense, be re- garded as an “ordering,” since this consideration, too, involves the act of putting things in order, albeit the order is made in and for the intellect alone. It is in this limited sense that we should understand the ordering activity of metaphysics, which, as we have seen, is a purely speculative science. But practical or speculative, true wisdom will re- flect that ultimate judgment and ordering that is God's. 4. The Excellence of Wisdom For St. Thomas the excellence of a virtue is measured principally by the perfection of its object, of what comes within its proper purview. By this standard wisdom is clearly the most excellent of virtues, since it inquires of the highest of causes, which is God, and judges of all things in the light of this cause. In addition, because of its superior point of view—superior in virtue of its superior object—wisdom presides over the other intellectual virtues; these, accordingly, are subordinate to wisdom, falling as they do under its judgment and its power to order all things.** St. Thomas, it may be mentioned, notes some doubt as to this subordination, Man, runs the objection, can have more perfect knowledge of things human than of things divine, wisdom being concerned with the latter. But + CE, Summa theol. Ia Hae, q. 66, a. 5. Introduction 15 the objection does not hold, at least for St. Thomas, who replies that it is worthier to acquire what little knowledge is possible of higher things than a whole lot of knowledge of lesser realities."* Aristotle is of similar mind. Though in some respects he left the matter hovering, he was not unaware that first philosophy (metaphysics, hence wisdom) owesits excellence to the pre-eminence of its principles. He calls it, in fact, a divine science, having a divine object; but instead of its prerogative to judge and to order, he is more inclined to extol its privilege of being free and autonomous, existing, that is, for its own sake. “For just as we call that man free,” he remarks, “who exists for his own sake and not for the sake of another, so this science, too, is the only one of all the sciences that is free, since it alone exists for its own sake, Hence also there is some ground for regarding its possession beyond human power.” In the highest sense of the word the wise man is thus a free man, with all the superiority this freedom confers. But if wisdom makes a man free, it promises still more. ‘What these further rewards are may be seen from this passage of St. Thomas, in which he praises the quest of wisdom: Of all human pursuits, that of wisdom is the most perfect, the most sublime, the most profitable, the most delightful. Tt is the most perfect, since in proportion as a man devotes himself to the pursuit of wisdom, so much does he already share in true happiness, . . . It is the most sublime because thereby especially does man approach to a likeness to God, who made all things in ™ CF, ibid. ad 3. % Metaph. A, 2, 982 b 25-30.16 Philosophy of St. Thomas: Metaphysics wisdom (Ps. 103:24), . . . It is the most profitable, because by wisdom itself man is brought to the kingdom of immortality, ._. It is the most delightful because her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any tediousness, but joy and glad- ness (Wis. 8:16) Doubtless, this encomium of the Angelic Doctor's, in which breathes his own enraptured soul, is not borne out in full except by wisdom founded on divine revelation; but measure for measure it finds fulfillment in metaphysical wisdom, too, the highest knowledge this side of revelation." III. METAPHYSICS AS THE SCIENCE OF WHAT IS SEPARATE FROM MATTER 1. Origins of the Doctrine of Separation Metaphysics, we have said, may also be understood as the science of what is utterly separate, or devoid of matter. Like many another doctrine in Greek thought, this one of separation, or distinguishing mind and matter, evolved gradually through a long line of philosophical thinkers. Its classical formulation in Aristotle represents, therefore, the efflorescence of an idea whose roots ran at least as far back as Anaxagoras, the first, or so it is commonly accepted, to put forth a separation, that is, distinction of mind from matter. It should be noted, however, that the Nous he proposes for meditation is not yet clearly differentiated * Contra Gentiles, I, 2. 1 CE, Text I, “The Prerogatives of Metaphysics,” p. 238. On the general theme of wisdom, in particular its developments in modern. philosophy, the reader could profitably consult Dr. James D, Collins’ i962. Marquette University Aquinas Tectare, namely The Lure of Wisdom (Milwaukee: The Marquette University Press, 1962); also, in the same series, Professor Gilson’s 1951 Lecture, Wisdom and Love in St. Thomas Aquinas —[Tr.] Introduction ay from corporeal objects, nor is its influence on these objects sharply defined, Still, a first step was taken by him toward the separation from matter of an element of being that lay beyond matter. With Plato the separation is decisive. The world of Ideas he postulated is a world of realities without so much as the shadow of matter attaching to them. For him, the Ideas were the necessary answer to the problem of intel- lectual knowledge. They alone, as he saw it, provided the intellect with the kind of object that could guarantee its Knowledge, for they varied not at all but were permanent, and permanently self-identical. So that only knowledge pertaining to the Ideas deserved the name of science; all else was opinion, shifting and ephemeral. Plato, it may be said in passing, was quite correct as to the kind of object the intellect must have, but whether this objest must exist in separation from matter, that is something else again. Aristotle, for one, did not think so, Though agreeing that scientific knowledge calls for a principle of stability and necessity, identified by Plato with the Idea, Aristotle did not seek this principle in a separate entity but, truer to experience, found it in material reality itse!f, namely in substantial form, Corporeal things, then, are not just mat- ter; they are matter and form. For all that, however, Aristotle did not repudiate the doctrine of separate sub- stances—substances, that is, without any mat‘er whatever. Moreover, in his theory of knowledge Aristotle is at one with Plato on the insistence that to be incelligible the object must be abstracted (taken away, somehow) from matter. For him as for Plato, the intellect is a spiritual faculty; directly (as against indirectly) it can only know the “quiddity” of corporeal things; which is to say, the essence18 Philosophy of St. Thomas: Metaphysics abstracted from matter. Consistent, also, with the spirit of Plato, and indeed implied in the principle of abstraction, is this other thought of Aristotle’s, that an object is in- telligible in proportion to its liberation from matter; the more immaterial it is, the more it is intelligible in itself— in itself, because not necessarily to every intellect. All of which St. ‘Thomas will capsule in the assertion that the foundation, the essential condition, of intellection is im- materiality. As intimated, however, not all immateriality, which is to say not all abstraction from matter, is of the same degree. This brings us to the next heading, where, in particular, the immateriality proper to metaphysics should be noted. 2. The Three Degrees of Abstraction ‘Within the complex of speculative science Aristotle distinguishes three types or degrees of immateriality in the objects of knowledge and, correlatively, in the intellectual operations proportioned to the objects. These degrees corre- spond to the threefold classification of speculative science into physical, mathematical, and metaphysical, a classifi- cation traditionally accepted. Now, how does one degree differ from another? It differs according to the objective matter or material conditions left behind by the intellect in the abstractive process, or inversely, according to the matter and material conditions retained in the definitions 18 St, Thomas, of course, as well as Aristotle knew that immateri- ality is the condition of ail knowledge, sense knowledge included. For some helpful remarks on the meaning of “immateriality” in this context the reader may consult the anthor's Psychology (Vol. III of the present series), pp. 99-101; trans. by John A. Otto (St. Louis: B, Herder Book Co., 1956)—{Tr.] Introduction 19 which govern demonstration in a given science. The de- tailed analysis of this doctrine rests, however, with psy- chology or, perhaps more properly, with logic—major logic, that is, not infrequently identified with epistemology. ‘We shall therefore content ourselves with a summarization. On the level of physical science the intellect abstracts from matter so far as it is the principle of individuation, hence from individual or signate matter (materia signata); but matter is retained so far as it is the basis of sensible qualities. It is therefore called sensible or common matter (materia sensibilis vel communis). Since qualities, which are retained, are changeable or mobile, by that very fact is retained the changeability or mobility of things. In the second or mathematical degree, abstraction is made of the aforesaid common sensible matter, but kept under con- sideration is material substance as quantified, which in the ‘Aristotelian tradition goes by the name “intelligible mat- ter” (materia intelligibilis).” In metaphysics, on the other hand, the abstraction is Not that this “matter” is “immaterial,” as the unwary might erroneously take it from the appellative “intelligible.” However, the exegesis of the phrase “intelligible matter” would require an histori- cal excursus that cannot be undertaken here. Suffice it to say that in the context “intelligible” refers not so much to the intellect as to the imagination, so that we would not impair, and perhaps improve the sense of it if we said “imaginable matter,” matevia imaginabilis, i.e, matter as terminating in and known by the imagination, an inner sense, in contrast to matter as terminating in and known by the outer sense. Further elucidations of this notion of “intelligible matter” may bbe found in Charles De Koninck’s eminently perceptive article “Ab- straction from Matter (II),” Laval Théologique et Philosophique, XVI (1, 1960), pp. 63-69—[TF]20 Philosophy of St. Thomas: Metaphysics complete; abstracted, therefore, is all matter and motion of whatever kind, This degree of abstraction takes us into the realm of the utterly immaterial, which comprises both spiritual realities (God and the angels) and the primary concepts of being—being itself and the transcendentals, to mention the more obvious. The latter, that is, the primary concepts and the realities corresponding to them are inde- pendent or separate from matter in the sense that they need not be realized in corporeal things but are found as well in incorporeal or spiritual being. ‘The special character of metaphysical abstraction will be pointed out at some length in the next chapter, when we analyze the notion of being. It is well, though, to antici- pate a word of caution on the general subject of abstraction, and on metaphysical abstraction in particular, The intel- lect, we have said, attains in successive steps the three degrees of immateriality; but the activity by which it does this is not of a piece, or uniformly the same, as though the three steps were mere repetitions of the identical opera- tion. The three acts of abstraction are not homogeneous, though comparable—analogous is really the word. To over- look this is to lapse into superficiality, not to say into gross misconception. True, the degrees of abstraction have in common that each is a removal of matter from considera- tion, but the manner of removal as well as the extent differs from one degree to the next. In the case of meta- physics St. Thomas prefers not even to call it abstraction * For St. Thomas’ analysis of the degrees of abstraction see In VI Metaph. lect. 1, nos. 1156-1163; In Boet. de Trinitate, q. 5, 22.2, 33 Summa theol. Ta, q. 85, a. 1, ad 2. Introduction 21 but, more accurately, “separation,” a term he does not apply to the first and second degree.** ‘The word “separation” must not, however, lead us astray in another direction. When, in other words, meta- physics is said to be the science of the “separste” or, if one prefers, of the “abstract,” this does not imply that its object is divorced from real existence but only from the material conditions of existence. It could not be otherwise. Indeed, we shall see that the object of metaphysics is eminently real and conerete; so that far from being out of touch with reality, the metaphysician is in the full sense of the word more a realist than any of his fellows in the fraternity of scholars and scientists. And this is true whether he con- sides, under the aspect of being, the totality of things mate- rial and immaterial or whether, sectoring his horizon, he fixes attention on what is real above all because immaterial above all: pure spirits, that is, and infinitely above them, God. IV. METAPHYSICS AS THE SCIENCE OF BEING AS BEING In this, the third aspect which Aristotle’s metaphysics assumes, the accent is on the universality 0: the science. * CE, In Boet. de Trinitate, q. 5, a. 3. Also well worth reading in this connection is Maritain, Existence and the Existent (Doubleday Image paperback), pp. 37-42, with particular attention to note 14, ‘on the abstraction proper to metaphysics together with references to other works of his dealing with the degrees of abstraction. Existence and the Existent is translated by Lewis Galantiere and Gerald B. Phelan (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 3957)—[Tr]22 Philosophy of St. Thomas: Metaphysics ‘There are in philosophy certain notions that run through all its branches, the most common or universal notions, as they are called. For each branch to make a study of these notions would lead to fruitless as well as endless repetition. Yet they are too important to go unexamined; somewhere they must be submitted to careful analysis and interpreta tion, Logically as well as by general agreement this task falls to metaphysics, the science universal. 1. Historical Derivation of the Metaphysics of Being ‘Among the universal notions just referred to is that of being. In Aristotelian thought, however, this notion is not simply one of many; it is first and most fundamental, the one the intellect conceives before all others, What, it may be asked, moved Aristotle to accord the primacy to the notion of being? The question is not idle; it has to do with what is perhaps the most significant adoption in all his philosophy. And as with other positions adopted by Aris- totle, this one too had had a considerable history in Greek thought; so that once again it is in the speculations of his predecessors that Aristotle finds the direction his own thought will take. As far as can be determined, it was Parmenides who first realized the preeminent value of the notion of being. For a century of two before him Greek philosophical schools had concentrated on determining the primordial clement, the ultimate substance of which the physical world could have een constituted. The answers were many and varied. ‘Thales held for water, Anaximenes for air, Heraclitus for fire. Others, going beyond the appearances of things, made some progress toward a first clement or principle that was Introduction 23 not sense-perceptible, Anaximander, for example, thinking he had found it in what he called the “indeterminate” (apeiron), and Pythagoras in number, Parmenides, next on the scene, was not detzined by these surmisings. In his poem on nature, as a man sure of his ground, he goes straight to the mark, unerringly showing the way to being, which he deems the way to truth, Being, he says, is (esti)—or, perhaps more aptly, exists; moreover, being is all one, and undivided, and immobile (unchang- ing) yet corporeal, resembling a vast sphere. But, he con- tinues, if being is, then nonbeing is the absolute opposite, an absolute nothing; in a word, it is not—where “not” means the utter negation of being.** We may note that the Parmenidean doctrine of being, if pushed to the limit, would mean the suppression of real becoming and real multiplicity in the world; nevertheless, the first founda- tions of the metaphysics of being are here in the making, Plato, while not ignoring the Parmenidean doctrine and the problems it raises, gave the quest of the first principle a different tum. In his view the ultimate explanation of a thing lay rather in its end, meaning its perfection or good. Thus the master Idea, the one that excels all others, is that of the Good, in which the science of dialectics," for him * To the uninitiated the assertion that “nonbeing can only mean utter nothing” is doubtless good sense, when in fact the conse- quences, alluded to in the text, are rather disastroas. This will be more fully examined in chapter 6, on act and potency.—[Tr] “Dialectic” is a chameleon word changing, practically, with every philosopher (or philosophy). As conceived by Plato, dialectic is essentially the science of highest principles (beating on the sub- sistent Tdeas, the only realities worthy of the name); which is far different from what it means (say) on the lips of Kent or the Marx- ists or, for that matter, of Aristotle. —Translator’s note.24 Philosophy of St. Thomas: Metaphysics the science par excellence, finds its true light and inspira- tion. Yet even Plato, in the later Dialogues, gives some indication of having gone beyond this initial position of his. There, in effect, we find him arguing that something still higher than the Good is needed, which he identifies as the One, source of the many. The decisive step in this direction was not taken, however, until some six hundred years later when Plotinus, leaving no doubt as to his posi- tion, categorically declared the One the first principle, and its contemplation the highest knowledge. In Plato, then, and in his school, being is a secondary notion, overshadowed by both the Good and the One: by the Good because as end it offers, in this view, the higher explanation of things; by the One because, again in this view, it is a simpler notion, hence more basic and primary. ‘Aristotle, countering Plato's persuasion, stuck to the view that for the absolutely primary notion of things one had to go back to Parmenides, back to being; and furthermore, if in being lay the primary notion, in being lay also the proper object of the primary science metaphysics. This was no derogation to the Good and the One; for these notions, too, belong to every being and are both of them every bit as uni- versal and scarcely less primary—transcendentals they are, even as being. Absolutely speaking, however, being (to on) is prior; a thing must be before it can be one or good. Meta- physics, accordingly, is essentially the science of being* 2. The Three Conceptions of Metaphysics in One To define metaphysics as the science of being as being fs at the same time to enunciate its proper object, or in 4 CE. Text Il, “The ‘Subject’ of Metaphysics,” p. 244. Introduction 25, more adequate terminology, its subject of inquiry—sub- jectum, as the Schoolmen understand it. With the proper object as the point of reference it is not difficult, and logically quite consistent, to integrate the two other con- ceptions (science of first causes, science of the separate) with the third (science of being). For, the study of an object and the study of its causes may well pertain to one and the same science. This granted, the science of being as being should also seck out its causes (first causes, hence science of first causes), among which is God, the most im- material, hence most separate cause (thereby, science of the separate). Thus, while there are three posible ways of viewing metaphysics, they are not exclusive—one implies the other. But only through one of them is its proper object formally stated, which is neither first causes nor separate being, but being as being * V. METAPHYSICS AND CRITIQUE OF KNOWLEDGE Sooner or later the expositor of St. Thomas, of his meta- physics especially, must meet the issue that divides him most sharply from the moderns. Led by its most eminent representatives modem philosophy takes a wholly different attitude as regards the object of metaphysics and indeed as regards the object of human knowledge generally. In the traditional view the first and immediate object of knowl- edge is being, the being of external reality, But in the modem view the first and immediate object is not external reality but the mind itself, or its thought processes, to use a ® Cf, St. Thomas, Commentary on the Metaphytics of Aristotle, Prologue.26 Philosophy of St. Thomas: Metaphysics not uncommon turn of speech. This difference in attitude is frequently epitomized as a transition from the dogmatic position of the past to the more critical and analytical stand of the present, or more succinctly still, from realism to idealism. How this “Copernican Revolution” in philoso- phy, as it has been called, came about is not now our main concer; yet some account of it is apposite to the moment, for it represents a complete volte-face in philosophical thinking, not least in metaphysics, where, though the name survive, the old meaning leaves scarcely a trace. Consider, first, the general trend of medieval philosophy. Here, by and large, was a philosophy that has since come to be known as “realist.” The mind, it was admitted without questioning, was ruled by a world of objects that exist apart from it and govern its content—“measured the intel- lect,” in Scholastic idiom. Being, or reality, came first; thought, corresponding to reality, came second, Interpreted, this means that what the mind knows directly is reality; then, upon reflection, its thought of reality. Transposed to sense it means that when I look at a thing, what I see is the thing and not my sight of the thing. This is the attitude of common sense, and both the ancients and medievals as a whole, accepted it on that basis; it was, I mean, the most natural and obvious attitude to take—whether this makes them naive and uncritical we need not inquire. They did not, however, pretend that the question of the validity of knowledge was thereby settled. The fruth of the matter is that the so-called objectivity (realism) of knowledge did not figure prominently in their speculations, since no acknowl- edged philosopher seriously doubted the common-sense view. And thus affairs stood until the dawn of modem philosophy. Introduction 27 Prophetic of the new order was Descartes. With him, as with his posterity, the first immediate object of certain, that is, indubitable knowledge is no longer extemal reality. But if not reality, what then? Thought, or the activity of thought, is adjudged the more immediate experience, hence the first direct object of knowledge. The effect of this inversion was to leave the mind cut off from reality. Descartes, it is true, felt that you had only to invoke his asic intuition “I think, therefore I am,” and you found yourself retuned to reality, His successors, however, would not be assured; to them, a return to reality from knowledge that was not in the first instance moored to reality seemed highly problematical, and was indeed impossible, the ideal- ist postulate having seen to that. For, as this postulate would have it, what you know directly is what goes on in your mind—external reality, if known at all, 's known as an inference, never as something actually experienced. Thought, accordingly, lies immured, its contact with out- side reality iretrievably lost. On this common theme of primacy of thought over external reality, subjectivists and idealists of every description fathered forth tractates and treatises of endless variety. On one thing, though, all agreed: there could be no true philosophy that was not based on the idealist postulate.*® Obviously, the supporters of traditional philosophy could not remain indifferent to this development. Threatened, in effect, was the whole structure of their philosophy; and % The Translator has taken the liberty of enlarging somewhat on the author's résumé of the “Copernican Revolution” in philosophy. Nothing was added, however, that was not implicit in the author's own remarks. As for the manner in which Thomists have met the Idealist challenge, this is examined in detail in the subsequent epistemological (or eriteriological) study of being, chapter 3—[Tr]28 Philosophy of St. Thomas: Metaphysics thrust upon them was the question: should they persist in regarding extramental reality as the unexceptionable start- ing point of philosophy, or should they yield to the mod- ems, adopting the reflective study of knowledge as their springboard, after which they would again take their stand with the metaphysics of realism? Offhand, there appears no reason why a follower of St. ‘Thomas should not undertake a critique of knowledge, a systematically conducted inquiry into its nature and validity, especially its validity, Not a few eminent Thomists have done just that. But all attempts are well advised of certain restrictions. The critique should not be considered the in- dispensable preliminary to metaphysics, nor be allowed to supersede metaphysics as the superior wisdom; but above all it must from the outset avoid the idealist principle of absolute interiority, whereby thought is arbitrarily so im- pounded in the mind as to render direct access to reality impossible. On these conditions, an epistemology (a cri- tique of knowledge) according to the mind of St. Thomas is quite possible and perhaps feasible. Yet, when all is said, the true embodiment of wisdom still lies in a metaphysics that is at once realist and critical (sclé-critical, that is), St. Thomas states flatly that there is Dut one supreme science, and as supreme it does not hand over the task of justifying or defending its principles to another; it does it itself. “Metaphysics [sc. itself},” to quote his own words, “carries the argument fo those who deny its principles.” ** This science must be grounded in realism, which is to say in being, assuming, as we do, that being is the first thing known by the intellect and constitutes its #'“Metaphysica disputat contra negantem sua principia” (Summa theol. Ia, q. 1,2. 8). Introduetion 29 proper object. Although it takes its stand on realism, this science will also be, in fact cannot but be critical (or criterioligical); for there are difficulties encountered as to the validity of knowledge, very substantial diffculties, which must be met by the science itself, there being none higher to which they can be referred for solution. Granted that the difficulties in question may be organized into a separate study, outside the context of metaphysics proper and under the heading, as is sometimes done, of epistemology or cri- teriology; nevertheless, there seems more to be gained, and more logic as well, in conducting the critique of knowledge within the compass of metaphysics proper. If nothing more, such a procedure does better to safeguard the unity of meta- physics; and better kept too will be the autonomy, the complete selfjurisdiction that belongs to it as first philo- sophical wisdom, In this, moreover, we have Aristotle's precedent, who incorporates a considerable criteriological section into his metaphysics, in the course of which he defends the first principles of thought against the sub- jectivists of his time® We, for our part, shall follow Aristotle's example, so that after the next chapter, which is the metaphysical study of being, will follow a criterio- logical chapter, the critical examination of our knowledge of being. VI. THE METAPHYSICAL WORK OF ARISTOTLE AND ST. THOMAS: PROBLEMS AND PROCEDURE a) Aristotle’s metaphysical production has given rise to some important literary problems. The principal one centers ‘on the formation of the eponymic Metaphysics, a collection in fourteen books containing his essential thought on first ™ CE. Metaph. Y, chapters 3-8.30 Philosophy of St. Thomas: Metaphysics philosophy. This collection, itis commonly realized, did not originate as a continuous composition, from one time and one effort. It is rather a compilation of writings, or parts thereof, which date from various periods of Aristotle's career. The present arrangement, moreover, stems not from himself but from his posthumous editors. For our purpose, however, it is not necessary, nor would it be feasible, to go into the literary problem the compilation poses; but we should at least indicate the basic groupings within the work as it now stands, since this bit of information is almost indispensable for intelligent reading of the whole. Books A, B, I, E. Z, H. © (1, 3, 4, 6 7, 8 9) constitute a sufficiently coherent body to be considered, for all practical purposes, a continuous development. Treated, after some preliminaries, are the following problems: the object of metaphysics (being as being, and the things pertaining to deing as being); substance (the fundamental mode of be- ing); act and potency. Books I and (10,12) appear to have een independent compositions, yet in the plan anticipated by Aristotle they follow logically after the preceding group. Book I deals with the problem of the one and the many; Book A, after some recapitulatory chapters, with the primary substance (the first mover). Books M and N (13,14), though probably of different date, are closely parallel in content; both present a searching criticism of the (Pythagorean) theory of numbers and the (Platonic) theory of Ideas. This eaves Books a, 8, and K (2, 5, 11), which it is difficult to fit into a pattern with the rest. As to content, Book « (2), whose authenticity is debated but generally accepted, deals mainly with the problem of nonregression to infinity; 4 (5) is scarcely more than an analytical lexicon, though a very valuable one, of philosophical notions, pertaining mostly to Introduction 3a physics and metaphysics; K (11) is a gathering of extracts from the Physics plus abridgment from B, I, and E of the Metaphysics. b) Further complication awaits us in turning to St ‘Thomas, whose metaphysical work, on the whole, falls to two principal deposits. The first is, of course, his Commentary on Aristotle’s ‘Metaphysics, the first twelve books, to be exact. Concerning this Commentary, the opinion has been advanced that St. ‘Thomas was only clarifying Aristotle's thought, refraining his own. The opinion is untenable. In the Commentary St. ‘Thomas, it must be maintained, was not only spelling out Aristotle but also philosophizing on his own, What is true is that the Commentary of its very nature does not escape the hobbles and hitches of Aristotle’s text, which, while perhaps sufficiently articulated, yet lacks thet perfectly or- ganic composition one might wish. In any event, the Com- mentary is not the complete metaphysical zhought of St. ‘Thomas. There are other developments of his on the sub- ject, more uniquely his own, and these also must be appreciated before one can see his metaphysics in all its richness and amplitude. ‘The second deposit in point is found in his theological study of God as one (De Deo uno). Here agcin all is not in one place, though all is very much of a piece. There is the ample section in the Summa theologiae,”* a whole book of the Contra Gentiles,” and an impressive array of parallel passages in various smaller works.** In these compositions * Summa theol. Ia, qq. 2-26. ® Contra Gentiles, Book I. % The most important of which are the Quaestiones Disputatae and not a few so-called Opuscula.32 Philosophy of St. Thomas: Metaphysics St. Thomas’ thought is expressed more at large than in the Commentary, and its scope and penetration grow accord- ingly. But here, on the other hand, it is interwoven with the fabric of supernatural (as against natural) theology. St. Thomas may be said to offer a twofold version of metaphysics: one whose source and methodology is purely philosophical but whose structure is noticeably grafted and underdeveloped; the other, more organic, excels in height and depth but has, for us, the disadvantage of being in- corporated in theological dissertation. Between the two, we hasten to add, there is remarkable coherence of doctrine, albeit the preoccupations and the standpoints are not the same, In practice, nevertheless, the expositor of St. Thomas’ metaphysics must, to keep his account orderly, make a choice. Either he adopts the strictly philosophical point of view and from the being of experience progresses to the being that is God (as in the Commentary), or he takes the theological approach, a more synthetic task, according to which God stands at the beginning of his inquiry and created being is elucidated throughout as his handiwork (as, for example, in the Summa Theologiae). ¢) Our choice is the former. While not disregarding alto- gether the invaluable complement of the theological writ- ings, our study follows the philosophical path of the Meta- physics and the Commentary. It begins, accordingly, with the being of immediate experience and advances by degrees to the being that is God, the natural culmination, it will appear, of the entire work as well as the keystone that firms it together. That done, we shall have an adequate view of St. Thomas’ metaphysics but not, be it said, an exhaustive one, For such a view, it would be necessary to go consider- Introduction 33 ably further. The steps of our inquiry would need to be retraced and the basic positions we have established gone over again to be propounded a second time, but from the perspective of the theological treatment of God. The result would be, so to speak, a downward metaphysics, from God to creature, in contrast to the upward manner of the present work, To achieve it, however, would have made a more formidable task, and a more formidable volume, than lay to the purpose,