Sea Lion Fishing Corp Vs People
Sea Lion Fishing Corp Vs People
Sea Lion Fishing Corp Vs People
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO , J : p
The . . . con scated vessel and all the shing gadgets, paraphernalia and
equipment are hereby ordered to be placed under the [temporary] custody of the
Philippine Coast Guard. The latter is hereby directed to prepare and submit to this
Court the inventory of all con scated items within 15 days from receipt of this
order. Further, the Commander of the Philippine Coast Guard should observe the
diligence of a good father of the family in the preservation and maintenance of
the entrusted confiscated items until the final disposition thereof by the Court.
Having appeared that the accused have been detained since January 19,
2004, the period of their detention is hereby credited in their favor.
TIHCcA
A Sentence 2 3 in Criminal Case No. 19422 was also issued on even date, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, with the plea of guilty of all seventeen (17) accused, the
Court hereby nds them guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the
crime of Violation of Section 87 of R.A. 8550 (Poaching) and sentences them to
pay a ne of One Hundred Thousand (US$100,000.00) Dollars to be paid to the
Republic of the Philippines. The Fishing Vessel F/V Sea Lion 1 as well as the
shing paraphernalia and equipments used by the accused in committing the
crime [are] hereby ordered confiscated in the favor of the government.
The . . . con scated vessel and all the shing gadgets, paraphernalia and
equipment are hereby ordered to be placed under the [temporary] custody of the
Philippine Coast Guard. The latter is hereby directed to prepare and submit to this
Court the inventory of all con scated items within 15 days from receipt of this
order. Further, the commander of the Philippine Coast Guard should observe the
diligence of a good father of the family in the preservation and maintenance of
the entrusted confiscated items until the final disposition thereof by the Court.
The Provincial Jail Warden of Palawan is hereby ordered to release all the
above-named accused unless held for some other lawful cause or causes:
SO ORDERED. 2 4
It was only after the issuance of the above Sentences that petitioner again made
its move by ling a Motion for Reconsideration 2 5 on June 24, 2005. It prayed for the
trial court to delete from said Sentences the con scation of F/V Sea Lion. The O ce of
the Provincial Prosecutor led an Opposition thereto. 2 6 After receipt of petitioner's
R e p l y 2 7 to said Opposition, the trial court denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration.
Hence, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus 2 8 with the CA.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On January 10, 2006, the CA promulgated its assailed Decision denying the
petition. 2 9 The CA ruled that there was no lack of jurisdiction, excess of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court since it had jurisdiction over the
crimes as alleged in the Informations and the penalty for violating the laws stated
therein. Necessarily, it had the authority to seize the F/V Sea Lion which was mentioned
in the said Informations. The CA further held that while the petitioner attempted to
claim as its own the shing vessel in its Motion for Reconsideration dated June 24,
2005, its effort is undeserving of merit due to failure to adduce evidence. Lastly, the CA
declared that the petitioner did not avail of the proper procedural remedy. After the trial
court recognized its personality to intervene in the Order dated August 4, 2005,
petitioner's recourse should have been an appeal and not certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. 3 0
The appellate court also denied petitioner's subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration 3 1 in its assailed Resolution dated May 5, 2006. 3 2
Thus, petitioner led this Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the sole issue
of whether the confiscation of F/V Sea Lion was valid. 3 3
The Parties' Arguments
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Petitioner contends that F/V Sea Lion should be released to it because it is the
registered owner of said vessel and her captain and crew members were not among
those accused of and convicted in Criminal Case Nos. 18965 and 19422. To buttress
its contention, petitioner invokes Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
DcITHE
Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be con scated and forfeited
in favor of the Government, unless they be the property of a third person
not liable for the offense , but those articles which are not subject of lawful
commerce shall be destroyed. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner also claims that it was denied its right to due process of law when it
was not noti ed of the judicial proceedings relative to the con scation of the shing
vessel. It argues that such noti cation was necessary considering that the provincial
prosecutor was duly informed of its claim of ownership of the F/V Sea Lion.
On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines through the O ce of the
Solicitor General (OSG) argues that since the 17 Chinese nationals were charged with
violations of the provisions of RA 8550, a special law, Article 45 of the Revised Penal
Code does not apply. This is in view of Article 10 of said Code which speci cally
declares that acts punishable by special laws are not subject to the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code. They are only supplementary to such laws unless the latter should
speci cally provide the contrary. Hence, the forfeiture and con scation of the shing
vessel under RA 8550 are different from the forfeiture and con scation under the
Revised Penal Code which are additional penalties imposed in the event of conviction.
And, since RA 8550 provides that the vessel used in connection with or in direct
violation of the provisions of RA 8550 shall be subjected to forfeiture in favor of the
government without mention of any distinction as to who owns the vessel, the
forfeiture of F/V Sea Lion was proper.
The OSG also contends that even if Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code is
applicable, still the present petition must fail due to petitioner's failure to present its
third-party claim at the earliest opportunity. It likewise argues that petitioner was not
deprived its right to due process considering that it was given ample opportunity to be
heard particularly when its motion for release of the F/V Sea Lion was granted by the
O ce of the Provincial Prosecutor subject to certain conditions. However, it opted not
to comply with the conditions imposed by the prosecutor and instead waited for the
trial court's final disposition of the case.
Our Ruling
The petition has no merit.
We note, at the outset, that petitioner pursued an incorrect remedy when it
sought recourse before the CA. The ling of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court before the CA is limited only to the correction of errors of jurisdiction
or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. 3 4 "A special civil action for
certiorari is an independent action, raising the question of jurisdiction where the
tribunal, board or o cer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
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excess of jurisdiction." 3 5 The CA did not nd either lack or error of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion. There was no jurisdictional error because based on the
Informations, 3 6 the offenses were committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the
trial court. The penalties imposable under the law were also within its jurisdiction. As a
necessary consequence, the trial court had the authority to determine how the subject
shing vessel should be disposed of. Likewise, no grave abuse of discretion attended
the issuance of the trial court's order to con scate F/V Sea Lion considering the
absence of evidence showing that said vessel is owned by a third party. Evidently, the
remedial relief pursued by the petitioner was infirm and improper. DaEcTC
We also agree with the CA's observation that the trial court impliedly recognized
petitioner's right to intervene when it pronounced that petitioner failed to exercise its
right to claim ownership of the F/V Sea Lion. This being the case, petitioner should have
led an appeal instead of a petition for certiorari before the CA. Under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, certiorari is unavailing when an appeal is the plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy. 3 7 "The nature of the questions intended to be raised on appeal is of no
consequence. It may well be that those questions will treat exclusively of whether . . .
the judgment or nal order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion . . . . This is immaterial. The remedy, to repeat, is appeal, not
certiorari as a special civil action." 3 8 The jurisdiction of a court is not affected by its
erroneous decision. 3 9 The orders and rulings of a court on all controversies pertaining
to the case cannot be corrected by certiorari if the court has jurisdiction over the
subject matter and over the person. 4 0 Thus, we agree with the CA's dismissal of the
petition.
Even assuming that the CA may resolve an error of procedure or judgment, there
was none committed in this particular case.
Petitioner's claim of ownership of F/V Sea Lion is not supported by any proof on
record. The only document on record that is relevant in this regard is a request for the
release of the F/V Sea Lion based on petitioner's alleged ownership led with the
Provincial Prosecutor. While the latter authorized the release of said shing vessel, this
was conditioned upon petitioner's submission of a proof of ownership and the ling of
a bond, with which petitioner failed to comply. Even when judicial proceedings
commenced, nothing was heard from the petitioner. No motion for intervention or any
manifestation came from petitioner's end during the period of arraignment up to the
rendition of sentence. While petitioner later explained before the CA that its inaction
was brought about by its inability to put up the required bond due to nancial
difficulties, same is still not a sufficient justification for it to deliberately not act at all.
It was only after the trial court ordered the con scation of F/V Sea Lion in its
assailed twin Sentences that petitioner was heard from again. This time, it led a
Motion for Reconsideration dated June 24, 2005 4 1 to which was attached a copy of an
alleged Certi cate of Registration issued by the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA).
4 2 However, as correctly observed by the CA:
Signi cantly, the lack of any factual basis for the third-party claim of
ownership was not cured at all when the petitioner led its motion for
reconsideration before the trial court. At that point, evidence should have been
adduced to support the petitioner's claim (so that a new trial or reopening of the
trial on the con scation aspect should have been prayed for, rather than a mere
motion for reconsideration.) There is rstly the factual issue — to be proved by
proper evidence in order to be properly considered by the court — that the vessel is
owned by a third party other than the accused. Article 45 required too that proof
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be adduced that the third party is not liable for the offense. After the admission by
the accused through their guilty plea that the vessel had been used in the
commission of a crime, we believe and so hold that this additional Article 45
requirement cannot be simply inferred from the mere fact that the alleged owner
is not charged in the same case before the court. 4 3
Finally, petitioner's contention that it was deprived of its right to due process in
the con scation of F/V Sea Lion has no factual basis. As correctly pointed out by the
CA:
That the trial court concluded that no denial of due process occurred is
likewise legally correct, perhaps not in the exact way expressed in the assailed
order, but for what the reason articulated in the assailed order directly implies. As
we discussed above, the petitioner did not intervene before the trial court to claim
ownership of the shing vessel, nor were there records before the court showing a
third-party claim of ownership of the vessel; the formal introduction of evidence
that would have formally brought the third-party ownership of the vessel to light
was prevented by the plea of guilt of the accused. There was therefore no third-
party property right sought to be protected when the trial court ordered the
confiscation of the vessel.
Signi cantly, the lack of any factual basis for the third-party claim of
ownership was not cured at all when the petitioner led its motion for
reconsideration before the trial court. At that point, evidence should have been
adduced to support the petitioner's claim (so that a new trial or reopening of the
trial on the con scation aspect should have been prayed for, rather than a mere
motion for reconsideration.) There is rstly the factual issue — to be proved by
proper evidence in order to be properly considered by the court — that the vessel is
owned by a third party other than the accused. Article 45 required too that proof
be adduced that the third party is not liable for the offense. After the admission by
the accused through their guilty plea that the vessel had been used in the
commission of a crime, we believe and so hold that this additional Article 45
requirement cannot be simply inferred from the mere fact that the alleged owner
is not charged in the same case before the court.
It was under this legal situation that the trial court issued its assailed order
that correctly concluded that there had been no denial of due process. Given the
absence of any admissible evidence of third-party ownership and the failure to
comply with the additional Article 45 requirement, the court's order to con scate
the F/V Sea Lion pursuant to Article 87 of R.A. No. 8550 cannot be incorrect to the
point of being an act in grave abuse of discretion. 4 5
In ne, it has been established beyond reasonable doubt that F/V Sea Lion was
used by the 17 Chinese shermen in the commission of the crimes. On the other hand,
petitioner presented no evidence at all to support its claim of ownership of F/V Sea
Lion. Therefore, the forfeiture of F/V Sea Lion in favor of the government was proper.
WHEREFORE , the petition is DENIED.
DENIED The Decision dated January 10, 2006 and
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the Resolution dated May 5, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91270 are
AFFIRMED.
AFFIRMED
SO ORDERED. CDHacE
CDHacE
Corona, C.J., Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro and Perez, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.CA rollo, pp. 114-126; penned by Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion (now a Member of this
Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes and Mariflor
Punzalan Castillo.
2.Id. at 2-14.
3.Id. at 51-56; penned by Judge Toribio E. Ilao, Jr.
4.Id. at 73-75.
5.Id. at 149-150.
6.Id. at 134-137.
Section 97. Fishing or Taking of Rare, Threatened or Endangered Species. — It shall
7.Section
be unlawful to fish or take rare, threatened or endangered species as listed in the CITES
and as determined by the Department.
Violation of the provision of this section shall be punished by imprisonment of twelve
(12) years to twenty (20) years and/or a fine of One hundred and twenty thousand pesos
(P120,000.00) and forfeiture of the catch, and the cancellation of fishing permit.
8.Otherwise known as "The Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998."
Section 90. Use of Active Gear in the Municipal Waters and Bays and Other
9.Section
Fishery Management Areas. — It shall be unlawful to engage in fishing in municipal
waters and in all bays as well as other fishery management areas using active fishing
gears as defined in this Code.
Section 27. Illegal Acts. — Unless otherwise allowed in accordance with this Act, it shall be
10.Section
unlawful for any person to willfully and knowingly exploit wildlife resources and their
habitats, or undertake the following acts;
(iv) when it is done to prevent an imminent danger to the life or limb of a human being;
and
(v) when the wildlife is killed or destroyed after it has been used in authorized research or
experiments.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 87. Poaching in Philippine Waters. — It shall be unlawful for any foreign
12.Section
person, corporation or entity to fish or operate any fishing vessel in Philippine waters.
The entry of any foreign fishing vessel in Philippine waters shall constitute a prima facie
evidence that the vessel is engaged in fishing in Philippine waters.
Violation of the above shall be punished by a fine of One hundred thousand U.S. Dollars
(US$100,000.00), in addition to the confiscation of its catch, fishing equipment and
fishing vessel: Provided, That the Department is empowered to impose an administrative
fine of not less than Fifty thousand U.S. Dollars (US$50,000.00) but not more than Two
hundred thousand U.S. Dollars (US$200,000.00) or its equivalent in the Philippine
Currency.
13.Except for I.S. No. 2004-61. Here, the Provincial Prosecutor dismissed the case against F/V
Sea Lion's Owner, Captain and Chief Engineer but owing to reports that the 17 Chinese
nationals made use of active fishing gears, he ordered that a subpoena be issued
against them to afford them their right to a preliminary investigation. See the Concurring
Resolution of Provincial Prosecutor Alen Ross B. Rodriguez, CA rollo, pp. 32-38.
14.Id.
15.As mentioned in the August 25, 2004 Resolution of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor,
id. at 47-49.
16.Id.
17.Id. at 49.
18.Id. at 50.
19.Id. at 51-53.
Section 88. Fishing Through Explosives, Noxious or Poisonous Substance,
20.Section
and/or Electricity. —
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Actual use of explosives, noxious or poisonous substances or electrofishing devices
for illegal fishing shall be punishable by imprisonment ranging from five (5) years to ten
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(10) years without prejudice to the filing of separate criminal cases when the use of the
same result to physical injury or loss of human life.
21.CA rollo, pp. 54-56.
22.Id. at 52-53.
23.Id. at 54-56.
24.Id. at 55-56.
25.Id. at 59-64.
26.Id. at 65-66.
27.Id. at 69-72.
28.Id. at 2-15.
29.Id. at 114-126.
30.Id. at 9-12.
31.Id. at 134-137.
32.Id. at 149-150.
33.Rollo, p. 13.
34.Borromeo Bros. Estate, Inc. v. Garcia, G.R. Nos. 139594-95, February 26, 2008, 546 SCRA
543, 551.
35.Id.
36.CA rollo, pp. 41-44.
38.HERRERA, REMEDIAL LAW, Volume III, 1999 Ed., p. 220, citing Pan Realty Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, 249 Phil. 521, 530-531 (1988).
39.Estrada v. Sto. Domingo, 139 Phil. 158, 187-188 (1969).
40.Paramount Insurance Corporation v. Judge Luna, 232 Phil. 526, 534 (1987).
41.CA rollo, pp. 59-64.
42.Id. at 76.
43.Id. at 124.
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44.Id.
45.Id. at 123-125.