Bel-Air Association vs. IAC PDF

8/17/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 176
VOL. 176, AUGUST 25, 1989 719

Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
*
G.R. No. 71169. August 25, 1989.
JOSE D. SANGALANG and LUTGARDA D. SANGALANG,

petitioners, FELIX C. GASTON and DOLORES R. GASTON,
JOSE V. BRIONES and ALICIA R. BRIONES, and BEL-AIR
VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., intervenors-petitioners, vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and AYALA
CORPORATION, respondents.
*
G.R. No. 74376. August 25, 1989.
BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs. THE

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ROSARIO DE JESUS
TENORIO, and CECILIA GONZALVES, respondents.
*
G.R. No. 76394. August 25, 1989.
BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner. vs. THE

COURT OF APPEALS, and EDUARDO and BUENA
ROMUALDEZ, respondents.
*
G.R. No. 78182. August 25, 1989.
BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT

OF APPEALS, DOLORES FILLEY and J. ROMERO &
ASSOCIATES, respondents.
*
G.R. No. 82281. August 25, 1989.
BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT

OF APPEALS, VIOLETA MONCAL, and MAJAL
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
*
G.R. No. 60727. August 25, 1989.
NEMESIO I. YABUT, Municipal Mayor of Makati, ARTURO R.

GABUNA, Secretary to the Mayor for Administration, Makati;
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000173faa698d6d7318c7b003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/17
_______________
* EN BANC.
720
720 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

JOSEFO S. LINGAD, Acting Municipal Engineer; NELSON

ERASGA of the Municipal Engineer’s Office, Makati; and
RUPERTO ACLE; Station Commander, Southern Police District,
Makati, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and BEL-AIR
VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., respondents.
Local Government; Police Power; The opening of Orbit St. to traffic by

the Mayor was warranted by the demands of the common good and is a
valid exercise of police power.—As we asserted in Sangalang, the opening
of Jupiter Street was warranted by the demands of the common good, in
terms of traffic decongestion and public convenience. We also uphold the
opening of Orbit Street for the same rationale. There is no merit in BAVA’s
claims that the demolition of the gates at Orbit and Jupiter Streets amounts
to deprivation of property without due process of law or expropriation
without just compensation. There is no taking of property involved here.
The act of the Mayor now challenged is, rather, in the concept of police
power. In the case of Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v.
Drilon, we said: The concept of police power is well-established in this
jurisdiction. It has been defined as the “state authority to enact legislation
that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare.” As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint
upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not
capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general
terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace. “Its scope, ever-
expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future
where it could be done provides enough room for an efficient and flexible
response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest
benefits.”
Same; Same; Police power, unlike the power of eminent domain, is
exercised without provisions for just compensation.—Unlike the power of
eminent domain, police power is exercised without provisions for just
compensation: Art. 436. When any property is condemned or seized by
competent authority in the interest of health, safety or security, the owner
thereof shall not be entitled to compensation, unless he can show that such
condemnation or seizure is unjustified. However, it may not be done
arbitrarily or unreasonably. But the burden of showing that it is unjustified

lies on the aggrieved party.
Same; Same; Same; The fact that the opening up of Orbit St. to
vehicular traffic has led to the loss of privacy of Bel-Air residents, does
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VOL. 176, AUGUST 25, 1989 721
not render the exercise of police power unjustified.—Our considered

opinion is that BAVA has failed to show that the opening up of Orbit Street
was unjustified, or that the Mayor acted unreasonably. The fact that it has
led to the loss of privacy of BAVA residents is no argument against the
Municipality’s effort to ease vehicular traffic in Makati. Certainly, the duty
of a local executive is to take care of the needs of the greater number, in
many cases, at the expense of the minority.
Same; Same; Same; Abatement of Nuisance; The Orbit gate may be
legally abated by summary means considering that it is a public nuisance.—
Other than BAVA’s claims that the opening of Orbit Street led to the loss of
privacy of BAVA residents, there is no showing that the Mayor, in carrying
out the demolition of the Orbit gate, had acted is disregard of due process or,
as the respondent court put it, with a “show of arrogance.” As we said, the
gate in question was a nuisance, which could have been legally abated by
summary means. The fact that it was accomplished summarily does not lend
to it a “show of arrogance” because, precisely, a summary method is
allowed by law. In any event, there is a showing that the Mayor notified
BAVA that Orbit (and Jupiter) Streets would be opened up. The Court finds
that such a notice is compliance enough with due process.
PETITIONS to review the motions for reconsideration from the

decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
J. Cesar Sangco and Renato L. Dela Fuente for G.R. No.

71169.
Funk & Associates for G.R. Nos. 74376, 76394, 78182 &
82281.
Sergio L. Guadiz; Gruba, Tanlimco, Lamson & Apuhin Law
Office; Tee Tomas & Associates and Castillo, Laman, Tan &
Associates for G.R. Nos. 74376, 76394, 78182 & 82281.
SARMIENTO, J.:
I.
Before the Court are: (1) two motions for reconsideration (G.R. No.
71169) of our Decision, promulgated on December 22, 1988, the
first one having been filed by Atty. J. Cezar Sangco on behalf of the
spouses Jose and Lutgarda Sangalang, and the
722

second, by Atty. Raul Sison, counsel for Bel-Air Village Association

(BAVA); and (2) a motion for reconsideration and/or motion for
clarification filed by Atty. Richard Funk (G.R. Nos. 74376, 76394,
78182, and 82281) of the said Decision.
The motion for reconsideration (G.R. No. 71169), filed by the
Sangalangs, is anchored on two grounds: (1) that contrary to our
decision, Jupiter Street is for the exclusive use of Bel-Air Village
residents; and (b) that the Ayala Corporation did contrive to acquire
membership at the Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA) purposely to
bargain for access to Jupiter Street by the general public.
Subsequently, BAVA informed the Court that it was adopting the
Sangalangs’ motion for reconsideration. The motion for
reconsideration (in G.R. Nos. 74376, 76394, 78182, and 82281)
raises more or less the same questions and asks furthermore that we
delete the award of damages granted by the Court of Appeals.
The Court: (1) DENIES the motions filed by both the Sangalangs
and BAVA with finality, no new arguments having been presented to
warrant reconsideration, and (2) DENIES Atty. Richard Funk’s own
motion for the same reason, with the further word that the grant of
attorney’s fees has been deemed to be just and proper under Article
2208, par. II, of the Civil Code.
II.
The lone issue in G.R. No. 67027 is whether or not the Mayor of
Makati could have validly opened Jupiter and Orbit Streets to
vehicular traffic. The facts, as stated in the assailed decision of the
respondent court, in CA-G.R. No. 11803-SP, entitled, “Bel-Air
Village Association, Inc., Petitioner, vs. Hon. Celso L. Magsino,
Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XX,
Pasig, Metro Manila; Mayor Nemesio Yabut, Municipal Mayor of
Makati, Metro Manila, Arturo R. Gabuna, Secretary to the Mayor
for Administration, Makati, Josefo S. Lingad, Acting Municipal
Engineer, Nelson Erasga, of the Municipal Engineer’s Office,
Makati; and Ruperto Acle, Station Commander, Southern Police

District, Makati, Respondents,” are as follows:
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VOL. 176, AUGUST 25, 1989 723

In its chronological sequence, the petition avers as follows: On October 24,

1979, petitioner instituted a petition for prohibition and damages with
preliminary injunction with the respondent Court docketed as Civil Case
No. 34948. On October 25, 1979, the respondent court issued an order
directing respondents to answer and denying the issuance of a temporary
restraining order. Petitioner filed an urgent motion for reconsideration of the
denial of its prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, adding
as new ground the continuation of the commission of acts of dispossession
by the respondents. The said urgent motion was denied.
On November 6, 1979, the parties were directed to submit their affidavits
and counter-affidavits as well as memoranda as basis for resolving the
application for preliminary injunction. In due time, the parties complied. On
December 11, 1979, respondents filed their answer to the petition.
On March 4, 1980, the respondent Court denied the application for
preliminary injunction. On November 14, 1980, an order was issued
denying the motion for reconsideration.
It is alleged by petitioner that by its orders of March 4, 1980 and
November 14, 1980, the respondent Court has unlawfully deprived the
petitioner of its right to due process to which it it entitled under the
Constitution, and that respondents’ acts are tantamount to grave abuse of
discretion and in excess of jurisdiction.
In their comment, respondents allege that prior to January, 1977, upon
the instructions of respondent Mayor Nemesio T. Yabut of Makati, Metro
Manila, studies were made by the other respondents on the feasibility of
opening streets in Bel-Air Village calculated to alleviate traffic congestions
along the public streets adjacent to Bel-Air Village. The studies revealed
that the subdivision plan of Bel-Air Village was approved by the Court of
First Instance of Rizal on condition, among others, that its major
thoroughfares connecting to public streets and highways shall be opened to
public traffic. Accordingly, it was deemed necessary by the Municipality of
Makati in the interest of the general public to open to traffic Amapola,
Mercedes, Zodiac, Jupiter, Neptune, Orbit and Paseo de Roxas streets. On
January 28, 1977, a meeting was held between representatives of the
Municipality of Makati and petitioner.
At this meeting, respondents claim that the representatives of petitioner,
particularly Rufino R. Santos, president of petitioner, had agreed to the
opening of Bel-Air Village streets. Regarding Jupiter Street, the
Municipality opened it because public welfare demanded its opening which
allegation the petitioner never questioned. With respect to Orbit Street,
whose opening was temporarily suspended
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until the flood control project from Buendia Extension up to the mouth
of the Pasig River, was about to be completed, it was opened only after
another meeting attended by Rufino R. Santos who agreed to the opening of
the street from J.P. Rizal Avenue up to Imelda Avenue and later up to Jupiter
Street, subject to certain conditions.
To bolster their side, respondents cite: specifically, Section 44 of the
Land Registration Act No. 496, as amended, the deeds of donation of Jupiter
and Orbit streets executed by and between the Ayala Corporation and the
petitioner, Presidential Decrees No. 957, Secs. 22 and 29 thereof, and No.
1216, Sec. 2 thereof, and Municipal Ordinance No. 17 of the Municipal
Government of Makati, Metro Manila, as amended by Resolution No. 139,
dated November 21, 1948, and contend that the opening of the two (2)
streets was demanded by public necessity and in the exercise of its police
powers, and, ultimately on the argument that petitioner has not shown a
clear legal right to the writ of preliminary injunction.
With leave of court, petitioner filed a reply to the respondents’ comment.
They assert that the streets mentioned in the comment, other than Jupiter
and Orbit streets, have always been kept open voluntarily by the
Association, that Rufino R. Santos, president of petitioner, has never agreed
on the opening of Jupiter and Orbit streets, and that the Torrens titles
covering these streets do not contain similar conditions as those titles for the
other street lots.
Petitioner relies on its ownership of the streets of which it should not
(be) deprived without due process of law, and without just compensation,
Article 539 of the Civil Code, an existing Ordinance of the Metro Manila
Commission No. 2, Sec. 14 thereof, and the concurrence 1
of all the requisites
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
The Court of Appeals found that the certificates of title (Transfer

Certificates of Titles Nos. S-76020, S-76021, S-76022, S-76024, and
S-76055, for Jupiter Street, and 206824, for Orbit Street) do not
contain the restrictions imposed by Section 44 of Act No. 496, now,
Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, for which reason, and
so the Appellate Court held, the Mayor of Makati did not have the
legal right to open them up to traffic. 2
In Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we held that
_______________
1 Rollo, 44-46.
2 G.R. Nos. 71169, 76394, 74376, and 82281, December 22, 1988.
725
VOL. 176, AUGUST 25, 1989 725

Ayala Corporation, the former owner of the Bel-Air subdivision, can

not be held responsible for the opening of Jupiter Street, among
other things,3 because it was the Mayor of Makati who ordered such
an opening. The issue herein, as we indicated, is whether or not the
Mayor could legally have done it. With respect, specifically, to
Jupiter Street, Sangalang avers:
Among other things, there is a recognition under both Ordinances Nos. 81

and 81-01 that Jupiter Street lies as the boundary between Bel-Air Village
and Ayala Corporation’s commercial section. And since 1957, it had been
considered as a boundary—not as a part of either the residential or
commercial zones of Ayala Corporation’s real estate development projects.
Thus, the Bel-Air Village Association’s articles of incorporation state that
Bel-Air Village is “bounded on the NE., from Amapola St., to de los Santos
Ave., by Estrella St., on the SE., from Estrella St., to Pedestrian Lane, by E.
De los Santos Ave., on the SW., from Pedestrian Lane to Reposo St., by
Jupiter Street...” Hence, it cannot be4 said to have been “for the exclusive
benefit” of Bel-Air Village residents.
Sangalang also had occasion to invoke 5

Ortigas & Co., Limited
Partnership v. Feati Bank and Trust Co. We reiterate Ortigas herein:
xxx xxx xxx

2. With regard to the contention that said resolution cannot nullify the
contractual obligations assumed by the defendant-appellee—referring to the
restrictions incorporated in the deeds of sale and later in the corresponding
Transfer Certificates of Title issued to defendant-appellee—it should be
stressed, that while non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally
guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the
legitimate exercise of police power, i.e., “the power to prescribe regulations
to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and
general welfare of the people.” Invariably described as “the most essential,
_______________
3 Apart from the fact that it did not commit itself to close it up. See supra.
4 Supra, 27-28.
5 No. L-24670, December 14, 1979, 94 SCRA 533.
726

insistent, and illimitable of powers” and “in a sense, the greatest and
most powerful attribute of government,” the exercise of the power may be
judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical,

unjust or unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process or a
violation of any other applicable constitutional guarantee. As this Court held
through Justice Jose P. Bengzon in Philippine Long Distance Company vs.
City of Davao, et. al., police power “is elastic and must be responsive to
various social conditions; it is not confined within narrow circumscriptions
of precedents resting on past condition; it must follow the legal progress of a
democratic way of life.” We were even more emphatic in Vda. de Genuino
vs. The Court of Agrarian Relations, et al., when We declared: “We do not
see why public welfare when clashing with the individual right to property
should not be made to prevail through the state’s exercise of its police
power.”
Resolution No. 27, s-1960 declaring the western part of Highway 54,
now E. de los Santos Avenue (EDSA, for short) from Shaw Boulevard to the
Pasig River as an industrial and commercial zone, was obviously passed by
the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise of police
power to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good order and
general welfare of the people in the locality. Judicial notice may be taken of
the conditions prevailing in the area, especially where Lots Nos. 5 and 6 are
located. The lots themselves not only front the highway; industrial and
commercial complexes have flourished about the place. EDSA, a main
traffic artery which runs through several cities and municipalities in the
Metro Manila area, supports an endless stream of traffic and the resulting
activity, noise and pollution are hardly conducive to the health, safety or
welfare of the residents in its route. Having been expressly granted the
power to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations, the
municipality of Mandaluyong, through its Municipal Council, was
reasonably, if not perfectly,
6
justified under the circumstances, in passing the
subject resolution.
The Bel-Air Village Association can not therefore rightfully

complain that His Honor, the Mayor of Makati, in opening up
Jupiter Street, had acted arbitrarily.
In connection with Orbit Street, the Court reaches the same
conclusion. We repudiate, therefore, that part of the assailed
_______________
6 Supra, 545-547.
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VOL. 176, AUGUST 25, 1989 727

decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as it held that the condition

imposed by Section 44, of 7 Act No. 496, now Section 50, of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, that “no portion of any street
_______________
7 Section 44, Act No. 496, provides in full: “Sec. 44. A registered owner of several
distinct parcels of land embraced in a single certificate of title desiring to have in lieu
thereof several new certificates each containing one or more parcels, may file a
petition for that purpose with the register of deeds, and this officer, upon the surrender
of the owner’s duplicate, shall cancel it and its original and issue in lieu thereof the
desired new certificates. So a registered owner of several distinct parcels of land in
separate certificates desiring to have in lieu thereof a single certificate for the whole
land or several certificates for the different portions thereof, may file a petition with
register of deeds, and this officer, upon the surrender of the owner’s duplicates, shall
cancel them and their originals and issue in lieu thereof new ones as requested.
Any owner subdividing a tract of registered land into lots shall file with the Chief
of the General Land Registration Office a subdivision plan of such land on which all
boundaries, streets and passageways, if any, shall be distinctly and accurately
delineated. If no streets or passageways are indicated or no alteration of the perimeter
of the land is made, and it appears that the land as subdivided does not need of them
and that the plan has been approved by the Chief of the General Land Registration
Office, or the Director of Lands as provided in Section fifty-eight of this Act, the
Register of Deeds may issue new certificates of title for any lot in accordance with
said subdivision plan. If there are streets and/or passageways, no new certificates
shall be issued until said plan has been approved by the Court of First Instance of the
province or city in which the land is situated. A petition for that purpose shall be filed
by the registered owner, and the court after notice and hearing, and after considering
the report of the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, may grant the
petition, subject to the condition, which shall be noted on the proper certificate, that
no portion of any street or passageway so delineated on the plan shall be closed or
otherwise disposed of by the registered owner without approval of the court first had,
or may render such judgment as justice and equity may require.
A registered owner desiring to consolidate several lots into one or more, requiring
new technical descriptions, shall file with the Chief of the General Land Registration
Office a plan on which shall be shown the lots to be affected, as they are before, and
as they will appear after
728

or passageway . . . shall be closed or otherwise disposed of by the

registered owner without approval of the court of first
________________
the consolidation. Upon the surrender of the owner’s duplicate certificate or

certificates and the receipt of proper authority from the Chief of the General Land
Registration Office, the register of deeds concerned shall cancel the old certificates
and issue a new one for the consolidated lot or lots.”
Under Section 50, Presidential Decree No. 1529, it is stated: “Sec. 50. Subdivision
and consolidation plans.—Any owner subdividing a tract of registered land into lots
which do not constitute a subdivision project as defined and provided for under P.D.
957, shall file with the Commissioner of Land Registration or with the Bureau of
Lands a subdivision plan of such land on which all boundaries, streets, passageways
and waterways, if any, shall be distinctly and accurately delineated.
If a subdivision plan, be it simple or complex, duly approved by the Commissioner
of Land Registration or the Bureau of Lands together with the approved technical
descriptions and the corresponding owner’s duplicate certificate of title is presented
for registration, the Register of Deeds shall without requiring further court approval
of said plan, register the same in accordance with the provisions of the Land
Registration Act, as amended: Provided, however, that the Register of Deeds shall
annotate on the new certificate of title covering the street, passageway or open space,
a memorandum to the effect that except by way of donation in favor of the national
government, province, city or municipality, no portion of any street, passageway,
waterway or open space so delineated on the plan shall be closed or otherwise
disposed of by the registered owner without the approval of the Court of First
Instance of the province or city in which the land is situated.
A registered owner desiring to consolidate several lots into one or more, requiring
new technical descriptions; shall file with the Land Registration Commission, a
consolidated plan on which shall be shown the lots to be affected, as they were
before, and as they will appear after the consolidation. Upon the surrender of the
owner’s duplicate certificates and the receipt of consolidation plan duly approved by
the Commissioner, the Register of Deeds concerned shall cancel the corresponding
certificates of title and issue a new one for the consolidated lots.
The Commission may not order or cause any change, modification, or amendment
in the contents of any certificate of title, or of any
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VOL. 176, AUGUST 25, 1989 729

8
instance (being first) had . . .” does not apply for lack of an
annotation of such a condition on the certificate of title (Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 206824). To begin with, Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 206824 does contain the annotation in question:
. . . subject to such of the encumbrances mentioned in Section 39 of said Act

as may be subsisting, and the condition that
9
the above lots are subject to the
conditions imposed by Republic Act 440.
Furthermore,10 the very Deed of Donation executed by the Ayala

Corporation covering Jupiter and Orbit Streets, amongst others, and
so we found in Sangalang, effectively required both passageways
open to the general public. We quote:
The alleged undertaking, finally, by Ayala in the deed of donation (over

Jupiter Street) to leave Jupiter Street for the private use of Bel-
________________
decree or plan, including the technical description therein, covering any real property
registered under the Torrens system, nor order the cancellation of the said certificate of title and
the issuance of a new one which would result in the enlargement of the area covered by the
certificate of title.”
8 Act No. 496, sec. 44, supra.
9 Rollo, G.R. 60627, 153, Nota bene: Republic Act No. 440, referred to therein, is an
amendment to Section 44, Act No. 496. Prior to the amendment, Section 44 provided as
follows: “Sec. 44. A registered owner holding one duplicate certificate for several distinct
parcels of land may surrender it, with the approval of the court, and take out several certificates
for portions thereof. So a registered owner holding separate certificates for several distinct
parcels may surrender them, and, with like approval, take out a single duplicate certificate for
the whole land, or several certificates for the different portions thereof. Any owner subdividing
a tract of registered land into lots shall file with the clerk a plan of such land, when applying for
a new certificate or certificates, and the court before issuing the same, shall cause the plan to be
verified and require that all boundaries, streets, and passageways shall be distinctly and
accurately delineated thereon.”
10 The Ayala Corporation was the original owner of the property subsequently subdivided as
Bel-Air Village. See Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra.
730

Air residents is belied by the very provisions of the deed. We quote:
xxx xxx xxx

“IV. That the offer made by the DONOR had been accepted by the DONEE
subject to the condition that the property will be used as a street for the use of the
members of the DONEE, their families, personnel, guests, domestic help and, under
certain reasonable conditions and restrictions, by the general public, and in the event
that said lots or parts thereof cease to be used as such, ownership thereof shall
automatically revert to the DONOR. The DONEE shall always have Reposo Street,
Makati Avenue, and Paseo de Roxas open for the use of the general public. It is also
understood that the DONOR SHALL continue the maintenance of the street at its
expense for a period of three years from date hereof. (Deed of Donation, p. 6, Exh.
7)
xxx xxx xxx
11
The donation on the contrary, gave the general public equal right to it.
As regards Orbit Street, it was stipulated:
1. That the property donated shall be used and maintained as

“private roads or streets for the use of the members of the
Donee, their families, personnel, domestic helps and under
certain reasonable conditions and restrictions, by the
general public;
2. In the event that the properties covered by this donation are

no longer used as such, the same shall automatically revert
to the Donor; and
3. That the Donee shall always have Reposo Street open for
the use of the general public and shall transfer its present
gate barrier located in the intersection of Orbit and Jupiter
to the southern
12
boundary of street Lot 8 of the Plan (LRC)
Psd-77820.”
As we asserted in Sangalang, the opening of Jupiter Street was

warranted by the demands of the common 13
good, in terms of traffic
decongestion and public convenience. We also uphold the opening
of Orbit Street for the same rationale.
_______________
11 Supra, 37.
12 Sangalang, supra, 41-42.
13 Rollo, id., 267.
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VOL. 176, AUGUST 25, 1989 731

There is no merit in BAVA’s claims that the demolition of the gates

at Orbit and Jupiter Streets amounts to deprivation of property
without due 14process of law or expropriation without just
compensation. There is no taking of property involved here. The
act of the Mayor now challenged is, rather, in the concept of police
power. In the 15case of Philippine Association of Service Exporters,
Inc. v. Drilon, we said:
The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has

been defined as the “state authority to enact legislation that may interfere
with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.”
As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or
property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an
exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to
underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.
“Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to
anticipate the future where it could be done provides enough room for an
efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring
the greatest benefits.”
It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does
not owe its origin to the Charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent
domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a
fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to perform the most
vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression has been

credited, refers to it succinctly as the plenary power of the State “to govern
its citizens.”
“The police power of the State . . . is a power coextensive with self-
protection, and it is not inaptly termed the ‘law of overwhelming necessity.’
It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which
enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of
society.”
It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. According to
Fernando, it is “rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and
imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights
did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens
to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated
to ensure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.” Significantly,
the Bill of Rights itself
_______________
14 Rollo, id., 260.

15 G.R. No. 81958, June 30, 1988.
732

does not purport to be an absolute guaranty of individual rights and

liberties “Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted
license to act accordingly to one’s will.” It is subject to16 the far more
overriding demands and requirements of the greater number.
Unlike the power of eminent domain, police power is exercised

without provision for just compensation:
Art. 436. When any property is condemned or seized by competent authority

in the interest of health, safety or security, the owner thereof shall not be
entitled to compensation,
17
unless he can show that such condemnation or
seizure is unjustified.
18
However, it may not be done arbitrarily or unreasonably. But the 19
burden of showing that it is unjustified lies on the aggrieved party.
Our considered opinion is that BAVA has failed to show that the
opening up of Orbit Street was unjustified, or that the Mayor acted
unreasonably. The fact that it has led to the loss of privacy of BAVA
residents is no argument against the Municipality’s effort to ease
vehicular traffic in Makati. Certainly, the duty of a local executive is
to take care of the needs of the greater number, in many cases, at the
expense of the minority.
The next question is whether or not the Mayor, by himself, is

vested with the power to order the demolition so questioned, without
the backing of a proper ordinance. On this score, the Mayor
submitted in evidence Municipal Ordinance No. 17, as 20
amended by
Resolution No. 139, dated November 21, 1948, requiring a
Mayor’s permit to erect construction anywhere in Makati. The
respondent court rejected, however, the Mayor’s reliance on the
Ordinance. We quote:
_______________
16 Supra, 3-5.
17 CIVIL CODE, art. 436.
18 PASEI v. Drilon, supra, 5.
19 CIVIL CODE, art. 436, supra.
20 It does not appear that Orbit Street is covered by Ordinance No. 81-01,
reclassifying various areas in Makati for zonal purposes. See Sangalang v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, supra.
733
VOL. 176, AUGUST 25, 1989 733

Respondents also invoke Municipal Ordinance No. 17, as amended by

Resolution No. 139, dated November 21, 1948, requiring a Mayor’s permit
before any construction of any kind shall be built, erected or constructed in
any place in the Municipality, and empowering the corresponding
authorities especially the Mayor to remove and demolish any such illegal
construction. For a long time the gates and fences removed by agents of
respondents have been in the sites where they were removed. We fail to
comprehend why the respondents did not invoke the Ordinance much
earlier. They cannot pretend ignorance of a condition or situation which was
never concealed from respondents and their agents. At any rate, the Torrens
titles of these street lots which
21
bore no restrictions whatsoever was authority
for its owner to close them.
Quite to the contrary, the Court is convinced that Ordinance No. 17

is a valid justification for the questioned act of the Mayor. The fact
that some time had elapsed before the Mayor acted, can not render
the ordinance uneforceable or void. At any rate, the gate, the
destruction of which
22
opened Orbit Street, has the character of a
public nuisance,
23
in the sense that it “hinders or impairs the use of
property,” which the Civil Code disposes of as follows:
Art. 699. The remedies against a public nuisance are:
(1) A prosecution under the Penal Code or any local ordinance; or

(2) A civil action; or
24
(3) Abatement, without judicial proceedings.
In The Homeowners Associations 25

of El Deposito, Barrio Corazon de
Jesus, San Juan, Rizal v. Lood, we held:
At any rate, the decisive point is that independently of the said ordinance,
petitioners’ constructions which have been duly found to be
_______________
21 Rollo, id., 50.

22 CIVIL CODE, supra, art. 694, par. (5); Art. 695.
23 Supra, art. 694, par. (5).
24 Supra, art. 699.
25 No. L-31864, September 29, 1972, 47 SCRA 174.
734

public nuisances per se (without provision for accumulation or disposal

of waste matters and constructed without building permits contiguously to
and therefore liable to pollute one of the main water pipelines which
supplies potable water to the Greater Manila
26
area) may be abated without
judicial proceedings under our Civil Code.
In addition, under Article 701 of the Code, summary abatement may

be carried out by the Mayor himself.
Although
27
estoppel is a valid defense against abatement of
nuisance, judicially or summarily, the Mayor is not being
condemned for estoppel here, but, rather, for inaction. Under,
however, the Civil Code:
Art. 698.
28
Lapse of time cannot legalize any nuisance, whether public or
private.
Other than BAVA’s claims that the opening of Orbit Street led to the
loss of privacy of BAVA residents, there is no showing that the
Mayor, in carrying out the demolition of the Orbit gate, had acted in
disregard of due process or,29 as the respondent court would put it,
with a “show of arrogance”. As we said, the gate in question was a
nuisance, which could have been legally abated by summary means.
The fact that it was accomplished summarily does not lend to it a
“show of arrogance” because, precisely, a summary method is
allowed by law. In any event, there is a showing that the Mayor 30
notified BAVA that Orbit (and Jupiter) Streets would be opened up.
The Court31
finds that such a notice is compliance enough with due
process.
_______________
26 Supra, 182; see also CIVIL CODE, supra, art. 701.

27 See II PARAS, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 556 (1975 ed.).
28 Rollo, id.
29 Id., 29-30.
30 Id.
31 It is to be stated that, with respect to Jupiter Street, in spite of the fact that we
held it to be open for use by the general public, we would have disposed of it in the
same way we now dispose of Orbit Street, i.e., that the Mayor can legitimately open it
up to the public on the ground that the gate closing it constitutes a nuisance. The gate
closing Jupiter Street would also have been a nuisance.
735
VOL. 176, AUGUST 25, 1989 735

What has been left unsaid is that the nation today is witnessing
profound changes occurring in its midst. A decade ago, we were a
people of forty or so million. Today, the number is knocking on sixty
million. We are reaping the cost that population explosion carries
with it. Housing the homeless has been one of the first casualties.
And so has been the transport system. Giving the homeless homes
and bringing them there safely is a formidable burden and the task of
the hour. Parochial concerns can not be an impediment to the greater
needs of the greatest number.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 60727 is GRANTED;
the motions for reconsiderations in G.R. Nos. 71169, 74376, 76394,
78182, and 82281 are DENIED with FINALITY.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Fernan, (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr.,

Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortés, Medialdea and Regalado,
JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., No part. I am a member of BAVA.
Padilla, J., No part, former director of Ayala Corporation.
Griño-Aquino, J., No part. Signed the Decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals.
Petition in G.R. 60727 granted; motions for reconsideration

denied.
Notes.—The exercise of police power by a local government

council is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the
Philippine Islands, or an Act of the Phil. Legislature, or unless it is
against public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial,
discriminating, or in derogation of common right. (De la Cruz vs.
Paras, 123 SCRA 569.)
The police power of the state has been described as the most
essential insistent illimitable of powers which enables it to prohibit
all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society.
(Lozano vs. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323.)
——o0o——
736
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8/17/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 176

VOL. 176, AUGUST 25, 1989 719

JOSE D. SANGALANG and LUTGARDA D. SANGALANG,

BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs. THE

BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner. vs. THE

BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT

BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT

NEMESIO I. YABUT, Municipal Mayor of Makati, ARTURO R.

720 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

JOSEFO S. LINGAD, Acting Municipal Engineer; NELSON

Local Government; Police Power; The opening of Orbit St. to traffic by

arbitrarily or unreasonably. But the burden of showing that it is unjustified

VOL. 176, AUGUST 25, 1989 721

Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

not render the exercise of police power unjustified.—Our considered

PETITIONS to review the motions for reconsideration from the

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

J. Cesar Sangco and Renato L. Dela Fuente for G.R. No.

722 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

second, by Atty. Raul Sison, counsel for Bel-Air Village Association

Makati; and Ruperto Acle, Station Commander, Southern Police

VOL. 176, AUGUST 25, 1989 723

In its chronological sequence, the petition avers as follows: On October 24,

724 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The Court of Appeals found that the certificates of title (Transfer

VOL. 176, AUGUST 25, 1989 725

Ayala Corporation, the former owner of the Bel-Air subdivision, can

Among other things, there is a recognition under both Ordinances Nos. 81

Sangalang also had occasion to invoke 5

xxx xxx xxx

726 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical,

The Bel-Air Village Association can not therefore rightfully

VOL. 176, AUGUST 25, 1989 727

decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as it held that the condition

728 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

or passageway . . . shall be closed or otherwise disposed of by the

the consolidation. Upon the surrender of the owner’s duplicate certificate or

VOL. 176, AUGUST 25, 1989 729

. . . subject to such of the encumbrances mentioned in Section 39 of said Act

Furthermore,10 the very Deed of Donation executed by the Ayala

The alleged undertaking, finally, by Ayala in the deed of donation (over

730 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Air residents is belied by the very provisions of the deed. We quote:

xxx xxx xxx

As regards Orbit Street, it was stipulated:

1. That the property donated shall be used and maintained as

2. In the event that the properties covered by this donation are

As we asserted in Sangalang, the opening of Jupiter Street was

VOL. 176, AUGUST 25, 1989 731

There is no merit in BAVA’s claims that the demolition of the gates

The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has

vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression has been

14 Rollo, id., 260.

732 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

does not purport to be an absolute guaranty of individual rights and

Unlike the power of eminent domain, police power is exercised

Art. 436. When any property is condemned or seized by competent authority

The next question is whether or not the Mayor, by himself, is