THIRD DIVISION

January 10, 2018

G.R. No. 190817

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner

vs.
ROVENCY REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent

DECISION

MARTIRES, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the 10 March
2009 Decision  and the 3 December 2009 Resolution  of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
1 2

G.R. CV No. 00651, which affirmed the 7 November 2003 Decision  of the Regional Trial
3

Court (RTC), Branch 41, Cagayan de Oro City, in LRA Case No. N-2000-084, which
granted the application for original registration of title to land by respondent Rovency
Realty and Development Corporation (RRDC).

THE FACTS

On 22 March 2001, RRDC filed before the RTC an Amended Application for
Registration  covering a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 3009 (subject land) situated in
4

Barangay Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City, described as follows:

A parcel of land (Lot No. 3009, Cad-237, Cagayan Cadastre) situated in

the Barrio of Carmen, City of Cagayan de Oro, Island of Mindanao.
Bounded on the S., along line 1-2 by Lot 6648; on the NW., along line 2-3
by Lot 30011; along line 3-4 by Lot 301 O; along line 4-5 by Lot 3047;
along line 5-6 by Lot 3020; on the N., along line 6-7 by Lot 3007; on the
SE., along line 8-9 by Lot 6645; along line 9-1 by Lot 3008; all of Cad-
237, Cagayan Cadastre.

Beginning at the point marked "1" on the plan being N. 51 deg. 24'W.,
1091.05 m. from PBM No. 24, Cad-237, Thence;

1-2 S. 79 deg. 15'W. 260.92 m.

2-3 N. 19 deg. 02'E. 231.49 m.
3-4 N. 13 deg. 32'E. 489.77 m.
4-5 N. 61 deg. 39'E. 302.54 m.
5-6 N. 40 deg. 09'E. 146.06 m.
6-7 S. 82 deg. 14'E. 140.06 m.
7-8 S. 24 deg. 28'E. 152.88 m.
8-9 S. 34 deg. 00'W. 448.33 m.
9-1 S. 33 deg. 26'W. 445.73 m.
 beginning; containing an area of THREE HUNDRED EIGHTEEN
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FORTY FIVE (318,345) square meters
more or less. All points referred to are indicated on the plan and marked
on the ground by Old BL., cyl. cone. mons. 15 x 60 cm. Bearing true, date
of Original Survey August 9 & 13, 1929, and that of the preparation June
29, 2000, executed by Crisanto M. Bagares, Geodetic Engineer and
approved on August 1, 2000. 5

RRDC alleged, among others, that it is a domestic corporation duly organized and
existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Republic of the Philippines; that it is the
absolute owner in fee simple of the subject land having acquired the same from its
previous owner, P.N. Roa Enterprises, Inc., by virtue of a notarized deed of absolute sale
executed on 05 March 1997; that the subject land was assessed at ₱2,228,000.00 as
shown in the Tax Declaration (TD) No. 141011; that it has registered the subject land for
taxation purposes and paid the realty taxes due therein from its acquisition, to the filing of
the application; that immediately after acquiring the subject land, it took actual physical
possession of the same and has been continuously occupying the subject land; and that
it and its predecessors-in- interest have been in open, continuous, adverse, and peaceful
possession in concept of owner of the subject land since time immemorial, or for more
than thirty (30) years.

Attached to the application are: original copy of the technical description of the subject
land ; the Tracing Cloth Plan of the survey plan ; Certification in Lieu of
6 7

Surveyor's/Geodetic Engineer's Certificate  issued by the Chief of the Land Surveys

8

Assistance Section, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region X; T.D.

No. 141011 in the name of RRDC  ; and the Deed of Absolute Sale between RRDC and
9

P.N. Roa Enterprises, Inc., dated 5 March 1997. 10

On 16 July 2001, an opposition to the application was filed by the Heirs of Paulino
Avancena. They alleged, that the subject land was already claimed and owned by the
late Atty. Paulino Avancena (Paulino), their father and predecessor-in-interest, as early
as 1926; that Paulino had been in open, continuous, notorious, adverse, and exclusive
possession and occupation of the subject land; that Paulino registered the subject land
for taxation purposes and has paid the taxes due thereon in 1948; that their parents,
Paulino and Rizalina Neri (Rizalina) merely allowed and tolerated Pedro N.
Roa's (Pedro) possession of the subject land after the latter approached them and
requested that he be allowed to use the subject land for his businesses; that Pedro is one
of RRDC's predecessors-in-interest; that sometime in 1994, Rizalina demanded the
return of the subject land from the heirs of Pedro, but to no avail; that in 1996, Rizalina
died leaving the private oppositors as the rightful heirs of the subject land; that their
parents never sold the subject land to Pedro nor to RRDC, and as such, no right or title
over the subject land was passed on to RRDC. Thus, they prayed that RRDC's
application be dismissed, and that their opposition be treated as their own application for
registration.
11

On 3 August 2001, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the

Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed its opposition to the application on the
following grounds: that neither RRDC nor its predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question
since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto; that the subject land exceeds the twelve (12)-hectare
limit for confirmation of imperfect title set by Section 47 of Commonwealth Act (CA.) No.
141, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6940; and that the subject land forms part of
the public domain belonging to the Republic and, thus, not subject to private
appropriation. 12
During trial, RRDC presented the following documents in support of its application: (i)
Deed of Absolute Sale notarized by notary public Paulino Avancena showing that the
subject land was sold by Catalino Ebalo to Nicolas Beja and Maximo Amper on 21 June
1937  ; (ii) Deed of Absolute Sale notarized by notary public Paulino A vancefia showing
13

that a portion of the subject land consisting of 159, 178.5 square meters (first
portion) was sold by Maximo Amper to Perfecto Virtudazo on 07 October 1940  ; (iii) 14

Deed of Absolute Sale notarized by notary public Troadio C. Ubay-ubay showing that the
first portion consisting of 15 hectares, 91 ares and 72 centares (159,172 square meters)
was sold by Trinidad Virtudazo, Israel Virtudazo, and Adelina Virtudazo to Victor D. Beja
on 22 April 1961  ; (iv) Deed of Absolute Sale showing that the first portion of the subject
15

land consisting of 159,172 square meters was sold by Victor D. Beja to Pedro N. Roa on
01 February 196  ; (v) Deed of Absolute Sale notarized by notary public Troadio C. Ubay-
16

ubay showing that the other portion (second portion) of the subject land was sold by
Nicolas Beja to Victor Beja on 22 April 1961  ; (vi) Deed of Sale showing that the second
17

portion was sold by Victor Beja to Pedro N. Roa on 01 February 1967  ; (vii) Deed of
18

Exchange notarized by notary public Jose L. Sabio, Jr. showing that the two portions of
the subject land were conveyed by Pedro N. Roa in favor of P.N. Roa Enterprises, Inc.
on 23 September 1987;  and (viii) Deed of Sale notarized by Rene C. Barbaso showing
19

that the two (2) portions of the subject land were sold by P.N. Roa Enterprises, Inc. to
RRDC on 25 July 1996. 20

RRDC also presented a certification  from the Community Environment and Natural
21

Resources Office (CENRO), Cagayan de Oro City, certifying that the subject land is

alienable and disposable and not covered by any public land application patent and
hence, no patent has been issued thereon. Lastly, RRDC presented several tax
declarations in the name of its predecessors-in-interest, the earliest of which is T.D. No.
91264, which showed that realty taxes on the subject land have been paid in 1947. 22

On the other hand, to support their claim that a patent over the subject land had been
issued in the name of their father, the private oppositors presented a certification  issued
23

by the Records Management Division of the Lands Management Bureau of the

Department of Environment and Natural Resources which merely states that "
...according to the verification made by the Geodetic Surveys Division, survey plan no.
Psu-45882 with an accession no. 284578 is located at Cagayan, Misamis, as per their
EDP listing. It is unfortunate however that as of this moment, this office (Records
Management Division) cannot locate said records despite diligent search made thereon."

The RTC Ruling

In its decision, dated 7 November 2003, the RTC granted RRDC's application for
registration of the subject land. It opined that the CENRO certification, stating that the
subject land is alienable and disposable and not covered by any public land application,
is sufficient to show the character of the land. It further ruled, that RRDC and its
predecessors-in-interest had been in open and continuous possession under a bona
fide claim of ownership over the subject land based on the documentary and testimonial
evidence offered by RRDC, without discussing how these pieces of evidence established
the required possession.

The trial court further brushed aside the opposition interposed by the heirs of Paulino
Avanceña. It was not convinced that the evidence they presented were sufficient to grant
the application in their favor. It noted that the oppositors' claim that they were the rightful
owners of the subject land does not hold water considering that the deeds of sale
presented by RRDC in support of their claim were notarized by Paulino himself.

The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:

 WHEREFORE, this Court considering the evidence of the applicant, the
reports of the Land Registration Authority, Director of Lands and the
Certification of the CENRO, DENR, Cagayan de Oro City, hereby
declares that the applicant, Rovency Realty & Development Corporation,
have sufficient title proper for registration over the parcel of land subject
of this application. The opposition of the Heirs of Paulino Avanceña, is
hereby ordered dismissed, being lack of merit.

Accordingly, in accordance with the prayer of the applicant herein, the

Commissioner, or anyone acting on his behalf is hereby directed to
ISSUE A DECREE OF REGISTRATION and the CORRESPONDING
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE FOR THE PARCEL OF LAND described in the
instant application in favor of RO VEN CY REAL TY and DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION. SO ORDERED. 24

Unconvinced, the Republic, through the OSG, and private oppositors heirs of Paulino
Avancena, elevated their respective appeals to the CA. 25

The Republic contended that the trial court erred in granting the application for
registration, considering that the land applied for is in excess of what is allowed by the
Constitution; and that the Corporation Code further prohibits RRDC to acquire the subject
land unless the acquisition thereof is reasonably necessary for its business. On the other
hand, the Avancena heirs insisted that they are the rightful owners of the subject land, by
virtue of the homestead patent granted to their predecessor-in-interest.

The CA Ruling

In its assailed decision, dated 10 March 2009, the CA affirmed the 7 November 2003
RTC decision. The appellate court concurred with the trial court's findings that the subject
land is alienable and disposable, and that RRDC has sufficiently established the required
period and character of possession. Likewise, the appellate court was not persuaded by
the claims of the heirs. It noted that the private oppositors anchored their claim on the
alleged homestead grant to Paulino, their predecessor-in-interest, which claim was
unsupported by sufficient documentary evidence.

The appellate court also ruled that the 12-hectare limit under the Constitution was not
violated. It explained that Section 3 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the
constitutional provision which provided for the 12-hectare limit in the acquisition of land,
covers only agricultural lands of the public domain. It ratiocinated that when the subject
land was acquired through acquisitive prescription by RRDC's predecessors-in-interest, it
was converted into a private property and, as such, it ceased to be part of the public
domain. Thus, when RRDC acquired the subject land by purchase, it was no longer
within the ambit of the constitutional limitation.

As to the contention that the Corporation Code bars RRDC to acquire the subject land,
the appellate court simply stated that while the said code imposes certain limitations on
the acquisition of real property, there is no such prohibition. It stressed that RRDC is an
artificial being imbued with the power to purchase, hold, and convey real and personal
property for such purposes that are within the objects of its creation. Considering that
RRDC is a corporation engaged in realty business, it has the power to purchase real
properties. The dispositive portion of said decision states:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed November 7, 2003

Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Misamis Oriental, Branch
41, Cagayan de Oro City is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. 26
The Republic moved for reconsideration; while the Heirs of Paulino Avanceña adopted
the Republic's motion for reconsideration as their own. In its resolution, dated 3
December 2009, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this petition.

THE ISSUES

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE AMENDED

APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION AND ORDERING THE ISSUANCE
OF A DECREE OF REGISTRATION AND THE CORRESPONDING
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE FOR A PARCEL OF LAND CONTAINING AN
AREA OF THREE HUNDRED EIGHTEEN THOUSAND THREE
HUNDRED FORTY FIVE (318,345) SQUARE METERS IN FAVOR OF
ROVENCY REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, DESPITE
THE FACTS THAT-

(i) THE LAND APPLIED FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE IS IN EXCESS

OF WHAT IS ALLOWED BY LAW; AND,

(ii) RESPONDENT'S RIGHT TO ACQUIRE THE SUBJECT PARCEL OF

LAND IS FURTHER LIMITED BY THE CORPORATION CODE.

II.

RESPONDENT'S EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE THAT IT

OR ITS PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST HAVE BEEN IN OPEN,
CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION UNDER
A BONA FIDE CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP SINCE JUNE 12, 1945 OR
EARLIER AND THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS NO LONGER INTENDED
FOR PUBLIC USE OR FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL
WEALTH. 27

THE COURT'S RULING

The petition is meritorious.

12-hectare limit under Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution

The Republic argues that the trial and appellate courts erred in granting RRDC's
application for the registration of the subject land, as the same has a total land area of
31.8 hectares, which is way beyond the 12-hectare limit under Section 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution, which provides:

SECTION 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural,

forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of
the public domain may be further classified by law according to the uses
which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be
limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may
not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by
lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not
more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in
area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five
 hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof
by purchase, homestead, or grant. [emphasis supplied]

As can be clearly gleaned from its language, Section 3, Article XII applies only to lands of
the public domain. Private lands are, therefore, outside of the prohibitions and limitations
stated therein. Thus, the appellate court correctly declared that the 12-hectare limitation
on the acquisition of lands under Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution has no
application to private lands.

A case in point is the absolute prohibition on private corporations from acquiring any kind
of alienable land of the public domain. This prohibition could be traced to the 1973
Constitution which limited the alienation of lands of the public domain to individuals who
were citizens of the Philippines. This constitutional prohibition, however, does not
necessarily mean that corporations may not apply for original registration of title to lands.
In fact, the Court, in several instances, affirmed the grant of applications for original
registration filed by corporations,  for as long as the lands were already converted to
28

private ownership by operation of law as a result of satisfying the requisite possession

required by the Public Land Act. 29

In Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court  (Director of Lands), the Court

30

granted the application for original registration of parcels of land filed by a corporation
which acquired the lands by purchase from members of the Dumagat tribe. The Court
ratiocinated that the lands applied for registration were already private lands even before
the corporation acquired them. The Court observed that the sellers, being members of
the national cultural minorities, had by themselves and through their predecessors,
possessed and occupied the lands since time immemorial. As a consequence of their
open, exclusive, and undisputed possession over the said lands for the period required
by law for the acquisition of alienable lands of the public domain, said lands ceased to
become part of the public land and were converted, by operation of law, into private
ownership. As such, the sellers, if not for their conveyance of the lands in question to the
corporation, were entitled to exercise the right granted to them by the Public Land Act to
have their title judicially confirmed. Considering further that the lands in question were
already private in character at the time the corporation acquired them, the constitutional
prohibition does not apply to the corporation.

In Republic v. TA.N. Properties   (TA.N. Properties), the Court stressed that what is

31

determinative for the application of the doctrine in Director of Lands is for the corporate
applicant for land registration to establish that when it acquired the land, the same was
already private land by operation of law because the statutory acquisitive prescriptive
period of 30 years had already lapsed.

The pronouncements in Director of Lands and TA.N. Properties apply with equal force to

the 12-hectare limitation, considering that both the limitation and the prohibition on
corporations to acquire lands, do not cover ownership of private lands. Stated differently,
whether RRDC can acquire the subject land and to what extent, depends on whether the
pieces of evidence it presented before the trial court sufficiently established that the
subject land is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and that the nature
and duration of the possession of its individual predecessors-in-interest converted the
subject land to private land by operation of law.

Requirements for original registration of title to land

In Republic of the Philippines vs. Cortez,  the Court explained that applicants for original
32

registration of title to land must first establish compliance with the provisions of either
Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, which state:
 Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in interest

have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription

under the provision of existing laws.

It must be emphasized that the requirements and bases for registration under these two
provisions of law differ from one another. Section 14 (1) mandates registration on the
basis of possession, while Section 14 (2) entitles registration on the basis of
prescription.  Thus, it is important to ascertain under what provision of Section 14 the
33

registration is sought.

A reading of the application, however, is unavailing. In its application, RRDC alleged that
it and its predecessors-in-interest "had been in open, continuous, adverse, and peaceful
possession in concept of owner of the subject property since time immemorial or for more
than thirty years." This allegation made it unclear whether registration is sought under
Section 14(1) - possession since 12 June 1945 or earlier; or under Section 14(2) -
possession for more than thirty years.

An examination of the 7 November 2003 RTC decision also proved futile considering
that, and as previously pointed out, aside from enumerating the exhibits offered by the
applicant, the trial court did not discuss how these pieces of evidence established the
requisites for registration. Thus, for the proper resolution of the issues and arguments
raised herein, it becomes necessary for the present application to be scrutinized based
on the requirements of the provisions of Sections 14 (1) and (2) of P.D. No. 1529.

Registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529

Under Section 14(1), applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish the
following requisites: first, that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable
lands of the public domain; second, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
the same; and third, that the possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12
June 1945, or earlier.34

The first requisite of Section 14(1) entails only that the property sought to be registered
be alienable and disposable at the time of the filing of the application for registration.  To
35

prove that the land sought to be registered is alienable and disposable, the present rule
is that the application for original registration must be accompanied by (1) a CENRO or
PENRO Certification; and (2) a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary, and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. This
36

strict requirement for the registration of lands enunciated in TA.N Properties had been
consistently applied and affirmed by the Court in a plethora of cases. 37

In the present case, to prove that the subject land is alienable and disposable, RRDC
presented a CENRO certification stating that the subject land is "alienable and
disposable and not covered by any public land application." RRDC, however, failed to
present a certified true copy of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary declaring the subject land alienable and disposable. Clearly, the evidence
presented by RRDC falls short of the requirements in TA.N. Properties. Thus, the trial
and appellate courts erred when they ruled that the subject land is alienable and
disposable part of the public domain and susceptible to original registration.

Furthermore, RRDC also failed to prove that it and its individual predecessors-in-interest
sufficiently complied with the required period and nature of possession.

An applicant for land registration must exhibit that it and its predecessors-in-interest had
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
land under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier. It has been held
that possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious, and not
clandestine; it is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken, and not intermittent or
occasional; it is exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion
over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and notorious when it
is so conspicuous, that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in
the neighborhood. 38

In Republic vs. Remman Enterprises, Inc.,   the Court held that for purposes of land
39

registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, proof of specific acts of ownership
must be presented to substantiate the claim of open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the land subject of the application. Applicants for
land registration cannot just offer general statements which are mere conclusions of law
rather than factual evidence of possession. Actual possession is in the manifestation of
acts of dominion over it of such nature as a party would actually exercise over his own
property.

In Republic v. Gielczyk, the Court explained that "possession" and "occupation" are not
synonymous to each other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes
constructive possession; whereas occupation delimits the all-encompassing effect of
constructive possession. Thus, taken together with the words open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious, the word occupation means that for one's title to land to be
judicially recognized, his possession of the land must not be mere fiction.40

In this case, aside from the deeds of absolute sale covering the subject land which were
executed prior to 12 June 1945, RRDC did not present any evidence which would show
that its predecessors-in-interest actually exercised acts of dominion over the subject land
even before the cut-off period. As such, RRDC failed to prove that its possession of the
land, or at the very least, its individual predecessors-in-interest's possession over the
same was not mere fiction.

Neither would the tax declarations presented by RRDC suffice to prove the required
possession. To recall, the earliest of these tax declarations dates back only to 1948.
Clearly, the required possession and occupation since 12 June 1945 or earlier, was not
demonstrated.

From the foregoing, it is clear that RRDC failed to prove that its individual predecessors-
in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945
or earlier; and that said possession and occupation converted the subject land into a
private property by operation of law. Consequently, the subject land cannot be registered
in the name of RRDC under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529.

Requirements under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529

RRDC also failed to establish compliance with the requirements for registration under
Section 14(2).
In Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic (Malabanan),  the Court explained that when
41

Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 provides that persons "who have acquired ownership over
private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws," it unmistakably refers
to the Civil Code as a valid basis for the registration of lands. The Civil Code is the only
existing law that specifically allows the acquisition by prescription of private lands,
including patrimonial property belonging to the State.

The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by
private persons through prescription.  This is brought about by Article 1113, which states
1âwphi1

that all things which are within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription, and
that property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not
be the object of prescription.42

Nonetheless, this does not necessarily mean that when a piece of land is declared
alienable and disposable part of the public domain, it can already be acquired by
prescription. In Malabanan, this Court ruled that declaration of alienability and
disposability is not enough - there must be an express declaration that the public
dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the
national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial, thus:

"(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree,

consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode
of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain
lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that
these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express
government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no
longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth,
under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has
become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of
property of the public dominion begin to run. "  [emphasis supplied]
43

The classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does
not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil
Code. As such, said land, although classified as alienable and disposable, is
insusceptible to acquisition by prescription. 44

In this case, RRDC did not present any evidence which would show that the subject land
was expressly declared as no longer intended for public service or the development of
the national wealth, or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Hence, it
failed to prove that acquisitive prescription has begun to run against the State, and that it
has acquired title to the subject land by virtue thereof.

In fine, RRDC failed to satisfy all the requisites for registration of title to land under either
Sections 14(1) or (2) of P.D. No. 1529. RRDC also failed to establish that when it or P.N.
Roa Enterprises, Inc., also a corporation and its direct predecessor-in-interest, acquired
the subject land, it had already been converted to private property, thus, the prohibition
on the corporation's acquisition of agricultural lands of the public domain under Section 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution applies. RRDC's application for original registration of
imperfect title over Lot No. 3009 must perforce be denied.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The 10 March 2009 Decision and 3
December 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00651, which
affirmed the 7 November 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Cagayan
de Oro City, in LRA Case No. N-2000-084, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Application for Registration of Lot No. 3009 filed by Rovency Realty and Development
Corporation is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

SAMUEL R. MARTIRES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ALEXANDER G. GESMUNDO
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decisionhad been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

 Rollo, pp. 59-75.
1

 Id. at 76-77.
2

 Id. at 78-91.
3

 CA rollo, pp. 466-470.
4

 Id. at 474.
5

 Id.
6

 Id. at 475.
7
 Id. at 476.
8

 Id. at 477.
9

10
 Id. at 478-479.

11
 Id. at 480-484.

12
 Id. at 489-490.

13
 Id. at 500.

14
 Id. at 501.

15
 Id. at 502-503.

16
 Id. at 504-505.

17
 Id. at 507-508.

18
 Id. at 509-511.

19
 Id. at 512-514.

20
 Id. at 515-516.

21
 Id. at 551.

22
 Id. at 553.

23
 Id. at 230.

24
 Id. at 557-558.

25
 Id. at 239-240, 279 and 432-433.

26
 Id. at 216.

27
 Rollo, pp. 30-31.

 Republic v. So god Development Corporation, 781 Phil. 78, 89 (2016); Director of

28

Lands v. Bengzon, 236 Phil. 396, 406 (1987).

29
 Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, 717 Phil. 141, 166 (2013).

30
 230 Phil.590, 597 (1986).

31
 578 Phil. 441, 461 (2008).

32
 726 Phil. 212, 220-221 (2014).

33
 Espiritu v. Republic, G.R. No. 219070, 21 June 2017.
  Republic v. Estate of Virginia Santos, G.R. No. 218345, 07 December 2016.
34

 Republic v. Roasa, 752 Phil. 439, 447 (2015).

35

 Republic v. De Guzman Vda. De Jason, 728 Phil. 550, 563 (2014).

36

 Republic v. Alora, 762 Phil. 695, 704 (2015); Republic v. Sps. Castuera, 750 Phil. 884,
37

890-891 (2015); Republic v. Lualhati, 757 Phil. 119, 131 (2015); Republic v. Sese, 735

Phil. 108, 121 (2014).

 Republic vs. Gielczyk, 720 Phil. 385, 403 (2013).

38

 727 Phil. 608, 625 (2014 ).

39

 Supra note 38 at 402.
40

 605 Phil. 244, 274 (2009).

41

 Id.
42

 Id. at 285.
43

 Supra note 34.
44