Article - Mercer Capital Guide Option Pricing Model
Article - Mercer Capital Guide Option Pricing Model
Article - Mercer Capital Guide Option Pricing Model
Executive Summary
The option pricing model is often used to value ownership interests in early-
stage companies.
The whitepaper closes with some thought on reconciling OPM results with the
market participant perspective.
MERCER CAPITAL
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Originally Published on the Financial Reporting Blog, May 2016 www.mercercapital.com
A Layperson’s Guide to the
Option Pricing Model
Everything You Wanted to Know, But Were Afraid to Ask
by Travis W. Harms, CFA, CPA/ABV
The option pricing model, or OPM, is one of the shiniest new tools in the valuation specialist’s toolkit.
While specialists have grown accustomed to working with the tool and have faith in the results of its use,
many non-specialists remain wary, as the model – and its typical presentation – has all the trappings of
a proverbial black box. The purpose of this whitepaper is to clarify the fundamental insights underlying
the model and illustrate its application so that non-specialist users of valuation reports can gain greater
comfort with the model. We will also address some qualitative concerns regarding use of the method in
practice.
The OPM becomes useful only after the value of the business enterprise has been determined through
application of valuation methods under the asset-based, income and market approaches. The OPM is
a tool for allocating the total equity value to individual ownership classes in a complex capital structure.
For enterprises with a simple capital structure (i.e., a single class of common equity), the OPM is not
necessary and should not be used. However, when the subject business enterprise features multiple
classes of preferred and/or common equity with differing economic rights, the OPM can be a most
effective tool for differentiating the value of the various ownership classes. Such complex capital struc-
tures are most frequently encountered in early-stage enterprises, which are commonly valued for equity
compensation and portfolio fair value reporting.
Consider a simple example. SimpleCo is capitalized with a single class of preferred shares and a single
class of common shares. Upon liquidation or sale of SimpleCo, the preferred shareholders are entitled to
receive $500, with the residual accruing to the common shareholders. The economic terms of the capital
structure are summarized in Exhibit 1.
$100 $100 $0
$200 $200 $0
$300 $300 $0
$400 $400 $0
$500 $500 $0
1. Financial engineering does not create value. In every possible state of the world, the sum
of the payoffs to the preferred and common shareholders is equal to the equity value. Creative
pie-slicing does not make the pie any bigger.
2. The payoffs to the common shareholders have the same basic shape as a call option.
The holder of a call option receives no payoff when the stock price is less than or equal to the
strike price. However, the call option holder participates dollar-for-dollar in appreciation above
the strike price.
In light of these observations, we can express the value of the preferred and common share as shown
in Exhibit 2 above.
By recasting the preferred and common equity classes into the component securities, the subjective
judgment associated with selecting the appropriate yield on the preferred shares has been eliminated,
as the value of the preferred shares is simply the excess of equity value over the value of a call option
with a strike price of $500.
What Is a “Breakpoint”?
Moving to a more complex example will allow us to explain and define additional vocabulary terms from
the OPM. Exhibit 3 summarizes the capital structure for ComplexCo.
Conversion/ Fully-
Liquidation Liquidation Exercise Diluted % of
Preference Priority Price Shares Total
Class A Preferred $1,000 Pari Passu $2.00 500 19.6%
While this capital structure is still quite tame relative to many real-world counterparts, it is sufficiently
complex to illustrate the fundamental tools used in OPM applications.
One could construct a payoff table similar to that in Exhibit 1. While certainly possible, doing so can
become a bit cumbersome as the complexity of the capital structure increases. As a shortcut, valuation
specialists identify the relevant “breakpoints” in the capital structure. In the OPM, a breakpoint is an
equity value beyond which the marginal allocation of incremental value to the various equity classes
changes. SimpleCo had a single breakpoint, while ComplexCo will prove to have four. We often see
cases in which a dozen or more can be identified.
Breakpoints are identified starting with an equity value of $0. For ComplexCo, the Class A and
Class B preferred shares participate on a pari passu basis, so the first breakpoint is the aggregate
liquidation preference, or $2,500 (the total “Net Proceeds” in Exhibit 4). Additional elements of Exhibit 4
will be explained as we proceed through the example.
For equity values from $0 to $2,500, the Class A preferred shareholders will receive 40% of value, and
the Class B preferred shareholders will receive 60%. For equity values above $2,500, the marginal
proceeds will be allocated differently, as shown in Exhibit 5. This change in allocation is what makes
$2,500 a breakpoint in this example.
The next change in the allocation of proceeds will occur when the Class A Preferred shares convert to
common. At common share values greater than $2.00 per share, the Class A Preferred shareholders
will elect to convert, as their net proceeds from conversion will exceed the liquidation preference. As a
result, the number of as-if converted shares increases, but the liquidation preference attributable to the
Class A shares is forfeited. The corresponding breakpoint equity value is $5,500.
Breakpoint #3 corresponds to the common share price that will induce the Class B Preferred share-
holders to convert to common shares ($5.00). In other words, the Class B Preferred shareholders will
elect to convert, and be treated as common shareholders when the total equity value exceeds $11,500
(Exhibit 6).
Beyond the last breakpoint, marginal proceeds can be allocated according to an additional illustrative
payoff schedule assuming some arbitrary share price in excess of the last breakpoint, as shown in
Exhibit 8 on page 7.
What is a “Tranche”?
The next step in applying the OPM is to build a matrix that identifies the marginal allocation percentages
between the various breakpoints. For purposes of the OPM, a “tranche” is the difference between two
adjacent breakpoints. The marginal proceeds within a given tranche are allocated to the various equity
classes in fixed proportions (Exhibit 9 on page 8).
The marginal tranche allocation matrix summarizes the relative allocation to the various equity classes
within the respective tranches. The allocations were calculated in the corresponding breakpoint tables.
The illustrative upside scenario (Exhibit 8) allows us to confirm marginal allocation percentages for
values in excess of the final breakpoint. Note that the marginal allocation percentages for the final
tranche are equal to the proportion of total fully-diluted shares outstanding from each equity class.
The next step is to determine the value of each tranche. In doing so, we will work from right to left.
Recall from our SimpleCo example that the portion of equity value in excess of a given amount can be
Marginal Allocations
calculated with reference to a call option on the underlying equity value with a corresponding strike price.
In the case of ComplexCo, the value of the upside in excess of the final breakpoint ($23,000) is equal to
the value of a call option having a strike price equal to that breakpoint value.
What about the value of the next tranche down? Following the same approach, the value of all of the
upside beyond $11,500 is equal to the value of a call option on the underlying equity value having that
strike price. The value of this call option represents the combined value of Tranche D and Tranche E.
Since the value of Tranche E is known, the value of Tranche D can readily be calculated by subtraction.
As shown in Exhibit 10 on page 9, the value of lower tranches is measured following the same proce-
dure. Note that – in keeping with first observation above – the sum of the individual tranche values is
equal to the equity value. Financial engineering can create complexity, but does not create value.
Finally, the tranche values are apportioned to the individual equity classes in accordance with the
percentages from the marginal tranche allocation matrix (Exhibit 9). As shown in Exhibit 11 on page 9,
the value of a particular equity class is the sum of the values of that class’s respective allocations for
each tranche.
The aggregate values are converted to per share amounts in Exhibit 12 on page 10.
On a per share basis, the results conform to expectations regarding the relative value of the various
classes. The higher liquidation preference of the Class B preferred shares causes those shares to be
most valuable. The common shares, which do not have any liquidation preference, are worth less than
either class of preferred shares. Finally, the strike price on the warrants reduces the value of those
instruments relative to common shares.
Calculated by subtraction
Marginal Allocations
Marginal Values
Calculated by addition
More exotic, and less common, features of preferred shares include price or return hurdles that influence
the allocation of proceeds to the equity holders. The OPM can also be accommodated to these features.
So long, as the feature can be reduced to a function of total equity value (i.e., for a given total equity
value, there is one and only one possible allocation of proceeds to the various classes), the feature can
be valued within the OPM framework.
Not all features can be reduced to a function of total equity value, however. The OPM cannot be adapted
to directly value differential voting rights, price protection or ratchet provisions, drag-along and tag-along
rights, pre-emptive rights. Some notable recent late-stage rounds have featured complex anti-dilution
provisions, including guaranteed minimum returns in the event of an IPO that go beyond the protections
offered by traditional price ratchets. When such features are present, valuation specialists need to consider
whether a discrete adjustment to the results of the OPM analysis should be made in measuring fair value.
The OPM allocates the value of the existing capital structure, with the volatility parameter determining
the potential changes in the value of the existing equity classes. Future issuances of additional equity
are assumed to pull their own economic weight (i.e., neither contribute to, nor detract from, the value
of the existing equity classes). As a result, there is no need to make assumptions in the OPM for the
amount, timing, or pricing of future equity raises.
Calculated by subtraction
The OPM inputs can be developed, and tested for reasonableness, in the same manner as in other
applications of the Black-Scholes model.
• Stock Price. The stock price in the OPM is the total equity value of the subject business.
The total equity value is derived through application of traditional valuation methods under the
asset-based, income and market approaches. As will be discussed in a subsequent section, a
known value for a particular component of the capital structure can be used to find the implied
total equity value (the “back-solve” method).
• Exercise Price. The exercise prices in the OPM correspond to the equity value breakpoints
identified in the formal analysis of the capital structure.
• Time to Expiration. In applying the OPM, one must assume a single point estimate for when
liquidity will be achieved, either through dissolution, strategic sale, or IPO. While the actual time
to expiration cannot be known with certainty, reasonable estimates can generally be made by
reference to the subject company’s life cycle stage, funding needs, and strategic outlook.
• Volatility. As with time to expiration, volatility cannot be directly observed. The most common
starting point for volatility analysis is an examination of historical return volatility for a group of
peer public companies. If reliable data is available, implied volatility from publicly traded options
on the shares of such companies may also be consulted. Analysts adjust the observed peer
volatility measures to take into account life cycle stage, remaining milestones, and other quali-
tative factors pertaining to the subject company.
• Risk-free Rate. The risk-free rate corresponds to the assumed time to expiration.
The most challenging assumptions to establish and support in application of the OPM are the time to
expiration and volatility. As discussed in the following section, testing the sensitivity of the OPM output
to variation in these inputs is a critical element of assessing reasonableness.
Beyond mere mechanical integrity, an additional step in assessing the reasonableness of the OPM
output is to consider the sensitivity of the resulting allocation to changes in key inputs, principally time to
expiration and volatility. Exhibit 13 below provides such sensitivity analysis for ComplexCo.
We can make a few general observations from the sensitivity analysis in Exhibit 13.
1. Since the OPM is an allocation model, the total value of the equity classes is unaffected by
changes in inputs. The only impact such changes can have is on the relative allocation to
various classes. This is purely a zero-sum game; for one class to increase in value, one or more
other classes must decrease in value.
Difference between
$0.34 $0.69 $0.94 $0.15 $0.69 $1.27
Class B & Common
3. The Class B preferred shares benefit from downside protection, as the proximity of the conver-
sion price ($5.00) to the current common share price increases the likelihood that the liqui-
dation preference will preserve returns to the Class B preferred shareholders. The payoff to
the Class B preferred shareholders is asymmetric since the upside is unlimited through the
conversion feature, while the downside is constrained by the liquidation preference. As a result,
assumptions that increase the dispersion of potential future outcomes (longer time to expiration
and higher volatility) cause the value of the Class B preferred shares to increase.
4. The junior preferred shares (Class A) are directionally aligned with the common shares,
although the fixed liquidation preference dampens volatility relative to the common shares. In
cases of short times to expiration and low volatility, the per share value for Class A approaches
that of the common as the likelihood that the current share price ($7.35) will fall below the Class
A conversion price ($2.00) diminishes to a trivial level.
5. The sensitivity of the common shares, which are situated between the preferred classes and
the warrants, is less predictable. In this case, the warrants have a parasitic relationship to
the common shares, such that increases in the value of the warrants are accompanied by
decreases in common share value. This relationship does not always obtain, however; the rela-
tive proportions of the instruments in the capital structure and the “moneyness” of the various
capital structure components will determine the sensitivity of the common.
With reference to seniority, the equity classes at the “edges” of the capital structure are those that
experience the greatest relative benefit from a skewed outcome. The most senior class benefits (on
a relative basis) from the liquidation preference in a downside scenario, while the most junior class
experiences the greatest marginal benefit from an upside scenario. Since the classes at the “edges” gain
the most from skewed outcomes, they exhibit the greatest sensitivity to volatility and time factors, with
the “interior” classes are less sensitive (Exhibit 14).
Class A Preferred
Muted Sensitivity
Common
Exhibit 15 on page 15 summarizes a comparison of the two models along a variety of axes.
As an example, consider the case of ComplexCo at the time the Class B preferred shares were issued
at a price of $5.00 per share (one year prior to the valuation date in our Part 1 example). What was the
implied total equity value of the company at that time? By starting with the known value of $5.00 per
Class B preferred share, we can work backward, developing estimates for all the other assumptions, to
determine the implied total equity value. In this case, we conclude that all assumptions are unchanged
from Exhibit 10, with the exception of time to expiration, which is five years, instead of four. As shown in
Exhibit 16, the resulting total equity value is $7,242 at the issuance date, compared to $17,500 at the later
valuation date from our prior example.
Total $7,242
This procedure is reasonable and appropriate in many circumstances. In our experience, however, it
is important to keep in mind how the limitations of the OPM (primarily the lognormal distribution of
outcomes) can distort the results of the analysis. When reading “backwards” from the value of a single
equity class to the value of all equity, the effect of such distortions can be magnified. In our experience,
the potential magnitude of such distortion is greatest when the known value is for the most senior
OPM PWERM
Required Assumptions In addition to the breakpoints and Requires more assumptions than the
tranche allocations dictated by the OPM. Analyst must specify amount,
capital structure terms, requires only timing and probability of future liquidity
five inputs. events as well as dilution from future
financing rounds and class-specific
discount rates.
Sensitivity to As shown in Exhibit 13, sensitivity for Since the PWERM is both a valuation
Assumptions many classes is somewhat muted. and allocation method, sensitivity to
Since the OPM is only an allocation changes in inputs is potentially greater
method, the impact of changes in than with OPM.
inputs on allocation is generally tame
compared to that in typical valuation
methods.
Flexibility / Adaptability Small number of required assumptions Can be readily adapted to unique
limits the flexibility and adaptability of features, such as price protection
the model. Cannot accomodate some or ratchets. Offers the flexability to
common features of preferred shares consider a range of potential future
such as mandatory conversion at IPO, outcomes that more closely represent
IPO price guarantees and the like. the market participant perspective
The assumed lognormal distribution of than a lognormal distribution. Allows
outcomes may not be representative the analyst to consider outcomes at
for many development-stage entities. different times, and to model dilution
from future funding rounds (even down
rounds).
Auditability While not necessarily intuitive for While the required inputs correlate to
non-specialists, small number of assumptions that market participants
assumptions and translation of actually make, convincing and docu-
governing documents to formal mentable support for these estimates
structure of model is highly auditable. may prove elusive.
In our view, these distortions can be further aggravated when the equity class used to calibrate the total
equity value accounts for only a small portion of the subject company’s capital structure. In our practice,
we temper the effect of this issue by also giving weight to the total equity value which is the product of
the known per share price and the fully-diluted share count.
In our experience working with market participants in early-stage companies, new financing rounds
are generally priced through a two-step process: (1) negotiate the pre-money total equity value of the
company, and (2) divide that figure by the fully-diluted share count. These market participants clearly
understand that the economic rights associated with senior preferred shares are valuable. However,
they do not develop or express a discrete estimate of that value. We suspect that there are at least two
potential explanations for this. First, the economic rights that benefit the senior preferred shares may
be the required “sweetener” to arrive at the headline total equity value. Second, in many early-stage
companies, the actual benefit of a liquidation preference may be perceived as limited. Certainly, the
scenario that would trigger payout of a liquidation preference, in lieu of participating as common share-
holder following conversion, is sub-optimal. If the most likely outcomes are smashing success (in which
case everyone converts and is treated equally) or abysmal failure (in which case being first in line to get
nothing is not helpful), market participants may be less impressed by the economic rights accruing to the
senior securities than the OPM would seem to be.
Assuming we are right, this perfectly rational behavior on the part of market participants can put those
with the responsibility to measure fair value in a difficult spot. Consider a company that recently closed
a $20 million Class B round, with customary liquidation preferences and conversion rights. The term
sheet states that the pre-money equity value is $100 million. There are 10 million Class A preferred and
common shares outstanding, and the issuance price for the Class B round is $10 per share.
As shown in Exhibit 17, there are three logical possibilities in this case. The only case that is inconsistent
with the OPM is the one that reflects the actual, stated terms of the transaction.
There is no simple solution to this conundrum. However, to our mind it does underscore the appropriate
posture toward analytical tools like the OPM. The fair value measurement tool should serve the market
TEV = $100 million TEV = $100 million TEV < $100 million
participant perspective; the market participant perspective should not be subordinated to the fair value
measurement tool, no matter how insightful and “correct” it may be. As we have noted on our Financial
Reporting Blog, Fidelity reports identical per share values for different equity classes of a given investee
company. In doing so, one is effectively disregarding the differential economic rights of the various
classes. Strictly speaking, such a conclusion is economically untenable. Yet, it likely mirrors how Fidelity,
and other market participants, actually view value.
Conclusion
Use of the OPM in fair value measurement is growing. The model has many attractive attributes, including
its precision, small number of assumptions, muted sensitivities, and auditability. However, the model is
not necessarily appropriate in all circumstances. The underlying assumption of lognormality may not
be appropriate for some companies, and may limit the usefulness of the backsolve technique for deter-
mining implied total equity values. In our view, the model is best used in conjunction with the PWERM.
Finally, as with all fair value measurement models, valuation specialists should carefully evaluate the
degree to which the results of the model cohere with the market participant perspective.
Mercer
Mercer Capital provides business valuation and financial advisory
services to venture capital firms and other financial sponsors.
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Madeleine L. Harrigan
901.322.9756
[email protected]
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