PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (2015-2018 JURISPRUDENCE)

Article 6 of the Civil Code

1. EDNA MABUGAY-OTAMIAS v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 189516     June 08, 2016
 
FACTS:
 
Petitioner Edna Mabugay-Otamias (Edna) and retired Colonel Francisco B. Otamias (Colonel
Otamias) were married on June 16, 1978 and had five (5) children. On September 2000, Edna
and Colonel Otamias separated due to his alleged infidelity. Their children remained with Edna.
On August 2002, Edna filed a Complaint-Affidavit against Colonel Otamias before the Provost
Marshall Division of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Edna demanded monthly support
equivalent to 75% of Colonel Otamias' retirement benefits. Colonel Otamias executed an
Affidavit. On February 26, 2003, Colonel Otamias executed a Deed of Assignment where he
waived 50% of his salary and pension benefits in favor of Edna and their children. The Deed of
Assignment was considered by the parties as a compromise agreement. Colonel Otamias
retired on April 1, 2003. The agreement was honored until January 6, 2006. Edna alleged that
the Armed Forces of the Philippines suddenly decided not to honor the agreement between
Colonel Otamias and his legitimate family.

In a letter dated April 3, 2006, the Armed Forces of the Philippines Pension and Gratuity
Management Center (AFP PGMC) informed Edna that a court order was required for the AFP
PGMC to recognize the Deed of Assignment.

In another letter dated April 17, 2006, the AFP PGMC reiterated that it could not act on Edna's
request to receive a portion of Colonel Otamias' pension "unless ordered by the appropriate
court.”

Heeding the advice of the AFP PGMC, Edna, on behalf of herself and Jeffren M. Otamias and
Jemwel M. Otamias (Edna, et al.), filed a case. 
 
ISSUE:
 
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the AFP Finance Center cannot be directed to
automatically deduct the amount of support needed by the legitimate family of Colonel Otamias.
 
RULING:

Article 6 of the Civil Code provides:

Article 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
The concept of waiver has been defined by this Court as: a voluntary and intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or
privilege, which except for such waiver the party would have enjoyed; the voluntary
abandonment or surrender, by a capable person, of a right known by him to exist, with the intent
that such right shall be surrendered and such person forever deprived of its benefit; or such
conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such right; or the intentional doing of
an act inconsistent with claiming it.
 
In determining whether a statutory right can be waived, this Court is guided by the following
pronouncement: The doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges of any character, and,
since the word 'waiver' covers every conceivable right, it is the general rule that a person may
waive any matter which affects his property, and any alienable right or privilege of which he is
the owner or which belongs to him or to which he is legally entitled, whether secured by
contract, conferred with statute, or guaranteed by constitution, provided such rights and
privileges rest in the individual, are intended for his sole benefit, do not infringe on the rights of
others, and further provided the waiver of the right or privilege is not forbidden by law, and does
not contravene public policy; and the principle is recognized that everyone has a right to waive,
and agree to waive, the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of
the individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without
infringing on any public right, and without detriment to the community at large.
 
When Colonel Otamias executed the Deed of Assignment, he effectively waived his right to
claim that his retirement benefits are exempt from execution. The right to receive retirement
benefits belongs to Colonel Otamias. His decision to waive a portion of his retirement benefits
does not infringe on the right of third persons, but even protects the right of his family to receive
support.

Art. 19 CC (Damages)

1. PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK v. GOMEZ

G.R. No. 199601     November 23, 2015
 
FACTS:
 
Josephine D. Gomez (Josephine) was a teller at the Domestic Airport Branch of the PCIB when
a certain Colin R. Harrington opened an account with said branch in January 1985. The
following day, Harrington presented two (2) genuine bank drafts. The PCIB, on the other hand,
alleged that it was a certain Sophia La'O, as a representative of Harrington, who presented the
bank drafts for deposit. Upon receipt of the bank drafts, Josephine asked her immediate
supervisor, Eleanor Flores, whether the drafts payable to "Servants C/C.R. Harrington" were
acceptable for deposit to the savings account of Harrington. When Flores answered in the
affirmative, and after receiving from the bank's foreign exchange supervision a Philippine
Currency conversion of the amounts reflected in the drafts, Josephine received the deposit slip.
Thereafter, the deposits were duly entered in Harrington's savings account. On two (2) separate
dates, a certain individual representing himself as Harrington withdrew the sums of P45, 000.00
and P5,600.00. Subsequently, the bank discovered that the person who made the withdrawals
was an impostor. Thus, the bank had to pay Harrington P50, 600.00 representing the amounts
of the bank drafts in his name. On November 14, 1985, the PCIB deducted the amount of P-
423.38 from Josephine's salary. Josephine wrote the PCIB to ask why the deduction was made.
After due investigation on the matter, the PCIB issued another memorandum finding Josephine
grossly negligent and liable for performing acts in violation of established operating procedures.
The memorandum required Josephine to pay the amount of P50, 600.00 through deductions in
her salary, allowance, bonuses, and profit sharing until the amount is fully paid. Josephine filed
a complaint for damages with prayer for preliminary injunction before the RTC of Makati City.
She claimed that the PCIB had abused its right by gradually deducting from her salary the
amount the bank had to pay Harrington.
 
ISSUE:
 
Whether or not PCIB is liable for damages.
 
RULING:
 
Yes. Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every person in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties must act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty
and good faith. The principle embodied in this provision is more commonly known as the "abuse
of right principle." The legal sanctions for violations of this fundamental principle are found in
Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil Code. Both the RTC and the CA found the acts of the PCIB were
in clear violation of Article 19 of the Civil Code and held the PCIB liable for damages. While the
PCIB has a right to penalize employees for acts of negligence, the right must not be exercised
unjustly and illegally. In the instant case, the PCIB made deductions on Josephine's salary even
if the investigation was still pending. Belatedly, the PCIB issued a memorandum finding
Josephine grossly negligent and requiring her to pay the amount which the bank erroneously
paid to Harrington's impostor. When Josephine asked for legal and factual basis for the finding
of negligence, the PCIB refused to give any. Moreover, the PCIB continued to make deductions
on Josephine's salary, allowances, and bonuses. The trial court and the CA also noted that
while Josephine was penalized, other employees of the bank involved in the subject
transactions were not. It was Josephine who was made solely responsible for the loss without
giving any basis therefor. It was emphasized that the subject deposit could not have been
received by the bank and entered in Harrington's savings account without the participation of
the other bank employees. The PCIB could have exercised prudence before taking oppressive
actions against Josephine.

 
2. ELIZABETH L. DIAZ v. GEORGINA R. ENCANTO
G.R. No. 171303     January 20, 2016
 
FACTS:
 
Plaintiff-appellant Elizabeth L. Diaz has been in the service of [he University of the Philippines
(U.P.) since 1963. In 1987, she was an associate professor in the College of Mass
Communication (CMC). During the second semester for Academic Year (AY) 1987-1988, she
was a full time member of the faculty and taught 12 units on full load. After 2 to 3 weeks of
teaching, she applied for sick leave effective November 23, 1987 until March 1, 1988. She
returned on March 2, 1988 and submitted a Report for Duty Form. On May 3, 1988, Diaz filed a
letter-application directly with U.P.'s Office of the President (Abueva) for sabbatical leave with
pay for one (1) year effective June 1988 to May 1989, for "rest, renewal and study." Cecilia
Lazaro, Chair of the Broadcast Department, initially recommended to CMC Dean Encanto that
Diaz's sabbatical application be granted. After they discussed the options available to the CMC,
Lazaro, on May 10, 1988, recommended instead that Diaz be granted any leave of absence she
may be qualified for. In her May 2, 1988 letter, Diaz indicated her unwillingness to teach.
Considering the CMC's experience with Diaz who dropped her courses in the previous
semester, Lazaro deleted Diaz's name in the final schedule of classes for the 1st semester of
AY 1988-89 beginning June 6, 1988. Incidentally, Diaz received her salary for June 1988,
indicating that her sabbatical might be approved. Thereafter, Encanto referred Diaz's sabbatical
application to the Secretary of U.P., recommending its denial. When requested by (Chancellor)
Tabujara, Encanto transmitted to the former a Reference Slip together with her comments
thereon. Meanwhile, Encanto requested Ermelina Kalagayan to hold Diaz's salary effective July
1, 1988 until further notice considering that her sabbatical application has not yet been
approved and that she did not teach that semester. Consequently, Diaz's name was deleted in
the payroll from September 1988 to January 1989. Meanwhile, on July 18, 1989, Diaz instituted
a complaint against the U.P., Abueva, Encanto, Tabujara and Abad with the Regional Trial
Court, Pasig, Metro Manila praying that the latter be adjudged, jointly and severally to pay her
damages. She claimed, among others, that [respondents] conspired together as joint tort
feasors, in not paying her salaries from July 1, 1988 in the first semester of academic year
1988-89, for the entire period when her sabbatical application was left unresolved, as well as
the salaries she earned from teaching in the second semester from November 1988 to May
1989. She likewise claimed moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
 
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled for damages.
 
HELD:
Article 19 of the Civil Code "prescribes a 'primordial limitation on all rights' by setting certain
standards that must be observed in the exercise thereof. Abuse of right under Article 19 exists
when the following elements are present: (1) there is a... legal right or duty; (2) which is
exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
Malice or bad faith is at the core of Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith refers to the state of
mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to
abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of... another. It is
presumed. Thus, he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. Bad faith does not
simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence; it involves a dishonest purpose or some
moral obloquy and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty due to some... motives
or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill will or spite and
speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.
Malice is bad faith or bad motive.

Prejudicial Question

RENATO S.D. DOMINGO on his own behalf and on behalf of his coheirs of the late
SPOUSES FELICIDAD DE DOMINGO and MACARIO C. DOMINGO v. SPOUSES
ENGRACIA D. SINGSON and MANUEL F. SINGSON.
THIRD DIVISION, G.R. No. 203287. April 5, 2017
REYES, J.

FACTS:
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari - G.R. Nos. 203287and
207936 - under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the Decision
dated August 31, 2012 in CA-G.R. SP No. 122054 and the Decision dated June 28, 2013 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 98026, both issued by the Court of Appeals.
Spouses Macario C. Domingo and Felicidad S..D. Domingo owned a parcel of land, situated in
F. Sevilla Street, San Juan, Metro Manila and the house built thereon. Domingo spouse both
died thereafter, leaving the properties to respondent Engracia D. Singson and petitioners
Renato S.D. Domingo and his co-heirs who are herein petitioners.
It appears that on September 26, 2006, Engracia filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila
a complaint for ejectment/unlawful detainer, docketed as Civil Case No. 9534, against
Consolacion, Rosario, Rafael, and Ramon. Engracia claimed that she is the absolute owner of
the subject property, having bought the same from the Spouses Domingo as evidenced by an
Absolute Deed of Sale. Petitioners then filed a complaint with the RTC of Pasig City, which
sought the nullity of the sale on the ground that signatures were procured through forgery.
Consequently, an Information was filed against Engracia for  the crimes of falsification of public
document, estafa, and use of falsified documents. Spouses Singson filed a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings Due to Prejudicial Question with the RTC, alleging that the validity and
genuineness of the Absolute Deed of Sale, which is the subject of Civil Case No. 70898 then
still pending with the RTC Branch 160, are determinative of their guilt of the crime charged.

ISSUE: Whether or not validity and genuineness of the Absolute Deed of Sale is determinative
of the guilt for the crimes of falsification of public document, estafa, and use of falsified
documents

RULING:
The Court ruled in affirmative. A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises
in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case and
the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The doctrine of prejudicial question comes
into play generally in a situation where civil and criminal actions are pending and the issues
involved in both cases are similar or so closely related that an issue must be pre-emptively
resolved in the civil case before the criminal action can proceed. The rationale behind the
principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflict decisions. 
For a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of
the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case, the following requisites must
-be present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action,
the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try
said question must be lodged in another tribunal. 

Based on the issues raised in both Civil Case No. 70898 and Criminal Case No. 137867 against
the Spouses Singson, and in the light of the foregoing concepts of a prejudicial question, there
indeed appears to be a prejudicial question in the case at bar. The defense of the Spouses
Singson in the civil case for annulment of sale is that Engracia bought the subject property from
her parents prior to their demise and that their signatures appearing on the Absolute Deed of
Sale are true and genuine. Their allegation in the civil case is based on the very same facts,
which would be necessarily determinative of their guilt or innocence as accused in the criminal
case.
If the signatures of the Spouses Domingo in the Absolute Deed of Sale are genuine, then there
would be no falsification and the Spouses Singson would be innocent of the offense charged.
Otherwise stated, a conviction on Criminal Case No. 137867, should it be allowed to proceed
ahead, would be a gross injustice and would have to be set aside if it were finally decided in
Civil Case No. 70898 that indeed the signatures of the Spouses Domingo were authentic.
 
 
 
Parental Authority & Custody of Children: Who May Exercise

1. BBB v AAA
G.R. No. 193225, February 9, 2015,
REYES, J;

Doctrine: The SC affirms the CA’s order to remand the case for the RTC to resolve the
question of custody. Since the children are now all older than seven years of age, they can
choose for themselves whom they want to stay with.

FACTS:
BBB and AAA allege that they started to date seriously only in 1996. AAA was then a medical
student and was raising her first child borne from a previous relationship, named CCC, a boy.
During their relationship, AAA bore two more children namely, DDD (born on December 11,
1997) and EEE (born on October 19, 2000). BBB and AAA married in civil rights to legalize their
relationship. The birth certificates of the children, including CCC’s, was amended to change
their civil status to legitimated by virtue of the said marriage. Later on, their relationship turn
sour and they decided to live separately. Citing economic and psychological abuse, AAA filed
an application for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order with a request to make the
same permanent after due hearing, before the RTC. Finding good ground in AAA’s application,
the RTC issued a TPO. The TPO was thereafter, made permanent by virtue of a Decision of the
RTC dated August 14, 2007.
BBB appealed before the CA. CA affirmed RTC’s decision but ordered the remand of the case
for the latter to determine in the proper proceedings to determine who shall be awarded custody
of the children. The CA found that under the provisions of RA9262, BBB had subjected AAA and
their children to psychological, emotional and economic abuses. BBB displayed acts of marital
infidelity which exposed AAA to public ridicule causing her emotional and psychological distress.
While BBB alleged that FFF was only a professional colleague, he continued to have public
appearances with her which did not help to dispel AAA’s accusation that the two had an extra-
marital relation. BBB filed a Manifestation and Motion to Render Judgment Based on a MOA
alleging that he and AAA had entered into a compromise regarding the custody, exercise of
parental authority over, and support of DDD and EEE: that BBB shall have the custody over
both children.

ISSUE:
Whether the RTC should determine who shall be awarded custody over the children.
HELD:
YES. All told, the Court finds no merit in BBB’s petition, but there exists a necessity to remand
the case for the RTC to resolve matters relative to who shall be granted custody over the three
children, how the spouses shall exercise visitation rights, and the amount and manner of
providing financial support. The RTC and the CA found substantial evidence and did not commit
reversible errors when they issued the PPO against BBB. Events, which took place after the
issuance of the PPO, do not erase the fact that psychological, emotional and economic abuses
were committed by BBB against AAA. Hence, BBB’s claim that he now has actual sole care of
DDD and EEE does not necessarily call for this Court’s revocation of the PPO and the award to
him of custody over the children.
This Court, thus, affirms the CA’s order to remand the case for the RTC to resolve the question
of custody. Since the children are now all older than seven years of age, they can choose for
themselves whom they want to stay with. If all the three children would manifest to the RTC their
choice to stay with AAA, then the PPO issued by RTC shall continue to be executed in its
entirety. However, if any of the three children would choose to be under BBB’s care,
necessarily, the PPO issued against BBB relative to them is to be modified. The PPO, in its
entirety, would remain effective only as to AAA and any of the children who opt to stay with her.
Consequently, the RTC may accordingly alter the manner and amount of financial support BBB
should give depending on who shall finally be awarded custody over the children.
Pursuant to Articles 201 and 202 of the Family Code, BBB’s resources and means and the
necessities of AAA and the children are the essential factors in determining the amount of
support, and the same can be reduced or increased proportionately. The RTC is reminded to be
circumspect in resolving the matter of support, which is a mutual responsibility of the spouses.
The parties do not dispute that AAA is now employed as well, thus, the RTC should consider the
same with the end in mind of promoting the best interests of the children.

RA 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004)

1. AAA vs BBB.
GR# 212448, January 11, 2018
TIJAM, J.:

Doctrine:

May Philippine courts exercise jurisdiction over an offense constituting psychological violence
under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and
their Children Act of 2004, committed through marital infidelity, when the alleged illicit
relationship occurred or is occurring outside the country?

The above question is addressed to this Court in the present Petition for the issuance of a writ
of certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, to nullify the Resolutions dated February 24,
2014 and May 2, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 158, in Criminal
Case No. 146468. The assailed resolutions granted the motion to quash the Information which
charged respondent BBB under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262, committed as follows:

‘On or about April 19, 2011, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
[BBB], being then legally married to [AAA], caused herein [AAA] mental and emotional anguish
by having an illicit relationship with a certain Lisel Mok as confirmed by his photograph with his
purported paramour Lisel Mok and her children and the e-mailed letter by his mother
mentioning about the said relationship, to the damage and prejudice of [AAA], in violation of the
aforecited law.’

Contrary to law.

Facts:

Petitioner AAA and BBB were married on August 1, 2006 in Quezon City. Their union produced
two children: CCC was born on March 4, 2007 and DDD on October 1, 2009.

In May of 2007, BBB started working in Singapore as a chef, where he acquired permanent
resident status in September of 2008. This petition nonetheless indicates his address to be in
Quezon City where his parents reside and where AAA also resided from the time they were
married until March of 2010, when AAA and their children moved back to her parents' house in
Pasig City.

AAA claimed, albeit not reflected in the Information, that BBB sent little to no financial support,
and only sporadically. This allegedly compelled her to fly extra hours and take on additional jobs
to augment her income as a flight attendant. There were also allegations of virtual
abandonment, mistreatment of her and their son CCC, and physical and sexual violence. To
make matters worse, BBB supposedly started having an affair with a Singaporean woman
named Lisel Mok with whom he allegedly has been living in Singapore. Things came to a head
on April 19, 2011 when AAA and BBB had a violent altercation at a hotel room in Singapore
during her visit with their kids. As can be gathered from the earlier cited Information, despite the
claims of varied forms of abuses, the investigating prosecutor found sufficient basis to charge
BBB with causing AAA mental and emotional anguish through his alleged marital infidelity.

The Information having been filed, a warrant of arrest was issued against BBB. AAA was also
able to secure a Hold-Departure Order against BBB who continued to evade the warrant of
arrest. Consequently, the case was archived.

On November 6, 2013, an Entry of Appearance as Counsel for the Accused With Omnibus
Motion to Revive Case, Quash Information, Lift Hold Departure Order and Warrant of Arrest was
filed on behalf of BBB. Granting the motion to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and
thereby dismissing the case.

Issue:

How R.A. No. 9262 should be applied in a question of territorial jurisdiction over a case of
psychological abuse brought against the husband when such is allegedly caused by marital
infidelity carried on abroad?

Ruling:

"Physical violence is only the most visible form of abuse. Psychological abuse, particularly
forced social and economic isolation of women, is also common." In this regard, Section 3 of
R.A. No. 9262 made it a point to encompass in a non-limiting manner the various forms of
violence that may be committed against women and their children:
Contrary to the interpretation of the RTC, what R.A. No. 9262 criminalizes is not the marital
infidelity per se but the psychological violence causing mental or emotional suffering on the wife.
Otherwise stated, it is the violence inflicted under the said circumstances that the law seeks to
outlaw. Marital infidelity as cited in the law is only one of the various acts by which psychological
violence may be committed. Moreover, depending on the circumstances of the spouses and for
a myriad of reasons, the illicit relationship may or may not even be causing mental or emotional
anguish on the wife. Thus, the mental or emotional suffering of the victim is an essential and
distinct element in the commission of the offense.

In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. Thus, in Treñas v. People, the Court explained that:
The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an
essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by
courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential
ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial
jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance
or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction
over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in
the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of
the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was
committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction
(Emphasis in the original)

What may be gleaned from Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262 is that the law contemplates that acts of
violence against women and their children may manifest as transitory or continuing crimes;
meaning that some acts material and essential thereto and requisite in their consummation
occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another. In such cases, the court
wherein any of the crime's essential and material acts have been committed maintains
jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same
excludes the other. Thus, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly
tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed.

It is necessary, for Philippine courts to have jurisdiction when the abusive conduct or act of
violence under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 in relation to Section 3(a), Paragraph (C) was
committed outside Philippine territory, that the victim be a resident of the place where the
complaint is filed in view of the anguish suffered being a material element of the offense.

In the present scenario, the offended wife and children of respondent husband are residents of
Pasig City since March of 2010. Hence, the RTC of Pasig City may exercise jurisdiction over the
case. Certainly, the act causing psychological violence which under the information relates to
BBB's marital infidelity must be proven by probable cause for the purpose of formally charging
the husband, and to establish the same beyond reasonable doubt for purposes of conviction. It
likewise remains imperative to acquire jurisdiction over the husband. What this case concerns
itself is simply whether or not a complaint for psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 may
even be filed within the Philippines if the illicit relationship is conducted abroad. We say that
even if the alleged extra marital affair causing the offended wife mental and emotional anguish
is committed abroad, the same does not place a prosecution under R.A. No. 9262 absolutely
beyond the reach of Philippine courts.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated February 24,
2014 and May 2, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 158, in Criminal Case
No. 146468 are SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 146468 is
ordered REINSTATED.

Declaration of Presumptive Death

 
1. REPUBLIC v. ORCELINO-VILLANUEVA
G.R. No. 210929     July 29, 2015
 
FACTS:  
 
Edna and Romeo were married on December 21, 1978, in Iligan City. In 1992, Edna worked as
domestic helper in Singapore while her husband worked as a mechanic in Valencia City,
Bukidnon. In 1993, Edna heard the news from her children that Romeo had left their conjugal
home without reason or information as to his whereabouts. Thereafter, Edna took a leave from
work and returned to the country to look for Romeo. She inquired from her parents-in-law and
common friends in Iligan City. Still, she found no leads as to his whereabouts or existence. She
also went to his birthplace in Escalante, Negros Oriental, and inquired from his relatives.   On
August 6, 2009, Edna filed before the RTC a petition to declare Romeo presumptively dead
under Article 41 of the Family Code. During the trial, Edna was presented as the lone witness.
In its October 8, 2009 Order, the RTC granted the petition on the basis of her well founded
belief of Romeo's death.  
 
ISSUE:  
 
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC decision granting the petition of Edna to have
her husband be declared presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code.  
 
RULING:  
 
Yes, Article 41 of the Family Code provides that before a judicial declaration of presumptive
death may be granted, the present spouse must prove that he/she has a well-founded belief that
the absentee is dead. In this case, Edna failed. The well-founded belief in the absentee's death
requires the present spouse to prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable
efforts to locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she
believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It necessitates
exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one). Mere absence of the spouse (even beyond
the period required by law), lack of any news that the absentee spouse is still alive, mere failure
to communicate, or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not suffice.

2. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSE B. SAREÑOGON, JR.

  G.R. No. 199194, February 10, 2016
  DEL CASTILLO, J.
 
FACTS:
On November 4, 2008, respondent Jose B. Sarefiogon, Jr. filed a Petition before the Regional
Trial Court of Ozamiz City-Branch 15 the declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Netchie
S. Sareñogon. Jose testified that he first met Netchie in Clarin, Misamis Occidental in
1991, They later became sweethearts and on August 10,1996, they got married in civil rites at
the Manila City Hall. However, they lived together as husband and wife for a month only
because he left to work as a seaman while Netchie went to Hongkong as a domestic helper. For
three months, he did not receive any communication from Netchie. He likewise had no idea
about her whereabouts. While still abroad, he tried to contact Netchie''s parents, but failed.   He
then inquired from Netchie''s relatives and friends about her whereabouts, but they also did not
know where she was. Because of these, he had to presume that his wife Netchie was already
dead. He filed the Petition before the RTC so he could contract another marriage pursuant to
Article 41 of the Family Code.
 
Jose's testimony was corroborated by his older brother Joel Sareñogon, and by Netchie''s aunt,
Consuelo Sande. These two witnesses testified that Jose and Netchie lived together as
husband and wife only for one month prior to their leaving the Philippines for separate
destinations abroad. These two added that they had no information regarding Netchie''s
location.
 
The RTC held that Jose had established by preponderance of evidence that he is entitled to the
relief prayed for under Article 41 of the Family Code. The RTC found that Netchie had
disappeared for more than four years, reason enough for Jose to conclude that his wife was
indeed already dead.
 
ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged efforts of respondents in locating his missing wife do not
sufficiently support a “well-founded belief” that the absent wife is probably dead.

RULING:
 
The "well-founded belief" requisite under Article 41 of the Family Code is complied with only
upon a showing that sincere honest-to-goodness efforts had indeed been made to ascertain
whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.
 
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.
 
The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." It depends upon the
circumstances of each particular case. Its determination, so to speak, remains on a case-to-
case basis. To be able to comply with this requirement, the present spouse must prove that
his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent
spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the
circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of active effort (not a
mere passive one).
 
The application of this stricter standard becomes even more imperative if we consider the
State''s policy to protect and strengthen the institution of marriage. Since marriage serves as the
family''s foundation and since it is the state''s policy to protect and strengthen the family as a
basic social institution, marriage should not be permitted to be dissolved at the whim of the
parties.
 
Given the Court''s imposition of "strict standard" in a petition for a declaration of presumptive
death under Article 41 of the Family Code, it must follow that there was no basis at all for the
RTC''s finding that Jose''s Petition complied with the requisites of Article 41 of the Family Code,
in reference to the "well-founded belief standard. If anything, Jose''s pathetically anemic efforts
to locate the missing Netchie are notches below the required degree of stringent diligence
prescribed by jurisprudence. For, aside from his bare claims that he had inquired from alleged
friends and relatives as to Netchie''s whereabouts, Jose did not call to the witness stand specific
individuals or persons whom he allegedly saw or met in the course of his search or quest for the
allegedly missing Netchie. Neither did he prove that he sought the assistance of the pertinent
government agencies as well as the media, Nor did he show mat he undertook a thorough,
determined and unflagging search for Netchie, say for at least two years (and what those years
were), and naming the particular places, provinces, cities, barangays or municipalities that he
visited, or went to, and identifying the specific persons he interviewed or talked to in the course
of his search.

 3. REPUBLIC VS NILDA TAMPUS

GR# 214243, April 13, 2016
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:
 
Respondent Nilda B. Tampus was married to Dante L. Del Mundo on November 29, 1975.
Three days thereafter, or on December 2, 1975, Dante, a member of the AFP, left respondent,
and went to Jolo, Sulu where he was assigned. The couple had no children. Since then, Nilda
heard no news from Dante. She tried everything to locate him, but her efforts proved futile. On
April 14, 2009, she filed before the RTC a petition to declare Dante as presumptively dead for
the purpose of remarriage, alleging that after the lapse of thirty-three (33) years without any kind
of communication from him, she firmly believes that he is already dead.
 
ISSUE:
 
Whether or not Dante should be declared presumptively dead.
 
RULING:
 
No. Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that
the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-
founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article 4119 of the Family Code of
the Philippines (Family Code), there are four (4) essential requisites for the declaration of
presumptive death: (1) that the absent spouse has been missing for four (4) consecutive years,
or two (2) consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death
under the circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the Civil Code; (2) that the present spouse
wishes to remarry; (3) that the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is
dead; and (4) that the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee.
 
The "well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires the present spouse to prove that
his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse and
that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the
absent spouse is already dead. It necessitates exertion of active effort, not a passive one. As
such, the mere absence of the spouse for such periods prescribed under the law, lack of any
news that such absentee spouse is still alive, failure to communicate, or general presumption of
absence under the Civil Code would not suffice.
 
In this case, Nilda testified that after Dante's disappearance, she tried to locate him by making
inquiries with his parents, relatives, and neighbors as to his whereabouts, but unfortunately,
they also did not know where to find him. Other than making said inquiries, however, Nilda
made no further efforts to find her husband. She could have called or proceeded to the AFP
headquarters to request information about her husband, but failed to do so. She did not even
seek the help of the authorities or the AFP itself in finding him. Considering her own
pronouncement that Dante was sent by the AFP on a combat mission to Jolo, Sulu at the time
of his disappearance, she could have inquired from the AFP on the status of the said mission, or
from the members of the AFP who were assigned thereto. To the Court's mind, therefore, Nilda
failed to actively look for her missing husband, and her purported earnest efforts to find him by
asking Dante's parents, relatives, and friends did not satisfy the strict standard and degree of
diligence required to create a well-founded belief of his death.

 
 
4. REPUBLIC VS LUDYSON CATUBAG
GR# 210580, April 18, 2018
Reyes, Jr., J:

 
FACTS:

Private Respondent Ludyson and Shanaviv were cohabiting with each other as husband and
wife, and had 2 children together. Ludyson and Shanaviv eventually married in 2003. The
marriage was solemnized by a Municipal Judge in Rizal, Cagayan. Sometime in 2006, while
Ludyson was working abroad, Shanaviv left their house and never returned (Ludyson’s relatives
took care of the children).
Ludyson flew back home and proceeded to look for his wife. He inquired with close friends and
relatives and even travelled as far as Bicol, where he wife was born and raised, but to no avail.
He also searched various hospitals and funeral parlors, also to no avail. Ludyson subsequently
sought the help of Bombo Radyo to broadcast the fact of his wife’s disappearance.
In 2012, Ludyson filed a petition with the RTC to have his wife declared presumptively dead.
The RTC granted the petition. Petitioner, through the office of the SolGen, elevated the case to
the CA via Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, contending that Ludyson failed to establish a
well-founded belief that his wife was already dead.
The CA dismissed the petition, ruling that Petitioner should have filed a MR with the RTC. The
Petitioner filed a MR but the CA denied the same.
 
ISSUES:
1. Whether Petitioner’s resort to an appeal to the CA under Rule 65 is proper.
2. Whether the Private Respondent has complied with the requisites of a petition for declaration
of presumptive death under Art. 41 of the Family Code.
 
RULING:
1 YES. The nature of the proceeding determines the appropriate remedy or remedies available.
Under Art. 41 of the Family Code, a petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary
proceeding. Art 253 of the same Code likewise characterizes proceedings under Art. 41 as
summary proceedings.
 
As a consequence of this summary nature, parties cannot seek reconsideration, nor appeal
decision in summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code because these judgments are
immediately final and executory by express mandate of law.
 
However, parties may challenge the decision in such proceedings through a petition for
certiorari to question grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. As previously
held by the Court in Republic vs. Sareňogon, Jr., in a summary proceeding for the declaration
for presumptive death, if a party is aggrieved by the decision of the RTC, then a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 should be filed with the CA. any subsequent decision by the CA may
be elevated to the SC via Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
 
2 NO. There are 4 requisites under Art. 41 that must be complied with for the declaration of
presumptive death to prosper:
1. The absent spouse has been missing for 4 consecutive years, or 2 if such spouse was in
danger of death when the disappearance occurred;
2. The present spouse wants to remarry;
3. The present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. The present spouse files for a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death
of the absentee.
 
In this case, Ludyson has complied with the 1st, 2nd, and 4th requisites, nut has not satisfied
the 3rd requisite as he has not established a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead.
Such belief must result from diligent efforts to locate the absent spouse. Ludyson failed to
establish his allegations. He did not present the friends and family he claims to have made
inquiries to. While he did have a certification from Bombo Radyo’s manager, he did not seek
help from government agencies like the police or NBI. Ludyson’s assertion, uncorroborated by
evidence, falls short of the diligence required to engender a well-founded belief that the
absentee is dead.
 

WHEREFORE the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated May 23, 2013 of the
Regional Trial Court of Tuao, Cagayan, Branch 11 and the Resolutions dated September 3,
2013 and December 6, 2013 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 131269 are
hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, the petition of private respondent Ludyson
C. Catubag to have his wife, Shanaviv G. Alvarez Catubag, declared presumptively dead is
DENIED. SO ORDERED.

MARRIAGE

1. CALIMAG v. HEIRS OF MACAPAZ

G.R. No. 191936     June 1, 2016
 
FACTS:
 
Virginia D. Calimag (petitioner) co-owned the property, the subject matter of this case, with
Silvestra N. Macapaz (Silvestra). Respondents are children of Silvestra’s brother, Anastacio
Macapaz, Sr. (Anastacio, Sr.) and Fidela O. Poblete Vda. De Macapaz (Fidela). The subject
property was duly registered in the names of the petitioner and Silvestra under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 183088. In said certificate of title, appearing as Entry No. 02671 is
an annotation of an Adverse Claim of Fidela asserting rights and interests over a portion of the
said property measuring 49.5 sq. m.
 
On November 11, 2002, Silvestra dies without issue. TCT No. 183088 was cancelled and a new
certificate of title, TCT No. 221466-7 was issued in the name of the petitioner by virtue of a
Deed of Sale whereby Silvestra allegedly sold her 99-sq.-m. portion to the petitioner for
P300,000.00. Included among the documents submitted for the purpose of cancelling TCT No.
183088 was an affidavit purportedly executed by both the petitioner and Silvestra. It was stated
therein that the affidavit of adverse claim filed by Fidela was not signed by the Deputy Register
of Deeds of Makati City, making the same legally ineffective.
 
On September 16, 2005, Fidela passed away. Respondents, asserting that they are the heirs of
Silvestra, instituted the action for Annulment of Deed of Sale and Cancellation of TCT No.
221466 with damages against the petitioner and the Register of Deeds of Makati City. In her
answer with compulsory counterclaim, the petitioner averred that the respondents have no legal
capacity to institute said civil action on the ground that they are illegitimate children of
Anastacio, Sr. As such, they have no right over Silvestra’s estate pursuant to Article 992 of the
Civil Code which prohibits illegitimate children from inheriting intestate from the legitimate
children and relatives of their father and mother.
 
ISSUE:
 
Whether or not Anastasio, Sr. and Fidela were married, therefore, respondents are legal heirs of
Silvestra.

 
RULING:
 
Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than
the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be recognized as
competent evidence of the marriage between his parents. Thus, in order to prove their
legitimate filiation, the respondents presented their respective Certificates of Live Birth issued by
the NSO where Fidela signed as the informant. A perusal of said documents shows that the
respondents were apparently born to the same parents their father’s name is Anastacio Nator
Macapaz, while their mother’s maiden name is Fidela Overa Poblete. The respondents’
certificates of live birth also intimate that Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela had openly cohabited as
husband and wife for a number of years, as a result of which they had two children the second
child, Anastacio, Jr. being born more than three years after their first child, Alicia. Verily, such
fact is admissible proof to establish the validity of marriage.
 
In Trinidad v. Court of Appeals, et al., this Court ruled that as proof of marriage may be
presented: a) testimony of a witness to the matrimony; b) the couple’s public and open
cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock; c) the birth and baptismal certificate
of children born during such union; and d) the mention of such nuptial in subsequent
documents.
 
Moreover, in a catena of cases, it has been held that, persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption or evidence special to the
case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the
parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the
constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil
Procedure is ‘that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage.’ Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio - Always presume
marriage.”

Marriages exempt from license requirement

1. Joan Diaz- Salgado and Dr. Gerard Salgado vs. Luis G. Anson
G.R. No. 204494 July 27, 2016
REYES, J.:

FACTS:
Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Decision and the of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 92989. The CA
affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 155, in Civil Case No.
69611.
Luis alleged in his complaint that he is the surviving spouse of the late Severina de Asis-Anson
(Severina). They were married in a civil ceremony on December 28, 1966. Prior to the
celebration of their marriage, Severina gave birth to their daughter, Maria Luisa on December
30, 1965 while Jo-Ann is Severina's daughter from a previous relationship. During his marital
union with Severina, they acquired several real properties located in San Juan, Metro Manila.
According to Luis, because there was no marriage settlement between him and Severina, the
above-listed properties pertain to their conjugal partnership. But without his knowledge and
consent, Severina executed three separate Unilateral Deeds of Sale in favor of Jo-Ann, who
secured new certificates of title over the said properties.10 When Severina died on September
21, 2002, Maria Luisa executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased
Severina de Asis on October 25, 2002, adjudicating herself as Severina's sole heir. Luis claimed
that because of the preceding acts, he was divested of his lawful share in the conjugal
properties and of his inheritance as a compulsory heir of Severina. Jo-Ann countered that she
was unaware of any marriage contracted by her mother with Luis. She knew however that Luis
and Severina had a common-law relationship which they both acknowledged and formally
terminated through a Partition Agreement executed in November 1980. The TCTs covering
Severina's properties were under Severina's name only and she was described therein as single
without reference to any husband. After the termination of their cohabitation in 1980, Luis went
to United States of America (USA), married one Teresita Anson and had a son with her; while
Maria Luisa was left under the guardianship and custody of Severina. The Spouses Maya were
also able to obtain a Certificate of No Record of Marriage (between Luis and Severina) from the
Office the Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics Office. The Spouses Salgado
disputed the validity of Luis and Severina's marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license
as borne out by the marriage contract. They further claimed that Luis himself disclosed on
cross-examination that he did not procure a marriage license prior to the alleged marriage. Luis
had also admitted the existence, due execution and authenticity of the Partition Agreement. The
logical conclusion therefore is that the properties disposed in favor of Jo-Ann were owned by
Severina as her own, separate and exclusive properties, which she had all the right to dispose
of, without the conformity of Luis. RTC rendered its Decision in favor of Luis, holding that the
marriage between Luis and Severina was valid. It noted that the marriage contract, being a
public document, enjoys the presumption of regularity in its execution and is conclusive as to
the fact of marriage. The trial court thus declared that the properties covered by the Unilateral
Deeds of Sale were considered conjugal which cannot be disposed of by Severina without the
consent of her husband, Luis. 

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the marriage is valid even without the marriage license falling under the
exceptions;
2)  who has the burden of proving the existence or non-existence of the marriage license?
3) whether or not the properties subject of the Deed of Sale were considered conjugal which
cannot be disposed of by Severina without he consent of hher husband/partition agreement
valid

RULING:
1) The Court held that Since the marriage between Luis and Severina was solemnized prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil Code,
the law in effect at the time of its celebration68 on December 28, 1966. A valid marriage license
is a requisite of marriage under Article 5369 of the Civil Code, and the absence thereof, save for
marriages of exceptional character, renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3).
The marriage is not of an exceptional character. A cursory examination of the marriage contract
of Luis and Severina reveals that no marriage license number was indicated therein. It also
appears therein that no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer with Article 77
of Republic Act No. 386 (Civil Code) being cited as the reason therefor. Article 77 of the Civil
Code provides:
Art. 77. In case two persons married in accordance with law desire to ratify their union in
conformity with the regulations, rites, or practices of any church, sect, or religion, it shall no
longer be necessary to comply with the requirements of Chapter 1 of this Title and any
ratification made shall merely be considered as a purely religious ceremony. The reference to
Article 77 of the Civil Code in the marriage contract is not dismissible. Being a public document,
the marriage contract is not only a prima facie proof of marriage, but is also a prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein.  The foregoing provision pertains to a religious ceremony
performed with the purpose of ratifying a marriage which was solemnized civilly. For this
exemption to be applicable, it is sine qua non that: (1) the parties to the religious ceremony must
already be married to each other in accordance with law (civil marriage); and (2) the ratifying
ceremony is purely religious in nature. Applied to the present case however, it is clear that Luis
and Severina were not married to each other prior to the civil ceremony officiated on December
28, 1966 - the only date of marriage appearing on the records.
2) Since there was an unequivocal declaration on the marriage contract itself that no marriage
license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer at the time of marriage owing to Article 77 of the
Civil Code, when in truth, the said exception does not obtain in their case, it is the burden of
Luis to prove that they secured the required marriage license.
However, instead of proving that a marriage license was indeed issued to them at the time of
their marriage, Luis relied mainly on the presumption of validity of marriage. This presumption
does not hold water vis-a-vis a prima facie evidence (marriage contract), which on its face has
established that no marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer.
3) As there is no showing that Luis and Severina were incapacitated to marry each other at the
time of their cohabitation and considering that their marriage is void from the beginning for lack
of a valid marriage license, Article 144 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 147 of the Family
Code, are the pertinent provisions of law governing their property relations. Article 147 of the
Family Code "applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like
absence of a marriage license." "Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses
through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership.
Accordingly, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code shall apply in the partition of
the properties co-owned by Luis and Severina. As to how partition may be validly done, Article
496 of the Civil Code is precise that "partition may be made by agreement between the parties
or by judicial proceedings x x x." The law does not impose a judicial approval for the agreement
to be valid. Hence, even without the same, the partition was validly done by Luis and Severina
through the execution of the Partition Agreement.

Absence of Marriage License Requirement

1. RAQUEL G. KHO, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND VERONICA B.

KHO, Respondents.
THIRD DIVISION, G.R. No. 187462, June 01, 2016
Ponente: PERALTA, J.

FACTS:
Challenged in the present petition for review on certiorari are the Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals , Cebu City The assailed CA Decision reversed and set aside the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court  of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, in Civil Case No. 464, which
ruled in petitioner's favor in an action he filed for declaration of nullity of his marriage with
private respondent, while the CA Resolution denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The present petition arose from a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage filed by herein
petitioner with the RTC of Oras, Eastern Samar. Pertinent portions of the Petition allege as
follows:
Sometime in the afternoon of May 31, 1972, petitioner's parents summoned one Eusebio
Colongon, now deceased, then clerk in the office of the municipal treasurer, instructing said
clerk to arrange and prepare whatever necessary papers were required for the intended
marriage between petitioner and respondent supposedly to take place at around midnight of
June 1, 1972 so as to exclude the public from witnessing the marriage ceremony;
Petitioner and Respondent thereafter exchanged marital vows in a marriage ceremony which
actually took place at around 3:00 o'clock before dawn of June 1, 1972, on account that there
was a public dance held in the town plaza which is just situated adjacent to the church whereas
the venue of the wedding, and the dance only finished at around 2:00 o'clock of same early
morning of June 1, 1972;
Petitioner has never gone to the office of the Local Civil Registrar to apply for marriage license
and had not seen much less signed any papers or documents in connection with the
procurement of a marriage license;
Considering the shortness of period from the time the aforenamed clerk of the treasurer's office
was told to obtain the pertinent papers in the afternoon of May 31, 1972 so required for the
purpose of the forthcoming marriage up to the moment the actual marriage was celebrated
before dawn of June 1, 1972, no marriage license therefore could have been validly issued,
thereby rendering the marriage solemnized on even date null and void for want of the most
essential requisite;
For all intents and purposes, thus, Petitioner's and Respondent's marriage aforestated was
solemnized sans the required marriage license, hence, null and void from the beginning and
neither was it performed under circumstances exempting the requirement of such marriage
license;
Respondent filed her Answer praying that the petition be outrightly dismissed for lack of cause
of action because there is no evidence to prove petitioner's allegation that their marriage was
celebrated without the requisite marriage license and that, on the contrary, both petitioner and
respondent personally appeared before the local civil registrar and secured a marriage license
which they presented before their marriage was solemnized.
The RTC found that petitioner's evidence sufficiently established the absence of the requisite
marriage license when the marriage between petitioner and respondent was celebrated. As
such, the RTC ruled that based on Articles 53(4), 58 and 80(3) of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the absence of the said marriage license rendered the marriage between petitioner
and respondent null and void ab initio.
 
Respondent then filed an appeal with the CA in Cebu City. The CA rendered a  decision dated
25 September 2000 of Branch 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern Samar,
reversing and setting aside the judgment of the RTC. The CA held that since a marriage was, in
fact, solemnized between the contending parties, there is a presumption that a marriage license
was issued for that purpose and that petitioner failed to overcome such presumption. The CA
also ruled that the absence of any indication in the marriage certificate that a marriage license
was issued is a mere defect in the formal requisites of the law which does not invalidate the
parties' marriage.

ISSUE:  WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

ALTOGETHER DISREGARDING PETITIONER'S OBVIOUSLY OVERWHELMING
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCES OF LACK OF MARRIAGE LICENSE AND GIVING WEIGHT
INSTEAD TO UNSUPPORTED PRESUMPTIONS IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT, IN ITS
ASSAILED DECISION.

RULING:
The Court finds for the petitioner.
The marriage of petitioner and respondent was celebrated on June 1, 1972, prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code. Hence, the Civil Code governs their union.
Article 58 of the Civil Code makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a
license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting
party habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil
Code, but not those under Article 75.14 Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional
character are covered by Chapter 2, Title 111, comprising Articles 72 to 79. These marriages
are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war; (2) marriages in
remote places; (3) consular marriages; (4) ratification of marital cohabitation; (5) religious
ratification of a civil marriage; (6) Mohammedan or pagan marriages; and (7) mixed marriages.
Petitioner's and respondent's marriage does not fall under any of these exceptions.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code also makes it clear that a marriage performed without the
corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate
consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage contract. The
rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the
authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper government official has
inquired into their capacity to contract marriage. Stated differently, the requirement and
issuance of a marriage license is the State's demonstration of its involvement and participation
in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested.
In the instant case, respondent claims that she and petitioner were able to secure a marriage
license which they presented to the solemnizing officer before the marriage was performed. On
the other hand, petitioner insists that the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Arteche,
Eastern Samar, coupled with the testimony of the former Civil Registrar, is sufficient evidence to
prove the absence of the subject marriage license.
The Court agrees with petitioner and finds no doubt to be resolved as the evidence is clearly in
his favor..
Apropos is the case of Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño.18 There, it was held that the certification of
the Local Civil Registrar, that their office had no record of a marriage license, was adequate to
prove the non-issuance of said license. It was further held that the presumed validity of the
marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it became the burden of the party alleging
a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage license
had been secured.
Based on the Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar,
coupled with respondent's failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license or of any
evidence to show that such license was ever issued, the only conclusion that can be reached is
that no valid marriage license was, in fact, issued. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, it cannot be
said that there was a simple defect, not a total absence, in the requirements of the law which
would not affect the validity of the marriage. The fact remains that respondent failed to prove
that the subject marriage license was issued and the law is clear that a marriage which is
performed without the corresponding marriage license is null and void.

Marriage (Declaration of Nullity of Marriage)

1. RENATO A. CASTILLO VS LEA P. DE LEON CASTILLO
GR# 189607, April 18, 2016,
SERENO, CJ:

FACTS:  
On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo (Lea) married Benjamin Bautista
(Bautista). On 6 January 1979, respondent married herein petitioner Renato A. Castillo
(Renato). On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, praying that his marriage to Lea be declared void due to her subsisting marriage to
Bautista and her psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Lea opposed the
Petition, and contended among others that her marriage to Bautista was null and void as they
had not secured any license therefor, and neither of them was a member of the denomination to
which the solemnizing officer belonged. On 3 January 2002, she filed an action to declare her
first marriage to Bautista void. On 22 January 2003, the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City,
Branch 260 rendered its Decision declaring that Lea's first marriage to Bautista was indeed null
and void ab initio. Renato countered that whether or not the first marriage of respondent was
valid, and regardless of the fact that she had belatedly managed to obtain a judicial declaration
of nullity, she still could not deny that at the time she entered into marriage with him, her
previous marriage was valid and subsisting.  

 
ISSUE:  
Whether the marriage between Lea and Renato is valid.
 
RULING:  
Yes, the Court thus concludes that the subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in view of
the invalidity of her first marriage to Bautista because of the absence of a marriage license. That
there was no judicial declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio before the second
marriage was contracted is immaterial as this is not a requirement under the Civil Code.
Nonetheless, the subsequent Decision of the RTC of Parañaque City declaring the nullity of
Lea's first marriage only serves to strengthen the conclusion that her subsequent marriage to
Renato is valid.
 

2. EMILIO AQUINO VS CARMELA,MORRIS,RANILLO TANKENGCO

GR# 197356, August 24, 2016
BERSAMIN, J.:

Facts:
Emilio Aquino, estranged husband of deceased Lovely Tangkeko-Aquino, filed a Petition for
Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus before the RTC in Malolos City to claim rightful custody of
his son. In his petition he alleged that due marital issues involving in-laws (respondents herein),
he was forced to leave their conjugal dwelling as well as their son named Azilimson Gabriel T.
Aquino. Emilio, at first, he could still visit and have access to his son but when Lovely died, his
access to his son had become scarce and respondents refused to inform him of his son's
whereabouts. Respondents, countering, denied that they had not deprived the petitioner of the
lawful custody of his son, and countered that Emilio consented to let his son stay with the
respondents upon Lovely’s death; and that they had then assumed the responsibility of raising
and taking care of Azilimson. RTC ruled in favor of the respondents, observing that letting the
custody remain with the respondents is for the best interest of the child. RTC's ruling had
attained finality prior to Emilio's Motion for Reconsideration, which, therefore, MR was denied.
Emilio filed a Petition For Relief From Judgment to seek nullification of RTC's ruling, contending
that his MR was filed on time, attaching a certification from PhilPost to support his claim. RTC
denied the petition for relief from judgment, opining that the petition was in the nature of a
second motion for reconsideration and was, therefore, prohibited by the Rules of Court.
Undeterred, Emilio assailed the dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus before the CA thru a
Petition for Annulment of Judgment on the ground of extrinsic fraud and denial of due process.
CA dismissed the Petition for Annulment of Judgment pointing out that it did not comply with the
conditions set for the remedy by Section 1 and 2 of Rule 47 of ROC; that it suffered infirmities,
among others, failure to include material dates. MR over CA's dismissal was filed but the same
was denied, holding that the petition had been "judiciously evaluated and passed upon" and
there's no compelling reason to deviate from the ruling.

Issue:
Whether the one who brought a Petition for Relief from Judgment under Rule 38 ROC can still
avail himself of an action for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court based
on the same grounds available to him for the prior remedy?

Ruling:

No. A Petition For Annulment of Judgment initiated under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a
remedy granted only under exceptional circumstances provided the petitioner has failed to avail
himself of the ordinary or other appropriate remedies provided by law without fault on his part. It
has often been stressed that such action is never resorted to as a substitute for the petitioner's
own neglect in not promptly availing himself of the ordinary or other appropriate remedies.
Owing to the exceptional character of the remedy of annulment of judgment, the limitations and
guidelines set forth by Rule 4 7 should be strictly complied with. A petition for annulment of
judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may be availed of only when
other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or final resolution sought to be
annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud. The Court has
thus instituted safeguards by limiting the grounds for the annulment to lack of jurisdiction and
extrinsic fraud, and by prescribing in Section 1 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court that the
petitioner should show that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. In this case,
petitioner could no longer avail himself of the remedy simply because he had already brought
the petition for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 38. He had thereby foreclosed his recourse
to the remedy of annulment of the judgment under Rule 47.

3. MELECIO DOMINGO VS SPOUSES GENARO/ ELENA MOLINA

GR# 200274, April 20, 2016
BRION, J.:

FACTS:

On June 15, 1951, the spouses Anastacio and Flora Domingo bought a property in Camiling,
Tarlac, consisting of a one-half undivided portion over an 18, 164 square meter parcel of land
which was annotated on the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 16354.
Anastacio has been borrowing money from the respondent spouses Genaro and Elena Molina
all throughout his life. Ten years after the death of Flora in 1978, Anastacio sold his interest over
the land to the spouses Molina to answer for his debts. It was registered under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 2729677 and the entire one-half undivided portion of the land was
transferred to the them.

One of the children of Anastacio and Flora filed a Complaint for Annulment of Title and
Recovery of Ownership against the spouses Molina when he learned of the transfer on May 17,
1999. Melecio claims that it is only to serve as collateral for the money that his father has
borrowed. He alleges that Anastacio could not have validly sold the interest over the subject
property without Flora’s consent, as she was already dead at the time of the sale.
The spouses Molina asserted that Anastacio surrendered the title to the subject property to
answer for his debts and told them that they already own half of the land. They have been in
possession of the subject property before the title was registered under their names and have
religiously paid the property’s real estate taxes.
The adopted son of the spouses Molina, Cornelio Molina, substituted them when they died
during the pendency of the case.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the case because Melecio failed to establish his
claim that his father did not sell the property to the spouses Molina considering that Anastacio
could dispose of conjugal property to answer for conjugal liabilities. Furthermore, it denied
Melecio’s motion for reconsideration of the RTC ruling and so he proceeded with his appeal to
the CA.
The CA affirmed the RTC ruling in toto. It held that Melecio failed to prove by preponderant
evidence that there was fraud in the conveyance of the property to the spouses Molina. It gave
credence to the OCT annotation of the disputed property sale. It also held that Flora’s death is
immaterial because Anastacio only sold his rights over the lot to the spouses Molina, excluding
Flora’s interest. Finally, the CA held that Melecio’s action has prescribed because he failed to
file the action within one year after entry of the decree of registration.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the sale of a conjugal property to the spouses Molina without Flora’s consent is valid
and legal;

2. Whether fraud attended the transfer of the subject property to the spouses Molina.

RULING:
The Supreme Court denied the petition. Melecio argues that the sale of the disputed property to
the spouses Molina is void without Flora’s consent. However, this argument is unmeritorious.

Anastacio and Flora Domingo married before the Family Code’s effectivity which was on August
3, 1988 and so their property relation is a conjugal partnership. It dissolved when Flora died in
1968, pursuant to now Article 126 (1) of the Family Code.
The heirs of Flora were governed by an implied co-ownership among the conjugal properties
pending liquidation and partition. This will also include Anastacio with respect to Flora’s share of
the conjugal partnership. Anastacio being a co-owner, cannot claim title to any specific portion
of the conjugal properties without having done an actual partition first, either by agreement or by
judicial decree. On the other hand, Anastacio owns one-half of the original conjugal partnership
properties as his share, but this is an undivided interest. As a consequence, he had the right to
freely sell and dispose his undivided interest in the subject property.

The spouses Molina became co-owners of the subject property to the extent of Anastacio’s
interest. Anastactio’s sale to the spouses Molina without the consent of the other co-owners was
not totally void, for his rights or a portion thereof were thereby effectively transferred. The
spouses Molina would be a trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs of Anastacio in respect of any
portion that might belong to the co-heirs after liquidation and partition. Melecio’s recourse as a
co-owner of the conjugal properties is an action for  PARTITION under Rule 69 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
On the issue of fraud, the lower courts found that there was no fraud in the sale of the disputed
property to the spouses Molina. The notarized deed of conveyance annotated on the OCT
executed between Anastacio and the spouses Molina negated Melecio’s argument that no
document was executed for the sale of the disputed property. Furthermore, the petitioner’s
belief that his father, Anastacio, could not have sold the property without his knowledge cannot
be considered as proof of fraud to invalidate the spouses Molina's registered title over the
subject property.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for review on certiorari. The decision dated August
9, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94160 is AFFIRMED.

4. JERRYSUS L. TILAR VS ELIZABETH A. TILAR

GR#214529, July 12, 2017
PERALTA, J.:

Facts:

On November 4, 2010, petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of private respondent's (respondent) psychological incapacity based on
Article 36 of the Family Code. He alleged that he and respondent were married on June 29,
1996 in a Catholic Church in Poro, Poro Camotes, Cebu with Rev. Fr. Vicente Igot as the
solemnizing officer; that a son was born of their marriage; that their marriage went well in the
first few months but respondent later became an extremely jealous, violent person which
resulted to frequent quarrels and petitioner being threatened and physically harmed; that she is
a happy-golucky and extravagant type of person and a gambler; that they eventually separated
in 2002; and, that respondent is now living with another man in Cebu City. Petitioner consulted a
clinical psychologist and respondent was said to be suffering from "aggressive personality
disorder as well as histrionic personality disorder" which made her psychologically incapacitated
to comply with her essential marital obligations.
Respondent failed to file her Answer despite being served with summons. The RTC then
required the Public Prosecutor to conduct an investigation whether collusion existed. In his
Manifestation and Compliance, the Public Prosecutor certified as to the absence of collusion
between the parties. Trial, thereafter, ensued with petitioner and his witness testifying.

Issue:

Whether the Regional Trial Court erred in dismissing the case on the ground that the validity of
church marriage is outside of the province of its authority.

Ruling:

The Family Code also provides on who may solemnize and how marriage may be solemnized,
thus:
Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
xxxx
(2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious sect duly authorized by his
church or religious sect and registered with the civil registrar general, acting within the limits of
the written authority granted by his church or religious sect and provided that at least one of the
contracting parties belongs to the solemnizing officer's church or religious sect;
xxxx
Article. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open
court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-
consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the
point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both of
the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be
solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.

Thus, the contract of marriage is entered into by complying with the requirements and
formalities prescribed by law. The marriage of petitioner and respondent which was solemnized
by a Catholic priest and was held in a church was in accordance with the above-quoted
provisions. Although, marriage is considered a sacrament in the Catholic church, it has civil and
legal consequences which are governed by the Family Code. As petitioner correctly pointed out,
the instant petition only seeks to nullify the marriage contract between the parties as postulated
in the Family Code of the Philippines; and the declaration of nullity of the parties' marriage in the
religious and ecclesiastical aspect is another matter. Notably, the proceedings for church
annulment which is in accordance with the norms of Canon Law is not binding upon the State as
the couple is still considered married to each other in the eyes of the civil law. Thus, the
principle of separation of the church and state finds no application in this case.
As marriage is a lifetime commitment which the parties cannot just dissolve at whim, the Family
Code has provided for the grounds for the termination of marriage. These grounds may be
invoked and proved in a petition for annulment of voidable marriage or in a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage, which can be decided upon only by the court exercising
jurisdiction over the matter. Section of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, otherwise
known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 provides:
Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
xxxx
(15) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;
Hence, a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, which petitioner filed before the RTC of
Baybay City, falls within its exclusive jurisdiction; thus, the RTC erred in dismissing the petition
for lack of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certjorari is GRANTED. The Regional Trial Court,
Branch 14, Baybay City, Leyte is ORDERED to PROCEED with the resolution of the case
based on the sufficiency of the evidence presented.
SO ORDERED.

5. ALEX RAUL BLAY VS CYNTHIA BANA

GR# 232189, March 7, 2018
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Facts:

On September 17, 2014, petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage,6 seeking that his marriage to respondent be declared null and void on account of his
psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. Subsequently, respondent
filed her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim dated December 5, 2014.

However, petitioner later lost interest over the case, and thus, filed a Motion to Withdraw his
petition. In her comment/opposition thereto, respondent invoked Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules
of Court (alternatively, Section 2, Rule 1 7), and prayed that her counterclaims be declared as
remaining for the court's independent adjudication. In turn, petitioner filed his reply, averring that
respondent's counterclaims are barred from being prosecuted in the same action due to her
failure to file a manifestation therefor within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Motion to
Withdraw, which - according to petitioner - was required under the same Rules of Court
provision. In particular, petitioner alleged that respondent filed the required manifestation only
on March 30, 2015. However, respondent's counsel received a copy of petitioner's Motion to
Withdraw on March 11, 2015; hence, respondent had only until March 26, 2015 to manifest
before the trial court her desire to prosecute her counterclaims in the same action.

Issue:
Whether the CA erred in upholding the RTC Orders declaring respondent's counterclaim for
independent adjudication before the same trial court.

Ruling:
It is clearly an ABSURD conclusion if the said provision will direct the defendant to manifest
within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice of dismissal his preference to prosecute his
counterclaim in the SAME ACTION when the same AUTOMATICALLY REMAINS. If the
automatic survival of the counterclaim and the death of the complaint as being ruled by the
Court of Appeals in its questioned Decision is indeed true, then the third sentence should have
required defendant to manifest that he will prosecute his counterclaim in a SEPARATE [and not
- as the provision reads - in the same] ACTION. (Emphases and underscoring in the original)

Petitioner's observations are logically on point. Consequently, the CA rulings, which affirmed the
patently erroneous R TC Orders, must be reversed. As it should be, the RTC should have only
granted petitioner's Motion to Withdraw and hence, dismissed his Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage, without prejudice to, among others, the prosecution of respondent's
counterclaim in a separate action.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 23, 2017 and the
Resolution dated June 6, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 146138 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is ENTERED solely granting petitioner Alex Raul B.
Blay’s Motion to Withdraw his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in Civil Case No. R-
PSY-14-17714-CV. The aforesaid dismissal is, among others, without prejudice to the
prosecution of respondent Cynthia B. Baña's counterclaim in a separate action.

MARRIAGE (Psychological Incapacity)

1. KALAW v. FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 166357     January 14, 2015
 
FACTS:
 
Tyrone Kalaw and Malyn Fernandez got married in 1976. After the birth of their 4th child, Tyrone
had an affair with Jocelyn Quejano. In May 1985, Malyn left the conjugal home and her four
children with Tyrone. Meanwhile, Tyrone started living with Jocelyn, and they had three more
children. In 1990, Tyrone went to the United States (US) with Jocelyn and their children. On July
6, 1994, nine years since the de facto separation from his wife, Tyrone filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. He alleged that Malyn
was psychologically incapacitated to perform and comply with the essential marital obligations
at the time of the celebration of their marriage. He alleged that 1) She leaves the children
without proper care and attention as she played mahjong all day and all night; 2) She leaves the
house to party with male friends and returned in the early hours of the following day; and 3) She
committed adultery on June 9, 1985 in Hyatt Hotel with one Benjie whom he saw half-naked in
the hotel room. Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Cristina Gates (Dr. Gates), and a Catholic
canon law expert, Fr. Gerard Healy, S.J. (Fr. Healy), to testify on Malyn’s psychological
incapacity. Dr. Gates explained that Malyn suffers from Narcissistic Personalityu Disorder and
that it “may have been evident even prior to her marriage” because it is rooted in her family
background and upbringing. Fr. Healy concluded that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated
to perform her marital duties. He explained that her psychological incapacity is rooted in her role
as the breadwinner of her family. This role allegedly inflated Malyn’s ego to the point that her
needs became priority, while her kids’ and husband’s needs became secondary.

 
ISSUE:
 
Whether or not Tyrone has sufficiently proven that Malyn suffers from psychological incapacity.
 
RULING:
 
No. He presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were
premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven.
No proof whatsoever was presented to prove her visits to beauty salons or her frequent partying
with friends.  Malyn’s sexual infidelity was also not proven because she was only dating other
men.  Even assuming that she had an extramarital affair with another man, sexual infidelity
cannot be equated with obsessive need for attention from other men.  Sexual infidelity per se is
a ground for legal separation, but it does not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.

2. Viñas vs. Parel-Viñas

G.R. No. 208790 January 21, 2015

Facts:
Petitioner Glenn Vinas filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage with respondent
Mary Grace. He alleged that they got married in civil rites in 1999 but Mary Grace refused to
perform even the most essential household chores; that she was self-centered and immature;
that she was insecure and extremely jealous and she drank and smoked heavily even when
she was pregnant.
Respondent filed no answer and did not attend any of the proceedings before the trial court.
Petitioner submitted himself to Dr. Nedy Tayag for psychological evaluation and the latter found
him amply aware of his marital roles and capable of maintaining a mature and healthy
heterosexual relationship. On the other hand, Dr. Tayag based her assessment of the
respondent upon information she gathered from the petitioner and the latter‘s cousin. She
concluded that respondent is suffering from Narcissistic personality disorder and anti-social
traits. The RTC declared the marriage void. The CA reversed.

Issue:
Whether there is psychological incapacity in the given case.

Ruling:
The SC that the cumulative testimonies of Glenn, Dr. Tayag and Rodelito, and the documentary
evidence offered do not sufficiently prove the root cause, gravity and incurability of Mary
Grace‘s condition. The evidence merely shows that Mary Grace is outgoing, strong-willed and
not inclined to perform household chores. Further, she is employed in Dubai and is romantically-
involved with another man. She has not been maintaining lines of communication with Glenn at
the time the latter filed the petition before the RTC. Glenn, on the other hand, is conservative,
family-oriented and is the exact opposite of Mary Grace. While Glenn and Mary Grace possess
incompatible personalities, the latter‘s acts and traits do not necessarily indicate psychological
incapacity.
 Rumbaua v. Rumbaua is emphatic that: In Bier v. Bier, we ruled that it was not enough that
respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his
marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor – an adverse integral element in the respondent‘s personality
structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essentialmarital obligations –
had to be shown and was not shown in this cited case.

A careful reading of Dr. Tayag‘s testimony reveals that she failed to establish the fact that at the
time the parties were married, respondent was already suffering from a psychological defect
that deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties and responsibilities of marriage.
Neither did she adequately explain how she came to the conclusion that respondent‘s condition
was grave and incurable. Her testimony was short on factual basis for her diagnosis because it
was wholly based on what the petitioner related to her.

3. OCAMPO v. OCAMPO
GR No. 198908    August 3, 2015
 
FACTS:
 
On September 10, 1990, petitioner Virginia Sy Ocampo (Virginia) filed a Petition for Declaration
of Nullity of her Marriage with Deogracio Ocampo (Deogracio) before Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 87, on the ground of psychological incapacity. The decision became final,
since no party appealed the judgment annulling the marriage. On March 31, 1999, the trial court
directed the parties to submit a project of partition of their inventoried properties, and if they
failed to do so, a hearing will be held on the factual issues with regard to said properties. Having
failed to agree on a project of partition of their conjugal properties, hearing ensued where the
parties adduced evidence in support of their respective stand. On January 13, 2004, the trial
court rendered the assailed Order stating that the properties declared by the parties belong to
each one of them on a 50-50 sharing.
 
ISSUE:
 
Whether respondent should be deprived of his share in the conjugal partnership of gains by
reason of bad faith and psychological perversity.
 
RULING:
 
No. The Court held that in a void marriage, as in those declared void under Article 36 of the
Family Code, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed
either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. Article 147 of the Family Code applies to
union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract
marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, as in this case. Article 147 of the Family
Code provides: xxx In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and
shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household.
 
xxx This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal
impediment to marry each other, exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void
marriage or without the benefit of marriage. It is clear, therefore, that for Article 147 to operate,
the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or their
marriage is void, as in the instant case. The term "capacitated" in the first paragraph of the
provision pertains to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage. Any impediment to marry
has not been shown to have existed on the part of either Virginia or Deogracio. They lived
exclusively with each other as husband and wife. However, their marriage was found to be void
under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity. From the
foregoing, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry should, therefore,
be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is
prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their  joint efforts. Thus, the trial court and
the appellate court correctly held that the parties will share on equal shares considering that
Virginia failed to prove that the properties were acquired solely on her own efforts.
 
We note that the former spouses both substantially agree that they acquired the subject
properties during the subsistence of their marriage.
The certificates of titles and tax declarations are not sufficient proof to overcome the
presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code. All properties acquired by the spouses
during the marriage, regardless in whose name the properties are registered, are presumed
conjugal unless proved otherwise. The presumption is not rebutted by the mere fact that the
certificate of title of the property or the tax declaration is in the name of one of the spouses only.
Article 116 expressly provides that the presumption remains even if the property is "registered in
the name of one or both of the spouses."
 
Thus, the failure of Virginia to rebut this presumption, said properties were obtained by the
spouses' joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be jointly owned by them in equal shares.
Accordingly, the partition of the former spouses' properties on the basis of co-ownership, as
ordered by the RTC and the appellate court, should be affirmed, and not on the regime of
conjugal partnership of gains.

4. REPUBLIC v. ROMERO
G.R. No. 209180     February 24, 2016
 
FACTS:
 
Reghis and Olivia were married on May 11, 1972. Reghis at that time was still a student and
less than a year into their relationship he tried to break up with Olivia because he felt that her
demanding attitude would prevent him from reaching his personal and family goals but she
refused. Olivia insisted on staying with Reghis making the former’s conclude that they have
eloped so they made plans to get them married even if Reghis objected.
The couple experienced a turbulent and tumultuous marriage. They become more distant when
Reghis secured a job as medical representative and become engrossed in his career and
focused on supporting his parents and siblings.  Then on June 16, 1998 Reghis filed for
declaration of nullity of marriage alleging that he is psychologically incapacitated and unable to
comply with his essential marital obligations.
One Dr. Valentina Nicdao-Basilio submitted that Reghis was suffering from Obsessive
Compulsive Personality Disorder (OCPD) which is the cause of his behavioural disorder of
having a strong obsession for whatever endeavour he chooses, such as his work, to the
exclusion of other responsibilities such as his role as a husband or a father.
 
ISSUE:
 
Whether or not Reghis is suffering from Obssessive Compulsive Personality Disorder which
constitutes as psychological incapacity.
 
HELD:
 
The Supreme Court was not convinced of the Reghis’ allegations because the requirements of
psychological incapacity were not satisfied. Based on Reghis’ testimony, it shows that he was
able to comply with his marital obligation which therefore, negates the existence of a grave and
serious psychological incapacity. He has also fulfilled his duty to support and take care of his
family, as he categorically stated that he loves their children and that he was a good provider to
them. Moreover, the psychological examination lacked juridical antecedence.

5. REPUBLIC VS DANILO PANGASINAN

GR# 214077, August 10, 2016
VELASCO JR., J.:

Facts:
Danilo and Josephine first met at the Philippine Plaza Hotel in Manila where they were both
working sometime in 1981. Following a three-month courtship, Josephine became pregnant. To
erase any notion of impropriety, the couple immediately contracted marriage, first civilly on
December 29, 1981, followed by a church wedding on January 23, 1982. The couple begot
three children—Juan Carlo, Julia Erika, and Josua.

At the outset, life for Danny and Josephine generally ran harmoniously, although marred from
time to time by arguments about money matters. They did not have any major problems, and
even became partners in Danilo's business pursuits. Signs of marital kinks appeared when
Danilo's business began to slow down. This caused the couple to fight incessantly, since Danilo
began to have difficulty supporting Josephine and their children at the same level to which they
were accustomed. Allegations of infidelity on the part of Danilo compounded things.

Sometime in September 2007, Josephine underwent hysterectomy. Four days after bringing her
home from the hospital, Danilo flew to Tacloban for a business trip, which Josephine already
knew of even prior to her operation. As it turned out, Josephine did not want him to leave.
Danilo came home to find an irate Josephine seething at him. Josephine's sudden demand to
see his bank passbook so enraged Danilo that he tossed the passbook in front of her.
Josephine, in turn, became incensed and started to curse and berate him. Out of anger and
exasperation, Danilo grabbed and smashed two glass cups beside him, while Josephine
continued on with her tirade against him. Josephine left the conjugal home the next day, never
to resume cohabitation with Danilo.[8]

Thereafter, Josephine filed a number of cases against Danilo, viz: two cases for violation of
Republic Act No. 9262 or the Anti-Violence against Women and Their Children Act of 2004 and
a petition for annulment—all of which she would withdraw. Subsequently, however, she filed an
action for legal separation.

After 30 years of marriage, Danilo filed a petition dated May 25, 2011 before the RTC, praying
for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Josephine on the ground of the latter's
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Docketed as Civil Case No. 11-
0205, the petition was consolidated with the legal separation case that Josephine filed, but
which was, however, ordered archived by the trial court upon her motion.

Issue:
Whether the totality of evidence presented warrants, as the courts a quo determined, the
declaration of nullity of Danilo and Josephine's marriage based on their psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Ruling:
"Psychological incapacity," as a ground to nullify marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
should refer to no less than a mental—not merely physical—incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Code,
among others, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity
and render help and support.

In sum, a person's psychological incapacity to comply with his or her essential obligations, as
the case may be, in marriage must be rooted on a medically or clinically identifiable grave
illness that is incurable and shown to have existed at the time of marriage, although the
manifestations thereof may only be evident after marriage. Using the abovementioned
standards in the present case, the Court finds that the totality of evidence presented is
insufficient to establish Josephine and Danilo's psychological incapacity.

The totality of evidence presented fails to establish the psychological incapacity of the parties.
The stringency by which the Court assesses the sufficiency of psychological evaluation reports
is necessitated by the pronouncement in our Constitution that marriage is an inviolable
institution protected by the State. It cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties, especially
where the pieces of evidence presented are grossly deficient to show the juridical antecedence,
gravity and incurability of the condition of the party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated to
assume and perform the essential marital duties. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of its
existence and continuation and against its dissolution and nullity.

Danilo's characterization of his wife, without more, is insufficient to constitute psychological

incapacity. At most, it merely establishes that their personalities are different and that their
frequent arguments and differences in handling finances and managing their business affairs
were money-related. No less than Danilo's own sister, Gatus, narrated during her interview with
Dr. Dayan that the couple's problems started when Danilo's business began to slow down and
he began to have difficulty supporting his family at the same level they were used to.[35] Thus, it
appears that her "incapacity" surfaced only in the latter years of marriage when they
experienced difficulties in their business ventures.

It has been held that mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities"
does not constitute psychological incapacity nor does failure of the'parties to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married persons.[36] These differences do not rise to the level of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code and are not manifestations thereof
which may be a ground for declaring their marriage void. If at all, these are difficulties that
couples ordinarily deal with in the course of their marriage.

Moreover, Danilo's psychological incapacity cannot be a basis of the RTC's declaration of the
invalidity of the marriage.

Records show that Danilo's petition is hinged primarily on his allegation that Josephine is
psychologically incapacitated to fulfil her marital obligations. Notably, Danilo's testimony and the
information gathered from Dr. Dayan's interview with Gatus and Jay are inclined to prove
Josephine's incapacity. As in Josephine's case, the records are bereft of any independent
evidence nor allegation of facts pointing to the psychological incapacity of Danilo. Therefore, in
addition to Danilo's failure to allege the complete facts showing his incapacity to comply with his
essential marital obligations to Josephine, he likewise failed to prove his wife's incapacity by
preponderance of evidence.

Finally, the Court notes the Compromise Agreement dated December 8, 2011 that Danilo and
Josephine executed respecting the division of their properties and support of their common
children. Considering that the parties may opt to divide their properties by judicial order under
Art. 134[40] of the Family Code, the Court upholds the validity of the Compromise Agreement.
However, par. 3[41] thereof providing for the cessation of financial support in case the parties'
marriage is declared null and void is inoperative since the marriage of the parties subsists.

The Court is not unmindful of the couple's marital predicament. Nevertheless, the Court has no
choice but to apply the applicable law and jurisprudence accordingly, if it must be true to its
mission under the rule of law. The Court's first and foremost duty is to apply the law no matter
how harsh it may be.

6. MIRASOL CASTILLO v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and FELIPE IMPAS

G.R. No. 214064. February 6, 2017
PERALTA, J.:

FACTS:
As their parents were good friends and business partners, Mirasol and Felipe started as friends
then, eventually, became sweethearts. They got married in Bani, Pangasinan on April 22, 1984
and were blessed with two (2) children born in 1992 and in 2001.
On June 6, 2011, Mirasol filed a Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dasmariñas, Cavite. Mirasol alleged that after thirteen (13) years
of marriage, Felipe resumed philandering. Their relatives and friends saw him with different
women. Tired of her husband's infidelity, she left the conjugal dwelling and stopped any
communication with him. Felipe's irresponsible acts like cohabiting with another woman, not
communicating with her, and not supporting their children for a period of not less than ten (10)
years without any reason, constitute a severe psychological disorder.
In support of her case, Mirasol presented clinical psychologist Sheila Marie Montefalcon
(Montefalcon) who, in her Psychological Evaluation Report, concluded that Felipe is
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the essential marital obligations.
The RTC declared the marriage between Mirasol and Felipe null and void. On February 22,
2012, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration, which the
RTC denied in an Order dated April 3, 2012. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the
decision of the RTC, ruling that Mirasol failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that Felipe
was suffering from psychological incapacity, thus, incapable of performing marital obligations
due to some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not the totality of evidence presented warrants, as the RTC determined, the
declaration of nullity of the marriage of Mirasol and Felipe on the ground of the latter's
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

RULING:
No. Time and again, it was held that "psychological incapacity" has been intended by law to be
confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the
party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage, (b) juridical
antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although
the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage, and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be
incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved. 
The presentation of any form of medical or psychological evidence to show the psychological
incapacity, however, did not mean that the same would have automatically ensured the granting
of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in
all the other cases they try, must always base their judgments not solely on the expert opinions
presented by the parties but on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of their
proceedings.
Guided by the foregoing principles and after a careful perusal of the records, this Court rules
that the totality of the evidence presented failed to establish Felipe's psychological incapacity.
The presentation of expert proof in cases for declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and an in-depth assessment of the parties by
the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence
of psychological incapacity. The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a
mere statement of her theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that she can render to the
courts in showing the facts that serve as a basis for her criterion and the reasons upon which
the logic of her conclusion is founded.
As such, there are no other convincing evidence asserted to establish Felipe's psychological
condition and its associations in his early life. Montefalcon's testimony and psychological
evaluation report do not provide evidentiary support to cure the doubtful veracity of Mirasol's
one-sided assertion. The said report falls short of the required proof for the Court to rely on the
same as basis to declare petitioner's marriage to respondent as void.
 

7. RACHEL A. DEL ROSARIO vs.JOSE O. DEL ROSARIO and COURT OF APPEALS

 G.R. No. 222541, February 15, 2017
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

FACTS:
Before the Court is this petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision and the Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 102745, which reversed the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 136 in Civil Case No. 11-891 declaring the marriage of Jose
O. Del Rosario (Jose) and Rachel A. Del Rosario (Rachel) void on the ground of psychological
incapacity pursuant to Article 365 of the Family Code, as amended.
Rachel, then fifteen (15) years old, met Jose, then seventeen (17) years old, sometime in
December 1983 at a party in Bintawan, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya. Very soon, they became
romantically involved. Sometime in 1988, Rachel went to Hongkong to work as a domestic
helper. During this period, Rachel allegedly provided for Jose's tuition fees for his college
education. Rachel and Jose eventually decided to get married on December 28, 1989 in a civil
rites ceremony held in San Jose City, Nueva Ecija, and were blessed with a son, named
Wesley, on December 1, 1993. On February 19, 1995, they renewed their vows in a church
ceremony held in the Philippine Independent Church.
In September 2011, Rachel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC,
alleging that Jose was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his essential marital obligations. In
support of her petition, Rachel claimed that: during their marriage, Jose conspicuously tried to
avoid discharging his duties as husband and father.
Rachel also presented the testimony of Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), who prepared the
Psychological Report (Report) on Rachel, which was primarily based on her interview with
Rachel and Wesley, stated that Jose suffered from Antisocial Personality Disorder (APD). For
his part, Jose denied all the allegations in the petition.
The RTC declared the marriage between Jose and Rachel void on the ground of psychological
incapacity. The CA reversed the ruling of the RTC, holding that the totality of the evidence
Rachel presented was not enough to sustain a finding that Jose is psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC's finding of psychological incapacity.

Ruling:
Based on the totality of the evidence presented, there exists insufficient factual or legal basis to
conclude that Jose's immaturity, irresponsibility, or infidelity amount to psychological incapacity.
It should be pointed out that Dr. Tayag's Report does not explain in detail how Jose's APD could
be characterized as grave, deeply rooted in his childhood, and incurable within the
jurisprudential parameters for establishing psychological incapacity. Particularly, the Report did
not discuss the concept of APD which Jose allegedly suffers from, i.e., its classification, cause,
symptoms, and cure, or show how and to what extent Jose exhibited this disorder or how and to
what extent his alleged actions and behavior correlate with his APD, sufficiently clear to
conclude that Jose's condition has no definite treatment, making it incurable within the law's
conception. Neither did the Report specify the reasons why and to what extent Jose's APD is
serious and grave, and how it incapacitated him to understand and comply with his marital
obligations. Lastly, the Report hastily concluded that Jose had a "deprived childhood" and "poor
home condition" that automatically resulted in his APD equivalent to psychological incapacity
without, however, specifically identifying the history of Jose's condition antedating the
marriage, i.e., specific behavior or habits during his adolescent years that could explain his
behavior during the marriage.
Moreover, Dr. Tayag did not personally assess or interview Jose to determine, at the very least,
his background that could have given her a more accurate basis for concluding that his APD is
rooted in his childhood or was already existing at the inception of the marriage. To be sure,
established parameters do not require that the expert witness personally examine the party
alleged to be suffering from psychological incapacity provided corroborating evidence are
presented sufficiently establishing the required legal parameters. Considering that her Report
was based solely on Rachel's side whose bias cannot be doubted, the Report and her testimony
deserved the application of a more rigid and stringent standards which the RTC failed to apply.
In sum, Dr. Tayag's assessment, even when taken together with the various testimonies, failed
to show that Jose's immaturity, irresponsibility, and infidelity rise to the level of psychological
incapacity that would justify the nullification of the parties' marriage. To reiterate and emphasize,
psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of the marital obligations; it is not enough that a party prove that the other failed to
meet the responsibility and duty of a married person. There must be proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person - an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying
with the obligations essential to marriage - which must be linked with the manifestations of the
psychological incapacity.
A final note. It is well to reiterate that Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, is not a
divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the grounds for divorce manifest themselves; a
marriage, no matter how unsatisfactory, is not a null and void marriage. Thus, absent sufficient
evidence establishing psychological incapacity within the context of Article 36, the Court is
compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.

 
8. MARIA TERESA B. TANI-DE LA FUENTE v. RODOLFO DE LA FUENTE, JR.,
G.R. No. 188400.March 8, 2017
LEONEN, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner Maria Teresa and respondent Rodolfo De La Fuente, Jr. were still sweethearts,
petitioner already noticed that Rodolfo was an introvert and was prone to jealousy. She also
observed that Rodolfo appeared to have no ambition in life and felt insecure of his siblings, who
excelled in their studies and careers.
On June 21, 1984, Maria Teresa and Rodolfo got married in Mandaluyong City. They had two
children: Maria Katharyn, who was born on May 23, 1985, and Maria Kimberly, who was born
on April 6, 1986.
Rodolfo's attitude worsened as they went on with their marital life. He was jealous of everyone
who talked to Maria Teresa, and would even skip work at his family's printing press to stalk
her. Rodolfo's jealousy was so severe that he once poked a gun at his own 15-year old cousin
who was staying at their house because he suspected his cousin of being Maria Teresa's lover.
In addition, Rodolfo treated Maria Teresa like a sex slave. They would have sex four (4) or five
(5) times a day. At times, Rodolfo would fetch Maria Teresa from her office during her lunch
break, just so they could have sex. During sexual intercourse, Rodolfo would either tie her to the
bed or poke her with things. Rodolfo also suggested that they invite a third person with them
while having sex, or for Maria Teresa to have sex with another man in Rodolfo's
presence. Rodolfo's suggestions made Maria Teresa feel molested and maltreated. Whenever
Maria Teresa refused Rodolfo's advances or suggestions, he would get angry and they would
quarrel.
Maria Teresa sought the advice of a doctor, a lawyer, and a priest, as well as any person she
thought could help her and Rodolfo. Maria Teresa also suggested that she and Rodolfo undergo
marriage counselling, but Rodolfo refused and deemed it as mere "kalokohan".
Sometime in 1986, the couple quarrelled because Rodolfo suspected that Maria Teresa was
having an affair. In the heat of their quarrel, Rodolfo poked a gun at Maria Teresa's head. Maria
Teresa, with their two daughters in tow, left Rodolfo and their conjugal home after the gunpoking
incident. Maria Teresa never saw Rodolfo again after that, and she supported their children by
herself.
On June 3, 1999, Maria Teresa filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. During the trial, medical doctor was presented as an expert
witness to conduct an in-depth interview with Maria Teresa to gather information on her family
background and her marital life with Rodolfo, and subjected her to a battery of psychological
tests. Furthermore, Dr. Lopez diagnosed Rodolfo with "paranoid personality disorder manifested
by [Rodolfo's] damaging behavior like reckless driving and extreme jealousy; his being
distrustful and suspicious; his severe doubts and distrust of friends and relatives of [Maria
Teresa]; his being irresponsible and lack of remorse; his resistance to treatment; and his
emotional coldness and severe immaturity. This diagnosis was did not result from personal
interview but through mails.
While Dr. Lopez was not able to personally examine Rodolfo, the trial court gave credence to
his findings as they were based on information gathered from credible informants. The trial court
held that the marriage between Maria Teresa and Rodolfo should be declared null and void.

ISSUE:  Whether expert opinion not based on personal conduct of interview is sufficient
evidence to prove psychological incapacity.

RULING:
The Court found that there was sufficient compliance with Molina ruling  to warrant the nullity of
petitioner's marriage with respondent. Petitioner was able to discharge the burden of proof that
respondent suffered from psychological incapacity.
The Court of Appeals chided the lower court for giving undue weight to the testimony of Dr.
Lopez since he had no chance to personally conduct a thorough study and analysis of
respondent's mental and psychological condition. The Court of Appeals cited Republic v.
Dagdag, where this Court held that "the root cause of psychological incapacity must be
medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts." The Court of Appeals then
ruled that "[o]bviously, this requirement is not deemed complied with where no psychiatrist or
medical doctor testifies on the alleged psychological incapacity of one party.
The High Court reiterated that the non-examination of one of the parties will not automatically
render as hearsay or invalidate the findings of the examining psychiatrist or psychologist, since
"marriage, by its very definition, necessarily involves only two persons. The totality of the
behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is generally and genuinely
witnessed mainly by the other.
Dr. Lopez's testimony, as corroborated by petitioner, sufficiently proved that respondent
suffered from psychological incapacity. Respondent's paranoid personality disorder made him
distrustful and prone to extreme jealousy and acts of depravity, incapacitating him to fully
comprehend and assume the essential obligations of marriage.

 9. YOLANDA GARLET VS VENCIDOR T. GARLET

GR# 193544, August 2, 2017
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Facts:
Petitioner Yolanda E. Garlet assails in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court the: (1) Decision[1] dated June 21, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 89142, which reversed and set aside the Decision[2] dated November 27, 2006 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 159, Pasig City in JDRC Case No. 6796; and (2)
Resolution dated August 24, 2010 of the appellate court in the same case, which denied
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

Petitioner and respondent Vencidor T. Garlet met each other sometime in 1988. They became
intimately involved and as a result, petitioner became pregnant. Petitioner gave birth to their
son, Michael Vincent Garlet (Michael), out of wedlock on November 9, 1989. Petitioner and
respondent eventually got married on March 4, 1994. Their union was blessed with a second
child, Michelle Mae Garlet (Michelle), on January 23, 1997. However, petitioner and respondent
started experiencing marital problems. After seven years of marriage, petitioner and respondent
separated in 2001. Petitioner now has custody over their two children.

On May 6, 2005, petitioner filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of
respondent's psychological incapacity to fulfill his essential marital obligations to petitioner and
their children. The Petition was docketed as JDRC Case No. 6796. On June 30, 2005,
respondent filed his Answer to the Petition.

The RTC further held that all of the properties which were acquired during the marriage were
bought with petitioner's exclusive funds, thus, negating the presumption of equality of shares
between the parties in a void marriage under Article 147 of the Family Code. The RTC awarded
the custody of the children to petitioner, but granted weekly visitation rights to respondent and
ordered respondent to give support to the children.

Issue:
Whether the CA erred and gravely abused its discretion in reversing the decision of the trial
court and declaring that the marriage between Yolanda Garlet and Vensidor Garlet to be
subsisting.

Ruling:

While the Court does not hold respondent totally without blame or free of shortcomings, but his
failings as husband and father are not tantamount to psychological incapacity which renders
their marriage void from the very beginning. Worthy of reiterating herein is the declaration of the
Court in Agraviador v. Amparo-Agraviador that:

These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of psychological incapacity that the law requires,
and should be distinguished from the "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect," in the
performance of some marital obligations that characterize some marriages. The intent of the law
has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disorders – existing at the time of the marriage – clearly demonstrating an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. The psychological
illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so
grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted.)
Finally, the Court is not bound by Ms. De Guzman's Psychological Report. While the Court
previously held that "there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated be personally examined by a physician," yet, this is qualified by the phrase, "if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity." The
psychologist's findings must still be subjected to a careful and serious scrutiny as to the bases
of the same, particularly, the source/s of information, as well as the methodology employed.

The Court similarly rejected the psychiatric evaluation report presented by the petitioner in
Agraviador for the following reasons:

The Court finds that Dr. Patac's Psychiatric Evaluation Report fell short in proving that the
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital duties. We
emphasize that Dr. Patac did not personally evaluate and examine the respondent; he, in fact,
recommended at the end of his Report for the respondent to "undergo the same examination
[that the petitioner] underwent." Dr. Patac relied only on the information fed by the petitioner, the
parties' second child, Emmanuel, and household helper, Sarah. Largely, the doctor relied on the
information provided by the petitioner. Thus, while his Report can be used as a fair gauge to
assess the petitioner's own psychological condition (as he was, in fact, declared by Dr. Patac to
be psychologically capable to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage), the same statement
cannot be made with respect to the respondent's condition. The methodology employed simply
cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of the examination required to
evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder.

We do not suggest that a personal examination of the party alleged to be psychologically

incapacitated is mandatory. We have confirmed in Marcos v. Marcos that the person sought to
be declared psychologically incapacitated must be personally examined by a psychologist as a
condition sine qua non to arrive at such declaration. If a psychological disorder can be proven
by independent means, no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted and
given credit. No such independent evidence appears on record, however, to have been
gathered in this case.

Much in the same way, the Court finds herein that Ms. De Guzman's sources and methodology
is' severely lacking the requisite depth and comprehensiveness to judicially establish
respondent's psychological incapacity. Ms. De Guzman relied on the information given by
petitioner; Avelino, respondent's brother; Ramil Ereve, petitioner's brother; an anonymous
female cousin of petitioner; and the couple's neighbors who refused to give their names. On the
basis thereof, Ms. De Guzman determined that respondent suffered from Narcissistic
Personality Disorder, the root cause of which, Ms. De Guzman traced back to respondent, as
the youngest child in the family, being favored, praised, and indulged by his caregivers. From
there, Ms. De Guzman already concluded that respondent's disorder rendered it beyond his
capacity to understand, comply, and attend to his obligations in the marriage; was present even
before marriage; and was "pervasive, permanent and clinically proven to be incurable." To put it
simply, Ms. De Guzman is saying that respondent was a spoiled child, and while it can be said
that respondent has grown up to be a self-centered and self-indulgent adult, it still falls short of
establishing respondent's psychological incapacity characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability, so as to render respondent's marriage to petitioner void ab initio.

All told, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals in declaring that the marriage of petitioner
and respondent as subsisting and valid. As the Court decreed in Republic v. Galang.
The Constitution sets out a policy of protecting and strengthening the family as the basic social
institution, and marriage is the foundation of the family. Marriage, as an inviolable institution
protected by the State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties. In petitions for the
declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies with the
plaintiff. Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the parties, or one of
them, could not have validly entered into a marriage by reason of a grave and serious
psychological illness existing at the time it was celebrated, we are compelled to uphold the
indissolubility of the marital tie. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on
Certiorari is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated June 21, 2010 and Resolution dated August
24, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89142 are AFFIRMED.

10. MANUEL R. BAKUNAWA III VS NORA REYES BAKUNAWA

GR#217993, August 9, 2017
REYES, JR., J

Facts:

Manuel and Nora met in 1974 at the University of the Philippines where they were students and
became sweethearts. When Nora became pregnant, she and Manuel got married on July 26,
1975 at St. Ignatius Church, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City.

Because Manuel and Nora were both college undergraduates at that time, they lived with
Manuel's parents. While Nora was able to graduate, Manuel had to stop his studies to help his
father in the family's construction business. Manuel was assigned to provincial projects and
came home only during weekends. This setup continued even as Nora gave birth to their eldest
child, Moncho Manuel (Moncho). However, whenever Manuel came back from his provincial
assignments, he chose to spend his limited time with friends and girlfriends instead of his family.
Nora resented this and they started quarreling about Manuel's behavior. Worse, Manuel
depended on his father and on Nora for their family's needs.

In 1976, Manuel and Nora lived separately from Manuel's parents. It was during this period that
Manuel first observed Nora's passiveness and laziness; she was moody and mercurial. Their
house was often dirty and disorderly. Thus, Manuel became more irritated with Nora and their
verbal quarrels escalated to physical violence.

On May 9, 1977, Nora gave birth to their second child. However, nothing changed in their
relationship. Manuel spent most of his time with friends and engaged in drinking sprees. In
1979, he had an extramarital affair and seldom came home. He eventually left Nora and their
children in 1980 to cohabit with his girlfriend. They considered themselves separated.

In 1985, Manuel, upon Nora's request, bought a house for her and their children. After Manuel
spent a few nights with them in the new house, Nora became pregnant again and thereafter
gave birth to their third child.

On June 19, 2008, Manuel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, on the ground that he and Nora are psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.

Issue:
Whether the totality of evidence presented by Manuel is sufficient to prove that he and Nora are
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage.

Ruling:
As the CA correctly ruled, the totality of evidence presented by Manuel comprising of his
testimony and that of Dr. Villegas, as well as the latter's psychological evaluation report, is
insufficient to prove that he and Nora are psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
obligations of marriage.

Dr. Villegas' conclusion that Manuel is afflicted with Intermittent Explosive Disorder and that
Nora has Passive Aggressive Personality Disorder which render them psychologically
incapacitated under Article 36 of the Family Code, is solely based on her interviews with Manuel
and the parties' eldest child, Moncho. Consequently, the CA did not err in not according
probative value to her psychological evaluation report and testimony.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Galang, the Court held that "[i]f the incapacity can be proven by
independent means, no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted to
support a conclusion of psychological incapacity, independently of a psychologist's examination
and report." In Toring v. Toring, et al., the Court stated that:

Other than from the spouses, such evidence can come from persons intimately related to them,
such as relatives, close friends or even family doctors or lawyers who could testify on the
allegedly incapacitated spouses' condition at or about the time of marriage, or to subsequent
occurring events that trace their roots to the incapacity already present at the time of marriage.

In this case, the only person interviewed by Dr. Villegas aside from Manuel for the spouses'
psychological evaluation was Moncho, who could not be considered as a reliable witness to
establish the psychological incapacity of his parents in relation to Article 36 of the Family Code,
since he could not have been there at the time his parents were married.

The Court also notes that Dr. Villegas did not administer any psychological tests on Manuel
despite having had the opportunity to do so. While the Court has declared that there is no
requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated should be personally
examined by a physician, much less be subjected to psychological tests, this rule finds
application only if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity. In this case, the supposed personality disorder of Manuel could have
been established by means of psychometric and neurological tests which are objective means
designed to measure specific aspects of people's intelligence, thinking, or personality.

With regard to the Confirmatory Decree of the National Tribunal of Appeals, which affirmed the
decision of the Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance for the Archdiocese of Manila in favor of
nullity of the Catholic marriage of Manuel and Nora, the Court accords the same with great
respect but does not consider the same as controlling and decisive, in line with prevailing
jurisprudence. WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated
March 27, 2014 and Resolution dated April 22, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
98579 are AFFIRMED.

 11. MARIA VICTORIA SOCORRO LONTOC-CRUZ vs NILO SANTOS CRUZ

GR#201988, October 11, 2017
Del Castillo, J:
FACTS:
 
On October 21, 1986 Nilo and Marivi was Married to each other and produced two sons. On
July 7, 2005 Marivi filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa City a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage based on psychological incapacity. She averred that it had been medically ascertained
that Nilo was suffering from "inadequate personality disorder related to masculine strivings
associated with unresolved oedipal complex," while she herself was found to be suffering from a
"personality disorder of the mixed type, histrionic, narcissistic with immaturity. In his answer,
Nilo claimed that he was madly in love with Marivi; that at the start of their relationship, both he
and Mari vi would exhibit negative personality traits which they overlooked; that he believed that
both he and Marivi were suffering from psychological incapacity; and that he was not singularly
responsible for the breakdown of their marriage. He stressed that Marivi also contributed to the
deterioration of their union. In October 13, 2008 the RTC denied the petition. The RTC took a
dim view of the expert witnesses' attribution of a double psychological incapacity to Marivi's
nature of being a "father figure woman," and to Nilo's "oedipal complex."
 
The court noted that Marivi already disengaged herself from her father as her standard of an
ideal husband when she married Nilo, despite the latter's limitations and his then being already
very focused on his job. Marivi's need for assurance that she is loved, vis-a-vis her looking up to
her father as her standard, was not by itself sufficient to declare her psychologically
incapacitated.
 
As for Nilo, the RTC found no concrete evidence of "oedipal complex;" the RTC held that
prioritizing his work over the emotional needs of his family was not reflective of his psychological
incapacity because what he did was still for his family's benefit. Neither was Nilo's lack of sexual
interest in Marivi a case of psychological incapacity, for this was a result of his being turned off
by Marivi's unabated naggings and her revelations to her family of his sexual inadequacies. CA
Affirmed.
 
ISSUE:

WHETHER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE IS APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE.

 
RULING:
 
No, Article 36 is not applicable in this case.
 
When is there a psychological incapacity? - We have laid down guidelines in interpreting and
applying this provision. In Republic v. De Gracia, we reiterated the doctrine in Santos v. Court of
Appeals, "that psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity (i.e., it must be
grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in a marriage); (b) juridical antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the
party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage); and (c) incurability (i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved)."
 
The showing of 'irreconcilable differences' and 'conflicting personalities in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity. - The mere showing of 'irreconcilable differences' and
'conflicting personalities' [as in the present case,] in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity." “Nor does failure of the parties to meet their responsibilities and duties as married
persons" amount to psychological incapacity. We further elucidated in Yambao v. Republic that
the psychological condition should render the subject totally unaware or incognitive of the basic
marital obligations:
 
Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital
obligations and not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations
or ill will. This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the
essentials of marriage; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations
of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the
procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a
psychological abnormality. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his
responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be
incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness.
 
In Marcos v. Marcos, the actual medical examination of the one claimed to have psychological
incapacity is not a condition sine qua non, for what matters is the totality of evidence to sustain
a finding of such psychological incapacity. While it behooves this Court to weigh the clinical
findings of psychology experts as part of the evidence, the court's hands are nonetheless free to
make its own independent factual findings. "It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all the
other cases they try, must always base their judgments not solely on the expert opinions
presented by the parties but on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the
proceedings."
 
With specific reference to the case before us, even granting that both parties did suffer from
personality disorders as evaluated by the expert witnesses, we find that the conclusions
reached by these expert witnesses do not irresistibly point to the fact that the personality
disorders which plague the spouses antedated the marriage; that these personality disorders
are indeed grave or serious; or that these personality disorders are incurable or permanent as to
render the parties psychologically incapacitated to carry out and carry on their marital duties.
What can be inferred from the totality of evidence, at most, is a case of incompatibility. For a
personality disorder to be declared clinically or medically incurable or permanent is one thing;
for a spouse to refuse or to be reluctant to perform his/her marital duties is another.
 
Indeed, we are loath to overturn the findings of the RTC and the CA. More than that, too, the
evidence on record do not square with the existence of psychological incapacity as
contemplated by law and jurisprudence. In the case of Nilo, what brought about the breakdown
of his relationship with Marivi was not necessarily attributable to his so-called "psychological
disorder" but can be imputed to his work and marital stress, and his ordinary human failings.

12. MARIA CONCEPCION N. SINGSON VS BENJAMIN L. SINGSON

GR#210766, January 8, 2018
Del Castillo, J:

Facts:

On February 27, 2007, Maria Concepcion N. Singson a.k.a. Concepcion N. Singson (petitioner)
filed a Petition5 for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code of
the Philippines.
It was alleged therein that on July 6, 1974, petitioner and Benjamin L. Singson (respondent)
were married before the Rev. Fr. Alfonso L. Casteig at St. Francis Church, Mandaluyong, Rizal;
that said marriage produced four children, all of whom are now of legal age; that when they
started living together, petitioner noticed that respondent was "dishonest, unreasonably
extravagant at the expense of the family's welfare, extremely vain physically and spiritually," and
a compulsive gambler; that respondent was immature, and was not able to perform his paternal
duties; that respondent was also irresponsible, an easy-going man, and guilty of infidelity; that
respondent's abnormal behavior made him completely unable to render any help, support, or
assistance to her; and that because she could expect no help or assistance at all from
respondent she was compelled to work doubly hard to support her family as the sole
breadwinner.
Petitioner also averred that at the time she filed this Petition, respondent was confined at Metro
Psych Facility, a rehabilitation institution in Pasig City.

Petitioner moreover asserted that respondent came from a "distraught" family and had a
"dysfunctional" childhood; that respondent had all the love, care, and protection of his parents
as the youngest child for some time; but that these parental love, care and protection were,
however, transferred to his youngest brother who was born when respondent was almost five
years old; and that these factors caused respondent emotional devastation from which he never
recovered.
Petitioner added that unknown to her, respondent even as a high school student, was already
betting on jai alai. She also claimed that she tried to adjust to respondent's personality
disorders, but that she did not attain her goal.

The RTC ruled that the requisites warranting a finding of psychological incapacity under Article
36 of the family Code are present in the instant case because the totality of evidence showed
that respondent is suffering from a psychological condition that is grave, incurable, and has
juridical antecedence.

Issue:
Whether the RTC erred in warranting a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the family Code.

Ruling:

“Habitual drunkenness, gambling and failure to find a job, [while undoubtedly negative traits are
nowhere nearly the equivalent of ‘psychological incapacity’], in the absence of [incontrovertible]
proof that these are manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological
condition or illness."

"There must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor that effectively incapacitated the
respondent spouse from complying with the basic marital obligations x x x."

"A cause has to be shown and linked with the manifestations of the psychological incapacity."

Again we agree with the CA that the RTC did not clearly or correctly lay down the bases or
premises for this particular finding relative to respondent's psychological incapacity.

There is also sufficient evidence to prove that the respondent's inabilities to perform his marital
obligations was a result of not mere intentional refusal on his part but are caused by
psychological abnormality. Such psychological incapacity of the respondent has been shown as
already present at the time of celebration of marriage but became manifest only after the
solemnization. x x x.

As heretofore mentioned, the medical basis or evidence adverted to by the RTC did not
specifically identify the root cause of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity. In fact, Dr.
Sta. Ana-Ponio did not point to a definite or a definitive cause, viz. "with his history of typhoid
fever when he was younger, it is difficult to attribute the behavioral changes that he manifested
in 2003 and 2006."

Equally bereft of merit is petitioner's claim that respondent's alleged psychological incapacity
could be attributed to the latter's family or childhood, which are circumstances prior to the
parties' marriage; no evidence has been adduced to substantiate this fact. Nor is there basis for
upholding petitioner's contention that respondent's family was "distraught" and that respondent's
conduct was "dysfunctional"; again, there is no evidence to attest to this. These are very serious
charges which must be substantiated by clear evidence which, unfortunately, petitioner did not
at all adduce. Indeed, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio did not make a specific finding that this was the origin
of respondent's alleged inability to appreciate marital obligations.

Needless to say, petitioner cannot lean upon her son Jose's testimony that his father's
psychological incapacity existed before or at the time of marriage.1âwphi1 It has been held that
the parties' child is not a very reliable witness in an Article 36 case as "he could not have been
there when the spouses were married and could not have been expected to know what was
happening between his parents until long after his birth."

To support her petition, petitioner ought to have adduced convincing, competent and trustworthy
evidence to establish the cause of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity and that the
same antedated their marriage. If anything, petitioner failed to successfully dispute the CA's
finding that she was not aware of any gambling by respondent before they got married and that
respondent was a kind and caring person when he was courting her.

Against this backdrop, we must uphold the CA's declaration that petitioner failed to prove that
respondents alleged psychological incapacity is serious or grave and that it is incurable or
permanent.

To be sure, this Court cannot take judicial notice of petitioner's assertion that "personality
disorders are generally incurable" as this is not a matter that courts are mandated to take
judicial notice under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.
"'Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the parties or one of them, by
reason of a grave and incurable psychological illness existing at the time the marriage was
celebrated, was incapacitated to fulfill the obligations of marital life (and thus could not then
have validly entered into a marriage), then we are compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the
marital tie." This is the situation here. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.

  
13. REPUBLIC vs KATRINA S. TOBORA-TIONGLICO
GR#218630, January 11, 2018
Tijam,J:
Facts:

Respondent Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico (Katrina) filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage with Lawrence C. Tionglico (Lawrence) on the ground of psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Katrina and Lawrence met sometime in 1997 through a group of mutual friends. After a brief
courtship, they entered into a relationship. When she got pregnant, the two panicked as both
their parents were very strict and conservative. Lawrence did not receive the news well as he
was worried how it would affect his image and how his parents would take the situation.
Nevertheless, they got married on July 22, 2000.
Even during the early stage of their marriage, it was marred by bickering and quarrels. As early
as their honeymoon, they were fighting so much that they went their separate ways most of the
time and Katrina found herself wandering the streets of Hong Kong alone.
Upon their return, they moved into the home of Lawrence's parents until the birth of their child,
Lanz Rafael Tabora Tionglico (Lanz), on December 30, 2000. Lawrence was distant and did not
help in rearing their child, saying he knew nothing about children and how to run a family.
Lawrence spent almost every night out for late dinners, parties and drinking sprees. Katrina
noticed that Lawrence was alarmingly dependent on his mother and suffered from a very high
degree of immaturity. Lawrence would repeatedly taunt Katrina to fight with him and they lost all
intimacy between them as he insisted to have a maid sleep in their bedroom every night to see
to the needs of Lanz.
Lawrence refused to yield to and questioned any and all of Katrina's decisions-from the manner
by which she took care of Lanz, to the way she treated the household help. Most fights ended
up in full blown arguments, often in front of Lanz. One time, when Katrina remembered and
missed her youngest brother who was then committed in a substance rehabilitation center,
Lawrence told her to stop crying or sleep in the rehabilitation center if she will not stop.

In 2003, due to their incessant fighting, Lawrence asked Katrina to leave his parents' home and
never to come back. They have been separated in fact since then.
Katrina consulted with a psychiatrist, Dr. Juan Arellano (Dr. Arellano), who confirmed her beliefs
on Lawrence's psychological incapacity. Dr. Arellano, based on the narrations of Katrina,
diagnosed Lawrence with Narcissistic Personality Disorder, that is characterized by a
heightened sense of self-importance and grandiose feelings that he is unique in some way.
Dr. Arellano determined that this personality disorder is permanent, incurable, and deeply
integrated within his psyche;and that it was present but repressed at the time of the celebration
of the marriage and the onset was in early adulthood. His maladaptive and irresponsible
behaviors interfered in his capacity to provide mutual love, fidelity, respect, mutual help, and
support to his wife.
The RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage of Katrina and Lawrence as void ab
initio.

Issue:
Whether the totality of evidence presented by Katrina supports the findings of both the RTC and
the CA that Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated to perform his essential marital
obligations, meriting the dissolution of his marriage with Katrina.

Ruling:
No. Time and again, it has been held that "psychological incapacity" has been intended by law
to be confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the
party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage, (b) juridical
antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although
the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage, and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be
incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.

The same could be said in this case, where the various tests conducted by Dr. Arellano can
most certainly be conclusive of the psychological disposition of Katrina, but cannot be said to be
indicative of the psychological condition of Lawrence. There was simply no other basis for Dr.
Arellano to conclude that Lawrence was psychologically incapacitated to perform his essential
marital obligations apart from Katrina's self-serving statements. To make conclusions and
generalizations on a spouse's psychological condition based on the information fed by only one
side, as in the case at bar, is, to the Court's mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence
as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.
Second, the testimony of Katrina as regards the behavior of Lawrence hardly depicts the picture
of a psychologically incapacitated husband. Their frequent fights, his insensitivity, immaturity
and frequent night-outs can hardly be said to be a psychological illness. These acts, in our view,
do not rise to the level of the "psychological incapacity" that the law requires, and should be
distinguished from the "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some
marital obligations that characterize some marriages. It is not enough to prove that a spouse
failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be
shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness. The psychological illness
that must afflict a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and
permanent as to deprive the party of his or her awareness of the duties and responsibilities of
the matrimonial bond he or she was then about to assume.
Although We commiserate with Katrina's predicament, We are hardpressed to affirm the RTC
and CA when the totality of evidence is clearly lacking to support the factual and legal
conclusion that Lawrence and Katrina's marriage is void ab initio. No other evidence or
witnesses were presented by Katrina to prove Lawrence's alleged psychological incapacity.
Basic is the rule that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof,
i.e., mere allegations are not evidence. Here, we reiterate that apart from the psychiatrist,
Katrina did not present other witnesses to substantiate her allegations on Lawrence's
psychological incapacity. Her testimony, therefore, is considered self-serving and had no
serious evidentiary value.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED.

Bigamous Marriages

1. Leonila G. Santiago v. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 200233 July 15, 2015

Facts:
Four months after the solemnisation of their marriage on 29 July 1997, Leonila G. Santiago and
Nicanor F. Santos faced an Information for bigamy. Petitioner pleaded "not guilty," while her
putative husband escaped the criminal suit. The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos,
who had been married to Estela Galang since 2 June 1974, asked petitioner to marry him.
Leonila averred that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, the second marriage should be
proven valid by the prosecution; but in this case, she argued that their marriage was void due to
the lack of a marriage license. She contended that her marriage to Santos was void ab initio for
having been celebrated complying with Article 34 of the Family Code, which provides an
exemption from the requirement of a marriage license if the parties have actually lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years prior to the celebration of their marriage. In her case,
petitioner asserted that she and Santos had not lived together as husband and wife for five
years prior to their marriage. Hence, she argued that the absence of a marriage license
effectively rendered their marriage null and void, justifying her acquittal from bigamy. RTC
convicted the petitioner. The CA affirmed.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner should be acquitted on the charge bigamy on the ground that the
marriage is void for lack of marriage license.

Ruling:
No. The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained the
misrepresentation perpetrated by them that they were eligible to contract marriage without a
license. We thus face an anomalous situation wherein petitioner seeks to be acquitted of
bigamy based on her illegal actions of (1) marrying Santos without a marriage license despite
knowing that they had not satisfied the cohabitation requirement under the law; and (2) falsely
making claims in no less than her marriage contract.
We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically a bigamous and illicit marriage
in an effort to escape criminal prosecution. Our penal laws on marriage, such as bigamy, punish
an individual's deliberate disregard of the permanent and sacrosanct character of this special
bond between spouses. In Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, we had the occasion to emphasize that
the State's penal laws on bigamy should not be rendered nugatory by allowing individuals "to
deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape
the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women
with the promise of futurity and commitment."
Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance petitioner's illegal acts of feigning a marriage
and, in the same breath, adjudge her innocent of the crime. For us, to do so would only make a
mockery of the sanctity of marriage.

2. SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR. V. Atty. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS

En Banc, G.R. No. 193719. March 21, 2017
JARDELEZA, J.

FACTS:
This petition for review on certiorari challenges the Amended Decision dated August 31, 2010 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 01945-MIN, which affirmed the resolutions of the
Civil Service Commission (CSC) dismissing petitioner's administrative complaint against
respondent.
Petitioner and respondent were married on December 28, 1992. However, Pacasum discovered
that Zamoranos was previously married to one Jesus De Guzman on July 30, 1982. On
December 14, 2004, Pacasum filed an administrative complaint for disgraceful and immoral
conduct against Zamoranos on the ground that she had contracted a bigamous marriage.
Respondent, on the other hand, argued that her previous marriage under the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines (the Muslim Code). Prior to her marriage with De Guzman, she
had converted to Islam. In 1983, however, she and De Guzman divorced, as evidenced by the
Decree of Divorce issued by Presiding Judge Kaudri L. Jainul of the Shari'a Circuit Court of
Isabela, Basilan in Case No. 407-92.
The CSC dismissed the complaint because Pacasum failed to assail the existence, much less
validity, of the Decree of Divorce. On appeal, the CA initially granted the petition, relying on the
judicial admissions of Zamoranos in the various cases between her and Pacasum. However, on
consideration, the appellate court corrected its initial ruling.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent’s previous marriage was validly terminated by reason of
divorce decree under Sharia Law.

RULING:
The Muslim Code recognizes divorce in marriages between Muslims, and mixed marriages
wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with
Muslim law or the Muslim Code in any part of the Philippines. At present, this is the only law in
the Philippines that allows domestic divorce.
The divorce becomes irrevocable after observance of a period of waiting called idda, the
duration of which is three monthly courses after termination of the marriage by divorce. Once
irrevocable, the divorce has the following effects: the severance of the marriage bond and, as a
consequence, the spouses may contract another marriage; loss of the spouses' mutual rights of
inheritance; adjudication of the custody of children in accordance with Article 78 of the Muslim
Code; recovery of the dower by the wife from the husband; continuation of the husband's
obligation to give support in accordance with Article 67; and the dissolution and liquidation of the
conjugal partnership, if stipulated in the marriage settlements.
The High Court agrees with the CA that the Decree of Divorce cannot be the subject of a
collateral attack. It is evident that Pacasum's persistence in pursuing the administrative case
against Zamoranos on the sole ground of bigamy is premised on the supposition that the latter's
marriage with De Guzman was still subsisting when she contracted marriage with Pacasum,
which effectively challenges the Shari'a Circuit Court's divorce judgment. As we have noted,
however, the judgment of the court is valid on its face; hence, a collateral attack in this case is
not allowed. The collateral unassailability of the divorce is a necessary consequence of its
finality. It "cannot now be changed in any proceeding; and much less is it subject to the
collateral attack which is here made upon it." As no appeal was taken with respect to the divorce
decree, it must be conceded to have full force and effect.The decree, insofar as it affects the
civil status of Zamoranos, has therefore become res judicata, subject to no collateral attack.
Furthermore, the proscription against collateral attacks similarly applies to matters involving the
civil status of persons. Thus, we have held that collateral attacks against the legitimacy and
filiation of children, adoption, and the validity of marriages (except void marriages) are not
allowed. Zamoranos' civil status as "divorced" belongs to the same category, and Pacasum
cannot impugn it in an administrative case filed with the CSC, where the sole purpose of the
proceedings is to determine the administrative liability, if any, of Zamoranos.
 
 
 

3. NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

 SECOND DIVISION, G.R. No. 207406, January 13, 2016
LEONEN, J.
 
FACTS:
 
In the Information dated April 29, 2008, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila charged
Norberto with bigamy.  According to the prosecution, on December 4, 1994, Norberto married
Alice G. Eduardo at the Manila Cathedral in Intramuros. Born into their union were three (3)
children. After some time, Alice "began hearing rumors that [her husband] was previously
married to another woman.]" She eventually discovered that Norberto was previously married to
a certain Gina M. Gaerlan (Gina) on July 17, 1987, as evidenced by a marriage contract
registered with the National Statistics Office.
 
Alice subsequently filed a criminal Complaint for bigamy against Norberto. On the other hand,
Norberto alleged that he and Alice became romantically involved sometime in 1987. "After much
prodding by their friends and relatives, [he and Alice] decided to get married in 1994.”Before
finalizing their marriage plans, however, Norberto revealed to Alice that he had a "fake
marriage"with his college girlfriend, a certain Gina Gaerlan. Nevertheless, despite Norberto's
revelation, Alice convinced him that they proceed with the wedding. Thus, Norberto and Alice
were married on December 4, 1994 and, thereafter, had three children.
 
Finding that Norberto contracted a second marriage with Alice despite his subsisting valid
marriage with Gina, Branch 25 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila convicted Norberto of
bigamy. On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the guilty verdict against Norberto. Norberto
filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before this court. Norberto argues that the first element
of bigamy is absent in this case. He presents as evidence a Certification from the Office of the
Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which states that the Office has no record of the marriage license
allegedly issued in his favor and his first wife, Gina. He argues that with no proof of existence of
an essential requisite of marriage—the marriage license—the prosecution fails to establish the
legality of his first marriage. In addition, Norberto claims that the legal dissolution of the first
marriage is not an element of the crime of bigamy. According to Norberto, nothing in Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code that punishes bigamy mentions that requirement.
 
ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction of Norberto for bigamy was proper.
 
RULING:
 
Contrary to petitioner's claim, all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. Petitioner was
still legally married to Gina when he married Alice. Thus, the trial court correctly convicted him
of the crime charged.
 
Based on the marriage contract presented in evidence, petitioner's first marriage was
solemnized on July 17, 1987. This was before the Family Code of the Philippines became
effective on August 3, 1988. Consequently, provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines
govern the validity of his first marriage. Moreover, petitioner admitted the authenticity of his
signature appearing on the marriage contract between him and his first wife, Gina. The marriage
contract between petitioner and Gina is a positive piece of evidence as to the existence of
petitioner's first marriage. This "should be given greater credence than documents testifying
merely as to [the] absence of any record of the marriage.
 
Petitioner presents a Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which
states:
[A]fter a diligent search on the files of Registry Book on Application for Marriage
License and License Issuance available in this office, no record could be found on
the alleged issuance of this office of Marriage License No. 8683519 in favor of MR.
 NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL and MS. GINA M. GAERLAN dated July 17,
1987.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
 
This Certification does not prove that petitioner's first marriage was solemnized without a
marriage license. It does not categorically state that Marriage License No. 8683519 does not
exist. Assuming without conceding that petitioner's first marriage was solemnized without a
marriage license, petitioner remains liable for bigamy. Petitioner's first marriage was
not judicially declared void. Nor was his first wife Gina judicially declared presumptively dead
under the Civil Code.The second element of the crime of bigamy is, therefore, present in this
case. As early as 1968, this court held in Landicho v. Relova, et al. that parties to a marriage
should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such
authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question.
A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
 
The third element of bigamy is likewise present in this case. Petitioner admitted that he
subsequently married Alice G. Eduardo on December 4, 1994. As for the last element of
bigamy, that the subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity, it is presumed.
The crime of bigamy was consummated when petitioner subsequently married Alice without his
first marriage to Gina having been judicially declared void.
 
With all the elements of bigamy present in this case, petitioner was correctly convicted of the
crime charged.

4. JONA BUMATAY VS LOLITA BUMATAY

GR# 191320, April 25, 2017
CAGUIOA, J:

Facts:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by
Petitioner Jona Bumatay (Jona) against herein Respondent Lolita Bumatay (Lolita), assailing
the Court of Appeals': (1) Decision dated August 28, 2009, which denied Petitioner's appeal in
the case of People of the Philippines v. Lolita F. Bumatay, docketed as CA-G.R. CR. No. 31124;
and (2) Resolution dated February 4, 2010 denying Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

Lolita allegedly married a certain Amado Rosete (Amado) on January 30, 1968, when she was
16 years old. The marriage was solemnized before Judge Delfin D. Rosario, in Malasiqui,
Pangasinan. Prior to the declaration of nullity of her marriage with Amado on September 20,
2005, Lolita married Jona's foster father, Jose Bumatay (Jose), on November 6, 2003.

Again, on November 6, 2003, while her husband Amado Rosete was still alive and her marriage
with him was valid and subsisting, Ms. Lolita Ferrer contracted another marriage with Jose M.
Bumatay in Malasiqui, Pangasinan; When Lolita Ferrer contracted her second marriage with
Jose Bumatay, she knows fully well that her first marriage with her first husband Mr. Amado
Rosete, who is still living up to today, has not been legally dissolved but existing.

In her Counter-Affidavit, Lolita claims that she learned from her children (with Amado) that
Amado had filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage. Subsequently, sometime in
1990, she was informed by her children that Amado had died in Nueva Vizcaya.[11]
Subsequently, an Information for Bigamy was filed
Contrary to Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.

RTC-Dagupan City issued a Decision declaring as null and void the marriage between Lolita
and Amado,... the RTC-Dagupan City found that no marriage ceremony took place between
Lolita and Amado as it was Lolita's sister who had married Amado and that, in fact, the
signature appearing on the marriage certificate was not Lolita's signature but that of her sister's.
Thus, to the RTC-Dagupan City, there being no marriage ceremony that actually took place
between Amado and Lolita, their marriage was void from the very beginning.

she filed a Motion to Quash the Information. Her motion was hinged on the argument that the
first element of the crime of bigamy - that is, that the offender has been previously legally
married - is not present. In support, Lolita attached a copy of the RTC-Dagupan City Decision
declaring the marriage between her and Amado void ab initio on the ground that there was no
marriage ceremony between them and what transpired was a marriage by proxy.

RTC-San Carlos granted Lolita's Motion to Quash

Due to the significant resemblance of this case to the Morigo case
Since the first marriage has been declared void ab initio, there is no first marriage to begin with
in determining the foremost element of bigamy.
The RTC-San Carlos concluded that there were "glaring material similarities" between Morigo
and the case against Lolita.

Issue:
Whether the CA committed any reversible error in upholding the RTC-San Carlos' Order
granting Lolita's motion to quash the Information for the crime of Bigamy.

Ruling:
The petition is denied.
Petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case.
the People is the real party-in-interest and only the OSG can represent the People in criminal
proceedings before this Court.

Settled is the rule that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party in interest[,]" who, in turn, is one "who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit, or by the party entitled to the avails of the suit."[56] Within this context, "interest" means
material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as
distinguished from mere interest in the question involved.[57] To be clear, real interest refers to
a present substantial interest, and not a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate
or consequential interest.[58] Here, the record is replete with indications[59] that Jona's natural
parents are unknown and she was merely raised as the "foster daughter" of Jose Bumatay,
without having undergone the process of legal adoption.

Petition for the Issuance of Letters of Administration filed by Rodelio Bumatay (Jose Bumatay's
nephew), Jona was described as "claiming to be the adopted [child] of [Jose] but cannot present
legal proof to this effect".[61] Finally, even in her own Reply[62] (to the comment to the petition
for review), Jona merely denotes herself as "the only child of the late Jose Bumatay,"[63]
without, however, presenting or even indicating any document or proof to support her claim of
personality or legal standing.

Based on the foregoing, the Court does not see the need and will not waste its precious time in
even delving into the question of whether or not the CA decision upholding the dismissal of the
Bigamy case was erroneous or not. Indeed, in view of the lack of personality of the party who
filed the petition, any such discourse by the Court would be obiter and correctly characterized as
an advisory opinion.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court resolves to DENY the instant petition for lack of
merit and AFFIRM the Court of Appeals' Decision dated August 28, 2009 and Resolution dated
February 4, 2010.

Divorce Marriage

1. Doreen Grace Parilla- Medina v. Michiyuki Koike

G.R. No. 215723 July 27, 2016
Ponente: PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner Doreen Grace Parilla (Doreen), a Filipino citizen, and respondent Michiyuki Koike
(Michiyuki), a Japanese national, were married on June 14, 2005 in Quezon City, Philippines.
Their union bore two children, Masato Koike, who was born on January 23, 2006, and Fuka
Koike who was born on April 4, 2007. Seeking to have the said Divorce Certificate annotated on
her Certificate of Marriage on file with the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, Doreen filed on
February 7, 2013 a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity
to remarry pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code before the RTC.
At the hearing, no one appeared to oppose the petition. On the other hand, Doreen presented
several foreign documents, namely, "Certificate of Receiving/ Certificate of Acceptance of
Divorce" and "Family Register of Michiyuki Koike" both issued by the Mayor of Ichinomiya City
and duly authenticated by the Consul of the Republic of the Philippines for Osaka, Japan. She
also presented a certified machine copy of a document entitled "Divorce Certificate" issued by
the Consul for the Ambassador of Japan in Manila that was authenticated by the Department of
the Foreign Affairs, as well as a Certification issued by the City Civil Registry Office in Manila
that the original of said divorce certificate was filed and recorded in the said Office. In addition,
photocopies of the Civil Code of Japan and their corresponding English translation, as well as
two (2) books entitled "The Civil Code of Japan 2000"  and "The Civil Code of Japan 2009" were
likewise submitted as proof of the existence of Japan's law on divorce. RTC denied Doreen's
petition, ruling that in an action for recognition of foreign divorce decree pursuant to Article 26 of
the Family Code, the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien recognizing his or
her capacity to obtain a divorce must be proven in accordance with Sections 2420 and 2521 of
Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. The RTC observed that the "The Civil Code of
Japan 2000" and "The Civil Code of Japan 2009," presented were not duly authenticated by the
Philippine Consul in Japan as required by Sections 24 and 25 of the said Rules. Doreen's
motion for reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce decree is should be recognized in the Philippines.

RULING:
The Court held that Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts
cannot grant it. However, Article 26 of the Family Code - which addresses foreign marriages or
mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner - allows a Filipino spouse to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by an alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry. Thus, in Garcia v. Recio,29 it was pointed out that in order
for a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse to be recognized in our jurisdiction, it must be
shown that the divorce decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. Both the
divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce
must be proven.30 Since our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our
law on evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be
alleged and proven like any other fact. Considering that the validity of the divorce decree
between Doreen and Michiyuki, as well as the existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the
matter are essentially factual that calls for a re-evaluation of the evidence presented before the
RTC, the issue raised in the instant appeal is obviously a question of fact that is beyond the
ambit of a Rule 45 petition for review.
 
 
 
 
2. REPUBLIC VS MARELYN TANEDO MANALO
GR#221029, April 24, 2018
Peralta, J.:

Facts:
On January 20, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for
cancellation of entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, by virtue of a
judgment of divorce rendered by a Japanese court. The petition was later amended and
captioned as a petition for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment.
The petition alleged, among others, that:
• Petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national named
YOSHIDO MINORO;
• Recently, a case for divorce was filed by petitioner in Japan and after due proceeding, a
divorce decree was rendered by the Japanese Court;
The trial court (RTC) denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce obtained by
Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil
Code, the Philippine law “does not afford Filipinos the right to file a divorce, whether they are in
the country or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated
their marriage in the Philippines or in another country” and that unless Filipinos “are naturalized
as citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have control over issues related to Filipino
family rights and duties, together with determination of their condition and legal capacity to enter
into contracts and civil relations, including marriages”.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the
Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for
divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree they obtained makes the latter no
longer married to the former, capacitating him to remarry. Conformably with Navarro, et al. v.
Exec. Secretary, et al. [663 Phil. 546 (2011)] ruling that the meaning of the law should be based
on the intent of the lawmakers and in view of the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be
the height of injustice to consider Manalo as still married to the Japanese national, who, in turn,
is no longer married to her. For the appellate court, the fact that it was Manalo who filed the
divorce case is inconsequential.

Issue:
Whether a Filipino citizen, who initiated a divorce proceeding abroad and obtained a favorable
judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry, has the capacity to
remarry pursuant to Article 26 (2) of the Family Code.

Ruling:
Yes.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of “a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry”. Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only
requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand
that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree
was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the
respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding.
The purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective
in the country where it is rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is
a corrective measure to address the anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage
while the foreign spouse is free to remarry under the laws of his or her country. Whether the
Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the
marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the
Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or a wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign
divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the
receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make
a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the
foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by
operation of the latter’s national law.
There is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce
proceeding and a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien
spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered Filipinos who have
the same rights and obligations in an alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike.
Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses who
are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them are based
merely on superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly
unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the
other.
Thus, a Filipino citizen, who initiated a divorce proceeding abroad and obtained a
favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry, has
the capacity to remarry pursuant to Article 26 (2) of the Family Code.

Filiation of Illegitimate Children

1. Rodolfo S. Aguilar vs. Edna G. Siasat
G.R. No. 200169 January 28, 2015

Facts:

Alfredo and Candelaria Aguilar (Aguilar spouses) died intestate and without debts and included
in their estate are two parcels of land covered by TCT of the Register of Deeds Bago and
Bacolod. Petitioner Rodolfo Aguilar filed a case for injunction with damages against Edna
alleging that he is the only son and sole heir of the Aguilar spouses. He alleged that he
discovered that the subject titles were missing and he suspected that someone from Siasat clan
could have stolen the titles to the properties.
Respondent Edna claimed that Rodolfo is not the son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar
spouses, but a mere stranger who was raised by the Aguilar spouses out of generosity and
kindness of heart; that Rodolfo is not a natural or adopted child of the Aguilar spouses; Edna
added that Alfredo predeceased his wife, Candelaria thus, the latter inherited the conjugal share
of the former; and that upon the death of Candelaria, her brothers and sisters inherited her
estate as she had no issue; and that the subject titles were not stolen but entrusted to her for
safekeeping.
To prove his claim that he is the son and heir of the Aguilar spouses Rodolfo presented the
following pieces of evidence: (i) school records, wherein it is stated that Alfredo Aguilar is
Rodolfo‘s parent; (ii) Individual Income Tax Return, which indicated that Candelaria Aguilar is
his mother; (iii) Alfredo Aguilar‘s SSS Form E-1 which bears his signature and thumb mark and
indicates that Rodolfo, who was born on March 5, 1945, is his son and dependent; (iv) Alfredo
Aguilar‘s Information Sheet of Employment with BBMC, indicating that Rodolfo is his son; and
(v) Certification issued by the Bacolod Civil Registrar to effect that the record of births during the
period of 1945-1946 were all destroyed by nature, hence no true copies of the Certificate of Live
Birth of Rodolfo could be issued as requested. On the other hand, respondent Edna offered as
evidence an Affidavit previously executed by Candelaria announcing that she and Alfredo have
no issue and that she is the sole heir to Alfredo‘s estate.

Both the RTC and CA ruled that the pieces of evidence presented by the petitioner failed to
establish his claim to be the sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses as provided in Art. 172 of
the Family Code (FC). Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not, petitioner‘s pieces of evidence particularly Alfredo Aguilar‘s SSS Form E-1
satisfy the requirement for the proof of filiation and relationship to the Aguilar spouses under Art.
172 of the FC.

Ruling:
Citing the case of De Jesus v. Estate of Dizon, the high court ruled that the filiation of illegitimate
children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof,
filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The due
recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the
child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a
ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a
separate action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on
other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable
statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the child‘s acknowledgment.

Rodolfo is correct in asserting that Alfredo Aguilar‘s SSS Form E-1 satisfies the requirement for
proof of filiation and relationship to the Aguilar spouses under Art.172 of the FC. By itself, said
document constitutes an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. To repeat what was stated in De
Jesus, filiation may be proved by an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, and such due recognition in
any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no
further court action is required.
2. Arado vs. Alcoran
G.R. No. 163362 July 08, 2015

Facts:
Raymundo Alcoran married Joaquina Arado. They had a son named Nicolas Alcoran. Nicolas
married Florencia but their union had no offspring. During his marriage to Florencia, Nicolas had
an extra marital affair with Francisca who gave birth to the respondent, Anacleto Alcoran in
1951. In 1972, Anacleto married Elenette Sonjaco. Raymundo died in 1939, while Nicolas died
in 1954. Likewise, Florencia died in 1960, and Joaquina in 1981. Plaintiffs (collateral relatives of
Nicolas) then filed a complaint for recovery of property alleging that when Raymundo died in
1939, his properties were inherited by his son Nicolas alone as it was the period of the old civil
code where the spouse could not inherit but only as share of the usufruct which was
extinguished during the death of the usufructuary. Plaintiffs averred that Anacleto was not
recognized by Nicolas as his child, hence, when Nicolas died his properties passed to his wife
Florencia and his mother Joaquina.

Issue:
Whether or not Anacleto has proven his status as an illegitimate son of Nicolas.

Ruling:
The SC ruled that rightly enough, the RTC and the CA unanimously concluded that Nicolas had
duly acknowledged Anacleto as his illegitimate son. The birth certificate of Anacleto appearing
in the Register of Births of the Municipality of Bacong, Negros Oriental (Exhibits 3, 3-A) showed
that Nicolas had himself caused the registration of the birth of Anacleto. The showing was by
means of the name of Nicolas appearing in the column "Remarks" in Page 53, Book 4, Register
No. 214 of the Register of Births. Considering that Nicolas, the putative father, had a direct hand
in the preparation of the birth certificate, reliance on the birth certificate of Anacleto as evidence
of his paternity was fully warranted.
Anacleto's baptismal certificate (Exhibit 7) was of no consequence in determining his filiation.
We have already held in Cabatania v. Court of Appeals that "while a baptismal certificate may
be considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the
sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the child's
paternity;" and that baptismal certificates were "per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of
filiation," and thus "cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove [filiation]."
Hence, we attach no probative value to the baptismal certificate as proof of the filiation of
Anacleto.
The lack of probative value of the respondents‘ aforecited corroborative evidence
notwithstanding, Anacleto‘s recognition as Nicolas‘ illegitimate child remain beyond question in
view of the showing that Nicolas had personally and directly acknowledged Anacleto as his
illegitimate child.

3. ROMEO F. ARA AND WILLIAM A. GARCIA Vs. DRA. FELY S. PIZARRO AND HENRY
ROSSI
G.R. No. 187273. February 15, 2017
FACTS:
Romeo F. Ara and William A. Garcia (petitioners), and Dra. Fely S. Pizarro and Henry A. Rossi
(respondents) all claimed to be children of the late Josefa A. Ara (Josefa), who died on
November 18, 2002.
Petitioners assert that Fely S. Pizarro (Pizarro) was born to Josefa and her then husband,
Vicente Salgado (Salgado), who died during World War II. At some point toward the end of the
war, Josefa met and lived with an American soldier by the name of Darwin Gray (Gray). Romeo
F. Ara (Ara) was born from this relationship. Josefa later met a certain Alfredo Garcia (Alfredo),
and, from this relationship, gave birth to sons Ramon Garcia (Ramon) and William A. Garcia
(Garcia). Josefa and Alfredo married on January 24, 1952. After Alfredo passed away, Josefa
met an Italian missionary named Frank Rossi, who allegedly fathered Henry Rossi (Rossi).
Respondent Pizarro claims that, to her knowledge, she is the only child of Josefa. Further,
petitioner Garcia is recorded as a son of a certain Carmen Bucarin and Pedro Garcia, as
evidenced by a Certificate of Live Birth dated July 19, 1950; and petitioner Ara is recorded as a
son of spouses Jose Ara and Maria Flores, evidenced by his Certificate of Live Birth.
Petitioners, together with Ramon and herein respondent Rossi (collectively, plaintiffs a quo),
verbally sought partition of the properties left by the deceased Josefa, which were in the
possession of respondent Pizarro.
Plaintiffs a quo filed a Complaint dated April 9, 2003 for judicial partition of properties left by the
deceased Josefa, before the RTC.
RTC held that petitioners Ara and Garcia to be children of Josefa, and including them in the
partition of properties, which the respondents appealed thereafter.
The CA,  promulgated its Decision and held that only respondents Pizarro and Rossi, as well as
plaintiff a quo Ramon, were the children of the late Josefa, entitled to shares in Josefa's estate.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners may prove their filiation to Josefa through their open and
continuous possession of the status of illegitimate children, found in the second paragraph of
Article 172 of the Family Code.

RULING:
On establishing the filiation of illegitimate children, the Family Code provides:
Article 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on
the same evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the
action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. Articles 172 and 173 of the Family Code
provide:
Article 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:      
                   1. The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
                   2. Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Article 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her
lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a
state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to
institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or
both of the parties.
Thus, a person who seeks to establish illegitimate filiation after the death of a putative parent
must do so via a record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, or an
admission of legitimate filiation.
Petitioners did not present evidence that would prove their illegitimate filiation to their putative
parent, Josefa, after her death as provided under Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code.
To recall, petitioners submitted the following to establish their filiation:
(1) Garcia's Baptismal Certificate listing Josefa as his mother, showing that the baptism was
conducted on June 1, 1958, and that Garcia was born on June 23, 1951;
(2) Garcia's Certificate of Marriage, listing Josefa as his mother;
(3) A picture of Garcia's wedding, with Josefa and other relatives;
(4) Certificate of Marriage showing that Alfredo and Josefa were married on January 24,
1952
(5) Garcia's Certificate of Live Birth from Paniqui, Tarlac, issued on October 23, 2003,
under Registry No. 2003-1447, which is a late registration of his birth, showing he was
born on June 23, 1951 to Alfredo and Josefa;[50]
(6) A group picture of all the parties in the instant case.
(7) In the Comment of Rossi to the Formal Offer of Exhibits of Pizarro, Rossi stated:
1. That William Garcia and Romeo Flores Ara are half brothers of Dr. Henry Rossi their
mother being Josefa Ara, who did not register them as her children for fear of losing her
pension from the U.S. Veterans Office;[52]
(8) Ara testified that he was a son of the late Josefa and Gray, and that his record of birth
was registered at camp Murphy, Quezon City;[53] and
(9) Nelly Alipio, first degree cousin of Josefa, testified that Ara was a son of Josefa and
Gray.
None of the foregoing constitutes evidence under the first paragraph of Article 172 of the Family
Code.
Although not raised by petitioners, it may be argued that petitioner Garcia's Certificate of Live
Birth obtained in 2003 through a late registration of his birth is a record of birth appearing in the
civil register under Article 172 of the Family Code.
True, birth certificates offer prima facie evidence of filiation. To overthrow the presumption of
truth contained in a birth certificate, a high degree of proof is needed. However, the
circumstances surrounding the delayed registration prevent us from according it the same
weight as any other birth certificate.
The Court of Appeals did not adopt the Trial Court's appreciation of evidence. It ruled that,
because petitioners' putative parent Josefa had already passed away, petitioners were
proscribed from proving their filiation under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family
Code.
The Court of Appeals properly did not give credence to the evidence submitted by petitioners
regarding their status.
 
Josefa passed away in 2002. After her death, petitioners could no longer be allowed to
introduce evidence of open and continuous illegitimate filiation to Josefa. The only evidence
allowed under the law would be a record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment, or an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private signed,
handwritten instruction by Josefa.
An alleged parent is the best person to affirm or deny a putative descendant's filiation. Absent a
record of birth appearing in a civil register or a final judgment, an express admission of filiation
in a public document, or a handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned, a deceased
person will have no opportunity to contest a claim of filiation.
 
4. Gloria Zoleta-San Agustin v. Ernesto Sales
G.R. No. 189289 August 31, 2016
Reyes, J.

FACTS:
The plaintiffs, having no knowledge of any relatives of Spouses Fernandez, directed the action
against unknown defendants. However, on May 30, 1994, the petitioner raised her opposition.
She alleged in her Amended Answer filed on July 26, 1994 that she is the niece of Louis and
that the Spouses Fernandez informally adopted her as their child when she was only 2 years
old. She insisted that the father of the plaintiffs is Corpus Micabalo (Corpus), the former
houseboy of the Fernandez household. One of the principal allegations in the amended answer
of the petitioner is that the documents presented by the plaintiffs to sustain the complaint were
spurious. RTC issued an order denying the admission of the photographs presented by the
petitioner seeking to prove that she was 'treated by the Spouses Fernandez as their own child.
the RTC in a Decision14 dated July 12, 2007 ruled in favor of the recognition of the plaintiffs as
the illegitimate children of Louis.

ISSUE: whether or not the documents executed by Louis are valid to acknowledge voluntary
recognition of Teodoro and Ernesto as his illegitimate children.

RULING:
The Court held that The legitimate filiation of a child may be established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the present concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proven by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
These requirements likewise apply to establish the filiation of illegitimate children. In order to
cast doubt as to the · authenticity of the documentary evidence presented by Ernesto, the
petitioner purported that the circumstances surrounding the execution and notarization of the
said documents are highly suspicious thereby warranting the overturn of the presumption of
regularity in favor of these documents. The petitioner claimed that during the execution and
notarization of the documents, Louis could still write, rendering incredible the mere affixing of his
thumbprints to the contested documents. However, Ernesto testified before the RTC that Louis
was no longer capable of writing his name as he was already blind and bedridden at the time he
affixed his thumb mark to the document dated November 11, 1980. The witnesses to the
document were Margarita Almeda, the hairdresser of Louis' sister, and Romeo Gadones,
Teodoro's acquaintance. A thumb mark has been repeatedly considered as a valid mode of
signature. The other inconsistencies cited by the petitioner are of no importance and insufficient
to overcome the presumption of regularity in favor of the notarized documents.
 
 
 

 
Proof of Legitimacy
1. VIRGINIA D. CALIMAG v. HEIRS OF SILVESTRA N. MACAPAZ, REPRESENTED BY
ANASTACIO P. MACAPAZ, JR.
THIRD DIVISION, G.R. No. 191936, June 01, 2016
REYES, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated in CA-G.R. CV No. 90907 which affirmed with modification the of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 147, in Civil Case No. 06-173, an action for annulment of deed of
sale and cancellation of title with damages. The CA Resolution denied the motion for
reconsideration thereof.
Virginia D. Calimag (petitioner) co-owned the property, the subject matter of this case, with
Silvestra N. Macapaz (Silvestra). On the other hand, Anastacio P. Macapaz, Jr. (Anastacio, Jr.)
and Alicia Macapaz-Ritua (Alicia) (respondents) are the children of Silvestra's brother,
Anastacio Macapaz, Sr. (Anastacio, Sr.) and Fidela O. Poblete Vda. de Macapaz (Fidela).
The subject property, is located at No. 1273 Bo. Visaya Street, Barangay Guadalupe Nuevo,
Makati City, and was duly registered in the names of the petitioner (married to Demetrio
Calimag) and Silvestra under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 183088.5 In said certificate
of title, appearing as Entry No. 02671 is an annotation of an Adverse Claim of Fidela asserting
rights and interests over a portion of the said property measuring 49.5 sq m.
On November 11, 2002, Silvestra died without issue. On July 7, 2005, TCT No. 183088 was
cancelled and a new certificate of title, TCT No. 221466, was issued in the name of the
petitioner by virtue of a Deed of Sale dated January 18, 2005 whereby Silvestra allegedly sold
her 99-sq-m portion to the petitioner for P300,000.00. Included among the documents submitted
for the purpose of cancelling TCT No. 183088 was an Affidavit dated July 12, 2005 purportedly
executed by both the petitioner and Silvestra. It was stated therein that the affidavit of adverse
claim filed by Fidela was not signed by the Deputy Register of Deeds of Makati City, making the
same legally ineffective. On September 16, 2005, Fidela passed away.
On March 2, 2006, the respondents, asserting that they are the heirs of Silvestra, instituted the
action for Annulment of Deed of Sale and Cancellation of TCT No. 221466 with Damages
against the petitioner and the Register of Deeds of Makati City.
In her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, the petitioner averred that the respondents have
no legal capacity to institute said civil action on the ground that they are illegitimate children of
Anastacio, Sr. As such, they have no right over Silvestra's estate pursuant to Article 992 of the
Civil Code which prohibits illegitimate children from inheriting intestate from the legitimate
children and relatives of their father and mother.
Demetrio Calimag, Jr. sought, but failed, to impugn the personality of the [respondents] to
initiate this action as the alleged heirs of [Silvestra]. The marriage between [Anastacio Sr.J and
[FidclaJ is evidenced by the Certificate of (canonical) Marriage. The name 'Fidela Obera
Poblete' is indicated in [the respondents'] respective birth certificates as the mother's maiden
name but Fidela signed the same as the informant as "Fidela P. Macapaz". In both birth
certificates, "Anastacio Nator Macapaz" is indicated as the name of the father.
Aggrieved, the petitioner elevated her case to the CA resting on the argument that the
respondents are without legal personality to institute the civil action for cancellation of deed of
sale and title on the basis of their claimed status as legitimate children of Anastacio, Sr., the
brother and sole heir of the deceased, Silvestra. The CA rendered its Decision affirming the
RTC decision with modification as to the amount of damages.
 
While the petitioner does not question that Anastacio, Sr. is the legal heir of Silvestra, she,
however, claims that the respondents failed to establish their legitimate filiation to Anastacio, Sr.
considering that the marriage between Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela was not sufficiently proven.
According to the petitioner, the marriage contract24 presented by the respondents is not
admissible under the Best Evidence Rule for being a mere fax copy or photocopy of an alleged
marriage contract, and which is not even authenticated by the concerned Local Civil Registrar.
In addition, there is no mark or stamp showing that said document was ever received by said
office. Further, while the respondents also presented a Certificate of (Canonical) Marriage,25
the petitioner asserts that the same is not the marriage license required under Articles 3 and 4
of the Family Code;26 that said Certificate of (Canonical) Marriage only proves that a marriage
ceremony actually transpired between Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela.
Moreover, the petitioner contends that the certificates of live birth of the respondents do not
conclusively prove that they are legitimate children of Anastacio, Sr.

ISSUE:  Whether or not respondents established their legitimate filiation to Anastacio, Sr.
considering that the marriage between Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela was not sufficiently proven
hence, respondents are legal heirs of Silvestra.

RULING:
The petition is bereft of merit.
While it is true that a person's legitimacy can only be questioned in a direct action seasonably
filed by the proper party, as held in Spouses Fidel v. Hon. CA, et al.,30 this Court however
deems it necessary to pass upon the respondents' relationship to Silvestra so as to determine
their legal rights to the subject property. Besides, the question of whether the respondents have
the legal capacity to sue as alleged heirs of Silvestra was among the issues agreed upon by the
parties in the pre-trial.
At first blush, the documents presented as proof of marriage between Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela,
viz: (1) fax or photo copy of the marriage contract, and (2) the canonical certificate of marriage,
cannot be used as legal basis to establish the fact of marriage without running afoul with the
Rules on Evidence of the Revised Rules of Court. Rule 130, Section 3 of the Rules on Evidence
provides that: "When the subject of the inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall
be admissible other than the original document itself, x x x." Nevertheless, a reproduction of the
original document can still be admitted as secondary evidence subject to certain requirements
specified by law. In Dantis v. Maghinang, Jr.,31 it was held that:
A secondary evidence is admissible only upon compliance with Rule 130, Section 5, which
states that: when the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the
offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad
faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some
authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. Accordingly, the
offeror of the secondary evidence is burdened to satisfactorily prove the predicates thereof,
namely: (1) the execution or existence of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original
or its non-production in court; and (3) the unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith on
the part of the proponent/offeror. Proof of the due execution of the document and its subsequent
loss would constitute the basis for the introduction of secondary evidence, x x x.32 (Citation
omitted)
On the other hand, a canonical certificate of marriage is not a public document. As early as in
the case of United States v. Evangelista, it has been settled that church registries of births,
marriages, and deaths made subsequent to the promulgation of General Orders No. 68 and the
passage of Act No. 190 are no longer public writings, nor are they kept by duly authorized public
officials.34 They are private writings and their authenticity must therefore be proved as are all
other private writings in accordance with the rules of evidence.35 Accordingly, since there is no
showing that the authenticity and due execution of the canonical certificate of marriage of
Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela was duly proven, it cannot be admitted in evidence.
 
Notwithstanding, it is well settled that other proofs can be offered to establish the fact of a
solemnized marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by
relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person's birth certificate
may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.
Thus, in order to prove their legitimate filiation, the respondents presented their respective
Certificates of Live Birth issued by the National Statistics Office where Fidela signed as the
Informant in item no. 17 of both documents.

SUPPORT
1. EDNA MABUGAY-OTAMIAS VS REPUBLIC
GR#189516, June 8, 2016
Leonen,J:
 
FACTS: 

Edna Mabugay-Otamias and Retired Colonel Francisco Otamias were married in June16, 1978.
They had 5 children. Due to the alleged Francisco’s infidelity they decided to separate and their
children were all in the custody of their mother.Edna, then, filed a complaint against Colonel
Francisco before the Provost Marshall Division of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. She
demanded that they be entitled to75% of the retirement benefits of Col. Otamias as their
monthly support since the children were all living with her.
 
ISSUES:
 
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the AFP Finance Center cannot be
directed to automatically deduct the amount of support needed by the legitimate family of
Colonel Otamias.
2. Whether or not Colonel Otamias' pension benefits can be executed upon for the financial
support of his legitimate family;
3. Whether or not Colonel Otamias’ legitimate family is entitled for support.
 
RULING:
 
1. Article 6 of the Civil Code provides:
Article 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
The concept of waiver has been defined by this Court as: a voluntary and intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or
privilege, which except for such waiver the party would have enjoyed; the voluntary
abandonment or surrender, by a capable person, of a right known by him to exist, with the intent
that such right shall be surrendered and such person forever deprived of its benefit; or such
conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such right; or the intentional doing of
an act inconsistent with claiming it.
 
In determining whether a statutory right can be waived, this Court is guided by the following
pronouncement: The doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges of any character, and,
since the word 'waiver' covers every conceivable right, it is the general rule that a person may
waive any matter which affects his property, and any alienable right or privilege of which he is
the owner or which belongs to him or to which he is legally entitled, whether secured by
contract, conferred with statute, or guaranteed by constitution, provided such rights and
privileges rest in the individual, are intended for his sole benefit, do not infringe on the rights of
others, and further provided the waiver of the right or privilege is not forbidden by law, and does
not contravene public policy; and the principle is recognized that everyone has a right to waive,
and agree to waive, the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of
the individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without
infringing on any public right, and without detriment to the community at large.
 
When Colonel Otamias executed the Deed of Assignment, he effectively waived his right to
claim that his retirement benefits are exempt from execution. The right to receive retirement
benefits belongs to Colonel Otamias. His decision to waive a portion of his retirement benefits
does not infringe on the right of third persons, but even protects the right of his family to receive
support.

2. The Deed of Assignment should be considered as the law between the parties, and its
provisions should be respected in the absence of allegations that Colonel Otamias was coerced
or defrauded in executing it. The general rule is that a contract is the law between parties and
parties are free to stipulate terms and conditions that are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy.The Deed of Assignment executed by Colonel Otamias
was not contrary to law; it was in accordance with the provisions on support in the Family Code.
Hence, there was no reason for the AFP PGMC not to recognize its validity.Further, this Court
notes that the AFP PGMC granted the request for support of the wives of other retired military
personnel in a similar situation as that of petitioner in this case. Attached to the Petition are the
affidavits of the wives of retired members of the military, who have received a portion of their
husbands' pensions.Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638 provides Section 31. The
benefits authorized under this Decree, except as provided herein, shall not be subject to
attachment, garnishment, levy, execution or any tax whatsoever;neither shall they be assigned,
ceded, or conveyed to any third person: Provided, That if a retired or separated officer or
enlisted man who is entitled to any benefit under this Decree has unsettled money and/or
property accountabilities incurred while in the active service, not more than fifty per centum of
the pension gratuity or other payment due such officer or enlisted man or his survivors under
this Decree may be withheld and be applied to settle such accountabilities.

3. Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638 provides that the benefits authorized under this
Decree, except as provided herein, shall not be subject to attachment, garnishment, levy,
execution or any tax whatsoever; neither shall they be assigned, ceded, or conveyed to any
third person: Provided, That if a retired or separated officer or enlisted man who is entitled to
any benefit under this Decree has unsettled money and/or property accountabilities incurred
while in the active service, not more than fifty per centum of the pension gratuity or other
payment due such officer or enlisted man or his survivors under this Decree may be withheld
and be applied to settle such accountabilities. Under Section 31, Colonel Otamias' retirement
benefits are exempt from execution. Retirement benefits are exempt from execution so as to
ensure that the retiree has enough funds to support himself and his family.

2. LACSON v. LACSON
GR No. 150644,     August 28, 2016
 
FACTS:

The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson are legitimate daughters of
petitioner Edward V. Lacson and his wife, Lea Daban Lacson  Not long after the birth of
Maonaa, petitioner left the conjugal home in Molo, Iloilo City, virtually forcing mother and
children to seek, apparently for financial reason, shelter somewhere else. For a month, they
stayed with Leas mother-in-law, Alicia Lacson, then with her (Leas) mother and then with her
brother Noel Daban. After some time, they rented an apartment only to return later to the house
of Leas mother. As the trial court aptly observed, the sisters and their mother, from 1976 to
1994, or for a period of eighteen (18) years, shuttled from one dwelling place to another not their
own. It appears that from the start of their estrangement, Lea did not badger her husband
Edward for support, relying initially on his commitment memorialized in a note dated December
10, 1975 to give support to his daughters. As things turned out, however, Edward reneged on
his promise of support, despite Leas efforts towards having him fulfill the same. Lea would
admit, though, that Edward occasionally gave their children meager amounts for school
expenses. Through the years and up to the middle part of 1992, Edwards mother, Alicia Lacson,
also gave small amounts to help in the schooling of Maowee and Maonaa, both of whom
eventually took up nursing at St. Pauls College in Iloilo City. In the early part of 1995 when Lea,
in behalf of her two daughters, filed a complaint against Edward for support before the Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 33, Maowee was about to graduate. Maowee and Maonaa, thru
their mother, averred that their father Edward, despite being gainfully employed and owning
several pieces of valuable lands, has not provided them support since 1976. Edward alleged
giving to Maowee and Maonaa sufficient sum to meet their needs. Following trial, the RTC
rendered on June 26, 1997 judgment finding for the plaintiff sisters, as represented by their
mother. In that judgment, the trial court, following an elaborate formula set forth therein, ordered
their defendant father Edward to pay them a specific sum which represented 216 months, or 18
years, of support in arrears.

ISSUE:
Whether a third party may furnish a support.

HELD:
Article 207 of the Family Code provides that when the person obliged to support another
unjustly refuses or fails to give support when urgently needed by the latter, any third person may
furnish support to the needy individual, with right of reimbursement from the person obliged to
give support. Mention may also be made that, contextually, the resulting juridical relationship
between the petitioner and Noel Daban is a quasi-contract an equitable principle enjoining one
from unjustly enriching himself at the expense of another
 

Parental Authority
1.CARAVAN TRAVEL v. ERMILINDA R. ABEJAR
 G.R. No. 170631,     February 10, 2016

 
FACTS:
 
On July 13, 2000, Jesmariane R. Reyes (Reyes) was walking along the west-bound lane of
Sampaguita Street, United Parañaque Subdivision IV, Parañaque City. A Mitsubishi L-300 van
with plate number PKM 195 was travelling along the east-bound lane, opposite Reyes. To avoid
an incoming vehicle, the van swerved to its left and hit Reyes. Alex Espinosa (Espinosa), a
witness to the accident, went to her aid and loaded her in the back of the van. Espinosa told the
driver of the van, Jimmy Bautista (Bautista), to bring Reyes to the hospital. Instead of doing so,
Bautista appeared to have left the van parked inside a nearby subdivision with Reyes still in the
van. Fortunately for Reyes, an unidentified civilian came to help and drove Reyes to the
hospital.
 
Respondent Ermilinda R. Abejar (Abejar), Reyes' paternal aunt and the person who raised her
since she was nine (9) years old, filed before the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque a
Complaint for damages against Bautista and Caravan. In her Complaint, Abejar alleged that
Bautista was an employee of Caravan and that Caravan is the registered owner of the van that
hit Reyes.
 
Caravan argues that Abejar has no personality to bring this suit because she is not a real party
in interest. According to Caravan, Abejar does not exercise legal or substitute parental authority.
She is also not the judicially appointed guardian or the only living relative of the deceased. She
is also not "the executor or administrator of the estate of the deceased." According to Caravan,
only the victim herself or her heirs can enforce an action based on culpa aquiliana such as
Abejar's action for damages.

Abejar counters that Caravan failed to provide proof that it exercised the requisite diligence in
the selection and supervision of Bautista. She adds that the Court of Appeals' ruling that
Caravan is solidarily liable with Bautista for moral damages, exemplary damages, civil
indemnity ex delicto, and attorney's fees should be upheld. Abejar argues that since Caravan is
the registered owner of the van, it is directly, primarily, and solidarity liable for the tortious acts
of its driver.

ISSUE:
Whether respondent Ermilinda R. Abejar is a real party in interest who may bring an action for
damages against petitioner Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. on account of
Jesmariane R. Reyes' death
 
RULING:
 
Having exercised substitute parental authority, respondent suffered actual loss and is, thus, a
real party in interest in this case.

Article 216 of the Family Code identifies the persons who exercise substitute parental authority:
 
Art. 216. In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the following persons shall
exercise substitute parental authority over the child in the order indicated:
(1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214;
(2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified;
and
(3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or
disqualified.

Whenever the appointment or a judicial guardian over the property of the child becomes
necessary, the same order of preference shall be observed.
 
Article 233 of the Family Code provides for the extent of authority of persons exercising
substitute parental authority, that is, the same as those of actual parents:
Art. 233. The person exercising substitute parental authority shall have the same authority over
the person of the child as the parents.
 
Both of Reyes' parents are already deceased. Reyes' paternal grandparents are also both
deceased. The whereabouts of Reyes' maternal grandparents are unknown. There is also no
record that Reyes has brothers or sisters. It was under these circumstances that respondent
took custody of Reyes when she was a child, assumed the role of Reyes' parents, and thus,
exercised substitute parental authority over her. As Reyes' custodian, respondent exercised the
full extent of the statutorily recognized rights and duties of a parent. Consistent with Article
220 of the Family Code, respondent supported Reyes' education and provided for her personal
needs. To echo respondent's words in her Complaint, she treated Reyes as if she were her own
daughter. We note that Reyes was already 18 years old when she died. Having reached the age
of majority, she was already emancipated upon her death. While parental authority is terminated
upon emancipation, respondent continued to support and care for Reyes even after she turned
18. Except for the legal technicality of Reyes' emancipation, her relationship with respondent
remained the same. The anguish and damage caused to respondent by Reyes' death was no
different because of Reyes' emancipation.

ADOPTION

1.GERONIMO v. SANTOS
G.R. No. 197099,     September 28, 2015
 
FACTS:
 
Rufino and Claridad died intestate leaving a property consisting of one half of the parcel of land.
Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo who are the brothers of Rufino executed a document
entitled Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman declaring themselves as the only heirs of the
spouses and adjudicating to themselves the property. They took possession and were able to
transfer the tax declaration of the property to their names. Karen Santos, claiming to be the only
child of deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo filed a complaint for annulment of document
and recovery of possession against the defendants Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo. Eugenio
and Emiliano denied the allegation that plaintiff was the only child and sole heir of their brother.
They disclosed that the deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo were childless and took in as
their ward the plaintiff who was in truth, the child of Caridad’s sister. They claimed that the birth
certificate of the plaintiff was a simulated document. According to Eugenio, when Rufino’s wife
could not bear a child, the couple decided to adopt the plaintiff who was Caridad’s niece from
Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur. It was in 1972, 13 years after the marriage, when Karen joined her
adoptive parents’ household. Eugenio was able to obtain a copy of the plaintiff’s alleged birth
certificate. It had irregular features, such as that it was written in pentel pen, the entry in the
box date of birth was erased and the word and figure April 6, 1972 written and the name Emma
Daño was superimposed on the entry in the box intended for the informant’s signature. Basing
on the secondary evidence of Karen’s open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child, both the RTC and CA ruled in favor of respondent Karen
 
ISSUE:
 
Whether or not the mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the
supposed parents, even if she is not a natural child of the latter, is a valid adoption.
 
HELD:
 
No. A mere cursory reading of the birth certificate of respondent would show that it was
tampered specifically on the entries pertaining to the date of birth of respondent and the name
of the informant. Using pentel ink, the date of birth of respondent – April 6, 1972 – and the name
of the informant – Emma Daño – were both superimposed on the document. The appellate court
itself ruled that the irregularities consisting of the superimposed entries on the date of birth and
the name of the informant made the document questionable. The corroborating testimony of
Arturo Reyes, a representative of the NSO, further confirmed that the entries on the date of birth
and the signature of the informant are alterations on the birth certificate which rendered the
document questionable. To be sure, even the respondent herself did not offer any evidence to
explain such irregularities on her own birth certificate. These irregularities and the totality of the
following circumstances surrounding the alleged birth of respondent are sufficient to overthrow
the presumption of regularity attached to respondent’s birth certificate. Finally, we also find that
the concurrence of the secondary evidence relied upon by both courts a quo does not
sufficiently establish the one crucial fact in this case: that respondent is indeed a child of the
deceased spouses. Both the RTC and the CA ruled that respondent is a legitimate child of her
putative parents because she was allowed to bear their family name "Geronimo", they
supported her and her education, she was the beneficiary of the burial benefits of Caridad in her
GSIS policy, Caridad applied for and was appointed as her legal guardian in relation to the
estate left by Rufino, and she and Caridad executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of
Rufino as his legal heirs.
 
Of great significance to this controversy was the following pronouncement:
But definitely, the mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the
supposed parents is not a valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the status of an
adopted child and the legal rights of such child, and even amounts to simulation of the child's
birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public document. Furthermore, it is
well-settled that a record of birth is merely a prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein.
It is not conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of the statements made there by the interested
parties.