CASES DIGESTs #2

GR No. 176633

1. G.R. No. 176633 September 5, 2007

FACTS

For review is the Decision dated 31 October 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01212, which
affirmed the Decision dated 19 January 1999 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 138, in
Criminal Case No. 98-024, finding herein appellant Armando San Antonio, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of rape committed against AAA.

Appellant Armando San Antonio, Jr. was charged with raping AAA in an Information which reads: The
undersigned Prosecutor, based on the sworn statement/complaint of AAA, a 14-year old minor, duly assisted by her
mother BBB, accuses ARMANDO SAN ANTONIO, JR. y DELA CRUZ of the crime of RAPE, committed as
follows: That on or about the 12th day of December 1997, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with complainant AAA, against her will
and consent.

Upon arraignment, the appellant, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded NOT GUILTY to the crime charged.
Thereafter, trial ensued.

The prosecution presented the following witnesses: AAA, the victim; Anabel Lopez-Medrano (Ana), the victim's
cousin; BBB, the victim's mother; and Dr. Antonio S. Vertido (Dr. Vertido), Medico-Legal Officer of the National
Bureau of Investigation. As rebuttal witness, the prosecution offered the testimony of Lydia Sarte (Lydia), AAA's
class adviser at Makati High School.

AAA testified that at around 11:00 o'clock in the morning of 12 December 1997, she was in her friend's house
located at XXX Street, XXX City as they were discussing the things to be done in school the following day. She
stayed there for less than three minutes. Thereafter, she went to the house of her friend's auntie, which was only
beside the house of her friend, and stayed there for about three minutes. She then returned to her friend's house
where she stayed for only two minutes because she heard a sudden call (a sutsot) coming from the house of her
cousin, Ana. She peeped inside and tried to find out who made the said call. But since the lights were off, she went
inside the house without knowing that the appellant was there. The appellant was at Ana's house because he was a
friend of Ana's husband and he constantly slept there. At such instance, she saw the appellant lying on the wooden
bed (papag) remorselessly staring at her. When she was about to leave the said house, appellant pulled her right
hand. She tried to remove appellant's grip on her using her left hand, but she failed. Subsequently, appellant dragged
her and pushed her to the wooden bed where she fell on her back. Appellant also threatened to punch her if she will
not accede to his desire. Then, while on a kneeling position, appellant pinned her right arm at the back of her head
and squeezed her legs with his thighs. He pulled down his "maong" shorts, released her legs and pulled down her
cycling shorts and underwear. She banged the wall of the house using her left elbow to get some help, but nobody
came. Appellant then placed himself on top of her and succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina, causing her
so much pain. Afterward, she felt something wet came out from appellant's penis. And while the appellant was still
on top of her, Ana arrived and saw them in that position. The appellant stood up and left. She likewise stood up and
went home.

Ana corroborated AAA's testimony that when she went home, coming from the house of her mother, on 12
December 1997, about 10 minutes after 11:00 o'clock in the morning, she saw the appellant lying on top of AAA in
the wooden bed. When the appellant saw her, he stood up, wore his shorts and left. AAA also stood up and went out.
Ana noticed that AAA was so afraid and teary eyed. She then went out of the house to report the incident to the
mother of AAA.

BBB, the mother of AAA, confirmed the testimony of Ana that at about 11:00 o'clock in the morning of 12
December 1997, Ana came to her house and told her that she saw the appellant on top of her daughter, AAA. She
immediately asked AAA about it who told her about her horrible experience in the hands of the appellant. AAA was
so afraid and in tears when she told her that she was raped by the appellant. She likewise told her mother that she
wanted to report the same to the police authorities. Thus, BBB, as well as Ana, accompanied AAA to Precinct 1 of
the Makati City Police Station to report the incident.

Dr. Vertido testified that he was the one who conducted the medical examination on AAA with the conclusions,
contained in AAA's Living Case No. MG-97-1691, as follows:

1. No evident sign of extragenital physical injuries noted on the body of the subject at the time of examination.
2. Hymen, intact, distensible and its orifice wide (2.5 cms. in diameter) as to allow complete penetration by an
average-sized, adult, Filipino male organ in full erection without producing any hymeneal injury.

Dr. Vertido explained that AAA has a distensible hymen, which means that AAA's hymen is incapable of being
ruptured even if penetrated by the male organ.
On the other hand, the defense presented the testimonies of the following witnesses: the appellant, Francisco
Portugal (Francisco), Wendy Cilomen (Wendy), Jacqueline dela Cruz (Jacqueline) and BBB, the victim's mother, as
hostile witness, to testify on the condition of AAA seven or nine months after the rape incident.

Appellant invoked the "sweetheart defense." He admitted having sexual intercourse with AAA on 12 December
1997, but claimed that the same was consensual as they were sweethearts. He stated that he had known AAA for 10
years because they were neighbors. He started courting her in January 1997, and AAA accepted his offer of love in
August 1997. He likewise asserted that AAA gave him a love letter; however, it was lost when his wallet was stolen.
He further averred that the sexual intercourse between him and AAA on 12 December 1997 was actually their third
time to engage in the sexual act. He professed that the first sexual encounter between him and AAA happened on 27
August 1997, between 8:00-8:30 in the evening in a jeepney parked at the garage of Danarra Condominium, while
the second time was on his birthday, 4 September 1997, at around 9:00 p.m., as the same was AAA's gift to him. He
then alleged that on 12 December 1997, at noontime, while he was sleeping at the house of Ana, AAA went inside
the house, but, he asked her to leave as he was tired and was about to sleep. AAA left, but she came back. Again, he
ordered her to leave. AAA came back for the third time at about 2:00 p.m., and upon her initiative, they engaged in
sexual intercourse, with AAA on top of him. He claimed that AAA was wearing jogging pants at that time.
Suddenly, Ana barged in and saw them. He stood up and left.

Wendy Cilomen was presented by the defense to corroborate the testimony of the appellant. She stated that at
around 11:00 o' clock in the morning, on 12 December 1997, she saw neither the appellant nor AAA. It was at
around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, while she was washing clothes in front of the house of her mother, that she saw
AAA go inside the house of Ana. When she peeped inside the house, she saw the appellant on top of AAA "as if
they were making a baby." However, when she was asked if she knew whether the appellant and AAA were in a
relationship, she answered in the negative. The same answer was given by Francisco, one of the witnesses for the
defense, when asked if he knew whether AAA was appellant's girlfriend. However, Jacqueline, the other defense
witness, testified that the relationship of the appellant and AAA as lovers was a matter of general knowledge in their
neighborhood.

To refute the testimony given by the appellant that prior to 12 December 1997, he and AAA had already engaged in
sexual intercourse on two occasions, i.e., 27 August 1997 and 4 September 1997, the prosecution presented Lydia,
the class adviser of AAA. She testified that on those dates, AAA was still in school because her class schedule was
until 8:20 p.m. as shown by the class register. Hence, it was impossible that the appellant had sexual intercourse
with AAA on the aforesaid dates. This testimony of Lydia was strengthened by the testimony of AAA when she was
called again to the witness stand and declared that she was never courted by the appellant. She further confirmed
that she never had sexual intercourse with the appellant on 27 August 1997 and 4 September 1997 for she was in
school on those dates. And from her school, it usually took her an hour before she can reach their house.

As a result of the sexual assault, AAA got pregnant and on 1 August 1998 or after seven months, she gave birth to a
baby boy. According to AAA, the father of her baby was the appellant because of what the appellant did to her.

After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision dated 19 January 1999, finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape. The trial court giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
ratiocinated as follows: The issue in this case is credibility.

The testimony of [AAA] is clear and categorical. [AAA] was [14] years old when she testified in Court. Her
testimony was given in a credible manner, sometimes haltingly but consistent and without gross inaccuracies. It has
not been shown that she was motivated by ill-will or bad intention in charging the [appellant]. Her deportment
during the time her testimony was being taken still shows traces of youthful innocence but with obvious sadness
about her predicament. The Court has observed that during the direct and cross-examination when scandalous
matters (sic) or matters which induce pain if remembered were asked, there was marked expression of
embarrassment and noticeable anguish on the face of [AAA], which deportment, the Court considered as indication
that she was telling the truth. The spontaneity (sic) with which she proceeded to lodge her complaint against the
[appellant] with the police barely hours after the commission was also considered by the Court and taken as another
indication of truthful narration. On the other hand no fact or circumstance in the narration of [AAA] or in her
conduct was observed or made of record which could lead the Court to doubt her testimony. Given the foregoing
findings, the burden to prove his innocence was shifted to the [appellant]. Unfortunately, his evidence failed to
overturn the facts established by the evidence for the prosecution.

On the claim that he and [AAA] are sweethearts and that they have an understanding (nagkakaunawaan), the only
evidence to support this claim is his word which is self-serving and has little or of no value at all. No letter, picture
or other article which indicate amorous relationship was presented in Court.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the [appellant] Armando San Antonio, Jr. y dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape. Applying the scale of penalties provided in Republic Act No. 8353,20 in relation to
Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance attending the
commission of the offense charged, the Court hereby impose upon the [appellant] the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Further following the provisions of Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code, [appellant] is ordered to indemnify
[AAA] of the amount of P50,000.00 as and for moral damages. Appellant is unmarried, hence he should be further
directed to acknowledge the minor child [CCC], and to provide him support which the Court initially set at
P1,000.00 per month. Cost de oficio.

The records of this case were originally transmitted to this Court on appeal.

ISSUE
In his brief, appellant's lone assignment of error was: the trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of
rape.

RULINGS

Pursuant to People v. Mateo, the records of the present case were transferred to the Court of Appeals for appropriate
action and disposition. The Court of Appeals rendered its Decision on 31 October 2006 affirming the Decision of
the RTC.

Feeling aggrieved, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal before the Court.

The Court required the parties to simultaneously submit their respective supplemental briefs. Both the Office of the
Solicitor General and the appellant manifested that they were adopting their respective briefs filed before the Court
of Appeals as their supplemental briefs. After a careful review of the records of this case, the Court affirms
appellant's conviction.

A rape charge is a serious matter with pernicious consequences both for the appellant and the complainant; hence,
utmost care must be taken in the review of a decision involving conviction of rape. Thus, in the disposition and
review of rape cases, the Court is guided by these principles: First, the prosecution has to show the guilt of the
accused by proof beyond reasonable doubt or that degree of proof that, to an unprejudiced mind, produces
conviction. Second, the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot draw strength
from the weakness of the evidence of the defense. Third, unless there are special reasons, the findings of trial courts,
especially regarding the credibility of witnesses, are entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal.
Fourth, an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person
accused, though innocent, to disprove; and Fifth, in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two
persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution.

Right off, it is clear that appellant does not deny the sexual intercourse between him and AAA. By way of
exculpation, appellant argues that the trial court erred in convicting him of the crime of rape because the
complainant has not been raped as the sexual intercourse between him and the complainant was consensual as they
were sweethearts. This is specious.

The "sweetheart defense" is a much-abused defense that rashly derides the intelligence of the Court and sorely tests
its patience. Being an affirmative defense, it must be established with convincing evidence - by some documentary
and/or other evidence like mementos, love letters, notes, pictures and the like. Likewise, the "sweetheart theory"
appellant proffers is effectively an admission of carnal knowledge of the victim and consequently places on him the
burden of proving the supposed relationship by substantial evidence. To be worthy of judicial acceptance, such a
defense should be supported by documentary, testimonial or other evidence. In this case, however, the appellant
failed to discharge this burden. Other than his self-serving assertions, there was no support to his claim that he and
AAA were lovers. His "sweetheart defense" cannot be given credence in the absence of corroborative proof like love
notes, mementos, pictures or tokens, that such romantic relationship really existed. Moreover, even the testimonies
of the witnesses for the defense, i.e., Francisco and Wendy, proved that, indeed, the appellant and AAA were not
lovers. Although the other defense witness, Jacqueline, claimed that the relationship of the appellant and AAA was
of general knowledge to the community, she cannot name even a single person who knew of such relationship.

Appellant also avers that the failure of the complainant to shout or make an outcry, despite the fact the he was
unarmed, belies the claim of rape. Case law has it that the failure of the victim to shout or offer tenacious resistance
does not make voluntary the victim's submission to the criminal acts of the accused. Not all rape victims can be
expected to act conformably to the usual expectations of everyone. Different and varying degrees of behavioral
responses are expected in the proximity of, or in confronting, an aberrant episode. It is well-settled that different
people react differently to a given situation or type of situation. There is no standard form of reaction for a woman,
much more a minor, when facing a shocking and horrifying experience such as a sexual assault. The workings of the
human mind placed under emotional stress are unpredictable, and people react differently - some may shout, some
may faint, and some may be shocked into insensibility while others may openly welcome the intrusion. In the
present case, it is noteworthy that at the time the complainant was raped, she was only 14 years old, while the
appellant was already 23 years old, thus, her failure to shout could be attributed to the shock and horror which she
felt as a result of appellant's sexual assault.

Also, at the time that she was raped, appellant threatened to punch her if she will not accede to his desire. It is settled
that force or intimidation is not limited to physical force. As long as it is present and brings the desired result, all
consideration of whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the point. The force or violence that is required in
rape cases is relative; when applied, it need not be overpowering or irresistible. That it enables the offender to
consummate his purpose is enough. The parties' relative age, size and strength should be taken into account in
evaluating the existence of the element of force in the crime of rape. The degree of force which may not suffice
when the victim is an adult, may be more than enough if employed against a person of tender age. Considering the
age of the complainant in this case, i.e., 14 years old, she was not in the possession and exercise of sufficient mental
capacity to make an intelligent decision of whether to submit herself to sexual intercourse that will bring dishonor to
herself and her family. At that age, the offended party was not in the right mind to balance, with deliberation, the
good or evil effect of submitting to such sexual act. Hence, the appellant's simple threat of punching her if she will
not give in to his bestial desire was enough intimidation to make the complainant succumb to the will of the
appellant.
Likewise, appellant's assertion that the complainant has not been raped because the medical examination conducted
on the complainant the day after she was allegedly raped showed no sign of any physical injury, deserves scant
consideration. It is well-settled that proof of physical injuries sustained by reason of resistance to the sexual attacker
is not an essential element of the crime of rape. It is enough to show that the appellant did succeed in having sexual
intercourse with the complainant against her will. Hence, even if a man lays no hand on a woman, if by an array of
physical forces he so overpowers her mind that she fails to resist or ceases resistance because of fear or greater
harm, the consummation of the sexual act between them is rape. Also, a freshly broken hymen is not an essential
element of rape. Even if the hymen of the victim was still intact, the possibility of rape cannot be ruled out. The
rupture of the hymen or laceration of any part of the woman's genitalia is not indispensable to a conviction for rape.
In the instant case, the medical findings revealed that the hymen of the complainant was still intact despite the
sexual intercourse between the appellant and the complainant. Nevertheless, the same does not negate the fact of
rape committed by the appellant against the complainant as Dr. Vertido clearly explained that AAA's hymen was
characterized as distensible, meaning, AAA's hymen is incapable of being ruptured even if penetrated by the male
organ.

Finally, appellant's contention that the testimony of the complainant is not credible, is untenable. Time and again,
the Court have held that when the decision hinges on the credibility of witnesses and their respective testimonies, the
trial court's observations and conclusions deserve great respect and are often accorded finality, unless there appears
in the record some fact or circumstance of weight which the lower court may have overlooked, misunderstood or
misappreciated and which, if properly considered, would alter the result of the case. The trial judge enjoys the
advantage of observing the witness' deportment and manner of testifying, her "furtive glance, blush of conscious
shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath" - all of which
are useful aids for an accurate determination of a witness' honesty and sincerity. The trial judge, therefore, can better
determine if such witnesses were telling the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies.
Unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case,
its assessment must be respected for it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses
while testifying and detect if they are lying. The rule finds an even more stringent application where the said
findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals.

The Court, upon examining the records of the present case, fully agrees in the findings of both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals that the testimony of the complainant is credible. Her testimony on how she was raped by the
appellant was characterized by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court as candid, clear and categorical.
The trial court even went on to say that during the direct and cross examination of the complainant, there were
marked expressions of embarrassment and noticeable anguish on her face especially when she was asked to recall
her painful experience in the hands of the appellant. Likewise the act of the complainant in filing a complaint against
the appellant, few hours after the rape incident happened, can be regarded as an indication of a truthful narration that
indeed, she was raped by the appellant. It is settled that no woman, least of all a child, would concoct a story of
defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she has not, in
truth, been a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her. Testimonies of child-victims are
given full faith and credit, since when a girl says she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show
that rape was indeed committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. It is also an
accepted doctrine that in the absence of evidence of improper motive on the part of the victim to falsely testify
against the accused, her testimony deserves credence. And in this case, it was never shown that the complainant had
an ill motive in filing a case against the appellant other than seeking justice to what had happened to her.

Moreover, the appellant failed to overturn the credibility of the complainant's testimony. First, the complainant
testified that the appellant inserted his penis into her vagina, meaning there was indeed a penetration. The appellant
even admitted in his direct examination that his organ penetrated the vagina of the complainant; however, during his
cross-examination he claimed that he was not able to insert his penis into the vagina of the complainant because Ana
barged in. Second, the complainant had proven during trial that at the time that she was raped by the appellant she
was wearing cycling shorts49 and the same was presented in court as part of the prosecution's evidence. Also, during
Ana's testimony, she affirmed that on the day the complainant was raped, the complainant was wearing shorts and
not jogging pants. The appellant, on the other hand, insisted that the complainant was wearing jogging pants at the
time the rape incident happened. Lastly, the testimony of the complainant that the appellant was the one on top of
her was corroborated by the testimony of Ana that when she barged in she saw the appellant on top of the
complainant. However, the appellant averred that the complainant was the one on top of him when Ana saw them
because it was the complainant who initiated the sexual intercourse. But the said contention of the appellant was
belied by the defense's very own witness, Wendy. During Wendy's testimony, she stated that when she peeped inside
the house of Ana she saw the appellant on top of the complainant.

Given the foregoing, the Court finds no reason to deviate from the general rule that factual findings of the trial court,
more so if affirmed by the Court of Appeals, should not be disturbed on appeal, as they are not clearly arbitrary or
unfounded. Appellant is guilty of simple rape which is punishable by reclusion perpetua.

As regards the award of damages, the appellate court merely affirmed the award of the trial court without any
modification. In simple rape, the Court awards P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages to
the rape victim. As the award of moral damages is separate and distinct from the civil indemnity awarded to rape
victims, the moral damages cannot take the place of the civil indemnity, which is actually in the nature of actual or
compensatory damages, and is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape. Hence, this Court also awards an
additional amount of P50,000.00, as civil indemnity, to the complainant, apart from the P50,000.00 moral damages
already awarded by the lower courts. It is also proper for the appellate court to require the appellant to support the
child, CCC, born from the appellant's act committed against the complainant.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01212 finding
herein appellant Armando San Antonio, Jr., GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed
against AAA is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the complainant is also granted civil indemnity
in the amount of P50,000.00, in addition to P50,000.00 granted by the lower courts as moral damages. Costs against
appellant. SO ORDERED.