THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 147097. June 5, 2009.]

CARMELO F. LAZATIN, MARINO A. MORALES, TEODORO L. DAVID

and ANGELITO A. PELAYO , petitioner, vs . HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO
as OMBUDSMAN, and SANDIGANBAYAN, THIRD DIVISION ,
respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA , J : p

This resolves the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
praying that the Ombudsman's disapproval of the O ce of the Special Prosecutor's
(OSP) Resolution 1 dated September 18, 2000, recommending dismissal of the criminal
cases filed against herein petitioners, be reversed and set aside.
The antecedent facts are as follows.
On July 22, 1998, the Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau of the O ce of the
Ombudsman led a Complaint-A davit docketed as OMB-0-98-1500, charging herein
petitioners with Illegal Use of Public Funds as de ned and penalized under Article 220
of the Revised Penal Code and violation of Section 3, paragraphs (a) and (e) of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended.
The complaint alleged that there were irregularities in the use by then
Congressman Carmello F. Lazatin of his Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) for the
calendar year 1996, i.e., he was both proponent and implementer of the projects funded
from his CDF; he signed vouchers and supporting papers pertinent to the disbursement
as Disbursing O cer; and he received, as claimant, eighteen (18) checks amounting to
P4,868,277.08. Thus, petitioner Lazatin, with the help of petitioners Marino A. Morales,
Angelito A. Pelayo and Teodoro L. David, was allegedly able to convert his CDF into
cash.
A preliminary investigation was conducted and, thereafter, the Evaluation and
Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB) issued a Resolution 2 dated May 29, 2000
recommending the ling against herein petitioners of fourteen (14) counts each of
Malversation of Public Funds and violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. Said
Resolution was approved by the Ombudsman; hence, twenty-eight (28) Informations
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 26087 to 26114 were led against herein petitioners
before the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner Lazatin and his co-petitioners then led their respective Motions for
Reconsideration/Reinvestigation, which motions were granted by the Sandiganbayan
(Third Division). The Sandiganbayan also ordered the prosecution to re-evaluate the
cases against petitioners.
Subsequently, the OSP submitted to the Ombudsman its Resolution 3 dated
September 18, 2000. It recommended the dismissal of the cases against petitioners
for lack or insufficiency of evidence. ADaSEH

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 The Ombudsman, however, ordered the O ce of the Legal Affairs (OLA) to
review the OSP Resolution. In a Memorandum 4 dated October 24, 2000, the OLA
recommended that the OSP Resolution be disapproved and the OSP be directed to
proceed with the trial of the cases against petitioners. On October 27, 2000, the
Ombudsman adopted the OLA Memorandum, thereby disapproving the OSP Resolution
dated September 18, 2000 and ordering the aggressive prosecution of the subject
cases. The cases were then returned to the Sandiganbayan for continuation of criminal
proceedings.
Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition.
Petitioners allege that:
I.
THE OMBUDSMAN ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR ACTED
WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION.
II.

THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION WAS BASED ON MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS,

SPECULATIONS, SURMISES AND CONJECTURES. 5

Amplifying their arguments, petitioners asseverate that the Ombudsman had no

authority to overturn the OSP's Resolution dismissing the cases against petitioners
because, under Section 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman is
clothed only with the power to watch, investigate and recommend the ling of proper
cases against erring o cials, but it was not granted the power to prosecute. They point
out that under the Constitution, the power to prosecute belongs to the OSP (formerly
the Tanodbayan), which was intended by the framers to be a separate and distinct
entity from the O ce of the Ombudsman. Petitioners conclude that, as provided by the
Constitution, the OSP being a separate and distinct entity, the Ombudsman should have
no power and authority over the OSP. Thus, petitioners maintain that R.A. No. 6770 (The
Ombudsman Act of 1989), which made the OSP an organic component of the O ce of
the Ombudsman, should be struck down for being unconstitutional.
Next, petitioners insist that they should be absolved from any liability because
the checks were issued to petitioner Lazatin allegedly as reimbursement for the
advances he made from his personal funds for expenses incurred to ensure the
immediate implementation of projects that are badly needed by the Pinatubo victims.
The Court finds the petition unmeritorious.
Petitioners' attack against the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6770 is stale. It has
long been settled that the provisions of R.A. No. 6770 granting the O ce of the
Ombudsman prosecutorial powers and placing the OSP under said o ce have no
constitutional in rmity. The issue of whether said provisions of R.A. No. 6770 violated
the Constitution had been fully dissected as far back as 1995 in Acop v. O ce of the
Ombudsman. 6
Therein, the Court held that giving prosecutorial powers to the Ombudsman is in
accordance with the Constitution as paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI provides that
the Ombudsman shall "exercise such other functions or duties as may be provided by
law". Elucidating on this matter, the Court stated:
. . . While the intention to withhold prosecutorial powers from the
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 Ombudsman was indeed present, the Commission [referring to the Constitutional
Commission of 1986] did not hesitate to recommend that the Legislature could,
through statute, prescribe such other powers, functions, and duties to the
Ombudsman. . . . As nally approved by the Commission after several
amendments, this is now embodied in paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI
(Accountability of Public Officers) of the Constitution, which provides: aESTAI

Sec. 13. The O ce of the Ombudsman shall have the following

powers, functions, and duties:

xxx xxx xxx

Promulgate its rules and procedure and exercise such other

functions or duties as may be provided by law.

Expounding on this power of Congress to prescribe other powers, functions, and

duties to the Ombudsman, we quote Commissioners Colayco and Monsod during
interpellation by Commissioner Rodrigo:

xxx xxx xxx

MR. RODRIGO:

Precisely, I am coming to that. The last of the enumerated functions of the

Ombudsman is: "to exercise such powers or perform such functions or
duties as may be provided by law." So, the legislature may vest him with
powers taken away from the Tanodbayan, may it not?

MR. COLAYCO:

Yes.

MR. MONSOD:

Yes.

MR. RODRIGO:
Madam President. Section 5 reads: "The Tanodbayan shall continue to
function and exercise its powers as provided by law".
MR. COLAYCO:

That is correct, because it is under P.D. No. 1630.

MR. RODRIGO:
So, if it is provided by law, it can be taken away by law, I suppose.

MR. COLAYCO:
That is correct.

MR. RODRIGO:
And precisely, Section 12(6) says that among the functions that can be
performed by the Ombudsman are "such functions or duties as may be
provided by law". The sponsors admitted that the legislature later on might
remove some powers from the Tanodbayan and transfer these to the
Ombudsman.
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 MR. COLAYCO:
Madam President, that is correct.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. RODRIGO:

Madam President, what I am worried about is, if we create a constitutional

body which has neither punitive nor prosecutory powers but only
persuasive powers, we might be raising the hopes of our people too much
and then disappoint them.
MR. MONSOD:

I agree with the Commissioner.

MR. RODRIGO:

Anyway, since we state that the powers of the Ombudsman can later on be
implemented by the legislature, why not leave this to the legislature? AECacS

xxx xxx xxx

MR. MONSOD:
(reacting to statements of Commissioner Blas Ople):

xxx xxx xxx

With respect to the argument that he is a toothless animal, we would like to
say that we are promoting the concept in its form at the present, but we are
also saying that he can exercise such powers and functions as may be
provided by law in accordance with the direction of the thinking of
Commissioner Rodrigo. We do not think that at this time we should
prescribe this, but we leave it up to Congress at some future time if it feels
that it may need to designate what powers the Ombudsman need in order
that he be more effective. This is not foreclosed.

So, this is a reversible disability, unlike that of a eunuch; it is not an

irreversible disability. 7

The constitutionality of Section 3 of R.A. No. 6770, which subsumed the OSP
under the O ce of the Ombudsman, was likewise upheld by the Court in Acop. It was
explained, thus:
. . . the petitioners conclude that the inclusion of the O ce of the Special
Prosecutor as among the o ces under the O ce of the Ombudsman in Section 3
of R.A. No. 6770 ("An Act Providing for the Functional and Structural Organization
of the O ce of the Ombudsman and for Other Purposes") is unconstitutional and
void.
The contention is not impressed with merit. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

. . . Section 7 of Article XI expressly provides that the then existing
Tanodbayan, to be henceforth known as the O ce of the Special Prosecutor,
"shall continue to function and exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be
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 provided by law, except those conferred on the O ce of the Ombudsman created
under this Constitution". The underscored phrase evidently refers to the
Tanodbayan's powers under P.D. No. 1630 or subsequent amendatory legislation.
It follows then that Congress may remove any of the Tanodbayan's/Special
Prosecutor's powers under P.D. No. 1630 or grant it other powers, except those
powers conferred by the Constitution on the Office of the Ombudsman.
Pursuing the present line of reasoning, when one considers that by express
mandate of paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, the
Ombudsman may "exercise such other powers or perform functions or duties as
may be provided by law", it is indubitable then that Congress has the power to
place the O ce of the Special Prosecutor under the O ce of the Ombudsman. In
the same vein, Congress may remove some of the powers granted to the
Tanodbayan by P.D. No. 1630 and transfer them to the Ombudsman; or grant the
O ce of the Special Prosecutor such other powers and functions and duties as
Congress may deem t and wise. This Congress did through the passage of R.A.
No. 6770. 8 HICATc

The foregoing ruling of the Court has been reiterated in Camanag v. Guerrero. 9
More recently, in O ce of the Ombudsman v. Valera, 1 0 the Court, basing its ratio
decidendi on its ruling in Acop and Camanag, declared that the OSP is "merely a
component of the O ce of the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision
and control, and upon authority of the Ombudsman" and ruled that under R.A. No. 6770,
the power to preventively suspend is lodged only with the Ombudsman and Deputy
Ombudsman. 1 1 The Court's ruling in Acop that the authority of the Ombudsman to
prosecute based on R.A. No. 6770 was authorized by the Constitution was also made
the foundation for the decision in Perez v. Sandiganbayan, 1 2 where it was held that the
power to prosecute carries with it the power to authorize the ling of informations,
which power had not been delegated to the OSP. It is, therefore, beyond cavil that under
the Constitution, Congress was not proscribed from legislating the grant of additional
powers to the Ombudsman or placing the OSP under the Office of the Ombudsman.
Petitioners now assert that the Court's ruling on the constitutionality of the
provisions of R.A. No. 6770 should be revisited and the principle of stare decisis set
aside. Again, this contention deserves scant consideration.
The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and
not to unsettle things which are established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines which provides, thus:
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.

It was further explained in Fermin v. People 1 3 as follows:

The doctrine of stare decisis enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It
requires courts in a country to follow the rule established in a decision
of the Supreme Court thereof. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to
be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare
decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined
and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument. 1 4

I n Chinese Young Men's Christian Association of the Philippine Islands v.

Remington Steel Corporation, 1 5 the Court expounded on the importance of the
foregoing doctrine, stating that:
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 The doctrine of stare decisis is one of policy grounded on the necessity for
securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions, thus:
Time and again, the court has held that it is a very desirable and
necessary judicial practice that when a court has laid down a principle
of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that
principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially
the same. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and
disturb not what is settled. Stare decisis simply means that for the sake
of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied
to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even
though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the rst principle of
justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like
cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions
relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly
situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court,
the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the
same issue. 1 6

The doctrine has assumed such value in our judicial system that the Court has
ruled that "[a]bandonment thereof must be based only on strong and
compelling reasons , otherwise, the becoming virtue of predictability which is
expected from this Court would be immeasurably affected and the public's con dence
in the stability of the solemn pronouncements diminished". 1 7 Verily, only upon showing
that circumstances attendant in a particular case override the great bene ts derived by
our judicial system from the doctrine of stare decisis, can the courts be justi ed in
setting aside the same.
In this case, petitioners have not shown any strong, compelling reason to
convince the Court that the doctrine of stare decisis should not be applied to this case.
They have not successfully demonstrated how or why it would be grave abuse of
discretion for the Ombudsman, who has been validly conferred by law with the power of
control and supervision over the OSP, to disapprove or overturn any resolution issued
by the latter.
The second issue advanced by petitioners is that the Ombudsman's disapproval
of the OSP Resolution recommending dismissal of the cases is based on
misapprehension of facts, speculations, surmises and conjectures. The question is
really whether the Ombudsman correctly ruled that there was enough evidence to
support a nding of probable cause. That issue, however, pertains to a mere error of
judgment. It must be stressed that certiorari is a remedy meant to correct only errors
of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. This has been emphasized in First Corporation v.
Former Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals, 1 8 to wit:
It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence is
not the province of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is extra ordinem
— beyond the ambit of appeal. I n certiora ri proceedings, judicial review
does not go as far as to examine and assess the evidence of the parties
and to weigh the probative value thereof. It does not include an inquiry
as to the correctness of the evaluation of evidence. Any error
committed in the evaluation of evidence is merely an error of judgment
that cannot be remedied by certiorari. An error of judgment is one which the
court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is one
where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of
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 jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, which is tantamount to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ
of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors of the trial court in
its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, or its conclusions
anchored on the said ndings and its conclusions of law. It is not for
this Court to re-examine con icting evidence, re-evaluate the credibility
of the witnesses or substitute the ndings of fact of the court a quo. 1 9
SDECAI

Evidently, the issue of whether the evidence indeed supports a nding of probable
cause would necessitate an examination and re-evaluation of the evidence upon which
the Ombudsman based its disapproval of the OSP Resolution. Hence, the Petition for
Certiorari should not be given due course.
Likewise noteworthy is the holding of the Court in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-
Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, 2 0 imparting the value of the
Ombudsman's independence, stating thus:
Under Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution and RA 6770
(The Ombudsman Act of 1989), the Ombudsman has the power to investigate
and prosecute any act or omission of a public o cer or employee when such act
or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or ine cient. It has been the
consistent ruling of the Court not to interfere with the Ombudsman's
exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers as long as his
rulings are supported by substantial evidence. Envisioned as the champion
of the people and preserver of the integrity of public service, he has wide
latitude in exercising his powers and is free from intervention from the
three branches of government. This is to ensure that his O ce is
insulated from any outside pressure and improper influence. 2 1

Indeed, for the Court to overturn the Ombudsman's nding of probable cause, it
is imperative for petitioners to clearly prove that said public o cial acted with grave
abuse of discretion. In Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Desierto, 2 2
the Court elaborated on what constitutes such abuse, to wit:
Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman's exercise of power
must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner which must be so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. . . . 2 3

In this case, petitioners failed to demonstrate that the Ombudsman acted in a manner
described above. Clearly, the Ombudsman was acting in accordance with R.A. No. 6770
and properly exercised its power of control and supervision over the OSP when it
disapproved the Resolution dated September 18, 2000.
It should also be noted that the petition does not question any order or action of the
Sandiganbayan Third Division; hence, it should not have been included as a respondent in
this petition.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING , the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No
costs.
SO ORDERED .
Ynares-Santiago, Carpio * , Corona ** and Nachura, JJ., concur.
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 Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 48-57.
2. Id. at 58-70.
3. Supra note 1.
4. Rollo, pp. 114-117.
5. Id. at 13.
6. G.R. No. 120422, September 27, 1995, 248 SCRA 566.

7. Id. at 575-579.
8. Id. at 580-582.
9. G.R. No. 164250, September 30, 2005, 268 SCRA 473.
10. G.R. No. 121017, February 17, 1997, 471 SCRA 715.

11. Id. at 743

12. G.R. No. 166062, September 26, 2006, 503 SCRA 252.
13. G.R. No. 157643, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA 132.
14. Id. at 145, citing Castillo v. Sandiganbayan, 427 Phil. 785, 793 (2002). (Emphasis
supplied).
15. G.R. No. 159422, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA 180.
16. Id. at 197-198. (Emphasis supplied).
17. Pepsi-Cola Products, Phil., Inc. v. Pagdanganan, G.R. No. 167866, October 12, 2006, 504
SCRA 549, 564.
18. G.R. No. 171989, July 4, 2007, 526 SCRA 564.

19. Id. at 578. (Emphasis supplied).

20. G.R. No. 138142, September 19, 2007, 533 SCRA 571.
21. Id. at 581-582. (Emphasis supplied).
22. G.R. No. 139296, November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 207.

23. Id. at 216.

* Designated to sit as an additional member, per Special Order No. 646 dated May 15,
2009.
** Designated to sit as an additional member, per Special Order No. 631 dated April 29,
2009.

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