International Phenomenological Society

The "Fifth Meditation" and Husserl's Cartesianism

Author(s): David Carr
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Sep., 1973), pp. 14-35
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
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 THE "FIFTH MEDITATION" AND HUSSERL'S CARTESIANISM

Addressing his audience in the AmphitheatreDescartes at the

Sorbonne in 1929,Husserl said that "one might almost call transcen-
dental phenomenologya neo-Cartesianism";'and he went on to name
the book that grew out of the Paris lectures the Cartesian Meditations.
To be sure, like most of Husserl's many homages to Descartes, this
one is qualified: ". . . even though [phenomenology] is obliged . . .
to reject nearly all the well-knowndoctrinal content of the Cartesian
philosophy."But this qualificationis furtherexpanded upon by a sort
of counterqualificationthat is also typical of Husserl's remarks on
Descartes: phenomenologyis so obliged "precisely by its radical de-
velopment of Cartesian motifs."
The extentand nature of Husserl's indebtedness to Descartes has
been a subject of much discussion, especially by those who are im-
pressed and inspired by Husserl's way of doing philosophy,but who
regard a rejection of Cartesianism as a point of honor in mid-twen-
tieth century philosophy. It has been widely noted that in his last
work,The Crisis of European Sciences and TranscendentalPhenomen-
ology (1936), Husserl not only does not employ the "Cartesian way"
found in both the Meditations and the Ideas, but even sharply criti-
cizes it.2Some have pointed out that the underminingof the Cartesian
approach begins gradually even before the Paris lectures;3so that the
Meditations appear as a last attempt, prompted by external circum-
stances, to restate the "classical" approach of the Ideas in rigorous
and succinct form.
I Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations. An Introduction to Phenomenology,tr,
Dorion Cairns, The Hague, MartinusNijhoff,1960,p. I (hereafterreferredto as "CM").
See also the reconstructionof the original Paris lectures in CartesianischeMeditationen
und Pariser Vortrtge,ed. S. Strasser, Haag, Martinus Nijhoff,1963,p. 3.
2 The Crisis of European Sciences and
TranscendentalPhenomenology.An Introduc-
tion to PhenomenologicalPhilosophy,tr.,withan introduction,by David Carr; Evanston,
NorthwesternUniversityPress, 1970,p. 155.
' See the "Einleitung des Herausgebers," p. xxxvii, in Husserl, Erste Philosophie
(1923/24).Zweiter Teil, ed. Rudolf Boehm, Haag, Martinus Nijhoff,1959.Also "Husserls
Abschied vom Cartesianismus" in LudwvigLandgrebc, Der Weg der Phanomenologie,
GiutersloherVerlagshaus Gerd Mohn, 1967,pp. 163ff.

14
 THE "FIFTH MEDITATION"
ANDHUSSERL'SCARTESIANISM 15

In the followingI shall tryto show that the Cartesian Meditations

themselves-specifically the fifthmeditation in its relation to the
other four-make manifesta significantdeparture fromCartesianism
in two importantpoints. The firstpoint concerns the problem peculiar
to the fifthmeditation, that of the alter ego. As it is usually inter-
preted, the fifthmeditation seems if anythingto support a Cartesian
reading of phenomenology,primarily because it addresses itself to
the problem of solipsism. Because the problem of solipsism is a
traditionallyCartesian problem,Husserl is usually seen as attempting
a Cartesian solution to it, or perhaps a Leibnizian variant thereof.
I shall try to show that Husserl is not at all concerned with the
problem of solipsism in any traditionalsense, and that the "solution"
he offers,when understood in light of Husserl's understandingof the
problem,removes his whole theoryfromthe context set by Descartes.
Husserl was quite clear on this firstpoint, I think,and merely
misled his readers by using the term "solipsism" in a peculiar way.
My second point may not have been clear to Husserl, but is implied
in what he said. After"solving" the problem of the alter ego in the
fifthmeditation,Husserl begins a project of putting his solution to
work in what he calls "intersubjectivephenomenology."I shall argue
that this project, roughly sketched though it is, reflects back on
phenomenology as a whole, calling into question one of its most
explicitly Cartesian elements, its dependence on the apodicticity of
the ego cogito.
What does Husserl seek in the fifthmeditation?According to the
title,to "uncover the sphere of transcendentalbeing as monadological
intersubjectivity."But in the firstparagraph it appears that this task
must be undertakenbecause of the objection that phenomenology,as
described in the preceding four meditations,could "be branded . . .
as transcendentalsolipsism."' By introducingthe problem in this way
Husserl has placed a great obstacle in the way of his readers' under-
standing of what he is about.
Now the objection of solipsism is often raised against idealisms,
and Husserl has just characterized his phenomenologyas (transcen-
dental) idealism.5What is the usual objection? To quote one concise
definition,solipsism "consists in holding that the individual I . . .
with its subjective modifications,is all of reality,and that other I's
of which one has a representation have no more independent exis-
tence than persons in dreams; -or [it consists] at least in admitting

'CM, p. 89.
S CM, pp. 83 ff.
16 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH

that it is impossible to demonstrate the contrary."6By seeming to

present his theory of intersubjectivityas an answer to such an
objection, Husserl gives the impression that he is setting out to
demonstrate or prove, deductively or inductively,the "independent
existence" or other "I's."
The impression that the standard problem of solipsism is at
issue is reinforced by the Cartesian "presence" which gives the
Meditations theirname. Husserl has presented the phenomenological
reduction as a variant of the Cartesian systematic doubt, as he had
already done in the Ideas; and he has credited Descartes with seeing
"that ego sum or sum cogitans must be pronounced apodiotic, and
that accordingly we get a firstapodictically existing basis to stand
on" [einen ersten apodiktischen Seinsboden hunterdie FUsse bekom-
men]."' But, once established upon this Seinsboden, what do we do?
Descartes' idea of proceeding from this point is, of course, to be able
to assert the existence of God and the rest of the world, including
other egos, with the same degree of certainty,even if by inference
rather than immediately,as that attaching to the assertion ego sum.
And it is precisely against Descartes' and others' failure to do this
that objection of solipsism is ordinarily raised. Now Husserl ex-
plicitlydissociates himself,early in the Meditations,from Descartes'
attempt to prove the existence of "the rest of the world" [die Ubrige
Welt] by using the ego sum as an "axiom."8But by raising the objec-
tion of solipsism in the fifthmeditation,and presentinghis theoryas
an answer to it, FHusserlseems to be returningto the Cartesian ap-
proach, hoping to ascribe independentexistence to other egos, if not
to the rest of the external world, with a degree of certaintycompara-
ble to that of the ego sum.
This becomes plausible if we consider Husserl's reasons for re-
jecting Descartes' procedure. It is impossible to move by inference
fromone's own ego to "the rest of the world" because the ego is not
a "tag end of the world," i.e., it is not "part" of the world at all. As
Descartes failed to realize, though there are differentways of consid-
ering the ego, the ego of which one has apodictic certaintyis trans-
cendental: its relation to the world and the thingsin it is intentional
and not that of a part to a causally interrelatedwhole. Consequently,
"inferencesaccording to the principle of causality," of the sort used
by Descartes, are ruled out.9 Thus we cannot prove the existence of
6 Vocabulaire technique el critique de la philosophic, ed. Andre Lalande, 8th ed.,
Paris, Presses Universitairesde France, 1960,p. 1008.
7 CM, p. 22.
8 CM, p. 24.
'9Ibid.
 ANDHUSSERL'SCARTESIANISM
THE "FIFTH MEDITATION" 17

other egos considered as part of the world's causal nexus. But what
about other egos considered as transcendental?The problem,as Hus-
serl announces it in the second meditation,is how "other egos -not
as mere worldly phenomena but as other transcendental egos -can
become positable as existing and thus become equally legitimate
themes of a phenomenologicalegology."10 And at the beginningof the
fifthmeditation the problem of solipsism is stated in this way: "But
what about other egos, who surely are not a mere intending and
intended [Vorstellung und Vorgestelltes] in me, merely synthetic
unities of possible verificationin me, but, according to their sense,
precisely others?"11Thus other egos seem to demand a treatment
which goes beyond the consideration of them merely as intentional
objects, for they are intentional subjects. He seems to be admitting
that he asserts that everythingelse has the status of merely some-
thing intended or represented "in me" and is now faced with the
question of whether other egos have only the same status. His
"denial of solipsism" would then 'take the form: "no, others as trans-
cendental egos in fact exist outside me," or the like."2
This could explain the fact that Husserl says he is addressing
himself to the problem of transcendental solipsism. But in fact the
transcendentalcharacter of the problem seems to involve much more,
for the objection is described as calling into question "the claim of
transcendentalphenomenologyto be itselftranscendentalphilosophy
and thereforeits claim that, in the form of a constitutional prob-
lematic and theorymoving within the limits of the transcendentally
reduced ego, it can solve the transcendental problems pertaining to
the objective world."'13
Not just a particular type of entitywhich has a status different
from other entities,but the objective world as a whole, then, seems
to be at issue. How is this so? Husserl explains the objectivityof the
world in this way: "I experience the world ... not as (so the speak)
my private syntheticformationbut as other than mine alone [mir
fremde],as an intersubjectiveworld, actually there for everyone,ac-
cessible in respect of its Objects to everyone."114Husserl has indeed
already insisted on the transcendence of the world by saying that
10 CM, p. 30.
" CM, p. 89.
12 Those who interpretHusserl's project in this way usually judge that he has not
succeeded. This interpretationseems to lie behind Quentin Lauer's opinion that Husserl
meant to provide an "additional guarantee for the validityof subjective constitution"
and failed. See his Phenomenology:Its Genesis and Prospect, New York, Harper and
Row, 1965,p. 150.
13CM, p. 89.
'4 CM, p. 91.
18 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH

"neither the world nor any worldly Object is a piece of my Ego, to

be found in my conscious life as a really inherent part of it, as a
complex of data of sensation or a complex of acts."15Accountingfor
transcendence,says Husserl, is the task which gives transcendental
philosophy its name. But while such transcendence is "part of the
sense of anythingworldly,"he goes on, ". . . anythingworldly neces-
sarily acquires all the sense determiningit, along with its existential
status, exclusively from my experiencing,my objectivating,thinking,
valuing,or doing...." As the analysis proceeds, this apparent para-
dox is cleared up. Transcendence is conceived as the irreducibility
of what is meant to the particular act or acts in which it is meant.
But the meant surpasses any particular act or acts by always being
the referencepoint of other possible acts implied in any actual one.
Until the fifthmeditation,all such acts, actual and possible, are con-
ceived as mine. By introducingthe problem of objectivity,Husserl
is simplydrawing on a sense of transcendenceinvolved in the natural
attitude which is stronger than the sense previously developed. The
objective is not only irreducible to any particular acts of mine; it is
also not reducible to all possible acts of mine, my whole actual and
possible stream of consciousness, because it is identically the same
for others and their acts as well.
Now if "the claim of transcendentalphenomenologyto be itself
transcendental philosophy" is threatened by the objection of solip-
sism, it is because phenomenologyseems to be incapable of dealing
with the stronger sense of the transcendence of the world. It can
account for the weaker sense of transcendence (the transcendenceof
my particular act or acts) because of its concept of the relation be-
tween actuality and potentialityin the stream of consciousness. But
up to now it has no concept of the alter ego to whose acts the stronger
sense of transcendencerefers.
The "objection of solipsism" thus takes on a differentsense: not
the existence but the very concept of the alter ego is needed in order
to answer it. But the character of the concept required must be fur-
ther specified.It is not equivalent, for example, to the concept of a
multiplicityof egos: Husserl is not concerned with showing that
differentegos are possible or conceivable. In a sense the possibility
of differentegos has already been taken into account by the very
eidetic approach of phenomenology.By taking the particular objects
of transcendental reflectionas merely exemplary, Husserl seeks to
describe the structureof any consciousness at all. That not all pos-
sibilities can be construed as possibilities of my consciousness is
'5 CM, p. 26.
16Ibid.
 THE "FIFTH MEDITATION"ANDHuSSERL'S CARTESIANISM 19

ruled out by the concept of the monad as a systemof compossibilities.

Not all possibilities of consciousness are compossible with all others,
and certain conceivable possibilities would rule out my actual present
and past. They would have to be other than they are, a different
stream of consciousness involved in a differentsystemof possibilities.
The monad as such a system of compossibilities makes no sense
except by referenceto other possible systems,and this is why Husserl
speaks in the Cartesian Meditations not only of the eidos of consci-
ousness, the instances of which could potentially all belong to one
stream of experience,but of the eidos ego whose instances are differ-
ent and incompatible streams of experience."
True, Husserl says that the eidetic approach presupposes "neither
the actuality nor the possibility of other egos.""8But it is necessary
to distinguishbetween differentegos and other egos in the sense of
the alter ego referredto in the fifthmeditation.The eidetic approach
conceives of differentegos without conceiving of any relation among
them other than their essence and their difference.But the concept
of objectivity,introduced in the fifthmeditation,places ego and alter
ego in relation, since the ego refers his world, or the things in it,
to others. The ego in the fullest sense, i.e., the monad, may differ
frommy own. But the problem now is to make sense of the alter ego
for that ego, whoever he may be. The concept of objectivity,after all,
is part of the natural attitude; it is the ego of the natural attitude
that refers the objects of his experience to others. The task which
arises is to explain how the other exists for him, not whether the
other exists as such.
What is sought, then, is a specificallyphenomenological concept
of the alter ego, that is, one that will fit into the overall scheme of
phenomenological investigation,the scheme indicated by the words
ego-cogito-cogitatum-qua-cogitatum. And when Husserl places the ob-
jection of "solipsism" in-tothe mouth of his imaginarycritic,it is the
possibilityof just such a concept that is being questioned in principle.
The critic doubts not Husserl's ability to prove that others exist,
which is not in question, but his ability to make "phenomenological
sense" of otheregos. There is simplyno place in the phenomenological
scheme, he argues, for the alter ego. In that scheme everythingmust
be either ego, cogitatio, or cogitatum, and the alter ego presents us
with the apparent paradox of a cogitatum cogitans.
Husserl has his opponent say that other egos "are not a mere
intendingand intended [Vorstellung und Vorgestelltes] in me," as if

'' CM, p. 71.

18 CM, p. 72.
20 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH

he, Husserl, were simply asserting that everythingelse is just that.

But this is a very naive statement of the results of the first four
meditations; and Husserl seems aware of this in his use of the words
Vorstellungand Vorgestelites.One could object to Cairns' translation
of this passage on the ground that Husserl is suggesting that the
"problem of solipsism" arises only if such a naive view is taken: to
say that everythingis somethingintended in (or by) me is equivalent
to saying it is "merely my representation"(Vorstellung). Thus trans-
cendental idealism is transformedinto subjective idealism. But Hus-
serl does not answer his imaginaryopponent by reiteratingthe dis-
tinction between transcendental and subjective idealism, so one
suspects that the latter's case does not rest merelyon this confusion.
A more accurate statementof the phenomenological procedure is that
it considers everythingmeant purely as it is meant (cogitatum qua
cogitatum) and withholdsany otherattitudetoward it." It thusarrives
at a full account of its being-for-meor its sense. But even on this
view it could be argued that the alter ego is not susceptible of this
kind of treatment: he cannot even -be considered purely as meant;
or, to the degree that he is, he is no longer an ego. Thus the concept
of the ego in general is incompatible with the phenomenological
concept of somethinggiven,at least if the alter ego is to be considered
transcendentaland not merelyworldly.To the extent that he is given
he is not a transcendentalego, and to the extenthe is a transcendental
ego he is not given.
The difficulty is explained best in a manuscript bearing the title
"Das Ich und sein Gegenjiber." Here Husserl refers to that which
gegeniibersteht,i.e., the Gegenstand or object, and brings up the
problem of considering the other subject as object.
The non-ego,the object that is not a subject, is what it is only as a Gegenjiber,
only as somethingconstitutedwith relation to an ego or an open multiplicityof
egos.... [But] the ego is gegeniiberfor itself,it is for itself,constitutedin it-
self. Any ego can also be gegeniber for another or several other egos, [i.e.] a
constitutedobject for them, grasped, experienced by them, etc. But it is also
precisely constitutedfor itself and has its constitutedsurroundingworld con-
sistingof non-egos,mere "objects".. .20

In this passage the problem of the alter ego is not raised as an

objection to phenomenology as such or even as a difficulty.It is
simply pointed out that if the other person is to be considered in his
being-for-me (the standard phenomenological move), he must also be
considered as being-for-himself, unlike any other kind of object. As
19The cogitatumqua cogitationgoes back to a distinctionin the Logical Investiga-
tions (tr. J. N. Findlay,New York, Humanities Press, 1970,vol. II, A. 578) between "the
object as it is intended,and the object (period) which is intended."
20 Ideen zu einer reinenPhdnomenologie, etc., Zweites Buch, ed. MarlyBiemel, Haag,
Martinus Nijhoff,1952,p. 318.
 ANDHUSSERL'SCARTESIANISM
THE "FIFTH MEDITATION" 21

usual in thephenomenologicalattitude,his "being-in-himself" is simply

not at issue. What is at issue is how he is given. But it is easy to see
how this formulationis transformedinto the "solipsistic objection"
of the fifthmeditation: how can the other person be considered
purelyas being-for-me, in accord with the phenomenologicalreduction,
when he is essentially for himself- not merely an object but a self-
constitutingstream of experience with "his own" world? Other per-
sons are not Gegenstdndebut Gegen-Subjekte,as Husserl says at one
point in Ideen II;2" how can something that is not a Gegenstand be
given at all in the phenomenological sense? Perhaps the an sich can
be considered purely as far mich, but how can the fur sich be so
considered? Up to now the universal characteristic of any concrete
object has been its position within the horizons of the world. An
object is spatiotemporallysituated in relation to my own body and
a spatial horizon and ultimatelycausally related to its surroundings.
But if the other ego is to be transcendental,his relation to his sur-
roundings is not of this sort. His relation to the rest of the world is
not that of a part to a whole or that of a thing to its surroundings.
Rather, the world is for him, his relation to it is purely intentional;
he can no more be considered a part of the world that I can. But how
can anythingbe given except as being in the world?
Thus, if the other cannot be accounted for-phenomenologically
-as other subject, how can the intersubjectivesense of the objective
world be given a phenomenological account? The only account of
objectivity,then,according to the critic,is "transcendentalrealism,""
which simplydogmatically assumes the existence of a multiplicityof
egos without providing an account of their givenness to each other.
But this, of course, is to give up the phenomenological attitude
altogether.
What Husserl has done by raising the issue of solipsism is to
articulate the problem he faces and even to give a preview of the
solution he proceeds to offer.He is convinced that the alter ego is
given in experience- the other must be considered an object in some
sense -but he must show that the other is given as a Gegen-Subjekt,
i.e., "not as mere worldly phenomenon, but as other transcendental
ego."23Withthe statementof the problem the firststep of the phenom-
21 Ibid., p. 194.
22 CM, p. 89.
23 Paul Ricoeur (Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology,tr. L. Embree and

E. G. Ballard, Evanston, NorthwesternUniversityPress, 1967, p. 117) says that "the

conflictbetween the requirementof reduction and the requirementof description be-
comes an open conflict" in the case of the other ego, and that the conflictis never re-
solved (p. 130). The alter ego is somehow "more other" than any other object. But any
transcendentobject is given as "other" and the requirementof reduction is simply to
describe it as it is given. Thus it is difficultto see why the alter ego is a special case.
22 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

ecological reduction has already been performed- the object has

been transformedinto the object-as-meant,the "how of its givenness"
has been broughtinto view. But Husserl must account for this given-
ness of the other subject in the usual way: he must correlate it with
the activityof the conscious subject to whom he is given. "We must
... obtain for ourselves insight into the explicit and implicit inten-
tionalitywherein the alter ego becomes evinced [sich bekundet] and
verifiedin the realm of our transcendentalego; we must discover in
what intentionalities,syntheses, motivations, the sense 'other ego'
becomes fashioned in me. . . ." But the first step of the analysis
already contains the second: by performingthe reduction on what
is meant and considering it purely as meant, one is already made
aware of the intentional act of meaning it. Thus the direction of
Husserl's inquiry is already outlined: he must lay bare the form of
experience throughwhich consciousness intends not merelyan object
within the world, as in the case of a perceived object, but another
subject with its own stream of experience and its own objects.
There are furthercomplications. While the other is not merely
an object in the world of things given to me, he is nevertheless
related to that world, and this in two ways: firsthe is given to me
somehow throughhis body, which is part of the world as a perceived
object; second, this object and the rest of my world must be for him
as well as for me. Husserl must point to a form of my experience
through which another subject is given as an individual when his
body is given and through which the world becomes the world for
both of us.
What Husserl does is to explicate the experience of others first
by pointing to certain features it shares with other forms of experi-
ence already treated in the Meditations and elsewhere. The experience
of others is in some ways analogous to perception and in some ways
analogous to recollection. By showing how it is analogous and then
how it is different,
he hopes to have provided an account that can be
understood in 'thecontextof the phenomenological theoryas a whole.
As for the other's body, it can be construed as "transcendent"in
the weak sense, i.e., purely in relation to my own actual and possible
acts of consciousness. Everythingthat can be so considered belongs
to what Husserl calls the sphere of ownness (Eigenheitsphdre).24 But
in the actual experience of another, in which the body is grasped as
body (Leib) and not just as a physical object (Kirper), it is subjected

24 CM, p. 92.
 ANDHUSSERL'SCARTESIANISM
THE "FIFTH MEDITATION" 23

to what Husserl calls an "'analogizing' apprehension";25it is taken

as the organ or expression of a consciousness, by analogy to my own
body in relation to my own consciousness. The consciousness of
which it is the manifestationis intended by virtue of an act Husserl
calls appresentation-the consciousness of something as copresent
(mnitgegenwdrtig) that is not itself directly presented to conscious-
ness.26
How is such an act to be understood? Appresentation,Husserl
points out, is what occurs in ordinaryexternal perception where the
intention includes the other side of object as "copresent."27 This is
differentfromwhat Husserl calls Vergegenwdrtigung, renderingpres-
ent to consciousness something that is not present either spatially
or temporally,as in imagination or recollection.What is appresented
is always the complement of what is presented, forminga kind of
continuumwith it. One can also, of course, remember the other sides
of a perceived object, or one can imagine what theyare like, perhaps
constructinga determined image on the basis of certain evidence;
but one need not do this, whereas the appresentative consciousness,
whethermore or less determinate,necessarily accompanies presenta-
tion in perception. The presented is what it is (the side of a thing)
only togetherwith the appresented. The appresented belongs to the
(internal) horizons of what is presented; it is intended in a horizon-
consciousness, not an independentact. Now the other consciousness,
he wishes to say, is given in a similar act as copresent with the
body, as its "other side," so to speak; it is not something imagined
in a separate act. Again, the presented (in this case the body as Leib,
not as mere Korper) is what it is only togetherwith the appresented.
Husserl is quick to point out the primary differencebetween
appresentation in perception and in Fremderfahrung:the copresent
side of the perceived object can be simultaneously present to others
and may be present to me at an earlier or later time; while the other
consciousness can never be anythingbut copresent to another and is
present only to itself.28
One might mention other ways in which this

25CM, p. 111. A great deal of discussion has been occasioned by the way in which
Husserl accounts for this apprehension.He seems to be asking for the experientialcon-
ditions under which one would be motivated to take a particular object as another
person. His account has been attacked by A. Schutz in "Das Problem der transzenden-
talen Intersubjektivititbei Husserl" (Phil. Rundschau V (1957) pp. 81-107)and defended
by M. Theunissen in Der Andere. Studien zur Sozialontologie der Gegenwart,Berlin,
de Gruyter,1965,pp. 64 ff.We leave this whole discussion aside, concentratingon the
analysis of such apprehension itself,whateverits preconditionsmay be.
26 CM, p. 109.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
24 PHILOSOPHYANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH

relation of the copresent to the present is a special one, not com-

parable to such a relation in the perceived object. The present (the
body) is organ or expression of consciousness, thus bearing a relation
to the copresent that is comparable to nothingelse. Thus the analogy
to perception is only partial, but it is helpful in avoiding certain
misunderstandingsarising from the distinguishabilityand the sup-
posed discontinuitybetween "mind" and "body." Just as Husserl
attacks the sign-theoryof thing-perception, where the sense-datumis
a mental sign or indicator of the thing that lies behind it,29so he
opposes *theview that the body is the "sign" of a separate mind,
something that announces or gives evidence of its existence. What
I see in perception is the thing itself, even though only a side is
strictly speaking presented to me. Likewise, in the experience of
someone else, "what I actually see is not a sign and not a mere
analogue, a depiction in any natural sense of the word; on the con-
trary,it is someone else...."30
While this analogy to perception is helpful in explaining the
mediatingrole of the other's body in Fremderfahrung,and goes some
way toward clearing up the apparent paradox of the object which is
a subject, it does not itself take account of what is ultimately given
through the "analogizing apprehension": another stream of consci-
ousness. In order to illuminate this central point, Husserl introduces
a comparison to a differentphenomenological dimension, that of
recollection.31Recollection, of course, is a special sort of Vergegen-
wartigung, an act which "renders present something that is not
present"; it is distinguished from an act of phantasy, for example,
by locating its object in the past, and, what is more, in my past. It
is, as Husserl says, in essence not only the consciousness of some-
-thingpast, but of this something as having been perceived or other-
wise consciously experienced by me.32Thus with a greater or lesser
degree of explicitness,recollectionrenders present not only the object
of the experience (e.g., a musical performance) but also the experi-
ence itself.In this sense "the present ego carries out an accomplish-
ment throughwhich it constitutesa variational mode of itself (in the
mode past) as existing."33What is constituted, an experience, is a
29 Cf. Ideen zu einer reinen Phdnomenologie,etc., Erstes Buch, ed. Walter Biemel,
Haag, Martinus Nijhoff,1950,p. 99.
30 CM, p. 124. See also p. 121.

31CM,pp. 115f.and 126ff.A clearer exposition of this point is found in The Crisis
. . . ,p. 185.
32 This is a paraphrase of a passage in an appendix to Erste-Philosophie.Erster Teil,
ed. R. Boehm, Haag, Martinus Nijhoff,1956,p. 264. See also Zur Pha'nomenologiedes
innerenZeitbewusstseins,ed. R. Boehm, Haag, Martinus Nijhoff,1966,p. 40f.
33 The Crisis...., p. 185.
 THE "FIFTH MEDITATION"
ANDHUSSERL'SCARTESIANISM 25

stream of consciousness, and this stream is distinct from and in a

sense differentfrom the stream which constitutes it. It can also
involve a differentspatial location, as Husserl points out in a manu-
script ("then I was in Paris, now I am in Freiburg").?4In any case,
one "original" living present renders another, as past, present to
itself,which is similar to what happens in Fremderfahrung.To be
sure, this is only an analogy, as Husserl makes clear, and not an
explanation;35but at least it makes somewhat less paradoxical or
self-contradictorythe idea of a stream of consciousness as object.
In order to make this comparison fruitfulit is necessary, again, to
be clear on the ways in which the two forms of experience are not
alike. While recollection is an act in which one stream of conscious-
ness is given to another, clearly both streams are actually segments
of one and the same stream,and past acts are constitutedas standing
in a continuum which leads up to the very recollective act in which
it is constituted.36
While the recollected act can never be simultaneous
with the recollection,the prime case of Frernderfahrungis precisely
that in which the object-act is simultaneous with the subject-act.
It belongs precisely to another stream of experience by virtue of this
difference,and stands in relation to its own retentions,recollections,
expectations,habitualities,etc. Furthermore,what is rememberedhas
a kind of evidence and certain procedures of verification(Bewdhrung)
which differfrom those connected to the experience of another: in
the one case "reactivation" simply by virtue of having been experi-
enced in livingpresence and thus retained; in the other case analogy,
"empathy,"throughthe mediation of the other's body.
But there is another important sense in which the comparison
holds, and which leads from the theory of Fremderfahrungto the
theoryof objectivityin the strong or intersubjectivesense. In recol-
lection,as we have noted, there is an inseparable correlation between
the experience and the experienced, whichever may be the primary
object of recollection. To recall a musical performance is to recall
hearing it, and to recall hearing it is to recall the performanceitself,
even if the correlate is remembered in each case only indistinctly.
Similarly,being aware of another person as a stream of experience
34 Cited in Rene Toulemont, L'Essence de la society selon Husserl, Paris, Presses
Universitairesdc France, 1962,p. 57.
3s Toulemiont (Ibid., pp. 55 tl.) mentions Husserl's use of "comparisons" with per-
ception and recollection, but confuses the issue by calling these modes of experience the
indispensablee foundationfor the higher associations," (p. 56) i.e., those of Fremder-
fahrung. But Husserl is quite clear on the fact that Fremderfahrung is not based on
recollection;the lattersimplyowners an "instructivecomparison" (CM, p. 115).
36 Cf. paragraph
25, 'The Double Intentionalityof Recollection" in Zur Phanomenol-
ogie ties inzecrcnZeitbew'usstseins.
26 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH

implies being aware to some extent of what he experiences, if only

"by analogy." When I am face to face with another person, I am aware
not only of him but also that I am an object for him and that our
surroundingsare given to him as theyare to me -or rather,as they
would be given to me if I were in his place.3"In other words, what is
appresented is not only the other consciousness, but also his body,
my body and our whole surroundingsas they are for him. From this
central core of the alter ego, given to me by analogy in Fremderfah-
rung,the other is a stream of experience extendingmore or less deter-
minately (in the case of a stranger almost totally indeterminately)
into the past, togetherwith all its objects. In short,the other is given
as a complete monad in his own right.
Now the fact about the experience of another that makes com-
prehensible the full-fledgednotion of objectivity is that, as monad,
he is thus constituted as having "his own" world just as I do. But
these two "own" worlds are construed in intersubjectiveexperience
as appearances or modes of givenness of one and the same world
which is intended by both of us and indeed by all, and from which
such appearances can at times differ."The objective, or the trans-
cendent in the strong sense, can thus be understood by analogy to
the transcendent in the weaker or "solipsistic" sense: just as the
latter is given as one by relation to a multiplicityof my acts, actual
and potential, so the intersubjective object has the same status in
relation to a multiplicityof acts by differentsubjects. My act and that
of the other "are so fused that they stand within the functionalcom-
munityof one perception,which simultaneously presents and appre-
sents, and yet furnishesfor the total object the consciousness of its
being itself there."39
Such is Husserl's phenomenologicalaccount of the alter ego which
in turnmakes possible his phenomenologicalaccount of the objective
world. "I experience the world . . . not as (so to speak) my private
syntheticformation" because I experience it as given to others as
well. That is, it is given as exceeding my actual and possible consci-
ousness, having the full sense it does only because it is referredin
part to the consciousness of another. Thus the other consciousness is
"the intrinsicallyfirstother (the first'non-ego')"40because it is by
being given to him that anythingelse is objective for me. But this is
possible only because the consciousness of another,as an alien locus
of givenness,itself has sense for me, i.e., it can be given to me in its
37 CM, p. 117.
38 CM, pp. 107, 123.
39 CM, p. 122.
40 CM, p. 107.
 ANDHUSSERL'SCARTESIANISM
THE "FIFTH MEDITATION" 27

own peculiar way. What Husserl has done, using the comparisons we
have mentioned,is to point to and elucidate the formof consciousness
throughwhich this givenness is realized. Through appresentation and
the peculiar "analogizing apprehension" involved in Fremderfahrung,
I am confronted with an object which is a subject, a cogitatum
cogitans.
What must be understood about this whole account is that,while
the alter ego makes it possible that the "rest" of the world exceeds
my actual and possible consciousness, the alter ego does not himself
exceed my actual and possible consciousness. That is, he is described
in the fifthmeditation in the same way that everythingelse was
described before the problem of "solipsism" was raised, namely as
transcendentonly in the weaker sense: not reducible to the particular
act or acts in which he is given to me. He is not so reducible only
because he is the objective unity of actual and possible acts of my
own in which he can be given. Or, if the other is himself given as
objective (transcendent in the strongersense) it is only by reference
to another possible alter ego (or the same alter ego) which is trans-
cendent only in the weaker sense. The objective is what it is for me
because it is given to a possible stream of experience that is not my
own. But this can make sense only because that stream of experience,
not myown, can in turnbe experiencedby me-though "experienced"
must now be understood in a broad enough sense to include the
appresentativeor "analogizing" apprehension.
In other words, Husserl's account up to this point is a strictly
egological account, one contained wholly within the schema ego-
cogitatio-cogitatum.It can even be called "solipsistic" if the solus ipse
is now understood at a higher level. This is necessary because the
cogitatum in the broadest sense - the world- has been provided
with an added dimension. The "objective world" has been explained
by referenceto other subjects who are not in it but are transcendental
in relation to it. In this narrow sense the other ego as transcendental
is not part of my world at all. But he and his total "contribution"to
the make-up of the world -which comprise a full-fledgedmonad in
its own right- do belong within the range of my actual and possible
experience. That is, I distinguishedbetween what is directlygiven to
me and what is directlygiven only to him; but it is within my own
experience that I do this. Now "my own experience" in this broadest
sense can itselfbe considered a monad which contains and constitutes
his (and also "my own" in the narrower sense). While the other does
not strictlybelong to my world,as we said above, he certainlybelongs
to my monad. Thus what has been shown is "how I can constitutein
myself another Ego or, more radically, how I can constitute in
28 PHILOSOPHYAND PHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH

my monad another monad. . . ." Furthermore,it has been shown

"how I can identifya nature constituted in me with a Nature con-
stitutedby someone else (or, stated with the necessary precision,how
I can identifya Nature constitutedin me with one constitutedin me
as a Nature constitutedby someone else).""4
Thus while everythingin this frameworkis understood by refer-
ence to my actual and possible experience, the fifthmeditation intro-
duces into this framework an important distinction that was not
articulated in the firstfour: the distinction between my actual and
possible experience in the strictor narrow sense (what Husserl calls
the "sphere of ownness"), those which give an object directly; and
those of my experiences in which what is given is another stream of
experience and throughwhich an object is given indirectly.The so-
called "reduction" to the sphere of ownness is not another phenom-
enological reduction at all, but simply a focus on the firstor narrow
sense of giveness so that the role and nature of the second sense can
emerge.42The two senses correspond, respectively,to the narrower
and the broader concept of a monad.
Thus Husserl can say at the end of his account that "at no point
was the transcendental attitude, the attitude of the transcendental
epoch&, abandoned." What has been provided is a "'theory' of ex-
periencingsomeone else, [a] 'theory'of experiencingothers, [which]
did not aim at being and was not at liberty to be anythingbut an
explication of the sense, 'others,' as it arises from the constitutive
productivityof that experiencing.. . ."I' It was not "at liberty"to be
anythingmore because the alter ego is simply another, though privi-
leged, cogitatum,and even thoughhe is not 'of the world' in the strict
sense his givenness is dependent on that of perception. Fremderfah-
rung is tied to the perceptual givenness of the other's body, and the
alter ego is thus given,"not originaliterand in unqualifiedly[schlich-
ter] apodictic evidence,but only in an evidence belongingto 'external'
experience."44This is certainly incompatible with any notion of
"proof" that others exist with a certaintycomparable to that of one's
own ego. In fact it is no proof at all. In this sense the alter ego is
treated as any other object is treated in Husserl's philosophy, i.e.,
purely as "phenomenon." The being of the other subject is at issue
only in the sense that the being of anythingat all is at issue in phe-
4' CM, p. 126.
42 Cf. Toulemont, op. cit., p. 40: "La
nature des deux reductions est diff6rente: la
premiere consisted en un changement d'attitude du sujet, la second est un r6tr6cisse-
ment de son champ de vision."
43CM, p. 148.
44 CM, p. 149.
 THE "FIFTH MEDITATION"
ANDHUSSERL'SCARTESIANISM 29

nomenologyup to this point, namely in the sense of his being-for-me.

Husserl's theory seeks to show the experiential conditions under
which the other exists for me as transcendentalother.
In Husserl's "solution to the problem of solipsism," then, the
alter ego is not posited outside my own experience; rather, he is
broughtinto the sphere of my own experience throughthe broadening
of the concept of experience and of the concept of a monad. That is,
it is shown how - i.e., throughwhat form of experience- the other
is given to me as subject, as cogitatum cogitans. This places Husserl's
project in the fifthmeditationin a context wholly differentfrom that
of the usual problem of solipsism, a contextdictated by the approach
of Descartes' Meditations.
But once he has "solved" the problem of solipsism in this way,
Husserl does not regard his work as done. Rather, he makes use of
his solution to add a completelynew dimension to his phenomenology.
The phenomenologyof the other ego's givenness provides the basis
for what Husserl calls "intersubjectivephenomenology."45 Let us con-
sider the transitionfrom one to the other. We noted that the inter-
subjective object, the transcendentobject in the strongor "objective"
sense, can be understood by analogy to the transcendentobject in the
weaker or "solipsistic" sense; just as the latter is given as a unity in
relation to a multiplicityof my acts, so the intersubjectiveobject is
given as a unity in relation to a multiplicitycomprising my act and
that of another. This multiplicity,Husserl says, is fused in the "func-
tional communityof one perception. "46 Now, one might ask, whose
perception is this? A perception of my own, as Husserl had seen in
the lectures on time consciousness,47can be considered the functional
unityof various temporal phases, not all of which are strictlypresen-
tations. Here the presented and the nonpresented are not simultane-
ous - the nonpresentedis not appresented but retained as just past.48
But theyform a "functionalunity" because their status in conscious-
ness is the function of a "meaning intention" which aims at "the
whole [temporal] object," e.g., an enduring tone or even a melody.
The perception as such, which is "relative"49to this whole object,
whateverit may be, cannot be reduced to any of the particular acts of
presentation that make it up, not even the one that is presently
"having its turn." The perception which is constitutiveof the object

45 CM, p. 155.
46 CM, p. 122.
47 Zur Phzanotmenologiedes innerenZeitbeiv'usstseins,p. 38.
48 And, one might
add, is given in "protention" as that which is just about to come.
49 Husserl speaks of
"Relativierung,"Ibid., p. 39.
30 PHILOSOPHYANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH

is an act that is itself constitutedby the "living present" of each of

its temporal phases.50
Returning to the "one perception" of which Husserl spoke in
reference to the intersubjective object, it can be seen as likewise
constitutedby referenceto the presentationsthat make it up. For me
it is the functionalunity of presentation and appresentation,and, to
the extent that it is for me, it can be considered my act. The unified
act is constituted by the other as well, with the differencethat the
content of presented and appresented are reversed. But from the
point of view of either presentation- mine or the other's- it is the
same act that is constituted.And, if we take the concept of sameness
seriously here, the perception "as such," which corresponds to "the
whole intersubjectiveobject," can only be considered our perception.
The perception is a constitutedact that cannot be ascribed totally to
either of us, but only to both of us, to the we. The establishment of
the we in common perception is the simplest form of what Husserl
calls the Vergemeinschaftungder Monaden:sl when two subjects con-
front one another and stand in relation to the same objects they
form, to that extent, a rudimentarycommunity that can itself be
considered as performingan act (cogitamus) through "its" diverse
(and in this case simultaneous) presentations.52
For Husserl this leads to a whole theoryof experience, constitu-
tion and the world whose point of departure is no longer individual
consciousness but such a community at whatever level it may be
found. The community now becomes the "zero member"53about
which the objective world is oriented. From this point of view the
communityis a "communityof monads, which we designate as trans-
cendental intersubjectivity."54 It is transcendental because it makes
"transcendentallypossible the being of a world,"55in this case the
intersubjectiveworld. As roughlysketched at the end of the Cartesian
Meditations, beginning with paragraph 56, Husserl's theory follows
the general lines of the theoryof constitutionat the solipsistic level,
i.e., basing its divisions on the ontological distinctions among the
formal and material regions, on the differencein analysis between
the static and the genetic, etc. Parallel to the solipsistic level, it is
necessary to provide a theorynot only of the community'sworld but
also of the community'sown being-for-itself, that is, a theory of its
50Cf. CM, p. 134.
SI CM, p. 120.
62 Cf. Ideen... , Zweites Bitch, p. 191: "Wir sind in Beziehung auf eine gemein-
same Umwelt- wir sind in einem personalen Verband: das gehbrtzusammen."
53 CM, p. 134.
54 CM, p. 130.
55CM, p. 129.
 THE "FIFTH MEDITATION"
ANDHUSSERL'SCARTESIANISM 31

givenness to itself.A community,in other words, like an ego, can be

considered as self-constituting even as it constitutes its world.
Husserl does not spell out in great detail the paths his "inter-
subjective phenomenology"is to follow. Clearly, in spite of its many
parallels to the theoryof self-and world-constitutionat the individual
level, it cannot be a mere repetition of every detail with merely a
"change of sign" or of attitude. While it is possible to talk of the
eidos communityin relation to the world, etc., it is also necessary to
take account of the much greater complexity of the intersubjective
problem. For one thing,any communityis composed of individuals
while the individual is not. We have seen that the "presentations"
united in a communalization (Vergemeinschaftung) can be simul-
taneous, which is not the case in an individual. Communities not only
contain individuals but also encompass smaller communities and are
parts of larger ones. Furthermore,the communityitself can be con-
ceived as a monad and the problem of Fremderfahrungcan be seen
to arise between communities-where it clearly must be solved in
a way very differentfrom,or at least more complex than, the theory
of "appresentation."56 Finally, communities dissolve and reconstitute
themselves in a way not ascribable to the individual. In general,
Husserl's intersubjectivephenomenologydoes not follow the Hegelian
path of considering the communityas a kind of macroperson5"and
endowing it with a life of its own of which the individual is only an
abstract moment.Any communitycan be treated as a concrete "sub-
ject" in a phenomenological analysis but, as our previous exposition
makes clear, it must be seen in its specificityas constituted by its
members.
This mightlead us to thinkthat the intersubjectivelevel, and the
phenomenological analysis that goes with it, is of merely secondary
importance for Husserl. On the contrary-and this is of great signi-
ficance for the problem posed by this paper -he sees it as comple-
mentingthe "solipsistic" dimension of phenomenologyand as being
required, as the original "objection of solipsism" suggested, if phe-
nomenologyis to be a full-fledgedtranscendentalphilosophy."'Solip-
sistically' reduced 'egology'" is only "the . . . firstof the philosophical
disciplines.... Then ... would come intersubjectivephenomenology,
which is founded on that discipline...." But priorityin the order of
inquiry does not imply priorityin the order of being. Husserl even
goes so far as to say that while solipsistic phenomenologyis the in-
trinsicallyfirst(die an sich erste) discipline, "the intrinsicallyfirst

56CM, p. 134f.
5' In spite of his use of the lerm "personalitiesof a higherorder," CM, p. 132.
32 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH

being [das an sich erste Sein], the being that precedes and bears every
worldly Objectivity,is transcendentalintersubjectivity:the universe
of monads, which effectsits communion in various forms- [das in
verschiedenenFormen sich vergemeinschaftendeAll der Monaden]."
Announcing the problem in the second meditation, Husserl puts it
this way:
Perhaps the reduction to the transcendentalego only seems to entail a
permanentlysolipsistic science; whereas the consequential elaboration of this
science, in accordance with its own sense, leads over to a phenomenologyof
transcendental intersubjectivityand, by means of this, to a universal trans-
cendentalphilosophy.As a matterof fact we shall see that,in a certain manner,
a transcendentalsolipsism is only a subordinate stage philosophically; though,
as such, it must firstbe delineated for purposes of method, in order that the
problems of transcendentalintersubjectivity,as problems belongingto a higher
level, may be correctlystated and attacked.S8
It is clear from these passages that what is referred to as the
"phenomenologyof transcendentalintersubjectivity"is not the inves-
tigationwhich makes up the largest part of the fifthmeditation- the
theory of how (through what forms of individual experience) the
alter ego is given to the ego -but rather the "intersubjective phe-
nomenology" that takes transcendental intersubjectivity,instead of
individual subjectivity,as the point of departure for a constitutive
theoryin relation to the world.
Now what is remarkable about this is that, in spite of its deriva-
tion from and dependence on the subordinate "solipsistic" stage of
inquiry, intersubjective phenomenology is accorded a status of at
least equal dignitywith it. This is remarkable because of what the
fifthmeditation, prior to the introduction of intersubjective phe-
nomenology,has taught us about the nature of our experience of
others.Based as it is on the perceptual experience of the other's body,
the certainty of the other's givenness can be no greater than the
certainty of that perception itself. If the existence of the body is
given only with the nonapodicticitycharacteristic of perception, the
existence of the other person seems to be equally nonapodictic. In
fact it seems even fartherremoved from certainty,since a claim is
made over and above that of the body. And the analogical apprehen-
sion that lends content to the other person's consciousness, the given-
ness of his experiences as those I would have "if I were in his place,"
etc., adds a furtherelement of fallibilityto the experience of another.
To be sure, there is, as Husserl says, a peculiar type of confirmation
that belongs to the essense of Fremderfahrung;59 it is no more a
mere presumption than perception itself. But this does not remove
S8CM, p. 30f.
59CM, p. 119.
 ANDHUSSERL'SCARTESIANISM
THE "FIFTH MEDITATION" 33

its ultimate fallibility,which is why Husserl remarks that the other's

consciousness is given "not originaliter and in schlichter apodikti-
scher Evidenz, but only in an evidence belonging to 'external' experi-
ence."60
But this is precisely the typeof evidence on which intersubjective
phenomenologymust be based, at least in part. Afterall, the "com-
munities" of which Husserl speaks, beginning with the simplest
perceptual encounter between two persons, are available to me only
insofar as I participate in them through my communication with
other persons. Part of my awareness of the community,of course, is
that of my own contribution to it, but part of it must also be my
awareness of the particular others who make it up and of their
particular contributions to its nature. And this is the part whose
evidence, for me, is that of Fremderfahrungas described above. And
there must be no mistake-thatit is my awareness of communities as
such, and not just of my own contributions to them, that must
functionas the basis of an intersubjectivephenomenology.For here
we are interestedno longer in the others-for-me or the community-for-
me-my experience of the community-but rather in the community
as a "subject" in its own right in relation to its world. It is, as we
have seen, the cogitamruswhich is the startingpoint of intersubjective
phenomenology; yet the phenomenologist is an individual, and he
must base his assertions in *thisdomain on his awareness of the
cogitamus just as, in the individual sphere, he bases his assertions
on his reflectiveawareness of the cogito. If the fifthmeditation had
provided a proof of the existence of the alter ego, if the other were
found to be given with a certaintyequivalent to that of the cogito, the
situation would be different.But it did not provide such a proof, as
we have seen, and indeed "was not at liberty"to provide it.
Now the point might be raised that the phenomenologist's ulti-
mate interestis not in the particular communities in which he parti-
cipates, but rather in the a priori structure of those communities
and indeed of all communities. Phenomenology,after all, is meant
to be an eidetic and not a factual science, and the same should hold
true at the intersubjective level. Such factual communities as are
directly available to the phenomenologist are taken, under the atti-
tude characterized as "eidetic reduction," simply as examples of an
essence which is sought. Since there corresponds to such an essence
a possible "intuitiveand apodictic consciousness" of it,61 there is no
60 Cairns' translation,"in unqualifiedlyapodictic evidence," suggests that such evi-

dence is somehow "qualifiedly" apodictic. But this is not at all suggested by schlicht,
which modifiesEvidenz and not apodiktische.
61 CM, p. 71.
34 PHILOSOPHYANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH

need to be disturbed if the consciousness of the examples themselves

is not apodictic.
Yet exactlythe same point can be made about phenomenology
at the solipsistic level. Here, too, phenomenology is not about the
individual facts encountered in transcendental reflection,but takes
these facts as examples for the.purpose of arrivingat an eidos. But
here, as is well known,Husserl not only insists on the apodicticityof
the assertion ego sum or sum cogitans,but regards this apodicticity
as a necessary condition if the science to be built upon it, phenomen-
ology,is to satisfythe highestdemands inherentin the idea of science
itself."Only if my experiencingof my transcendentalself is apodictic
can it serve as ground and basis for apodictic judgments; only then
is there accordinglythe prospect of a philosophy,a systematic struc-
ture made up of apodictic cognitions,startingwith the intrinsically
firstfield of experience and judgment." The role of the ego sum in
phenomenology is indicated by Husserl when he describes apodic-
ticityas "the absolute indubitabilitythat the scientist demands of all
'principles.'
"63
Here we have one of the most explicitlyCartesian strains in Hus-
serl's phenomenology,the idea that the scientificrigor of his investi-
gation is ultimatelysecured because they stand on the "firmground"
of the ego cogito.Now we have seen that if the existence of the ego
is a "principle,"it is not a premise from which to infer the existence
of anythingelse, not even, as we have seen, that of the alter ego.
Rather,it functionsas the basis of apodictic claims about the essence
of the ego, and it is these claims that form the actual content of
phenomenology. But does the apodicticity of these eidetic claims
really require the apodicticity of the existentialclaim ego sum? If
our picture of intersubjectivephenomenologyhas been correct,Hus-
serl conceives of such a phenomenologyas having the same dignity,
and thus presumably the same scientificstatus, as individual phe-
nomenology.And it is based on the cogitamusin just the same way
that individual phenomenologyis based in the cogito.To be sure, the
two types of phenomenology are not simply parallels, as we have
seen, since the cogitamushas to be grounded in the cogito,i.e., it has
to be shown how the communityis given to the ego in his Vergemein-
schaftungwith others. But precisely what this grounding shows is
that the cogitamusis not given in an apodictic way.
The difficultyraised by the introductionof intersubjective phe-
nomenology,then,can be put this way: if the rigorof phenomeno-

62 CM, p. 22.
63 CM, p. 15.
 THE "FIFTH MEDITATION"
ANDHUSSERL'SCARTESIANISM 35

logicalanalysisrequiresthe apodicticgivennessof the subjectiveto

thephenomenologist, thenonlyegologicalor solipsisticphenomenol-
ogycan be rigorous.If, on the otherhand,intersubjectivephenome-
nologyis to be regardedas equal in dignity,
and thuspresumablyin
rigor, to its solipsistic "subordinate stage," then the apodicticity of
the primarygiven is no longer the standard of rigor.
At the end of the CartesianMeditationswe findHusserl insisting
unambiguously upon the equal dignity,even the primacyof inter-
subjectivephenomenology and its correlate,transcendental
intersub-
jectivity.
He does notseem to be explicitly
awareof theway in which
this insistence reflectsback upon and requires a rather non-Cartesian
reinterpretation of the startingpointof his inquiry.It is plausible,
however,thatHusserldid becomeaware of this; forthiswould help
explain the fact that in the Crisishe makes an attempt to begin phe-
nomenologywithoutinsistingon the apodicticityof the ego cogito.

DAVID CARR.
YALEUNIVERSITY.