Perez Vs Dela Cruz

Facts :
On January 8, 1968, in a private conference held at the Office of the petitioner Perez, with the seven
city councilors and the vice-mayor of Naga present, the latter presiding thereat, the matter of
selecting the secretary of the municipal board of the said city as well as the chairmen of the various
standing committees of the said board came up for discussion. At the indication by the four
Nacionalista Party councilors of their desire to vote for a particular person as secretary of the board
and to hold the chairmanship of the committee on markets for one of them, vice-mayor Perez
expressed her intention to vote, in the deliberation on such matters, to create a tie vote and
thereafter to exercise her power as presiding officer to break such deadlock.
On January 15, 1968 the four aforesaid councilors filed with the Court of First Instance of Camarines
Sur a petition for prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction, docketed as civil case 6504, to
prevent Perez from casting her vote in the selection of the secretary of the municipal board and in
the choice of chairmen and members of the different standing committees thereof, except in the
event of a tie vote, and from voting on any legislative proposal or measure or in any proceeding of
the said board except when the members thereof are equally divided. In their petition, the herein
respondents alleged that the vice-mayor of Naga City is not a member of the municipal board but
only its presiding officer; that pursuant to par. "g" of Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the said
board, the chairman of the board cannot vote except in case of a tie that in the choice of secretary of
the board, the vice-mayor as presiding officer of the board cannot vote except when the members of
the board are equally divided; that the vice-mayor had threatened to participate in the election of the
board secretary, in the choice of the chairmen of the various committees of the board and in other
legislative matters, proposals and proceedings, other than to break a tie vote.
On the same day, Jan. 1968, the respondent judge issued an order directing the vice-mayor to
show cause within 10 days why the writ should not issue, at the same setting the hearing on the
petition for preliminary injunction for Jan.1968.On Jan. 1968 Perez moved for time to file a motion to
dismiss and an opposition to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction but her motion was
denied orally in open court by the respondent judge. On Jan.19, 1968 the respondent judge issued
an order granting the prayer for a preliminary injunction upon the application posting a bond of
P1,000. The writ of preliminary injunction issued on Jan 22, 1968 recites:
Issue : 1) Is the vice-mayor of Naga city, besides being the presiding officer of the municipal board,
also a member thereof? Corollary thereto, can she vote twice: to create a deadlock and then to
break it?
(2) Did the respondent judge have jurisdiction to issue the writ of prohibitory injunction against
Perez?
Ruling: 1. There is absolutely nothing in Republic Act 305, also known as the charter of the City of
Naga, which provides that the vice-mayor of the said city is a member of the municipal board
thereof. For sooth, the position of vice-mayor was not even provided for, as the "acting mayor"
designated to take over in case of sickness, absence or other temporary incapacity of the Mayor was
the "City Treasurer. True it is that upon the passage of Republic Act 2259, the position of vice-mayor
in Naga City, and in all other chartered cities whose corporate charters did not provide for the
position of vice-mayor, was created, but section 3 thereof simply provides that "the Vice-Mayor shall
be the presiding officer of the City Council or Municipal Board in all chartered cities. It does not
decree that the vice-mayor is a member of the city council or municipal board.
2. Explicit statutory command, courts are given authority to determine the validity of municipal
proceedings. 36 It is not disputed that the present proceeding for prohibition has for its objective to
prevent the petitioner from "participating in the election of Secretary of the Board, chairmanship of
different committees and in voting in other legislative matters, proposals and proceedings, other than
to break a tie." It is our view that the petitioner, in insisting to exercise the right to vote twice in the
municipal board, acted without jurisdiction and power to do so, and may be validly prevented and
restrained by a writ of prohibition. In reply to the petitioner's assertion that the acts sought to be
restrained are mere "probable individual actuations" beyond the reach of a prohibitory writ, suffice it
to state that prohibition is essentially a "preventive remedy" and is "not intended to provide for a
remedy for acts already accomplished." 38 Withal, petitioner's threat of voting twice in the municipal
board was not an empty or meaningless gesture, for the record shows that on March 5, 1968, soon
after the writ complained of was lifted by the Court of Appeals through the latter's restraining order of
February 20, 1968, the petitioner proceeded to act by voting twice for the approval of an alleged
amendment to the rules of procedure of the municipal board.
ACCORDINGLY, the present petition is hereby denied, and the preliminary injunction heretofore
issued is dissolved, at petitioner's cost.

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