58 Body and Mind

of man. As the materiality af the body enjoys massive

scienac support, the spirituality of the mind has natu-
rally been the favorite casualty. To theories which deny THE BEHAVIORIST SOLUTION
that the mind is a spiritual thing we now turn.

In what is, broadly speaking, the materi&st trend of

thought in modern times, Behaviorists are the most
radical. They deny that the mind is a thing at all, and so
deny a fortiori that it is a spiritual thing. If the mind is
not a thing at all, there can be no problem of ho* the
thing which is a mind relates to the body or anything
else. Behaviorism is more a dissolution than a solution
of the Mind-Body problem as we have posed it.
i
i

1 (i) %he Behaviorist Doctrine of M e n d States

Behaviorists assert that a "mental" description of a man

as intelligent, angry, seeing a trafEc light, or in pain, is
not a description of what some special part of him-his
mind-is like. Rather, such descriptions tell us of that
man's behavior and dispositions to behave.l
To say a man is intelligent is to say that his rate of
success in solving intellectual and practical problems is
higher than normal, that solutions come to him corn-
parativeIy quickly and with little effort, that he has the
disposition. to learn more quickly and forget more slowly
than common men, and so on. The "and so on'' is
lFor example, B. P. Skinner, Sciet~ce and Human Be-
havior, New York, 1953, and Gilbert Ryle, The Concepl of
Mind, London, 1949.
60 Body and Mid The Behaviorist Solufion 61
crucial; ment a1 predicates are typically "open-ended" in patterns of action, whereas the latter are specific,
that they point to a whole cluster of dispositional traits determinate, and mention particular acts.
which is not at any time h a U y crystallized. To say of a "He is angry" cannot be translated into any h i t e
particular performance, fox example, making a speech, set of descriptions of him shouting, tearing his hair,
that it is intelligently done, is to say that in it the speaker flushing, striking, or grinding his teeth, for "He is angry"
exercises and displays some of the cluster of dispasi- speaks indifferently of some pattern of behavior, not
tions which together make up intelligence. But just exactly specified, in which some or all of these are
which dispositions belong to the intelligence cluster, and more or less prominent ingredients, and in which there
just which of these are displayed, is not definitely
may be orher, hitherto unrecognized "expressions of
anger." Yet this failure of translatability does not
specsed in saying the speaker shows intelligence.
show the mind is more than behavior. Fur neither
The difference between an angry man and one wbo is
can "He won the battle" be translated into any finite
not is that the angry man tends to shout, throw things,
set of descriptions of camage, confusion, and flight. Yet
k o t h at the mouth, attempt to hurt the object of his
"He won the battle" applies, in a flexible and rather
anger, and so on. The man who sees the tr&c light has
unspecific way, exactly to the physical events of motion,
the capacity to conduct his car in a way quite different
noise, life, and death which constitute the battle, and
from him who does not see it. Both tendencies and
not t~ anything else. So equdy, mahtah the behavior-
capacities are kinds of disposition. ists, "He is angry" applies to the display we call angry
Mentd descriptions, on the Behaviorist view, are not behavior and to nothing else.
descriptions of a man's mental part. They are desMip We cannot conclude, because mental terns are not
tions of his behavior and his dispositions to behave. dispensable, that f hey describe something spiritual
DiEerences between mentd states are differences in beyond the body and its behavior.
these behavior patterns and nothing more.

There Are No Mental Objects

The Psychological Vocabulary Is Nut Eiiminable
Behaviorism rejects the idea that the miod is a spiri-
Although mental descriptions describe nothing but tuaI thing, and rejects it principally because there can
behavior and behavioral tendencies, they cannot be never be the public human experience of spirits upon
translated into purely bodily terms, We cannot dispense which alone the idea and knowledge of such things
with mental terms and use only behavioral ones to could be founded. For the same reasons, Behaviorist
mean just what the mental terms meant. Mental descrip- theory has no place for mental objects. Sometimes
tions cannot be replaced by behavioral descriptions be- men are in pain, but this does nut mean that there are
cause the former are vague, open-ended, and speak of things called "pains" which they have, feel, or are in.
62 Body and Mind The Behaviorist Solution 63
Sometimes men have afterimages, but there are no pattern, what he is apt to say about hinuelf, is natu-
such things as afterimages that they have or see. Pains, rally of cardinal importance in, these cases.
afterimages, pangs of remorse, are not placeless, im-
palpable objects. We can fully describe what is happen-
ing when pains or pangs occur using sentences which (ii) The l&3[iamd-Body Problem and the Problem of
refer only to the man involved: The maa is suffering, Oher Minds
or in an afterimage-seeing condition, or in a remorse-
pang-feeling condition. Behaviorism is thus a dear, uncompromising, thor-
Thus mental objects are abstractions, conveniences oughly naturalistic doctrine of man. It makes possible
of thought and speech, not red entities. "I have a pain" a most attractive treatment of the Mind-Body prob-
is more like "I have a aew hair style" than "I have a new lem and furthermore, it disposes of another classical
puppy." "1 see an afterimage" is likened to "I walk a conundrum, the problem of how we know om fellow
mile" rather than "1 walk a tightrope." Descriptions men are not mindess automata.
of men mentioning pains, afterimages, or pangs of re Behaviorism transforms our view of the Miid-Body
morse are not relational descriptions connmtiag men problem. It po~itraysthe traditional Miid-Body problem
with pains, etc., but complex descriptions of the men's as just a confusion. The mind is not a thing related to
condition, mentioning events or processes but not the body; the relation of mind to body is the relation
relahg one object to another. of activity to agent. The problem of the relation of a
This doctrine is extended to all the "contents af the siren to its wailhgs is not a particdarly deep, perplex-
mind," the thoughts, sensations, surges of emotion, ing, and "philosophicaI" one. The only problem is
etc., wbich we might be tempted to think of as inner, scient5c; How does fbe siren work? In Behaviorist
non-physical objects. The elimination of mental ob- doctrine, the philosophical Mind-Body problem gives
jects is obligatory for anyone opposing the spiritual way to the scientific probIem: How does the body work
view of mind, as we saw in chapter 2. As it so greatly in producing those behavioral manifestations which we
nduces the number of objects in our account of men, describe in mental terms? And this scientilic problem is
it is very appealing for Dualists too. So the program to to be solved in two parts, a developed psychology estab-
eliminate mental objects is almost common ground ia lishing the laws which connect stimulus and response in
the philosophy of mind. all the phases of human behavior, and a developed
Behaviorists alone are committed to the further view physiology determining the neural bridges between
that descriptions of men as suffering, having an after- them. This transformation of the Mind-Body problem is
m g e , etc., describe only the behavior, and tendencies most satisfactory, for it becomes a problem to which we
to behavior, of the man in question. His verbal behavior can apply well-established research t echaiques.
64 Body and Mind The Behaviorist S~lution 65
The classical problem of Other Minds, the problem
of haw we know that others who behave as we do have
minds like us, also becomes a pseudopmbiem. Like the jiii) Behaviorism and Mental Causes
Mind-Body problem, it is generated by mistakenly
thinking that the mind is a thing, and since it is not a According to Behaviorist doctrine, mental events are
bodily thing, that it is a spiritud thing. The problem of behavioral events or events of gaining and losing dispo-
Other Minds then arises because it is so hard to h o w sitions to behave. So mental events are always effects of
when spiritual things are present or absent. From the whatever causes human behavior, or dispositions to
Behaviorist standpoint, the problem of Other a d s is show such effects. A man's mental condition is not the
simply the problem of whether other people behave, or cause of any of his behavior; it does riot cause him to
are disposed to behave, in the ways to wbich the say or do anything. The connectio'n of mind to behavior
mental terns apply. And it is quite obvious that they do. is too dose to be causal. For the behavior-writing a
Even those raising the problem of Other Minds admit poem, say-is itself a piece of mental activity. Nothing
as much, but go on to ask whether in the case of other is the cause of itself. The wail is not the cause of the
peopIe any mind lies behind their behavior. For Be- siren making a noise, it is the noise, When we say the
haviorists the mind does not lie behind, but in, the b e siren is of the superloud variety we axe not saying it is
havior. They hold that the traditional problem of Other now being very noisy, nor are we attributing to it a mys-
Minds is one with which we are not faced, and which terious, ghostly, and inaudible loudness which is the
we would be unable to solve if we were. The traditional cause of its wail being noisy. We are attributing to an
problem cannot even be stated unless the behavioral ordinary material object, a siren, the disposition to be,
analysis of mental descriptions is rejected. when sounding, noisier than most. The Behaviorists
The objections to Behaviorism are not objections analyze "This man is arrogant" along the lines of "This
springing from a faulty treatment of the Mind-Body siren is superIoud," as attributing a behavioral dispo-
problem or the problem of Other Minds. The short- sition and involving no reference to states or events
comings of the theory lie rather in its general doctrine hidden inside him.
of the nature of mind, and are of two chief kinds. Mental descriptions only explain behavior in the sense
First, Behaviorism offers a faulty analysis of those that they describe a man's behavior in general terms.
mental descriptions which do pertain to patterns of "Because he is arrogant'' answers "Why was he so
behavior, for it omits the causal element in mental rude?" in the same way that "Because it's a superloud
concepts. Second, at least some mental descriptions one" answers "Why is the siren so noisy?" The answer
refer to events and processes which are neither be- assigns the rudeness, or noisiness, to the class of normal
havioral nor dispositional. happenings. It does not give the cause, either of the
66 Body and Mind The Behnviorist Solution 67
disposition to perform arrogantly (loudly), or of the consider that even in this favorable case the Behavior-
par ticdar rude (noisy) performance in question. ist view is wrong. "It was his arrogance which caused
In Behaviorist doctrine, what is true here of arro- him to be rude to his milkman (when he was given the
gance is true of every mental state or event-pains, sen- wrong order) " seems to me much more like "It was
sations, emotions, decisions, intentions, and so on. The the low le17el of brake fluid which caused the brakes to
entire group of psychological expressions refers to be fail (when the pedd was pressed)," in which we speak
havior and behavioral dispositions. Body relates to of a relatively permanent "standing" condition within
mind as Nureyev relates not to Miss Fonteyn but t o his which a particular event triggered mothel: particular
dancing. event as effect.
A mental condition, as a disposition to a pattern of But be that as it may, our regular employment of
behavior, can of course be a cause of events, even many other mental concepts is certainly causal. "It was
mental events, in other people. "His arrogance made the pain that caused him to cry out," "It was the flashes
him abhorred," "Her hypochondria made her a laugh- before his eyes tbat caused him to seek an oculist," "It
ingstock," "His carelessness resulted in his dismissal" was his decision to go swimming which led to his
are all acceptabIe in Behaviorist theory. What is out of taking a towel from the cupboard," "It was his love of
the question is that mental everts, processes, or condi- honor which caused him to enlist," "It was his jealousy
tions should play a causal role in producing the behavior that made him kill her."
which is a manifestation of that mental event, process, AU these sentences are perfectly normal, and all use
or condition. To call the behavior a manifestation of mental concepts in perfectly standard ways. They show
the mental state is already misleading. The behavior is that as we ordinarily think about the mind, mental
the mentd state, to the extent that anything categorical events and conditions and processes are at least the sorts
constitutes a mental state. The menial state is never a of things which can be causes. Some philosophers go
cause of its own behavioral elements, just as nothing is further than this, and hold that the mental ideas are
cause of itself. It is this restriction on mental states as themselves causal in character. They think "jealousy",
causes which is relevant in what follows. like "poison", is an idea which cannot even be fully
For this restriction is utterly out of step with our understood except in terms of the sort of effects jedous
normal use of mental concepts. Arrogance is a particu- (or poisonous) things have. We postpone discussion
larly favorable case for Behaviorists. We might agree of this further claim to the next chapter; here we need
that "It was his arrogance which caused him to be only note that both the view that mental events can
rude to the milkman" is like "It was the trend of be causes of their manifestations in behavior, and the
population to the city which made him abandon his view that their causal role is an integral part of the
farm" and thus wrongly ascribes as cause something of meaning of mental terms, are incompatible with Be-
which the alleged effect is redly a part. For myself, I haviorism.
68 Body and Mind The Behaviorist Solution 69
The Behaviorists know this very welI. They recognize one.Angy behavior is never caused by any of the com-
that in common thought mental events are often held to mody accepted causes; it is never caused by anger, or
be causes. They believe this to be a fundamental error, by the intention to seem angry, or by the resolve to
both deriving from and helping to prop up the Dualism play on stage the part of an angry man. Angry behavior
with which common thought is infected. The error has, under no circumstances, a mental cause. The com-
consists in mistakenly analyzing mental descriptions mon opinion is in error, not just as in t M i g bad air
along the same h e s as physical ones, so that just as gives folk malaria, where among possible causes the
"He built a house" describes a sequence of pubIic wrong one is chosen, but as in supposing that Newton's
events in a public space involving physical rearrange- laws keep the planets in motion, where a cause of
ments, so "He built a fantasy" is thought to describe a quite the wrong sort altogether is proposed. Contrary
sequence of private events in a private space involving to our fond opinions, unless we know some brain
mental rearrangements. The analysis of mental descrip- physiology we are quite ignorant of what makes people
tions as parallel to physical ones lands us with both a behave as they do, except that in knowing what some
spiritual mind and impalpable mental objects as its stimuli are we can know what response to expect. To
contents. The analogy of mental to physical descriptions think pleasure or pain, hostility or admiration are ever
may be tempting, but Behaviorists believe it tempts us to operative factors in human life is to suffer an illusion
philosophical ruin. For mental descriptions, like all generated by misunderstanding descriptions which use
others, get the meaning they have from the c i r m - mental terms.
stances in which we can know it is correct to apply Nevertheless, we are not to suppose angry behavior
them. Let us call these conditions "criterial condi- has no natural cause at allLNothing could be further
tions". The only criterial conditions for "Me built a from the naturalistic spirit of Behaviorism than to make
fantasy" are the behavioral dispositions, especially to human life a continuing miracle in which stimulus and
verbalization, through which the subject passes. Mea- response just bagpen to exhibit intelligible patterns. Nor
tal descriptions, like all descriptions, ciaim that the are we to think non-physical causes are at work; the
conditions criterial for their application obtain; hence error in Dualism is not just taking the mind to be a spirit
they do not, and cannot, refer to private events but to but in thinking there is an inner spirit at all which could
tendencies for there to be public and physical events. be .cause of behavior to which mental descriptions
To suggest otherwise is incoherent, for on the alter- apply. No matter what terms, mental ox otherwise, we
native which construes mental descriptions as ando- use in speaking of the spiritual, these terms will be
gous to bodily ones, there will be no criterial conditions without sense. For they will lack public criterial condi-
for the mental words, so they will have no meaning tions without which no terms have sense.
at all. So Behaviorists hold that angry behavior has non-
The position we have now reached is a very curious mental physioIogica1 causes. It springs, so we conjec-
70 Body and Mi& The Behaviorist Solution 71
ture, from a special condition of the brain. But that ! there is just confusion and no real meaning at all in
;

special brain condition, cannot be anger, for the existence !

mental words as ordinarily intended? Whichever way we
I decide, bow could we justify our decision to someone
of such a condition is no part of what we look for in
seeking criteria1 circumstances for "He is angry." 1
f
who disagreed?
Thus although in common me anger is thought of as t
a cause of angry behavior, and states of the nervous
system are discovered, in developing science, to be a
cause of that very same behavior, an argument from how
mental terms get their meaning stands in the way of
I (k) Mental Episodes

The second group of objections to Behaviorism centers

applying the mental term "anger" to the appropriate about mentat episodes md claims that behavioral
causes of angry behavior to be found in the nervous accounts of these are inadequate. paids are favorite
system. examples of mental episodes. To have a gain is, accord-
Behaviorism thus involves revising our psychological ing to Behaviorists, to acquire a set of dispositions to
vocabulary. References to the causes of behavior are move one's body in the pain-behaving way. Wincing,
transformed into descriptions of patterns in the behav- groaning, soothing the hurt part, taking aspirin, stiffen-
iord effects themseIves. There will be no need to make ing the upper lip, and a hundred other pieces of behavior
this radical change, and no point to it, if the argument a l l belong to the pain group, and to be in pain is to be
from how mental terms get their meaning can be suc- disposed to exhibit a fair sample of behaviors from this
cessfully challenged. And on tbe other hand, if the argu- group. Some elements of this group, such as bodily
ment is sound, this will establish Behaviorism and tension, are not properly under voluntary control, and
confound all its alternatives. A challenge to the argu- so scarcely count as behavior rather than mere bodily
ment has been mounted in recent years, and this will happening. There is a general problem about what is
be discussed in the next chapter. behavior and what is mere h a p p e a but we will pass
Whether or not that challenge is successfd, we en- it by. It will not matter to us if some pieces of the pain-
counter here one of the knottiest knots in philosophical behaving pattern are not, in strictness of language,
method. A certain prlncipIe about how words and sen- pieces of behaving at alt.
tences get their meaning, and what meaning they get, For the objection to this account of pain is that it
has as consequence a very radical new conception of leaves something out, something usually called the
mental expressions. Should we conclude that since sensation of pain. We display our tendency to think of
mental expressions do not have the meaning which the pain in this way as a definite inner episode by speaking
principle awards them, there is something faulty in the of pain-behavior as our reaction to pain, suggesting
.

principle? Or should we conclude rather that, because that the pain is an event which triggers it off. And we
our ordinary thinking has ignored a sound principle, may weU feel that what the Behaviorists omit from
 The Behaviorist Solution 73
72 Body and Mind
Since pains hurt and decisions to imitate them never
their account of pain is the very thing which matters
do, the conclusion is false, and therefore at least one of
most about it. Pains hurt; indeed that is their most salient
the premisses is false too. Behaviorists defending them-
feature. But for Behaviorists, to have a pain is to ac-
selves against this argument must show that one or
quire a complex disposition. On one view of disposi-
other premiss does not follow from their principles.
tions, acquiring a disposition is just having come m e
They might point first to the presence of some involun-
some conditional statements describing my tendency to
tary conditions in the case of pain, for example, bodily
behave. Who can believe that the truth of some condi-
tension, which are absent from the decision to imitate
tional statements can literally hurt? On another view of
pain. This is an unsuccessful defense, for pains and their
dispositions, the acquiring of a disposition involves the
expert imitation will then be the same in the possible
acquisition of some particular real inner state which
situation where every perceptible bodily happening is
underlies and serves to explain the conditional truths
subject to voluntary control, and this is just as absurd.
which describe my tendency to behave. It is indeed
Second, it might be suggested that only a segment of the
sensible to think such an i ~ e state
r could be hurtful.
dispositions coincide. For example, the pain-suRerer will
But on Behaviorist principles the inner state could not
be urgently wishing this section of his life were over and
be the pain. For the vocabulary of pain gets its sense
done with in a way quite lacking in the pain-imitator.
from the criteria1 conditions for its application, and
This defense is unsuccessful, for wishing gets in turn a
hence refers not to any inner state but instead to
behavior-disposition analysis, and the imitator can ex-
the very behaviors and behavior tendencies which we
tend his imitation to the expressions of wishing, which
blunderingly call "expressions" of the pain. So that on
include speaking, keeping diaries, sighing even when
the second view of dispositions we reach the crazy con-
alone, and so on.
clusion that even if something involved in having a pain
Third, there is the defense which fills out the analysis
could hurt, it would not be the pain but something
of pains, decisions, and mental episodes generally, by
else.
including mention of their causes. Pains are now not
There is further trouble for Behaviorists in the
just dispositions to pain behavior, but dispositions
problem of distinguishing real from imitation menta1
caused by bodily damage or malfunction, while their
episodes. Consider this argument:
imitations have a quite different set of causes. This is
not a successful move, for it implies that someone who
To have a pain is to acquire dispositions ta pain-
behavior. feels tickles when others feel pain (i.e., when there h
To decide to imitate a man in pain is also to acquire bodily damage or malfunction), but is resolved to con-
dispositions to pain behavior, maybe the very same ceal this fact by an imitation of pain, really feels pains
set of painexpressing behaviors. after all.
So having pains and deciding to imitate them are not n o s e who attack Behaviorism maintain that not
different sorts of mental episodes.
74 Body and M i d The Behqviorbt Solution 75
only can there be pain-behavior without pain, there can ceptual connection between descriptions of creatures in
be pain without pain-behavior or any disposition thereto. mental term and descriptions in behavioral terms.
Thus Behaviorists are accused of the error of W n g a It is impossible to understand or explicate mental terms
paralytic can feel no pain. lt is more satisfactory to without some sort of reference to behavioral dis-
argue the question for normal people, so we must positions.
turn to less urgent sensations to make the point. A Excitement and fear are two diflerent mental states.
slight glow of well-being may have no behavioral mani- Yet by all subjective tests of introspection and memory,
festations at all, yet stiU exist and be felt. Alternatively, a case of excitement and a case of fear may not differ
and t h i s is equally fatal, its manifestations may be quite at d.What makes one excitement and the other fear
indistinguishable from those of a determination to please are the different bodily activities associated with each.
the boss by st smart and cheerful demeanor. Again, all the "inner" features of jealousy and hatred
So Behaviorism is unsatisfactory in its treatment of may be the same. What distinguishes them, what
the episodes called sensations. It is also unsatisfactory in makes them the mental states they are, lies in the pattern
dealing with episodes which occur in perceiving. When I of action belonging to each.
see that the tr&c light has changed, more has happened Again, no matter what it seemed like to the person
than just the acquisition of a new set of dispositions to who made it, a decision to marry would not be a deci-
acts in which I discriminate one state of the t r d c light sion to marry unless (hindrances apart), it were fol-
from another. If I have a curious sort of color blind- lowed by some bride-seeking performances.
ness, in which I see as many different shades of color as At least some mental conditions cannot be fully de-
you do, but dzerent ones, then when we both see the scribed without mention of bodily action. So there is
traf5c light (or anythmg else) we will each acquire the some kind of logical connection between mental states
very same discriminative dispositions. Yet there are and what happens in and to the body.
great differences in our mental lives, and since these Behaviorism takes the extreme view that mental
differences cannot appear in a behavioral analysis, that
descriptions describe, imprecisely and obliquely, noth-
analysis is unsatisfactory.
ing but behavior and tendencies to behave. It reaches
this view by way of the principle that unless mental
dkcriptions refer only to the behaviord "expressions"of
(v) The Strength of Behaviorism
the mental state described, they can have no meaning at
all. It thus restricts the reference of mental expressions
Behaviorism, despite its great virtue in dealing with the
to perceptible conditions for their proper appiication.
Mind-Body problem, is deficient as a general philosophy
Since the manifestations of a mental state are the only
of mind. Yet it expresses, in a distorted form, a truth
aspects of mental life which we can see, hear, or touch,
of the k s t importance. This truth is that there is a con-
76 Body and Mind
Behaviorism idenmes a mental state with the pattern Chapter 5
of its manifestations.
The Mind-Body problem tbus leads us on again into CENTRAL,-STATE MATERIALISM
the fields of metaphysics and epistemology. For now we
must ask: Is there any way of retaining the conceptual
link of mind with behavior while denying that tbe sub- ti) The Causal IFbeory of the Mind
ject matters of mental and behavioral descriptions co-
incide exactly? If so, is this new position compatible Some terms get their meaning by reference to the
with human limitations on understanding and know- effects produced by what the terms denote. Take "poi-
ledge? m m a t i v e answers to both questions will oc- son", for example. No one understands what a poison
cupy us in the fist part of the next chapter. is if be doesn't understand that drinking it is not a good
idea. It is in terms of its deleterious effects upon human
or animal health that we express what "poison" means.
There is a conceptual connection between poisons and
ill-health. Yet talk about poisons is not just talk about
ill-health. It is talk about substances which can play a
causal role in ill-health. A poisonous substance will,
if swallowed in large enough doses, without any in-
hibitor, by a person who takes neither a neutralizer
nor an emetic, and provided his metabolism is typical,
adversely d e c t his health.
Arsenic is a substance quite separate from humans,
healthy or otherwise. It is a poison whether swallowed or
not. Yet although arsenic is something different from
humans and health, when we describe it as poisonous
we are adverting to its mnnection with illness and
death. "A poison is apt to produce illness and death" is
like "A furnace heats"; it is a statement specifying condi-
tions under which a substance deserves the label "poi-
son" ("furnace"). By contrast, 'CA poison tends to
deteriorate if left standing" or "A furnace burns more
fuel if the draft is forced" do not deal with what must
be so if the label "poison" or "furnace" is deserved.