Comparative Police System Summer

LEA-6
COMPILATION IN COMPARATIVE POLICE SYSTEM

2011
__________________________________________________________________
COMPARATIVE POLICE SYSTEM

__________________________________________________________________
The study of comparative police system, criminal justice and law is a fairly
new field and has correspond with rising interest in a more established field,
comparative criminology. However, in this chapter, we will present some issues
which will bring you to discover ideas useful in the conceptualization of successful
crime controls.
Rationale
With Globalization goes transnational crimes like terrorism, drug trafficking,

money laundering and human smuggling. Transnational crimes cross across
borders and the need for bilateral and international cooperation becomes
imperative. It is also essential to study trends in policing because the speed by
which changes affect the lives of people disturbs traditional values and social
arrangements which used to unite people in pursuing common goals in the past.
This state of anomie (as Merton termed it) or “normlessness” brings about a new
breed of crimes which the police normally is not prepared to face. As we compare
our own police system with other models we would be able to gain insights into
how to deal with transnational or borderless crimes. Besides, best practices maybe
adopted from other police models in order to make policing in this country more
current and effective.
1
LEA-6
2011
Course outline:
_____________________________________________
Part I. Effects of Globalization

-The Changing Role and Nature of the Police
-The Effects of Globalization
Part II. Transnational Crime
-Terrorism
-Drug Trafficking
-Money Laundering
-Human Trafficking
-Cyber Crimes
-Others
Part III. Selected Police Models
-Japan Police System
-Singapore Police System
-Police System of Other ASEAN Countries
-Australian Federal Police
-US and other European Models
-Programs of Select Police Models
-Application to the Philippine Setting
Part IV. Role of INTERPOL
-Organizational Setup
-Functions and Programs
-Role in Anti-Transnational Crime
-Criminal Intelligence Analysis
Part V. Bilateral and International Cooperation of Transnational Crime
-UN Convention against Transnational Crime
-Role of ASEANAPOL
-PNP Agreements with ASEAN Police Organizations
Part VI. Participation of PNP Personnel in UN Peacekeeping Missions
-Selection and Qualifications
-Terms of Deployment
2
LEA-6
2011
Course Goal:
To identify contemporary transnational crime problems and their origins, as well as

international criminal justice responses.
Course Objectives:
At the end of this course the student will be able to:
1. Analyze the process that leads to the identification of certain social problems as
transnational crime issues.
2. Understand the types of information available regarding transnational crimes
and how to critically evaluate these sources.
3. Develop an awareness of the difficulties involved in both defining what
constitutes transnational crime and designing global strategies to combat it.
4. Discuss the role of policy in developing strategies to combat transnational crime.
5. Analyzed different law enforcement practices and be able to identify its
usefulness in our own setting.
6. Compare different selected police models in the world, their similarities and
differences;
7. See the need for Bilateral and international cooperation in addressing transnational
crimes like terrorism, drug trafficking, money laundering, etc;
8. Understanding that globalization brings about changes which disturb traditional
values and social arrangements;
9. Adopt best practices from different police models of the world.
THE HISTORICAL COMPARATIVE METHOD
The study of comparative justice and law is a fairly new field less than fifty
years old, and it has corresponded with rising interest in a more established field,
comparative criminology, which can be traced back to Durkheim's famous 1895
statement that "comparative sociology is ... sociology itself." Whether the purpose
is to discover more successful crime control policies or to test hypotheses in
diverse cultures, the goal of comparative justice and comparative criminology is to
3
LEA-6
2011
remedy American ethnocentrism (the view that American ideas apply naturally to
other parts of the world).
Comparative research is usually carried out by the so-called "safari"

method (a researcher visits another country) or "collaborative" method (the
researcher communicates with a foreign researcher). Published works tend to fall
into one of three categories: single-culture studies (the crime problem of a single
foreign country is discussed), two-culture studies (the most common type), and
comprehensive studies (which cover three or more countries). Examinations of
crime and its control in the comparative context often require an historical
perspective since the phenomena under study have frequently developed under
unique social, economic, and political structures. Hence, the method most often
employed by researchers is the historical-comparative method. To summarize the
historical-comparative method in a few words, it is basically an alternative to both
quantitative and qualitative research methods that is sometimes called
historiography or holism.
In historiography, there are at least eight (8) ways to do history:
The Great Man approach, the historical forces approach, the crisis of civilization
approach, the dialectic approach, the evolutionary approach, the geographic
factors approach, the conflict or "who won" approach, and the serendipity or
accidental discovery approach. In holism (which is a term that describes when a
whole gives meaning to parts), there is an emphasis upon inductive inference from
description, which is similar to Max Weber's notion of "ideal types" that are
general to many cases. The idea of "wholes as configurations of parts" is also part
of the idea behind Boolean algebra, which is a comparative method advocated by
Ragin (1987). Max Weber's main method was case-based and covered only a
handful of cultures at a time. Durkheim's method was variable-based and would
consider hundreds of cultures at a time. It should be noted that Durkheim's method
is the one that caught on in historical-comparative sociology and sociology in
general. One might say it is this Durkheimian bias toward large sample sizes
which has made sociology and criminology so quantitative. In conclusion,
patterns, trends, and syndromes are mostly synonymous words used in comparative
criminal justice with essentially the same meaning as ideal-types. One should not
4
LEA-6
2011
be afraid of using their intuition and announcing their "discovery" of a pattern,

trend, or syndrome.
INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE

"When a classification does not exhaust, a haphazard classification is preferable"
(Kierkegaard)
There are four kinds of societies in the world:
(1) folk-communal, which are also called primitive societies;

(2) urban-commercial, which rely on trade as the essence of their market system;
(3) urban-industrial, which produce most of the goods and services they need
without government interference; and
(4) bureaucratic, or modern post-industrial societies where the emphasis is upon
technique or the "technologizing" of everything, with the government taking the
lead.
Some people also talk about a fifth type, the post-modern society, where the
emphasis is upon the meaning of words, coded narratives, and the deconstruction
of institutions. Developing countries tend to be lumped into the first two types (1
& 2) where the study of culture becomes more important than the study of
structure. Developed countries tend to be lumped into the last two types (3 & 4)
where the study of structure becomes more important. The study of culture
involves the study of customs and folkways of the people, culture referring to
things which come and go, which are mainly produced by people each generation.
The study of social structure involves the study of enduring institutions, like
economic and political systems, which remain in place generation after generation.
It should also be noted that some comparativists are "splitters" instead of "lumpers"
which means that instead of lumping closely similar societies together, they may
make some fine comparisons, thereby splitting types into subtypes. The lumping-
splitting problem is a problem in any social science, and unfortunately, there is no
good way to resolve it. Most people are lumpers, and the four types of societies
presented here are examples of lumping similar things together (knowing full well
that finer subtypes exist).
 folk-communal -- little codification of law, little specialization among

police, and a system of punishment that just lets things go for awhile without
attention until things become too much, and then harsh, barbaric punishment
5
LEA-6
2011
is resorted to. Classic examples include the early Roman gentiles, African
and Middle Eastern tribes, and Puritan settlements in North America (with
the Salem "witch trials").
 urban-commercial -- presence of civil law (some standards and customs are
written down), specialized police forces (some for religious offenses, others
for enforcing the King's law), and punishment is inconsistent, sometimes
harsh, sometimes lenient, but mostly harsh. Most of Continental Europe
developed along this path.
 urban-industrial -- presence of codified law (statutes that proscribe as well
as prescribe) with an attempt to create more law in a direction that prescribes
good behavior; police become specialized in how to handle property crimes,
and the system of punishment attempts to run on market principles of
creating incentives and disincentives. England and the U.S. followed this
positive legal path.
 bureaucratic -- a coherent system of laws (along with armies of lawyers),
police who tend to keep busy handling rare events, terrorism, and newly
emerging forms of crime; a system of punishment often characterized by
moral panics, over-criminalization and overcrowding. The U.S. and perhaps
only eight other nations fit the bureaucratic pattern. Juvenile delinquency is
a phenomenon that usually only occurs in a bureaucratic society because of
the way such societies extend the adolescent age period.
Many comparativists romanticize the folk-communal society for its low crime
rates as well as the way most quarrels and conflicts are settled privately. However,
folk societies are also known for "lumping it" which is a process of letting things
go on too long until it's too much to tolerate anymore. Basically, the more
primitive the society, the more likely it is to let things build up until it reaches a
"boiling point" or the "straw that broke the camel's back." By contrast, the more
modern a society is, the more likely it is to over-react to the slightest, little thing.
Folk societies work very hard to avoid the over criminalization common to modern
bureaucratic societies.
Theorists have worked hard to attempt understanding exactly when and where
societies became so crime-fixated. In this regard, the most frequently pointed-to
variable in comparative criminal justice is urbanization, or the process of internal
migration from the countryside to the cities. It is suspected that urbanization
dissolves family ties, creates cultures of poverty, and produces a stabilized criminal
underworld consisting of well-defined criminal career pathways.
6
LEA-6
2011
Also of importance are the variables of colonization and underdevelopment, as

these processes of globalization shape underdog ideologies among exploited poor
people which come back in the form of terrorism against the more developed
countries. However, an event (like urbanization or colonization) cannot be the
cause of crime if it occurs when crime rates are falling, as anomalies don't occur
that often against "master trends." However, there are so many examples of
fluctuating crime rates in so many countries under so many conditions that any
search for a "master variable" is likely futile.
FOUR LEGAL TRADITIONS
It is the consensus of experts is that there are four types of legal traditions in the
world:
(1) Common;
(2) Civil;
(3) Socialist; and
(4) Islamic.
This pretty much classifies about 185 different nations. It is important to compare
nations that have similar legal traditions because crimes may not be defined the
same. In fact, legal systems may not even be the same. According to Reichel
(2005), a legal tradition refers to a culture's attitudes, values, and norms (the
conceptual components), whereas a legal system refers to the operational
components that function day in and day out.
Interpol and the U.N. have dealt with this problem for years -- that even something
as simple as murder is defined differently by different nations, and even within the
same nation, there may be a dozen or more different kinds of murder. There's also
a reporting problem. In some countries, crime data are based on offenses known to
police, and in other countries, statistical data is based on convictions.
Certain countries (such as those in Central Africa) do not even collect crime
statistics. In other countries (mostly socialist ones), crime statistics are collected,
but the data are classified. It is also difficult to compare punishments, since in
some countries, the family members of the offender are punished, and the range of
punishments includes such things as stoning and mutilation.
7
LEA-6
2011
The four legal traditions are:
 Common law systems -- also known as Anglo-American justice. They exist

in most English-speaking countries of the world, such as the U.S., England,
Australia, New Zealand, Canada, India, and former British colonies in
Africa. They are distinguished by a strong adversarial system where lawyers
interpret and judges are bound by precedent (or stare decisis). Common law
systems are distinctive in the significance they attach to precedent (the
importance of previously decided cases). They rely primarily upon oral
systems of evidence in which the public trial is a main focal point.
Conceptually, all common law countries believe that law originates in
custom, that a fair and open competition will sort out the truth, and that if
everybody just plays by the rules, everything will work out.
 Civil law systems -- also known as Continental justice, Romano-Germanic

justice, or Roman law. It is the largest and most prevalent system of justice
in the world. About 48% of the world is on the Roman system according to
Reichel (2005). It is practiced throughout most of the European Union, in
places such as Sweden, Germany, France, and Japan, and throughout much
of Latin America. It is distinguished by a strong inquisitorial process where
less rights are granted to the accused, and the written law is taken as gospel
and subject to little interpretation. For example, a French maxim goes like
this: "If a judge knows the answer, he must not be prohibited from achieving
it by undue attention to regulations of procedure and evidence." By contrast,
the common law method is for a judge to at least suspend belief until the
sporting event of a trial is over. Legal scholarship is much more
sophisticated in civil law systems, as opposed to the more democratic
common law countries where just about anybody can get into law school or
write legal scholarshp. Romano-Germanic systems are founded on the basis
of natural law, which has a deep respect for tradition. The sovereigns, or
leaders, of a civil law system are considered above the law, as opposed to
the common law notion that nobody is above the law. Despite this elitism,
everyone who works in a civil law system, from police to prosecutor to
judge, sees themselves as equals who pool their efforts to determine what
happened. Historically, civil law systems go back to the Corpus Juris
Romanis of 450 B.C., and this is mentioned because over the years, there
have been various other important codes, or landmark pieces of legislation,
which are taken as gospel within this tradition, an example being the famous
Napoleonic Code of 1804.
8
LEA-6
2011
 Socialist systems -- also known as Marxist-Leninist or Communist justice.

It exists in many places, such as Africa and Asia, and parts of Latin
America, anywhere where there has been a Communist revolution or the
remnants of one. It is distinguished by procedures designed to forcibly
rehabilitate or retrain people into fulfilling their responsibilities to the state.
It is the ultimate expression of positive law, designed to move the state
forward toward the perfectibility of state and mankind. It is also primarily
characterized by administrative law, where non-legal officials make most of
the decisions. For example, in a socialist state, neither judges nor lawyers are
allowed to make law. Law is the same as policy, and an orthodox Marxist
view is that eventually, the law will not be necessary. In practice, however,
most societies which claim to have a socialist system of justice either have a
dictatorship (no law at all) or some variant of a Roman legal tradition.
 Islamic systems -- also known as Muslim or Arabic justice. It derives all of

its procedures and practices from interpretation of the Koran. It is the only
legal tradition in the world which considers all law to be of divine origin.
Most Islamic law is in the form of commands, orders, or directives which
govern the whole lifestyle of a person. For example, a citizen in a common
law or Roman law society might be able to find some place, some time,
where a little bit of unlawful behavior would be tolerated. Not so with
Islamic law. There are few exceptions, and few situations where the Shari'a
(the path to follow - another word for Islamic law) does not apply.
Exceptions include places where Islamic law is not uniformly applied, but
Islamic systems in general are characterized by the absence of positive law
(the use of law to move society forward toward some progressive future). It
is based on a concept of natural justice (crimes are considered acts of
injustice that offend a religious or moral tradition). Religion plays an
important role in Islamic systems, so much so that most nations of this type
are theocracies, where legal rule and religious rule go together. In point of
fact, religion must play an important role in Islamic law because only a few
verses of the Koran can be used for law. Additional guidance can be had
from books which point out statements and deeds by the Prophet, and
although Islamic jurisprudence varies on this, one can also rely upon
analogical reasoning (qiyas) to resolve controversies, and following that, the
consensus of legal scholars (ijma).
9
LEA-6
2011
Each society also has its own customary law or tribal traditions. Many parts of
Africa, for example, have reverted back to a tribal system because they could not
accommodate their heritage of colonialism, or could not choose among Common,
Civil, Socialist and Islamic systems. Tribal justice systems tend to be
characterized by arrest without trial and other summary procedures. In other parts
of the world, such as Latin America, the problem has involved the profit of drug
crime outpacing the capability of justice systems, and where a normal trend toward
decriminalization should have occurred, an opposite trend of haphazard legal
practice and harsh punishment has occurred. Traditionalism, colonialism,
modernization, and the increasing tendency for crime to become transnational in
an international marketplace form the components of the globalization problem in
comparative criminal justice. It is important now, more than ever, to understand
how we got to this point.
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS
If one had to summarize the whole time span of human history into what have
been the three "master trends," what would one say? The renowned sociologist,
Max Weber (1947) said they were demystification, rationalization, and
bureaucratization. The history of mankind has been the history of movement from
myth to reason, and bureaucracy has been what we simultaneously depend on and
deplore (Jacoby 1973). The first large-scale project that mankind probably faced
was irrigation to grow crops. That's why most of the earliest societies -- the
"cradles of civilization" -- were river valley societies. Someone (perhaps the first
government) had to organize the irrigation of water so that there was not too much
or too little, and Wittfogel (1957) argues that such "hydraulic societies" took on a
form of government he calls "Oriental despotism" because total power was
required over the land and property relations. Marxists called it the "Asiatic mode
of production" and it pulled the world out of a tribal system into a class or status-
based system.
Next came the world's great empires (the Egyptian, Chinese, Hindu, Persian,
Inca, Aztec, Roman, and Ottoman) which Eisenstadt (1963) has documented as
movement toward a centralized bureaucratic structure. Bureaucracies were crucial
to the rulers of such empires if only for the reason that unquestionable loyalty was
required of their staff. A tendency for empires to have some kind of in-house
magic or primitive religious belief as an adjunct to their rule probably led to the
first cases of specialization and professionalization in the form of shamans or
10
LEA-6
2011
viziers (the world's first bureaucrats). Secular specialization and professionalism

came about with the advent of the Chinese civil service. The American
civilizations (Mayas, Incas, and Aztecs) followed a different route, relying instead
upon blood-based clan or interclan councils. The city-state system also emerged
independently, or by colonization, in the Mediterranean basin (Heady 2001).
Athens, Sparta, Carthage, and Rome started out as perfect examples of the urban-
commercial pattern, but only Imperial Rome and its Byzantine Empire became
influential enough to impact Western civilization as we know it. The movement
from strict, civil-military hierarchies of the Byzantine Empire to the strict, royal
court hierarchies of European feudalism was relatively seamless. Feudalism, by
definition, required every person to know their place, and although customs varied,
it was common for a peasant to have a small plot, or share a communal plot, on
which to grow food for subsistence as long as they paid a portion to their lord who
protected them and dispensed justice when the need arose.
Feudalism was eventually replaced by powerful monarchies with central

bureaucracies. The key historical development was a money economy which
replaced a barter economy. The ability to accumulate "coin of the realm" produced
freemen, burgesses (municipal officials/bankers), and a middle-class. To manage
these new groups of people, rulers fell back upon Roman Law traditions which saw
the "right" of sovereignty (owning the state) vested in one person. The king (or
queen) shared their power with the aristocracy, but also created the countervailing
institution of "privy councils" (advisors) which consisted of non-aristocrats given
royal duties (the most famous of which was the French Conseil d'Etat which still
exists today). Bureaucracies grew because a growing manufacturing sector
required subsidies and controls, colonies required administrators, and the huge
treasuries required the attention of clerks and accountants. Kings also had little
time for dispensing justice as was done in the old feudalism days, so they
appointed justice officials (intendants or commissioners) to act as their
representatives. Old-fashioned competition, however, took place among people
who wanted appointment to the royal service, and various training/education
services sprang up along with other screening devices such as entrance exams.
Thus, the royal service was converted into the public service. Only the "best and
the brightest" obtained government work. All that followed was development of
the nation-state and manufacturing (industrialization).
11
LEA-6
2011
POLICE, COURT, AND CORRECTIONAL SYSTEMS
Every type of system -- Common, Civil, Socialist, Islamic -- has local variation.
Even in English-speaking countries, for example, there is variation. Canadian
justice places more emphasis upon the right to a fair trial, free from prejudicial
publicity. In Canada, the public and the media are usually banned from the
courtroom, and there is little interest in crime news. In England, there is more
emphasis upon fairness in sentencing, and making sure the guilty don't go free.
English police dossiers along with two types of lawyers (solicitors and barristers)
and two types of courts (Magistrate and Crown) help ensure this.
Police systems are quite different around the world. With the exceptions of
Japan and the Common Law nations, few countries hold their police officers
strictly accountable for violations of civil rights. In Socialist and Islamic countries,
the police hold enormous political and religious powers. In fact, in such places,
crime is always seen as political crime and a co-occurring religious problem.
Police everywhere are the most visible (and accountable) symbols of criminal
justice, so one universal finding is that when police fail to control crime, informal
methods of law (vigilante policing and community courts) tend to arise. Other
universal findings include the fact that minorities everywhere seem to distrust
police, and that the American innovation of community policing doesn't transfer
well to other countries because it comes off as too omnipresent (Braga et al.
2007).
Court systems of the world are of two types: adversarial, where the accused is
innocent until proven guilty; and inquisitorial, where the accused is guilty until
proven innocent or mitigated. The U.S. adversarial system is unique in the world.
No other nation, not even the U.K., places as much emphasis upon determination
of factual guilt in the courtroom as the U.S. does. Outside the U.S., most trials are
concerned with legal guilt where everyone knows the offender did it, and the
purpose is to get the offender to apologize, own up to their responsibility, argue for
mercy, or suggest an appropriate sentence for themselves. Inquisitorial systems
have more secret procedures. Outside of the United States, one is likely to
encounter community (or neighborhood-focused) courts which offer an array of
non-conventional, alternative sanctions.
Correctional systems worldwide can be fairly easily distinguished by whether

they support corporal punishment (beatings) or not. Some so-called "civilized"
countries that claim they are better than the U.S. because they don't have the death
penalty regularly practice such corporal punishments as beatings and whippings.
12
LEA-6
2011
Nations that practice corporal punishment do tend, however, to have less of a

correctional overcrowding problem. Probation and parole, where they exist cross-
culturally, tend to be available only for native citizens, and not for foreigners nor
immigrants. Outside of the United States, prisons tend to be less sanitary and
unhealthy.
Juvenile Justice Systems vary widely. Scotland has the toughest system,
regularly sentencing juveniles to harsh boot camps with a strict military regimen
and forced labor. Germany has a juvenile justice system similar to the U.S., but
there is more emphasis upon education. Not every country in the world believes in
special handling of juveniles, nor the concept of adolescence.
SEVEN THEORIES IN COMPARATIVE CRIMINOLOGY
Schneider (2001) does a good job summarizing the various theories that exist
with at least some empirical support. They are listed here with little comment
since, as theories, they are always under development:
 Alertness to crime theory -- holds that as a nation develops, people's

alertness to crime is heightened, so they report more crime to police and also
demand the police become more effective at solving crime problems.
 Economic or migration theory -- holds that crime everywhere is the result
of unrestrained migration and overpopulation in urban areas such as ghettos
and slums.
 Opportunity theory -- holds that along with higher standards of living,
victims become more careless of their belongings, and opportunities for
committing crime multiply.
 Demographic theory -- holds that when the event occurs when a great
number of children are born, as the baby boom grows up, delinquent
subcultures develop out of the adolescent identity crisis.
 Deprivation theory -- holds that progress comes along with rising
expectations, and people at the bottom develop unrealistic expectations
while people at the top don't see themselves rising fast enough.
 Modernization theory -- holds that (and this is an oversimplification) that
the basic problem is society becoming too complex.
 Anomie and synomie theory -- suggests that progressive lifestyles and
norms result in the disintegration of older norms that once held people
together (anomie), but in other cases, people can come together and achieve
social consensus or social cohesion over values (synomie).
13
LEA-6
2011
PART I
EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZATION
A. THE NEED FOR INNOVATIVE POLICING
Theories and practices in law enforcement have been compared in several studies
under diverse circumstances, the goal is to test whether the theory and practice in
policing needs innovations to meet the demands in the present trends in crime
fighting.
Comparative research is usually came out by the “safari” method (a researcher

visits another country) or “collaborative” method (the researcher communicate
with a foreign researcher).
Published works tend to fall into three categories:

1. Single-culture (the police and the crime problem of a single foreign country is
discussed),
2. Two culture studies (the most common type, and
3. Comprehensive textbooks (which cover three or more countries).
The examination of crime and its control in the comparative context often
requires historical perspective since the phenomena under study are seen as
having developed under unique social, economic, and political structures.
Hence, the method most often employed by researchers is the historical-
comparative method. On the other hand, whatever method used in comparative
research in this subject matter, one thing is evident-police systems are now
moving towards innovative law enforcement.
14
LEA-6
2011
A-1. GLOBALIZATION AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
Every nation has its own law enforcement agency called the Police. One
thing is common. The police symbolize the presence of a civil body politics in
everyday life; they symbolized the capacity of the state to intervene and the
concern of the state for the affairs of the citizenry. It is therefore timely to discuss
the connection of globalization to policing.
What is globalization?
Globalization is a package of transnational flows of people, production

and investment, information, ideas, and authority.
Alison Brysk in a digest paper stated that Globalization is the growing

interpretation of states, markets, communications, and ideas. It is one of the
leading characteristics of the contemporary world. International norms and
institutions for the protection of policing human rights are more developed than
any previous point in history. While global civil society fosters growing avenues of
appeal for citizens repressed by their own states.
But assaults in human dignity continue, and very blurring of borders and rise
of transnational actors that facilitated the development of a global human rights
abuse.
With Brisk new globalization and human rights, a more broadly articulated
and accepted way of protecting these rights is within the hands of the Law
Enforcement Agencies in the world. The rights of individual have come to depend
ever more on a broad array of global system of policing and forces, from the local
police to the INTERPOL.
Effects of Globalization on Law Enforcement
Every law enforcement agency in the world is expected to be the protector of

the people’s rights. Globalization has great impact on every human right.
The emergence of “international regime” for state security and protection of

human rights, growing transnational social movement networks, increasing
consciousness and information politics have the potential to address both
15
LEA-6
2011
traditional and emerging forms of law violations. Open international system should
free individuals to pursue their rights, but large numbers of people seem to be
suffering from both long standing state repression and new denials of rights linked
to transnational forces like international forces like international terrorism and
other acts against humanity.
The challenge of globalization is that unaccountable flows of migration and

open markets present new threats, which are not amenable to state-based human
rights regimes, while the new opportunities of global information and institutions
are insufficiently accessible and distorted by persistent state intervention.
(RK MANWONG; LAW ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION CHAPTER 10)
Threats on law enforcement: Some threats brought about by globalization are:
1. Increasing volume of human rights violations evident by genocide or mass

killing
2. The underprivileged gain unfair access to global mechanisms on law
enforcement and security
3. Conflict between nations
4. Transnational criminal networks for drug trafficking, money laundering,
terrorism, etc.
Opportunities for law enforcement: While globalization brings the threats and
many other threats to law enforcement, opportunities like the following are carried:
1. Creation of International Tribunals to deal with human rights problems

2. Humanitarian interventions that can promote universal norms and link them
to the enforcement power of the states
3. Transnational professional network and cooperation against transnational
crimes
4. Global groups for conflict monitoring and coalitions across transnational
issues
16
LEA-6
2011
A-2. Globalization and Human Rights
Transnational Threats and Opportunities

Alison Brysk
Globalization—the growing interpenetration of states, markets, communications,

and ideas across borders—is one of the leading characteristics of the
contemporary world. International norms and institutions for the protection of
human rights are more developed than at any previous point in history, while
global civil society fosters growing avenues of appeal for citizens repressed by
their own states. But assaults on fundamental human dignity continue, and the very
blurring of borders and rise of transnational actors that facilitated the development
of a global human rights regime may also be generating new sources of human
rights abuse. Even as they are more broadly articulated and accepted, the rights of
individuals have come to depend ever more on a broad array of global actors and
forces, from ministries to multinationals to missionaries.
What are the patterns of the human rights impact of globalization? Are new
problems replacing, intensifying, or mitigating state-sponsored repression? Are
some dynamics of globalization generating both problems and opportunities? How
can new opportunities be used to offset new problems? And how has the idea and
practice of human rights influenced the process of globalization?
How does globalization—which liberals claim will promote development,

democracy, personal empowerment, and global governance—instead present new
challenges for human rights?
Globalization is a package of transnational flows of people, production,

investment, information, ideas, and authority (not new, but stronger and faster).1
Human rights are a set of claims and entitlements to human dignity, which the
existing international regime assumes will be provided (or threatened) by the state.
A more cosmopolitan and open international system should free individuals to
pursue their rights, but large numbers of people seem to be suffering from both
long-standing state repression and new denials of rights linked to transnational
forces.
The essays in this volume show that the challenge of globalization is that
unaccountable flows of migration and open markets present new threats, which are
not amenable to state-based human rights regimes, while the new opportunities of
17
LEA-6
2011
global information and institutions are insufficiently accessible and distorted by

persistent state intervention.
The emergence of an "international regime" for human rights (Donnelly 1986),

growing transnational social movement networks, increasing consciousness
(Willetts 1996), and information politics have the potential to address both
traditional and emerging forms of human rights violations. The United Nations has
supervised human rights reform in El Salvador, Cambodia, and Haiti, while
creating a new high commissioner for human rights. The first international
tribunals since Nuremberg are prosecuting genocide in the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda. Transnational legal accountability (Stephens and Ratner 1996) and
humanitarian intervention promote universal norms and link them to the
enforcement power of states. Thousands of nongovernmental organizations
monitor and lobby for human rights from Tibet to East Timor (Boli and Thomas
1999).
Alongside principled proponents such as Amnesty International, globalization has

generated new forms of advocacy such as transnational professional networks
(Doctors without Borders), global groups for conflict monitoring, and coalitions
across transnational issues (Sierra Club-Amnesty International).
New forms of communication allow victims to videotape their plight, advocates to

flood governments with faxes, Web sites to mobilize urgent action alerts. But the
effectiveness of global consciousness and pressure on the states, paramilitaries, and
insurgents responsible for long-standing human rights violations varies
tremendously. And access to the new global mechanisms is distributed unevenly,
so that some of the neediest victims—such as the illiterate rural poor and refugee
women—are the least likely to receive either global or domestic redress.
Beyond this interaction of new solutions with old problems, new human rights
problems may result from the integration of markets, the shrinking of states,
increased transnational flows such as migration, the spread of cultures of
intolerance, and the decision-making processes of new or growing global
institutions (Kofman and Youngs 1996; Mittelman 1996; Held 2000). The
increasing presence of multinational corporations has challenged labor rights
throughout Southeast Asia, along the Mexican border, and beyond. Increasing
levels of migration worldwide make growing numbers of refugees and
undocumented laborers vulnerable to abuse by sending and receiving states, as
well as transnational criminal networks.
18
LEA-6
2011
Hundreds of Mexican nationals die each year crossing the U.S. border; in contrast,
450 German migrants were killed during forty years of Europeans crossing the
Berlin Wall. International economic adjustment and the growth of tourism are
linked to a rise in prostitution and trafficking in women and children, affecting
millions in the Caribbean, Southeast Asia, the post-Soviet states and even the
United States. The U.S. State Department estimates that one to two million persons
each year are trafficked for various forms of forced labor and "modern-day
slavery"—including almost 50,000 annually to the United States (Richard 1999).
The same Internet that empowers human rights activists increases government
monitoring, instructs neo-Nazis, and carries transnational death threats against
dissenters. Unelected global institutions like the World Bank, international
peacekeepers, and environmental NGOs administering protected areas increasingly
control the lives of the most powerless citizens of weak states.
In this volume, we attempt to map new territory, bring together diverse

perspectives, challenge conventional wisdom, and begin to cumulate research to
address these questions and contradictions. Our aim is not to introduce a new
theory of globalization, but rather to identify generalizable patterns from diverse
developments. In order to make sense of these developments, we must first
consider the general trends of human rights and globalization. Then we can map
patterns in the globalized development of human rights threats and opportunities.
Human Rights in a Global Arena
Human rights are a set of universal claims to safeguard human dignity from
illegitimate coercion, typically enacted by state agents. These norms are codified
in a widely endorsed set of international undertakings:
The "International Bill of Human Rights" (Universal Declaration of

Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and
International Covenant on Social and Economic Rights); phenomenon-specific
treaties on war crimes (Geneva Conventions), genocide, and torture; and
protections for vulnerable groups such as the UN Convention on the Rights of the
Child and the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women.
International dialogue on human rights has produced a distinction between three
"generations" of human rights, labeled for their historical emergence. Security
rights encompass life, bodily integrity, liberty, and sometimes associated rights of
political participation and democratic governance.
19
LEA-6
2011
Social and economic rights, highlighted in the eponymous International Covenant,

comprise both negative and positive freedoms, enacted by states and others:
prominently, rights to food, health care, education, and free labor. More recently
discussed collective rights may include rights such as membership in a cultural
community and access to a healthy environment (Chris Brown 1997). These
"generations" of rights often involve different sets of actors and different levels of
state accountability.
While the origins of the international human rights regime, U.S. foreign policy,
NGO monitoring, and much previous scholarship have focused on security rights,
this project will entertain a broader conception of linked political, social, and
cultural rights grounded in the Universal Declaration. A focus on security rights
may be desirable for clarity and manageability, as well as because security rights
of life and freedom are "basic" or enabling rights that make the pursuit of other
rights possible (Shue 1980). However, human rights claims have an inherently
expanding character, which requires the consideration of every type of threat to
human dignity under a range of changing social conditions. Thus, both liberty and
survival may involve social issues, such as the right to free labor and to organize
for better labor conditions. Some vulnerable groups, notably women and
indigenous peoples, may face linked threats that emanate from public and private
actors, and seek cultural freedoms to meaningfully participate in civic life.
Furthermore, the very process of globalization blurs distinctions among categories

of rights: humanitarian intervention seeks to rescue ethnic groups, women working
as prostitutes are beaten by police for "bothering tourists" to feed their children,
and rights to privacy and expression collide on the Internet (also see
McCorquodale and Fairbrother 1999). In this volume, these linked rights can be
delineated by granting priority to those rights that enable others and those
violations that present the greatest harm to victims.
Human rights values derive from and are justified by reference to philosophical
constructions of human nature, cultural and religious traditions, demands from
civil society, and international influence. In practical importance, the latter two
political factors are the most important source of human rights in the contemporary
world (Perry 1998; Montgomery 1998). Accordingly, despite frequent violations in
practice, international consensus has implanted human rights as a nearly universal
vocabulary of debate, aspiration, and civic challenges to state legitimacy.
Analysts of human rights have identified a variety of psychological, social,

economic, and political patterns that put societies "at risk" of human rights
20
LEA-6
2011
violations. These generally include authoritarian government, civil war, strong

ethnic cleavages, weak civil society, power vacuums, critical junctures in
economic development, and military dominance (Mitchell and McCormick 1988;
Haas 1994; Donnelly 1998b). Above all, the study of human rights teaches us that
human rights violations usually reflect a calculated (or manipulated) pursuit of
political power, not inherent evil or ungovernable passions (Gurr 1984; Human
Rights Watch 1995b). One of our first tasks is to analyze the effect of globalization
on these risk factors.
The effect of globalization on state-based human rights violations will depend

on the type of state and its history. In newly democratizing countries with weak
institutions and elite-controlled economies (Russia, Latin America, Southeast
Asia), the growth of global markets and economic flows tends to destabilize
coercive forces but increase crime, police abuse, and corruption.
Global mobility and information flows generally stimulate ethnic mobilization,

which may promote self-determination in responsive states but more often
produces collective abuses in defense of dominant-group hegemony. On the other
hand, the same forces have produced slow institutional openings by less
fragmented single-party states (like China and Mexico).
In much of Africa, globalization has ironically increased power vacuums, by both

empowering substate challengers and providing sporadic intervention, which
displaces old regimes without consolidating new ones. Some of the most horrifying
abuses of all have occurred in the transnationalized, Hobbesian civil wars of Sierra
Leone, Angola, and the Congo.
But the literature on human rights has also moved beyond the conventional
wisdom that situated human rights violations and remediation predominantly
within the state, to suggest ways in which globalization creates new opportunities
to challenge the state "from above and below" (Brysk 1993; Risse et al. 1999).
Human rights research has produced both evidence of new capabilities for
monitoring, pressure, and sanctions (Alston and Steiner 1996; Keck and Sikkink
1998), along with reports of new types and venues of abuse (Human Rights Watch
1996; Fields 1998; Rickard 1998; Peters and Wolper 1995). In general, analysts of
globalization find that states' international integration improves security rights, but
increases inequality and threatens the social rights of citizens (Crossette 2000;
Milner 1998). However, neither economic development nor economic growth in
and of themselves improve human rights performance (Montgomery 1998: 325;
Amartya Sen 1999; Tan 1999). In addition to globalization and growth, findings on
21
LEA-6
2011
the effectiveness of international pressure on state human rights policy suggest that
target states must be structurally accessible, internationally sensitive, and contain
local human rights activists for linkage (Burgerman 1998; Sikkink 1993).
There is little systematic evidence available on the overall human rights impact of
global flows and actors, and that which does exist is often contradictory. For
example, quantitative studies that demonstrate improved security rights where
MNCs (multinational corporations) are present (Meyer 1998) contrast with case
studies documenting multinational reinforcement of state coercion and labor
suppression (Arregui 1996; Ho et al. 1996).
Other scholars suggest that the impact of multinationals depends more on their
type of production, customer base, or sending country than their globalizing nature
(Spar 1998). Similarly, some studies indicate that even within "economic
globalization," different types of global economic flows at different times will have
different impacts on democracy and human rights (for example, for Li and
Reuveny 2000, trade is negative but foreign direct investment is positive).
There is some basis for believing that new global human rights mechanisms, such
as transnational NGO campaigns, may be particularly effective against
transnational actors like multinationals. Analysts argue that transnational human
rights threats can be most easily met by transnational human rights campaigns,
since it is easier to access transnational actors than repressive states, transnational’s
cannot cloak their abuses in sovereignty rationales, global elites are increasingly
amenable to "rights talk," and global civil society can provide local linkages for
transnational networks (Rodman 1998; Brysk 2000a). The research in this volume
suggests that the human rights impact of globalization depends on three types of
factors: the type of globalization involved, the level of analysis addressed, and the
type of state that is filtering globalizing flows.
A-3. Globalization: Rights and Wrongs
What do we mean by globalization?
While some analysts treat globalization as a predominantly economic process or

even a synonym for global capitalism (Greider 1997; Korten 1995), others focus on
the growth of international institutions and organizations (Ruggie 1998). Some
scholars emphasize the impact of transnational demographic, environmental, and
cultural flows (Kearney 1995; Sassen 1998, 1996), while others plot the emergence
22
LEA-6
2011
of cross-border networks that may constitute a "global civil society" (Kaldor 1999;
Lipschutz 1996; Wapner 1996).
In this project, these developments are seen as facets of a linked, albeit uneven,
process. In an extension of Jan Aart Scholte's definition, globalization is an
ensemble of developments that make the world a single place, changing the
meaning and importance of distance and national identity in world affairs (Scholte
1996b: 44).2 Nevertheless, aspects of globalization that occur simultaneously may
have very different logics and impact for human rights—as the sections of this
book reflect.3
In order to analyze globalization as a comprehensive process, it must be recognized

as a dynamic process, that is, a change over time. One of the biggest challenges to
analyzing the current era of globalization is the observation of historical periods
with similar elements and very different political results (Hirst and Thompson
1996). However, globalization need not be entirely new to be significant, and
significant in new ways. Some suggest that globalization has occurred in waves,
with the current wave linked to U.S. hegemony and the emergence of a
"democratic peace" in the core of the world economy.4
The current wave of globalization does surpass previous eras in the breadth, scope,
and intensity of the combination of connection, cosmopolitanism,
commodification, and communication. It is this combination of norms, flows,
institutions, and markets that has particular political consequences for human
rights.
A more globalized world is simultaneously more connected, cosmopolitan,

commodified, and influenced by communication. Connection is a functional
parameter of globalization, involving increasing numbers, volumes, and salience of
transnational flows of bodies, business, information, and norms. The sections of
this volume are organized around these flows: transnational migration and
citizenship, global markets and commodification, international uses of information
and communication, and transnational norms embodied in attempts at governance.
The cosmopolitan dimension is structural; the evolution of multiple, linked, and

overlapping centers of power above and below the state. This is closely related to
James N. Rosenau's analysis of a "multicentric" turbulent world. Commodification
highlights distinctive characteristics of expanding world markets and their
relationship to other flows, institutions, and states. As Richard Falk's contribution
23
LEA-6
2011
details, globalization as commodification means that increasing spheres of social

relationship are based on exchange value, including citizenship.
The underlying causal dynamic that has catalyzed and intensified each of these
dimensions of globalization is communication, which combines an increase in
technical capacity and volume, a shift in the distribution of capabilities, a
diversification of channels, and an expansion of content (Deibert 1997). As Shayne
Weyker and Clifford Bob discuss, communication carries both information and
norms, affective images and transnational identities. Both terrorism and the
international response also reflect these characteristics.
What are the effects of globalization?
Optimists suggest that transnational integration will empower citizen challenges to

state power (Falk 1995; Rosenau 1997), while revisionists assert that globalization
reiterates national and/or market exploitation (Bhabha 1998a; Burbach et al. 1997;
Brecher and Costello 1994; Mander and Goldsmith 1996).
One attempt to resolve this debate delineates good and bad forms of globalization;
"globalization from above" versus "globalization from below." (Hunter 1995; Falk
1994) Another set of scholars contend that a deeper process of globalization has
transformed the fundamental forms of world politics through changing identities,
evolving social forms such as networks, and the diffusion of an increasingly
influential world institutional culture that includes support for human rights or at
least democracy (Robertson 1992; Castells 1997; Meyer et al. 1997). This project
suggests, instead, that different elements and levels of globalization may produce
distinct effects of empowerment, exploitation, and evolution; also Friedman 1999).
But these diverse effects are not random or wholly ambiguous. Previous research
suggests that world politics is clustered in three streams, with distinctive logics: the
interstate realm, global markets, and transnational civil society. These domains are
differentially accessible and responsive to human rights appeals, with civic actors
most amenable and states most resistant to a reconstruction of existing
relationships.
Furthermore, the appeals of target groups are facilitated when markets, states, and
transnational social forces are separable rather than working in tandem (Brysk
2000a). Globalization is most positive for human rights when it enables the
exchange of information and the formation of new identities, and most negative
when it reinscribes borders and props up repressive states. Global markets, on the
24
LEA-6
2011
other hand, generate systematically contradictory effects that depend heavily on the
type of state and sector involved. Meanwhile, global civil society introduces new
norms, which sometimes become institutionalized as evolving human rights
standards, and, ultimately, objects of interstate enforcement. Recent events suggest
that a fourth realm of transnational violence may have its own patterns and effects.
We can thus begin to map the effects of different forms of globalization on

different kinds of rights (see table 1). Increased mobility provides refuge to some
but also opportunities for abusive policing and economic exploitation. Global
markets also increase economic exploitation, but may provide increased
monitoring of social and security conditions. Information facilitates campaigns for
all types of rights, as well as the formation of transnational networks and reporting
to the emergent "international human rights regime." And governance provides a
new array of enforcement tools, from intervention to law to economic sanctions.
<Place table 1 about here>
Meanwhile, these streams of globalization are unfolding at different levels of

analysis—the second key factor suggested by our approach. Rosenau's contribution
examines the human rights impact of globalization across states and concludes that
transnational flows and institutions are constructing evolving responses to "the
most obstreperous actor" (still usually a state). By contrast, Richard Falk
distinguishes globalization above and below the state, attributing threats mainly to
unaccountable transnational market forces and institutions, partly combated by the
struggles of grassroots global civil society. Donnelly introduces the missing
element of globalization through the state, which he finds highly problematic for
social rights, in ways that also reiterate the distinction between different streams of
globalization and their differential effect on rights.
These levels of analysis overlap with the streams of globalization. Global mobility
operates across and through the state, and the rights impact is generally more
positive across and more negative through—both Kristen Maher and Amalia Lucia
Cabezas suggest that policing creates more violations than migration itself. Global
markets may be across (financial flows), above (multilateral trade and financial
institutions), through (economic adjustment), or below (grassroots protests, shifts
in local production or consumption).
This is part of the problem in assessing the contradictory effects of markets on

rights (Wesley Milner's analysis is across and above, while Raul Pangalangan's is
through and below). Global information is predominantly across and below the
25
LEA-6
2011
state, hence it tends to facilitate rights unless bottlenecks develop through

(Weyker) or above (Bob) the state.
Finally, global governance appears as the paradigm of globalization from above.

But Fox explores a trilateral struggle between a multilateral institution above, a
transnational campaign below, and recalcitrant states in the middle, while Wayne
Sandholtz shows that globalization from above can partially supersede the state
level—when states have lost legitimacy across the international system. The latter
has wider implications for the study of global governance, as it suggests that the
development of global norms and institutions is actually a three- or four-level
game, not just an interstate coordination problem (Evans et al. 1993; Smith et al.
1997).
Finally, our analysis shows that the human rights impact of globalization is
filtered through the type of receiving state (Holm and Sorensen 1995). Much of the
literature on globalization has overlooked the effect of globalization on the state;
globalization has produced a new "globalized state"—changing rather than eroding
sovereignty (Ian Clark 1999).
As some scholars have argued, power is moving from weak states to strong states,
from all states to markets, and away from state authority entirely in certain
domains and functions (Strange 1998; Schmidt 2000). At the same time, the state is
the main administrator of globalization. As one partisan of globalization puts it,
globalization means that the quality of the state matters more, since the state is "the
operating system for global capitalism" (Friedman 1999: 134). Thus, the struggle
for human rights in a global era is now from above, from below—and still through
the middle.
The Globalized State as Threat
In the security sphere, states respond with increased repression to fragmentation,

transnationalized civil war, and uncontrolled global flows such as migrants and
drug trafficking. Transborder ethnic diasporas help inspire civil conflict, while the
global arms trade provides its tools. Even extreme civil conflicts where states
deteriorate into warlordism are often financed if not abetted by foreign trade:
diamonds in the Congo and Sierra Leone, cocaine in Colombia.
While nonstate actors like insurgents and paramilitaries pose increasing threats
to human rights, state response is a crucial multiplier for the effect on citizens.
Since all but the most beleaguered states possess more resources and authority than
26
LEA-6
2011
rebels, they can generally cause more damage—and human rights monitoring in a
wide variety of settings from Rwanda to Haiti attributes the bulk of abuses to state
(or state-supported) forces. States also differ in their ability and will to provide
protection from insurgent terror campaigns (like that in Algeria).
Global economic relationships can produce state policies that directly violate social
and labor rights and indirectly produce social conflict that leads to state violations
of civil and security rights. While globally induced economic adjustment may cut
state services and intensify poverty and protest, global windfalls of wealth may
also underwrite repressive and predatory states, as in Angola, where oil revenues
have fueled repression and civil war (Harden 2000). It is states that largely
determine labor rights and security response to labor dissidence; states also
regulate multinationals, certify unions, and form joint ventures with global
investors.
A-4. Globalization and the Citizenship Gap
Just as globalized states may present new threats alongside long-standing patterns
of repression, globalization offers states declining opportunities to serve as a
source of human rights protection. Increasing numbers of residents of increasing
numbers of states are less than full citizens.
Over 25 million people are international refugees, while an estimated similar

number are economic migrants—mostly undocumented and generally lacking civil
rights (Mills 1998: 97-124). Refugee camps can also become sites or sources of
human rights violations, as in Rwanda, Lebanon, Guatemala, and Indonesia.
Within many countries, internally displaced persons, rural-urban migrants, and
isolated peasants (often illiterate) are also undocumented and lack rights and civil
status. In China alone, an estimated 100 million people are unregistered domestic
migrant workers (Solinger 1995).
Many millions around the world live in occupied territories or emergency zones
where citizenship was never granted or has been suspended. A number of the states
hosting the world's 300 million indigenous people assign them special juridical
status—often tutelary—which may fall short of conventional citizenship.
Similarly, a significant number of states (especially in the Middle East)
circumscribe the rights of the female half of their populations—and personal status
codes contravene international human rights standards and sometimes directly
deny citizenship or nationality (Chinkin 1999).
27
LEA-6
2011
Analysts of globalization speak of variable levels and configurations of citizenship

within the same state, depending on the triangulation between a given sector, state
power, and transnational forces, and even regional zones of limited citizenship
(such as limitations on movement, speech, and assembly in export-processing
zones) (Ong 1999).
Meanwhile, alongside people who are not citizens, states have diminished capacity
to control the conditions of citizenship—even for those securely inscribed within
the juridical and social status. Observers of states undergoing both political and
economic liberalization decry the emergence of "delegative democracy," which is
characterized by "low-intensity citizenship" (O'Donnell 1994; Stahler-Sholk 1994).
More and more legal citizens lack effective accountability for power relationships;
their lives depend on distant investment decisions, organizational resolutions,
religious edicts, and information campaigns. "Economic liberalization is
exacerbating the gap between rich and poor within virtually all developing regions.
At the same time, other elements of globalization are increasing the inequalities of
political power and influence, as well as highlighting new dimensions of
inequality.
For one group of countries globalization is eroding the cohesion and viability of
the state" (Hurrell and Woods 1999: 1). These global forces are often translated
into local conditions in opaque ways, which deepens the gap of information,
knowledge, and control further. Since migration is the transnational flow with the
strongest claim to state control, it is interesting that Maher and Cabezas each note a
"citizenship gap" both for aliens to developed countries and citizens of developing
countries (vis-à-vis tourists).5
Types of States and the Impact of Globalization
Beyond these general trends of accelerating threats and declining opportunities, the
impact of globalization on human rights conditions differs in different types of
states. Many analyses of transnationalism suggest that the impact of global forces
on various issue-areas is filtered by domestic characteristics (Risse-Kappen 1995;
Keohane and Milner 1996)—even straightforward economic effects depend on a
state's factor endowments, economic institutions, and policies (Stewart and Berry
1999).6
One scholar outlines a general pattern of types of states with different patterns of
international interaction: premodern, Westphalian modern nation-states, and
28
LEA-6
2011
postmodern, with the former and latter departing significantly from standard
scholarly assumptions of sovereignty, anarchy, and self-help (Sorenson 2000).
We can further develop these distinctions, and the tendencies of different types of
globalizing states for human rights performance and the citizenship gap.
First, in collapsing and "failed" states such as large sectors of Africa, foreign aid
and international organizations often simultaneously prop up power vacuums and
assist victims (Ignatieff 1998). Globalization brings increased market flows and
weak intervention, but little accountability and no definitive governance. Here, the
citizenship gap is most severe, as victims lack control at the community, state, and
international level.
In second place, aspiring theocracies like Afghanistan—which make war on

women—are less a return to tradition than a reaction against foreign penetration
sustained by international identity politics. Victims lack both state citizenship and
voice in the religious/ethnic community, which engenders "private" violations.
Similarly, ethnocracies are both inspired by and reactive to international forces.
Sometimes international organizations intervene, as in Kosovo. However,
interveners, ethnocratic and emerging states, and ethnic communities all violate
rights (the way ethnic Albanians in Kosovo are now persecuting Serbs), and none
are subject to citizen accountability.
Next, the few remaining "hard states"—such as China—seem to be evolving

toward what has been labeled "market Leninism," in which centralized political
control coexists with (and indeed may depend upon) opening to global markets.
But in such states, growing international influence does seem to foster some partial
increase in transparency, the rule of law, and international cooperation—although
it has not yet produced systematic improvement in human rights. The citizenship
gap here is predominantly democratizing the state, and secondarily accessing
market pressures.
Most of Latin America, parts of Southeast Asia, and many post-Soviet states are
now "low-intensity democracies," with globalizing electoral regimes systematically
skewed by social inequalities and weak states. Residents of these areas have low-
quality citizenship and no access to the market forces that dominate their states.
Even postmodern, liberal capitalist democracies experience human rights impacts
from globalization, becoming more connected and aware but simultaneously
overloaded in state capacity to process diverse and complex issues.
29
LEA-6
2011
We too lack full control over global markets, although we are more insulated from
their effects than citizens of weak or authoritarian states. We are also more
dependent on the opportunity of the globalization of information, but thus more
vulnerable in those situations where information is a threat: as surveillance,
ideology, or terror.
A-5. Globalization, Human Rights, and the New World Order
These essays were written during 2000, before the September 11th terrorist attacks
on New York and Washington ushered in a new world order framed by renewed
security threats, directly targeting globalization, along with an international
military response. While in some ways these events go beyond the scope of issues
considered in this volume, in others they strengthen the relevance and urgency of
this analysis.
The nature of the threat, its targets and impact, and the response all indicate the
growing power of globalization as a parameter of political action. The emergence
of transnational civil networks capable of state-level crimes against humanity
depends upon the globalizing patterns of connection, communication, and even
commodification (via financial networks). It is inspired by a transnational ideology
of a radical, extremist version of Islamic fundamentalism that is largely reactive to
economic and cultural globalization, and thus targets sites and symbols of both
cosmopolitanism and hegemony.
The shattering impact of threats to globalizing flows such as air travel on the world
economy and daily life demonstrate how deeply dependent we have become on
these connections. And even the U.S.-sponsored response has gone beyond the
historical standard reaction of a great power under direct attack; it is more
internationalist, multisectoral in its treatment of areas like migration and finance,
and much more conscious of human rights issues such as laws of war, refugees,
and humanitarian assistance.
While the crisis of 2001-2002 has diminished global levels of migration and
economic exchange, it has increased flows of communication and governance. And
the new world order has not diminished the salience or fundamentally altered the
pattern of the human rights impact of any of the forms of globalization. Indeed, the
impact on human rights of the new global threat of terrorism itself largely follows
the logic suggested by this volume, with the most deleterious spillovers linked to
state-regulated migration and governance (intervention), mixed results of markets,
30
LEA-6
2011
and enduring avenues of appeal via global communications. Our second factor, the
type of state, is also relevant, as liberal democracies are most vulnerable to the new
threat, while failed states suffer disproportionately from the response.
The final element—level of analysis—matters in a new way that will require

further study, as international authorities above and through the state struggle to
respond to unaccountable forces across and below state boundaries.
The first global conflict of the new millennium marks a new phase in the
development of human rights, which should heighten our attention to the issues
examined in this volume. The persistence of human rights as a focus of legislative
and public debates on security measures in the United States and Germany, as well
as the widespread efforts to foster tolerance and support for Muslim minorities,
show that liberal human rights standards have shifted the agenda beyond those of
previous conflicts. Although such standards are not always achieved, and new
security policies sometimes do violate civil liberties, human rights norms and
networks remain legitimate and incorporated in international policymaking and the
politics of the dominant international powers.
Yet the background and supporters of the terrorists demonstrate the limitations of
liberal conceptions, and the connections between chronic denials of economic,
social, and political rights and a climate of dysfunctional political violence.
Without excusing or justifying the moral responsibility of terrorists, we must
understand the conditions that make perpetrators more likely to arise and gain
credence. The emergence of new human rights threats from the ashes of Cold War
struggles, at the haunting edges of the globalizing world economy, should remind
us to broaden our attention beyond the core conflict of each era—to consider those
at the peripheries, whose pain or pathology may well become the theme of the next
epoch. In this new world order, it is ever more urgent to deepen our understanding
of the new global threats to human rights, even beyond the normative and
cosmopolitan connections charted below—for our own survival.
Effects of globalization to human rights
The effect of globalization on state-based human rights violations will

depend on the type of state and its history. In newly democratizing countries with
weak institutions and elite-controlled economies (Russia, Latin America, and
Southeast Asia), the growth of global markets and economic flows tends to
destabilized coercive forces but increases crime, police abuse, and corruption.
31
LEA-6
2011
Global mobility and information flows generally stimulate ethnic

mobilization, which may promote self-determination in responsive states but more
often produces collective abuses in defense of dominant-group hegemony. On the
other hand, the same forces have produced slow institutional openings by less
fragmented single-party states (like China and Mexico). In much Africa,
globalization has ironically increase power vacuums, by both empowering sub-
state challengers and providing sporadic intervention, which displaces old regimes
without consolidating new ones. Some of the most horrifying abuses of all have
occurred in the transnationalized Hobbesian civil wars of Sierra Leone, Angola,
and Congo.
In general, analyst of globalization find that states international integration

improves security rights, but increases inequality and threatens the social rights of
citizens. However, neither economic development nor economic growth in and of
themselves improves law enforcement capabilities and human rights performance.
In addition to globalization and growth, findings on the effectiveness of
international pressure on state human rights policy suggest that target states must
be structurally accessible, internationally sensitive, and contain human rights
activist for linkage.
Map of the Volume
In this volume, we try to assess the impact of globalization on human rights and
the impact of human rights on globalization. The chapters cannot possibly
encompass the full range of either globalization or human rights, but they do
sample across the spectrum of threats and opportunities. Although most of the
chapters are global in focus, those that concentrate on a place or region include the
United States (Maher), Latin America (Cabezas), Asia (Pangalangan), and Africa
(Bob). Similarly, the contributors bring a variety of methodologies to bear on
common questions: theoretical deduction (Falk, Rosenau, Donnelly), cross-
national quantitative study (Milner), policy analysis (Maher, Fox, Sandholtz), and
case studies (Cabezas, Bob).
The first section, "Citizenship," analyzes the effect on rights as people cross
borders and states shift capabilities and goals. This essay has identified a broader
"citizenship gap," as globalized states introduce new threats and provide declining
opportunities to citizens, while increasing numbers of residents lack citizenship
claims. Illustrating the latter dynamic, Kristen Maher deconstructs the immigration
policy of the largest receiving nation, the United States, in relation to labor flows
from Latin America and the rights ideology of liberalism. In a complementary
32
LEA-6
2011
geography and analysis, Amalia Lucia Cabezas shows how prostitution in the
Dominican Republic is constituted by global economic adjustment and northern
tourism. However, her contribution also emphasizes both the role of the state as an
intervening actor in economic development and policing and sex workers'
transnational mobilization for labor and security rights.
In "Commodification," the book turns to the globalization of markets. Richard

Falk highlights the political impact of economic globalization, and the
contradictions between economic and political liberalism for social rights. Wesley
Milner's comprehensive study of economic liberalization establishes the
differential impact of structural integration on different types of rights. By contrast,
Raul Pangalangan documents and analyzes mobilization against the deleterious
effects of multinational labor exploitation in Asia.
"Communication" examines the influence of information flows and global civil

society on human rights. Shane Weyker provides an overview of the inherent
potential and pitfalls of the new information technologies for human rights
activists. Clifford Bob documents the power and distortions of transnational
communications and network appeals, through a comparative case study of
Nigeria's Ogoni. Both authors emphasize the social context of information and the
organizational politics of NGOs. James Rosenau applies his pioneering analysis of
global turbulence to the cosmopolitan governance of "most obstreperous actors."
The next section, "Cooperation," explores the emerging exercise of institutional

authority across borders on behalf of human rights. Jonathan Fox explores an
increasing mechanism of international accountability: transnational mobilization
against a global institution. Then, his chapter outlines the limitations of
institutional reform, seeking largely social and collective rights. Wayne Sandholtz
chronicles the emergence and limitations of a norm and practice of humanitarian
intervention—when global human rights standards trump state sovereignty.
Finally, Jack Donnelly analyzes the evolving role of state power in filtering the
impact of globalization on human rights.
Challenges of Globalization in the field of law Enforcement
In the law enforcement and security sphere, states respond with increased
repression to fragmentation, transnationalized civil war, and uncontrolled global
flows such as migrants and drug trafficking. Transborder ethnic differences help
inspire civil conflicts, while the global arms trade provides its tools. Even extreme
civil conflicts where states deteriorate into warlordism are often financed if not
33
LEA-6
2011
abetted by foreign trade diamonds in the Congo and Sierra Leone, cocaine in
Columbia. While non-state actors like insurgents and paramilitaries pose
increasing threats to human rights, state response is a crucial multiplier for the
effect on citizens.
Since all but the most beleaguered states posses more resources and authority than
rebels, they can generally cause more damage and human rights monitoring in a
wide variety of settings from Rwanda to Haiti attributes the bulk of abuses to state
(or state-supported ) forces. States also differ in their ability and will to provide
protection from insurgent terror campaigns (like that in Algeria).
Global economic relationships can produce state policies that directly violate
social and labor rights and indirectly produce social conflict that leads to state
violations of civil and security rights. While globally induced economic adjustment
may cut state services and intensify poverty and protest, global windfalls of wealth
may also underwrite repressive and predatory states, as in Angola, where oil
revenues have fueled repression and civil war (Harden 2000). It is states that
largely determine labor rights and security response to labor dissidence; states also
regulate multinationals, certify unions, and form joint ventures with global
investors.
The challenge now is on how every state pursues a strong relationship in the
area of policing these global wrongs.
A-6. Globalization and Terrorism
The nature of the threat, its target and impact, and the response all indicate
the growing power of globalization as a parameter of political action. The
emergence of transnational civil networks capable of state-level crimes against
humanity depends upon the globalizing patterns of connection, communication,
and even commodification (via financial networks). It is inspired by a transnational
ideology of radical, extremist version of Islamic fundamentalism that is largely
reactive to economic and cultural globalization, and thus target sites and symbols
of cosmopolitanism. The shattering impact of threats to globalizing flows such as
air travel on the world economy and daily life demonstrate how deeply dependent
we have become on these connections.
And even the U.S.-sponsored response against terrorism and all its form has
gone beyond the historical standard reaction of a great power under direct attack; it
34
LEA-6
2011
is more internationalists, multi-sectoral in its treatment of areas like migration and

finance, and much more conscious of human rights issues such as laws of war,
refugees, and humanitarian assistance.
B. GLOBAL THREATS AND THE POLICE
John P. Sullivan and James J. Wirtz (Global Metropolitan Policing)
Police, like the rest of society, face a changing political, technical, and economic
setting. Traditionally, urban police forces confined their activities to their
immediate local area for the simple reason that criminal activity was primarily a
local phenomenon – jurisdictions generally matched patterns of criminal activity.
As globalization and technology stimulated greater linkages among cities,
widespread connections between criminal and terrorist activity began to surface,
culminating in a new range of threats that local police had to address. One
component of this threat stream is the global Islamist jihad.
Islamist movements form a loose confederation of independent groups with

varying roles and reach. They often work in a cooperative manner among “theaters
The emergence of transnational criminal actors challenges national
law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Global criminals are involved
in traditional organized crime activities, e.g., theft, smuggling, and
dealing in all types of contraband. These criminal networks, however,
also engage in activities that can fuel domestic and international
conflicts, potentially creating threats that can undermine state actors
and existing security regimes. The tensions created by what amounts to
the “darker side” of globalization challenge existing mechanisms of
cooperation among various national police organizations.
John P. Sullivan and James J. Wirtz
of operation.” Local groups gather intelligence and targeting data and share it
across the global jihadi network. David Kilcullen believes that this movement is
best viewed as a global insurgency. Countering it, according to Kilcullen,
“demands extremely close coordination and integration between and within police,
intelligence, military, development, aid, information, and administrative agencies”
– a difficult task when undertaken at the global level.
Other observers believe that Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda is a malignant and
mutated version of the market-state – an emerging state form. Al Qaeda and its kin
are more than state-less gangs. These networked adversaries possess standing
armies, treasury and revenue sources derived from criminal enterprises, a
35
LEA-6
2011
bureaucracy or “civil” service, intelligence collection and analysis capabilities,

welfare systems, and the ability to make alliances with state and other non-state
actors.
They also promulgate law and policy for their adherents and declare war.
From this perspective, the al Qaeda network constitutes a sort of virtual state that
can control territory. Through insurgency and terrorism it seeks to influence events
and policies across the globe.
Criminal and terrorist networks thus constitute a departure from traditional
criminal activity because they are not concentrated in any one local jurisdiction.
They create a problem for everyone, but they belong to no one. Actions
taken by a few local jurisdictions or even states can deliver a setback to the
criminal network, but they cannot destroy the network because it exists outside of
their jurisdictions.
To contain and eventually destroy these international criminal and terrorist

enterprises, local and national jurisdictions have to work together in real time. The
traditional distinction between domestic and foreign threats that is common in both
the law enforcement and security studies literature seems especially inappropriate
because the external threat posed by terrorists to one state actually represents an
ongoing domestic threat to another government.
In effect, the nature of this threat creates a good deal of pressure to increase the
pace, scope, and intensity of global law enforcement activity. Without global
engagement, terrorists can always retreat to safe havens provided by unchallenged
portions of their networks.
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME V, NO. 2 (MAY 2009)
WWW.HSAJ.ORG
36
LEA-6
2011
PART II
TRANSNATIONAL CRIMES

1. Terrorism
2. Drug Trafficking
3. Money Laundering
4. Human Trafficking
5. Cyber Crimes
6. Others
Transnational crimes are crimes that have actual or potential effect across
national borders and crimes which are intra-State but which offend fundamental
values of the international community.[1] The term is commonly used in the law
enforcement and academic communities.
The word "transnational" describes crimes that are not only international (that is,
crimes that cross borders between countries), but crimes that by their nature
involve border crossings as an essential part of the criminal activity. Transnational
crimes also include crimes that take place in one country, but their consequences
significantly affect another country. Examples of transnational crimes
include: human trafficking, people smuggling, smuggling/trafficking
of goods (such as arms trafficking and drug trafficking), sex
slavery, terrorism offences,torture and apartheid. Transnational organized
crime (TOC) refers specifically to transnational crime carried out by organized
crime organizations.
Transnational Crimes may also be crimes of customary international
law or international crimes when committed in certain cricumstances. For example
they may in certain situations constitute Crimes against humanity.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transnational_crime
C. THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY
Introduction
37
LEA-6
2011
The international system that was conceived with the conclusion of the
Treaty of Westphalia has undergone significant and sweeping changes. The
classical actors in international relations consisting purely of sovereign and
independent states have been expanded to accommodate non-state actors to include
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations and multinational
corporations. Countries are no longer polarized by ideological conflicts but
economic status. The paramount objectives in their dealings with one another are
no longer confined to the advancement of national interest but include the
attainment of regional and international peace and security.
It is, however, the degree of interdependence, which is popularly referred to as the

era of globalization, characterized by rapid increase of transactions across national
borders that underwent the most notable but controversial changes. This pattern of
interconnectedness encompasses information revolution and breaking down of
national barriers to allow the free flow of all factors of production. It is also
characterized by the general tendency for many domestic problems to affect other
countries and renders inutile unilateral national solutions.
These developments in international relations are indications that the world is

gradually being transformed into what Marshall McLuhan termed as "global
village" or even a "shrinking world" by Peter Grabosky. Whether the
interdependence has reached this level or not, the fact remains that humanity stands
to savor globalization's benefits as well as adverse effects.
Transnational Crime Defined
The transnational character of many crimes, although not new, has not been
fully recognized until recently. Crime was traditionally viewed as a purely
domestic law enforcement issue and, therefore, treated and addressed as an
exclusive concern of individual states. As such transnational crime, being a new
threat to domestic and international interest and security, has yet to be baptized
with an official definition. However, there is an emerging consensus to accept the
definition of transnational crime as proposed by Bossard. He defined transnational
crime as an offense that has an international dimension and implies crossing at
least one national border before, during or after the fact.
With this working definition, we can now enumerate many crimes that satisfy the
elements of transnational crime. This includes the six major concerns of the
Philippine Center on Transnational Crime (PCTC) namely; illicit trafficking of
38
LEA-6
2011
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, money laundering, terrorism, arms

smuggling, trafficking in persons and piracy. The kidnapping of local and foreign
nationals by members of the terrorist Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in Sipadan, an
island resort of Malaysia and a cyber crime involving the spread of a love bug
virus that crippled computer softwares worldwide are clear examples of recent
crimes falling under this category. The trafficking of Filipino nationals to Italy
using Hungary and other countries as transit points and the smuggling of illegal
drugs from Mainland China to our shores are some of the frequent transnational
crime incidence encountered by Philippine authorities.
PCTC PHILIPPINE CENTER FOR TRANSNATIONAL CRIME

Mission and Function of Interpol NCB-Manila
NCB-INTERPOL Manila serves as the office and main coordinating body for
international police cooperation against transnational crimes representing all law
enforcement agencies in the Philippines. In the accomplishment of its mission,
NCB-INTERPOL Manila has the following functions.
1. Monitor and coordinate all activities of all law enforcement agencies relative
to transnational crime committed against or affecting the Philippines;
2. Maintain records and minutes of all meetings of NCB-INTERPOL Manila.
3. Operate and maintain the operation center of NCB-INTERPOL Manila as
the focal point for international cooperation against transnational crimes for
all law enforcement agencies in the Philippines; and
4. The NCB-INTERPOL Manila also functions as a sub-committee of the
NALECC for the monitoring of the sensitive activities of the latter.
Roles and Function of NCB Sub-Bureaus
1. Receives request for information and record checks of local and foreign
nationals and reply to such request.
2. Conduct investigation of cases brought to their attention involving Filipino's
and foreign nationals as requested by other Interpol member countries.
3. Monitor result of investigation for cases referred by Interpol for compliance
and feedback.
39
LEA-6
2011
4. Ensures that cases referred for action are acted upon and reports are rendered
promptly.
5. Informs Interpol Manila on any case being handled by their agency
involving foreign nationals or seek assistance for verification or any
coordination needed with other Interpol member countries based on the
Standard Message Format.
6. Maintain a list of wanted persons (local/foreign) circulated by Interpol and
inform Interpol Manila of any arrest.
7. Gives summaries of the most important international cases in which their
agency was involved; and
8. Submits periodic activity report of accomplishments to Interpol Manila
based on the Standard Message Format.
Information exchange between the Interpol General Secretariat and NCBs.
In its progress towards the goals and objectives set for the organization renewal of
INTERPOL, the organization has undergone enormous changes in recent years
notably in the stregthening of international police cooperation and in the
modernization of telecommunications.
In order for Interpol to facilitate the rapid and reliable exchange of criminal
investigative information among the police of member countries, the NCBs used
the Interpol Global Communication System (I-24/7). In technical terms, I-24/7 is a
security technology network which operates using Internet protocols and state of
the art security technology. It delivers fast, reliable and secure information in a
highly user-friendly manner permitting immediate analysis and identification.
NCBs now have easy and immediate access to criminal information (drugs,
counterfeit credit cards and fraudulently identity documents,stolen vehicles,
international notices, weapons and explosives tracking systerm, finger prints and
DNA, Stolen works of art...)
Telecommunication Network (X-400 Communication System)
One of INTERPOL's prime objective is to ensure that it's Member States have
rapid, reliable, secure and permanently available system for transmitting to each
other to the General Secretariat.
The telecommunication as network, security by encryption system. The
information to be transmitted maybe anything from typed text to images,
fingerprints to database consolations, photographs to facts files.
40
LEA-6
2011
Benefits that the Philippines Derive as Member of the INTERPOL

1. As member of the ICPO-INTERPOL we can have access to police
information on international Criminal Cases.
2. Access to International Summaries of Criminal Cases.
3. Attend meetings and symposiums on case of special topics.
4. Request information about criminal intelligence in an international
perspective through the criminal intelligence subdivision.
5. Access to information dealing with economic and financial crime in an
international level.
6. Access to information dealing with illicit drug trafficking in an international
level.
7. Recipient of reference materials on criminology, crime prevention, criminal
law and procedures, techniques used by the police etc.
8. Participate in I.C.P.O - Interpol organized trainings.
9. Receives technical assistance and support on telecommunication and
computerization.
10.Use of the IPSG to circulate information intended for International
Circulation:
a. Individual notices
b. Stolen property notices
c. Modus operandi sheets
d. Facilitating identification
e. Criminal information on intelligence
11.Receives cooperation from other NCB's in Combating International
Crimes such as:
a. Crimes against person

b. Crime against property
c. Organized crime and terrorism
d. Firearms and explosives used for criminal purposes
e. Human trafficking, exploitation of prostitution, child abuse
f. Unlawful interference with international civil aviation
g. Trafficking of precious substance (gold, diamond, etc.)
h. Currency counterfeiting and forgery
i. Identification, tracing, seizure and forfeiture of assets derived from
41
LEA-6
2011
criminal activities
j. Illicit drug trafficking
k. Drug related activities
12.Receives cooperation on matters involving extradition from other NCB's.

13.Receives technical assistance granted by the more advanced countries to less
advanced countries especially in connection with training and specialization
of police personnel.
C-1. Beyond Transnational Crime

Sharon Pickering and Jude McCulloch
During the last two decades, neoliberal globalization has resulted in significant
growth in transnational crimes such as global terrorism, trafficking in antiquities,
people and drugs, immigrant smuggling, and money laundering. Beyond being
pressing social problems, they are the consequences of a significant extension and
reconfiguration of state power on various fronts, resulting from the progressive
intersection of the internal and external coercive functions of the political state in
ways that have implicated crime control in foreign policy and merged law
enforcement with issues of national security. The dramatic political-economic,
social, and cultural transformations shaping the contemporary global environment
call for a new approach to transnational crime, one that transcends the verities of
orthodox criminology by examining the role of criminal organizations and
individuals, and that of political states and their economic partners in the
generation of transnational crime. The goal of this volume is to offer such a new
approach.
Although globalization has rendered the borders between nation-states less

significant in terms of capital and financial flows, the border has simultaneously
become an important symbol of state power, fortified against unregulated flows of
goods, money, and people. Countermeasures against transnational crime have
increasingly treated the boundaries between military and police action, domestic
and international law, and criminal justice and international relations as ever more
indistinct.
In addition, the development and deployment of preemptive countermeasures and

the application of retrospective legislation increasingly undermine the distinction
between past and present as states "colonize the future" and "rewrite the past."
42
LEA-6
2011
Border politics, border reconstruction, geographically and temporally mobile

borders, and a trend toward "a-national" sites of enforcement are the hallmarks of
state responses to transnational crime and the conditions leading to transnational
crime. Globalization's challenge to geographic and temporal borders has been
matched and reflected by challenges to the boundaries that historically marked the
limits of sovereignty, citizenship, and nation-state. In important and as yet
relatively unexamined ways, these shifts are evident in the nature of transnational
crime, and are animated through state responses to it. These issues are addressed
here.
The articles published here arise from the 2006 meeting of the Prato Group,
comprised of criminologists from New Zealand, Australia, the United Kingdom,
and the United States. The Group and these articles seek to lay a foundation for a
transnational or global criminology that begins with critical understandings of the
state, borders, and crime. We hope this edition will contribute to creating a new
space for the development of useful theories, empirical investigations, and the
formulation of constructive social policy regarding the phenomena labeled
transnational crime and those frameworks, laws, policies, and actions that are
produced in response.
The ways in which transnational crime and its countermeasures confront the
traditional borders of crime control, national security, politics, and international
relations challenge the disciplinary boundaries of orthodox criminology, which has
traditionally focused on matters internal to nation-states. Critical criminologists, in
contrast, have always understood that sociologically grounded analyses of crimes,
social harms, and wrongful acts require an engagement with and understanding of
the broadest political, economic, and social terrain. Thus, as the authors here
demonstrate, analyzing crimes and harms that occur in the transnational context--
and increasingly all contexts are transnationalized--requires close attention to the
processes of globalization and the dynamics between states, and between states and
nonstate actors, particularly the relationship between the states and corporations.
The contributors to Beyond Transnational Crime also recognize that while state
coercive powers have been increasingly globalized under the auspice of
transnational crime frameworks, rights frameworks are still often territorially
bounded, requiring enforcement from a particular place. International frameworks
related to state power and rights have developed asymmetrically, with the result
that discourses, laws, and measures related to transnational crime have
significantly eroded, undermined, and eclipsed the international human rights
frameworks that potentially limit state power and associated social harms.
43
LEA-6
2011
Orthodox, state-centered ways of labeling and responding to troublesome

transnational activities also obscure the social, political, and economic conditions
that give rise to them, relieving states of the responsibility for creating and
ameliorating these conditions, and thus creating a fertile context for blaming,
stigmatizing, and punishing victims instead.
Although transnational crime enforcement strategies are purportedly aimed at

organized criminals, these countermeasures typically miss their targets altogether.
Instead, they are responsible for generating a range of serious transnational social
harms borne disproportionately by the world's poorest and most vulnerable people,
especially refugees and "illegalized" migrants. Although neoliberal
countermeasures to transnational crime have been frequently spectacularly
unsuccessful, they have succeeded in reproducing established social divisions
based on race, class, and gender by maintaining and extending social, political, and
economic hierarchies between and within states.
Beyond Transnational Crime offers an alternative theoretical approach to

understanding both the phenomena that are currently labeled transnational crime
and state responses to them. This collection differentiates itself from orthodox,
state-centered and administrative criminologist by paying careful attention to the
conditions that produce transnational crimes and the harms that arise from state
responses, as well as, in some cases, the failure of the state to respond. By critically
analyzing the role of the state and the dynamics of power between state and
nonstate actors, the authors here foreground the ways in which crime and social
injuries in the transnational context are intimately linked to the intersection of
neoliberal globalization and renewed forms of empire and imperialism.
C-2. Specific Types of Transnational Crime

http://www.criminology.fsu.edu/transcrime/week7.htm
We began thinking about ways to categorize international and transnational crime,

with one such division being motivation. Most of the items on the transnational
crime list appear to have financial motivation. The international crimes appear to
have political, ideological, or other non-financial motivations. Obviously, this
distinction breaks down, as terrorist acts might be carried out for monetary gain or
political reasons. Certain forms of computer hacking don't seem to fit in either
44
LEA-6
2011
category, as some are done just to see if it’s possible to break through digital
security systems.
For this course, we've used financial motivation as a key, and spent weeks looking
at transnational crimes that appear to be primarily monetary in nature. This
summer we'll cover international crimes and those whose motivation are other than
financial. Included on this list are terrorism, trafficking in people, and computer
crime. Each of these could have financial elements and frequently do, but political,
social, and cultural underpinnings often motivate crimes on the above list.
1. Global Terrorism
The Terrorism Research Center provides this definition of terrorism:
Terrorism is a crime, consisting of an intentional act

of political violence to create an atmosphere of fear. Terrorists use
violence to make a political statement about a government or policy
with which they disagree. The victim may be symbolic or random,
but the act itself is always political. Acts of terrorism are
premeditated by their perpetrators and are conspiratorial in nature. It
is by generating fear the terrorist hopes to motivate the public, group
or government to make changes whereby the goals of the terrorist
might be realized.
2. Trafficking in People
This is a very broad category, encompassing everything from illegal

immigration to international prostitution, slavery, and child pornography.
The greatest motivations for the first three appear to be global economic
conditions and political unrest. People attempt to escape from politically
repressive and economically depressed societies (push factors) and head
towards ones that promise economic opportunity and political freedom (pull
factors).
The President’s Interagency Council on Women has formulated a definition

on trafficking in women and children:
Trafficking is all acts involved in the recruitment, abduction, transport,

harboring, transfer, sale or receipt of persons; within national or across
international borders; through force, coercion, fraud or deception; to place
45
LEA-6
2011
persons in situations of slavery or slavery-like conditions, forced labor or

services, such as forced prostitution or sexual services, domestic servitude,
bonded sweatshop labor or other debt bondage.
In essence, trafficking in women is the use of force and deception to

transfer women into situations of extreme exploitation. Examples of this may
include Latvian
women threatened
and forced to dance
nude in Chicago; Thai
women brought to the
US for the sex
industry, but then
forced to be virtual
sex slaves; ethnically
Korean-Chinese women held as indentured servants in the Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands; and hearing-impaired and mute Mexicans brought to the
US, enslaved, beaten, and forced to peddle trinkets in New York City.
Human trafficking is the acquisition of people by improper means such as force,

fraud or deception, with the aim of exploiting them.
Smuggling migrants involves the procurement for financial or other material
benefit of illegal entry of a person into a State of which that person is not a national
or resident.
Virtually every country in the world is affected by these crimes. The challenge for
all countries, rich and poor, is to target the criminals who exploit desperate people
and to protect and assist victims of trafficking and smuggled migrants, many of
whom endure unimaginable hardships in their bid for a better life.
3. The Internet and International Crime
Obviously, the Internet (I-way) and international crime are fundamentally

related, as the Internet backbone connects all online computer networks
worldwide to each other.
Digital crime in all forms is likely to increase dramatically in the

21st Century, as globalization of computer networks continues, accompanied
by dramatically increased access to these networks. Criminologists, criminal
justice officials, and computer security personnel need to prepare now to be
46
LEA-6
2011
able to meet this threat. However, until recently it has been difficult to even
categorize digital crime adequately so that analysts and practitioners can
discuss this phenomenon intelligently. Phrases such as computer crime,
network crime, Internet crime, and information crime have all been
employed, often times without specificity, to describe digital crime. Terms
such as hacking, cracking, freaking, spoofing, and computer terrorism have
been applied to certain types of digital crimes; again without consistent
usage.
The Webopedia offers the following definitions:
Hacker
A slang term for a computer enthusiast, i.e., a person who enjoys learning
programming languages and computer systems and can often be considered an
expert on the subject(s). Among professional programmers, depending on how
it used, the term can be either complimentary or derogatory, although it is
developing an increasingly derogatory connotation. The pejorative sense
of hacker is becoming more prominent largely because the popular press has
co-opted the term to refer to individuals who gain
unauthorized access to computer systems for the purpose of stealing and
corrupting data. Hackers, themselves, maintain that the proper term for such
individuals is cracker.

Crack
(1) To break into a computer system. The term was coined in the mid-80s
by hackers who wanted to differentiate themselves from individuals whose
sole purpose is to sneak through security systems. Whereas crackers sole aim
is to break into secure systems, hackers are more interested in gaining
knowledge about computer systems and possibly using this knowledge for
playful pranks. Although hackers still argue that there's a big difference
between what they do and what crackers do, the mass media has failed to
understand the distinction, so the two terms -- hack and crack -- are often used
interchangeably.
(2) To copy commercial software illegally by breaking (cracking) the
47
LEA-6
2011
various copy-protection and registration techniques being used.
IP spoofing
A technique used to gain unauthorized access to computers, whereby the
intruder sends messages to a computer with an IP address indicating that the
message is coming from a trusted host. To engage in IP spoofing,
a hacker must first use a variety of techniques to find an IP address of a trusted
host and then modify the packet headers so that it appears that the packets are
coming from that host.
Crime in the Digital Age by Grabosky and Smith provides much needed assistance to our
thinking about digital crime. Their categorization of electronic crimes recognizes that there are
differences between existing types of crime now being committed by digital means, and newly emerging
forms of crime impossible before the advent of networked computer systems. Overall, the authors
categorize digital crimes as follows, devoting a chapter to fleshing out examples of each:
Illegal interception of telecommunications

Electronic vandalism and terrorism
Stealing telecommunications services
Telecommunications piracy
Pornography and other offensive content
Telemarketing fraud
Electronic funds transfer crime
Electronic money laundering
Telecommunications in furtherance of criminal conspiracies
It is within this framework that we can define and apply terms such
as hacking and spoofing, so that all professionals who need to refer to these
practices can use a common frame of reference. Just to give one example, under
the heading of pornography and other offensive content fall such new forms of
harassment as flaming, mail-bombing, and spoofing the identity of another to send
libelous or defamatory information. The categories developed by Garbosky and
Smith can be modified or added to as new digital crimes emerge.
Boni and Kovacich in I-Way Robbery: Crime on the Internet focus on specific

crimes, frequently chosen targets, and methods of attack. Their book is aimed at
law enforcement professionals and computer security personnel, both currently
overwhelmed by the current amount of I-way crime.
48
LEA-6
2011
Equally important, is discussions of the laws (or the lack thereof) that apply to each
type of digital crime. Grabosky and Smith provide summaries of the laws of
Australia, the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. A number of
conclusions emerge from such comparative analysis.
(1) Many types of digital crime are prosecutable under several legal statutes
simultaneously. For example, since the Internet ultimately use phone lines to
transmit data, criminal violators can be charged with telecommunications crimes as
well as specific computer crimes.
(2) Despite the plethora of laws, most are in no way universally applicable, and
thus extremely difficult to enforce. Internet criminals are likely to use servers in
countries with the least restrictions on their activities. For example, in 1999,
American network TV signals were being digitized and “rebroadcast” using
streaming technology from a Canadian server, because copyright laws are more
difficult to enforce there.
(3) Given the difficulty of enforcing laws across jurisdictions and countries,
prevention strategies hold much greater promise in reducing digital crimes. These
include personal and organizational security policies and practices, featuring such
things as filtering software, anti-virus software, firewalls, password and encryption
tools, and biometric access technologies. Paradoxically, government officials are
equally worried about the use of these technologies by digital criminals to hide
evidence, make interception of messages impossible, and thwart law enforcement
efforts. The result has been requests for back door entry to all computer files
(clipper chips) and weaker available encryption standards. This in turn has inspired
privacy advocates to seek greater protections from government intrusions.
(4) Another avenue to stopping digital crime in the future will be the use of
international treaties to govern cyberspace. Recent efforts such as the Geneva
conference on copyright protection may help.
Other efforts the can be recommend as part of comprehensive planning in this area
include: better detection and higher reporting rates by victimized users; expanded
data collection and analysis, coordination of efforts, and specialized units within
law enforcement; harmonization of laws and expanded extradition to aid
prosecution, and stiffer penalties as deterrents.
49
LEA-6
2011
4. Drug Trafficking
Drug trafficking refers to

illegal drugs being sold and
distributed. This happens in
the United States as well as
in other countries. The main
concern with transnational
drug trafficking for the
United States is illegal
drugs being transported in
from other countries and
sold. Not only do these
illegal drugs cause crime in
the States, the sale of them also draws large amounts of money into other
countries. Because illegal drugs, such as marijuana, methamphetamines and
cocaine, are in demand in the United States, trafficking in drugs is a very common
and lucrative transnational crime. This causes drug trafficking to be extremely hard
to combat and stop. With drug trafficking comes other types of crime, such as
money laundering, illegal procession of arms or even murder.
Global heroin flows from Asian points of origin
Source: UNODC World Drug Report 2010
50
LEA-6
2011
5. Money Laundering
Money laundering refers to the process of criminals disguising the illegal origins of
their money.
Money laundering
occurs all over the
world. Criminals
who get their
money from
illegal actions,
such as
prostitution,
smuggling
or computer fraud
typically launder
their money in
order not to attract
the attention of authorities. By not attracting attention from authorities, criminals
are able to fly under the radar and continue their criminal activities, making even
more money without getting in trouble. Money laundering is done in three main
ways: disguising the source of the money -- such as disguising a prostitution ring
as a massage parlor, changing the form -- such as changing cash into a money
order, or moving the funds -- such as taking money from one large bank account
and putting it in several smaller accounts under different names.
Money-laundering is the process that disguises illegal profits without
compromising the criminals who wish to benefit from the proceeds. There are two
reasons why criminals - whether drug traffickers, corporate embezzlers or corrupt
public officials - have to launder money: the money trail is evidence of their crime
and the money itself is vulnerable to seizure and has to be protected. Regardless of
who uses the apparatus of money-laundering, the operational principles are
essentially the same. Money-laundering is a dynamic three-stage process that
requires:
 placement, moving the funds from direct association with the crime;
 layering, disguising the trail to foil pursuit; and,
 integration, making the money available to the criminal, once again, with its
occupational and geographic origins hidden from view.
These three stages are usually referred to as placement, layering and integration.
51
LEA-6
2011
Questions, Answers and Facts about Money Laundering
Q: What is money laundering and why do people do it?

A: Today, enterprise criminals of every sort, from drug traffickers to stock
fraudsters to corporate embezzlers and commodity smugglers, must
launder money for two reasons. The first is that the money trail itself can become
evidence; the second is that the money can be the target of investigation and
seizure. The operational principles of money laundering are as follows: first,
moving the funds from direct association with the crime; second, disguising the
trail to foil pursuit; and, third, making the money available to the criminal once
again with its origins hidden from view.
Q: How much money is laundered every year and how much is recovered by
law enforcement?
A: Estimates have ranged as high as $300 billion to $500 billion a year. Law
enforcement authorities recover about $500 million in a good year, roughly a
quarter of 1 per cent.
Q: What are the consequences of money laundering activities for national

economies?
A: Money laundering undermines international efforts towards free and competitive markets,
and the development of national economies:
 It distorts the functioning of markets:

money laundering transactions can
increase the demand for cash, create
exchange rate volatility and generate
unfair competition.
 It damages credibility and therefore the

stability of financial markets: bank
collapses related to organized crime
activities can have a domino effect on the
financial system of individual countries or
regions.
Small States are particularly vulnerable to
money laundering. The economic power
generated by outlaw activities provides
criminal organizations with leverage on
small economies. The absence of
52
LEA-6
2011
appropriate controls, or of the capacity to

enforce them, provides de facto impunity
to criminals.
Q: How effective are the international instruments governing money

laundering?
A: The international community is not using all the tools at its disposal. The 1988
UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances obliges States to make money laundering illegal and assist
investigations. Of the 148 signatories to the Convention, fewer than 30 are fully
implementing its measures.
Q: Is there an acceptable right to banking privacy?

A: Yes, but acceptable levels of confidentiality must be clearly defined. There are
legitimate commercial, legal or even human rights reasons for confidentiality.
However, the abuse of bank secrecy must be countered.
Q: What role does the Internet have in money laundering?

A: Internet banking is a growing source of worry. It has already been proven that
fraudulent banking business can be conducted via the Internet. For example, in one
case an Internet bank was domiciled in an offshore centre, the server was in
another country and the operational management was located in a third. When the
owners of the bank stole the depositors' funds, it was impossible to pursue them
through the three jurisdictions. Their actions were not even considered illegal in
the jurisdiction where the bank was physically located.
Q: What should the international community do?

A: The members of the international community have agreed to comply with the
existing international instruments currently governing money laundering by the
year 2003. Of particular importance is adherence to the provisions of the 1988
United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances. But the international community needs to continue to
question the way banks are defined. Should they be chartered by Governments in
order to tighten controls? How should they be regulated? Should we allow
companies to be formed in places where they have no apparent purpose connected
with normal commercial activities, or whose owners may conceal their identity?
An emphasis must be placed on systemic reforms, rather than specific tinkering
with the odd regulation. The harmonization of regulatory regimes covering
financial havens, trusts, shell companies and banks should be a main goal.
53
LEA-6
2011
Q: What can the UN Global Programme against Money Laundering (GPML)

do to help?
A: Developing countries, and those with economies in transition, are in particular
need of technical assistance and training. Local law enforcement cannot crack
down on complex financial crimes unless they know the tricks of the money
launderer. The UN Global Programme against Money Laundering is ready to
provide expert training, assistance, public awareness and research tools on the art
of financial investigations,
prosecutions, best banking practices and financial regulations for government,
business, law enforcement and judicial professionals.
To request assistance and additional information from the

UN Global Programme against Money Laundering, please contact
the United Nations directly at the following address:
UN Office on Drugs and Crime

Global Programme against Money Laundering
P.O. Box 500, A-1400 Vienna, Austria
Tel.: (43-1) 260 60 5762
Fax: (43-1) 260 60 6878
E-mail: [email protected]
Web site: http://www.imolin.org
The G-7 Economic Summit in Paris in 1989 established the Financial Action
Task Force (FATF) the purpose of which is the promotion and development of
policies to combat money-laundering. In April 1998, FATF member-states
confirmed their intention to build a strong global alliance and urged all concerned
to foster the establishment of a world-wide anti-money laundering network through
expansion of its membership, development of regional bodies and close
coordination with all relevant international organizations. It also expressed its
concerned on jurisdictions which allow excessive banking secrecy and the use of
“screen companies” for illegal purposes. It then issued the FATF 40
Recommendations on money-laundering which was revised in 1996 and referred to
as the FATF Recommendations.
THE G7: Group of Seven: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK,
USA
6. Arms Trafficking
54
LEA-6
2011
Arms’ trafficking refers to the smuggling of guns, ammunition and other weapons.
When weapons are smuggled into a country and sold illegally, buyers don't have to
have any type of license or waiting period in order to buy one. This makes it easier
for criminals who can't purchase a weapon legally to obtain one. Smuggled
weapons typically end up in the hands of criminals or people with criminal
intentions. This causes more crime to occur that could potentially be reduced if
illegal arms trafficking is reduced or eliminated. Stopping arms trafficking is
difficult because weapons have military, law enforcement and sport uses. This
makes it harder to determine if a weapon is in the country and possessed legally.
Read more: Types of Transnational Crime | eHow.com http://www.ehow.com/info
7. The Market for Human Body Parts
The first successful human transplant - a kidney - occurred in France in 1906.

More transplant attempts followed in other parts of Europe and later in the Soviet
Union. But the modern era of human transplants only began in the 1950s, and even
then transplants remained largely experimental until the mid-1970s (Patrick et al.,
1991).
Beginning in the early 1980s, however, the number of transplants began to
increase, an increase that continued to accelerate throughout the decades. For
example, of 6000 heart transplants performed worldwide by 1988, 80% had
occurred during the period 1984-1988 (Patrick et al., 1991). Graph 1 shows the
increased occurrence of human organ transplants internationally between 1978 and
1994.(4)
The most rapid increase in transplant procedures occurred in the wealthy and
technologically advanced Western countries. Nonetheless, organ transplants came
into practice in many parts of the world, rich and poor alike. By 1994, nearly
300,000 transplants (of all types) had been conducted throughout the world (see
Table 1).
Moreover, the variety of different types of transplants also "took off," especially
following the approval for general use in 1983 of the immunosuppressive drug,
cyclosporine. Kidneys, hearts, and lungs remained the organ transplants "of
choice," but other types, including multiple transplants, became more common
(see, for example, CORR, 1996).
55
LEA-6
2011
C-3. How Do We Know Anything About the Reality of Transnational

Crime?
Deductive or Inductive?
As this course focuses on the transnational crime problem as an aspect of

comparative criminology, it will be critical to reflect on what we currently know
about this phenomenon and how we know it. Only then can we discuss and
compare contemporary responses to transnational crime, and suggest new crime
control policies.
There are two ways we could approach these issues, corresponding closely to
inductive and deductive reasoning as investigative techniques. In a deductively
constructed course, the instructor would give out a list of definitions, describe the
problems to be investigated, what is currently known about each problem, etc.
In this course, we will adopt an inductive approach instead. Rather than presuming
that transnational crime can be easily defined and its extent statistically validated,
we will begin by analyzing the ways in which "knowledge" about this phenomenon
is produced and becomes "taken for granted" as part of reality. Only then, will we
attempt to define transnational crime and it global extent.
In this regard, this course will adopt a starting position variously known as social
constructionism, symbolic interactionism, labeling, or phenomenological
existentialism. Since the 1960s, a number of social scientists have focused upon
the "social construction of reality." This phrase, coined by Peter Berger and
Thomas Luckman in their book with the same title, presumes that ultimately reality
may be unknowable except as a mediated phenomenon. Similarly, in A Sociology
of the Absurd, Stanford Lyman and Marvin Scott asserted that reality is "absurd" in
the sense that it is unfathomable. However, Lyman and Scott also recognized that
to accept reality as absurd ran counter to most people's common sense
understanding of the world in which they live. Most people (except for the insane
and some existential philosophers) assume that "reality" is indeed knowable. But,
how do we know it? How do we come to the conclusion that we have grasped the
essence of reality?
56
LEA-6
2011
Components of Reality
Reality as a mediated experience is different for each individual. This was pointed
out by Aaron Cicourel in his book Cognitive Sociology. Yet, we remain able to
converse intelligently with others because of shared understandings. Durkheim identified these
features of collective life as "social facts." Reality is in turn mediated to each individual, and
these images are internalized and accepted as fact. Components of an individual's interpretation
of reality include a combination of the following:
Experience
Socialization
Mass Media
Academic Studies
Experience
Obviously, some of the knowledge of reality we possess is based on experience.

Some even go so far as to claim that experience is the only basis for understanding
reality clearly. I have witnessed this in classes when students who work in the
criminal justice system caution others about presuming they know something about
policing, the courts, or corrections when they have never been a police or
corrections officer. Unfortunately, most people will never have the opportunity to
be police officers or even to take part in ride-along programs or jail tours.
However, every citizen in this society has an opinion about police and prisons; and
their thoughts form part of their understanding of reality. People in everyday life
claim to know about many things they have never experienced themselves. While
few have ever been to Antarctica, most could describe it.
What types of personal experiences do citizens have with the criminal justice
system? For most people the only personal experiences they have with police are in
situations such as traffic stops or crowd control at sports contests. If citizens have
had "negative experiences" during these interactions, they may harbor an overall
negative image of police. The major benefit of community-oriented
policing, school resource officers, and programs such as DARE may be that these
programs offer people positive experiences with police officers. This may in turn
change attitudes toward law enforcement.
Most citizens have no experience at all with transnational crime, though some may
have been willing consumers of illegal products such as drugs or imported
bootlegged CDs. So, if experience has so little to do with what we know about
57
LEA-6
2011
crime and justice, how do people come to their understandings of the nature of
such things?
Socialization
The traditional answer given by sociologists is that reality is produced as a by

product of the socialization process. Individuals interact with others and internalize
their experiences and conversations. As children, we come to understand the
world around us because it is mediated for us by parents, teachers, siblings and
peers. As we grow older we continue to rely on personal experiences and the
experiences of others.
The experiences of others and their retelling can be important in shaping a person's
view of reality, and in some cases the reality shared by any entire community. For
example, while not all black males have had a "bad experience" during a police
stop, enough have that the accounts of such experiences are ubiquitous in the black
community and a pervasive fear/dislike of the police may exist as a result. When
black celebrities like Joe Morgan, ex-baseball player, or Blair Underwood, actor on
L.A. Law, discussed for the national media how they were stopped while driving
expensive cars in upper middle class neighborhoods, a logical conclusion was that
minorities continue to harassed by the police needlessly. The Mark Furman
tapes introduced during the O. J. Simpson trial only added to what minorities
"already know" is true. While a number of police department spokespersons
appeared in the media to claim that Furman was an aberration among police
officers, most minority members continued to think otherwise.
However, as with personal experience, the accounts of others and their

internalization as part of socialization may provide little data about topics relevant
to this course. Most have not directly been victimized by transnational crimes,
though those with networked computers are more and more frequently under direct
attack by global computer viruses and worms. In a recent HBO docudrama, The
Corner, victims of drug addiction in urban Baltimore appeared to have no
conception that they were caught up in international drug trafficking patterns.
Mass Media
Certainly the media plays a very important part in constructing reality for us within
our technological society because of its ability to provide images of experiences
most people are unlikely to have (like going to Antarctica; or being arrested, going
to jail, being a criminal defendant, or being sentenced to prison). When considering
58
LEA-6
2011
things few of us experience directly, media images must of necessity play a very
important part. Graber's study of news sources found that mass media was credited
with providing 95% of the information the public receives about crime.
Almost all of us have watched movies and documentaries about transnational

crime. From James Bond type efforts to stop global terrorism to drug trafficking
films like The French Connection to the latest escapades of The
Sopranos, international crime and efforts to stop it are frequently depicted. Are
these depictions in any way based in reality? Or do they mostly just reference other
media images, like earlier movies?
News stories about transnational crime appear almost every night on network TV
news. A quick search of the Vanderbilt TV News Archive reveals a multitude of
related stories. As the number of television news sources has increased, so has the
number of stories about international crime.
How citizens are affected by this steady dose of global crime stories?
One model, cultivation theory, was put forward by George Gerbner at the
Annenberg School of Communications. He believes that the typical heavy viewer
of such programming is likely also to be isolated and atomized, thus highly
influenceable by the media. The result of a heavy diet of media violence is that
people perceive our society as a mean, scary, and dangerous place when it is not.
The unintended consequence of media violence is that citizens respond by overly

supporting conservative crime control agendas (e.g. electing legislators who run on
platforms that they will be tough on crime, supporting laws that toughen criminal
penalties, etc.) The ultimate result has been the massive buildup of our jails and
prisons. Gerbner compared heavy viewers to light viewers, saying heavy viewers
showed greater fear responses. Senior citizens trap themselves in their own homes
and watch a steady diet of murder and mayhem on the evening news. Other
researchers disagree with Gerbner's hypothesis that the media creates the fear
response in viewers and have criticized his methodology. (see Chandler below)
The Internet has emerged over the last 10 years as a major sources of information
on all topics, including transnational crime. However, a new problem emerges as to
how to sort out the importance of the materials found there. Everything from
online editions of newspapers to government and United Nations reports to the
private postings of crime victims is available. We'll look at ways to analyze the
59
LEA-6
2011
value of Internet materials as sources of information about transnational crime and

criminal justice.
Academic Study
The academic study of transnational crime is still in its infancy, particularly when
compared to other criminological concerns. For example, there are no textbooks in
this area that give an overview of all types of transnational crime and how various
countries are attempting to deal with it. This course should contribute to a better
overall understanding of this topic.
However, there are a number of important issues that need to be discussed in

relation to the academic study of transnational crimes. These include:
1. Why have certain negative behaviors been focused upon (e.g. drug
trafficking) while others (global pollution) not been treated as serious crime
issues?
2. Can crime statistics compiled by different countries even be compared?
3. What are we to make of the fact that not all countries have laws
criminalizing the negative behaviors we are discussing? For example, money
laundering is not universally a crime.
4. How do we account for the major differences in policy in regards to

preventing and deterring these type crimes? The United States has been
employing imprisonment of both dealers and users as the solution to drug
trafficking; in Holland you can purchase marijuana in cafes.
PART III
Selected Police Models
D- I. Japan Police System

D-2. Singapore Police System
D-3. Police System of Other ASEAN Countries
D-4. Australian Federal Police
D-5. US and other European Models
60
LEA-6
2011
D-6. Programs of Select Police Models

D-7. Application to the Philippine Setting
D -1. JAPAN POLICE SYSTEM
Description of the Japanese Police Organization
1. Responsibilities
Police responsibilities under the Police Act include “protecting life, person
and property; preventing, suppressing and investigating crimes;
apprehending suspects; traffic enforcement; and, maintaining public safety
and order."
The Code of Criminal Procedure states that “when a judicial police official deems
an offense has been committed, he shall investigate the offender and evidence
thereof.” Accordingly, the police are empowered to investigate not only penal code
offenses but also all illegal acts punishable under Japan’s judicial system. Most
cases are investigated by the police and referred to the public prosecutor’s office
for prosecution. While public prosecutors are also empowered to conduct
investigations, their investigations are generally supplementary. The primary duty
of the public prosecutor is to determine case dispositions and prosecute defendants.
Several other authorities such as the Japan Coast Guard and the Narcotics Control
Department retain investigative powers. Their investigations are generally limited
in scope, as authorized by act, and the number of cases is small.
61
LEA-6
2011
Besides criminal investigations, the police perform many administrative activities

to maintain public safety and order applying various acts such as the Road Traffic
Act and the Anti-Boryokudan Act.
The police also conduct a wide variety of activities and maintain close contact
with local communities to:
・Prevent crimes;
・Handle lost and found articles;
・Give guidance to juveniles;
・Help people in times of disaster;
・Take care of lost children and runaways; and,
・Provide counseling services to help citizens solve their problems.
2. History
In 1872, the government sent the first Superintendent General Toshiyoshi

KAWAJI to Europe to research the police system. He returned the following year
and in 1874 established the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department in the Ministry
of the Interior. This was the first modern police agency in Japan. The police system
was based on a National Police system.
In the process of the democratization of Japan after World War 􁶘the old Police
Act, enforced in 1948, had incorporated the system of public safety Commission
into the police and had created a structure consisting of national and municipal
police with the aim of ensuring democratic management and decentralization of
police power.
The old Police Act had an epochal significance in that it had aimed at
democratizing the police. However, it had institutional shortcomings such as the
existence of a multitude of municipal police forces in parallel with the National
Rural Police. This caused several problems.
With a view to retaining the good features of the old act and remedying its
institutional shortcomings, the old Police Act was amended in its entirety into the
present act in 1954. Under the present Police Act, the National Police Agency was
established and the present police system started.
62
LEA-6
2011
3. Organization
The Police Act empowers the national government to establish a central police
organization to control and supervise prefectural police organizations on matters of
national concern. The act also gives each prefecture the authority to carry out
police duties to “protect life, person and property” and “maintain public safety and
order” within its prefectural jurisdiction. At both the national and prefectural
levels, public safety commissions have administrative supervision over the police.
A. National Police Organization
The National Public Safety Commission and the National Police Agency constitute
Japan’s national police organization.
(1) National Public Safety Commission
After the World War 􁶘, the

public safety commission system
was introduced under the process
of police reform. The main object
of introduction of this system is
to ensure the democratic
administration and political
neutrality of police under the
administrative supervision by the
commission which consists of
people with good sense.
The National Public Safety Commission exercises administrative supervision

over the National Police Agency. While the Commission is under the jurisdiction
of the Prime Minister, the Prime Minister is not empowered to exercise direct
command or control. This ensures the Commission’s independence and its political
neutrality.
63
LEA-6
2011
The Commission formulates basic policies and regulations, coordinates police

administration on matters of national concern and authorizes general standards for
training, communication, criminal identification, criminal statistics and equipment.
The Commission appoints the National Police Agency’s Commissioner General

and senior officials of prefectural police organizations. The Commission indirectly
supervises prefectural police organizations through the National Police Agency.
The Commission consists of a chairman and five members. To make the cabinet’s
responsibility for the public safety clear, the chairman is a state minister who
presides over Commission meetings. Members, who serve five-year term, are
appointed by the Prime Minister with the consent of both houses of the Diet. They
must be persons who have not served as police or prosecutorial officials for the last
five years. To ensure political neutrality, no more than two members may belong to
the same political party.
To fulfill its duty, the commission holds a regular meeting once a week, and if
necessary, holds additional meetings.
(2) National Police Agency
(a) Organization and Authority
The NPA is headed by a Commissioner General who is appointed or dismissed by

the Commission with the approval of the Prime Minister. The Commissioner
General, under the administrative supervision of the Commission, administers the
agency’s operations, appoints and dismisses agency employees and supervises and
controls prefectural police organizations within the agency’s defined duties.
The NPA duties include:
・Planning and research on police systems;

・National police budget;
・Review of national policies on police;
・Police operations in time of large scale disasters and disturbances;
・Formulation and implementation of plans for emergency situations;
・Measures against trans-prefectural organized crime;
・Traffic regulation on national highways;
・International criminal investigation assistance;
64
LEA-6
2011
・Operation of the Imperial Guard;

・International emergency relief activities;
・Police training;
・Police communications;
・Criminal identification
・Criminal statistics;
・Police equipment;
・Standards of recruitment, duties and activities of police personnel;
・Coordination of police administration; and,
・Inspection.
(b) Organizations Attached to the National Police Agency

NPA-attached
organizations
include the
National Police
Academy, the
National Research
Institute of Police
Science and the
Imperial Guard
Headquarters.
The National Police Academy provides training to senior police officers and
carries out academic research. I t has nine t raining departments, including
65
LEA-6
2011
Community Safety, Criminal Investigation, Traffic and Security Training

Departments. Experts in each department serve as instructors or researchers.
Academy sub-units that provide advanced and expert training and conduct research
are: the Highest Training Institute for Investigation Leaders, the Research and
Training Center for International Criminal Investigation and Police Cooperation,
the Police Policy Research Center, the Police Info-Communications
Research Center, the Police Info-Communication Academy, and the Research and
Training Center for Financial Crime Investigation.
The National Research Institute of Police Science conducts research in forensic

science and applies the results of such research in the examination and
identification of evidence collected during police investigations. It also conducts
juvenile crime prevention and traffic accident research. The Institute’s seven
departments are: General Affairs; First, Second, Third and Fourth Forensic
Science; Criminology and Behavioral Sciences; and, Traffic. The Imperial Guard
Headquarters provides escorts for the Emperor, Empress, Crown Prince and other
Imperial Family members. It is also responsible for the security of the Imperial
Palace and other Imperial facilities. It consists of the Imperial Police
Administration, the Imperial Security and the Imperial Escort departments.
(c) Regional Police Bureaus
66
LEA-6
2011
Regional
Police
Bureaus
(RPB) are
subordinate
to the NPA.
There are
seven RPBs
nationwide.
They are
located in
major cities
of each
geographic
region.
Tokyo
Metropolitan
Police
Department
and
Hokkaido
Prefectural Police Headquarters are excluded from the jurisdiction of RPBs.
67
LEA-6
2011
Headed by a Director General, each RPB exercises necessary control and

supervision over and provides support services to prefectural police within its
jurisdiction, under the authority and orders of NPA’s Commissioner General.
Attached to each RPB is a Regional Police School that provides police personnel
with education and training required of staff officers as well as other necessary
education and training.
B.
Prefectural Police Organization
The Police Act requires that each prefectural government has its own police
organization to carry out police duties within its jurisdiction. The prefectural public
68
LEA-6
2011
safety commission and prefectural police headquarters constitute the police

organization.
(1) Prefectural Public Safety Commissions
Prefectural Public Safety Commissions (PPSC) are under the jurisdiction of elected
prefectural governors.
PPSC exercise administrative supervision over the prefectural police by
formulating basic policies and regulations for police operations. They are also
authorized to issue administrative licenses for amusement businesses, firearm
possession and driving permits; however, neither PPSC nor prefectural governors
nor elected assemblies may supervise individual cases or specific law enforcement
activities of the prefectural police.
Large PPSC have five members, while others have three. Members are appointed
from those who have not served as a police or prosecutorial official within five
years of appointment by the prefectural governor with prefectural assembly’s
consent and serve a three-year term. The members then elect their chairman among
them. A majority of the PPSC members may not belong to the same political party.
(b) Police Stations, Police Boxes and Residential Police Boxes
The MPD and the PPH divide their territory into districts, each under the
jurisdiction of a police station headed by a station chief. As operational units at the
front lines, police stations perform their duties in close contact with the local
community. Police boxes (Koban) and residential police boxes (Chuzaisho) are
subordinate units of police stations and are located in sub-districts of the station.
They are the focal points of community police activities and serve as the
“Community Safety Center” for local residents.
They play the leading role in the maintenance of the safety of local communities
through links with the people and local government bodies. To permit them to
successfully fulfill this role, Japanese police strive to provide them with the
infrastructure they require.
(c) Relations among Prefectural Police Organizations
Although each PPH (including MPD) is independent, when large scale incidents
occur within a single prefecture or crimes cross prefectural borders, other
prefectural police forces and the NPA render assistance when requested. In
69
LEA-6
2011
addition, PPH can extend their authority (generally up to 15 km beyond its border)
to cope with incidents occurring on or near prefectural boundaries. A PPH can also
exercise its authority in other prefectures to such an extent as necessary for
protecting the life, persons and property of the prefecture’s residents and
maintaining the public safety of the prefecture.
4. Human Resources
A. Authorized Strength
The National Police Agency (NPA) and prefectural police are staffed with police
officers and Imperial guards, clerical and technical officials, and other necessary
personnel. As of 2009, the total strength reached approximately 290,600 personnel.
The NPA total is about 7,700: 1,900 police officers, 900 Imperial guards and 4,900
civilians. Prefectural police total is about 283,000: 254,300 police officers and
28,700 civilians. Nationwide, there are about 14,200 female police officers and
about 11,800 female civilians.
Female police officers are expected to play a greater role in various fields of police
activities. Their characteristics and competence are indispensable for the
improvement and promotion of assistance to the victims of crime, especially to the
victims of sex crimes, and to cope with newly emerging threats, such as stalking,
domestic violence and child abuse. The police, therefore, are making every effort
to promote measures to improve the working environment for female police
officers, including the introduction of a babysitter system in contract with private
enterprises, etc.
B. Rank
70
LEA-6
2011
Police officers are divided into nine ranks:

1. Superintendent General,
2. Superintendent supervisor,
3. Chief Superintendent,
4. Senior superintendent,
5. Superintendent,
6. Police inspector,
7. Assistant police inspector,
8. Police sergeant and
9. Police Officer.
The NPA Commissioner General holds the highest

position of the Japanese police. His title is not a rank but
rather denotes his position as head of the NPA. On the
other hand, the MPD Superintendent General represents
not only the highest rank in the system but also assignment
as head of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department. In
order to integrate and coordinate the prefectural police,
prefectural police officers who hold the rank of senior
superintendent or above are national government
employees. At present, 623 senior superintendents and
above are assigned to prefectural police.
C. Promotion
The police promotion process differs according to rank.

Promotion up to police inspector is based on written
examination and professional accomplishment. In each
case, however, knowledge, skill and experience are taken
into consideration. Promotion to superintendent or above is
based on an evaluation of ability, experience and work
record.
D. Pay and Welfare
71
LEA-6
2011
Because police work is inherently dangerous, police officers are paid under a
special pay scale. Their initial salary in the case of high school graduates, who
engage in dangerous or difficult duties, such as criminal investigation, traffic
control and vehicle patrols, is, on average, approximately 15% higher than that of
administrative service personnel. Police officers are also paid special allowances.
E. Recruitment
Recruitment procedures of NPA police officers differ from those of the Prefectural
Police Headquarters.
The NPA recruits from those who have passed the National Public Service
Examinations conducted by the National Personnel
Authority. These officers are assigned either to the
NPA or the PPH as key members.
PPH applicants are administered an exhaustive

written examination by prefectural personnel
authorities in cooperation with the PPH. In 2008,
nationwide, about 110,300 persons took the
examination; about 14,500 passed. Different
examinations are given in accordance with the
applicant’s educational background, high school or
university graduates, and each is recruited
separately.
PPH interviews those who pass the written

examination and final selections are made based on
an assessment of an applicant’s ability and
adaptability to the rigor of police duties. University
graduates account for about 65% of the successful
applicants.
F. Educational Training
(1) Educational Training for New Recruits
Newly recruited prefectural police officers undergo

an initial training program consisting of pre-service
72
LEA-6
2011
training course, on-the-job training, pre-service progress course, and the actual
exercise course.
Educated training for high school graduates is 21 months (15 months for university
graduates).
High school graduates first attend a ten-month pre-service training course at the
prefectural police school (6 months for university graduates). During the course,
they acquire basic community policing knowledge and skills.
After graduation, they are assigned to a police station for 3 months of on-the-job
training under instruction of a senior officer.
Then, they return to the police school for a three-month progress educational
training program to cultivate character, improve professional legal knowledge and
hone their understanding and skills in community policing (2 months for university
graduates).
Thereafter, they are assigned to a police station, where they perform their actual
duties for 5 months in the police box, receiving instruction by a senior officer (4
months for university graduates).
(2) Educational Training upon Promotion and

Higher Level Training
When promoted, police officers receive educational training suited for their new
rank.
Newly promoted police sergeants and assistant police inspectors receive

educational training to acquire the knowledge and skills to perform their new
duties at a regional police school. (6 week course for police sergeants, 8 week
course for assistant police inspectors)
Additionally those who promoted to police inspectors enter the National Police
Academy in Tokyo for a four-month educational training program to develop
management skills, leadership, and practical abilities to serve as the section chief
of a police station.
73
LEA-6
2011
The National Police Academy also provides educational training for

superintendents designated for assignments as the chief of a police station. This is
the highest-level educational training course available for police officers.
As the affiliated organizations of the National Police Academy, the Highest

Training Institute for Investigation Leaders trains police inspectors and above in
leadership, management skills, advanced techniques and technologies concerning
criminal investigation, and the Research and Training Center for International
Criminal Investigation and Police Cooperation provides both foreign language
training for Japanese police officers and training course for police officers from
other countries.
(3) Martial Arts
When police officers are attacked or resisted by suspects, they must be able to
control the situation and apprehend the suspects with minimum force. For that
reason, police officers are required to attain a high level of skill in judo, kendo,
arrest techniques and shooting. Due to their proficiency in martial arts and
shooting, Japanese police officers often achieve outstanding records in domestic
and international competitions.
74
LEA-6
2011
Current State of “Dial 110"
The number of “Dial 110” calls has increased annually. In 2008 the police received
about ９million calls nationwide, almost 1.3times more calls than a decade ago.
This means that on any given day the CCC receives a call about every 3.5 seconds.
(Refer to Police Info Communications on page 35 about Communications
Command System.)
INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION
1. Technical Assistance
A. Policy Initiatives for Promoting International Cooperation
Police Administration, the traffic control system, Koban system, method of

criminal investigation, criminal identification techniques etc., as developed by the
Japanese police are of great interest to nations throughout the world. We frequently
have requests for technical cooperation, primarily from developing countries.
75
LEA-6
2011
The aim of international police cooperation is to contribute to the development and

progress of relevant countries, especially to improve their ability to counter crime
and terrorism.
Promoting international cooperation by using the experience and knowledge of

Japanese police is expected to contribute not only to the international community,
but also to the security of Japan. To accomplish this, we have established “Policy
Initiatives for Promoting International Cooperation” in September 2005 to clarify
the principles of international police cooperation as well as the directions and
measures to be implemented.
International cooperation by the Japanese police, contributing to the achievement

of good governance and to the improvement of the capability of a country to
counter organized criminal activity (capacity building), has been of great value to
relevant countries. The Japanese police, as an arm of the government, are expected
to make the most of their achievements and experience and to actively promote
further international cooperation.
B. International Seminar on Police Activity
Japanese Police promotes police technical cooperation by convening international

seminars and inviting police officers from developing countries. These
cooperation are done by joint hosting Japanese police and JICA, Japan
International Cooperation Agency, or independently by Japanese police.
C. Dispatches of Experts
Technical cooperation to developing countries is operated by invitation of police

officers from counterpart countries and dispatch of experts to the countries. In
2009, a total of 16 long-term experts and 27 short-term experts were dispatched to
transfer technology and skill on criminal identification, drug enforcement, Koban
system, information communication and etc. to Indonesia, Philippines, Brazil,
Thailand and others.
76
LEA-6
2011
D-2. Singapore Police Force

SPF Organization Structure (With effect from 1 April 2011)
Staff Departments
Administration & Police National Service
Finance Department Department
International Police Technology
Cooperation Department
Department
Manpower Department Public Affairs Department
Operations Department Security Industry
Regulatory Department
Planning and Volunteer Special
Organisation Constabulary
Department
Police Logistics Service Development &
Department Inspectorate Department
Specialist Staff Departments
Commercial Affairs Police Intelligence
Department Department
Criminal Investigation
Department
Specialist and Line Units
Airport Police Division Police Coast Guard
Gurkha Contingent Public Transport Security
Command
77
LEA-6
2011
Six Land Divisions Security Command

Ang Mo Kio Police Special Operations
Division Command
Bedok Police Division Traffic Police
Central Police Training Command
Division
Clementi Police
Division
Jurong Police
Division
Tanglin Police
Division
The Singapore Police Force (Abbreviation: SPF; Chinese: 新加坡警察部队 ;

Malay:Pasukan Polis Singapura; Tamil: சிங்கப்பூர் காவல் துறை) is the
main agency tasked with maintaining law and order in the city-state.[1] Formerly
known as the Republic of Singapore Police (Abbreviation: RSP; Malay: Polis
Republik Singapura), it has grown from an 11-man organization to a 38,587
strong force. It enjoys a relatively positive public image, and is credited for helping
to arrest Singapore's civic unrests and lawlessness in its early years, and
maintaining the low crime rate today despite having a smaller police-citizen ratio
compared to other major cities. Singapore has been ranked consistently in the top
five positions in the Global Competitiveness Report in terms of its reliability of
police services.
The organization structure of the SPF is split between the staff and line functions,
roughly modeled after the military.[6] There are currently 15 staff departments and
13 line units. The headquarters is located in a block at New Phoenix Park
in Novena, adjacent to a twin block occupied by the Ministry of Home Affairs.
Early years
The Singapore Police Force has a heritage almost as old as that of modern
Singapore, having been formed in 1819 with a skeleton force of 11 men under the
command of Francis James Bernard, son-in-law of William Farquhar, and kept in
operation with a monthly budget of $300. Manpower constraints meant that the
78
LEA-6
2011
men had to perform a wide range of roles, and required the help of headmen
amongst the various ethnic communities to maintain orderliness on the streets, all
the more possible as the communities lived in segregated areas around the city.
This partnership with the community was in line with Sir Stamford Raffles' vision
of a thriving colony largely self-regulated by local social structures, with the
British masters administrating it via indirect rule. The large influx of migrants from
China, however, began to test this system when the hands-off approach by the
British allowed secret societies in Singapore to thrive. Although originally formed
with legal intentions of community bonding and the provision of assistance to
fellow migrants, these societies gradually became influential, competitive, and
increasingly engaged in illegal activity including monetary extortion from the
masses, the operation of gamblingdens, and the smuggling of illegal goods on top
of more legal commercial operations to meet their financial needs.
Competition gradually heated up between large rival factions, such as that between
the largerGhee Hin Kongsi, the Ghee Hock Kongsi and the Hai San Kongsi.
Murders, mass riots, kidnappings, arson and other serious crimes became
commonplace in the next four decades since the colony's founding. Faced with
violent acts of crime which may involve thousands, such as the funeral
riots of 1846 involving 9,000 members from the Ghee Hin and Ghee Hock secret
societies, the police force was woefully incapable of bringing the situation under
control, and often had to call in the army for assistance. The escalating number of
serious crimes prompted the need for stronger legislation to deter would-be
criminals. Singapore's first executions were thus held in the wake of the first
criminal session in June 1828, when a Chinese and Indian were found guilty and
convicted for murder.
Headed by Europeans and predominantly staffed by Malay and Indian officers, the
force had little Chinese representation as the military and policing professionals
were traditionally shunned by the Chinese community, which therefore impaired
policing efforts amongst the large Chinese populace. In 1843, the force comprised
a sitting magistrate doubling up as a superintendent, three European constables and
an assistant native constable, 14 officers and 110 policemen. With a total strength
of no more than 150 men, the police was compelled to avoid direct intervention in
these mass acts of violence, else risking almost total annihilation.
79
LEA-6
2011
A repeat of this scenario occurred in 1851, when lingering displeasure

against Roman Catholic ethnic Chinese erupted into major rioting leaving over 500
Chinese dead. The army was called in again, although it involved having to induct
Indian convicts into military service almost overnight. In 1854, twelve consecutive
days of violence sparked by a dispute between the Hokkiens and Teochews
disrupted trade. This particular incident led to the formation of the
military's Singapore Rifle Corps on 8 July 1854, the earliest predecessor of
the Singapore Armed Forces' People's Defence Force today.
Criminal violence was not merely in the domain of the ethnic Chinese, however.
Rivalries between Malay princes and communities also often result in acts of
violence, which prompted the passing of Singapore's first arms law in
March 1823 restricting the right to bear arms to 24 of the Malay Sultan's followers.
Nearly two centuries later, these anti-arms laws continue to be strictly enforced,
resulting in a society relatively free from firearms-related criminal offences.
Regulars
Regulars, or uniformed, full-time officers, constitute about 20% of the police's total
workforce and number approximately 8,000 in strength. Basic entry requirements
for police officers include normal fitness levels, good eyesight, and at least five
passes in the GCE Ordinary level or a NITEC from the Institute of Technical
Education, although those with lower qualifications may still be considered.
[13]
Those joining the senior police officers require a basic degree from a recognized
university.[14] Alternatively, police officers from the junior ranks may also be
considered for promotion into the senior ranks. [15] Officers serving in the force as
national servicemen are also regularly considered for absorption into the regular
scheme. Basic training for all officers are conducted at the Home Team
Academy, under the purview of the Police Training Command. It takes about six
months[16] and nine months[17] to train a new police officer and senior police officer
respectively.
As is the case with many other civil service positions in Singapore, the salaries of
police officers are reviewed in accordance to market rates. Salaries are kept
competitive as part of anti-corruption measures. Gross starting salaries for police
officers may range from S$1,559.43 to $2,186.90,[18] and that of senior police
officers from S$2,650.00 to S$3,889.00,[19] depending on entry qualifications and
National Service.
80
LEA-6
2011
Police officers commence their careers as Sergeants (Full GCE 'A' level or
Diploma holders) or Corporals (other qualifications),[18] while senior police officers
start as either Assistant Superintendent of Police (2nd Upper Honors Degree and
above) or Inspectors (2nd Lower Honors degree and lower).[19] Reviews of an
officer's performance for promotion consideration are conducted annually.
Interviews conducted for promotion to certain ranks were phased out since 1995. It
takes approximately five years for a police officer to be promoted to the next rank,
although the system allows for accelerated promotion for outstanding officers.
While joining the force as a career is generally considered a respectable decision in

contemporary Singapore,[20] support from the ethnic Malay community has been
traditionally stronger due to less social stigma attached to the profession.
Traditionally, Chinese culture has eschewed careers in uniformed positions,
resulting in a force dominated by non-Chinese officers for most of the force's early
history. National servicemen also contribute a higher proportion of ethnic Malays
in the force. The current ethnic profile of the force continues to have a significantly
higher proportion of ethnic minorities compared to the national ethnic profile,
although such an outcome is related to operational demands: police resources are
typically deployed with a diverse ethnic mix to decrease communication problems
while attending to incidents in ethnically-diverse Singapore.
Competition in the employment market, usually heating up during economic boom
times, occasionally depressed the number of police recruits as well as its existing
ranks. A series of major incidents in 2008 affecting agencies of the Home Affairs
Ministry has led to the ministry conducting a study which concluded that there is a
shortage of officers, resulting in officers being "overstretched, strained and
overstressed".[12]
In the police force, it was admitted that the recruitment and retention of non-
graduate police officers has been "adversely affected by the tighter labor market",
with resignation rates increasing by 50% between 2004 and 2007. Recruitment
figures, while remaining relatively stable, has been unable to "address the higher
demands placed on the Force".[21] Various measures were thus taken in response,
including an increase in starting salaries, sign-on bonuses for senior police officers,
and retention bonuses of up to S$30,000 for non-graduate police officers in a bid to
81
LEA-6
2011
encourage them to stay for at least eight years, [22] over the five years where many
leave at the end of their service bonds.
Police national servicemen
While national service was introduced in 1967 in Singapore, it was solely geared
towards the building up of the Singapore Armed Forces. There was little urgency
in the police force to increase its manpower strength until the Laju incident in 1974
demonstrated the need for additional trained reserve officers who can be called up
at short notice in the event of an emergency. National service was thus extended to
the Singapore Police Force in 1975, with the primary aim of guarding key
installations and to act as a reserve unit. Subsequent expansion of the scheme,
changing security needs, and the trend in outsourcing installation protection (such
as to the Auxiliary Police Forces) has expanded their role to more functions, which
may range from administration, investigation to front-line policing alongside their
regular counterparts.
Volunteers
Main article: Volunteer Special Constabulary
Formed in 1946, The Volunteer Special Constabulary (VSC) is an important
component of the Singapore Police Force, contributing more than fifty years of
volunteer service to the nation.
The VSC is composed of volunteers from all walks of life in Singapore, from
businessmen to blue-collar executives to even bus captains, bonded with the same
aspiration to serve the nation by complementing the Singapore Police Force. They
are vested with equal powers of a police officer to enforce law and order in
Singapore. VSC Officers don the same police uniform and patrol the streets,
participate in anti-drug operations and sometimes even high-speed sea chases.
Previously headquartered at the Eu Tong Sen Street Police Station and Toa Payoh
Police Station, it relocated to the new Police Cantonment Complex in year 2000.
Civilian staff
Civilian staff in the Police Force are deployed in areas such as technology,
logistics, human resource and administrative and finance services as well as
planning and intelligence. The civilian staff schemes falls under the general civil
service schemes managed by the Public Service Division. These schemes include:
82
LEA-6
2011
Management Executive Scheme(MX) for degree holders

Home Affairs Senior Executive (HASE)
Corporate Support Scheme (CS) for diploma and below
Technical Support Officer
Corporate Support Officer
The civilization of non-core police functions have accelerated over the years in
order to free up additional manpower for redeployment into Police Divisions.
Other changes include the deployment of contract staff through organizations such
as Ministry of Finance's VITAL.org for administrative staff and partners such
as Singapore Technologies, CSA Singapore for technical support.
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
C
o
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
83
LEA-6
2011
D
e
p
a
r
t
m
e
n
t
Background
The International Cooperation Department (ICD) was established on 1 Oct 2009

as the staff authority on all international engagement efforts of the Singapore
Police Force ( SPF ). ICD has three divisions: the International Policy Division,
International Operations Division and the Protocol and Administrative Services
Division.
Mission
ICD’s mission is to:
1. serve as the central gateway for communication and cooperation between

local law enforcement agencies and their counterparts in INTERPOL’s
member countries;
2. craft coherent foreign engagement policies to enhance SPF's standing in the
international policing community;
3. contribute towards SPF’s efforts in building and strengthening
relationships with partners through practising established diplomatic
formalities and protocol; and
4. provide guidance on foreign engagement to SPF units.
Vision
ICD strives to be a world-class agency spearheading SPF's international

engagement efforts to inspire the world.
84
LEA-6
2011
Our Divisions
International Policy Division (IPD)
The IPD is the staff authority on international policy matters; tasked with the
responsibility to co-ordinate all foreign relations related issues in SPF and collate
information pertaining to all foreign bilateral affairs and engagements.
International Operations Division (IOD)
The IOD assumes the role of the INTERPOL National Central Bureau (NCB) in
Singapore . NCB Singapore is the designated contact point with the INTERPOL
General Secretariat, regional offices and all the other 187 member countries on
transnational police cooperation, including investigations and operations. It also
serves as a gateway for exchange of information, as well as facilitation of
cooperation, between SPF and local enforcement agencies with our foreign
counterparts.
As the staff authority on international operations, the IOD provides guidance to

SPF units on matters relating to cooperation with fellow foreign counterparts on
operations and investigation, and ensures alignment of SPF's international
operations with that of our international policies.
Protocol & Administrative Services Division (PASD)
PASD is the staff authority on all Protocol matters pertaining to major SPF
ceremonies, events and visits to ensure that the due order of precedence and
procedures are observed in accordance to established international diplomatic
formalities and protocol. The Division also ensures that the due hospitality
provisions are accorded to all visiting dignitaries. Through relationship-building,
the Division provides steadfast support in SPF's efforts to strengthen relationships
with our foreign and local partners, both Police and non-Police, through the
various platforms of diplomatic engagements
Organization Structure
85
LEA-6
2011
D- 3. Australian Federal Police
This section details the nature and organisational structure of the AFP. It includes
the AFP’s history, relevant legislation, recognition and ceremonial initiatives and
more.
Responding to change
The nature of the AFP and what is required of it, has changed significantly in
recent years. The AFP has responded to a rapidly changing environment and this
has required a greater focus on national and international operations.
The new challenges the AFP faces include counter terrorism, human

trafficking and sexual servitude, cyber-crime, peace operations, protection and
other transnational crimes.
To help meet these challenges, the AFP has implemented a new organisational
structure. The structure focuses on AFP's main operational areas and provides a
higher level of national coordination and support to these areas.
The objectives of the new structure are to achieve better results by:
 improving the management structure and methodologies to better reflect the

AFP's national and international focus
 providing an improved management framework which is better able to meet
the national expectations of government, client and partner agencies
 providing a stronger accountability framework to the government
 ensuring the organisation is acting in a corporately consistent manner and
that resources are being aligned to meet corporate priorities
 providing a stronger management framework to develop and implement
corporate strategy and policy
 improving our strategic position and management capabilities to proactively
identify and manage new demands and emerging crime and security threats,
and
86
LEA-6
2011
 providing opportunities for staff development in managerial roles.
The Australian Federal Police (AFP) is the federal police agency of the
Commonwealth of Australia. Although the AFP was created by the amalgamation
(Combining) in 1979 of three Commonwealth law enforcement agencies, it traces
its history from Commonwealth law enforcement agencies dating back to the
federation of Australia's six precursor British self-governing colonies in 1901.
The role of the AFP is to enforce Commonwealth of Australia criminal law and to
protect Commonwealth and national interests from crime in Australia and
overseas. The AFP is Australia's international law enforcement and policing
representative, and the Government's chief source of advice on policing issues.[2]
Since 7 September 2009, the Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police has
been Mr Tony Negus who was sworn in following the retirement of the previous
commissioner, Mick Keelty.[3]
History
The AFP was formed on 19 October 1979 under the Australian Federal Police Act
1979[2] after the merging of the former Commonwealth Police and the Australian
Capital Territory Police. In November 1979, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics of the
Australian Customs Service was transferred to the new agency. [4] In 1984 the
Protective Service component of the AFP was separated forming the Australian
Protective Service under the Administrative Service and later governed by
Attorney Generals Department, subsequently that government agency was
transferred back to the AFP in 2004 and is now known as Australian Federal Police
Uniform Protection.
Roles and functions
The AFP falls within the portfolio of the Home Affairs Ministry, a ministerial
position outside of the Cabinet and subordinate to the Attorney-General. The
Minister responsible for the AFP is the Minister for Home Affairs, Brendan
O'Connor MP .[2] Prior to the creation of this ministerial portfolio with the
commencement of Rudd Government in November 2007, the Minister responsible
for the AFP was the Minister for Justice and Customs.
Key priorities of the AFP are set by the Australian Minister for Home Affairs,
through a 'ministerial direction' issued under the Australian Federal Police Act
87
LEA-6
2011
1979. The current 'ministerial direction' was issued by the former Minister for
Home Affairs, Hon Bob Debus MP, on 12 October 2007. [5]
The AFP enforces Commonwealth law, protects Commonwealth and national

interests from crime in Australia, and overseas. The AFP provides community
policing to the ACT, the Jervis Bay Territory, Norfolk Island, Christmas Island and
the Cocos (Keeling) Islands. The AFP provides protective security for (and on
behalf of) the Australian Government.
The AFP is Australia's international law enforcement and policing representative,

and is the chief advisor on policing issues to the Australian Government. The AFP
maintains an extensive international liaison network; officers are posted to 33
international posts. The AFP works closely and collaboratively with all Australian
police forces and criminal investigative agencies and Crime Commissions.
The AFP consists of a workforce of over 6500. The Australian Federal Police Act
1979 is the legislative base for the employment of all AFP staff. Each employee is
described in the legislation as an AFP Employee, who are then declared as either a
Member (Police Officer, Federal agent), (Uniform Protection Officer)-Protective
Service Division , Special Member.
Industrial representation of AFP staff solely rests with the Australian Federal
Police Association branch of the Police Federation of Australia.
National
Federal Agents are based in each Australian state and Territory capital city,
internationally and form the largest component of the AFP staff; Federal Agents
chiefly perform criminal investigative duties.
Current areas of focus for the AFP:
 Illicit drug trafficking

 Organized people smuggling, including sexual servitude and human
exploitation
 Serious major fraud against the Government
 High Tech Crime involving information technology and communications
 Preventing, countering and investigating terrorism
88
LEA-6
2011
 Transnational and multi-jurisdictional crime

 Money laundering
 Organized crime
The AFP hosts the National Missing Persons Coordination Unit, the Australian
Interpol National Central Bureau and the Australian Bomb Data Centre.
Community policing role
A Traffic Operations vehicle, with Traffic Operations and other officers in

ceremonial dress at the 2008 National Anzac Day Service at the Australian War
Memorial, Canberra.
The AFP provides community policing services to the Australian Capital Territory,
under a contractual agreement between the Australian Government and the ACT
Government. This AFP portfolio, ACT Policing, is the successor of the ACT
Police, one of the agencies that was merged to form the AFP in 1979. The mission
of ACT Policing is to keep the peace and preserve public safety for the citizens of
the ACT. Key sections of ACT Policing include general duties, crime and safety
management, criminal investigations, crime prevention, traffic operations and
criminal intelligence. The head of ACT Policing is known as the Chief Police
Officer of the Australian Capital Territory.
A 2005 review of aviation security in Australia led to the streamlining of security

at all major Australian airports, the Aviation portfolio was established as a result
of the review. Members of State, and the Northern Territory, police agencies are
seconded to the AFP to provide policing services at each of the 11 major
Australian airports.
The AFP provides community policing within the mainland Jervis Bay Territory,
and the three populated external territories of Norfolk Island, Christmas Island and
the Cocos (Keeling) Islands.
The AFP provides a mix of United Nations peacekeeping, community policing and
advisory roles and services in a number of nations.
Uniform protection role
89
LEA-6
2011
AFP providing Uniform Protection outside an

Embassy in Canberra, Australia
AFP Uniform Protection provides physical

protection for the Australian Government at key
locations throughout Australia and internationally.
Uniform Protection officers are firearms and
defensive tactics trained, performing duties which
include armed escorts, bomb appraisals, bomb detection canines, visitor control,
static guarding, alarm monitoring and response, mobile, foot and bicycle patrols,
maintain civil disorder, security consultancy services, counter terrorism first
response at many Commonwealth establishments. Uniform Protection Officers
have powers under Section 14 of the AFP Act 1979 to arrest, stop, search, and
request identification in their jurisdiction. Uniform Protection officers undertake a
critical role in protecting Australia's critical infrastructure and assist in providing
protection for Australian High Office Holders, diplomatic, consular personnel and
other foreign nationals.
Uniform Protection Officers providing an armed uniform capability are located at

Commonwealth establishments including Parliament House in Canberra; the
residences of the Prime Minister and Governor-General; foreign Embassies and
Consulates in Canberra, Sydney, Melbourne and Perth; the Australian Nuclear
Scientific Technology Organization installation, Joint Defense Facilities (such as
the Australian Defence Force Headquarters in Canberra) and sensitive covert
locations.
International deployment group
Since its inception, the AFP has had a long tradition of involvement in
international peacekeeping, policing and capacity development. This portfolio of
the AFP, the International Deployment Group (IDG), has increased rapidly in a
short time since its inception in 2004. Since 1964, Australia has contributed police
officers to the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus. AFP officers also
presently serve with the United Nations in East Timor and Sudan. Previous
peacekeeping missions have included Haiti, Mozambique, Thailand, Namibia,
South Africa and Somalia.
In recent years, Australian Government efforts to assist neighboring and remote

countries with institutional capacity building has led to AFP deployments to Papua
New Guinea, the Solomon Islands (Under the Regional Assistance Mission to
90
LEA-6
2011
Solomon Islands), Timor-Leste (Under the Timor-Leste Police Development

Program TLPDP, Nauru, Tonga, Vanuatu and Afghanistan.
Liaison Office of the AFP for Europe is located in Belgrade, Serbia. It was opened
in 2003, following the closure of the office in Rome, Italy that operated from 1990
to 2002.[6]
Ceremonial and protocol duties
To recognize, celebrate and respectfully honor the achievements and commitments

made by members of the AFP, the AFP Ceremonial Team conducts and
participates in a variety of police and community functions and ceremonies.
Ceremonial events include: Annual National Police Remembrance Day Service at

the National Police Memorial in Canberra on 29 September ], medal presentations,
parades, police funerals, memorial services, official opening of Police Stations and
Policing Facilities, AFP Pipes and Drums concerts, inauguration events and Public
relations events
The Ceremonial Team coordinates the AFP Ceremonial and Protocol Officer
(CAPO) Network, the AFP Ceremonial Mounted Cadre and the AFP Pipes and
Drums to perform ceremonial duties at these functions and ceremonies.
The AFP Ceremonial Mounted Cadre was raised on the 29th September, 2006 at
the dedication of the National Police Memorial. The ceremonial uniform comprises
linkages to former mounted policing units of the AFP's predecessor organisations,
namely the Commonwealth Police and the Peace Officer guard, as well as mounted
policing units from the NSW Police Force which patrolled the geographic area of
the Australian Capital Territory.
The AFP Ceremonial and Protocol team currently provide Drill Instructor
Accreditations for both the AFP and the NSW Police Force, and also provide
Ceremonial and Protocol Officer accredition for all of Australia's policing
jurisdictions.
Titles and ranks
AFP Commissioner's Order 1 (Administration) states that all Members (Police

Officers) are titled Federal Agent, unless undertaking duties in ACT Policing,
External Territories, Aviation, International Deployment Group (mission
component only), where uniforms are worn.
91
LEA-6
2011
AFP Commissioner's Order 1 (Administration) states that every AFP Member

holds a rank (as detailed below), with the corresponding title and role adopted.
Policing ranks
Original
Initial Title & Current Title &
Original AFP Ranks Broadband
Role Role
Ranks
Constable / 1st
Federal Agent, Federal Agent, Team
Constable / Senior Constable
Team Member Member
Constable
Sergeant / Senior
Federal Agent, Federal Agent, Team
Sergeant / Station Sergeant
Team Leader Leader
Sergeant
Inspector / Federal Agent, Federal Agent,
Superintendent
Superintendent Coordinator Coordinator
Federal Agent, Commander,
Commander Commander
Manager Manager
Assistant
Assistant Assistant Federal Agent,
Commissioner,
Commissioner Commissioner National Manager
National Manager
Deputy Deputy Deputy
Deputy Commissioner
Commissioner Commissioner Commissioner
Commissioner Commissioner Commissioner Commissioner
(AFP Uniform Protection) protective service officer ranks
Protective Service Officer Rank Internal Title and Role

Team Member Probationary & Under 4
Protective Service Officer( PSO )
years service
Protective Service Officer( PSO 1) > Team Member Over 4 years service
Protective Service Officer (PSO 2) >> Team Member Supervisor
Senior Protective Service Officer
Team Leader / Duty Manager
(SPSO) >>>
Assistant Inspector ** Operation Supervisor
Inspector *** OIC-Station Manager
Superintendant **+ Regional Co-ordinator
92
LEA-6
2011
Commander *++ Divisional Portfolio Manager
Additional ranks have been adopted throughout the country in the Aviation
Portfolio, reflecting the rank held by the seconded State or Territory Police Force
Members, such as different levels within the Constable and Sergeant Rank,
Inspectors and so on.
ACT Policing has a title for Members within the Constable level, Senior
Constable, which is a reflection of six years of service as a Member, it does not
equate with the Senior Constable terminology used within Section 23WA of the
Crimes Act 1914, which refers to Members who are Sergeants. [7]
Constable and Non-commissioned ranks

Senior
Constable Sergeant
Constable
 Australian Protective Service (Obsolete)

 CrimTrac
 Federal police
 National police (disambiguation)
 List of Australian Federal Police killed in the line of duty
 Specialist Response and Security, the Police Tactical Group of the AFP
 Commonwealth Police
 Australian Capital Territory Police
 Australian Federal Police Association
D-4. United States of America
93
LEA-6
2011
Types of police
Policing in the United States is conducted by numerous types of agency at many

different levels. Every state has their own nomenclature for agencies, and their
powers, responsibilities and funding varies from state to state.
Federal
Main article: Federal law enforcement in the United States
Federal police possess full federal authority as

given to them under United States Code
(U.S.C.). Federal Law Enforcement Officers
are authorized to enforce various laws not only
at the federal level, but also state, county, and
local in many circumstances.
U.S. Park Police officers standing by during the 2005 Inauguration Day
Both types operate at the highest level and are endowed with police roles, both
may maintain a small component of the other (for example, the FBI Police). The
agencies have nationwide jurisdiction for enforcement of federal law. All federal
agencies are limited by the U.S. Code to investigating only matters that are
explicitly within the power of the federal government. However, federal
investigative powers have become very broad in practice, especially since the
passage of the USA PATRIOT Act.
The Department of Justice (DOJ) is responsible for most law enforcement duties at
the federal level.[8] It includes the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms,
and Explosives (ATF), the United States Marshals Service, and others.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is another branch with numerous

federal law enforcement agencies reporting to it. U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), United
States Secret Service (USSS), United States Coast Guard (USCG), and the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) are some of the agencies that report
to DHS.
At a crime or disaster scene affecting large numbers of people, multiple

jurisdictions, or broad geographic areas, many police agencies may be involved by
94
LEA-6
2011
mutual aid agreements, for example the United States Federal Protective Service
responded to the Hurricane Katrina natural disaster. Command in such situations
remains a complex and flexible issue.
The federal government is prohibited from exercising general police powers due to
restrictions in the constitution, because the United States is organized as a union of
sovereign states, which each retain their police, military and domestic law-making
powers. For example, the State's National Guard is the state's military. The
constitution gives the federal government the power to deal with foreign affairs
and interstate affairs (affairs between the states). For policing, this means that if a
non-federal crime is committed in a state and the fugitive does not flee the state,
the federal government has no jurisdiction. However, once the fugitive crosses a
state line he or she violates the federal law of interstate flight and is subject to
federal jurisdiction, at which time federal law enforcement agencies may become
involved.
State
Main article: State police
Most all states operate statewide government agencies that provide law
enforcement duties, including investigations and state patrols. They may be called
State Police, State Patrol or Highway Patrol, and are normally part of the state
Department of Public Safety. In addition, the Attorney General's office of each
state has their own state bureaus of investigation.
Various departments of State Governments may have their own enforcement

division such as capitol police, State Hospitals, Departments of Correction, Water
police, environmental (fish and game/wildlife) Game Wardens or Conservation
Officers (who have full police powers and statewide jurisdiction). In Colorado, for
instance, the Department of Revenue has its own investigative branch, as do many
of the state funded universities.
County
Also known as parishes and boroughs, county law enforcement is provided by

Sheriffs' Departments or Offices and County police.
County police
Main article: County police

95
LEA-6
2011
County police tend to exist only in metropolitan counties and have countywide
jurisdiction. In some areas, there is a sheriff's department which only handles
minor issues such as service of papers such as a constable in other areas, along
with security for the local courthouse. In other areas, there are no county police
and the local sheriff is the exclusive law enforcement agency and acts as both
sheriff and county police, which is much more common than there being a separate
county police force. County police tend to fall into three broad categories:
 Full-service - provide the full spectrum of police services to the entire

county, irrespective of local communities, and may provide contractual
security police services to special districts within the county.
o Hawaii - Hawaii has only county police, there are no local police.
 Limited service - provide services to unincorporated areas of the county

(and may provide services to some incorporated areas by contract), and
usually provide contractual security police services to special districts within
the county.
 Restricted service - provide security police to county owned and operated
facilities and parks. Some may also perform some road patrol duties on
county built and maintained roads, and provide support to municipal police
departments in the county. Some northeastern states maintain county
detectives in their county attorneys' offices.
Sheriffs' departments
Main article: Sheriffs in the United States

 Full service - The most common type, provide all traditional law-
enforcement functions, including countywide patrol and investigations
irrespective of municipal boundaries.
 Limited service - along with the above, perform some type of traditional
law-enforcement function such as investigations and patrol. This may be
limited to security police duties on county properties (and others by contract)
to the performance of these duties in unincorporated areas of the county, and
some incorporated areas by contract.
96
LEA-6
2011
 Restricted service - provide basic court related services such as keeping the
county jail, transporting prisoners, providing courthouse security and other
duties with regard to service of process and summonses that are issued by
county and state courts. The sheriff also often conducts auction sales of real
property in foreclosure in many jurisdictions, and is often also empowered to
conduct seizures of chattel property to satisfy a judgment. In other
jurisdictions, these civil process duties are performed by other officers, such
as a marshal or constable.
Municipal
See Municipal police departments of the United States for a list
Municipal police range from one-officer agencies (sometimes still called the town
marshal) to the 40,000 men and women of the New York City Police Department.
Most municipal agencies take the form (Municipality Name) Police Department.
Many individual cities and towns will have their own police department, with
larger communities typically having larger departments with greater budgets,
resources, and responsibilities.
Metropolitan departments, such as the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department,

have jurisdiction covering multiple communities and municipalities, often over a
wide area typically coterminous with one or more cities or counties. Metropolitan
departments have usually have been formed by a merger between local agencies,
typically several local police departments and often the local sheriff's department
or office, in efforts to provide greater efficiency by centralizing command and
resources and to resolve jurisdictional problems, often in communities
experiencing rapid population growth and urban sprawl, or in neighboring
communities too small to afford individual police departments. Some county
sheriff's departments, such as the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, are
contracted to provide full police services to local cities within their counties.
Other
See Specialist police departments of the United States for a list
There are other types of specialist police department with varying jurisdictions.
Most of these serve special-purpose districts and are Special district police. In
some states, they serve as little more than security police, but in states such as
97
LEA-6
2011
California, special district forces are composed of fully-sworn peace officers with
statewide authority.
These agencies can be transit police, campus police, airport police, park police or
police departments responsible for protecting government property such as the Los
Angeles General Services Police. Some agencies, such as the Port Authority of
New York and New Jersey Police Department, have multi-state powers. There are
also some private (non-governmental) agencies, such as the Co-op City
Department of Public Safety.
Police functions
A Florida Highway Patrol state trooper at

the scene of a motor vehicle accident
Textbooks and scholars have identified three

primary police agency functions. The
following is cited from The American
System of Criminal Justice, by George F.
Cole and Christopher E. Smith, 2004, 10th edition, Wadsworth/Thomson Learning:
 Order maintenance. This is the broad mandate to keep the peace or

otherwise prevent behaviors which might disturb others. This can deal with
things ranging from a barking dog to a fist-fight. By way of description,
Cole and Smith note that police are usually called-on to "handle" these
situations with discretion, rather than deal with them as strict violations of
law, though of course their authority to deal with these situations are based
in violations of law.
 Law enforcement. Those powers are typically used only in cases where the
law has been violated and a suspect must be identified and apprehended.
Most obvious instances include robbery, murder, or burglary. This is the
popular notion of the main police function, but the frequency of such activity
is dependent on geography and season.
 Service. Services may include rendering first aid, providing tourist

information, guiding the disoriented, or acting as educators (on topics such
as preventing drug use). Cole and Smith cited one study which showed 80%
of all calls for police assistance did not involve crimes, but this may not be
the case in all parts of the country. Because police agencies are traditionally
98
LEA-6
2011
available year-round, 24 hours a day, citizens call upon police departments

not only in times of trouble, but also when just inconvenienced. As a result,
police services may include roadside auto assistance, providing referrals to
other agencies, finding lost pets or property, or checking locks on
vacationers' homes.
Styles of Policing
Given the broad mandates of police work, and yet having limited resources, police
administrators must develop policies to prioritize and focus their activities. Some
of the more controversial policies restrict, or even forbid, high-speed vehicular
pursuits.
Three styles of policing develop from a jurisdiction’s socioeconomic

characteristics, government organization, and choice of police administrators.
According to a study by James Q. Wilson (”Varieties of Police Behavior”, 1968,
1978, Harvard University Press), there were three distinct types of policing
developed in his study of eight communities. Each style emphasized different
police functions, and were linked to specific characteristics of the community the
department served. (Wilson’s field of study was in the United States, and it is not
clear if similar studies have been done for other countries with different
governmental organization and laws.)
 Watchman. Emphasizes maintaining order, usually found in communities

with a declining industrial base, and a blue-collar, mixed ethnic/racial
population. This form of policing is implicitly less pro-active than other
styles, and certain offenses may be “overlooked” on a variety of social,
legal, and cultural grounds, as long as the public order is maintained. Smith
and Cole comment the broad discretion exercised in this style of policing
can result in charges of discrimination, when it appears police treatment of
different groups results in the perception that some groups get better
treatment than others;
 Legalistic. Emphasizes law enforcement and professionalism. This is

usually found in reform-minded cities, with mixed socioeconomic
composition. Officers are expected to generate a large number of arrests and
citations, and act as if there were a single community standard for conduct,
rather than different standards for different groups. However, the fact that
certain groups are more likely to have law enforcement contact means this
strict enforcement of laws may seem overly harsh on certain groups;
99
LEA-6
2011
 Service. Emphasizes the service functions of police work, usually found in

suburban, middle-class communities where residents demand individual
treatment. Police in homogeneous communities can view their work as
protecting their citizens against “outsiders”, with frequent but often-informal
interventions against community members. The uniform make-up of the
community means crimes are usually more obvious, and therefore less
frequent, leaving police free to deal with service functions, and traffic
control.
Wilson’s study applies to police behavior for the entire department, over time. At
any given time, police officers may be acting in a watchman, service, or legalistic
function by nature of what they’re doing at the time, or temperament, or mood.
Individual officers may also be inclined to one style or another, regardless of
supervisor or citizen demands.
Entry qualifications
Nearly all U.S. states and the federal government have by law adopted minimum-
standard standardized training requirements for all officers with powers of arrest
within the state. Many standards apply to in-service training as well as entry-level
training, particularly in the use of firearms, with periodic re-certification required.
These standards often comply with standards promoted by the US Department of
Justice. These standards typically require a thorough background check that
potential police recruits:
 Be a United States citizen.

 Must have a high school diploma or a G.E.D. and if necessary a college
degree or served in the United States military without a dishonorable
discharge;
 Be in good physical and psychological condition;
 Maintain a clean criminal record without either serious or repeated
misdemeanor or any felony convictions;
 Must have a valid driver's license with a clean driving record and that is not
currently or has a history of being suspended or revoked;
 Be of high moral character;
 Not have a history of prior narcotic or repeated marijuana use or alcoholism;
100
LEA-6
2011
 Not have a history of ethical, professional, prior employment, motor vehicle,

or financial improprieties;
 Not have a history of domestic violence or mental illness;
 Not to pose a safety and security risk;
 Be legally eligible to own and carry a firearm.
Repeated interviews, written tests, medical examinations, physical fitness tests,

comprehensive background investigations, fingerprinting, drug testing, a polygraph
examination and consultation with a psychologist are common practices used to
review the suitability of candidates. Recruiting in most departments is competitive,
with more suitable and desirable candidates accepted over lesser ones, and failure
to meet some minimum standards disqualifying a candidate entirely. Departments
maintain records of past applicants under review, and refer to them in the case of
either reapplication or requests from other agencies.
Despite these safeguards, some departments have at times relaxed hiring and
staffing policies, sometimes in violation of the law, most often in the cases of local
departments and federally-funded drug task forces facing staffing shortages,
attrition, and needs to quickly fill positions. This has included at times the fielding
(and sometimes the arming) of uncertified officers (who may be working
temporarily in what is supposed to be a provisional limited-duty status prior to
certification) and the hiring of itinerant "gypsy cops", who may have histories of
poor performance or misconduct in other departments. Several serious cases of
police misconduct such as the LAPD beating of Rodney King, the late-1990s
LAPD Rampart Scandal, the 1999 Tulia, Texas mass drug arrests, the late 1990s
shooting of Amadou Diallo, the 2004 torture of Lester Eugene Siler, and the Sean
Bell shooting incident all raised questions surrounding the screening of potential
recruits.
Salary
Salary varies widely for police officers, with most being among the top third of
wage-earners, age 25 or older, nationwide.[9] In May 2008, the overall median was
$51,410. The median salary for those at the federal level was $46,620, compared to
$57,270 for those at the state level and $51,020 for those employed by local law
enforcement agencies. The top 10% earned more than $79,680 and bottom 10%
less than $30,070.[10]
101
LEA-6
2011
Rank Minimum Salary Maximum Salary

Police Chief $90,570 $113,930
Deputy Chief $74,834 $96,209
Police Captain $72,761 $91,178
Police Lieutenant $65,688 $79,268
Police Sergeant $58,739 $70,349
Police Corporal $49,421 $61,173
Reserve Officer $0.00 $0.00
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, 2010
D-5. Law enforcement in France

Law enforcement in France is conducted at the national and municipal level, and
is the responsibility of a variety of law enforcement agencies. Three agencies
operate at the national level, and at the local level each commune is able to
maintain their own municipal police. Paris does not have its own police
municipale and that the Police Nationale provides these services directly as a
subdivision of France's Ministry of the Interior. Only certain, designated police
officers have the power to conduct criminal investigations, and such investigations
are supervised by investigative magistrates.
Organizations
Agencies
France has three national law enforcement agencies:
 Police Nationale, formerly called the Sûreté, a civilian force; it has primary
responsibility for major cities and large urban areas; run under the Ministry of
the Interior); its strength is roughly 150,000 agents.
 Gendarmerie Nationale, a gendarmerie; it has primary responsibility for
smaller towns and rural areas, as well as all military installations; run by
the Ministry of Defence but under operational control, for most purposes, of
the Ministry of the Interior); its strength is roughly 100,000 agents.
 Direction générale des douanes et droits indirects , a
civilian customs service more commonly known as the Douane, under
the Minister of Budget, Public Accounting and Civil Servants; its strength is
roughly 20,000 agents.
102
LEA-6
2011
Those three agencies are the only ones legally capable of making full arrests or
serving search warrants. A similar diffusion exists, or has existed, in several other
countries following the French system.
Other agencies
French municipalities may also have a local police called the police
municipale, garde municipale or garde champetre, with restricted powers: they can
only enforce the municipal by-laws (amongst which those related to the road
circulation) and participate in prevention actions (survey, evacuation of buildings,
protection against accidents, etc.). These personnel may or may not be allowed to
bear firearms.
Local governments (communes) may maintain a Police

municipale (Municipal police) forces, which have very limited law
enforcement powers outside of traffic issues and local ordinance
enforcement
Rural communes may also form a garde champetre or Police Rurale (Rural
police), which is responsible for limited local patrol and protecting the
environment
The Department of Corrections (Administration pénitentiaire)

operates Équipes régionales d’intervention et de sécurité (SWAT teams)
In Wallis and Futuna, there is a territorial guard as well as royal police.
Police vs Gendarmerie
The existence of two national police forces with similar goals and attributions, but
somewhat different zones of activity, has at times created friction or competition
between the two. Their merging has sometimes been suggested.
Since 1941, the division of the zones of activity between the Police and the
Gendarmerie was that cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants were handled by the
Police, and the remaining ones by the Gendarmerie; however, with the
development of suburban dwellings, this had increasingly proved inadequate.
Furthermore, the shifting of a town from a Police to a Gendarmerie zone was often
103
LEA-6
2011
controversial, because, typically, a gendarmerie unit serves a wide area. A

redistribution of authority was thus decided and implemented between 2003 and
2005. Large conurbations will be handled entirely by the Police. Rural and
suburban areas, and some smaller cities with populations ranging from 5,000 to
16,000, will be handled by the Gendarmerie.
In addition, the Police and the Gendarmerie have specific zones of authority:
the Police handle questions about the admittance and continuing stay of
foreigners (border police);
the Gendarmerie handles all matters regarding the military, the police at sea,
the security of airports, and the security of certain public buildings
(Republican Guard).
In French, the term "police" not only refers to the forces, but also to the general
concept of "maintenance of law and order" (policing). There are two types
of police in this general sense:
 Administrative police (police administrative): uniformed preventative

patrols, traffic duties etc., with limited powers of arrest.
 Judicial police (police judiciaire): law enforcement and investigation of
crime, with full powers of arrest.
Thus, the mayor has administrative police power in a town (i.e. they can order the
police to enforce the municipal by-laws), and a judge has police power in their
court (i.e. they can have people who disrupt the proceedings expelled from the
court room).
Until 1984, the National Police was involved in the prehospital care and casualty
transport (Police secours). The prehospital care is now performed by firefighters;
however, mountain rescue is performed by the Gendarmerie PGHM (Peloton de
gendarmerie de haute montagne) and the National Police CRS (Compagnies
républicaines de sécurité; Republican Security Companies).
Some other countries follow this model and have separate police agencies with the
same role but different jurisdictions.
104
LEA-6
2011
Local Police or Gendarmerie precincts may not be capable of conducting complex

investigations. For this reason, both the Police and the Gendarmerie maintain
regional services dedicated to criminal investigations (police judiciaire); these are
known as "regional services of judiciary police" in the Police, "research sections"
in the Gendarmerie. In addition, both the Police and the Gendarmerie maintain
laboratories dedicated to forensics. Most criminal enquiries are conducted by the
Police. Justice may choose either service; sometimes, if the judiciary is
disappointed by the results or the methods of one service, it may give the enquiry
to the other service.
The National Police also features some central offices with national jurisdiction,
charged with specific missions, such as the national anti-terrorist division.
Both the Police and the Gendarmerie have SWAT teams. The Gendarmerie has the
foremost and best-known, the GIGN; the Police has the RAID and
the GIPN groups. The Gendarmerie also has armored and paratroops squadrons.
Both the Police and the Gendarmerie have riot control forces: the CRS for the
Police, the Gendarmerie Mobile for the Gendarmerie (which are often mistaken for
the former). They intervene throughout the country.
One justification for the maintenance of a military force handling matters of
civilian police is that the military cannot unionize, contrary to civilian civil
servants such as the Police, which may make management easier. The gendarmes
found a workaround by forming associations of spouses of gendarmes.
The gendarmes each have a free housing inside their
respective gendarmerie stations, which is not the case for the police.
Procedures
Administrative policing
The police administrative comprises a variety of actions undertaken under the
direction and supervision of the executive branch, notably theprefect, police and
gendarmerie forces conduct a variety of actions ensuring public order. They
include:
directing road traffic
channelling street demonstrations
105
LEA-6
2011
positioning riot control forces (CRS or Mobile Gendarmerie)
Judicial policing
The police judiciaire comprises a variety of actions undertaken under the direction
and supervision of the judiciary. They include:
pursuing and arresting suspects
interrogating suspects in some phases of judicial enquiries
gathering evidence
serving search warrants
These actions must follow the rules given in the Code of Penal Procedure (Code de
procédure pénale), articles 12 to 29.
In order to better fulfill these missions, some sections of the French National
Police (police judiciaire) are specialized in criminal enquiries; the Gendarmerie
counterpart are the sections de recherche (research sections).
Rights and limitations

The powers of French Police and Gendarmerie forces are constrained by statute
law and jurisprudence. The rules of procedure depend on the stage of enquiry:
Crimes committed in flagrante delicto, in which a suspect was found

committing the crime, or pursued by witnesses, or found in possession of
objects from the crime or other probable cause.
Preliminary enquiries — it is unclear whether a crime, or which crime, has
been committed, but there exist good reasons to believe this might be the
case.
106
LEA-6
2011
Judicial information — an investigative magistrate (a judge, external to the

police) supervises an enquiry on a case where it is certain, or at least very
probable, that a crime has been committed.
In particular, outside of crimes in flagrante delicto, law enforcement forces may

not conduct searches or arrests without a specific commission from the
investigative magistrate.
Not all law-enforcement officers are capable of making full arrests or conducting
searches; these powers are, by law, restricted to those have special legal
qualifications (see next section).
Officers and agents of judiciary police
The procedures that police and gendarmerie officers follow when conducting
criminal enquiries are set by the Code of Criminal procedure(Code de procédure
pénale) and applicable jurisprudence. Criminal enquiries are conducted under the
supervision of the judiciary (depending on the phase, under the supervision of the
public prosecutor or of an investigative judge).
Two important notions are those of "officer of judiciary police" (officier de police
judiciaire or OPJ), "agent of judiciary police" (agent de police judiciaire or APJ)
and "agent of judiciary police assistant" (APJ adjoint).
 Mayors and deputy mayors. This disposition is rarely used.

 In the National Police, these are OPJs:
 the commissioners and above ranks;
 the titular members of the corps de commandement nominally listed in

a joint decision by the Ministers of Justice and of the Interior;
 Members of the Corps d'encadrement et d'application who have

completed 3 years of service, are affected in some specific services, and are
nominally listed in a joint decision by the Ministers of Justice and of the
Interior.
 In the National Gendarmerie, these are OPJs:
107
LEA-6
2011
 commissioned officers
 non-commissioned officers having completed 3 years of service,

nominally designated by a joint decision by the Ministers of Justice and of
Defense.
These ministerial nomination decisions may only be taken after the approval of a
specific commission. The current rules also warrant the completion of an
examination pertaining to legal matters.
Most other members of the National Police and Gendarmerie are APJs. The
remaining members of the National Police, as well as members of municipal police
forces, are APJ assistants.
Only OPJs may perform full arrests or serve search warrants; APJs may only assist
them in these talks. In case a suspect has been apprehended by an APJ, he/she must
be brought before an OPJ for a full arrest. According to the law, any citizen can
apprehend the author of a crime or of an offence that can be punished by a prison
sentence (citizen's arrest), and lead him/her to an OPJ (this includes APJ, APJ
assistants). However, this is problematic in case of a "simple" citizen due to the
estimation of what can be punished by a prison sentence or not, and due to possible
abuse (abuses are a restriction of the individual freedom and can be sued for illegal
confinement).
In all cases, the prerogatives of an OPJ may only be exercised if they are affected
to a position where these are needed, and by nominal decision of the general
prosecutor of their area. These prerogatives are temporarily suspended when they
engage, in an organized force, in an operation of public order (i.e. riot control).
The quality of officer of judiciary police may be withdrawn by the Judiciary if the
officer has behaved in an inappropriate fashion. The general prosecutor grades
OPJs, and these grades are taken into account for possible promotions.
D-6. Law enforcement in the United Kingdom
Jurisdictions and territories
In the United Kingdom, every person has limited powers of arrest if they see
an indictable crime being committed[1] – these are called "every person powers",
commonly referred to as a "citizen's arrest". In England and Wales, the vast
108
LEA-6
2011
majority of attested constables enjoy full powers of arrest and search as granted by

the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. All police officers are "constables" in
law, irrespective of rank. Although police officers have wide ranging powers, they
are still civilians and subject to the same laws as members of the public. However
there are certain legal restrictions on police officers such as the illegality of taking
industrial action and the ban on taking part in active politics.
Types of law enforcement agency
There are four general types of agency, the first mostly concerned with policing the
general public and their activities and the rest concerned with policing of other,
usually localised, matters:
 Territorial police forces, who carry out the majority of policing. These are
police forces that cover a 'police area' (a particular region) and have an
independent Police Authority. The Police Act 1996, the Police (Scotland) Act
1967 and the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000, prescribe a number of issues
such as appointment of a Chief Constable, jurisdiction and responsibilities, for
police forces in England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland
respectively.
 Special police forces, which are national police forces that have a specific,
non-regional jurisdiction, such as the British Transport Police. The Serious
Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 refers to these as 'special police forces'.
 Non-police law enforcement agencies, whose officers are not police

constables, but still enforce laws.
 Miscellaneous police forces, mostly having their foundations in older

legislation or Common Law. These have a responsibility to police specific local
areas or activities, such as ports and parks and before the passing of recent
legislation such as the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 were often
referred to as 'special police forces'; care must therefore be taken in interpreting
historical use of that phrase. These constabularies are not within the scope of
the legislation applicable to the previously mentioned organisations but can still
be the subject of statutes applicable to e.g. docks, harbours or railways. Until
the passing of Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003, the British Transport
Police was such a force.
109
LEA-6
2011
Cross-border powers
Territorial police constables have certain powers of arrest in countries other than
the one they were attested in. There are four main provisions for them to do so –
arrest with a warrant, arrest without a warrant for an offence committed in their
country, arrest without a warrant for an offence committed in another country and
mutual aid. Note: this section applies to territorial police constables only, and not
to others – except the British Transport Police, whose also have certain cross-
border powers in addition to their natural powers.
Arrest with warrant
Certain warrants can be executed by constables even though they are outside their
jurisdiction: arrest warrants, warrants of commitment and a warrant to arrest a
witness (England, Wales or Northern Ireland) a warrant for committal, a warrant to
imprison (or to apprehend and imprison) and a warrant to arrest a witness
(Scotland).[2] A warrant issued in one country may be executed in either of the
other two countries by a constable from either the country where it was issued, or
the country where it is executed.:
When executing a warrant issued in Scotland, the constable executing it shall have
the same powers and duties, and the person arrested the same rights, as they would
have had if execution had been in Scotland by a constable of a police force in
Scotland. When executing a warrant issued in England & Wales or Northern
Ireland, a constable may use reasonable force and has specified search powers
provided by section 139 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994
Arrest without warrant:
Offences committed in home country
If a constable suspects that a person has committed or attempted to commit an
offence in his country, and that person is now in another country, he may arrest
(and in the case of a constable from Scotland, detain) them in that other country.
A constable from England & Wales is subject to the same necessity tests for arrest
(as under section 24 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984) as he would be
in England & Wales, a constable from Scotland may arrest/detain if it would have
been lawful to do so in Scotland and a constable from Northern Ireland is subject
to the same necessity tests for arrest (as under Article 26 of the Police and Criminal
Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989) as he would be in Northern Ireland.
110
LEA-6
2011
A person arrested under the above powers:
 in Scotland, shall be taken to the nearest convenient designated police

station or to a designated police station in a police area in which the offence is
being investigated (England & Wales or Northern Ireland),
 in England or Wales, shall be taken to the nearest convenient police station
(Scotland) or to a police station within a sheriffdom in which the offence is
being investigated (Scotland), to the nearest convenient designated police
station (Northern Ireland) or to a designated police station in which the offence
is being investigated (Northern Ireland), or
 in Northern Ireland, shall be taken either to the nearest convenient

designated police station (England & Wales) or to a designated police station in
a police area in which the offence is being investigated (England & Wales) or to
the nearest convenient police station (Scotland) or to a police station within a
sheriffdom in which the offence is being investigated (Scotland).
A person detained under the above powers:
 in England or Wales, shall be taken to the nearest convenient police station

being investigated (Scotland), or to the nearest convenient designated police
station (England or Wales), or
 in Northern Ireland, shall be taken to the nearest convenient police station
being investigated (Scotland), or to the nearest convenient designated police
station (Northern Ireland), as soon as reasonably practicable.
Detention under these powers, which in Scotland normally lasts for six hours, is
limited to four hours.
111
LEA-6
2011
Arrest without warrant:

Offences committed in other countries
A constable from one country has, in the other countries, the same powers of arrest
as a constable of that country would have.
A constable from England & Wales has:
 in Scotland, the same power of arrest as a constable from Scotland

 in Northern Ireland, the same power of arrest as a constable from Northern
Ireland would have under Article 26 of the Police and Criminal Evidence
(Northern Ireland) Order 1989 (necessity test).
A constable from Scotland has:
 in England and Wales, the same power of arrest as a constable from England
& Wales would have under section 24 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act
1984 (necessity test).
 in Northern Ireland, the same power of arrest as a constable from Northern
Ireland would have under Article 26 of the Police and Criminal Evidence
(Northern Ireland) Order 1989 (necessity test).
A constable from Northern Ireland has:
 in Scotland, the same power of arrest as a constable from Scotland

 in England and Wales, the same power of arrest as a constable from England
& Wales would have under section 24 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act
1984 (necessity test).
When a constable arrests a person in England & Wales, the constable is subject to
the requirements of section 28 (informing of arrest),section 30 (taking to a
designated police station) and section 32 (search on arrest).[5] When a constable
arrests a person in Scotland, the arrested person shall have the same rights and the
constable the same powers and duties as they would have were the constable a
constable of a police force in Scotland.[5] When a constable arrests a person in
Northern Ireland, the constable is subject to the requirements of Article
112
LEA-6
2011
30 (informing of arrest), Article 32 (taking to a designated police station)

and Article 34 (search on arrest).[5]
Other situations
Police forces often support each other with large-scale operations, such as those
that require specialist skills or expertise and those that require policing levels that
the host forces cannot provide. Referred to as mutual aid, constables 'on loan' from
one force have all the powers and privileges of a constable of the host force.
[6]
Constables from the Metropolitan Police who are on protection duties in
Scotland or Northern Ireland have all the powers and privileges of a constable of
the local territorial police force.[7] A constable who is taking a person to or from
aprison retains all the powers, authority, protection and privileges of his office
regardless of his location.[8] Regardless of where they are in the United Kingdom, a
constable may arrest under section 41[9] and may stop and search under section
43[10] of the Terrorism Act 2000 on suspicion of terrorism (defined by section 40).
Powers of officers
Territorial police constables
Police Constables and an Inspector
of Greater Manchester Police on the beat
in Manchester city centre after the 2008
UEFA Cup Final Riots
Most police officers are members
of territorial police forces. Upon taking
an oath for one of these forces, they have
all the powers and privileges, duties and
responsibilities of a constable in one of the three distinct legal systems -
eitherEngland and Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland, and the territorial waters
of that country. The limited circumstances where their powers extend across the
border are described below.
Other constables
There are many constables who are not members of territorial police forces. The
most notable are members of the three forces referred to as 'special police forces':
the British Transport Police, Ministry of Defence Police and Civil Nuclear
Constabulary. These officers have the 'powers and privileges of a constable' on
113
LEA-6
2011
land relating to their work and in matters relating to their work. [11][12][13] BTP and
MDP officers have additional jurisdiction where requested by a constable of
another force, in which case they take on that constables jurisdiction. [14][15] Upon
request from the chief police officer of a police force, members of one of the above
three forces can be give the full powers of constables in the police area of the
requesting force.[14][16] This was used to supplement police numbers in the areas
surrounding the 2005 G8 summit at Gleneagles.
Many acts allow companies or councils to employ constables for a specific
purpose. Firstly, there are 10[17] companies whose employees are sworn in as
constables under section 79 of the Harbours, Docks, and Piers Clauses Act 1847.
As a result, they have the full powers of a constable on any land owned by the
harbour, dock, or port and at any place within one mile of any owned land.
Secondly, there are also some forces created by specific legislation such as the Port
of Tilbury Police (Port of London Act 1968), Mersey Tunnels Police (County of
Merseyside Act 1989) and the Epping Forest Keepers (Epping Forest Act 1878).
Thirdly, under Article 18 of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government
Provisional Order Confirmation (Greater London Parks and Open Spaces) Act
1967, London Borough Councils are allowed to swear in council officers as
constables for "securing the observance of the provisions of all enactments relating
to open spaces under their control or management and of bye-laws and regulations
made thereunder". These constables are not legally police constables and have no
powers to enforce criminal law other than those afforded to every citizen.[18]
Police civilians
In England & Wales, the chief police officer of a territorial police force may
designate any person who is employed by the police authority maintaining that
force, and is under the direction and control of that chief police officer, as one or
more of the following:

community support officer (commonly referred to as a Police Community
Support Officer),

investigating officer,

detention officer, or
114
LEA-6
2011

escort officer.[19]
They have a range of powers given by the Police Reform Act 2002,[20] and their
chief police officer decides which of these powers they may use. Unlike a police
constable, a PCSO only has powers when on duty and in uniform, and within the
area policed by their respective force.
Until 1991, most parking enforcement was carried out by police-employed traffic
wardens. Since the passage of the Road Traffic Act 1991,decriminalised parking
enforcement has meant that most local authorities have taken on this role and now
only the Metropolitan Police employs Traffic Wardens, combining the role with
PCSOs as "Traffic Police Community Support Officers".
In Scotland, Police Custody and Security Officers have powers similar to those of
detention officers and escort officers in England and Wales. [21] Similar powers are
available in Northern Ireland.[22]
Accredited Persons
Chief police officers of territorial police forces[23] (and the British Transport
Police[24]) can also give limited powers[25] to people not employed by the police
authority, under Community Safety Accreditation Schemes. A notable example are
officers of the Vehicle and Operator Services Agency, who have been given
powers to stop vehicles.[26] However, this practice has been criticised by the Police
Federation who described it as 'half-baked'.[27]
Members of the armed forces
In Northern Ireland only, members of Her Majesty's Armed Forces have powers to
stop people[28] or vehicles,[29] arrest and detain people for three hours[30] and enter
buildings to keep the peace[31] or search for people who have been kidnapped.
[32]
Additionally, commissioned officers may close roads.[33] They may use
reasonable force when exercising these powers.[34]
Under the Customs Management Act 1979, members of Her Majesty's Armed
Forces may detain people if they believe they have committed an offence under the
Customs & Excise acts, and may seize goods if they believe they are liable to
forfeiture under the same acts.[35]
115
LEA-6
2011
Other civilians
Many employees of local authorities have powers of entry relating to inspection of
businesses, such as under the Sunday Trading Act 1994[36] and powers to
give Fixed Penalty Notices for offences such as littering, graffiti or one of the wide
ranging offences in the Clean Neighbourhoods and Environment Act 2005. Further
such powers may be given under local bylaws or local acts of parliament.
When carrying out an investigation, staff of the Independent Police Complaints
Commission have all the powers and privileges of constables throughout England
and Wales and the territorial waters. [37] Similarly, staff of the Police Ombudsman
for Northern Ireland have certain powers under the Police and Criminal Evidence
(Application to the Police Ombudsman) Order (Northern Ireland) 2009[38]
Employees of the Serious Organised Crime Agency can be designated[39] with the
powers of a constable,[40] Revenue and Customs officer[41] and immigration officer.
[42]
These designations can be unconditional or conditional: time limited or limited
to a specific operation.
Employees of the UK Border Agency may be Immigration Officers and/or customs
officers. They hold certain powers of arrest, detention and search.
In England & Wales, water bailiffs employed by the Environment Agency have
certain powers in relation to enforcement of fishing regulations. Scottish water
bailiffs have similar powers. There are also seven types of court officer - two in
Scotland and five in England & Wales, commonly referred to as 'bailiffs', who can
enforce court orders and in some cases arrest people.
Traffic officers are employed by the Highways Agency and maintain traffic flows
on trunk roads and some bridges and tunnels. There are different types of traffic
officer, and they are appointed under separate Acts. They have limited powers to
direct traffic and place road signs.
Wildlife inspector have certain powers of entry and inspection in relation to
wildlife and licenses relating to wildlife.
Employees of public fire and rescue services have extensive powers in the event of
an emergency, and more limited ones in certain other circumstances, such as
investigations into fires.
116
LEA-6
2011
Prison officers have all the powers, authority, protection and privileges of a

constable when acting as prison officers.[43]
History
Accountability
In England and Wales a Police Authority, normally consisting of
three magistrates, nine local councillors and five independent members, is
responsible for overseeing each local force. They also have a duty under law to
ensure that their community gets best value from their police force.
In Northern Ireland the Police Service of Northern Ireland is supervised by

the Northern Ireland Policing Board.
In Scotland each police force is overseen either by the local authority (for Fife
Constabulary and Dumfries and Galloway Constabulary) or by a joint board of the
relevant authority for all other forces.
Two of the three special police forces in Great Britain, (the British Transport
Police and the Civil Nuclear Constabulary) had their own police authorities set up
in 2004. These forces operate across national jurisdictions but their normal
responsibility is to the activities they police, i.e. the railways and the civil nuclear
industry.
Police harbor patrol boat in Poole Harbor, Dorset

Her Majesty's Inspectorates of Constabulary
Her Majesty's Inspectorates of
Constabulary (HMIC) are the official bodies
responsible for the examination and assessment of
police forces to ensure their requirements are met
as intended.
There are two similarly named organizations:
 Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) - this organization is

responsible to the Home Office for police forces in England and Wales. It also
117
LEA-6
2011
inspects, by invitation, various UK special police forces. Since 2004, HMIC has
also had responsibility for examining HM Revenue and Customs and
the Serious Organized Crime Agency. Inspection services have been provided
on a non-statutory basis for the Police Service of Northern Ireland.
 Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary for Scotland (commonly

known as HMIC) - this organisation is responsible to the Scottish
Government and examines Scotland's territorial police forces, the Scottish
Crime and Drug Enforcement Agency, the Scottish Criminal Record Office,
the Scottish Police College and the Scottish Police Information Strategy.
Crown dependencies and overseas territories

The Crown dependencies and British overseas territories have their own police
forces, the majority of which use the British model. Because they are not part of
the United Kingdom, they are not answerable to the British Government; instead
they are organised by and are responsible to their own governments (an exception
to this is the Sovereign Base Areas Police - because the SBAs existence is purely
for the benefit of the British armed forces and do not have full overseas territory
status, the SBA Police are responsible to the Ministry of Defence). However,
because they are based on the British model of policing, these police forces
conform to the standards set out by the British government, which includes
voluntarily submitting themselves to inspection by the HMIC.
Ranks
Police ranks of the United Kingdom
Throughout the United Kingdom, the rank structure of police forces is identical up
to the rank of Chief Superintendent. At higher ranks, structures are distinct
within London where the Metropolitan Police Service and the City of London
Police have a series of Commander and Commissioner ranks as their top ranks
whereas other UK police forces have assistants, deputies and a Chief Constable as
their top ranks. All Commissioners and Chief Constables are equal in rank to each
other.
Uniform and equipment
118
LEA-6
2011
A Bedfordshire Police Vauxhall Astra patrol car
Main articles: Uniforms and equipment of the British police and Police use of

firearms in the United Kingdom
Uniforms, the issuing of firearms, type of patrol cars and other equipment varies by
force. Unlike police in other developed countries, the vast majority of British
police officers do not carry firearms on standard patrol; they do however
carry Extendable "Asp" or fixed Monadnock PR-24 batons and CS/PAVA spray.
There are, however, exceptions. Every territorial force has a specialist Firearms
Unit,[44]which maintains Armed Response Vehicles to respond to firearms related
emergency calls, while one territorial force (the Police Service of Northern Ireland)
and two of the special police forces, (the Civil Nuclear Constabulary and
the Ministry of Defence Police) are routinely armed. The British Transport
Police is the only police force in the country without firearms officers, relying on
the local territorial force should an armed incident occur on the railways.
The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) firearms unit is called CO19 (formerly
SO19), but every force in the United Kingdom apart from the British Transport
Police has firearms trained officers available should the need arise. Metropolitan
and City of London Police operate with three officers per Armed Response Vehicle
(ARV). Each unit comprises a driver, a navigator, and an observer who gathers
information about the incident and liaises with other units. Other police forces
carry two Authorised Firearms Officers instead of three. Armed Police carry a
combination of weapons, ranging from German Heckler & Koch MP5 carbines,
Heckler & Koch MSG901 Sniper rifles, Heckler & Koch Baton Guns (which
fire baton rounds) and Heckler & Koch G36Cs to a number of specialist weapons
such as the Remington pump-action shotgun.
Former Home Secretary Jacqui Smith recently unveiled new plans, for England
and Wales, to train and arm response officers with Tasers, rather than just
specialist firearms teams.[45][46][47] Several forces underwent a trial period with
Tasers issued to members of response teams, and it was subsequently unveiled
across the country.
Height
119
LEA-6
2011
In the 19th and early 20th centuries most forces required that recruits be at least 5
feet 10 inches (178 cm) in height. By 1960 many forces had reduced this to 5 feet
8 inches (173 cm), and 5 feet 4 inches (163 cm) for women. Many senior officers
deplored this, believing that height was a vital requirement for a uniformed
constable.[48] Some forces retained the height standard at 5 feet 10 inches (178 cm)
or 5 feet 9 inches (175 cm) until the early 1990s, when the height standard was
gradually removed. This is due to the MacPherson report of 1999, as the height
restriction was seen to possibly discriminate against those of ethnic backgrounds
who may be genetically predisposed to be shorter. No British force now requires
its recruits to be of any minimum height. The shortest officer in the UK, PC Sue
Day of Swindon Police, is 4 feet 10 inches tall.[49]
Organization of police forces
As all police forces are autonomous organizations there is much variation in
organization and nomenclature, however outlined below are the main strands of
policing that makes up police forces:
 All police forces have teams of officers who are responsible for general beat
duties and response to emergency and non emergency calls from the public.
These officers are generally the most visible and will invariably be the first
interface a member of the public has with police. In general terms these officers
will normally patrol by vehicle (though also on foot or bicycle in urban areas).
They will generally patrol a sub-division or whole division of a police force
area or in the case of the Metropolitan Police Service, a borough. Nearly all
police officers begin their careers in this area of policing, with some moving on
to more specialist roles. The Metropolitan Police Service calls this area of
policing 'Response Teams', whilst other forces use terms such as 'patrol',
'section' and other variations.
 Most local areas or wards in the country have at least one police officer who
is involved in trying to build links with the local community and resolve long
term problems. In London, the Metropolitan Police Service addresses this area
of policing with Safer Neighbourhood Teams. This entails each political ward
in London having a Police Sergeant, two police constables and a few PCSOs
who are ring fenced to address problems and build community links in their
120
LEA-6
2011
respective wards. Other police forces have similar systems but can be named
'Area officers', 'Neighbourhood officers', 'Beat Constables' and a number of
other variations.
 Criminal Investigation Departments (CID) can be found in all police forces.

Generally these officers deal with investigations of a more complex, serious
nature, however this again can differ from force to force. Most officers within
this area are detectives. Depending on the force in question this area of policing
can be further divided into a myriad of other specialist areas such as fraud.
Smaller forces tend to have detectives who deal with a wide range of varied
investigations whereas detectives in larger forces can have a very specialist
remit.
 All police forces have specialist departments that deal with certain aspects of
policing. Larger forces such as Greater Manchester Police, Strathclyde Police
and West Midlands Police have many and varied departments and units such as
traffic, firearms, marine, horse, tactical support all named differently depending
on the force. Smaller forces such Dyfed Powys Police and Warwickshire Police
will have fewer specialists and will rely on cross training, such as firearms
officers also being traffic trained officers. The Metropolitan Police, the largest
force in the country, has a large number of specialist departments, some of
which are unique to the Metropolitan Police due to policing the capital and its
national responsibilities. For example, the Diplomatic Protection
Group and Counter Terrorism Command.
Issues
Deaths after contact with the police
The police service in the UK is sometimes criticised for incidents that result in
deaths due to police firearms usage or in police custody, as well as the lack of
competence and impartiality in investigations by the Independent Police
Complaints Commission after these events.[citation needed] The Economist stated in 2009:
“ Bad apples ... are seldom brought to justice: no policeman has ever been ”
convicted of murder or manslaughter for a death following police contact,
121
LEA-6
2011
though there have been more than 400 such deaths in the past ten years
alone. The IPCC is at best overworked and at worst does not deserve the
“I” in its name.
—The Economist[50]
Controversial shootings
Main article: Police use of firearms in the United Kingdom#Controversial
shootings
The policy under which police officers in England and Wales use firearms has
resulted in controversy. Notorious recent examples include theStephen Waldorf
shooting in 1983, the shooting of James Ashley in 1998, Harry Stanley in
1999, Jean Charles de Menezes in 2005 andAbdul Kahar in 2006.
Deaths in police custody
In 1997/98, 69 people died in police custody or following contact with the police
across England and Wales; 26 resulted from deliberate self harm.[51]
There are two defined categories of death in custody issued by the Home
Office:
Category A: This category also encompasses deaths of those under arrest who are
held in temporary police accommodation or have been taken to hospital following
arrest. It also includes those who die, following arrest, whilst in a police vehicle.
 s/he has been taken to a police station after being arrested for an offence, or
 s/he is arrested at a police station after attending voluntarily at the station or
accompanying a Constable to it, and is detained there or is detained elsewhere
in the charge of a constable, except that a person who is at a court after being
charged is not in police detention for those purposes.
Category B: Where the deceased was otherwise in the hands of the police or death
resulted from the actions of a police officer in the purported execution of his duty.
 when suspects are being interviewed by the police but have not been
detained;
 when persons are actively attempting to evade arrest;
122
LEA-6
2011
 when persons are stopped and searched or questioned by the police; and
 when persons are in police vehicles (other than whilst in police detention).
Recent issues
Evidence of corruption in the 1970s, serious urban riots and the police role in
controlling industrial disorder in the 1980s, and the changing nature of police
procedure made police accountability and control a major political football from
the 1990s onwards.

The coal miners' strike (1984–1985) saw thousands of police from various
forces deployed against miners, frequently resulting in violent confrontation.

The presence of Freemasons in the police caused disquiet in the early 1990s.

The Fettesgate scandal in the early 1990s concerned the theft (and allegedly
the subsequent recovery) of sensitive documents from
theEdinburgh headquarters of Lothian and Borders Police. Nobody has ever
been charged, and, at least publicly, no officer was disciplined.

The perceived absence of a visible police presence on the streets also
frequently causes concern. This is partially being addressed by the introduction
of uniformed Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs), following the
passing of the Police Reform Act 2002, although some have criticised these as
for being a cheap alternative to fully trained police officers.[53]

Recent undercover TV programmes BBC's The Secret Policeman[54] and
the Channel 4 Dispatches programme Undercover Copper[55]raised questions of
standards within UK police forces.
Racism
Despite attempts to end racism and what the Macpherson Report described as
"institutionalized racism" in the police since the 1993 murder of Stephen
Lawrence, there have been ongoing problems. At the same time, some
commentators and academics have claimed that political correctness and excessive
sensitivity to issues of race and class have reduced the effectiveness of the police
123
LEA-6
2011
force, not least for people living in deprived areas or members of minority groups
themselves.
In 2003, ten police officers from Greater Manchester Police, North Wales
Police and Cheshire Constabulary were forced to resign after a BBC
documentary, The Secret Policeman, shown on 21 October, revealed racism among
recruits at Bruche Police National Training Centre at Warrington. On 4 March
2005 the BBC noted that minor disciplinary action would be taken against twelve
other officers (eleven from Greater Manchester Police and one from Lancashire
Constabulary) in connection with the programme, but that they would not lose their
jobs. In November 2003, allegations were made that some police officers were
members of the far-right British National Party.
Privacy
At the beginning of 2005 it was announced that the Police Information Technology
Organisation (PITO) had signed an eight-year £122 m contract to
introduce biometric identification technology.[56] PITO are also planning to
use CCTV facial recognition systems to identify known suspects; a future link to
the proposed National Identity Register has been suggested by some.[57]
Freedom of speech
A number of recent cases where police intervened in matters of free speech have
also given rise to allegations[who?] that the police are in danger of becoming thought
police. In December 2005, author Lynette Burrows was interviewed by police after
expressing her opinion on BBC Radio 5 Live that homosexuals should not be
allowed to adopt children.[58] The following month, Sir Iqbal Sacranie was
investigated by police for stating the Islamic view that homosexuality is a sin.[59]
Photography of police
Main article: Counter-Terrorism Act 2008#Photographs of police officers in
public places
Section 76 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 came into force on 15 February
2009[60] making it an offence to elicit, attempt to elicit, or publish information "...of
a kind likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism"
about:[61] a member of Her Majesty's Armed Forces; a constable, the Security
Service, the Secret Intelligence Service, or Government Communications
124
LEA-6
2011
Headquarters. Any person found guilty faces 10 years imprisonment and an

unlimited fine.[61] It is a defense for a person charged with this offence to prove that
they had a reasonable excuse for their action.[61] Outside of such circumstances,
however, it is perfectly legal to photograph or video a police officer in a public
place.
Policing of protests
In April 2009, a total of 145 complaints were made following clashes between
police and protesters at the G20 summit.[62] Incidents including the death of 47 year
old Ian Tomlinson,[63] minutes after an alleged assault by a police officer,[64] and a
separate alleged assault on a woman by a police officer,[65] has led to criticism of
police tactics during protests.[66] In response, Metropolitan Police Commissioner
Sir Paul Stephenson asked Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary (HMIC)
to review policing tactics,[67] including the practice of kettling.[68]
Fixated Threat Assessment Centre
Main article: Fixated Threat Assessment Centre
In the United Kingdom, the Fixated Threat Assessment Centre is a joint
police/mental health unit set up in October 2006 by the Home Office,
the Department of Health and Metropolitan Police Service to identify and address
those individuals considered to pose a threat to VIPs or the Royal Family. [69]
[70]
They may then referred to local health services for further assessment and
potential involuntary commitment. In some cases, they may be detained by police
under the section 136 powers of the Mental Health Act 1983 prior to referral.
Proposed mergers for England and Wales
In 1981, James Anderton, the then Chief Constable of Greater Manchester
Police called for 10 regional police forces for England and Wales, one for each
region that would be adopted as Government Office Regions in England, plus
Wales.[71]
A 2004 proposal by the Police Superintendents' Association for the creation of a
single national police force, similar to Garda Síochána na hÉireann was rejected by
the Association of Chief Police Officers, and the government has thus far agreed.
[72]
125
LEA-6
2011
In September 2005, in a report[73] delivered to the then Home Secretary, Charles

Clarke, HM Inspectorate of Constabulary suggested that the forty-three force
structure in England and Wales was "no longer fit for purpose" and smaller forces
should be forcibly merged. As of 2005, nineteen forces had fewer than 2,000
regular officers, and the report suggested that forces with 4,000 or more officers
performed better and could deliver cost savings.[74] Forces were asked to produce
proposals for mergers, within Wales and the English Government Office Regions.
Nearly all the existing forces were under the 4,000 limit, with only
the Metropolitan Police, Greater Manchester Police, Merseyside
Police, Northumbria Police, Thames Valley Police, West Midlands
Police and West Yorkshire Police over the limit - see Table of police forces in the
United Kingdom for a full list.
Draft options were announced in November 2005. [75] The Home Office offered
money to police authorities that decided to voluntarily merge ahead of schedule,
and was consequently accused of attempting to "bribe" unwilling Chief Constables
into compliance.[76] The proposals were debated in the House of Commons on 19
December 2005.[77] Most Chief Constables and police authorities did not back the
measure,[78] and some suggested that cross-regional mergers would make more
sense (for example, Hampshire Constabulary in the South East suggested it could
merge with Dorset Police in the South West, whilst there was also a suggestion
of North Wales Police increasing co-operation with Cheshire Police)[79]
On 6 February 2006, preferred options for several regions were announced by the
Home Secretary in a written ministerial statement,[80][81]and set a deadline of 24
February for forces to agree to the mergers. By this dead-line the only merger to
have the agreement of all forces involved was the Cumbria/Lancashire merger.
Cheshire was opposed to a merger with Merseyside, and West Mercia and
Cleveland were holdouts in their regions, whilst all the Welsh forces opposed the
creation of a single Welsh force.[82] The Home Secretary had the power to order the
Cumbria/Lancashire merger to proceed by statutory instrument under the Police
Act 1996, and also to force through the contested mergers, given a four-month
consultation period. In a Written Statement made on 3 March 2006, [83] he
announced that the Lancashire/Cumbria merger could be ordered in May, and that
the consultation period on the others was starting, and would end on 2 July 2006.
The new forces would come into being on 1 April 2007.[84][85]
126
LEA-6
2011
A second batch of merger proposals were made on 20 March 2006, with the
Eastern, East Midlands and South East regions covered. A deadline of 7 April 2006
was set for responses, after which it was expected that the process above would be
followed.[86][87][88] The following day, the Home Secretary proposed a merger of all
four forces in the Yorkshire and the Humber region.[89] The consultation period on
this second batch of mergers started on 11 April 2006, and would have finished on
11 August, with a target of 1 April 2008 for the mergers coming into effect.[90]
Greater London
Metropolitan Police officers on the beat
inLondon's Trafalgar Square
Upon the publication of the proposals, the Greater
London area was not included. This was due to two
separate reviews of policing in the capital - the first
was a review by the Department of Transport into
the future role and function of the British Transport Police. The second was a
review by the Attorney-General into national measures for combating fraud (the
City of London Police is one of the major organisations for combating economic
crime).[91] Both the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Sir Ian Blair, and
the Mayor, Ken Livingstone, stated that they would like to see a single police force
in London, with the Metropolitan Police absorbing the City of London Police and
the functions of the British Transport Police in London.[92]
However, this met with criticism from several areas; the House of Commons
Transport Select Committee severely criticised the idea of the Metropolitan Police
taking over policing of the rail network in a report published on 16 May 2006,
[93]
while the City of London Corporation and several major financial institutions
in The Citymade public their opposition to the City Police merging with the Met.
[94]
In a statement on 20 July 2006, the Transport Secretary announced that there
would be no structural or operational changes to the British Transport Police,
effectively ruling out any merger[95]
The interim report by the Attorney General's fraud review recognised the role
taken by the City Police as the lead force in London and the South-East for
tackling fraud, and made a recommendation that, should a national lead force be
127
LEA-6
2011
required, the City Police, with its expertise, would be an ideal candidate to take this
role.[96] This view was confirmed on the publication of the final report, which
recommended that the City of London Police's Fraud Squad should be the national
lead force in combatting fraud, to "act as a centre of excellence, disseminate best
practice, give advice on complex inquiries in other regions, and assist with or
direct the most complex of such investigations"[97]
Merger abandonment
On 20 June 2006 the new Home Secretary, John Reid, announced that the
contested mergers would be delayed for further discussion, [98]and no mergers
would be ordered before Parliament's summer recess on 25 July other than the
agreed Lancashire/Cumbria one.
On 11 July 2006, it then emerged that the entire proposal for police mergers might
be ended, following the decision by the only two forces to have agreed to
amalgamation, Cumbria and Lancashire, not to proceed.[99] The announcement of
this was followed by the head of the ACPOstating that "The necessary financial
support has not materialised and mergers, including voluntary ones, will not take
place".[100] On 12 July 2006, the Home Office confirmed that the mergers were to
be abandoned, with the entire proposal taken back for consultation.[101]
Other police forces
Policing in Scotland and Northern Ireland does not come under the purview of the
Home Office, and so would have remained unaffected by these proposals.
Likewise, the major non-territorial forces (British Transport Police, Civil Nuclear
Constabulary, Ministry of Defence Police) are responsible to other government
departments, and so would not have been affected by this review.
List of proposed mergers
Note: these mergers have all been suspended in the long term while a further review and
consultation into policing in England and Wales takes place
Region Proposed force
Eastern Merge Bedfordshire Police, Essex Police and Hertfordshire
128
LEA-6
2011
Constabulary
Merge Cambridgeshire Constabulary, Norfolk
Constabulary and Suffolk Constabulary
Merge Derbyshire Constabulary, Leicestershire
East Midlands Constabulary, Lincolnshire Police, Northamptonshire
Police andNottinghamshire Police
London not included in the review of policing, so City of London

London
Police and Metropolitan Police unaffected.
Merge Cleveland Police, Durham Constabulary and Northumbria

North-East
Police
Merge Cumbria Constabulary and Lancashire Constabulary
North-West Merge Cheshire Constabulary and Merseyside Police
Greater Manchester Police unchanged
Kent Police unchanged
Merge Surrey Police and Sussex Police

South-East
Hampshire Constabulary unchanged
Thames Valley Police unchanged
129
LEA-6
2011
Option 1: Merge Avon and Somerset Constabulary, Devon and

Cornwall Constabulary, Gloucestershire Constabulary,Dorset
Police and Wiltshire Constabulary
South-West[102]
Option 2: Merge Avon and Somerset Constabulary,
Gloucestershire Constabulary, Wiltshire Constabulary and Dorset
Police
Devon and Cornwall Constabulary unchanged
Merge Dyfed-Powys Police, Gwent Police, North Wales

Wales
Police and South Wales Police
Merge Staffordshire Police, Warwickshire Police, West Mercia

West Midlands
Constabulary, West Midlands Police
Yorkshire and Merge Humberside Police, North Yorkshire Police, South

Humberside Yorkshire Police, West Yorkshire Police
Border and Immigration Agency/UK Border Agency

As part of the wide ranging review of the Home Office, the then Home
Secretary, John Reid, announced in July 2006 that all British immigration officers
would be uniformed. On April 1, 2007, the Border and Immigration Agency (BIA)
was created and commenced operation. However, there were no police officers in
the Agency, a matter that attracted considerable criticism when the Agency was
established - agency officers have limited powers of arrest. Further powers for
designated officers within the Agency, including powers of detention pending the
arrival of a police officer, were introduced by the UK Borders Act 2007.[103]
The Government has effectively admitted the shortcomings of the Agency by
making a number fundamental changes within a year of its commencement. On 1
April 2008 the BIA became the UK Border Agency following a merger
with UKvisas, the port of entry functions of HM Revenue and Customs. The Home
Secretary, Jacqui Smith, announced that the UK Border Agency (UKBA) "...will
130
LEA-6
2011
bring together the work of the Border and Immigration Agency, UK Visas and
parts of HM Revenue and Customs at the border, [and] will work closely with the
police and other law enforcement agencies to improve border controls and
security."[104]
Within months of this, the Home Secretary revealed (in a 16-page response to a
report by Lord Carlile, the independent reviewer of UK terrorism legislation) that
the Home Office will issue a Green Paper proposing to take forward proposals by
the Association of Chief Police Officers (England & Wales) for the establishment
of a new 3,000-strong national border police force to work alongside the Agency.
[105][106]
National Crime Force (England and Wales)

In April 2007, the Leader of the Opposition, David Cameron announced
the Conservative Party's proposals for reform of policing. These included:
 Replacing police authorities with directly elected police commissioners.

These individuals would have control over budgets and target setting, with the
Chief Constable retaining operational control of policing.
 Giving the public the right to discuss local policing issues with their local
police officers at regular meetings.
In addition, the proposals made clear that on the issue of serious crime the 43
police forces in England and Wales would either have to have greater cooperation,
or that the serious crime elements of their function would be invested in a National
Serious Crime Force.[107]
Police pay
The decision by the Home Secretary to refuse to implement, in England and Wales,
the recommendation of the Police Arbitration Tribunal of a 2.5% increase in pay
has caused widespread anger, especially as this decision stood in sharp contrast to
the decision of the Scottish Government to fully implement the award for police
officers in Scotland by backdating it to 1 September 2007.[108] By instead
implementing the award with effect from 1 December 2007, the Home
Secretary effectively reduced it to 1.9%, claiming that this was necessary to control
inflation, despite the fact that police authorities had already made provision for the
131
LEA-6
2011
full 2.5% increase from their revenue budgets. There were marches on
Westminster by off-duty officers as a result.
Proposed mergers for Scotland
In 2010, the Justice Secretary in Scotland, Kenny MacAskill, outlined plans for
reform of policing in Scotland. Under a consultation, three proposals would be
discussed in light of the financial situation and the need for some level of budget
cuts:
1. The eight existing police forces are retained, but with "increased
collaboration"
2. Policing in Scotland moves towards a more regional structure, with the
number of individual forces reduced
3. All eight Scottish police forces are merged to form a single Scottish police
service
According to the Scottish Government, approximately 25% of the total police

budget in Scotland is spent on Headquarters costs. TheScottish National Party has
made a commitment to increasing numbers of police officers by up to 1,000.
Both Labour and the Conservativeshave come out in favour of a single force, while
the Liberal Democrats are against this proposal.
Overseas police forces in the UK

There are certain instances where police forces of other nations operate in a limited
degree in the United Kingdom:

The Police aux Frontières or PAF (French Border Police), a division of
the Police Nationale, is permitted to operate in regard to Eurostarrail services
through the Channel Tunnel. This includes on Eurostar trains to London, within
the international terminal at St Pancras Station, at Ebbsfleet and Ashford
International railway stations, and at the Cheriton Parc Le Shuttle terminal
(alongside French Customsofficials). The PAF also operate at Dover Ferry
terminals. This arrangement is reciprocated to the British Transport Police, UK
Border Agency, and UK Customs Officers on Paris bound trains and within the
132
LEA-6
2011
terminal at Paris Gare du Nord, Coquelles (Le Shuttle), Gare de Lille-

Europe, Bruxelles-Midi/Brussel-Zuid and the Calais, Dunkerque, and Boulogne
ferry terminals.[110] The French police officers are not permitted to carry their
firearms in the London Terminal; the firearms must be left on the train.

An Garda Síochána na hÉireann (Irish Police), under a recent agreement
between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, have the right,
alongside the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland, to carry out
inspections of the Sellafield nuclear facility in Cumbria.[111]

In 2006 a small number of officers from the Policja (Polish Police) were
seconded to the North Wales Police to assist with the supervision of foreign
(largely eastern European) truck traffic largely on European route E22 (the A55
road).[112] The Chief Constable of North Wales has publicly stated (November
2006) that he is considering directly recruiting a small number of officers from
Poland to assist with policing the substantial population of Polish people that
have migrated to his area since Poland's accession to the EU in 2004.[113]

Military Police of forces present in the UK within the terms of the Visiting
Forces Act 1952 are permitted to travel to/from relevant premises in uniform
and their (usually distinctive) vehicles will occasionally be seen. Their powers
(including the carrying of firearms) are generally limited by that and other
legislation to those necessary for the performance of duties related to their own
forces and to those possessed by the General Public.
D.7 “Programs of Selected Police Models and its application to Philippine

Setting”
(Student Work Assignment)
Possible Role Models: Police Structures in Established Democracies
By: Christopher Paun
Describing the police structures and police reform in established democracies

serves two purposes. On the one hand, those states are likely to serve as role
models for states in transition to democracy. On the other hand, it serves as a frame
of reference to asses whether the police structures in the case studies are
rather centralized or decentralized by international comparison. States that have
133
LEA-6
2011
been chosen as possible examples, are the USA and France as the oldest
democracies of modern times, the UK as a very influential state that also served as
the basis for the US police system, and Germany and Japan as examples of states
that have been successfully led to democracy by external intervention, which
included an externally supervised police reform. After the short description of the
police structures in these selected countries, the chapter is concluded with a brief
categorization of the police structures of the states of the G7, the EU15 and
Switzerland.

1. Policing in the United Kingdom
The police structures in the United Kingdom and in the United States both have
their roots in the so called frankpledge system of the 12th and 13th century in
England. In this system the king appointed for every shire (or county) one
shire-reeve (or Sheriff), who was the local judge and chief of police. The sheriff
was the only paid professional in the policing system. Two unpaid constables have
been drafted per every about 100 citizens, to assist the sheriff and patrol in their
neighborhood3 (Mawby 1999: 29, Roberg et. al. 2000: 33). When the judiciary
became independent, the sheriff was not anymore the local judge, but he remained
the local chief of police and prison warden. In the late 18th century increasing
crime rates, especially in cities, led to demands to create a professional police
force. The attempt to create a London city police in 1785 was rejected, as citizens
feared a repressive police after the example of the authoritarian states in
continental Europe. But there have been fewer concerns about civil liberties in the
English colony of Ireland. And therefore a Dublin city police has been established
with a police act of 1786. The Dublin police was designed to be a centralized,
militarized and repressive colonial police (Waddington 1999: 24-26, Mawby 1999:
32).

In England it took until 1829, until the home secretary Sir Robert Peel managed to
get approval for a police act establishing the London Metropolitan Police. His
plan was to establish a professional police that was not repressive and respected the
civil liberties of the citizens. Therefore the London police was unarmed and was
wearing a uniform that clearly differed from military uniforms. For the democratic
control of the police, local watch committees have been established since 1835
134
LEA-6
2011
comprised of local council members and representatives of the judiciary (Mawby

1999: 33, Roberg et. al. 2000: 35, Waddington 1999: 21-24).

The London Metropolitan Police served as a role model for the introduction of
many local police forces in England and Wales. Since 1856 all counties and
boroughs have been obliged by law to run a professional police force. In exchange
the national government covered 25% of the costs. In 1874 the national financing
has been increased to 50% in exchange for a centralized setting of standards for the
police. So by the late 19th century the unpaid self-policing system has been
completely replaced by more than 200 professional local police forces each under
the control of local committees, but meeting national standards due to shared local-
national financing of the police. With several reforms increasing the minimum size
of a police force, the number of police forces in England, Wales and Scotland has
been reduced to 51 until the 1960s and has remained stable since then (Mawby
1999: 42. Tupman 1999: 5).

Most scholars describe the English police system as a decentralized system, as
only the standards are set nationally, but policing is mainly a local task. However,
some scholars disagree and argue that it is rather centralized, because they consider
the national control more important than the local control (e.g. Loveday 1999).
Contrary to common belief, there is no centralized criminal investigation police in
England. Every local English police has its own criminal investigation department
(CID). Only the CID of the London Metropolitan Police (Scotland Yard) has such
a good reputation that it is often called for help by other local police forces
(Mawby 1999: 41). To summarize, the characteristic of the English police system
is its mixed national and local democratic control with the 50/50 financing that
ensures national standards but defines policing as a mainly a local task.
______________________________
The police structures in England and Wales are identical. In Scotland the local
control is exercised mainly through representatives of the judiciary and less
through local council members. In Northern
Ireland the centralized colonial policing model has been kept until today. But a
police reform is part of the peace agreement of 2006. On some Channel Islands
135
LEA-6
2011
unpaid constables are still part of the policing system (Mawby 1999: 33, 41-45,
BBC 2006).
2. Policing in the United States of America
At first the English colonies in North America adapted the English policing
system with its unpaid constables. But some counties decided to have paid police
forces instead. With the independence of the USA, the office of sheriff was turned
into an electoral office and a network of sheriff departments5 and other local police
forces emerged throughout the states. Especially cities increasingly developed
professional police forces after the example of the London metropolitan police
between since the 1830s (Roberg et. al. 2000: 38-40, Mawby 1999: 31, 38). Until
the 1920s the local police was almost the only form of police structure in the USA.
But this form of policing has been heavily criticized due to high levels of
corruption and political influence. In a patronage system people have been
rewarded for political support with employment by the police. For example, after
the elections of 1880 in Cincinnati 219 of 295 police officers have been replaced
(Roberg et. al. 2000: 44).
In such a police system the police officers have been loyal rather to their patron
than to the law. Decisions about police actions against labor rallies, for example,
have been made according to political considerations instead of the legal situation
of labor unions (Roberg et. al. 2000: 45, Mawby 1999: 39). And also the treatment
of Afro- Americans was largely influenced by “local customs” instead of laws,
especially in the Southern states. Even though federal law (Ku Klux Klan Act of
1871) regulated the equal treatment of Afro-Americans by the police throughout
the states, it had little effect in the South. It took until 1936 until the law was first
successfully applied by the US Supreme Court (Skolnick 2001: 223).

In the early 20th century there were increasing demands for a police reform in
order to professionalize the police, reduce corruption and political influence, and
increase the accountability of the police to the law. As a structural method to
achieve these goals the so-called progressive movement demanded police
centralization. Further arguments for police centralization have been economies of
136
LEA-6
2011
scale arguments and the examples of continental European police forces that have
been considered to be much more professional.
They have been able to employ criminologists with university degrees, which was
impossible for small local police forces in the US. Especially influential was the
development of criminal investigation records by the French
criminologist Alphonse Bertillion. He established a system to take pictures and
body measurements of criminals on file that was later complemented
with fingerprints. The storing of such files by more than 3000 local police offices
in the USA would have been much more inefficient than a centralized system.
(Roberg et. al. 2000: 45-47) In 1908 the FBI was created within the national
department of justice, with very little competences, as it was based on an executive
order by President Roosevelt and had no approval from Congress.
The bureau took over the national clearinghouse for criminal investigation records
from the Association of Chiefs of Police. Since the 1920s, the FBI got more
competencies and funding, and developed into a federal criminal investigation
police. Parallel to the FBI and local police forces, also state police agencies have
been created. Before 1900 only Texas and Massachusetts had state police agencies,
but until 1960, all states created a state police service (Mawby 1999: 38-40,
Roberg 2000: 51-59).
The division of competencies between different police agencies is not totally clear
until today. For a given policing task, there are often more than one police agency
that could claim responsibility. Therefore the distribution of police competencies
between local, state and federal level has often been an issue of political debate.
Especially economic difficulties during the recession of the 1930s led counties to
downsize their local police and accept increasing competences by the state police.

This is also true for the FBI, which got a good reputation in the fight against
organized crime during the prohibition era and afterwards. Therefore the FBI
became a general criminal investigation police, which can claim jurisdiction over
any “federal crime”, which is given, for example, if the crime involves crossing a
137
LEA-6
2011
state border or has effects in more than one state (Roberg et. al. 2000: 58-90,
Mawby 1999: 47).
However, since the 1960s there is a movement against police centralization, as

arguments for centralized police have been counterbalance with the idea of
“community policing”, which is about better relations between police and the local
community. (see p. 34) To summarize, the characteristic of the US policing system
are police agencies on all state levels: the municipality, the county, the state, and
the federal level. The system is clearly decentralized, when it comes to preventive
policing and emergency response. But the federal level has increasing
competencies when it comes to the investigation of trans-state crimes and
especially organized crime.
3. Policing in France
Police researchers often use the term “Napoleonic” to categorize a certain police
structure, which can be found for example in today’s France, Italy, and Spain
(Tupman 1999: 13). In the 19th and early 20th century it was the most common
police structure throughout continental Europe. It was used by countries as diverse
as Portugal, the Netherlands, Poland, Austria-Hungary and many German states.
These countries either developed a Napoleonic police structure when they had been
conquered by Napoleon, or, if they had not been conquered, they modeled their
police structure after the Napoleonic model. This Napoleonic police structure is to
be described here at the example of the motherland France. The hallmark of the
structure are different national police forces, which are accountable to different
national ministries. In France, the Gendarmerie is responsible for policing
throughout the country and especially in rural areas. It is accountable to the
ministry of defense. The Police Nationale is responsible for policing in cities and is
accountable to the ministry of the interior. The Police Judiciaire is the criminal
investigation police and is accountable to the ministry of justice. However, the
Police Judiciaire and the Police Nationale are working very close together. They
often share buildings and employees can transfer from one organization to the
other, while the Gendarmerie is a completely separate organization. (Horton 1995:
26)
The Gendarmerie is the oldest police agency in France, named as such since its
reconstitution in 1791. The predecessor-organization was the Maréchaussée, a
138
LEA-6
2011
military police in existence since the 14th century, whose functions had been
expanded towards general policing since the 16th century. However, the main
function of the Maréchaussée was not to protect the citizens, it was to protect the
state, by preventing revolutions, civil disorder, and policing the military (Horton
1995:18). With increasing urbanization, special city guards have been created with
the responsibility to police a particular city.
The first of such city guards has been created in 1667 in Paris. Joseph Fouché, who
was Napoleons Minister of Police from 1799 to 1810, has established a centralized
management of the different city polices. But this centralized control of the police
was limited to the protection of the state, which remained a central function of the
French police due to the many insurgencies and coup d’états.7
The protection of the citizens from criminals in cities remained at first under the
decentralized control of the local mayors, while the centralized Gendarmerie was
policing the rural areas. But with the integration of the Paris police and the Lyon
police into one national police, the centralization of city polices started and more
of them have been integrated until the 1920s. However, the complete centralization
of the city polices into one national police is a result of the occupation by Nazi-
Germany. (Horton 1995: 10)
Since the 1980s, the centralized character of the French police is being challenged
by the community policing idea, which is called “police de proximité” in France.
In several cities small municipal police agencies have been created to establish
good relations to the community and work parallel to the national police. However,
the bulk of the police work is still done by the national police. The municipal
police agencies together have only about 5% of the employees of all French police
agencies (Brogden / Nijhar 2005: 111). So despite of some community policing,
the main characteristic of the French police structure remained the different
centralized police forces, which are accountable to different national ministries.
4. Policing in Germany
The police in Germany has been radically restructured after World War II. The
main influencing factors have been the police reform plans of the occupying
powers and the history of the German police system. German politicians have been
advocating for the “status quo ante”, meaning the structure of the police in the
Weimar Republic before the Nazis seized power. But the Weimar Republic did not
actually have a well structured police. In the situation of fragile statehood8 after
139
LEA-6
2011
World War I different guards have been created parallel to the police agencies, and
some of those guards have been integrated into the official police agencies. And
when statehood has been regained, existing agencies have been kept with very little
reform. A “democratization of the police” was not on the agenda, as stability and
security had priority before democratization.
However, one constant in the German policing system was the responsibility of the
German states for policing. Already at the unification of the German Reich in
1871, all 25 German states kept the sovereignty in the area of policing. Some city-
states had police after the English model, while most states, including Prussia, had
Napoleonic policing systems. Prussia, as the largest German state and with its
special role, dominated the German policing system, but the police was not
centralized until the Nazis seized power. After the occupation of Germany the
allied powers have redrawn the borders of the German states and abolished Prussia
as a state. As a consequence, there was not anymore one single state that could
dominate the others. (Funk 2000, Leßmann-Faus 2000, Reinke / Fürmetz 2000)
The allied occupation powers have agreed on a police reform program, which is
usually described with the so-called four “D”s: denazification, demilitarization,
decentralization and democratization. The implementation of this program varied
in the different occupation zones. There was more concern about denazification in
the Soviet and the American zone, while the British and the French tolerated more
police officers with a Nazi history. When it comes to democratization, the longest
lasting influence of the Western allies was the limitation of police powers.
Traditionally the German police had very far-reaching powers that included even
some lawmaking and some judicial competencies. These powers have been
abolished. Local watch committees had been created for the democratic control of
the police after the English model. But these committees have been abolished with
the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949.
As a matter of police decentralization, municipal police agencies have been

created, but with the exception of the British, the occupying powers allowed the
creation of state police agencies parallel to the local police agencies. The West
German politicians did not like the idea of municipal police agencies and
advocated for police centralization. They were finally allowed to centralize the
police in each of the German states with the founding of West Germany, but the
occupying powers required them to keep this decentralized character of the police
(Reinke / Fürmetz 2000).
140
LEA-6
2011
In East Germany the police has been completely centralized on the national level in
1952, like all other administrative structures in the socialist authoritarian state.
With the reunification of Germany in 1990 the East German states have adopted
the West German policing system and received assistance from the West German
police. Thereby the decentralized system of state police agencies has been
established for Germany as a whole. Since Germany regained full sovereignty with
its reunification, there are some contended tendencies to expand the competencies
of the Federal Criminal Investigation Office (BKA) and the Federal Border Guard
(BGS). The border guard has been renamed to Federal Police in 2005, to reflect the
diminishing importance of borders in a unified European Union. (Lindenberger
2000, Haselow et. al. 2000, Lisken / Lange 2000) In spite of these recent
developments, the German police system is still characterized by its decentralized
structure on the state-level. There are no municipal police agencies and only
limited competencies for federal police agencies, such as in the area of
transnational organized crime.
5. Policing in Japan
After World War II the US administration had similar plans for police reform in
Japan as in Germany: demilitarization, decentralization and democratization. But
depoliticization was not on the agenda, as the Japanese government has been kept,
and even the Japanese emperor was not forced to resign. Unlike in Germany, there
was no democratic tradition that could have been build upon. The empire existed
since 1868, and before, there was a feudal system called Shogunat Tokugawa
(1603-1868).
In the Shogunat, the policing system was very decentral. The samurais, as the
lowest ranking noble men, have been responsible for policing in their area. For that
purpose, they combined five to ten families to a group (gonon-gumi) that was
punished as a whole, if one of their members committed a crime. Therefore
policing was based on a high level of social control. At the end of the Shogunat the
new emperor secured his power with a new centralized police after the examples of
France and Prussia.
The Japanese police had similar far reaching powers as in Prussia, and it still
employed the gonin-gumi system of social control. (Aldous 1997: 19-40, Leishman
1999) After World War II, the national police has been kept until 1947, when a
police reform plan has been implemented together with the entry into force of the
141
LEA-6
2011
new constitution. According to this plan, every city with more than 50 000
inhabitants had to create a municipal police. For the policing of smaller towns and
rural areas, the US advisors proposed state police agencies on the level of the
Japanese prefectures (todōfuken).
But as a compromise with the Japanese cabinet, the national police has been kept
to police the rural areas instead. However, the cities did not have enough financial
resources to create adequate municipal police agencies. The low salaries of police
officers led to a further increase of the high level of corruption. And as the
municipal police agencies have been overstrained, the national police continued to
be active in cities. So the plan for the police reform was based on the US model,
but the result was a somehow Napoleonic system with competing police agencies
(Aldous 1997: 148-207, Leishmann 1999).
In 1951, the Japanese parliament has passed a law that allowed the cities to hold a
referendum weather to keep or abolish their municipal police agencies. And within
only six months, 1028 cities have held referenda of which 1024 resulted in the
abolition of the local police and the integration of their police stations and officers
into the national police. In response to continuing demands of US officials for
police decentralization and democratization, Japan has reformed its police again in
1954. In this reform the national police has been restructured into sub-divisions
along the lines of the prefectures.
The control of these sub-divisions is mixed: by the national minister of the interior
and by the local prefect, as well as by a national and a prefectural civil watch
committee. However, the democratic control on the subnational level is rather
consultative. The advice needs to be passed to the national level, where the control
of the police actually lies (Aldous 1997: 218f, Leishman 1999). This police
structure is in existence in Japan until today. In essence, it can be described as
centralized system, with minor decentralized consultation mechanisms.
Overview of Police Structures in Established Democracies
The police structures in five very important democracies have been briefly
described above. Japan is an example of a centralized police structure. France is an
example of the Napoleonic structure, with different centralized police agencies.
And the USA, the UK, and Germany are examples of different decentralized police
structures. The USA has police agencies on all state levels, Germany has its police
mainly on the state-level, and the UK has a system of combine central and
decentralized democratic control of the police. An overview of the police
142
LEA-6
2011
structures in the states of the G7, the EU15 and Switzerland can be seen in Figure
1.
The G7 and the EU15 have been chosen as the can be described as “clubs of
democracies”, and Switzerland has been added as it is also a very old democracy
with a distinct political system. The figure also illustrates some changes to police
structures. For example the Police in the Netherlands used to be Napoleonic, but
was reformed in 1990 after the example of the decentralized English police, but the
result is not an exact copy. On the contrary, Austria and Luxemburg have chosen
to merge their Napoleonic police agencies into centralized national police agencies.
Centralizations of previously decentralized police structures happened in Sweden
and in Finland.
PART IV
The Role of INTERPOL
143
LEA-6
2011
- Organizational Setup
- Functions and Programs
- Role in Anti-Transnational Crime
- Criminal Intelligence Analysis
E-1. INTERPOL – A Global Organization
• Created in 1923, INTERPOL is the world’s largest international police

organization, with 188 member countries
• General Secretariat in Lyon, France,

six Sub-Regional Bureaus, one Liaison
Office, and one Office of the Special
Representative of INTERPOL to the United Nations.
• Four official languages: Arabic, English, French and Spanish
• A National Central Bureau (NCB) in each member country
Milestones in INTERPOL’s history
1914 – First International Criminal Police Congress held in Monaco (23

countries in attendance)
1923 – Creation of International Criminal Police Commission, based in
Vienna
1946 – Organization rebuilt after WWII and based in Paris; notice system
created and first Red Notices issued
1956 – Renamed International Criminal Police Organization - INTERPOL
144
LEA-6
2011
1971 – Recognised as intergovernmental organization by the UN

1989 – General Secretariat moves from Paris to Lyon
2004 – INTERPOL representative office opened at the UN in New York
Governance and management
THE INTERNATIONAL
POLICE (INTERPOL)
The role of the International Police in the control of the impact of

globalization in policing and human rights violations is tremendous being uniquely
positioned to contribute substantially to the success of all law enforcement efforts
armed at combating global crimes, human rights violation, and terrorism.
GLOBAL ISSUES FACE BY THE INTERPOL
- Crime that is increasing Internationally

- Terrorist plot and train
- Traffickers smuggle drugs across boarders
- Hackers steal personal data
- Counterfeit Medicine that kills people
- Children are sexually abused
- Fugitives makes their escape
In a Globalized and interconnected world, crime is increasingly international. As

criminals cross boarders, police needs to stay one step ahead. Interpol brings the
world police forces together to solve international crimes at the heart of every
member country, an Interpol Bureau links national police with their global
145
LEA-6
2011
networks and general secretariat in France 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, watch
the world together, analyzed and share information on crime.
Searching for data, sharing analysis, making connections to track down criminals,
our red notices alert worldwide to wanted persons, bridging a member country over
our secure communications network.
Interpol warned police of different criminal activities and threats using the latest
technology to reach out officers on the frontline to support our member countries
specialized police provided operational assistance and crisis response and build
skills training courses helping national police to use our data bases up dated day
and night. The data base is provided real time criminal information. This countries
helping out together makes Interpol unique.
Definition
Interpol is the acronym of the International Criminal Police Organization, an

international non-governmental police organization that presently counts member
agencies from 186 nations. Interpol primarily facilitates international co-operation
among criminal law enforcement agencies from different parts of the world, and
also co-operates with other organizations involved with combating international
crime.
To achieve its mission, Interpol operates a central headquarters, the General

Secretariat located in Lyon, France, that is linked for information exchange with its
member agencies via so-called National Central Bureaus. Since its formation in
1923, Interpol has continually expanded its membership, even in periods of
international instability.
Formally, Interpol has four core functions.
146
LEA-6
2011
INTERPOL’s 4 core functions
Core function #1: Secure global police communications services
INTERPOL’s global police communications system,

known as I-24/7, enables police in all member countries
to request, submit and access vital data instantly in a
secure environment.
Originally conducted by regular mail, since 2003 these communications have been
electronically secured through an encrypted internet-based system called I-24/7
connecting the General Secretariat in Lyon with the National Central Bureaus.
I-24/7 - Connecting police, securing the world
• High-security global police network
• Gateway to INTERPOL databases
• Access to crucial data in seconds, any minute of any day
• Platform for sharing criminal information between law enforcement entities
• Controlled access
147
LEA-6
2011
• Trained personnel
• Adapted to police needs
Core function #2: Operational data services and databases for police
Member countries have direct and immediate access to a wide range of databases
including information on known criminals, fingerprints, DNA profiles and stolen
or lost travel documents. INTERPOL also disseminates critical crime-related data
through a system of international notices.
Interpol provides its member agencies with operational data and databases
containing information, such as names, fingerprints and DNA profiles, on
international fugitives from justice as well as information on stolen property such
as passports and works of art.
Operational databases and data services for police
INTERPOL Notices and Diffusions
148
LEA-6
2011
The INTERPOL Notices System
At the request of member countries, INTERPOL circulates electronic notices that

serve to alert police of fugitives, suspected terrorists, dangerous criminals, missing
persons or weapons threats.
Red Notice - to seek the arrest or provisional arrest of wanted persons with a view
to extradition
Blue Notice - to collect additional information about a person’s identity or illegal

activities in relation to a crime
Green Notice – to provide warnings and criminal intelligence about persons who
have committed criminal offences and are likely to repeat these crimes in other
countries.
Yellow Notice – to help locate missing persons
Black Notice – to seek information on unidentified bodies.
INTERPOL-United Nations Security Council Special Notice - issued for groups

and individuals associated with Al-Qaeda and the Taliban listed by the 1267
149
LEA-6
2011
Committee of the United Nations Security Council and subject to sanctions

through the freezing of assets, travel bans and arms embargoes.
Orange Notice – To warn police, public entities and other international

organizations of dangerous materials, criminal acts or events that pose a potential
threat to public safety.
Another frequently used tool is a ‘diffusion’, a wanted persons message sent by

NCBs through I-24/7, INTERPOL’s global police communications system. Unlike
a more formal notice, a diffusion can be sent immediately by an NCB to some or
all INTERPOL member countries.
MIND / FIND
Integrated solutions to access INTERPOL’s databases
• MIND – Mobile INTERPOL Network Database
• FIND – Fixed INTERPOL Network Database
Benefits of FIND and MIND:
• Brings the INTERPOL databases to the front line.
• Offers real-time information for front-line officers.
• Allows external users to access INTERPOL’s databases.
No language barriers in technical integration
Core function #3: Operational police support services
INTERPOL provides law enforcement officials in the field with emergency

support and operational activities, especially in its priority crime areas. A
Command and Co-ordination Centre operates 24 hours a day, seven days a week
and can deploy an Incident Response Team to the scene of a serious crime or
disaster.
Interpol offers operational assistance, particularly in Interpol’s priority areas,

which presently include public safety and terrorism, international fugitives
from justice, drugs and organized crime, human trafficking, and financial and
150
LEA-6
2011
high-tech crime. In support of these operational services, Interpol organizes a

Command and Coordination Centre that operates as the primary point of contact
for any member agency that seeks immediate support. Other operational support
can, at the request of a member agency, be provided by a Crisis Support Group, a
Criminal Analysis Unit, and Incident Response Teams or Disaster Victim
Identification Teams.
INTERPOL’s priority crime areas
INTERPOL’s initiatives in public safety and terrorism
• INTERPOL’s anti-terrorism program is designed to:
– increase the exchange of information on terrorist groups
– assist member countries in the event of terrorist incidents or

investigations through analytical, investigative and database support
– support member countries in building early detection and counter-

terrorism capacity through training and analytical products
• Environmental crimes - projects focusing on oil pollution, illegal

discharge of hazardous wastes, and illegal trafficking of endangered flora
and fauna.
• INTERPOL’s initiatives in public safety and terrorism
• Global initiatives on terrorism
151
LEA-6
2011
– Fusion Task Force (FTF) - created to initiate a proactive, multi-

disciplinary approach to assist member countries in terrorism-related
investigations.
– Fusion Task Force projects in specific regions:
• Amazon ð Central and South America
• Baobab ð Africa
• Europe ð Europe
• Kalkan ð Central Asia
• Middle East ð Middle East
• Pacific ð Southeast Asia
• Global initiatives on terrorism
– Terrorists Arrest Report - collects information from member
countries on individuals arrested for terrorist activities, along with
identifying data.
– Bioterrorism Prevention – aims to raise awareness of the threats
posed by bio-terrorism, counter bio-weapons proliferation, develop
police training programmes and strengthen enforcement of existing
legislation.
– INTERPOL Weapons electronic Tracking System (IWeTS) -
provides member countries with a communication and information-
sharing tool which helps to enhance criminal and terrorism
investigations related to firearms.
– Orange Notice - warns police, public entities and other international
organizations about dangerous materials, criminal acts or events that
posed a potential threat to public safety.
– Project Geiger - collects and analyses data on the theft of
radiological materials.
• INTERPOL initiatives in trafficking in human beings
• Trafficking in women and children for sexual exploitation

– Manual of Best Practice for Law Enforcement Investigators on
Trafficking in Women for Sexual Exploitation – used as the key
instruction manual for training police in human trafficking matters.
– Project Red Routes – targets the trafficking of women from Africa
for sexual exploitation.
152
LEA-6
2011
– People smuggling - the procurement, for financial or material gain, of

the illegal entry of an individual into a country of which he/she is
neither a citizen nor a permanent residence.
– Active co-operation with other international organizations
– Project Bridge – targets smuggling of people from Asia
– Human Smuggling and Trafficking Message - provides a
standardized format for the easy exchange of information. It is
accessible to all authorized users via I-24/7
• Child sexual exploitation on the Internet - ranging from sexual images of
children to visual recordings of brutal sexual crimes that are uploaded and
downloaded on the Internet.
– INTERPOL Child Abuse Image Database (ICAID) - Operational
since 2001 and endorsed by the G8. Contains more than 519,203 child
abuse images. Since its creation, 614 victims from 33 countries have
been identified and rescued.
• INTERPOL initiatives in drugs and criminal organizations
• Operational databases
• Support police operations against organized crime
• Identify new drug trafficking trends and criminal organizations worldwide
• Publication of Drug Intelligence Reports and Alerts
• Assist all national and international law enforcement agencies regarding the
illicit production and trafficking of narcotics
• Organized crime projects
– Bada – targets maritime piracy and armed robberies of ships
– FormaTrain – standardised investigative training programme to fight
international vehicle theft and trafficking
– Millennium – targets transnational Eurasian organized crime
– AOC – targets Asian organized crime
• Illegal trafficking of drugs projects
– NOMAK – aims to enhance operational knowledge of trafficking of
drugs and precursor chemicals in Central Asia
– COCAF – targets cocaine trafficking from Western Africa to Western
Europe via commercial airlines
153
LEA-6
2011
– DRUM – targets the diversion of precursor chemicals in Africa

– Drug.net – focuses on Internet-related drug trafficking
• Other serious crimes
– SCREAM - aims to enhance co-operation in the identification and
apprehension of suspects in serious criminal cases (serial crime cases)
INTERPOL initiatives in financial and high-tech crime

• Information technology (IT) crime
– GoldPhish: Phishing Project
– BOTNET Task Force: joint INTERPOL-Microsoft initiative which
includes 35 countries and 50 high-tech industry participants
– TOPSI: Training and Operational Standards Initiative on IT Crime
• Money laundering
– IMLASS: INTERPOL Money Laundering Automated Search System
• Payment card fraud
– Counterfeit payment card database – helps connect isolated
investigations based on technical examination of counterfeit payment
cards and their components.
– INTERPOL Counterfeit and Security Documents Branch
(CSDB) – provides forensic support and operational assistance
regarding counterfeit currency.
• Intellectual property (IP) crime
– INTERPOL Intellectual Property Crime Action Group (IIPCAG)
– Operation Jupiter – target crimes involving intellectual property
rights in South America
– Database on International Intellectual Property (DIIP) – funded
by the US Chamber of Commerce and the Office of Patent and
Trademarks
• Fugitive Investigative Support (FIS)
• Provide fugitive investigative support and training to member countries

• Capacity-building for member countries on war crime investigations
– Liaison with the International Criminal Court and other international
tribunals
– War crime investigators’ manual on INTERPOL website
154
LEA-6
2011
– Online information advice for specialist war crime units – networking

• Issuance of Notices
• INTERPOL’s initiatives in Corruption
• The INTERPOL Anti-Corruption Academy (IACA)

– Will be the most innovative provider of anti-corruption education,
training, operational assistance and research in the world
– Serves as a Centre of Excellence for Anti-Corruption Professionals
– To be located in Vienna, Austria
– The INTERPOL Anti-Corruption Office
– Global focal point for anti-corruption activities in support to all anti-
corruption agencies worldwide
– Supports the work of the IACA
• INTERPOL’s Command and Co-ordination Centre (CCC)
• Operates 24 hours a day, 7 days a week in INTERPOL’s four official

languages
• Key activities
– Monitoring message traffic and media sources
– Co-ordinating exchange of information among INTERPOL member
countries
– Providing crisis support, Incident Response Teams (IRTs) or Disaster
Victim Identification (DVI) teams
– INTERPOL Major Events Support Teams (IMESTs)
• INTERPOL’s Criminal Analysis Service
• Main analytical services provided to member countries

– Operational analysis
– Strategic analysis/crime threat assessments
– Training and consulting to member countries
• 14 analysts
– INTERPOL has 11 criminal intelligence analysts from 8 different
countries at IPSG
– 3 additional analysts are based in regional offices in El Salvador,
Argentina and Thailand
• INTERPOL’s support services to NCBs
155
LEA-6
2011
• Assist in the expansion of the I-24/7 system beyond the NCB

• 24/7 assistance to NCBs
• Provide support in the implementation of MIND/FIND integrated solutions
• Facilitate exchange of NCB Good Practices
• Establish NCB Contact Officers’ network
• Provide trainings to NCB staff officers
Core function #4: Police training and development
INTERPOL provides focused police training initiatives with the aim of enhancing
the capacity of member countries to effectively combat transnational crime and
terrorism. This includes sharing knowledge, skills and best practices in policing
and establishing global standards.
Police training and development, INTERPOL provides focused police training

initiatives with the aim of enhancing the capacity of member countries to
effectively combat transnational crime and terrorism. This includes sharing
knowledge, skills and best practices in policing and establishing global standards.
159 INTERPOL training sessions involving 4,404 participants across four

Africa , 35
regions Europe , 64
(Jan 2005 – December 2007)
Asia , 32
America
, 28
The INTERPOL International Police Training Program (IIPTP)

• To assist the international police community to achieve excellence in
international coordination in combating international crime
• Seven participants for each 10-week session.
156
LEA-6
2011
• In 2007, a total of 21 students, covering 20 nationalities and 1 person from

UNMIK, participated
INTERPOL’s co-operation with other organizations

• Global organizations
– UN, WIPO, WCO, etc.
• Regional organizations
– ASEANAPOL, ACCP, SARPCCO, etc.
• International criminal tribunals
– ICC, ICTFY, ITCTR, etc.
INTERPOL-UN Co-operation
INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice created in 2005 in response

to
UN Security Council resolution 1617
The resolution called on the UN Secretary General to work with INTERPOL to
provide better tools to help the UN Security Council’s 1267 Committee carry out
its mandate regarding the freezing of assets, travel bans and arms embargos aimed
at groups and individuals associated with Al Qaeda and the Taliban.
 300 notices published as of December 2007
INTERPOL’s added value

• Support and assist all organizations, authorities and services in preventing or
combating international crime
• Enhance the global exchange of police information
• Develop and maintain global operational criminal information databases
• Provide capacity-building measures and expert assistance against major
crimes
157
LEA-6
2011
The way forward
• Active use of the INTERPOL system

• Utilise NCBs in regional and international police operations
• Bring INTERPOL tools and services to the frontline
International Police Cooperation:
The roles of Interpol and Europol
When it comes to transnational crime, prevention entails making the activity a

risky endeavor by reducing safe havens and viewing borders as the criminals do –
relatively invisible. So, police from states that provide safe havens, those that
provide the demand for the services that transnational criminal organizations
supply, and those that serve as transit and/or provide operational permissibility,
must all collaborate to tighten the net. The demand for international cooperation
between national police services has become very clear in an environment ridden
with anxiety about security challenges such as terrorism, arms, drugs and human
trafficking, cyber crime or corruption. But demand hasn’t necessarily translated
into supply, and international police cooperation rates remain relatively low. In
light of the demand for cooperation to address the threats posed by transnational
crime, what prevents national police agencies from sharing information with
foreign colleagues, engaging in joint investigations and surveillance? And how are
those obstacles to police cooperation being addressed?
Distinctive Features
Interpol was established at an international meeting of police in Vienna in 1923 in

order to facilitate international police co-operation in response to rising
international crime following the end of the First World War. Then known as the
International Criminal Police Commission, the organization was from the start not
set up as a supranational police force sanctioned by an international governing
body, but as a non-governmental collaborative network among the criminal law
enforcement authorities of various nations, as remains the case today. To facilitate
inter-agency collaboration, a central headquarters was established in Vienna,
Austria, and various institutions of co-operation, such as a radio network, regular
meetings, and printed publications, were organized to facilitate international police
communications. By the late 1930s, police of the German Nazi regime gradually
took control of the organization, and the headquarters were subsequently moved to
158
LEA-6
2011
Berlin where they were institutionally linked to the SS police structure. Absent any
meaningful form of international co-operation during the Second World War, the
organization was revived in 1946 at an international police meeting in Brussels,
Belgium. The headquarters were then moved to France, where they have since
been located, first in Paris and, since 1989, in Lyon. The formal name change to
the International Criminal Police Organization, abbreviated as ICPO-Interpol or
just Interpol, came about in 1956.
The formal goals of Interpol, as specified in its constitution, are ‘to ensure and
promote mutual assistance [among] criminal police authorities within the limits of
the laws’ of their respective nations and in the spirit of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (Interpol, undated). The functions of Interpol are restricted to the
prevention and suppression of ordinary law crimes or violations of criminal law, at
the exclusion of ‘activities of a political, military, religious or racial character’
(ibid.). Membership of the organization is assigned by Interpol’s Secretary General
to national police agencies selected by the governmental authorities of their
respective nations as their representatives. Presently, the four official languages of
the organization are English, French, Spanish and Arabic.
The structure of Interpol consists of a General Assembly, an Executive Committee,

a General Secretariat, and the National Central Bureaus. The General Assembly is
Interpol’s main governing organ, which meets annually and comprises delegates
appointed by each member agency. The Assembly takes all important decisions
related to Interpol’s policies, resources, methods, finances, and activities. The
Assembly also elects the 13-member Executive Committee, which comprises a
President, three Vice-Presidents, and nine delegates covering the regions of Africa,
the Americas, Asia, Europe and the Middle-East and Northern Africa. Interpol’s
President is elected by the General Assembly for a period of four years. The
General Assembly and the Executive Committee together comprise Interpol’s
governance bodies.
The General Secretariat is located in the Lyon headquarters and has six regional
offices, in Argentina, the Ivory Coast, El Salvador, Kenya, Thailand, and
Zimbabwe, in addition to a liaison office at the United Nations in New York. Since
1996, Interpol has had a formal agreement with the United Nations, granting each
organization observer status in sessions of their respective general assemblies and
enabling co-operation in various matters of the fight against international crime.
Interpol has reached similar co-operation agreements with Europol (the European
Police Office), the International Criminal Court, and other police and legal
organizations.
159
LEA-6
2011
The National Central Bureaus are maintained in the individual nations of the
member agencies. The Bureaus function as the designated contact points for the
General Secretariat, the regional offices, as well as the other member agencies for
all official Interpol police communications concerning international investigations
and the location and apprehension of fugitives. These communications are
conducted on the basis of a specialized color-coded notification system whereby
each one of six possible colors represents a specific type of request.
For example, a red notice is a request for the arrest of a wanted person in view of
extradition, and a blue notice is a request to collect information about a person in
relation to a crime. In 2005, an Interpol-United Nations Special Notice was added
for requests concerning groups or individuals that are subject to actions formally
sanctioned by the United Nations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban.
There are two categories of obstacles to international police cooperation:
(1) The traditional nationalistic approach to policing, and

(2) National institutions’ lack of structures to facilitate the sharing of intelligence
inside and outside the state. The traditional, age old, obstacles to international
cooperation run parallel to those at the national level.
Turf wars between police officers and/or federal/national agencies and

local/regional agencies have always impeded the sharing of information and the
collaboration between colleagues. These stem from mistrust between colleagues,
even at the national level. At the international level, a lack of trust stems from fear
that information, if shared, will be mishandled (i.e not well encrypted or not
handled in a way that makes the evidence admissible in court) or even “lost” to
transnational crime. The problem is compounded by the fact that cooperation by
national police services requires national systems that enable the flow of
information.
Hence, implementation of a policy to cooperate in law enforcement matters

requires the development of national information flow systems, whereby
intelligence gathered by police services will have established channels to travel to
a centralized national police office, which in turn will be in a position to share
information with foreign offices or international police cooperation organizations.
Mindsets also have to shift from a nationalistic culture guided by a code of secrecy,
to one that is open to sharing sensitive information with colleagues across borders.
Finally, policy must reflect the state’s commitment to cooperation by reflecting a
trend toward harmonization to ensure compatibility of information and of evidence
160
LEA-6
2011
gathering techniques. This is all is in the interest of making evidence gathered in

one state admissible in another state’s courts, to reduce the permissive environment
for transnational crime.
To address these obstacles, international police cooperation organizations have

been created.
The recognition that international cooperation may be the answer to international
crime was sparked by the theft of the imperial jewels in Vienna, Austria in 1913.
After several weeks, the jewels were located in another European capital. When
the Austrian government requested the restitution of the jewels and the extradition
of the perpetrator, no one knew how to proceed; no procedure existed.
A Dr. Schroder and Prince Albert of Monaco called the first International
Criminal Congress in Monaco in 1914. This event, which was organized as a
meeting of police chiefs and essential members of the international community, led
to the creation of INTERPOL, the International Police Office. INTERPOL was
established to facilitate the collaboration of national police services all around the
world. EUROPOL began full operations in 1998 to compensate for the erosion of
borders that resulted from the Schengen and other European Union agreements.
These international police cooperation facilitators are intended to serve member

states as clearing houses. They are intergovernmental organizations whose
membership are states, and put in force by the ratification of member states and
their financial support. Both INTERPOL and EUROPOL have staff, Secretariats
and national liaison offices whose roles are to collect and analyze national police
information gathered from investigations, and voluntarily shared by states.
The crime analysis performed by these International Organizations is coined

“finished intelligence”, and offers a big picture perspective to national police
services that tap this valuable resource. A big picture perspective comes from the
compilation of information on criminal activity in a variety of countries which is
analyzed and provides an ‘above the state’ perspective, depicting the modus
operandi, trends and threat assessments based on where criminal activity takes
place, where perpetrators find the resources to engage in such activity, and where
they find safe havens to seek impunity. All these activities take place in different
parts of the world.
161
LEA-6
2011
International Police Cooperation Organizations (IPCOs) play three roles that

enhance their respective memberships’ ability to fight transnational crime. First,
they raise the levels of concern of states vis-à-vis the threats posed by transnational
crime and the benefits of cooperation. Secondly, they assist states to cooperate
internationally more readily on a systematic basis, by building their capacity.
Thirdly, IPCOs aim to circumvent, or even remove, the traditional obstacles to
international police cooperation by promoting trust, communication and
professional partnerships between foreign colleagues.
IPCOs raise levels of concern by informing both policy and operational national
authorities about transnational crime and the multilateral approach to combating it.
To address low participation rates, Interpol and Europol have introduced initiatives
to promote states’ understanding of the threats they face, the policies they need to
adopt vis-à-vis their national security, and that of their fellow members, and the
procedures and structures and/or institutions that they need to put in place in order
to implement policies that are formulated around international cooperation.
Both Europol and Interpol organize meetings, symposia, working groups and ad
hoc case meetings. Beyond providing valuable opportunities to network, establish
personal relationships and face-to-face interaction, these conferences also provide
a medium for states to find guidelines for policy formulation. Attendees, who at
some of the conferences are decision-makers themselves, have the opportunity to
debate and compromise on policy directions and set standards for police
cooperation. Operational meetings give field officers a chance to acquire expertise
from others and establish approaches for joint investigations.
IPCOs also have programs that aim to assist states in the development of national
information flow systems, and training seminars that teach national police
authorities how to collect intelligence that is admissible in their judicial systems as
well as those of other states.
Simply, they provide assistance to states to build the capacity of national police
services to participate in an international system of cooperation – sharing and
receiving intelligence.
INTERPOL impacts the capacity of states and the likelihood that foreign police
colleagues will share information through several programs. “Finished
intelligence” that is incomplete, because of the failure of some states to share
information, is inaccurate and its value to national police authorities limited.
162
LEA-6
2011
The Regional Modernization Program and the Model Cooperation Agreement are
initiatives that were implemented by Interpol in recognition that insufficient
national capacity affected cooperation, and in turn, the quality of the output of the
IPCO. These programs provide guidance, training, and even resources to states that
are willing to establish channels for cooperation, but which do not have the
competence and/or the necessary resources. The Regional Modernization Program
offers assistance in setting up National Central Bureaus (Liaison offices that
facilitate communication between national authorities and Interpol), and the Model
Cooperation Agreement serves as a guide for bilateral cooperation agreement for
states willing to initiate a working relationship with another state.
EUROPOL also engages in field training to enhance the success of operations

against transnational criminal activity. The drugs expert department, for example,
has established a demonstration on how to identify, raid, gather evidence and
dismantle a drug production lab.
A team from Europol goes to the various police stations and provides this type of
training to police officers. The Euro Counterfeit department also launched
workshops to educate and train police and border officers about the modus
operandi, the trends and operational approaches to Euro counterfeiting activities.
These programs give national police opportunities to learn about new forms of
crime and how to address them. Europol is in a unique position to provide this
training, taking the lessons learned by individual states and communicating them to
the entire membership.
Besides this operational approach to capacity building, Europol is also engaged in

expanding existing international police cooperation. The Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaty on Criminal Matters of 2000 is an attempt to reconcile two distinct channels
for police cooperation: the direct channel at the police level, and the judicial
channels that make up the law enforcement apparatus. These two interconnected
channels enable Europol to communicate quickly with member states by
harmonizing investigative reports, and making them easier to understand and use
over time. Consequently, analysis tools are improved. These two channels were
established to extent mutual legal assistance and make sure that evidence is
admissible in any court within the membership. The Treaty provides for enhanced
cooperation through coordination of joint teams, joint satellite tracking in order to
facilitate the transfer of evidence and prosecution activities from one member state
to another, a scoreboard mechanism whereby Europol performs an audit of
163
LEA-6
2011
national information-sharing systems, and the right to request member states to

initiate an investigation.
Finally, IPCOs tackle the obstacles to cooperation which include mistrust,

lack of training and information, turf issues and incompatible investigative
methods (ie. the Anglo- Saxon surveillance approach to gathering
intelligence vs. the infiltration/spy approach widely used elsewhere). They
provide a mechanism for police officers to access information from foreign
colleagues that can significantly enhance their investigations, inform them in
order to devise strategy and increase the chances of prosecution. The
institution serves as a clearinghouse for police information through a variety
of services provided by international experts, whose output is designed to
enhance law enforcement successes on an international scale, making full
use of communication and information exchange.
EUROPOL and INTERPOL diffuse "finished intelligence" derived from

compilation and analysis of voluntarily shared intelligence gathered by
national law enforcement authorities. Through this analysis, their staffs
identify current and future trends of criminality and areas of concern both in
geographic terms and in types of crime. The diffusion of information takes
place through a sophisticated computerized information exchange system via
a protected database system to which competent authorities have access in a
centralized national office. Besides serving as a means to send information
about criminal activity, investigations or other operations to member states,
the information exchange system is available for member states to
communicate directly in the event that one would request information from
another, e.g. about the criminal record of a perpetrator from one state
conducting criminal activity in another.
International police cooperation organizations enjoy a unique ability to facilitate

cooperation between national police services, however, the ‘above the state’
perspective will be limited and of less value to all members if some members
withhold information. Participation rates have been relatively low. In 2001,
EUROPOL enjoyed systematic cooperation by only 6 out of the 15 member states.
Some states have been working to improve their ability to participate. The case of
France, which has been slow to participate, illustrates that when concern about
transnational crime and instruments to combat it is combined with concern that
IPCOs are gaining too much executive power over the state, policies and attitudes
can gradually change. A recent parliamentary report (Rapport du Sénat du
164
LEA-6
2011
Parlement Français, session ordinaire de 2003-2004) has further defined the

relationship between France and Europol and other cooperation conventions, and
has resulted in a significant increase in requests for information by France for
information and in intelligence shared via Europol and other cooperation
mechanisms. There have been significant recent improvements in the participation
rates of states as they strive to integrate their national systems into the larger
international network of cooperation. And much remains to be done.
(Nadia Gerspacher, Ph.D.)
Interpol’s Criminal Intelligence Analysis
Concept: Criminal Intelligence Analysis (sometimes called Crime Analysis) has

been recognized by law enforcement as a useful support tool for over twenty-five
years and is successfully used within the international community. Within the last
decade, the role and position of Criminal Intelligence Analysis in the global law
enforcement community has fundamentally changed. Whereas, previously there
were a few key countries acting as forerunners and promoters of the discipline,
more and more countries have implemented analytical techniques within their
police forces. International organizations, such as Interpol, Europol and the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), all have
Criminal Intelligence Analyst among their personnel. The techniques are also
widely used within private sector organizations.
Definition: There are many definitions of Criminal Intelligence Analysis in use

throughout the world. The one definition agreed on June 1992 by an
International group of twelve European Interpol member countries and
subsequently adopted by other countries as follows: The identification of and
provision of insight into the relationship between crime data and other
potentially relevant data with a view to police and judicial practice.
Purpose: The central task of analysis is to help officials-law enforcers, policy

makers, and decisions makers – deal more effectively with uncertainty, to
provide timely warning of threats, and to support operational activity by
analyzing crime.
Divisions: Criminal Intelligence Analysis is divided into operational (or

tactical) and strategic analysis. The basic skills required are similar’, and the
difference lies in the level of detail and the type of client to whom the products
are aimed.
165
LEA-6
2011
1. Operational Analysis aims to achieve a specific law enforcement outcome.

This might be arrests, seizure of forfeiture of assets or money gained from
criminal activities, or the disruption of criminal group. Operational Analysis
usually has a more immediate benefit.
2. Strategic Analysis is intended to inform higher level decision making and the
benefits are realized over the long term. It is usually aimed at managers and
policy-makers rather than individual investigators. The intention is to provide
early warning of threats and to support senior decision-makers in setting
priorities to prepare their organizations to be able to deal with emerging
criminal issues. This might mean allocating resources to different areas of
crime, increased training in a crime fighting technique, or taking steps to close
a loophole in a process.
Both disciplines make use of a range of analytical techniques and analyst need
to have a range of skills and attributes.
PART V.
Establishing Bilateral and International Cooperation in Addressing
Transnational Crimes
Globalization and, more specifically, the emergence and expansion of

transnational crime confront all justice systems with some new difficulties.
Criminal offenders are mobile and often seek to evade detection, arrest, and
punishment by operating across international borders. They avoid being caught by
taking advantage of those borders and playing on the frequent reluctance of law
enforcement authorities to engage in complicated and expensive transnational
investigations and prosecutions. The weak capacity of any one country to address
effectively some of these new threats translates itself into an overall weakness in
the international regime of criminal justice cooperation. For countries with a
relatively weak criminal justice capacity, these challenges can sometimes appear
insurmountable.
The international community now recognizes international cooperation in

criminal matters as an urgent necessity. This demands national efforts to comply
166
LEA-6
2011
with new international standards, to encourage convergence and compatibility of

national legislation, to introduce complex procedural reforms, and generally to
develop a much greater investigation and prosecution capacity at the national level
as well as strengthen the capacity to cooperate at the international level. For some
countries, building a capacity for international cooperation within their own
criminal justice system is, to say the least, a struggle.
The main mechanisms supporting international cooperation are mutual legal

assistance, extradition, transfer of prisoners, transfer of proceedings in criminal
matters, international cooperation for the purposes of confiscation of criminal
proceeds and asset recovery as provided for in the United Nations Convention
against Corruption, as well as a number of less formal measures, including
measures in the area of international law enforcement cooperation. These
mechanisms are based on bilateral or multilateral agreements or arrangements or,
in some instances, on national law. All of them are evolving rapidly to keep pace
with new technologies and their evolution over the last decade or so reflects the
new determination of Member States to work more closely with each other to face
the growing threats of organized crime, corruption and terrorism.
Noticeably, some of the most innovative strategies are coming out of

cooperation efforts between countries that have either a crime problem or a
geographical border in common. Some of the most significant lessons learned in
recent years come from the experience of countries working at the bilateral, sub-
regional or regional level to address practical issues on a regular basis. Regional
cooperation is evolving rapidly in all parts of the globe.
A consensus is emerging around some of the most promising means of

enhancing international cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of serious
crimes. Some of them are now included in the international cooperation framework
established by the United Nations Conventions against Transnational Organized
Crime; against Corruption; and against the Financing of Terrorism, and several
other multilateral instruments at the global and regional levels, which provide a
strong basis for internal cooperation. Having national legislation in place to
implement fully these instruments is therefore of paramount importance, as are the
development of a capacity to cooperate and the adoption of the administrative
measures necessary to support the various modalities of international cooperation.
This assessment tool identifies some practical issues that are typically
encountered by a country trying to actively engage in international cooperation. It
167
LEA-6
2011
refers also to some of the practical issues that have recently emerged during the
implementation of new international conventions, such as the UN Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime, whose main purpose is precisely to
facilitate international cooperation. Questions are suggested for assessing the
capacity and willingness of a particular jurisdiction to cooperate at the international
level, as well as the obstacles it is facing with respect to building that capacity.
For the purpose of this tool, international cooperation is defined broadly

because it can and should occur at various levels of the criminal justice system.
The assessor, however, will frequently need to narrow the scope of the assessment.
In doing so, one may consider the nature of the country’s existing or anticipated
future obligations under various treaties (multi-lateral, regional or bi-lateral).
In spite of the considerable progress accomplished at the bilateral, regional,

trans-regional, and international levels, international cooperation in the
investigation and prosecution of serious crimes still needs considerable
strengthening. Practitioners are well aware of the many obstacles that still exist to
international cooperation in criminal matters. They include sovereignty issues, the
diversity of law enforcement structures, the absence of enabling legislation, the
absence of channels of communication for the exchange of information, and
divergences in approaches and priorities. These problems are often compounded by
difficulties in dealing with the varied procedural requirements of each jurisdiction,
the competitive attitude that often exists between the agencies involved, language,
and human rights and privacy issues.
There are also rule of law issues that require attention in relation to
international cooperation. Measures to reinforce the rule of law need not be
characterized as impediments to international cooperation. A country’s
commitment to the rule of law and the protection of human rights should not be
negotiable or bartered against some international cooperation concessions in
fighting transnational crime or terrorism. In fact, a commitment to the rule of law
can enhance international cooperation in criminal matters. Measures to enforce the
rule of law and adherence to international human rights standards are also directly
relevant to enhancing mutual assistance and international cooperation. In matters
of extradition, mutual legal assistance, or joint investigations, the agencies and
institutions involved retain an obligation to ensure the lawfulness of all actions
taken in the name of cooperation.
168
LEA-6
2011
Integrated approaches are also important in the provision of technical

assistance. Smaller countries often experience difficulties implementing the
numerous international conventions and bilateral treaties they are expected to
comply with. The basic capacity of their criminal justice and law enforcement
institutions is often limited. They can benefit from integrated technical assistance
activities that focus on building their overall investigation and prosecution capacity
as well as their ability to cooperate effectively.
Technical assistance in the area of international cooperation in the context of

a broader strategic framework may include work that will support the
following:
 􀂃 Review and enhance the legal framework to include measures that support
and strengthen mutual assistance;
 􀂃 Review and enhance the legal framework to include measures that enable
mutual legal assistance as required by instruments to which the country is a
party;
 􀂃 Review and enhance the legal framework to enable extradition as required
by any treaty to which the country is a party;
 􀂃 Review and enhance the legal framework to include measures that
authorize law enforcement\ cooperation as required by any bilateral or
multilateral agreements;
 􀂃 Review and enhance the legal framework to include measures that
authorize law enforcement cooperation as required by any bilateral or
multilateral agreements;
 􀂃 Review and enhance the criminal and criminal procedure code to ensure
that the predicate proscribed acts described in the instruments above are
criminalized under the legislative framework, that legal jurisdiction for them
is established;
169
LEA-6
2011
that the appropriate criminal acts are extraditable;
that sensitive information received via international cooperation is kept
confidential;
 􀂃 Develop national policies and implement procedures to facilitate
exchange of information as well as its analysis and to prevent the disclosure
of sensitive information received via such exchanges;
 􀂃 Develop national policies for and implement mechanisms such as central
authorities, liaisons, secondments and exchanges of prosecutors and law
enforcement officials, and networks to facilitate mutual cooperation;
 􀂃 Develop national policies and implement procedures for mutual legal
assistance in the absence of treaties and to the extent possible where dual
criminality is absent;
 􀂃 Develop the capacity of existing institutions and agencies to develop, use,
and respond to requests for mutual legal assistance and information;
 􀂃 Train law enforcement personnel, prosecutors and judicial officials
regarding legal requirements for mutual legal assistance and extradition;
170
LEA-6
2011
 􀂃 Develop the capacity of authorities to cooperate internationally in the

protection of victims, their compensation for the harm they suffer, and their
safe repatriation when necessary.
STIMULANT QUESTIONS IN TRANSNATIONAL CRIMES:
A. How frequently, in what circumstances and with what results have agencies
have been involved in seeking cooperation from another country?
B. From which countries was international assistance most frequently requested?
C. What difficulties have agencies typically encountered in trying to seek the

assistance of other countries?
D. How frequently, in what circumstances, for what type of offences are agencies
most frequently asked for assistance from other countries? What is the volume of
request? Are agencies typically able to reply positively for request for assistance?
What are the delays typically involved in responding to a request for assistance?
E. What are the countries that most frequently request assistance from agencies?
For what kind of assistance? What are offences usually involved?
The assessor may wish to enquire about the experience of the country and its various criminal justice
agencies with various transnational forms of crime, including prevalence, patterns, routes, trends,
modus operandi, victims, etc. The assessor should also be curious about the countries experience with
international cooperation, both as a provider of assistance and as a requesting State. Furthermore, it is
clear that inter-agency cooperation at the national level is not only crucial to effective local action
against transnational organized crime, corruption and terrorism, but is also an important precondition
for effective cross-border cooperation against these major threats.
Designating a single central authority for all incoming and outgoing legal assistance and extradition
requests and strengthening its effectiveness remain crucial to the success of international cooperation
in criminal matters. This is how a country, among other things, can coordinate its own requests for
assistance and stand ready to respond expeditiously to requests for cooperation it receives from other
countries. Increasingly, mutual legal assistance treaties require that States Parties designate a central
authority (generally the Ministry of Justice) to which requests can be sent, thus providing an alternative
to diplomatic channels. The Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Convention
against Corruption makes it mandatory for States Parties in order to ensure the expeditious
transmission or execution of the requests. Nevertheless, the role of the central authorities need not
necessarily be an exclusive one. Direct exchanges of information and cooperation, to the extent
permitted by domestic law, should also be encouraged.
171
LEA-6
2011
F. What difficulties have agencies typically encountered in trying to offer technical

assistance to other countries? Are some kinds of assistance more problematic than
others?
G. Does the country have a Central Authority for International Cooperation or

equivalent? Has another agency been delegated this responsibility?
H. Does the Central Authority have sufficient resources to achieve its mandate
(skilled and trained staff, communication equipment, ongoing training, etc.)? Is it
able to collaborate and exchange with other central authorities?
I. Are law enforcement agencies able to share criminal record and other law
enforcement information with each other, directly, in real time, while providing all
the required security and human rights safeguards?
J. Do agencies have access to advanced data communication and storage

technologies for the sharing of criminal record information and the exchange of
other criminal justice data between agencies?
K. Are there clear guidelines, rules, and accountability mechanisms to prevent and
detect improper or corrupt practices in data sharing?
L. Does national legislation allow or support lawful and effective exchanges of

data on an international basis? Does national legislation authorize or provide
mechanisms for the exchange of such information among domestic law
enforcement agencies?
M. Where the country is not a party to mutual legal assistance or extradition

treaties does the national legislation authorize such activities? Under what
circumstances? Are these circumstances defined by law?
Evaluation
172
LEA-6
2011
In terms of membership, Interpol is one of the world’s largest international

organizations. The ability to attract a wide and in many ways diverse membership
clearly counts among the organization’s most notable achievements. Yet, while
Interpol has secured a measure of co-operation despite the political and other
differences that exist among the nations of the world, the wide scope of the
organization’s membership has ironically also hindered effective co-operation due
to frequent mistrust between the police of different nations. As a result, police from
the member countries often prefer to conduct international police work in a
bilateral or otherwise limited form rather than rely on the multilateral structure of
Interpol.
Interpol has been able to institute various means of communication among

police that are driven by professional concerns of efficiency in police work,
relatively unhindered by periods of international instability. Following the terrorist
incidents of September 11, Interpol has technologically upgraded and expanded its
facilities. Problematic is the fact that Interpol’sits ways of working may operate at
the cost of considerations of accountability and formal legality. A constant concern
for Interpol is finding a way to balance a quest for efficiency in police performance
with due concern for democratic accountability – a dilemma shared by police
organizations worldwide. Associated Concepts:
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Whether a country is attempting to prevent organized crime activities, financial and economic crime, computer crime, corruption or
terrorism, the establishment of better legal bases for international cooperation is a prerequisite. Strengthening the convergence of
criminal law and criminal law procedure is part of any long-term strategy to build more effective international cooperation.
Developing stronger bilateral and multilateral agreements on mutual legal assistance is also part of the solution. The universal
conventions against terrorism, as well as the United Nations Conventions against Transnational Organized Crime and against
Corruption provide a strong basis for legal cooperation and often suggest some of the elements that must be developed as part of
a national capacity for effective investigation and prosecution of these crimes. Having national legislation in place to fully implement
these instruments is therefore of paramount importance.
In matters of international cooperation, criminal justice agencies must rely, to a large extent, on the treaty network developed by
their country. The various conventions mentioned above call upon their States Parties to widen their treaty network by entering into
new bilateral and multilateral treaties to facilitate international cooperation in criminal matters. Making this network work for them in
a practical manner is often still a challenge for prosecution services.
It is important to note, however, that mutual legal assistance can be provided without the existence of a specific treaty if national
laws are flexible enough.
Existing treaties and laws should be reviewed periodically and amended as necessary to keep pace with rapidly evolving practices
and challenges in international cooperation. They should provide maximum flexibility to enable broad and expeditious assistance. To
facilitate these efforts, the General Assembly adopted a Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters.
173
LEA-6
2011
Accountability, Europol, multi-agency policing, security networks, transnational

policing.
Deflem, Mathieu. 2009. "Interpol." Pp. 179-181 in The Sage Dictionary of

Policing, edited by Alison Wakefield and Jenny Fleming. London: Sage
Publications.
http://www.mathieudeflem.net/
Key Readings
 Anderson, M. (1989) Policing the World: Interpol and the Politics of

International Police Cooperation. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press.
 Barnett, M. & L. Coleman. 2005. ‘Designing police: Interpol and the study
of change in international organizations’, International Studies Quarterly, 49, 593-
619.
 Bresler, F. (1992) Interpol. London: Sinclair-Stevenson.
 Deflem, M. (2002) Policing World Society: Historical Foundations of
International Police Cooperation. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.
 Deflem, M. (2006) ‘Global rule of law or global rule of law enforcement?
International police cooperation and counter-terrorism’, The Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 603, 240-251.
 Interpol (undated) ICPO-INTERPOL Constitution and General Regulations,
Interpol: Lyon, available at www.interpol.int.
UN Convention against Transnational Crime
With the signing of the United Nations Convention against Transnational

Organized Crime in Palermo, Italy, in December 2000, the international
community demonstrated the political will to answer a global challenge with a
global response. If crime crosses borders, so must law enforcement. If the rule of
law is undermined not only in one country, but in many, then those who defend it
cannot limit themselves to purely national means. If the enemies of progress and
human rights seek to exploit the openness and opportunities of globalization for
their purposes, then we must exploit those very same factors to defend human
rights and defeat the forces of crime, corruption and trafficking in human beings.
174
LEA-6
2011
One of the starkest contrasts in our world today is the gulf that exists between the
civil and the uncivil. By “civil” I mean civilization: the accumulated centuries of
learning that form our foundation for progress. By “civil” I also mean tolerance:
the pluralism and respect with which we accept and draw strength from the world’s
diverse peoples. And finally, I mean civil society: the citizens’ groups, businesses,
unions, professors, journalists, political parties and others who have an essential
role to play in the running of any society.
Arrayed against these constructive forces, however, in ever greater numbers and
with ever stronger weapons, are the forces of what I call “uncivil society”. They
are terrorists, criminals, drug dealers, traffickers in people and others who undo the
good works of civil society. They take advantage of the open borders, free markets
and technological advances that bring so many benefits to the world’s people. They
thrive in countries with weak institutions, and they show no scruple about resorting
to intimidation or violence. Their ruthlessness is the very antithesis of all we regard
as civil. They are powerful, representing entrenched interests and the clout of a
global enterprise worth billions of dollars, but they are not invincible.
The Millennium Declaration adopted by the Heads of State meeting at the United
Nations in September 2000 reaffirmed the principles underlying our efforts and
should serve to encourage all who struggle for the rule of law. The Declaration
states that “men and women have the right to live their lives and raise their
children in dignity, free from hunger and from the fear of violence, oppression or
injustice”.
At the Millennium Summit, world leaders proclaimed freedom—from fear and

from want—as one of the essential values in the twenty-first century. Yet the right
to live in dignity, free from fear and want, is still denied to millions of people
around the world. It is denied to the child who is working as an indentured laborer
in a sweatshop; to the father who must pay a bribe to get medical care for his son
or daughter; to the woman who is condemned to a life of forced prostitution.
I believe the trafficking of persons, particularly women and children, for forced
and exploitative labor, including for sexual exploitation, is one of the most
egregious violations of human rights that the United Nations now confronts.
It is widespread and growing. It is rooted in social and economic conditions in the

countries from which the victims come, facilitated by practices that discriminate
against women and driven by cruel indifference to human suffering on the part of
175
LEA-6
2011
those who exploit the services that the victims are forced to provide. The fate of
these most vulnerable people in our world is an affront to human dignity and a
challenge to every State, every people and every community.
I therefore urge the Member States to ratify not only the United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, but also the Protocol to
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children, which can make a real difference in the struggle to eliminate this
reprehensible trade in human beings.
Criminal groups have wasted no time in embracing today’s globalized economy

and the sophisticated technology that goes with it. But our efforts to combat them
have remained up to now very fragmented and our weapons almost obsolete.
The Convention gives us a new tool to address the scourge of crime as a global
problem. With enhanced international cooperation, we can have a real impact on
the ability of international criminals to operate successfully and can help citizens
everywhere in their often bitter struggle for safety and dignity in their homes and
communities.
The signing of the Convention in Palermo in December 2000 was a watershed

event in the reinforcement of our fight against organized crime. I urge all States to
ratify the Convention and the Protocols thereto at the earliest possible date and to
bring these instruments into force as a matter of urgency.
Sample contents of UN CONVENTIONS

United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its
Protocols
Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime
176
LEA-6
2011
 Working groups established by the

Conference of the Parties
 Full text of the Convention and its
Protocols
 Review of the implementation of the
United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime and
the Protocols thereto
 Status of ratification
 Travaux Préparatoires
 Legislative guides and glossaries of
terms
 Legal tools
The United Nations Convention against

Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by
General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000, is the main
international instrument in the fight against transnational organized crime. It
opened for signature by Member States at a High-level Political Conference
convened for that purpose in Palermo, Italy, on 12-15 December 2000 and entered
into force on 29 September 2003. The Convention is further supplemented by three
Protocols, which target specific areas and manifestations of organized crime: the
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially
Women and Children; the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land,
Sea and Air; and the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking
in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition. Countries must become
parties to the Convention itself before they can become parties to any of the
Protocols.
The Convention represents a major step forward in the fight against transnational
organized crime and signifies the recognition by Member States of the seriousness
of the problems posed by it, as well as the need to foster and enhance close
international cooperation in order to tackle those problems. States that ratify this
instrument commit themselves to taking a series of measures against transnational
organized crime, including the creation of domestic criminal offences
177
LEA-6
2011
(participation in an organized criminal group, money laundering, corruption and

obstruction of justice); the adoption of new and sweeping frameworks for
extradition, mutual legal assistance and law enforcement cooperation; and the
promotion of training and technical assistance for building or upgrading the
necessary capacity of national authorities.
The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially
Women and Children, was adopted by General Assembly resolution 55/25. It
entered into force on 25 December 2003. It is the first global legally binding
instrument with an agreed definition on trafficking in persons. The intention
behind this definition is to facilitate convergence in national approaches with
regard to the establishment of domestic criminal offences that would support
efficient international cooperation in investigating and prosecuting trafficking in
persons cases. An additional objective of the Protocol is to protect and assist the
victims of trafficking in persons with full respect for their human rights.
The Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, adopted by
General Assembly resolution 55/25, entered into force on 28 January 2004. It deals
with the growing problem of organized criminal groups who smuggle migrants,
often at high risk to the migrants and at great profit for the offenders. A major
achievement of the Protocol was that, for the first time in a global international
instrument, a definition of smuggling of migrants was developed and agreed upon.
The Protocol aims at preventing and combating the smuggling of migrants, as well
as promoting cooperation among States parties, while protecting the rights of
smuggled migrants and preventing the worst forms of their exploitation which
often characterize the smuggling process.
The Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their
Parts and Components and Ammunition was adopted by General Assembly
resolution 55/255 of 31 May 2001. It entered into force on 3 July 2005. The
objective of the Protocol, which is the first legally binding instrument on small
arms that has been adopted at the global level, is to promote, facilitate and
strengthen cooperation among States Parties in order to prevent, combat and
eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and
components and ammunition. By ratifying the Protocol, States make a commitment
178
LEA-6
2011
to adopt a series of crime-control measures and implement in their domestic legal

order three sets of normative provisions: the first one relates to the establishment of
criminal offences related to illegal manufacturing of, and trafficking in, firearms on
the basis of the Protocol requirements and definitions; the second to a system of
government authorizations or licensing intending to ensure legitimate
manufacturing of, and trafficking in, firearms; and the third one to the marking and
tracing of firearms.
Role of ASEANAPOL
The Challenge of International Cooperation
The crime of trafficking in persons is often transnational in both commission and

effect. In contrast, criminal justice responses to trafficking in persons (criminal
laws, law enforcement agencies, prosecution services and the courts) are typically
structured and generally only operate within the confines of national borders.
The disjuncture between the reality of transnational crime and the limits of national
systems presents a significant challenge to the ability of countries to effectively
respond to trafficking in persons.
There are numerous practical and political factors that can impede cooperation
across borders in criminal investigations and prosecutions. These include the
difficulties in communicating with counterparts who speak a different language;
differences in legal, political and cultural traditions; political considerations; and
even apprehension about cooperating with colleagues in another country.
However, while there are many challenges, there are also important opportunities.
Through national laws and international agreements, most countries have
developed a range of tools that can be used by criminal justice agencies to facilitate
cooperation across borders in criminal matters. These include the tools of mutual
legal assistance (which incorporates a sub-set of tools that can assist with recovery
of proceeds of crime) and extradition. An understanding of these tools and of how
they work is an important first step in encouraging States to take a more proactive
approach to international cooperation in trafficking in persons cases.
ASEAN Commitment to International Cooperation
Over the past several years, ASEAN and its Member States1 have affirmed the
importance of stronger and more effective regional and international cooperation in
179
LEA-6
2011
the area of trafficking in persons – recognizing that such cooperation is vital to

successful domestic prosecutions as well as to eliminating safe havens for
traffickers and their accomplices.2 A number of instruments have been developed
that support such cooperation. A treaty on mutual legal assistance in criminal
matters, completed in 2006, is directly relevant to this issue. A set of guidelines on
trafficking in persons, endorsed by the (ASEAN) Senior Officials Meeting on
Transnational Crime (SOMTC) in 2007, provide detailed guidance to criminal
justice practitioners on international cooperation as it relates to trafficking in
persons cases. Instruments developed by other multilateral organizations such as
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized
Crime3(UNTOC), the United Nations Convention against Corruption4 (UNCAC)
and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Introduction
Preface
The first formal meeting of the Chiefs of ASEAN

Police was held in Manila, Philippines on the 21
to 23 October 1981.
 To discuss matters of law enforcement and

crime control.
 This annual meeting was called
ASEANAPOL Conference.
 The members of ASEAN were originally Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand,
Indonesia and the Philippines.
 The basic requirement to become a member of ASEANAPOL is that the

country of the applicant needs to be already a member of ASEAN and needs
to apply to the conference.
 1984, Royal Brunei Police join the conference for the 1st time.
 1996, The Republic of Vietnam National Police join the conference
 1998, Laos General Department of Police and Myanmar police force join the
conference
180
LEA-6
2011
 2000, Cambodia National Police join the conference

 The current members of ASEANAPOL are Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia,
Lao People Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.
ASEANAPOL PERMANENT SECRETARIAT
History
 The Secretariat of ASEANAPOL was on a rotational basis with member

countries taking turn to host the ASEANAPOL Conference and
automatically assume the role of the secretariat for the current year.
 The 25th Joint Communique signed by the ASEAN Chiefs of Police during
the 25th ASEANAPOL Conference held in Bali, Indonesia, expressly
stated the need to establish a Permanent ASEANAPOL Secretariat.
Objectives of the establishment of a Permanent Secretariat
 To harmonise and standardize coordination and communication mechanisms

amongst ASEAN police institutions;
 To conduct a comprehensive and integrative study concerning the
resolutions agreed in the ASEANAPOL Joint Communiqués
 To establish a mechanism with responsibility to monitor and follow up the
implementation of resolutions in the Joint Communiqués; and
 To transform the resolutions adopted in the Joint Communiqués into
ASEANAPOL Plan of Action and its work program
The working group which was set up to consider the viability of the permanent
ASEANAPOL Secretariat finalized that:
(1) The Secretariat shall be administrated based on the Terms of Reference;

(2) The Head of the Secretariat is to be an Executive Director and he is to be
assisted by 2 Directors.
The tenure of services are:
Executive Director - 2 years

Directors - 3 years
181
LEA-6
2011
 During the 29th ASEANAPOL Conference in Hanoi, Vietnam in 2009, the

Terms of Reference on the establishment of ASEANAPOL Secretariat was
finally endorsed. Kuala Lumpur was made the permanent seat.
 The Aseanapol Secretariat started its operation fully from the 1st January
2010.
ASEANAPOL's Objective and Function
Objective
 Ensure the effective implementation of all resolutions adopted at the

ASENAPOL Conferences;
 Serve as a coordination and communication mechanism to allow members to
establish and to maintain all channels of interaction amongst members;
 Foster mutual assistance and cooperation amongst members; and
 Endeavour to increase regional cooperation efforts against transnational
crimes
Function
 Prepare and implement work plans for effective implement of all the
resolutions adopted in the annual Joint Communiqués signed at the
ASEANAPOL Conference;
 Facilitate and coordinate cross-border cooperation on intelligence and
information sharing and exchange;
 Facilitate and coordinate joint operations and activities involving criminal
investigation, the building and maintenance of the ASEANAPOL database,
training, capacity building, the development of scientific investigative tools,
technical support and forensic science;
 Provide support and necessary assistance in organizing the ASEANAPOL
Conferences;
 Submit on a quarterly basis to the Chiefs of ASEAN Police Forces proposals
on all planned programmed and activities to be carried out;
 Prepare an annual report on its activities and expenditure to be presented to
the ASEANAPOL Executive Committee immediately before the
ASEANAPOL Conference, and distributed to all members and to the
ASEANAPOL Conference; and;
 Act as a custodian of all documents and records of ASEANAPOL
182
LEA-6
2011
A brief History of ASEANAPOL

Year Details
1981 - Manila  The first formal meeting of The Chiefs of ASEAN
Police
 Attended by 5 original member countries (Indonesia,
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand)
1983 - Jakarta  Endorsement of the model & design of ASEANAPOL
logo
1984 - Kuala  Royal Brunei Police became a member and joined the
Lumpur annual conference
1996 - Kuala  Vietnam joined as a new member
Lumpur
1998 - Brunei  Laos joined ASEANAPOL
th
2000 - Myanmar  Myanmar became the 10 country to joined as a new
member
2005 - Bali  The setting up of a working group to consider the
viability of establishing a permanent ASEANAPOL
Secretariat
 Silver Jubilee Commemoration of ASEANAPOL
2008 - Brunei  The Royal Malaysia Police was chosen as a host of

permanent ASEANAPOL Secretariat
2009 - Vietnam  Adoption of Terms of Reference (TOR)
st
2010  On 1 January 2010 commencement of ASEANAPOL
Secretariat in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
30th ASEANAPOL Conference Focus on Harmonization in Region
CAMBODIA, PHNOM PENH, May 25, 2010-Cambodia on Tuesday hosted the

30th ASEANAPOL conference with focusing on the combating terrorism, illicit
drug trafficking, arms smuggling, human trafficking, maritime fraud, commercial
crime, bank offense and credit card fraud, cyber crime, fraudulent travel,
progression, on electronic-ASEANPOL data system (E-ADS), mutual assistance
on crime matters, exchange of personnel, and drafting of joint communiqué.
Speaking at the opening forum today, Deputy prime minister and interior minister
Sar Kheng said that the 30th ASEANAPOL meeting is happening during a time
183
LEA-6
2011
when the world is edging out of the economic and financial crises which have been
troubling the economies of many countries and negatively affected almost every
sector, slowing sown the momentum of the national construction and development
in the previous decades.
“Our respond to these challenges have also revealed the creativity of various
countries in setting up economic rehabilitation fund, and within the ASEAN
framework, an ASEAN reserved up fund worth hundreds of millions of dollars was
establishing in order to respond to any unexpected global challenges such as the
present economic and financial crisis and in order to ensure the economic stability
of the ASEAN in region, “he said. The
He added that while the whole world is busy solving the economic and financial
crisis, our common enemy –transnational crimes has had the opportunity to
broaden by exploiting targets and vulnerable groups, modern technology and
globalization to carry out economic crime.
“These activities seriously affected the social stability, resources and lives of
people and law enforcement forces,” he noted,
“The gathering today and discussion within the next tow days signifity the unity of
ASEAN in combating all kinds of threats of transactional crime as well as
recognizing the benefits of the broadening cooperation inside and outside of the
ASEAN region so as to enhance the effectiveness of the fighting against
transactional crime through partnership building with a number of countries whose
delegates are also attending this conference namely China, Japan, republic of
Korea, au , news Zealand, representative of Interpol, “he added.
The cooperation between ASEANAPOL and Interpol has been developing in a

positive direction, “he said, adding that the role and responsibilities of police these
days are aslo regarded as important in the international stage. Many countries
including ASEAN member countries have sent their police force to peace-keeping
missions of the UN.” The initiative of sending police force for UN mission is
appropriate and necessary because countries which have just ended wars or internal
conflicts lost infrastructure and social order, “he emphasized. Our future goal to
improve effectiveness and good cooperation, we need minimized gap of technical
law enforcement skills and experienced of the police agencies, he said. It is a pride
that so far ASEANAPOL has had many dialogues partners who have come to
cooperate and share experience and expertise, he added.
184
LEA-6
2011
National Police chief Net Savoeurn said today meeting will provide the experience
and for each other and strengthen cooperation within effectiveness for regional
police agencies to deal crimes crossing borders, and regional security and issues to
live in harmonization and peace.
Currently, ASEANAPOL has its own headquarter in Kular Lumpur, Malaysia. this
office established in January 2010.
PNP Agreements with ASEAN Police Organizations
ASEAN police chiefs agree on crime data sharing

May 30, 2006, 8:00am
Leaders of the 10-member Association of South East Asian Nations Chiefs of

Police (ASEANAPOL) have forged an agreement to further promote cooperation
among the police forces in the Southeast Asian region to combat criminality and
terrorism by establishing the first international database system on lawless
elements.
Director General Arturo C. Lomibao, chief of the Philippine National Police

(PNP), led a 16-man PNP delegation to the annual meeting of heads of national
police agencies of ASEAN member-states in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, over the
weekend.
During the conference, Malaysia sought the commitment of the ASEAN national
police forces to closely monitor and exchange information on newly emerging
militant and radical groups, and take action to prevent them from growing as
terrorist groups.
The 26th ASEANAPOL conference was highlighted by the official launching of

the Electronic ASEANAPOL Database System (e-ADS). The eADS system is now
ready to relay data to the 1-24/7 crime database system of the International Police
(Interpol).
Lomibao said he presented during the conference the country’s paper on current
transnational crime concerns, including efforts aimed at strengthening international
185
LEA-6
2011
cooperation with other police forces in the ASEAN against transnational

syndicates.
"The PNP is proud to take part in the efforts of the international law enforcement
community in maintaining an atmosphere of peace and stability in the Southeast
Asian Region," Lomibao said.
Aside from the Philippines, other national police forces represented in the
conference were the Royal Brunei Police Force, Cambodian National Police Force,
Myanmar Police Force, Singapore Police Force, Socialist Republic of Vietnam
Police, Royal Thai Police, and the host agency, the Royal Malaysia Police.
Present as observers were representatives from the the ASEAN Secretariat, ICPO-
Interpol, Australian Federal Police, National Police Agency of Japan, New Zealand
Police, Ministry of Public Security of the People’s Republic of China, and the
National Police Agency of the Republic of Korea.
In September, 2003, the PNP hosted the 23rd ASEANAPOL Conference in

Manila. The Philippines is a founding member of the ASEANAPOL which held its
first conference in Manila in 1981. (Aris R. Ilagan)
1 The Member States of the Association are Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia,

Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet
Nam.
2 See, for example, Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN], ASEAN
Declaration Against Trafficking in Persons
Particularly Women and Children, Nov. 29, 2004 [hereinafter ASEAN Declaration
Against Trafficking in Persons]; ASEAN, ASEAN Responses to Trafficking in
Persons: Ending Impunity for Traffickers and Securing Justice for Victims (ASEAN,
2006 (Supplement and Update, 2007)).
3 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, Dec. 12,
2000, UN Doc. A/RES/55/25 (Annex I), entered into force Sept. 29, 2003
[hereinafter UNTOC].
4 United Nations Convention against Corruption, Oct. 31, 2003, UN Doc.
A/RES/58/422 (Annex), entered into force Dec. 14, 2005 [hereinafter UNCAC].
Participation of PNP Personnel in UN Peacekeeping Missions
Philippine Participation in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
186
LEA-6
2011
PRESS RELEASE
NYPM- 20-2009
22 JUNE 2009
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/milad/fgs2/unsas_files/sba.htm
The United Nations Stand-by

Arrangements System
(UNSAS) is based on
conditional commitments by
Member States of specified
resources within the agreed
response times for UN
peacekeeping operations.
These resources can be
military formations,
specialized personnel
(civilian and military),
services as well as material
and equipment. The
resources agreed-upon
remain on "stand-by" in
their home country, where
necessary preparation, including training, is conducted to prepare
them to fulfill specified tasks or functions in accordance with
United Nations guidelines. Stand-by resources are used
exclusively for peacekeeping operations mandated by the
Security Council. When specific needs arise, stand-by resources
are requested by the Secretary-General and, if approved by
participating Member States, are rapidly deployed to set up new
peacekeeping missions or to reinforce existing ones.
RP TO DEPLOY PEACEKEEPING BATTALION TO THE GOLAN HEIGHTS
NEW YORK—In what is going to be its biggest overseas deployment in almost a

decade, the Philippines will be sending more than 300 troops to join United
Nations peacekeepers in the Golan Heights in Syria, the Philippine Mission to the
United Nations said today.
187
LEA-6
2011
In his report to Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto G. Romulo, Ambassador Hilario

G. Davide Jr., Philippine Permanent Representative to the United Nations, said a
composite battalion of 336 Filipino peacekeepers will be deployed in September to
serve with the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan
Heights.
Ambassador Davide, at the same time, reported that the Philippines will also be
sending military observers to support the UN Military Observer Group in India and
Pakistan (UNMOGIP), which is supervising the ceasefire in the contested state of
Jannu and Kashmir.
Ambassador Davide said the deployments to the Golan Heights and Kashmir were
upon the invitation of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and are
being carried out under the UN Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS) that the
Philippines formally entered into during the visit to Manila last year of UN
Secretary General Ban Ki Moon.
The Golan Heights deployment is considered significant since this would be the
first time the Philippines will deploy a sizeable unit since 2001 when it deployed
over 600 peacekeepers to support the UN Transitional Administration in East
Timor.
“In our own little way, we would help keep the peace in that part of the Middle
East,” Ambassador Davide said, noting the excellent relations the Philippines
enjoys with both Israel and Syria.
UNDOF was established as part of diplomatic efforts to ease the tensions that
followed the 1973 Yom Kippur War that saw Israel successfully defend territory in
the Golan Heights that it seized from Syria during the 1967 Six-Day War. The
Agreement on Disengagement that both sides signed in 1974 called for an area of
separation and two equal zones of limited forces and armaments to be supervised
by a UN observer force.
According to Ambassador Davide, the Philippine contingent will be replacing a

battalion of peacekeepers from Poland and will join more than 1,000 peacekeepers
from Austria, Canada, Croatia, Japan, India and Poland that are presently stationed
across the so-called area of separation.
Ambassador Davide said three officers will also soon join around 40 military
188
LEA-6
2011
observers from Chile, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Korea, Sweden and Uruguay who
are currently serving in UNMOGIP.
The latest deployments are expected to improve the standing of the Philippines as a
troop contributing country. The Philippines is presently the 30th largest contributor
of peacekeepers with 613 military and police peacekeepers serving in eight UN
missions in Afghanistan, Cote d’ Ivoire, Georgia, Haiti, Liberia, Sudan and Timor
Leste.
UN Special Action Team exam opens
Police personnel have now better chances of joining the Philippine delegation for
United Nations (UN) for peace-keeping missions with the opening of pre-
qualifying examinations in regional testing centers.
The establishment of more testing centers is geared towards attaining transparency

and “regional balance” in force generation procedures as mandated by PNP
Memorandum Circular 2009-006 which prescribed the “Rules and Procedures on
the Selection of PNP Personnel for Secondment, Detail to International
Organizations, Peacekeeping Missions.”
In past years, pre-qualifying examinations were all held in Camp Crame alone.
The two sets of examination schedules with different venues are: April 12-16, 2010
in PRO 7, Camp Sergio Osmeña, Cebu City; PRO 9 Camp General Eduardo
Batalla, Zamboanga City, Province of Zamboanga del Sur; PRO 11 Camp
Catitipan, Davao City Province of Davao del Sur and April 26-30, 2010 in PRO
CAR (the Cordilleras) Camp Bado Dangwa, La Trinidad Province of Benguet; and
National Headquarters Camp General Rafael C Crame Quezon City.
The examinations cover three stages: Stage 1 for Written Examination such as the
reading and listening comprehension, and report writing; Stage 2 for driving
proficiency test; and, Stage 3 for firing proficiency test.
Applicants must not be less than 25 years old and not more than 53 years old upon
the actual deployment and must have at least 5 years of active police service.
189
LEA-6
2011
Rank requirement for Police Commissioned Officers must be Police Senior

Inspector to Police Superintendent while for Police Non-commissioned Officers
must be Police Officer 3 to Senior Police Officer 4.
Applicants must also pass the physical fitness test as well as medical, dental and
the neuron-psychiatric examinations.
Computer literacy and driving proficiency are the special skills needed to possess
by the applicants with the recommendation of the unit commander such as the
Command Group and directors of their respective Directorial Staff.
Interested personnel who plan to take the UNSAT exam must submit the electronic
copy of his/her latest PNP Personal Data Sheet, Scanned Valid Driverâs License
and Scanned Recommendation from the Unit Commander not later than March 29,
2010 addressed to the PNP Directorate for Plans, Attention: Chief, UNPOC with
email address [email protected] with telephone numbers (02) 721-85-49
or 721-04-01 local 3554.
TO BE CONTINUED…………….
190

Comparative Police System Summer

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Comparative Police System Summer

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Comparative Police System Summer

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

What are the main topics covered in the course outline?

What are the main topics covered in the course outline?

What are the course goals and objectives?

What are the course goals and objectives?

LEA-6

COMPILATION IN COMPARATIVE POLICE SYSTEM

COMPARATIVE POLICE SYSTEM

With Globalization goes transnational crimes like terrorism, drug trafficking,

Part I. Effects of Globalization

To identify contemporary transnational crime problems and their origins, as well as

At the end of this course the student will be able to:

THE HISTORICAL COMPARATIVE METHOD

Comparative research is usually carried out by the so-called "safari"

In historiography, there are at least eight (8) ways to do history:

be afraid of using their intuition and announcing their "discovery" of a pattern,

INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE

There are four kinds of societies in the world:

(1) folk-communal, which are also called primitive societies;

 folk-communal -- little codification of law, little specialization among

Also of importance are the variables of colonization and underdevelopment, as

FOUR LEGAL TRADITIONS

The four legal traditions are:

 Common law systems -- also known as Anglo-American justice. They exist

 Civil law systems -- also known as Continental justice, Romano-Germanic

 Socialist systems -- also known as Marxist-Leninist or Communist justice.

 Islamic systems -- also known as Muslim or Arabic justice. It derives all of

viziers (the world's first bureaucrats). Secular specialization and professionalism

Feudalism was eventually replaced by powerful monarchies with central

POLICE, COURT, AND CORRECTIONAL SYSTEMS

Correctional systems worldwide can be fairly easily distinguished by whether

Nations that practice corporal punishment do tend, however, to have less of a

SEVEN THEORIES IN COMPARATIVE CRIMINOLOGY

 Alertness to crime theory -- holds that as a nation develops, people's

A. THE NEED FOR INNOVATIVE POLICING

Comparative research is usually came out by the “safari” method (a researcher

Published works tend to fall into three categories:

A-1. GLOBALIZATION AND LAW ENFORCEMENT

Globalization is a package of transnational flows of people, production

Alison Brysk in a digest paper stated that Globalization is the growing

Effects of Globalization on Law Enforcement

Every law enforcement agency in the world is expected to be the protector of

The emergence of “international regime” for state security and protection of

The challenge of globalization is that unaccountable flows of migration and

Threats on law enforcement: Some threats brought about by globalization are:

1. Increasing volume of human rights violations evident by genocide or mass

1. Creation of International Tribunals to deal with human rights problems

A-2. Globalization and Human Rights

Transnational Threats and Opportunities

Globalization—the growing interpenetration of states, markets, communications,

How does globalization—which liberals claim will promote development,

Globalization is a package of transnational flows of people, production,

global information and institutions are insufficiently accessible and distorted by

The emergence of an "international regime" for human rights (Donnelly 1986),

Alongside principled proponents such as Amnesty International, globalization has

New forms of communication allow victims to videotape their plight, advocates to

In this volume, we attempt to map new territory, bring together diverse

Human Rights in a Global Arena

The "International Bill of Human Rights" (Universal Declaration of

Social and economic rights, highlighted in the eponymous International Covenant,