THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 192250. July 11, 2012.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

HERMOGENES DE GUZMAN @ Mong, accused-appellant.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J : p

This is an appeal from the February 9, 2010 Decision 1 of the Court of

Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03458, which affirmed the May 2, 2008
Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 45, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro
(RTC), in Criminal Case No. R-5285, finding accused Hermogenes De Guzman @
Mong (De Guzman) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder
defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

THE FACTS

De Guzman was charged with the crime of Murder in the Information, 3

dated November 12, 2002, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the 20th day of April, 2002 at around 11:00 o'clock
in the evening, in Brgy. San Francisco, Municipality of Sablayan, Province
of Occidental Mindoro, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused being then armed with a sharp bladed
instrument, with intent to kill, with treachery, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said weapon one
Noriel Rosales Urieta, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious wounds
which caused his untimely death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

When arraigned, De Guzman entered a plea of "Not Guilty" 4 to the offense

charged. After pre-trial was terminated, trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution
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 presented the testimonies of Ignacio Flores (Flores), the childhood friend of victim
Noriel Urieta (Urieta) and the purported eyewitness to the stabbing incident; Dr.
Ma. Socorro Ragos (Ragos), who conducted a post-mortem examination on the
cadaver of the victim; and Gina Urieta (Gina), the wife of the victim. The defense,
on the other hand, presented the lone testimony of De Guzman. ATEHDc

The Version of the Prosecution

The version of the prosecution is succinctly summarized by the Office of

the Solicitor General (OSG) in its Brief 5 as follows:

On April 20, 2002 at around 11:00 o'clock in the evening, Noriel

Urieta was in Brgy. Francisco, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro along with
Ignacio Flores. They were drinking in the amusement area.

When they were about to leave the premises, appellant suddenly

approached them and without any provocation, suddenly stabbed Noriel
Urieta with a knife on his left chest.

After the first blow, the victim was already kneeling down and
appellant proceeded to stab him three (3) more times.

Appellant thereafter ran away.

Ignacio Flores called out for help and one Elmer Honato arrived to
give them aid and bring the victim to a secure place and thereafter proceeded
to call for help.

He waited for Elmer Honato to arrive but he did not return anymore.
With the condition of the victim uncertain and as he was afraid, he decided
to leave the victim and go home.

Two days later, Police Officer Gamba, together with the father of
Noriel Urieta and Gina Urieta, the wife of Noriel Urieta, went to the house
of Ignacio Flores in order to get the sworn statement as to the facts that
happened in this case. They were able to do so.

Subsequently, an arrest on the person of Hermogenes de Guzman

was made.

The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor then filed the appropriate

charges thereafter. 6

The Version of the Defense

In his Brief, 7 De Guzman denied the charge against him and presented his
version of the events: CcEHaI

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 On the evening of April 21, 2002, Hermogenes De Guzman joined a
drinking spree at the house of a relative at barangay San Francisco. He was
there from 8:00 o'clock in the morning until 12:00 o'clock midnight, when
he went home with his wife.

The following day, he was drying palay when his wife informed him
that police officers were looking for him. He approached and inquired from
the officers what was the reason. He was told to go with them to the
municipal hall for questioning. Thereat, he was incarcerated because of his
alleged involvement in a stabbing incident.

De Guzman does not personally know the victim, his wife, nor the
supposed eyewitness, Ignacio Flores. He (De Guzman) was not with Urieta
when the former had a drinking spree. He denied having stabbed and killed
Urieta. 8

The RTC Ruling

On May 2, 2008, the RTC rendered judgment finding that the prosecution
was able to establish with certitude, through the credible testimony of prosecution
witness Flores, that De Guzman stabbed and killed Urieta on that fateful night of
April 20, 2002. The RTC rejected the unsubstantiated defense of alibi proffered by
De Guzman in the face of the positive identification of Flores pointing him as the
perpetrator of the crime. It held that treachery attended the commission of the
crime which qualified the killing to murder. The RTC adjudged:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused HERMOGENES DE

GUZMAN alias "Mong" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
and with neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance and in line with
the mandate of Republic Act No. 9346, hereby imposes the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua.

Also, this Court hereby orders the said accused to PAY the surviving
heirs of the victim the following:

1) The sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex-delicto;

2) The sum of P38,000.00 as actual damages;

3) The sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages; and

4) The costs of this suit.

The said accused is hereby credited of his total duration of preventive

imprisonment in the service of his imposed imprisonment.

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 SO ORDERED. 9 STEacI

The CA Decision

On appeal, the CA affirmed the judgment of conviction of De Guzman

holding that his guilt for the crime of murder was proven beyond reasonable doubt
by the prosecution's evidence. The CA added that the facts established by the
unwavering testimony of eyewitness Flores could not be displaced by the empty
denials and self-serving alibi of De Guzman. It sustained the RTC in appreciating
the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery which elevated the killing
to Murder. The dispositive portion of the February 9, 2010 Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby

DISMISSED. The decision of Branch 45, Regional Trial Court of San Jose,
Occidental, Mindoro in Criminal Case No. R-5285 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 10

On February 18, 2010, De Guzman filed a Notice of Appeal, 11 which was

given due course by the CA in its March 3, 2010 Minute Resolution. 12

On July 2, 2010, this Court issued a resolution 13 notifying the parties that
they could file their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desire, within thirty
days from notice. Both parties manifested that they would no longer file
supplemental briefs.

THE ISSUES

Insisting his innocence, De Guzman imputes to the RTC the following

errors:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL

CREDENCE TO THE INCONSISTENT AND DOUBTFUL
TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION'S EYEWITNESS.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE

ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF MURDER DESPITE THE EYEWITNESS' FAILURE TO
POSITIVELY IDENTIFY THE FORMER. DTcASE

III

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT

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 TREACHERY ATTENDED THE SUBJECT KILLING. 14

De Guzman argues that the evidence for the prosecution did not meet that
quantum of proof necessary to convict him of the crime charged. The testimony of
Flores was riddled with inconsistencies and contradictions which tend to erode his
credibility and raise doubt on the veracity of the prosecution evidence. It was
highly improbable for Flores to clearly identify the assailant considering that the
stabbing incident took place suddenly and quickly at 11:00 o'clock in the evening
in a remote barangay with no good source of illumination. The prosecution
miserably failed to show any ill motive on his part that could have possibly
impelled him to commit the crime. Since the prosecution's case is weak, his
defense of alibi assumes importance and can effectively negate his criminal
liability. Finally, De Guzman asserts that even granting arguendo, that he indeed
stabbed Urieta, he cannot be convicted of murder because the prosecution failed to
establish the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.

For the prosecution, the OSG urges this Court to affirm in toto the
challenged decision for failure of De Guzman to show that the RTC committed
any error in rendering a judgment of conviction. It contends that the narration of
Flores regarding the bloody assault on Urieta had clearly established the corpus
delicti of the crime which rendered inconsequential the alleged inconsistencies in
his testimony. It is of the position that eyewitness Flores testified in clear and
unequivocal terms as to the identity of the author of the crime. Lastly, it posits that
treachery was alleged and duly proved by the prosecution during the trial and,
hence, the conviction of De Guzman for murder was correct.

THE COURT'S RULING

The crucial issue in this case is the sufficiency of evidence to convict De

Guzman. More particularly, the Court has to inquire whether there had been
sufficient identification of De Guzman as the perpetrator of the crime.

In every criminal case, the task of the prosecution is always two-fold, that
is, (1) to prove beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the crime charged; and
(2) to establish with the same quantum of proof the identity of the person or
persons responsible therefor, because, even if the commission of the crime is a
given, there can be no conviction without the identity of the malefactor being
likewise clearly ascertained. 15 ITECSH

Although it is entrenched in this jurisdiction that findings of the trial court

on the credibility of the witnesses are accorded great weight and respect because it
had ample opportunity to observe the demeanor of the declarants at the witness
stand, this rule admits exceptions. The saving instance is said to be when a fact or
circumstance of weight and influence has been overlooked, or its significance
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 misconstrued by the trial court sufficient to harbor serious misgivings on its
conclusions. 16

After a painstaking review of the records and the transcripts of stenographic

notes of the testimonies of the witnesses, the Court is not convinced with moral
certainty that De Guzman committed the crime charged. Reasonable doubt bothers
the conscience. With a cloud of doubt continuously hovering, the mind cannot rest
easy.

The case for the prosecution was woven basically on the testimony of
Flores, who claimed to be a childhood friend of Urieta. 17 This alleged eyewitness
recounted that on April 20, 2002, at around 11:00 o'clock in the evening, he and
Urieta were drinking beer at a store near a "peryahan" in Barangay Francisco,
Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro; that after they had finished their third bottle of
beer, they decided to leave their table; that when Urieta was about to stand up, De
Guzman suddenly appeared from nowhere and stabbed Urieta using a knife with a
red handle, without any reason or provocation; that the stab blow landed on the left
breast of Urieta and caused him to fall down; that while in a kneeling position, De
Guzman stabbed him three more times; that Flores cried for help but no one came
to their aid; and that thereafter, De Guzman ran away.

Flores claimed that a certain Elmer Honato (Honato) came and brought
Urieta to the corner of the street; that Honato then went to the barangay hall
allegedly to look for a physician who would attend to the seriously injured Urieta;
that he waited for Honato but sensing that the latter would no longer return, he
hurriedly went home leaving Urieta alone on the ground; and that he did not know
whether Urieta was still alive when he left him.

Flores testified that he was just a meter (an arm's length) away from Urieta
when the latter was stabbed by De Guzman; that the light of the "moron" coming
from the "peryahan" illuminated the table where they were drinking, enabling him
to see the face of the perpetrator whom he identified to be De Guzman; that two
(2) days after the stabbing incident, Police Officer Gamba, Gina and Urieta's father
came to his house; that he then executed a sworn statement before a police officer
narrating his accounts of the stabbing incident which led to the death of Urieta;
that he did not know De Guzman and it was on the night of the stabbing incident
that he first saw him; and that he came to know of the name of De Guzman from
the policemen.

A nexus of logically related circumstances, however, rendered the

testimony of Flores as highly suspect. His testimony is laden with improbabilities
that detract from his credibility. The totality of the evidence for the prosecution
leaves much to be desired. Somehow, the Court cannot help but entertain serious
doubts on the veracity of the malefactor's identity. It is almost as if it was merely
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 contrived to pin criminal culpability upon De Guzman. SECcIH

First, the condition of visibility at the time of the stabbing incident did not
favor the witness Flores, as it did not lend credence to his testimony. The incident
took place during nighttime at 11:00 o'clock in a remote barangay with no electric
lighting in the surroundings and the only source of light then was the illumination
of a "moron" coming from a "peryahan." Apart from the testimony of Flores, no
other competent and corroborative evidence was adduced to settle this question of
visibility and lighting condition as well as to confirm that indeed the light of the
"moron" was existent and adequate for purposes of identification on the night of
the incident. The Court observes that in his Sinumpaang Salaysay, 18 Flores stated
that the "moron (de gas)" was just on the table where they were drinking which
was contrary to what he had testified in court.

The distance of the "moron" in the "peryahan" from the site of the stabbing
incident was not disclosed either. It could have helped determine if the place was
well illuminated. It is important to note that illumination or brightness diffuses as
the distance from the source increases. Moreover, it is clear from the records that
the stabbing incident was so swift for ample observation and Flores, who had three
bottles of beer, was admittedly very afraid so much so that all he did was to cry for
help. Under these circumstances, the Court finds the positive identification of De
Guzman by Flores hazy.

In People v. Faustino, 19 the Court stated that the identification of an

accused by an eyewitness is a vital piece of evidence and most decisive of the
success or failure of the case for the prosecution. In the case at bench, however,
the inconclusive and unreliable identification by Flores of De Guzman as the
culprit failed to break the barrier of proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Second, Flores' story, that a certain Honato came to their aid and brought
the seriously wounded Urieta to the corner of the street but left thereafter
supposedly to seek a physician at the barangay hall, simply does not make sense. It
appears strange that Honato should proceed to the barangay hall to look for a
doctor when natural instinct and reason would dictate that he and Flores should
have brought Urieta straight to the hospital for the immediate medical treatment of
his wounds. It appears even stranger that this Honato was not presented in court to
corroborate the testimony of Flores. Besides, can one really find a physician at the
barangay hall at that late hour of the night?

His story about Honato being nebulous, the Court doubts if Flores ever
shouted for help at all. If he really did, many people in the "peryahan" would have
surely come to their aid. Indeed, if he was a childhood friend, he would not have
second thoughts in bringing Urieta to the hospital himself. As he merely
abandoned his dying friend, one cannot help but harbor a suspicion. DICSaH

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 Furthermore, the reaction of Flores, in hurriedly going home and leaving
Urieta alone to die, was unnatural and contrary to common human experience. The
seemingly apathetic behavior displayed by Flores in leaving Urieta without even
checking his condition to see if he was still breathing and his failure to report the
matter to the police or at least inform the victim's family about what happened on
the same night were highly inconsistent with the natural/common reaction of one
who had just witnessed the stabbing of his childhood friend. The Court cannot
accept a story that defies reason and leaves much to the imagination. The failure of
Flores to lend a touch of realism to his tale leads to the conclusion that he was
either withholding an incriminating information or was not telling the truth.

The time-honored test in determining the value of the testimony of a

witness is its compatibility with human knowledge, observation and common
experience of man. 20 Thus, whatever is repugnant to the standards of human
knowledge, observation and experience becomes incredible and must lie outside
judicial cognizance. Consistently, the Court has ruled that evidence to be believed
must proceed not only from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible
in itself as to hurdle the test of conformity with the knowledge and common
experience of mankind. 21 In the case at bench, the testimony of Flores, the lone
eyewitness of the prosecution does not bear the earmarks of truth and, hence, not
credible.

Third, the Court finds disturbing how the police officers were able to
identify De Guzman as the killer of Urieta. It is undisputed that on the day
following the stabbing incident, De Guzman was invited by the police officers to
the municipal hall, was informed by them that he was a suspect in the commission
of a crime and then placed behind bars. De Guzman testified, to wit:

Atty. Jennifer Garcia

(On Direct Examination)

Q: The following day, what did you do?

A: I was drying our palay, sir.

Q: While drying your palay, do you know if there was anything that
happened?

A: My wife arrived, sir.

Q: When your wife arrived what happened? ACcaET

A: According to her I was being looked by some policemen, sir.

Q: Why are these policemen were looking at you?

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 A: Because according to them they are going to ask something from me,
sir.

Q: After knowing that some policemen are looking for you, what did
you do then?

A: I was the one who approached them, sir.

Q: Where did you approach them?

A: I asked them why they are looking for me, sir.

Q: Did they told you why they are looking for you?

A: They are inviting me to go with them in the Municipal Hall, sir.

Q: For what purpose they are asking you to come with them in the
Municipal Hall?

A: According to them they are going to ask something from me, sir.

Q: Did you reach the Municipal Hall?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: While in the Municipal Hall, what happened?

A: I was incarcerated, sir.

Q: Did you come to know from them why you are incarcerated?

A: They said that I was involved in a stabbing incident, sir. 22

Also, on April 21, 2002, Gina, the wife of the victim, executed her
Sinumpaang Salaysay 23 wherein she declared, among others, that she came to
know the identity and the name of the assailant from the police officers. Thus:

T: Kung ikaw ay nasa inyong bahay sa bukid naroroon kagabi ng

maganap ang pananaksak ni HERMOGENES DE GUZMAN alias
"Mong" sa iyong asawa, papaano mong nalaman na itong si
HERMOGENES DE GUZMAN nga ang may kagagawan ng
pananaksak sa iyong asawa, gayong wala ka naman kagabi sa lugar
ng pinangyarihan? DHECac

S: Napag-alaman ko po sa mga Pulis na sumurender na ang sumaksak

sa aking asawa kaya't ako nga ay pumunta dito at ipinagtanong ko
ang kanyang pangalan sa mga Pulis kaya ko siya nakilala at
napag-alamang siya nga ang sumaksak sa aking asawang si Noriel.

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 During the trial, Gina stated the same thing as she testified, to wit:

Asst. Pros. Dante V. Ramirez

(On Direct Examination)

Q: Who was the person who killed your husband?

A: Hermogenes de Guzman, sir. 24

COURT

Q: You mentioned a while ago that when you were asked who killed
your husband, you answered Hermogenes de Guzman, how did you
come to know the killer of your husband?

A: I came to know from the Police Officer, Your Honor.

Q: Have you known Hermogenes de Guzman before the death of your

husband??

A: No, Your Honor.

Q: You came to know him only upon the death of your husband?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: Do you know any reason why Hermogenes de Guzman killed your

husband?

A: I do not know any reason, Your Honor. 25

Two days after the incident in question or on April 22, 2002, Flores
executed his Sinumpaang Salaysay and gave his account of the stabbing incident
only because Police Officer Gamba together with the father and the wife of Urieta
came to his house. 26 Even so, nowhere in the record does it show that Flores gave
the police officers a description of the physical features and attributes of the
assailant. During the trial, he admitted that he did not know De Guzman or his
name at the time of the stabbing incident. Thus:

Atty. Jennifer Garcia

(On Cross-Examination) ACTIcS

Q: How about accused, did you know him personally?

A: I only saw him on that night when he stabbed Noriel Urieta and I
only learned his name from the Police Officer. 27

The foregoing sequence of events clearly reveals that the police officers had
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 already a suspect, De Guzman, in the killing of Urieta, even before Flores could
give his statement and despite the absence of any description from Flores himself
as to how the culprit looked like. Curiously, no police officer was called to the
witness stand to shed light on the matter. This gray area in the case of the
prosecution is fatal to its cause and casts serious doubt on the veracity and
credibility of its evidence.

The Court is likewise puzzled as to how the prosecution came into

possession of the alleged murder weapon marked as Exhibit "B." During the trial,
a knife with a red handle was shown to Flores who specifically identified it to be
the same bladed weapon used by De Guzman in stabbing Urieta. The information,
however, as to who recovered that knife, and from whom it was seized remained a
mystery. At any rate, considering the visibility condition and other attending
circumstances on the night of the stabbing incident, the Court indeed doubts how
Flores could have positively identified the murder weapon.

Lastly, it has not been shown that De Guzman had any motive for killing
Urieta. The brutal and gruesome attack on Urieta, who sustained two stab wounds
on the chest, a stab wound along the waist area which hit the liver, and a stab
wound on the elbow, clearly manifested the intention of the perpetrator to
purposely bring death upon the victim. There was no evidence, however, that De
Guzman carried a grudge or had an axe to grind against the victim or his family, or
even knew the victim at all. Prosecution witnesses Flores and Gina even attested
that they did not know of any reason why De Guzman killed Urieta.

Generally, the motive of the accused in a criminal case is immaterial and

does not have to be proven. Proof of the same, however, becomes relevant and
essential when, as in this case, the identity of the assailant is in question. 28 In
People v. Vidad, 29 the Court said:

It is true that it is not indispensable to conviction for murder that the

particular motive for taking the life of a human being shall be established at
the trial, and that in general when the commission of a crime is clearly
proven, conviction may and should follow even where the reason for its
commission is unknown; but in many criminal cases, one of the most
important aids in completing the proof of the commission of the crime by the
accused is the introduction of evidence disclosing the motive which tempted
the mind to indulge in the criminal act. (Underscoring ours) TADaCH

In light of the weakness in the prosecution's case, the alibi of De Guzman

assumes credence and importance. While alibi is a weak defense and the rule is
that it must be proved to the satisfaction of the court, the said rule has never been
intended to change the burden of proof in criminal cases. Otherwise, an absurd
situation will arise wherein the accused is put in a more difficult position where
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 the prosecution evidence is vague and weak as in the present case. 30 The burden
of proof still lies in the prosecution to establish that De Guzman was responsible
for the killing.

It is oft-repeated that a finding of guilt must rest on the evidence of the

prosecution not on the weakness or even absence of evidence for the defense.
Thus, it is required that every circumstance favoring the innocence of the accused
must be duly taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test of
reason and the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. 31 In
the case at bench, the evidence for the prosecution was unable to pass the exacting
test of moral certainty that the law demands. In People v. Fernandez, 32 this Court
has aptly said:

It is better to liberate a guilty man than to unjustly keep in prison one

whose guilt has not been proved by the required quantum of evidence.
Hence, despite the Court's support of ardent crusaders waging all-out war
against felons on the loose, when the People's evidence fails to prove
indubitably the accused's authorship of the crime of which they stand
accused, it is the Court's duty — and the accused's right — to proclaim their
innocence. Acquittal, therefore, is in order.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The February 9, 2010 Decision

of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03458 is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Accused Hermogenes De Guzman is hereby ACQUITTED of
the crime charged against him and ordered immediately RELEASED from
custody, unless he is being held for some other lawful cause.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to forthwith

implement this decision and to INFORM this Court, within five (5) days from
receipt hereof, of the date when De Guzman was actually released from
confinement.

SO ORDERED. DAETcC

Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Reyes * and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
* Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad, per
Special Order No. 1244 dated June 26, 2012.
1. Penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok with Associate
Justice Ricardo R. Rosario and Associate Justice Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla,
concurring; rollo, pp. 2-11.
2. Penned by Judge Jose S. Jacinto, Jr.; records, pp. 148-153.
3. Id. at 1.
4. Id. at 26.
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 5. CA rollo, pp. 55-72.
6. Id. at 60-62.
7. Id. at 25-41.
8. Id. at 31-32.
9. Records p. 153.
10. CA rollo p. 87.
11. Id. at 88-89.
12. Id. at 91.
13. Rollo, pp. 17-18.
14. CA rollo, p. 27.
15. People v. Bacalso, 395 Phil. 192, 199 (2000).
16. Id.
17. CA rollo, pp. 44 and 79.
18. Records, pp. 11-12.
19. 394 Phil. 236, 259 (2000).
20. Ocampo v. People, G.R. No. 163705, July 30, 2007, 528 SCRA 547, 560.
21. Zapatos v. People, 457 Phil. 969, 985 (2003).
22. TSN, dated July 17, 2007, pp 3-4.
23. Records, p. 10.
24. TSN, dated October 12, 2005, p. 8.
25. Id. at 12-13.
26. TSN, dated August 25, 2004, p. 10.
27. Id. at 14.
28. People v. Garcia, 390 Phil. 519, 528 (2000).
29. 369 Phil. 954, 965 (1999), citing US v. Carlos, 15 Phil. 47 (1910).
30. People v. Caverte, 385 Phil. 849, 873 (2000).
31. People v. Mejia, 341 Phil. 118, 145 (2002).
32. 434 Phil. 435, 455 (2002).

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