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Advanced Event Analysis Tutorial

Part 1: Questions
Karl Zimmerman, Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Inc.

Abstract—Event reports continue to be an invaluable feature II. DIRECTIONAL ELEMENT OPERATES FOR REVERSE FAULT
in microprocessor-based relays. Some events are relatively
straightforward to analyze, and others require experience and
This event occurred on a 230 kV line protected with an
considerable knowledge of the power system and protective relay SEL-311C Transmission Protection System. Direct tripping
system in order to find root cause. This session provides several and a permissive overreaching transfer trip (POTT) scheme
advanced real-world event examples, time to evaluate them, and were employed with phase and ground protection elements.
solutions. The relay produced a trip for an apparent reverse fault, as
shown in Fig. 1.
I. INTRODUCTION
The event reports provided in this session are from real-
world applications. They have been edited only to the extent
that the owner involved is not revealed. They provide us the
opportunity to learn and improve our power system. We want
to thank the engineers and technicians who share information
and what they know for the benefit of our industry.
We provide a number of example case studies. These come
from a wide variety of power system and protection Fig. 1. One-line diagram of example system
applications and include distribution, transmission, First, consider the expected operation. For an external fault
transformer, and bus event examples. (reverse fault from the R terminal), no tripping would be
In each case, we provide some or all of the following: expected. The L relays would likely detect a forward fault and
 A brief introduction to the application and problem. send a permissive trip signal to the R terminal. The only
 The event reports required to solve the problem. possibility for a trip is if there were a protection or breaker
 The instruction manual for the product involved. failure to clear the fault from the protected line. However,
 References for future reading and further instruction. what actually occurred is a trip at the R terminal.
Students are required to use their own personal computer Open the event labeled 2_EXAMPLE 2_311C.cev. Also,
with SEL Compass®, ACSELERATOR QuickSet® SEL-5030 in order to analyze the relay settings and logic, some
Software, and ACSELERATOR Analytic Assistant® SEL-5601 familiarity with the relay and protection scheme is necessary.
Software installed. These programs are available for download
at no cost from www.selinc.com. It will also be helpful to II-a What relay elements are programmed to trip, and what
have the instruction manuals available for the relays being tripping schemes are applied?
applied in the example events. II-b What relay element or elements actually produced the
Students are invited to answer the questions asked in this trip condition?
document. These questions are intended to guide analysis,
keep the class efforts focused in the same direction, and II-c What type of fault occurred? Was the fault forward or
highlight the main lesson points. Please document the solution reverse? Did the relay elements operate correctly?
to each case study in the format of a Microsoft® Word
II-d How was the directional element set? Did the relay use
document with appropriate software screen captures and notes.
negative sequence, zero sequence, or both?
Some of the events highlight the need to capture certain
event formats. For example, it is always recommended that II-e Were the settings correctly applied?
users capture a filtered compressed format and unfiltered
compressed or COMTRADE format for each event. In some
cases, a traveling wave COMTRADE is required.
Finally, instructors are available to answer questions, share
tips, and highlight lessons learned. Have fun!
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III. HIGH-SPEED ZONE 1 TRIP FOR 345 KV LINE FAULT provide traveling wave (TW) fault location, which measures
In this example, an SEL-421 Protection, Automation, and the time that high-frequency transients produced by faults are
Control System tripped at high speed for a line fault. The sensed at each end of the line. The TW-based fault locating
utilities involved considered this to be a correct operation. function uses the internal protection elements, the
However, here we take the opportunity to analyze the event communications channel to the remote terminal, and Global
reports. What can we learn from a correct operation? The one- Positioning System-based (GPS-based) time synchronization.
line diagram is shown in Fig. 2. The TW fault locator uses conventional current transformer
(CT) measurements.
Local Remote Although the fault location estimate can be provided
automatically from each end, it is useful to be able to evaluate
345 kV and calculate the estimate using event reports.
1 37 miles 1 For this example, we examine an actual BG fault on a
72.77-mile 161 kV line in an area of rough terrain in the
western part of the United States. The actual line data, event
information, and traveling wave calculation details are
2 2
Y BG Y described in [1]. The basic formula for calculating fault
SEL-421 SEL-421
location is shown in (1).
X W W X
LL   TwaveA  TwaveB  • c • LPVEL
TWFL  (1)
Fig. 2. One-line diagram of example system 2
In this section, we have the following three events: where:
 Local SEL-421 compressed filtered event at 8 samples TWFL is the TW-based fault location from local
per cycle. Terminal A.
 Local SEL-421 COMTRADE unfiltered event. LL is the line length.
 Remote SEL-421 filtered event at 4 samples per TwaveA is the TW arrival time recorded at Terminal A.
second (not compatible with ACSELERATOR Analytic TwaveB is the TW arrival time recorded at Terminal B.
Assistant). c is the speed of light.
Each event has useful data that we can use to evaluate the LPVEL is the propagation velocity of the TW in per unit
protection system performance. First, open the local (pu) of the speed of light.
compressed filtered event 3_421_LOCAL.CEV. From [1], the TW propagation velocity is a key parameter
in the fault location calculation and is typically obtained from
III-a What type of fault occurred?
line parameter estimation programs. We can also estimate
III-b What protection schemes does the relay apply? propagation velocity using TW measurements with the
following:
III-c What element within the relay caused the trip? How
 Local TW information recorded during line or reactor
long did it take for the relay to operate? How long did
energization tests.
the breaker(s) take to clear the fault?
 Local and remote TW information recorded during
III-d Did the relay and protection system operate correctly external faults.
and as expected? Open the event reports titled 4_TW_10002_LOCAL.DAT
and 4_TW_10002_REMOTE.DAT to find the precise time
III-e Open the local COMTRADE event of the transient of the fault. Using the zoom-in feature of
HR_10003_421_LOCAL.DAT. Evaluate the
ACSELERATOR Analytic Assistant and selecting Line and
unfiltered currents and voltages before, during, and
Points in the Style selection, we can view the peak of the
after the fault. What observations can we make, and
local and remote waveforms. We can select the peak point on
are there any concerns?
the given phase to give us the time stamp.
III-f Evaluate the DCB scheme. What inputs and outputs
were assigned for the DCB scheme? Did the local IV-a What is the time stamp for each event?
inputs and outputs assert as expected? IV-b Calculate TWFL using the observed times and
III-g Open the remote event 3_421_REMOTE.txt. Did the remaining parameters, which are the following:
remote SEL-421 send a block signal? What could have  LPVEL = 0.98821 (setting determined from system
caused the local SEL-421 BT input to assert?
test).
 c = 186282.39705 miles per second.
IV. TRAVELING WAVE FAULT LOCATION
 LL = 72.77 miles.
The SEL-411L Advanced Line Differential Protection,
Automation, and Control System now has the ability to
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V. TRANSFORMER DIFFERENTIAL OPERATION VI. BUS DIFFERENTIAL RELAY APPLICATION

A fault on a distribution feeder produced an undesired Fig. 4 shows the one-line diagram of a 138 kV bus
operation on a transformer differential relay. Fig. 3 shows the protected by a high-impedance bus differential scheme. The
system one-line diagram. bus has two line sources, two transformers feeding radial load,
a surge arrester, and a capacitor bank. The capacitor bank is
manually controlled (energized and de-energized) by system
operators to adjust the system voltage.
138 kV Bus

Load

Load

Fig. 3. System one-line diagram

In order to analyze this event, it is first important to Capacitor

Surge Arrester Bank
understand the following expected operation: Zone of Protection
 The recloser (A) should operate first.
Fig. 4. One-line diagram of bus differential zone of protection
 The transformer backup overcurrent relay (B) should
operate second. In a high-impedance bus differential scheme, the paralleled
 The relay protects the transformer based on the output of all of the CTs is connected through a large resistor
damage curve. (2,000 ohms in the SEL-587Z High-Impedance Differential
 The relay coordinates with the downstream Relay). The CTs are selected to be the same ratio (in this case,
recloser control. all CTs are 2000:5). If an unbalance current flows, such as for
an internal fault, a voltage is developed across that resistor and
 The output from B is connected as an input on
the relay compares the voltage to a predefined threshold. The
Relay C, which acts as a lockout relay.
threshold is typically set to withstand an external fault if one
 The transformer differential relay (C) 87T should
CT completely saturates.
restrain.
On one occasion, the high-impedance bus differential
The following actually occurred:
operated when the capacitor bank was de-energized. To
 A line-to-ground fault occurred on the feeder.
evaluate this event, open the event files 6_SEL_587Z
 Recloser A did not trip. FILTERED.CEV and 6_SEL_587Z RAW.CEV.
 The high-side circuit switcher did trip. See [2] for more background on this event.
 The substation and all load were de-energized.
In order to find root cause, we will analyze the event VI-a What element produced the trip? How was the element
reports. Open the events 5_YELLOW Event Files 587 2-4- set?
12.CEV and 5_YELLOW Event Files 551 2-4-12.CEV.
VI-b There were no other faults on the system at the time of
V-a Where was the fault (internal to the transformer or the trip. The trip was directly related to the
external to the protection zone)? Did Relay B operate? de-energization of the capacitor bank. What is the
Based solely on the event reports and the one-line possible cause of the trip?
diagram, what observations can we make?
VI-c If the root cause is the conduction of the surge arrester,
V-b What problems, settings, wiring, testing, and so on what protection measures can be taken?
contributed to these misoperations?
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VII. RESTRICTED EARTH FAULT (REF) ELEMENT TRIP

A large manufacturing facility experienced two critical
transformer trips, which caused a loss of production while the
trips were being investigated. The transformers were actually
three single-phase, three-winding transformers connected in
wye-wye-delta. A simplified three-line diagram is shown in
Fig. 5. Fig. 6 shows a more detailed wiring diagram where we Fig. 7. One-line diagram shows Zone 1 trip for remote bus fault
can see a spare transformer.
The initial report from the field was that a Zone 1 distance
element operated.
Open the event 8_311L_67G1 operation.cev.

VIII-a What elements were set to trip, and what element

produced the trip? How was the element set?
VIII-b What could have caused the unexpected rise in
current? What actions can be taken to avoid this in the
future?

IX. LINE CURRENT DIFFERENTIAL OPERATES ON LINE

CHARGING CURRENT
A line current differential (87L) scheme operated for an
out-of-section CA fault on the negative-sequence (87L2)
element on a 5.6-mile 230 kV cable with no tapped load. By
Fig. 5. Simplified three-line diagram definition, this is an undesired operation. Fig. 8 shows a basic
one-line diagram. Note that this line is radial with only tapped
load and a reactor at Station G.
Open the event SEL-311L_STATION G_LINE GH1.cev.
Station F
Line HF
Station H

Open SEL-311L
CA
Fault

Fig. 6. Detailed screen capture shows single-phase transformers connected Line GH1
wye-wye-delta with spare transformer Line GH2 (5.6 mile
cable)
The questions and discussion in this section follow a
sequence of events that allow us to determine root cause.
Open the event 7_CEV_S4_L30_1 initial trip.CEV.

VII-a What elements were set to trip, and what element

produced the first trip? How was the element set?
Open
VII-b Open the event 7_CEV_S4_L15_1-trip after
load.CEV. What element produced the second trip?
SEL-311L
VII-c What could have caused the trip?
Station G

VIII. GROUND DIRECTIONAL OVERCURRENT OPERATES FOR Open

REMOTE FAULT
A line protective relay tripped for a remote AG bus fault
and produced a Zone 1 target, which was deemed to be a Reactor
misoperation. See Fig. 7.
Tapped
Load

Fig. 8. Basic system one-line diagram

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IX-a What elements were set to trip, and what element

produced the trip? How was the element set?
IX-b Was there differential current in the prefault currents?
What might have caused this?
IX-c What was the line charging current? What measures
can be taken to prevent future operations? The events
SEL-411L STATION G LINE GH1_REPLAY.cev
and SEL-411L STATION G LINE
GH1_REPLAY_LINE CHARGING
COMPENSATION ENABLED.cev will be
necessary to complete this exercise.
IX-d What measures can be taken to prevent future
operations?

X. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author acknowledges the contributions of
David Costello, Oskar Reynisson, Normann Fischer,
Lee Underwood, Tony Lee, Bill Fleming, Mike Collum,
Mangapathirao V. Mynam, and the many utility and industrial
engineers who provided events and helped determine root
cause of the events contained in this analysis.

XI. REFERENCES
[1] S. Marx, B. K. Johnson, A. Guzmán, V. Skendzic, and M. V. Mynam,
“Traveling Wave Fault Location in Protective Relays: Design, Testing,
and Results,” proceedings of the 16th Annual Georgia Tech Fault and
Disturbance Analysis Conference, Atlanta, GA, May 2013.
[2] K. Koellner, O. Reynisson, and D. Costello, “High-Impedance Bus
Differential Misoperation Due to Circuit Breaker Restrikes,”
proceedings of the 67th Annual Georgia Tech Protective Relaying
Conference, Atlanta, GA, May 2013.

XII. BIOGRAPHY
Karl Zimmerman is a regional technical manager with Schweitzer
Engineering Laboratories, Inc. in Fairview Heights, Illinois. His work
includes providing application and product support and technical training for
protective relay users. He is a senior member of the IEEE Power System
Relaying Committee and chairman of Working Group D25, Distance Element
Response to Distorted Waveforms. Karl received his BSEE degree at the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and has over 20 years of
experience in the area of system protection. He has authored over 25 papers
and application guides on protective relaying and was honored to receive the
2008 Walter A. Elmore Best Paper Award from the Georgia Institute of
Technology Protective Relaying Conference.

© 2013 by Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Inc.

All rights reserved.
20130724 • LWP0011-01