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    Kurzman The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran 2004 Synopsis

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    This document provides a summary of Charles Kurzman's book "The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran". The book examines ordinary Iranians' perceptions of the revolutionary movement against the Shah in Iran from 1977-1979. Kurzman argues that political, organizational, cultural and economic explanations are inadequate and that understanding the movement's viability was crucial. As the movement gained viability in late 1977, more Iranians joined the protests. By late 1978, victory seemed possible to many. Kurzman advocates abandoning attempts to retroactively predict events and instead understanding the lived experience and confusion of the moment.

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    Kurzman The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran 2004 Synopsis

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    Zapatomon
    76 views3 pages
    This document provides a summary of Charles Kurzman's book "The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran". The book examines ordinary Iranians' perceptions of the revolutionary movement against the Shah in Iran from 1977-1979. Kurzman argues that political, organizational, cultural and economic explanations are inadequate and that understanding the movement's viability was crucial. As the movement gained viability in late 1977, more Iranians joined the protests. By late 1978, victory seemed possible to many. Kurzman advocates abandoning attempts to retroactively predict events and instead understanding the lived experience and confusion of the moment.

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    La revolución impensable

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    16154728-Kurzman-The-Unthinkable-Revolution-in-Iran-2004-Synopsis

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    This document provides a summary of Charles Kurzman's book "The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran". The book examines ordinary Iranians' perceptions of the revolutionary movement against the Shah in Iran from 1977-1979. Kurzman argues that political, organizational, cultural and economic explanations are inadequate and that understanding the movement's viability was crucial. As the movement gained viability in late 1977, more Iranians joined the protests. By late 1978, victory seemed possible to many. Kurzman advocates abandoning attempts to retroactively predict events and instead understanding the lived experience and confusion of the moment.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf or txt
    76 views3 pages

    Kurzman The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran 2004 Synopsis

    Uploaded by

    Zapatomon
    This document provides a summary of Charles Kurzman's book "The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran". The book examines ordinary Iranians' perceptions of the revolutionary movement against the Shah in Iran from 1977-1979. Kurzman argues that political, organizational, cultural and economic explanations are inadequate and that understanding the movement's viability was crucial. As the movement gained viability in late 1977, more Iranians joined the protests. By late 1978, victory seemed possible to many. Kurzman advocates abandoning attempts to retroactively predict events and instead understanding the lived experience and confusion of the moment.

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    of 3

    UFPPC (www.ufppc.org) Digging Deeper: May 29, 2006, 7:00 p.m.

    Charles Kurzman, The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran (Cambridge, MA &


    London: Harvard University Press, 2004).

    “I have tried in this book to pull and the Shah; political explanations of
    together all the evidence I could on the latter’s fall (12-15). Theda Skocpol
    ordinary Iranians’ perceptions of the and “bringing the state back in” to
    revolutionary movement . . . the explanations of revolution (15-17). Brief
    relative lack of source material on non- liberalization phase in Iran in 1977 (17-
    elites matters. . . . This book’s sole 21). Khomeini’s attitude (21-24). In late
    prediction is that the emergence of 1977, “Khomeini’s followers clearly
    such voices will confirm the confusion began to mobilize”; author has seen no
    and unpredictability that are the focus order from Khomeini ordering this (24).
    of the present analysis” (184-85). Premature death of Mostafa Khomeini,
    Ruhollah’s eldest son & chief aide, in
    Preface. As HS student, author Iraq, on Oct. 23, 1977, in his mid-40s,
    ignorantly participated in anti-Iran leads to political opposition to shah (25-
    demonstration outside Saudi-affiliated 30). Assertions that some threshold had
    mosque (vii). “We can only guess at the been achieved, giving the movement
    future. We cannot know how people will greater viability, seem more important
    act in a situation of confusion until it is than the shah’s liberalization period (30-
    upon them” (viii-ix). 32).

    Ch. 1: Introduction. Oct. 27, 1978: Ch. 3: Mobilization of the Mosque


    CIA says shah “is expected to remain Network: Organizational
    actively in power over the next ten Explanations (Early 1978). Regime
    years” (1-2). U.S. Ambassador to Iran insults Khomeini in article published Jan.
    William Sullivan’s Nov. 9 memo, 7, 1978, leading to violent protests (33-
    “Thinking the Unthinkable” (2). 37). The mosque network: 9,015
    Khomeini’s conviction that the revolution mosques, enjoying a certain autonomy
    would soon succeed (2-4). Revolution from the regime (37-40). State
    poses general problems for “retroactive repression (40-42). Islamists not in
    prediction” (4-5). “Anti-explanation” is an control of network (42-44). It was
    attempt to incorporate anomaly and commandeered by them in 1978, but this
    confusion, and to abandon “the mirage of was an effect more than a cause of the
    retroactive predictability” (5-6). Political, revolution (44-48).
    organizational, cultural, economic, and
    military explanations are all inadequate Ch. 4: Shi‘i Appeals: Cultural
    (6-7). Individuals are unpredictable (7-8). Explanations (Mid-1978). The 40-day
    Confusion — “the recognition of mourning cycle, which set the crescendo-
    deinstitutionalization” — is “the essence like rhythm of the revolutionary
    of the revolutionary experience” (8-9). In movement (50-54). But the ending of
    this situation, “preferences changed the cycle in Jun. 1978 weakens this
    radically and quickly” (9-10). Judgments explanation; in fact, the cycle is more an
    of viability are important factors (10). effect than a cause (54-56). Cultural
    Social scientists can only “examine the explanations are rather weak, as
    mindset of the moment” (11). contradictions in “the concept of social-
    movement ‘framing’ . . . elaborated in
    Ch. 2: The Emergence of Protest: the 1980s and 1990s by the sociologists
    Political Explanations (1977). Carter David Snow, Robert Benford, and others”
    show (56-58). July-Sept. 1978 revival of (131-33). But actors cannot predict their
    movement (58-64). Weakness of own behavior: “I can’t” (133-35). “A
    Islamism as ideology in 1978 (64-68). viable alternative is a movement that
    Martyrdom as Shi‘i institution “is a red seems to have a realistic chance of
    herring” as an explanation, as is shown success” (136). Analysis of Iranian case:
    by actual events and comparison with “The critical mass moment began in Iran
    other cultures (68-73). Martial law in late 1977, when Khomeini’s followers
    declared Sept. 8, 1978; “Black Friday” started to mobilize against the shah”
    crackdown (73-76). (136). “In late summer 1978, the
    movement became ‘viable’ in the minds
    Ch. 5: General Strike: Economic of many Iranians outside the
    Explanations (Fall 1978). Strikes revolutionary circle” (137). “[V]ictory
    spread across Iran in Sept. 1978 (77-79). may be dated to mid-November 1978”
    Iran’s economic distress (79-83). (137). “Viability is non-predictive” (138).
    Difficulties with economic explanations of “What is left when we part from
    revolution (83-86). Effects of “the oil retroactive prediction? Understanding”
    boom of 1973-1974” (86-90). Pattern of (138). Iranian culture of inner & outer
    dashed expectations, inequality, and self limits national solidarity, but the
    corruption “known in the economic revolution created solidarity (139-41).
    literature as ‘the Dutch disease’ was not Khomeini’s prestige came not from
    stronger in Iran than other countries, ideology but from his having created a
    however (91-96). Macroeconomic data viable movement (142). The attitudes of
    (96-99). Comparison of villagers, poor liberals (143-45), left opposition groups
    urban migrants, bazaaris, and university (145-48), the “disorganized left”
    students shows no correlation between centered in the student movement (148-
    economics and revolutionary activism 50), feminists (150-52), all demonstrates
    (99-104). the importance of viability. Non-
    participation became dangerous (152-
    Ch. 6: Failure of the Fist: Military 54). Analysis of the “stalemate” period
    Explanations (Winter 1978-1979). from mid-Nov. 1978 to the collapse of the
    Shah appoints military government in regime — due to an unplanned uprising
    early Nov. 1978 (105-07). Explanations on Feb. 9-11, 1979 (154-62).
    of its failure (107-11). “The problem for
    the shah was that Iranians had stopped Ch. 8: Conclusion. “[E]xplanations of
    obeying” (111-14). A period of great the Iranian Revolution are only partially
    uncertainty (114-21). “It is almost valid” (163). Review of weaknesses
    unheard of for a revolution to involve as (163-65). In general, explanations
    much as 1 percent of a country’s “suffer an inversion of cause and effect”
    population. . . . Yet in Iran, more than 10 (165). “The problem, I contend, is . . .
    percent of the country marched in anti- with explanations in general” (166).
    shah demonstrations on December 10 Advocates embracing “anti-explanation”:
    and 11, 1978” (121-24). “recognizing and reconstructing the lived
    experience of the moment,” including
    Ch. 7: A Viable Movement: Anti- “confusion” (166). The objections to this
    Explanation (Winter 1978-1979). approach also apply to objectivist social
    Testimony of importance of estimations science explanations (166-68). The more
    of viability (125-28). Social-science events break from routine, the less they
    accounts of crowd psychology (128-31). are objectively explicable (168).
    “[P]eople decide to protest based in large Individuals’ estimates of viability are
    part on their expectation that others will crucial (169-71). This accords with
    protest” (131). Critical mass theory “recent trends in social theory which
    suggest that the reproduction of memoirs, oral history projects, and 2nd
    practices from one moment to the next wave of analyses (180-81).
    actually requires work and cannot be
    taken for granted” (171). Notes. 51 pp.

    About the Sources. Khomeini References. 36 documentary


    encouraged documentation of collections, 47 periodicals, 591 books and
    revolutionary movement (175). Early essays.
    documentary collections valuable (176-
    77). Early wave of explanatory accounts Acknowledgments. Neil Smelser on
    based accounts of revolution on dubious dissertation committee.
    journalistic sources (177-78). Islamists’
    documentary collections (178-80). Élite Index. 5 pp.

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