Diamond Drilling Corp vs Crescent Mining and the decision in Civil Case No.

00-055 only involves

Dev’t Corp PFRC, and not Crescent.
The MGB, through Director Ramos, also
ratiocinated that the JVA between PFRC and Crescent as
Facts:
regards the Guinaoang Project is a private matter
On October 27, 1993, Crescent Mining and between the said corporations such that the conveyance
Development Corporation (Crescent), a Filipino by PFRC to DDCP of its interest therein is not within the
corporation, and Pacific Falkon Resources Corporation DENR Secretary's authority to approve.
(PFRC), a Canadian corporation, entered into a Joint
In view of the denial, DDCP filed a Motion
Venture Agreement (JVA) in preparation for the
dated June 2, 2011 praying that an order be issued
formation of a joint venture to undertake copper and
directing the DENR Secretary, thru the MGB Director,
gold mining operations within a 534-hectare area in
to amend MPSA No. 057-96-CAR by incorporating the
Guinaoang and Bulalacao, Mankayan, Benguet (the
40% ownership of DDCP therein.
Guinaoang Project).
The trial court granted DDCP’s motion.
On November 12,1996, DENR Sec Ramos awarded
MPSA No. 057-96-CAR to Crescent. Under the
agreement, Crescent was granted the exclusive right to
Issue #1
conduct initial exploration and possible development and
commercial utilization of minerals that may be found whether there is propriety to Crescent's resort to
within the Guinaoang Project area. certiorari; and
Later, Crescent and PFRC amended their JVA, Ruling:
where the latter acquired 40% of the Guinaoang Project. The Court is not obliged to tackle this issue, as DDCP
On January 11, 2000, DDCP, PFRC's drilling did not raise it before the appellate court. In Dimaandal
contractor, filed a Complaint for collection of sum of v. PO2 Ilagan, et al.,20 the Court said:
money with damages and prayer for the issuance of a At the outset, we reiterate the well-settled rule that no
writ of preliminary attachment against PFRC before the question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been
RTC of Makati City. The application for the writ was raised in the proceedings below. Points of law, theories,
then granted and the 40% share of PFRC was attached issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the
and levied upon. lower court, administrative agency, or quasi-judicial
After PFRC failed to file its responsive pleading body need not be considered by a reviewing court, as
within the reglementary period, the trial court issued an they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage.
Order dated January 5, 2001 declaring PFRC in default. Basic considerations of fairness and due process impel
this rule. Any issue raised for the first time is barred by
On April 23, 2001, the trial court rendered a
[estoppel].
Decision8 holding PFRC liable to DDCP in the amount
of US $307,726.00. A writ of execution was issued by Note that this principle forbids parties from changing
the trial court. The 40% interest of PFRC in the their theory of the case. A party, after all, is bound by
Guinaoang Project was levied. PFRC's interest in the the theory he adopts and by the cause of action he stands
Guinaoang Project was publicly auctioned whereupon on, and cannot be permitted after having lost thereon to
DDCP came out as the highest bidder. Certificate of Sale repudiate his theory and cause of action and adopt
was issued in favor of DDCP. The sale was duly another and seek to re-litigate the matter anew either in
registered with the MGB-CAR. Hence, DDCP became the same forum or on appeal.21 (Citations omitted)
the 40% equitable owner. Issue # 2
DDCP requested the MGB to record its 40% WON the amendment of the MPSA is a discretionary
interest in the Guinaoang Project. The request was function on the part of the DENR, whose performance
denied by then DENR-MGB Director Horacio C. Ramos cannot be directed by judicial order.
(Director Ramos) on the ground that DDCP has not
acquired any interest in MPSA No. 057-96-CAR since Ruling:
the said Agreement is between the government and the Court holds that the judgment in favor of DDCP
Crescent; that PFRC has no equity in Crescent; and, that should be deemed fully satisfied at the time it filed the
motion to amend the MPSA. The trial court had already
lost jurisdiction by the time it issued the assailed order,
for upon the acquisition by judicial sale of DDCP of
PFRC's 40% interest in the Guinaoang Project, DDCP
had already acquired property of its judgment debtor
which stands as payment for the judgment debt.
DDCP's assertion that the assailed order is a mere
continuation of the execution proceedings is unavailing.
It must be noted that PFRC was a foreign corporation DOLE vs Kentex and Ong
whose only attachable property in this jurisdiction was
its 40% share in the Guinaoang Project
By the execution sale, DDCP became subrogated to all Facts:
the rights of PFRC under the JVA and the Letter- A fire broke out in a factory owned by Kentex which
Agreement dated August 5, 1997. The right to demand claimed the lives of 72 people and injured a number of
the amendment of the MPSA to reflect the 40% interest workers.
therein is only one among the bundle of rights that
As part of its standard procedures, personnel of DOLE-
DDCP had acquired in the execution sale. These rights
CAMANAVA went to Kentex’s Premises and assessed
constitute property which may stand as payment for the
Kentex’s compliance with Occupational Health and
judgment debt. As regards the share in the MPSA, at this
Safety Standards. It was later discovered that it
point, the remedy of DDCP no longer lays with the trial
Contracted with CJC for the deployment of workers.
court but with the DENR Secretary, because the
approval of an amendment to an MPSA to reflect a In the meantime, when DOLE-RO III conducted its own
transfer or assignment of rights therein is a power and Joint Assessment of CJC, the former found that the later
function of the DENR Secretary was a mere labor-only contractor.
DDCP asseverates that it is entitled to be designated as during the mandatory conference set by the DOLE-NCR,
co-contractor in the MPSA. Both the DENR and CJC's representatives admitted that there was no service
Crescent counter that the MPSA cannot be amended to contract between CJC and Kentex; that CJC had
reflect such designation without their consent. The deployed 99 workers at the Kentex factory on the day of
DENR further asserts that it cannot be bound by the the unfortunate incident; that there were no employment
provisions of the JVA, therefore, it cannot be compelled contracts between CJC and the workers; that a CJC
to amend the MPSA in accordance with the said JVA. representative was sent once a week to Kentex only to
check on the workers' daily time records; that Kentex
The Court sustains the position of the government. An
remitted to CJC the wage of Php230.00/day for each of
MPSA can only be amended to include a new co-
the deployed workers from which amount CJC deducted
contractor if the government, through the DENR,
administrative costs and other statutory contributions,
approves the amendment; and the requirements set by
leaving each worker a mere wage of Php202.50 a day.
law are complied with; as this is tantamount to a transfer
of a mineral agreement right. Kentex and its corporate officers, through counsel,
refuted CJC's claims. They alleged that CJC's workers
were originally engaged by Panday Management and
Labor Consultancy which CJC later absorbed; and that
the workers' wages ranged from Php250.00 to
Php350.00/day on top of CJC's wage of, more or less,
Php202/day. They contended that Kentex complied with
the labor standards particularly on the minimum wage
requirement and with the occupational health and safety
standards, as evidenced by a Certificate of Compliance
(COC) signed by the DOLE-NCR Regional Director
Alex Avila (Avila).
DOLE-NCR rejected the aforementioned arguments of
Kentex. It declared that Kentex could not invoke the
COC because this only attested to the findings of the The June 26, 2015 Order had already become final and
compliance officer at the time of the executory in view of the failure of respondents Kentex
assessment/inspection, even as Kentex was duty-¬bound and Ong to appeal therefrom to the Secretary of Labor.
to observe continuing compliance with the labor Notice ought to be taken of the fact that, at the time the
standards as well as the occupational health and safety DOLE-NCR rendered its ruling, Department Order No.
standards. 131-13 Series of 201325 was the applicable rule of
procedure.
Like the June 8, 2015 Compliance Order of the DOLE-
RO III, the DOLE-NCR also found that CJC was a mere A mere notice of appeal shall not stop the running of the
labor-only contractor considering that it was period within which to file an appeal. Here, instead of
unregistered with the DOLE Regional Office where it filing an appeal with the DOLE Secretary, Ong moved
operated.12 The DOLE-NCR likewise found that the for a reconsideration of the subject Order; needless to
workers were underpaid, and computed the monetary say, this did not halt or stop the running of the period to
claims due them. elevate the matter to the DOLE Secretary. Indeed, the
DOLE-NCR took no action at all on Ong's motion for
On July 3, 2015, only Ong moved for reconsideration of
reconsideration; in fact, it categorically informed Ong
the foregoing order. However, in a letter dated July 7,
that his resort to the filing of a motion for
2015, DOLE-NCR Regional Director Avila explained
reconsideration was procedurally infirm. The June 26,
that Ong's motion for reconsideration was not the proper
2015 Order having become final, it could no longer be
remedy. Instead, an appeal to the DOLE Secretary
altered or modified by discharging or releasing Ong
should have been made within 10 days from receipt of
from his accountability.
the Order. Moreover, since Ong received the June 26,
2015 Order on the same day, he had only until July 6, It is also self-evident that the CA committed serious
2015 within which to appeal to the DOLE Secretary. error when it ordered the discharge or release of Ong
However, Ong never did; thus, the Compliance Order from the obligations of Kentex. The reason is elemental
had attained finality. After this, Kentex and Ong filed in its simplicity: contrary to settled, unrelenting
with the CA a Rule 43 Petition. jurisprudence, it unconsciously and egregiously sought
to alter and modify, as indeed it altered and modified, an
On appeal, the CA upheld the assailed orders and letter
already final and executory verdict
of the DOLE-NCR Regional Director. It observed at the
outset that Kentex and Ong resorted to the wrong We have already declared in Mocorro, Jr. v. Ramirez28
remedy in filing a Rule 43 Petition, when the proper that:
remedy should have been a Rule 65 certiorari petition
x x x A definitive final judgment, however erroneous, is
from the decisions/resolutions of the DOLE Secretary.
no longer subject to change or revision.
Given the fact that time had irretrievably lapsed without
any appeal being availed of by Kentex and Ong as A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable
prescribed by the procedural rules on labor laws, the CA and unalterable. This quality of immutability precludes
ruled that the assailed orders had become final and the modification of a final judgment, even if the
executory. modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions
of fact and law. And this postulate holds true whether
Anent the particular issue involving Ong, the CA took
the modification is made by the court that rendered it or
the view that, as a company officer, he could not be
by the highest court in the land.
personally held liable for the debts of Kentex without a
showing of bad faith or wrongdoing on his part for the The orderly administration of justice requires that, at the
corporation's unlawful act. risk of occasional errors, the judgments/resolutions of a
court must reach a point of finality set by the law. The
noble purpose is to write finis to dispute once and for all.
Issue: This is a fundamental principle in our justice system,
without which there would be no end to litigations.
WON the June 26, 2015 Order had become final and
Utmost respect and adherence to this principle must
executory in view of the failure of respondents Kentex
always be maintained by those who exercise the power
and Ong to appeal therefrom to the SOLE.
of adjudication. Any act, which violates such principle,
must immediately be struck down. Indeed, the principle
Ruling: of conclusiveness of prior adjudications is not confined
in its operation to the judgments of what are ordinarily
known as courts, but extends to all bodies upon which Subsequently, through a manifestation dated June 21,
judicial powers had been conferred. 2003, petitioners informed the QC-RTC that a Stay
Order was issued by the Makati RTC and respondent
The only exceptions to the rule on the immutability of
was included as one of the creditors in the petition for
final judgments are (1) the correction of clerical errors,
rehabilitation, thereby asking the court to suspend its
(2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no
proceedings. However, the court already rendered the
prejudice to any party, and (3) void judgments. x x x29
decision in June 12, 2003.
In the absence of any showing that the CA's
October 1, 2003, the Makati RTC lifted the Stay Order
modification or alteration of the subject Order falls
and dismissed the petition for rehabilitation. However,
within the exceptions to the rule on the immutability of
on appeal, the CA, in its Decision dated June 21, 2005,
final judgments, the DOLE-NCR's June 26, 2015 Order
reversed the Makati RTC.17 It remanded the case to the
must be upheld and respected.
trial court for further proceedings.

Subsequently however, the rehabilitation receiver

resigned, and petitioner filed an omnibus motion for
appointment of a new receiver. Before the Makati RTC
could act on the omnibus motion, the position of the
La Savoie Development Corp vs Buenavista Presiding Judge became vacant; thus, the Presiding
Properties, Inc Judge of Branch 61 heard the case. Thereafter, the case
Facts: was transferred to the Rehabilitation Court

Sps. San Juan and Sps. Buencamino (collectively, the Later, QC RTC issued a writ of execution. Petitioner,
landowners) entered into a JVA with petitioner over 3 however filed a motion for the issuance of an order to
parcels of land located in Bulacan. Under the said JVA, prohibit the enforcement of the writ, which was
the latter undertook to completely develop the properties eventually granted. This was challenged by respondent
into a commercial and residential subdivision on or through a petition for certiorari before the CA, which
before May 5, 1995. If petitioner fails to do so within the was likewise granted.
schedule, it shall pay the landowners a penalty of
P10,000.00 a day until completion of the project.
Issue:
On May 26, 1994, the landowners sold the properties to
Josephine Conde, who later assigned all her rights and WON the stay order binds the respondent.
interest therein to Buenavista Properties, Inc.
(respondent). Unfortunately, petitioner did not finish the
Ruling:
project on time. Thus, it executed an Addendum to the
JVA with respondent, extending the completion of the the Rehabilitation Court issued a Stay Order on June 4,
project until May 5, 1997. However, petitioner still 2003 or during the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-98-
failed to meet the deadline. 33682 before the QC RTC. The effect of the Stay Order
is to ipso jure suspend the proceedings in the QC RTC at
On February 28, 1998, respondent filed a complaint for
whatever stage the action may be.
termination of contract and recovery of property with
damages against petitioner before the QC RTC. The Stay Order notwithstanding, the QC RTC proceeded
Petitioner failed to appear during pre-trial, and was with the case and rendered judgment. The judgment
declared in default. Respondent presented its evidence became final and executory on July 31, 2007
ex-parte.
Respondent relies on this alleged finality to prevent us
Due to the 1997 Asian financial crisis, petitioner from looking into the effect of the Stay Order on the QC
anticipated its inability to pay its obligations as they fall RTC Decision. Respondent's attempt fails.
due; thus, on April 25, 2003, it filed a petition for
reject respondent's contention that the Rehabilitation
rehabilitation before the Regional Trial Court of Makati
Court cannot exercise its cram-down power to approve a
(Makati RTC). The latter issued a Stay Order, staying
rehabilitation plan over the opposition of a creditor.
the enforcement of all claims, money or otherwise, and
Since the QC RTC Decision did not attain finality, there
court action or otherwise against petitioner.
is no legal impediment to reduce the penalties under the The Order of the Rehabilitation Court preventing the
ARRP. implementation of the QC RTC Decision is invalid for
being issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction.
Further, we have already held that a court-approved
rehabilitation plan may include a reduction of liability.
This case does not involve a law or an executive
issuance declaring the modification of the contract JAIME BILAN MONTEALEGRE AND CHAMON'TE,
among debtor PALI, its creditors and its accommodation INC
mortgagors. Thus, the non-impairment clause may not
v. SPOUSES ABRAHAM AND REMEDIOS DE
be invoked. Furthermore, as held in Oposa v. Factoran,
VERA
Jr. even assuming that the same may be invoked, the
non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of Facts:
the State. Property rights and contractual rights are not Servandil field a complaint for illegal dismissal against
absolute. The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment Devera Corporation. LA found the corporation guilty of
of obligations is limited by the exercise of the police illegal dismissal and held it liable for backwages,
power of the State for the common good of the general separation pay and unpaid salary. On appeal, the NLRC
public. dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction by reason of
The prevailing principle is that the order or judgment of the failure of the corporation to post the appeal bond.
the courts, not being a law, is not within the ambit of the The Motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
non-impairment clause. Further, it is more in keeping The CA also denied the petition for certiorari. When it
with the spirit of rehabilitation that courts are given the reached the SC, the latter denied the petition for failure
leeway to decide how distressed corporations can best to show any reversible error of the CA.
and fairly address their financial issues. Necessarily, a Meanwhile, NLRC declared that the resolution became
business in the red and about to incur tremendous losses final and executory. A writ of execution was issued
may not be able to pay all its creditors. Rather than leave commanding the sheriff to proceed against the movable
it to the strongest or most resourceful amongst all of and immovable properties of the Corporation and
them, the state steps in to equitably distribute the Abraham De Vera.
corporation's limited resources
When the writ was returned unsatisfied, an alias writ was
Issue #2 issued, levying and selling the property registered in the
WON the rehabilitation court can issue an order name of respondents to petitioners at public auction.
preventing the QC-RTC from enforcing its decision. Since no redemption was made, the petitioners sough the
issuance of a final deed of sale and the issuance of a new
Ruling:
title in their names.
No. The QC RTC and the Rehabilitation Court are co-
It was during this time that respondents realized that
equal and coordinate courts. The doctrine of judicial
only the corporation was impleaded as party-respondent
stability or non-interference in the regular orders or
in Servandil's complaint for illegal dismissal. Thus,
judgments of a co-equal court is an elementary principle
respondents filed a verified counter-manifestation with
in the administration of justice: no court can interfere by
omnibus motion18 stating that the property sold at
injunction with the judgments or orders of another court
auction does not belong to the judgment debtor, the
of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the
corporation, but to respondents, who were not impleaded
relief sought by the injunction.
as party-respondents in the case for illegal dismissal.
Petitioner cannot argue that the Rehabilitation Court, in They likewise claimed that the property was conjugal
issuing the injunction, merely aims to enforce the Stay and there was no showing that an advantage or benefit
Order that it earlier issued. No law confers upon the accrued to their conjugal partnership.
Rehabilitation Court the authority to interfere with the
LA denied respondents motion.
order of a co-equal court. Only the CA or this Court, in a
petition appropriately filed for the purpose, may halt the In 2011, NLRC issued a TRO and a writ of preliminary
execution of the judgment of a regional trial court. injunction to enjoin the enforcement of the writ.
However, in March 2012, NLRC declared that the levy
and sale of the property cannot be questioned on the on the part of respondent Abraham De Vera. There was
basis that the property levied upon is a conjugal property likewise nothing in the November 27, 2003 LA Decision
of respondents. that would establish that respondent Abraham De Vera
acted in bad faith when Servandil was dismissed from
On appeal, the CA reversed the NLRC’s decision.
the service. There was likewise no invocation of bad
faith on the part of respondent Abraham De Vera to
Issue: evade any judgment against the corporation.

WON the writs of execution issued by the LA and the

subsequent orders and resolutions of the LA and NLRC CONGRESS OF INDEPENDENT ORGANIZATION-
implementing said writs of execution against ASSOCIATES LABOR UNIONS vs.
respondents' property be declared null and void.
COURT OF APPEALS AND THE METROPOLITAN
BANK AND TRUST COMPANY
Ruling: Facts:
As a general rule, a writ of execution must strictly CIO-ALU is a legitimate labor organization which
conform to every particular of the judgment to be represents the workers in San Carlos Milling Company,
executed. It should not vary the terms of the judgment it Inc. (SCMCI). CIO-ALU is among the complainants in
seeks to enforce, nor may it go beyond the terms of the three (3) cases4 against SCMCI for unpaid wage
judgment sought to be executed, otherwise, if it is in increases, 13th month pay, differential pay, holiday pay,
excess of or beyond the original judgment or award, the and separation pay. All three cases were eventually
execution is void.38 Furthermore, the power of the decided in favor of the SCMCI workers. The
courts in executing judgments extends only to properties controversy before the Court arose during the
unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor and consolidated proceedings for the execution of the
liability may even be incurred by the sheriff for levying aforesaid judgments.
properties not belonging to the judgment debtor.
It all started from the Notice of Levy dated February 9,
In this case, LA Decision did not mention respondents' 2006 issued by Sheriff Enrique Y. Paredes (Sheriff
liability. Nevertheless, the Writ of Execution dated May Paredes), advising the authorized representative or
22, 2007 and the Alias Writ of Execution dated February agents of SCMCI that he has to attach properties found
11, 2008 were directed against the movable and inside the premises of SCMCI
immovable properties of both the corporation and
Thereafter, Sheriff Paredes issued a "Notice of Sale on
respondent Abraham. Clearly, the writs of execution
Execution of Some Properties" mentioned in the Notice
here exceeded the terms of the final and executory
of Levy. The notice indicates that the auction sale has to
judgment of the LA.
be conducted on February 21, 2006
The piercing of the veil of corporate fiction is likewise
Upon learning of the impending auction sale, MBTC
unwarranted in this case.
filed a third-party claim alleging that it is the owner of
Moreover, in the absence of malice, bad faith, or a the properties to be levied pursuant to the certificate of
specific provision of law making a corporate officer sale issued to it through a public auction sale upon
liable, such corporate officer cannot be made personally SCMCI’s default on a Mortgage Trust Indenture in favor
liable for corporate liabilities. To hold a director or of MBTC.
officer personally liable for corporate obligation is the
LA approved the third-party claim and declared the
exception and it only occurs when the following
auction sale suspended pending the resolution of such
requisites are present: (1) the complaint must allege that
claim.
the director or officer assented to the patently unlawful
acts of the corporation, or that the director or officer was Consequently, the auction sale proceeded but it did not
guilty of gross negligence or bad faith; and (2) there include those items in the said third-party claim to
must be proof that the director or officer acted in bad satisfy the balance of the judgment award.
faith.52
MBTC, however, moved to quash the writ of execution
Here, the two requisites are wanting. Servandil's and to cite Sheriff in contempt, which was later
complaint failed to allege or impute bad faith or malice dismissed.
 present petition in their behalf, the binding effect of this
decision can only extend to CIO-ALU, whose judgment
Issue:
has already been satisfied and over whom the NLRC and
WON further levies may be made on the properties this Court, perforce, no longer have jurisdiction.
located at the SCMCI’s premises. Therefore, the proper party to invoke the non-
Ruling: satisfaction of the two other judgments are the
complainants who obtained those judgments, Wilfredo
The resolution of this issue is complicated by the Senador, et al. and Placido Alcano, et al., who,
existence of two rulings on MBTC's third-party claim: unfortunately, did not come before this Court to
the August 2006 NLRC Decision granting such claim, vindicate their rightful claims. Stated differently, by
and the 2011 RTC decision which dismissed it. The their failure to appeal therefrom, the CA decision had
August 2006 NLRC Decision pertains to the properties become final and binding as against them.
enumerated in the third-party claim brought by MBTC in
the execution proceedings.
On the other hand, the issue resolved in the RTC CAROLINA'S LACE SHOPPE, LOURDES RAGAS
decision is "whether the machineries, equipment and and CLAUDINE MANGASING
other materials levied upon and sold on public auction vs.
by the NLRC Sheriff, as enumerated in the Certificate of
GLORIA MAQUILAN and JOY MAQUILAN
Sale dated July 17, 2006, are included in the Certificate
of Sale in favor of [MBTC] arising from the Mortgage Facts:
Trust Indenture."
Respondents Gloria and Joy were employed by
In the case at bar, the CA gravely erred in concluding petitioner as sales clerk and header, respectively.
that the judgments have been fully satisfied. The
In April 2008, when DOLE inspected CLS, one of the
evidence relied upon by ELA Acosta and the appellate
latter’s employees, Espultero, told the labor inspector
court, i.e., MBTC's Ex-Parte Manifestation and the two
that he was receiving a daily wage of P250. Later, the
Reports submitted by Sheriff Paredes, only establishes
former was terminated. A month thereafter, Gloria was
that there is enough property already levied for the
dismissed without any reason given and she was made to
satisfaction of the judgment. However, there is no
sign a quitclaim for her separation pay amounting to
evidence on record which would indicate that these
P15,000 despite her 3 yrs in service.
properties have already been sold and the proceeds
thereof distributed to the SCMCI workers in full Joy was likewise dismissed from service and was forced
satisfaction of the judgment. Based on the writs of to sign a quitclaim as she received P4,ooo as separation
execution, the total amount due under the three pay.
judgments is P12,650,058.83.67 However, the July 17, Gloria and Joy and two others were constrained to file a
2006 Certificate of Sale is only in the amount of case for illegal dismissal with money claims and
P6,575,610.00, leaving a balance of P6,074,448.83 damages against CLS, but only Gloria and Joy filed their
However, this erroneous conclusion of the appellate position papers.
court cannot inure to the benefit of CIO-ALU, for it has The LA ruled in favor of respondents. NLRC, however,
been established by the record that the judgment in its reversed the former’s decision and gave credence to the
favor has been fully satisfied by virtue of the July 17, respondents’ resignation letters.
2006 Certificate of Sale.
On Appeal, the CA reinstated the decision of the LA.
The amount stated in the said Certificate of Sale
(P6,575,610.00) far exceeds the amount awarded to
CIO-ALU. At this point, the Court reiterates the fact that Issue:
this petition stemmed from three separate cases against
SCMCI which were consolidated only at the execution WON the quitclaims signed by the respondents were
stage.70 However, the prevailing parties in the two other valid.
cases, namely, Wilfredo Senador, et al.71 and Placido
Alcano, et al.,72 did not join CIO-ALU in filing the
Ruling:
present petition before this Court; hence, in the absence
of proof that they authorized CIO-ALU to bring the
In order to prevent disputes on the validity and she signed the alleged quitclaim, she immediately filed a
enforceability of quitclaims and waivers of employees complaint for illegal dismissal
under Philippine laws, said agreements should contain
While the resignation letter of Gloria and quitclaim
the following:
signed by Joy appear to have been notarized, the fact of
1. A fixed amount as full and final compromise such notarization is not a guarantee of the validity of the
settlement; contents. The presumption of regularity as regards
notarized documents is not absolute and may be rebutted
2. The benefits of the employees if possible with the
by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary
corresponding amounts, which the employees are giving
up in consideration of the fixed compromise amount; In this case, the presumption cannot be made to apply
because of the following circumstances: (1) Gloria and
3. A statement that the employer has clearly explained to
Joy denied appearing before a notary public; (2) Gloria
the employee in English, Filipino, or in the dialect
and Joy did not understand the textual import and effects
known to the employees - that by signing the waiver or
of the documents notarized; (3) the consideration therein
quitclaim, they are forfeiting or relinquishing their right
was not fixed; (4) the executions by Gloria and Joy of
to receive the benefits which are due them under the law;
the notarized documents appear questionable; and (5)
and
Gloria and Joy did not intend to resign from CLS.
4. A statement that the employees signed and executed
Under the law, there are no shortcuts in terminating the
the document voluntarily, and had fully understood the
security of tenure of an employee.32 As the certitude of
contents of the document and that their consent was
the purported resignations of Joy and Gloria remain
freely given without any threat, violence, duress,
dubious as the evidence of the same were done
intimidation, or undue influence exerted on their person
involuntarily, this Court rules that Gloria and Joy were
Admittedly, the quitclaim does not indicate that Gloria illegally dismissed from their employment.
received the amount of ₱15,000.00 as full and final
settlement. Similarly, there was nothing which indicates
that said amount constitutes said full and final
settlement. The quitclaim was also couched in general
terms and the tenor of the same does not show that
Gloria understood the importance of the same
considering that on the same day that she resigned, she
immediately relieved respondents from their liabilities.
There was also no indication that Gloria intends to give
up her claimed benefits in consideration of a fixed
compromise amount. It must be emphasized that Gloria
was constrained to receive the amount of ₱15,000.00 as
she was eight months pregnant at that time and lives
with no other means aside from her employment with
CLS’.
As to Joy, there was no indication that she intended to
voluntarily resign. There was no execution of a
resignation letter, but merely a quitclaim,30 which
likewise does not contain the above-mentioned
stipulations as the same was a standard clearance and
quitclaim form which Joy merely filled out. The manner
by which Joy's name and the effectivity date of her
cessation from employment were written, bore the same
style and strokes with the entries pertaining to the
computation of the amount paid to her; such entries were
obviously written by one of CLS's employees. It is
apparent, therefore, that the entries in the whole
document were written by the same person and Joy was
merely asked to sign the same. In addition, the day after