Petitioners Vs Vs Respondents Syquia Law Offices For Petitioners. Jose L. Lapag For Private Respondent
Petitioners Vs Vs Respondents Syquia Law Offices For Petitioners. Jose L. Lapag For Private Respondent
Petitioners Vs Vs Respondents Syquia Law Offices For Petitioners. Jose L. Lapag For Private Respondent
SYNOPSIS
SYLLABUS
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; REPAIRS MADE ON THE PREMISES NOT A REASON FOR LESSEES TO
RETAIN POSSESSION THEREOF. — The fact that petitioners allegedly made repairs on the
premises in question is not a reason for them to retain the possession of the premises.
There is no provision of law which grants the lessee a right of retention over the leased
premises on that ground. Art. 448 of the Civil Code, in relation to Art. 546, which provides
for full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until
reimbursement is made, applies only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on a
land in the belief that he is the owner thereof. In a number of cases, the Court has held that
this right does not apply to a mere lessee, like the petitioners, otherwise, it would always
be in his power to "improve" his landlord out of the latter's property. Art. 1678 merely
grants to such a lessee making in good faith useful improvements the right to be
reimbursed one-half of the value of the improvements upon the termination of the lease, or,
in the alternative, to remove the improvements if the lessor refuses to make
reimbursement.
4. ID.; DAMAGES; ATTORNEY'S FEES; AWARD THEREOF IN CASE AT BAR IS PROPER. —
Petitioners were thus correctly ordered to pay attorney's fees considering that private
respondent had to go to court to protect his interest. The award of P10,000.00 is
reasonable in view of the time it has taken this rather simple case for ejectment to be
decided.
5. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; COUNTERCLAIM FOR DAMAGES; NOT PROPER
IN CASE AT BAR. — Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
denial of their counterclaim for damages for their failure to enjoy the peaceful possession
of the premises because private respondent allowed vendors to ply their trade at the front
portion of the leased premises. Petitioners claim that, as a result, they suffered business
losses and moral injuries. As both the Metropolitan Trial Court and Regional Trial Court
held, however, there is no evidence to support this claim. As the Court of Appeals said,
petitioners never complained before about the sidewalk vendors occupying a portion of
the leased property. It was only after negotiations for renewal of the lease had failed and
private respondent had filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against them did they
complain about the vendors.
DECISION
MENDOZA , J : p
SO ORDERED.
On appeal by both parties, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59 of Makati ruled
that the lease was for a xed period of ve (5) years and that, upon its expiration on
January 1, 1990, petitioners' continued stay in the premises became illegal. As provided
in Art. 1687 of the Civil Code, the power of the courts to x the period of lease is limited
only to cases where the period has not been xed by the parties themselves. The
dispositive portion of the decision 3 states: cdphil
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which af rmed the decision. In its
decision, dated October 8, 1992, the Court of Appeals ordered:
WHEREFORE, except for the modification that the monthly rental that
petitioners should pay private respondent from July 24, 1990 until the latter
finally vacate the premises in question is reduced to P7,320.00, the decision of
the respondent court in this case is AFFIRMED in all other respects, with costs
against petitioners Jose L. Chua and Ko Sio Eng. 4
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, this petition
for review on certiorari. Petitioners assign several errors as having been allegedly
committed by the Court of Appeals.
First . Petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals erred in af rming the lower
court's nding that they owe private respondent the amount of P42,306.00 as unpaid
rentals from January 1, 1987 to December 31, 1989 because neither the letter of
demand nor the complaint for unlawful detainer alleged a claim for unpaid rentals. As
the Court of Appeals pointed out, however, the issue of arrearages was raised at the
pre-trial by private respondent and evidence on this question was presented without
objection from petitioners: 5
First of all, while it is true that there was no express demand in private
respondent's complaint for unlawful detainer against petitioners for the latter's
payment of rental arrearages, private respondent in a pleading dated December
17, 1990 filed with the MTC (by way of comment to petitioners' motion to admit
amended answer) stated:
That moreover the unpaid rentals from January 1987 to December 31,
1989 amounts to FORTY TWO THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SIX PESOS
(P42,306.00), exclusive of rentals from January 1 to December 31, 1990
which would be one hundred eighty thousand pesos (P180,000.00) or a
total of TWO HUNDRED TWENTY TWO THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SIX
PESOS (P222,306.00)
3. defendants are in arrears for the rentals from Dec. 31, 1987 to
January 1989, in accordance with the contract;
Indeed, any objection to the admissibility of evidence should be made at the time
such evidence is offered or as soon thereafter as the objection to its admissibility
becomes apparent, 6 otherwise the objection will be considered waived and such
evidence will form part of the records of the case as competent and admissible
evidence. 7 Rule 10, §5 8 of the Rules of Civil Procedure allows the amendment of the
pleadings in order to make them conform to the evidence in the record. cdasia
1. Per Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy and concurred in by Justices Ricardo J. Francisco and
Ricardo P Galvez.
2. Petition, Annex E; Rollo, p. 83.
9. CIVIL CODE, Arts. 1669 and 1673 (1); Heirs of Dimaculangan v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 170 SCRA 393 (1989); Uy Hoo and Sons Dev. Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA
100 (1989); Palanca v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 180 SCRA 119 (1989).
10. Alcuaz v. PSBA, 161 SCRA 7 (1988); Henson v. IAC, 148 SCRA 11 (1987); Roxas v.
Alcantara, 113 SCRA 21 (1982); Escaño v. CA, 100 SCRA 197 (1980); Gindoy v. Tapucar,
75 SCRA 31 (1977).
11. This article provides:
If the period for the lease has not been fixed, it is understood to be from year to year,
if the rent agreed upon is annual; from month to month, if it is monthly; from week to
week, if the rent is weekly; and from day to day, if the rent is to be paid daily. However,
even though a monthly rent is paid, and no period for the lease has been set, the courts
may fix a longer term for the lease after the lessee has occupied the premises for over
one year. If the rent is weekly, the courts may likewise determine a longer period after the
lessee has been in possession for over six months. In case of daily rent, the courts may
also fix a longer period after the lessee has stayed in the place for over one month.