G.R. No. 200030. April 18, 2012.

*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NELSON
BAYOT y SATINA, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Death of a Party; Civil Liability; Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, specifically provides the effect of death of the accused on his criminal, as well as
civil, liability.—Appellant’s death on 4 December 2004, during the pendency of his appeal
before the Court of Appeals, extinguished not only his criminal liability for the crime of rape
committed against AAA, but also his civil liability solely arising from or based on said crime.
Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, specifically provides the effect of death
of the accused on his criminal, as well as civil, liability. It reads thus: Art. 89. How criminal
liability is totally extinguished.—Criminal liability is totally extinguished: 1. By death of
the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability
therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.
Same; Same; Same; Whether or not appellant was guilty of the crime charged had become
irrelevant because even assuming that appellant did incur criminal liability and civil liability
ex delicto, these were totally extinguished by his death, following the provisions of Article 89(1)
of the Revised Penal Code and this Court’s ruling in People v. Bayotas, 236 SCRA 239
(1994).—Evidently, as this Court has pronounced in People v. Olaco, 659 SCRA 171 (2011)
and People v. Paniterce, 617 SCRA 389 (2010), it is already unnecessary to rule on appellant’s
appeal. Appellant’s appeal was still pending and no final judgment had been rendered
against him at the time of his death. Thus, whether or not appellant was guilty of the crime
charged had become irrelevant because even assuming that appellant did incur criminal
liability and civil liability ex delicto, these were totally extinguished by his death, following
the provisions of Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code and this Court’s ruling in People
v. Bayotas, 236 SCRA 239 (1994).
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
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* SECOND DIVISION.
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286 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Bayot
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney’s Office for accused-appellant.

RESOLUTION

PEREZ, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated 9 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CEB-CR-H.C. No. 00269 affirming with modification the Decision2 dated 31
July 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental,
6th Judicial Region, Branch 61, in Criminal Case No. 98-2025, finding herein
appellant Nelson Bayot y Satina (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape, committed against AAA,3 thus, sentencing him to suffer
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1 Penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican with Associate Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and
Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., concurring. Rollo, pp. 4-10.
 2 Penned by Judge Henry D. Arles. CA Rollo, pp. 21-24.
3 This is pursuant to the ruling of this Court in People of the Philippines v. Cabalquinto [G.R. No.
167693, 19 September 2006, 502 SCRA 419], wherein this Court resolved to withhold the real name of the
victim-survivor and to use fictitious initials instead to represent her in its decisions. Likewise, the personal
circumstances of the victims-survivors or any other information tending to establish or compromise their
identities, as well as those of their immediate family or household members, shall not be disclosed. The
names of such victims, and of their immediate family members other than the accused, shall appear as
“AAA,” “BBB,” “CCC,” and so on. Addresses shall appear as “XXX” as in “No. XXX Street, XXX District, City
of XXX.”
The Supreme Court took note of the legal mandate on the utmost confidentiality of proceedings
involving violence against women and children set forth in Sec. 29 of Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise
known as Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act; Sec. 44
of Republic Act No. 9262,
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People vs. Bayot
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The appellate court increased the award of
indemnity from P40,000.00 to P50,000.00. It also ordered appellant to pay AAA moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00.
Appellant Nelson Bayot y Satina was charged with Rape in an Information4 dated
29 December 1997, which reads as follows:
“That on or about the 17th day of September, 1997, in the Municipality of XXX, Province
of XXX, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
[appellant], by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of and/or sexual intercourse with the
[AAA], 44 years old, against her will.”5
On arraignment, appellant pleaded NOT GUILTY to the crime charged. Trial on
the merits ensued thereafter.
In its 31 July 2000 Decision, the RTC convicted appellant of the crime of rape and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay AAA the amount
of P40,000.00 as indemnity with costs. In convicting appellant, the RTC ratiocinated
that AAA’s testimony as regards her ordeal was simple and straightforward,
unshaken by a rigid cross-examination. There appeared to be no inconsistency in her
testimony. Further, AAA’s declaration that she was raped by appellant was
corroborated by a medical certificate showing contusion on her vagina at 6:00 o’clock
quadrant of the crevice, which was explained by Dr. Rodrigo Cubid to have been
caused by forceful vaginal intrusion. The RTC negates the “sweet heart” defense
offered by appellant. It stated that
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otherwise known as Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004; and Sec. 40 of A.M.
No. 04-10-11-SC, known as Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children effective 15 November
2004.
4 CA Rollo, pp. 10-11.
5 Id., at p. 10.
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REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Bayot
appellant’s claim of being AAA’s lover was a mere devise to extricate himself from the
consequence of his dastardly lust. AAA’s immediate response of reporting the rape
incident carries the stamp of truth. Moreover, if, indeed, there was such relationship
between appellant and AAA, the latter would not have pursued this case. It bears
stressing that despite appellant’s repeated plea for the dismissal of the case, AAA
remained steadfast in seeking justice for the violation of her womanhood.6
Aggrieved, appellant appealed the aforesaid RTC Decision to this Court by filing
a Notice of Appeal dated 6 September 2000.7 In light, however, of this Court’s
pronouncement in People v. Mateo,8 the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals
for intermediate review per Resolution9 dated 4 October 2004.
In a Decision dated 9 May 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed appellant’s
conviction with the modification increasing the award of indemnity from P40,000.00
to P50,000.00. It likewise awarded moral damages in favor of AAA in the amount of
P50,000.00. The Court of Appeals aptly observed that the prosecution was able to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that appellant committed the crime of rape against
AAA. It further held that other than the self-serving declaration of appellant that he
and AAA were sweethearts; no other evidence was ever presented to substantiate
such claim. Even the testimony of appellant’s daughter, who claimed that her father
and AAA are maintaining an illicit relationship, could not be given any considerable
weight. Aside from the fact that appellant’s daughter could not point to any other
circumstance supporting her claim, except for one incident when she allegedly saw
her father and AAA holding hands during a
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6 Id., at pp. 23-24.
7 Id., at p. 25.
8 G.R. Nos. 147678-87, 7 July 2004, 433 SCRA 640.
9 Rollo, pp. 2-3.
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People vs. Bayot
dance at their barangay fiesta, her testimony could not be stripped of bias and
partiality considering that she is the daughter of appellant. In the same way, her
testimony that she saw her father and AAA in the act of sexual intercourse deserves
scant consideration as she was not present at the time of the commencement of the
said act. She could not, therefore, be in a position to state with certainty that there
was no struggle on the part of AAA. Hence, her testimony regarding such matter is a
mere conclusion of fact.10
However, in a letter dated 29 May 2006,11 Dr. Juanito S. Leopando, Penal
Superintendent IV of the New Bilibid Prison, informed the Court of Appeals that
appellant died at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital on 4 December 2004. Attached in
his letter is the original copy of appellant’s Certificate of Death.12
Nonetheless, the Public Attorney’s Office still appealed, on behalf of appellant, the
aforesaid Court of Appeals Decision to this Court via a Notice of Appeal13 dated 31
May 2006, which was given due course by the Court of Appeals per Resolution14 dated
19 January 2007. The Court of Appeals also directed the Chief of the Judicial Records
Division to forward the entire records of the case to this Court.
Taking into consideration appellant’s death, this Court will now determine its
effect to this present appeal.
Appellant’s death on 4 December 2004, during the pendency of his appeal before
the Court of Appeals, extinguished not only his criminal liability for the crime of rape
committed
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10 Id., at pp. 6-8.
11 CA Rollo, p. 105.
12 Id., at pp. 106-107.
13 Rollo, p. 11.
14 CA Rollo, p. 114.
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People vs. Bayot
against AAA, but also his civil liability solely arising from or based on said crime. 15
Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, specifically provides the effect
of death of the accused on his criminal, as well as civil, liability. It reads thus:
“Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished.—Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
1. By death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment; [Emphasis supplied].”
Applying the foregoing provision, this Court, in People v. Bayotas,16 which was
cited in a catena of cases,17 had laid down the following guidelines:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil
liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, “the death of the accused prior
to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and
based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.”
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of [the] accused, if the same may
also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates
these other
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15 People v. Olaco, G.R. No. 197042, 17 October 2011, 659 SCRA 171.
16 G.R. No. 102007, 2 September 1994, 236 SCRA 239.
17 People v. Olaco, supra note 15; People v. Abungan, 395 Phil. 456, 461; 341 SCRA 258, 261-262 (2000); People v. Enoja, 378 Phil. 623, 633-634;
321 SCRA 7, 16 (1999); De Guzman v. People, 459 Phil. 576, 579-580; 416 SCRA 341 (2003); People v. Romero, 365 Phil. 531, 543; 306
SCRA 90, 99 (1999).
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People vs. Bayot
sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x xxx xxx
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be
pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/
 administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is
based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the
private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations
on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with
[the] provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible
privation of right by prescription.18
From the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as the civil liability ex delicto.
The rationale, therefore, is that the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there
is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action instituted therein for
recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the
criminal case.19
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18 People v. Bayotas, supra note 16 at pp. 255-256.
19 People v. Romero, supra note 17 at p. 543; p. 99.
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REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Bayot
Evidently, as this Court has pronounced in People v. Olaco and People v.
Paniterce,20 it is already unnecessary to rule on appellant’s appeal. Appellant’s appeal
was still pending and no final judgment had been rendered against him at the time
of his death. Thus, whether or not appellant was guilty of the crime charged had
become irrelevant because even assuming that appellant did incur criminal liability
and civil liability ex delicto, these were totally extinguished by his death, following
the provisions of Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code and this Court’s ruling
in People v. Bayotas.
In the same breath, the appealed Decision dated 9 May 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-H.C. No. 00269— finding appellant guilty of the crime
of rape, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay AAA
P50,000.00 as indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages—had become ineffectual.
WHEREFORE, in view of the death of appellant Nelson Bayot y Satina, the
Decision dated 9 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-H.C. No.
00269 is SET ASIDE and Criminal Case No. 98-2025 before the RTC of Kabankalan
City, Negros Occidental, is DISMISSED. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Sereno and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Judgment set aside due to the death of appellant Nelson Bayot y Satina, case
dismissed.
Notes.—The death of the accused during the pendency of his appeal in the
Supreme Court totally extinguished his criminal liability based on Article 89 of the
Revised Penal Code. (People vs. Bunay, 630 SCRA 445 [2010])
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20 G.R. No. 186382, 5 April 2010, 617 SCRA 389, 395.
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 People vs. Bayot
The death of the accused likewise extinguished the civil liability that was based
exclusively on the crime for which the accused was convicted (i.e., ex delicto), because
no final judgment of conviction was yet rendered by the time of his death. (Id.)