PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Vs HENRY T. GO
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Vs HENRY T. GO
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Vs HENRY T. GO
GO
G.R. No. 168539, March 25, 2014
Fact:
An Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of this Court’s which nullified the
various contracts awarded by the Government. Subsequent to the Decision, a certain
Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against several individuals
for alleged violation of R.A. 3019. Among those charged was herein respondent, who
was then the Chairman and President of PIATCO, for having supposedly conspired with
then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile (Secretary Enrile) in entering into a contract which
is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. The Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict, among others, herein
respondent for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there was likewise a finding
of probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he was no longer indicted because he died
prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause. The Sandiganbayan
issued an Order to show cause why this case should not be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused considering that the accused is a private
person and the public official Arturo Enrile, his alleged co-conspirator, is already
deceased, and not an accused in this case. The Sandiganbayan grants the Motion to
Quash and the Information filed in this case is hereby ordered quashed and dismissed.
Hence this case.
Issue:
Whether the death of a Public Officer in a crime extinguishes the Liability of his co-
conspirators
Held:
No, It is true that by reason of death, there is no longer any public officer with whom
respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however, that
the allegation of conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or that their alleged
conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of public
officer is his criminal liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove
the basis of the charge of conspiracy between him and private respondent. Stated
differently, the death of a public officer does not mean that there was no public officer
who allegedly violated Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019, that there was probable cause to the
public officer for infringement of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019. Were it not for his
death, he should have been charged. The requirement before a private person may be
indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, among others, is that such private
person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The law,
however, does not require that such person must, in all instances, be indicted together
with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the public officer may no longer be
charged in court, as in the present case where the public officer has already died, the
private person may be indicted alone.