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Jllanila

SECOND DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE G.R. No. 240621

PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
Present:

- versus - CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

PERLAS-BERNABE,
CAGUIOA,
THE HONORABLE
J. REYES, JR., and
SANDIGANBAYAN
LAZARO-JAVIER, JJ.
(SEVENTH DIVISION) AND
JAIME KISON RECIO,
Respondents. Promulgated:

·;; 4 JIJl 2J19.

\\(h\~~~1~
x---------------------------------------.-------------------------------- mN-~-- ~ ------- ----- --------x

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for certiorari 1 are the Resolutions dated April
27, 2018 2 and May 22, 2018 3 of the Sandiganbayan (SB) in SB-17-CRM-
0063 which denied the Motion for Leave of Court to File Amended
Information 4 and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration 5 filed by
petitioner People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Ombudsman
(Ombudsman), on the ground that the amendment sought is substantial.

1
Rollo, pp. 129-151.
2
See Minute Resolution signed by Associate Justices Ma. Theresa Dolores C. Gomez-Estoesta
(Chairperson), Zaldy V. Trespeses, and Bayani H. Jacinto; id. at 160-161.
3
See Minute Resolution; id. at 163-164.
4
DatedMarch27,2018.ld.atl66-170.
5
DatedMay3,2018. Id.atl71-176.

(
Decision 2 G.R. No. 240621

The Facts

The instant case stemmed from an Information6 filed before the SB

charging respondent Jaime Kison Recio (Recio) with violation of Section 3
(e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, 7 entitled the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act." Verily, the Information accuses Recio, then Executive
Director III of the National Parks and Development Committee (NPDC), of
entering into numerous security service contracts with Variance Protective
and Security Agency (Variance) from 2002 to 2010 absent the required
public bidding, thereby giving the latter unwarranted benefits. The
accusatory portion thereof reads:

That on 30 January 2004 to 8 October 2004, or .thereabout, in the

City of Manila, and within this Honorable Court's jurisdiction, public
officer JAIME K. RECIO, Executive Director III, National Parks
Development Committee, City of Manila, while in the performance of his
official functions, acting with evident bad faith, manifest partiality, or
gross inexcusable negligence, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
criminally give unwarranted benefits, preference, or advantage to Variance
Protective and Security Agency (Variance), a private corporation, when he
signed Disbursement Vouchers facilitating the release of payment to
Variance for security services purportedly rendered from 1 January 2004
to 15 September 2004, amounting to P7,843,54.33, knowing fully well
that Variance was not legally entitled thereto considering that the public
bidding and other procurement activities required under Republic Act No.
9184 and its implementing rules and regulations were not conducted prior
to the procurement of Variance's security service for said period, to the
damage and prejudice of the government.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 8

During trial and before the prosecution presented its last witness on
April 4, 2018, it filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Amended
Information9 dated March 27, 2018 seeking to amend the amount stated in
the Information from P7,843,54.33 to P7,842,941.60, which is the amount
10
reflected in the disbursement vouchers. In opposition thereto, Recio argued
that the amendment is not merely formal but substantial, which would be
prejudicial to his right to be informed of the charges against him. 11

The SB Ruling

In a Resolution 12 dated April 27, 2018, the SB denied the

13
prosecution's motion for lack of merit. It ruled that the mistake in the

6
See id. at 136.
7
Approved on August 17, 1960.
8
See rollo, p. 136.
9
Id.atl66-170.
10
See id. at 137. See also id. at 166.
11
See id. at 160.
12
Id. at 160-161.

~
Decision 3 G.R. No. 240621

amount of the alleged undue injury stated in the Information is too

substantial to have been left uncorrected for more than a year, during which
time evidence to prove the allegations in the Information had already been
presented. Moreover, it held that the alleged difference could not be ruled
out as a mere typographical error, especially cortsidering that the amount
involved was only alleged numerically and had not been spelled out in
words where the difference would have been readily apparent. 14

Dissatisfied, the Ombudsman moved for reconsideration, 15 which the

SB denied in a Resolution 16 dated May 22, 2018. Hence, this petition. 17

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the SB
~

gravely abused its discretion in denying the Ombudsman's Motion for Leave
of Court to File Amended Information.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

At the outset, it must be stressed that to justify the grant of the

extraordinary remedy of certiorari, petitioners must satisfactorily show that
the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely abused the discretion conferred
upon it. Grave abuse of discretion connotes judgment exercised in a
capricious and whimsical manner that is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.
To be considered "grave," discretion must be exercised in a despotic manner
by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law. 18 There is grave
abuse of discretion when: (1) an act is done contrary to the Constitution, the
law, or jurisprudence; or (2) it is executed whimsically, capriciously, or
19
arbitrarily out of malice, ill-will, or personal bias.

Guided by the foregoing considerations and as will be shown below,

the SB gravely abused its discretion when it denied the Ombudsman's
Motion for Leave of Court to File Amended Information despite the absence
of any resulting prejudice to the rights of the accused.

13
Id. at 161.
14
See id. at 160-161.
15
See motion for reconsideration dated May 3, 2018; id. at 171-176.
16
Id. at 163-164.
17
Id. at 129-151.
18
Gadia v. Sykes Asia, Inc., 752 Phil. 413, 420-421 (2015), citing Omni Hauling Services, Inc. v. Bon,
742 Phil. 335,342 (2014).
19
See Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections, 464 Phil. 173,
190 (2004); citations omitted.

✓
V
Decision 4 G.R. No. 240621

The proper procedure for the amendment of an Information is

governed by Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, viz.:

Section 14. Amendment or Substitution. - A complaint or

information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of
court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and
during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of
court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights
of the accused.

However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the

nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from the
complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the
prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The
court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order
shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)

Under this provision, the prosecution is given the right to amend the
information, regardless of its nature, so long as the amendment is sought
before the accused enters his plea, subject to the qualification under the
second paragraph thereof. However, once the accused enters his plea during
arraignment, the prosecution is already prohibited from seeking a substantial
amendment, particularly citing those that may prejudice the rights of the
accused. One of these rights is the constitutional right of the accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him, a right which is
given life during the arraignment of the accused. The theory in law is that
since the accused officially begins to prepare his defense against the
accusation on the basis of the recitals in the information read to him during ~

arraignment, then the prosecution must establish its case on the basis of the
• c- • 20
same m1ormatlon.

While there is no precise definition under the Revised Rules on

Criminal Procedure of what should be deemed as a substantial amendment,
case law instructs that substantial amendments consist of the recital of facts
constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the
court.21 On the other hand, formal amendments which can be made at any
time do not alter the nature of the crime, affect the essence of the offense,
surprise, or divest the accused of an opportunity to meet the new accusation.
Verily, they are amendments which merely state with additional precision
something which is already contained in the original Information, and
which, therefore, adds nothing essential for conviction of the crime
charged. 22 Hence, the following are considered as mere formal amendments:
(a) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the

20
See Mendez v. People, 736 Phil. 181, I 92 (2014); citations omitted.
21
See Corpus, Jr. v. Pamular, G.R. No. 186403, September 5, 2018, citing Teehankee, Jr. v. Madayag,
283 Phil. 956, 966 (I 992). See also Mendez v. People, id., citing Almeda v. Villaluz, 160 Phil. 750, 757
(1975).
22
See id.; citations omitted.

J\/
Decision 5 G.R. No. 240621

court might impose in the event of conviction; (b) an amendment which does
not charge another offense different or distinct froII_l that charged in the
original one; (c) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecution's
theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form
of defense he has or will assume; and (d) an amendment which does not
adversely affect any substantial right of the accused, such as his right to
invoke prescription. 23

In this case, the Court finds that the amendment of the Information
sought by the prosecution is one of form, and not of substance, as it adds
nothing essential for Recio' s conviction of the crime charged nor does it
seek to amend the Information's recital of facts constituting the offense
charged. On the contrary, the amendment simply sought to correct the total
amount of the disbursement vouchers24 reflected in the Information to make
it conform to the evidence on record. Moreover, a plain reading of the
amount stated, i.e., P7,843,54.33 cannot but convince the Court that the
same is erroneous and mathematically inexistent, and therefore, cannot be
proved. A basic rule in writing figures consisting of ~our (4) or more digits
requires the use of commas to separate thousands; thus, to place the first
comma, co'unt three (3) spaces or digits to the left of the decimal point, and
continue dping so after every three digits. 25 Here, the comma was written
immediately to the left of the second digit from the decimal point. In other
words, the Information obviously bears a typographical error as the error in
the amount is apparent to the naked eye.

More importantly, the Court has observed that the Information

charged Recio and his co-accused with violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019
when, through their actions characterized by manifest partiality, Variance
was given unwarranted benefit, advantage, and preference. In Ampil v.
Ombudsman, 26 the Court discussed the modes of committing the aforesaid
crime, to wit:

[I]t should be noted that there are two ways by which Section 3
(e) of RA 3019 may be violated - the first, by causing undue injury to
any party, including the government, or the second, by giving any
private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage, or preference.
Although neither mode constitutes a distinct offense, an accused may be
charged under either mode or both. The use of the disjunctive "or"
connotes that the two modes need not be present at the same time. In other
words, the presence of one would suffice for conviction.

23
See id.; citing Teehankee, Jr, v, Madayag, supra note 21.
24
See copies of Disbursement Vouchers dated January 30, 2004 to October 8, 2004; rollo, pp. 204-230.
25
See <https://www .grammarbook.com/numbers/numbers.asp>,
<https://grammar.yourdictionary.com/grammar-rules-and-tips/rules-for-writing-numbers.html>, and
<https://www.englishgrammar.org/rules-writing-numbers> (visited July 10, 2019). Note that the
International System of Units does not recommend the use of commas or periods, and instead
recommends the use of space to separate groups of three digits (see
<https://www.englishgrammar.org/rules-writing-numbers> [visited July 10, 2019]).
26
715 Phil. 733 (2013).

~
Decision 6 G.R. No. 240621

x x x Under the second mode, damage is not required. 27

(Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Hence, regardless of which is the correct amount - either the clearly

erroneous P7,843,54.33 which is stated in the Information, or
P7,842,941.60, the amount which the Ombudsman sought to reflect in the
Information via an amendment thereof - the same is not a necessary element
for a violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 under the second mode.

The Court also notes that Recio was well aware of the amount of
P7 ,842,941.60 even during the early stages of the preliminary investigation
as he was given a copy of the complaint28 and the disbursement vouchers
indicating said amount. Furthermore, the Joint Resolution 29 dated January
21, 2016 of the Ombudsman which resolved to indict Recio of the aforesaid
crime clearly enumerates, in tabulated form, 30 the specific amount of,
including the period covered by, the disbursement vouchers signed by him,
which is sufficient to inform him of the total amount thereof. Clearly, Recio
will not be prejudiced by the amendment sought considering that the same
did not involve a completely new fact or matter previously unknown to him
and thereby deprive him of an opportunity to meet the same, nor require him
to undergo a material change or modification in his defense.

Finally, the Court observes that copies of the complaint, disbursement

vouchers, and the January 21, 2016 Joint Resolution of the Ombudsman
were part of the records of this case before the SB., and that the prosecution
had specifically argued that the amendment sought would only reflect the
total amount stated in the aforementioned documents. Under these
circumstances, the SB should have been more circumspect and compared the
amount indicated in the Information with the available documents especially
considering the apparent and glaring error in the amount stated in the
Information.

All told, the amendment sought by the Ombudsman in this case

involves mere matters of form that are allowed under Section 14, Rule 110
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Accordingly, the Court finds
the SB to have gravely abused its discretion in denying the Motion for Leave
of Court to File Amended Information.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The

Resolutions dated April 27, 2018 and May 22, 2018 of the Sandiganbayan in
SB-17-CRM-0063 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The prosecution is
hereby granted the necessary leave of Court to file the amended Information.

27
Id. at 758-759; citing Sison v. People, 628 Phil. 573, 584-585 (2010).
28
Dated October 7, 2013. Rollo, pp. 177-182.
29
See id. at 184-203. Approved by Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales.
30
See id. at 194-199.

r
Decision 7 G.R. No. 240621

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA~ ~S-BERNABE
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
Chairperson

G'/A /
SEC.~S,JR.
Associate Justice

AMfc/L/i,A~RO-JAVIER
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division. --

Senior Associate Justice

Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the

Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.