Things Done or Said by A Common Conspirator in A Common Design 1. Emperor v. Ganesh Raghunath Vaisham Payan, 1931

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Things done or said by a common conspirator in a common design

1. Emperor v. Ganesh Raghunath Vaisham Payan, 1931


o Facts: This is called the ‘Lamington Road’ shooting conspiracy case and involved
wounds to a police officer and his wife from a passing vehicle. Several persons were
arrested pursuant to the same. The charge against them included that of a criminal
conspiracy to do various criminal acts including publishing seditious materials, collect
firearms, murder/attempt to murder/cause hurt to police officers. Some statements
were made after the shooting that referred to their past and planned conduct.
o Question of Law: Whether the statements mentioned lastly may be admissible under
Section 10.
o Held: The Bombay High Court held Section 30 to be inapplicable in the present case
as the maker of the statement was not simultaneously being tried. Nor do they come
under Section 10, as they do not refer to the common intention of the conspirators.
Narratives about past acts cannot be held to refer to common intention as the word
‘intention’ itself implies that such an act occurs in the future. Section 10 is based on
the principle of agency but it can scarcely be said that a common conspirator that
statements relating to past conduct of himself and other conspirators cannot be
included herein.

2. Mirza Akbar v. King Emperor1


o Facts: A conviction under Section 302 was found where the appellant, the paramour
of his victim’s wife, hatched a conspiracy of murder with a paid assassin, with whom
he was later tried along with a third co-conspirator, the wife of the deceased. The
assassin had earlier been caught red handed as he tried escaping the scene of the
crime. The appellant came running from his fields and when the assassin was caught,
pled with the people that he was innocent. Importantly, under Section 10, the
statement of the conspirators including the wife of the deceased, their statements were
recorded and their relevancy placed under scrutiny. Love letters from the lady also
refer to arrangements for money.
o Held: Adequate evidence including love letters attributed to the co-conspirators was
extrinsic to the matter and taken as evidence ali-unde to find that the three documents
together show the conspiracy to murder the now deceased.
The appellants claimed that the statements were recorded even though inadmissible as
they were made after arrest. It is a rule of common law cited in R v. Blake that
evidence of entries used in documents to carry out a fraud to be admissible against
each other and a statement made thereafter is inadmissible for not being in pursuance
of the conspiracy. Past facts of the course of the conspiracy cannot be narrated as
admissible statements as the common intention subsists only when the conspiracy is
afoot. Section 10 employees this principle, by carrying out this distinction.

1
WW Joshi v. State of Bombay
Actionable wrong may not be given a restricted meaning as it is nowhere defined in the act. An act is wrongful
if offends the legal rights of another and actionable wrong is an illegal/unauthorized act breaching another’s
rights in law thus guaranteeing him a right.
Rohtas Industries Staff Union v State of Bihar
The law with regard to the tort of conspiracy has now been well settled. It must arise from a combination of two
or more purposes wishing to inflict damage rather than server bona-fide interest.
In case of mixed motive or purpose for conspiracy, the dominant purpose must be determined not the natural
result of such action, herein workmen protesting against management violently.
Things done or said by a common conspirator in a common design

3. Sardar Singh Caveshwar v. State of Maharashtra


o Facts: In this fraud, shares from a company were bought at a certain price from the
buyer, with an assurance to pay later but rights of ownership vesting then onwards
were actually paid for by selling shares of the company, once they controlled it, in the
market. Apprehending this fraud being un-earthed by auditors, they repeated this
exercise with being another company to pay the defalcations in the first company.
o Questions of Law: Whether there were two distinct conspiracies or a single
conspiracy?
o Held: The Supreme Court opined that the facts constituted more than one conspiracy.
Direct evidence may be used to prove the agreement behind a conspiracy or
circumstantial evidence, but under the doctrine of agency under Section 10 makes
these admissible against co-conspirators, when the court is already satisfied that two
or more persons conspired to commit a crime or some actionable wrong. Such facts
cannot be used in an exculpatory fashion for a co-accused. Requirements are:
1. Prima facie evidence of two or more people conspiring to commit an offence
or actionable wrong;
2. Anything said, done or written must be so after the conspiracy arose;
3. Such statement pertains to a time before the co-conspirator leaves the
conspiracy;
4. Then, the statement could be used as evidence against the co-accused;
5. It can only be used against a co-conspirator, not in his favor.

4. Sardool Singh v. State of Bombay


o Conduct of each co-conspirator including his acts and writings are also evidence
against himself and may be relied on by the prosecution to show his involvement in
the conspiracy. The question with regard to Section 10 is whether conduct outside the
period of conspiracy or when they may be now deceased as shown by statements is
admissible. Prejudice may arrive at their conclusions.
Such evidence is admissible against co-conspirators as this evidence is not sought to
be made admissible under any other provision. Under the theory of agency, an
analogous principle may to be made liable. Hence the period is restricted to when a
common intention still subsisted.

5. State v. Nalini
o Confessional statements made after arrest, if reliable may be used as substantive
evidence against its maker but where a co-accused is concerned, it is treated as merely
corroborative.
Section 10 may be inapplicable in some cases upon the arrest of the conspirator but it
is required that before this provision is treated as unavailable if the object of
conspiracy still subsists. The rule herein is an exception to hear-say. Importantly, a
co-conspirator may not cross examine another. Prosecution should prove beyond a
reasonable doubt of the same.

Rohtas Industries Staff Union v. State of Bihar 1963 – Para 5 and 6


Rohtas Industries Ltd. V. RI Staff Union 1976 – “The object is to bring…”
Jupiter Conspiracy –
Held, that the essence of conspiracy is that there should be
an agreement between persons to do one or other of the acts
described in the section. The said agreement may be proved
by direct evidence or may be inferred from acts and conduct
of the parties. But s. 10 of the Evidence Act intro. duces
Things done or said by a common conspirator in a common design

the doctrine of agency and if the conditions laid down therein are
satisfied, the acts done by one are admissible
against the co-conspirators. The section can be analysed as
follows : (1) There shall be a prima facie evidence
affording a reasonable ground for a court to believe that
two or more persons are members of a conspiracy; (2) if the
said condition is fulfilled, anything said, done or written
by any one of them in reference to their common intention
will be evidence against the other; (3) anything said, done
or written by him after the intention was formed by any one
of them; (4) if it would also be relevant for the said
purpose against another who entered the conspiracy whether
it was said, done or written before he entered the
conspiracy or after he left it; and (5) it can only be used
against a co-conspirator and not in his favour.

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