The F-16 Canopy Sill Longeron:

Getting Control of a Multi-National Safety

of Flight Issue
2014 Aircraft Structural Integrity Program Conference
San Antonio, TX
2-4 December
Presented by:
Kevin Welch
F-16 ASIP
F-16/F-22 IFG Structural Integrity

DISTRIBUTION A. Approved for public release: unlimited distribution. Case #: 75ABW-2014-0037

© 2014 Lockheed Martin Corporation.
 Authors
• Charles Babish, USAF ASIP Technical Advisor, AFLCMC/EZ
• Bryce Harris, F-16 ASIP Manager, AFLCMC/WWMEX
• Tim Jeske, F-16/F-22 IFG Service Life Analysis
• Kevin Welch, F-16/F-22 IFG Structural Integrity

© 2014 Lockheed Martin Corporation.

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 Acknowledgments
• The Following People Also Contributed Substantially to the
Work Described herein:
– Matthew Edghill, (Formerly) F-16/F-22 IFG Structural Integrity
– Selen Minarecioglu, (Formerly) F-16/F-22 IFG Structural
Integrity
– Tom Jones, F-16/F-22 IFG Stress Analysis and Finite Element
Analysis
– Travis Hawks, F-16/F-22 IFG Service Life Analysis
– Keith Sundstrom, F-16/F-22 IFG Stress Analysis and Finite
Element Analysis

© 2014 Lockheed Martin Corporation.

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 Overview
• The Short Story
• Early Longeron Force Management History
– Durability Test Crack
– First Analysis Wave

• First Fleet Cracks Discovered

• Second Analysis Wave
• Interim Force Management Approach
• Summary

© 2014 Lockheed Martin Corporation.

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 The Short Story -1
• This Presentation Addresses the F-16 Single Seat
Configuration (A- and C-Models)
– A Similar Situation was Later Identified for the Two-seat
Configuration

• The Two-seat Configuration is not Addressed Herein

– That Story is still Unfolding

© 2014 Lockheed Martin Corporation.

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 The Short Story -2
• Initial Canopy Sill Longeron Maintenance Requirements
were Damage Tolerance Based
– Longeron Assumed Safety of Flight (SOF)

• After F-16 C/D Block 30 Durability Test Finding in 1992, a

First Wave of Analyses were Accomplished
– Re-classified the Canopy Sill Longeron as a NOT SOF
• Pressure Leak (Before Break) Failure Mode
• Fail-Safety was Believed to Exist
– Updated the Maintenance Requirements to Durability-Based

• Based on International Crack Findings in 2011, a Second

Wave of Analyses was Accomplished
– Large Cracks Found with NO Pressure Leak

© 2014 Lockheed Martin Corporation.

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 The Short Story -3
• Objectives of the Second Wave Analyses
– Determine if the Structure was Fail-Safe
– Determine Inspection Requirements and Grounding Criteria
– Develop a Field Level Repair
– Develop a Preferred Spare Replacement Longeron

• As Field Findings Came in, a Third Analysis Wave was

Accomplished to Determine Final Force Management
Intervals
• This Presentation Focuses on the Work Accomplished to
Scope the Emerging Force Management Problem (Through
the Second Analysis Wave)

© 2014 Lockheed Martin Corporation.

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 Canopy Sill Longeron Location

Right Hand Side

16B1103 Canopy Sill Longeron

Up

Aft

Canopy Sill Longeron

Cracking Location
(both sides)

Left Hand Side

16B1103 Canopy Sill Longeron

© 2014 Lockheed Martin Corporation.

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 Photo of Cracked Area

Up

Aft
Outboard
Blue Arrows Indicate Crack Path
Right Hand Side
16B1103 Sill Longeron

FS 158

© 2014 Lockheed Martin Corporation.

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 Potential Impact
Customer Block Configurations
10/15 20 25/30/32 40/42 50/52 50+/52+
USAF - - X X X -
USN X - - - - -
RBAF - - - X - -
BAF X - - - - -
FACh X - - - - X
RDAF X - - - - -
EAF X - X X - X
HAF - - X - X X
IDAF X - X - - -
IqAF - - - - - X
IAF X - X X - -
• 24 F-16 Customers RJAF X - - - - -
RoKAF - - X - X -
Worldwide RMAF - - - - - X
RNLAF X - - - - -
RNoAF X - - - - -
• Roughly 2400 single RAFO
PAF
-
X
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
X
X
seat F-16 aircraft in PLAF - - - - - X
PoAF X - - - - -
service RSAF - - - - X -
TAF - X - - - -
RTAF X - - - - -
TurAF - - X - X X

© 2014 Lockheed Martin Corporation.

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 Early Force Management Practice
• Pre-Block 40 (Includes A- and C- models)
– Classified as SOF but not Fracture Critical (FC)
• Based on FSD Cracking and Damage Tolerance Analysis
– Durability Life Predictions well above Design Service Life
– FSMP/IAT Maintenance Area
• Over 770 USAF Field Inspections Accomplished with no Findings
• However, many Customers Not Inspecting Due to Access
Difficulty

• 1998: Block 40 Reclassified to FC During Design Phase

– Material Controls/Traceability Desired
• Especially Production NDI Requirements
• Needed to Meet the more Stringent Damage Tolerance Inspection
Requirements for this Block

© 2014 Lockheed Martin Corporation.

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 Block 30 Durability Test Experience
• 1992: Discovered Right Hand Side Canopy Sill Longeron Crack at
13,000 Hours
– Discovered Due to Cabin Pressure Leak
– Longeron Repaired and Survived to End of Test

Up Blue Arrows Indicate Crack Path

FS 158
Outboard Up
Aft

Aft

FS 158
Right Hand Side
16B1103 Sill Longeron

© 2014 Lockheed Martin Corporation.

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 First Wave of Analyses
• Based on Test Experience
– Functional Impairment Failure Mode Apparently Demonstrated
– Residual Strength Assumed to Exist
– Therefore, SOF Designation Removed

• Crack Growth Model Correlated to Test, But with Some

Uncertainty
– Block 30 FSDT Under-tested this Area
– Test did not Synchronize Maneuver and Cockpit Pressure
Loads

• Maintenance Requirements Revised to Durability Based

– Fed into FSMP for ALL Pre-Block 40 Versions

© 2014 Lockheed Martin Corporation.

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 The First Cracks Are Discovered
• Oct 2011: F-16 FMS Customer Discovers First Cracks
– Initial Finding Due to Cabin Pressure Leak
– Cracks on Additional Aircraft found During Inspections Instituted by
the Customer
• 11 FMS Block 10 (A/B) Aircraft Found Cracked
• 3 FMS Block 30 Aircraft Found Cracked
• No FMS Block 40 Aircraft Reported with Cracks
– Many Subsequent Findings did not Involve Pressure Leaks

• Feb 2014: USAF Discovers Cracking Next

– 18 Block 25, 32, 40, 42 Aircraft as of May 2014
– Cracks Found During Scheduled Inspections and Inspections per
Urgent Action TCTO
– However, NO Pressure Leaks Detected

Pressure Leak Failure Mode Not Occurring

© 2014 Lockheed Martin Corporation.

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 Second Analysis Wave
• Provided New Understanding of the Structural Integrity
Characteristics of the Longeron and Surrounding Structure and
Resulted in:
– Interim Repair Design Based on The Durability Test Repair
– A Preferred Spare Longeron Design
– An Interim Force Management Approach to Bring Risk Under Control
– USAF Establishment of Crisis Management Team in Jan 2014

• Analyses Included:
– Residual Strength Analysis
– Finite Element Modeling
– Durability and Damage Tolerance Analysis
– Metallurgical Evaluation
– Short Term Repair and New Longeron Design
– Risk Analysis

© 2014 Lockheed Martin Corporation.

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 Fail Safe Analysis Results
• Two Failure Scenarios Considered for the Residual
Strength Analysis
– Simultaneous Failure of Left and Right Hand Side Longerons
– Right Hand Side Longeron Failure Only

• Subsequent Failures of the Adjacent Structure Predicted by

the Residual Strength Analysis
• The Longeron cannot be Classified as a Fail-Safe Structure
Per EN-SB-08-001 for Either Failure Scenario
– Structure must be Managed by Damage Tolerance
Requirements for Slow Crack Growth Design

SOF Designation Reinstated

© 2014 Lockheed Martin Corporation.

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 Improved Finite Element Models
• The Previous FEM Used Shell Elements
• The Improved FEM Uses Solid Elements to Provide More
Accurate Stress Distributions at the Critical Location
– Provides a More Accurate Prediction of the 3-Dimensional
Stress Concentration at the Critical Location
• Needed Due to Complex Geometry (Intersecting Fillet Radii,
Stiffener Runouts, Etc.)
– Also Provides Ability to Develop Through-the-Thickness
Stress Gradients to Support Service Life Analysis

• The FEM is Run Separately for Critical Flight Loads and

Pressure Loads
– The Crack Growth Analyses Combine the Results

© 2014 Lockheed Martin Corporation.

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Finite Element Model Improvements
16B1103 Representation
FS 188.8 Using Solid Elements
FS 158.0 16B1103 Representation
FS 158.0
Using Shell Element
Up

Aft FS 88.0

Up

Aft

Up Up

Aft Aft

© 2014 Lockheed Martin Corporation.

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 Improved Finite Element Model
Analysis Results
FS 158.0
16B1103 Canopy Sill Longeron
Up 10 psi Cockpit Pressure
Maximum Principal Stress
Aft
Up
Aft

94910 psi

© 2014 Lockheed Martin Corporation.

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 Durability and Damage
Tolerance Analysis
• Updated Crack Growth Models Using the Improved FEM
Data and Field Findings Showed a Significant Reduction in
Predicted Life Compared to Previous Predictions
• New Damage Tolerance Inspection Requirements Defined
– Nearly all Customers had Aircraft Past Initial DT Inspection
– Many Aircraft Were Past the DT Life
– Many were also Approaching the Predicted Durability Life

• Results were Fed into the FSMP’s for all Customers

Increased Local Stress Prediction Results

in Shorter Life Prediction

© 2014 Lockheed Martin Corporation.

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 Metallurgical Evaluation -1
• LM Aero Performed Metallurgical Evaluations of Longerons
from Block 25 USAF Aircraft
– Purpose: Validate Crack Growth Models Used to Establish
Current Force Management Actions

Up

Aft Crack

Up

Aft

© 2014 Lockheed Martin Corporation.

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 Metallurgical Evaluation -2

Fracture Surface Morphology

Up Fatigue Region Boundary
Overload Region

Outboard

Fatigue
Region

Overload
Region

45 Degree Overload
Regions

Up

Outboard

Up Fatigue Cracking Limited to the Inboard

Section Region of the Longeron
Outboard

© 2014 Lockheed Martin Corporation.

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 Metallurgical Evaluation
Observations
• Fatigue Cracking Present in the Inboard Region of the
Longeron
• Remainder of the Longeron Cross Section Showed Static
Overload Type Failure
• Validates Crack Growth Models Used to Establish Current
Force Management Actions
– Particularly the Predicted Small Critical Crack Size

© 2014 Lockheed Martin Corporation.

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 Initial Risk Analysis
• Focused on Determining Pre-Inspection Risk Status of Individual
Aircraft for USAF Block 25/30/32
– Aircraft Divided Into Two Populations Due to Usage Differences:
Block 25/32 (P&W Engine ) and Block 30 (GE Engine)

• Accomplished while the other Second Wave Analyses were

being Accomplished
• Results Summary
– Near Term Inspections Required for Some Aircraft in Order to
Maintain Risk below 10-7 Single Flight Probability of Failure (SFPOF)
• Provided Data to Prioritize Inspections by Base and Individual Aircraft
– Continue FSMP-Recommended Eddy Current Phase Inspection in
Order to Continue Flying Operations until the Longeron is Replaced

© 2014 Lockheed Martin Corporation.

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Initial Risk Analysis Results –
Block 25/32

© 2014 Lockheed Martin Corporation.

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Initial Risk Analysis Results –
Block 30

Base 1
Base 2
Base 3
Base 4
Base 5
Base 6
Base 7
Base 8
Base 9
Base 10
Base 11
Base 12

© 2014 Lockheed Martin Corporation.

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 Updated Initial Risk Assessment
• Addressed the Following:
– A New Force Management Baseline Usage Recently Incorporated for
the 25/30/32 Fleet
– Risk Assessment Extended to USAF Block 40/42 and 50/52 Aircraft as
Separate Populations
– Latest Crack Growth Models

• Identified:
– Some USAF Aircraft Operating at Risk Levels above 10-5 SFPOF
– Need to Reduce Inspection Intervals to Maintain Current Fleet Risk
Level
• Deterministic Damage Tolerance Inspection Intervals were not Sufficient
to Maintain Acceptable Risk Level
– Need to Develop Improved NDI Method and Procedure To Extend
Inspection Intervals

© 2014 Lockheed Martin Corporation.

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Interim Force Management Approach

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© 2014 Lockheed Martin Corporation.
 Initial USAF Response
• Based on Results from the Updated Initial Risk Analysis,
USAF Established Crisis Management Team in Jan 2014
• USAF Issued Urgent Action TCTO 1F-16-2705 on 3 Feb 2014
to Maintain Structural Integrity of Aircraft Operating at Risk
Level Greater than 10-5 SFPOF
– Affected 55 USAF aircraft
– Required 5 to 13 Hour Recurring Inspections Using then
Existing NDI Procedure (Skin Panel In-Place)
• Interval was also Based on Aircraft Block
• Due to Covered Crack Length and Short Critical Crack Size

© 2014 Lockheed Martin Corporation.

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 USAF Fleetwide Inspection
• Based on the Risk Analysis, TCTO 2705 Findings and Additional
PROF Analyses, USAF Initiated Fleetwide Inspections (Skin Panel
Removed) in March 2014:
Compliance
TCTO Affects Follow-On Inspection
Period
2707 Aircraft > 10-5 risk 25 Hours 75 or 100, Based on Block
Aircraft > 10-7 risk
2708 100 Hours 18 very High Risk Aircraft
but <10-5 risk
Required 3 x 10 Hour
2706 Inspections to Reduce
(Included International Aircraft < 10-7 risk Next Phase
Customers)
Risk to Acceptable Levels

• Supporting Tech Order Supplements were Issued:

– -3 T.O. for Skin Panel Trim
– -6 T.O. for Recurring Inspection Intervals
– -36 T.O. for Improved NDI Procedure

© 2014 Lockheed Martin Corporation.

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 Interim Repair and New Longeron
Design Developed
• Interim Repair Capability Limited by the Geometric
Constraints at the Critical Location
– Restores Interim Operational Capability
– Interim Repair cannot be Used as Preventative Repair
• Provides Limited Service Life Benefit
• Inspection Requires Canopy Seal Removal
• Requires Inspections of Fastener Holes Used for Repair
Installation

• Preferred Spare Canopy Sill Longeron Incorporates:

– Material Substitution: 7475-T7351 in Lieu of 2124-T851
– Geometry Improvements at the Critical Location

© 2014 Lockheed Martin Corporation.

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 Summary
• Beware of Removing a SOF Designation
• Cracks Detected During Test may Behave Differently in the Fleet
– Pressure Leak may not be a Reliable Failure Detection
• Focused Effort Stabilized the Situation and Ensured that the
Aircraft were Operating within Safe Limits
– Not only for USAF but also for Many International Customers
• No New Methods or Processes Required:
– Follow ASIP Best Practices
– Teamwork between USG and OEM
– Make Efficient Use of Tasking/Contracting Processes
– Focus on Getting the Job Done!

ASIP Success Story:

Engineering Processes Provided Successful Recovery

© 2014 Lockheed Martin Corporation.

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