RULE 42 SECTION 2 AND 3

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 159116. September 30, 2009.]

SPS. NESTOR and FELICIDAD DADIZON, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and SPS. DOMINADOR and ELSA MOCORRO, respondents.

FACTS:

Spouses Dominador and Elsa Mocorro (Mocorros) initiated this case in the Municipal Trial Court against the Dadizons to recover a parcel of land
and to cancel the latter's tax declaration. The Mocorros also sought consequential damages.

Ruling of the MTC

In determining the issue as to who between the Mocorros and the Dadizons possessed the better right to the lot occupied by the Dadizons, the
MTC rendered judgment on December 6, 1999 in favor of the Mocorros.

Ruling of the RTC

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Naval, Biliran affirmed the MTC's findings through its decision of May 17, 2001, 10 to wit:

Factual findings and conclusions of the trial court are entitled to great weight and respect absent any showing of a fact or any circumstance which
the court a quofailed to appreciate and which would change the result if it were considered.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds that the decision of the court  a quo  as correct; hereby affirming the said decision in toto.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Dadizons filed a notice of appeal. Initially, the CA required the Dadizons to file their appellant's brief. Later on, however, the Mocorros moved
to dismiss the Dadizons' appeal on the ground that the mode of appeal they had adopted was erroneous. 

Agreeing with the Mocorros, the CA dismissed the Dadizons' appeal through its resolution dated February 26, 2003. The CA denied the Dadizons'
motion for reconsideration on June 30, 2003.

Hence, the Dadizons have come to this Court to assail the dismissal of their appeal and the denial of their motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: WON Dadizon’s Mode of Appeal was erroneous?

RULING:

The mode of appeal  vis-à-vis the decision of the Regional Trial Court adopted by the Dadizons was undoubtedly wrong. They should have filed a
petition for review in accordance with Rule 42, Rules of Court, which was the correct mode of appeal, considering that the Regional Trial Court had
rendered the decision in question in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

The error of the Dadizons was inexcusable and inexplicable.

It is not possible to take an appeal by certiorari to the Court of Appeals. Appeals to that Court from the Regional Trial Courts are perfected in two
(2) ways, both of which are entirely distinct from an appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court. They are:

a) by ordinary appeal, or appeal by writ of error — where judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of
original jurisdiction; and
b) by  petition for review — where judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction.

The petition for review must be filed with the Court of Appeals within 15 days from notice of the judgment, and as already stated, shall point out
the error of fact or law that will warrant a reversal or modification of the decision or judgment sought to be reviewed. An ordinary appeal is taken
by merely filing a notice of appeal within 15 days from notice of the judgment, except in special proceedings or cases where multiple appeals are
allowed in which event the period of appeal is 30 days and a record on appeal is necessary.

There is therefore no longer any common method of appeal in civil cases to the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. The present procedures
for appealing to either court — and, it may be added, the process of ventilation of the appeal — are now to be made by petition for review or by
notice of appeals (and, in certain instances, by record on appeal), but only by petition for review on certiorari  under Rule 45. As was stressed by
this Court as early as 1980, in Buenbrazo v. Marave, 101 SCRA 848, all "the members of the bench and bar" are charged with knowledge, not only
that "since the enactment of Republic Act No. 8031 in 1969", the review of the decision of the Court of First Instance in a case exclusively
cognizable by the inferior court . . . cannot be made in an ordinary appeal or by record on appeal", but also that  appeal by record on appeal to the
Supreme Court under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court was abolished by Republic Act No. 5440 which, as already stated, took effect on September 9,
1968. Similarly, in  Santos, Jr., v. C.A., 152 SCRA 378, this Court declared that "Republic Act No. 5440 had long superseded Rule 41 and Section 1,
Rule 122 of the Rules of Court on direct appeals from the court of first instance to the Supreme Court in civil and criminal cases, . . . and that "direct
appeals to this Court from the trial court on questions of law had to be through the filing of a petition for review on  certiorari, wherein this Court
could either give due course to the proposed appeal or deny it outright to prevent the clogging of its docket with unmeritorious and dilatory
appeals."

In fine, if an appeal is essayed to either court by the wrong procedure, the only course of action open is to dismiss the appeal. In other words, if an
appeal is attempted from a judgment of a Regional Trial Court by notice of appeal, that appeal can and should never go to the Supreme Court,
regardless of any statement in the notice that the court of choice is the Supreme Court; and more than once has this Court admonished a Trial
Judge and/or his Clerk of Court, as well as the attorney taking the appeal, for causing the records to be sent up to this Court in such a case. Again, if
an appeal by notice of appeal is taken from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals and in the latter Court, the appellant raises naught but
issues of law, the appeal should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. And finally, it may be stressed once more, it is only through petitions for
review on certiorari  that the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may properly be invoked.

There is no longer any justification for allowing transfers of erroneous appeals from one court to the other, much less for tolerating continued
ignorance of the law on appeals. It thus behooves every attorney seeking review and reversal of a judgment or order promulgated against his
client, to determine clearly the errors he believes may be ascribed to the judgment or order, whether of fact or of law; then to ascertain which
Court properly has appellate jurisdiction; and finally, to observe scrupulously the requisites for appeal prescribed by law, with keen awareness
that any error or imprecision in compliance therewith may well be fatal to his client's cause.

xxxx

The dictum of Murillo v. Consul found its way to the Rules of Court  as Sec. 2, Rule 41, effective July 1, 1997, under which the various modes of
appeal are now specifically delineated, viz.:

Sec. 2. Modes of appeal. —

(a) Ordinary appeal. — The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall
be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the
adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law
or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.

(b) Petition for review. — The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction shall be by petition for review in accordance with Rule 42.

(c) Appeal by certiorari. — In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for
review oncertiorari in accordance with Rule 45. (n)

Consequently, the CA's dismissal of the Dadizons' appeal was proper. Sec. 2, Rule 50 of the  Rules of Court 14 pronounces that "an appeal by notice
of appeal instead of by petition for review from the appellate judgment of a Regional Trial Court shall be dismissed." The dismissal was also
unavoidable notwithstanding that the procedural rules might be liberally construed, 15 because the provisions of law and the rules concerning
the  manner and period  of appeal were mandatory and jurisdictional requirements essential to enable the appellate court to take cognizance of the
appeal. 16 According to Dee Hwa Liong Electronics Corporation v. Papiona, 17 the liberal construction of the rules — authorized by Sec. 6, Rule
1,  Rules of Court, in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding —
cannot be made the vehicle by which to ignore the  Rules of Court  at will and at random to the prejudice of the orderly presentation and
assessment of the issues and their just resolution.

Indeed, the policy of liberal construction mandated by the Rules of Court  may be invoked only in situations in which there is some excusable formal
deficiency or error in a pleading, but not where its application subverts the essence of the proceeding or results in the utter disregard of the  Rules
of Court. Imperative justice requires the correct observance of indispensable technicalities precisely designed to ensure its proper dispensation, for,
as Justice Regalado observed in one case: 18

The danger wrought by non-observance of the Rules of Court is that the violation of or failure to comply with the procedure prescribed by law
prevents the proper determination of the questions raised by the parties with respect to the merits of the case and makes it necessary to decide, in
the first place, such questions as relate to the form of the action. The rules and procedure laid down for the trial court and the adjudication of
cases are matters of public policy. They are matters of public order and interest which can in no wise be changed or regulated by agreements
between or stipulations by parties to an action for their singular convenience.