DEUTSCHE BANK AG MANILA BRANCH Vs CIR

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DEUTSCHE BANK AG MANILA BRANCH, PETITIONER,

vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENT.

G.R. No. 188550 August 19, 2013

DECISION

SERENO, CJ.:

This is a Petition for Review1 filed by Deutsche Bank AG Manila Branch (petitioner) under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure assailing the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc (CTA En Banc) Decision2 dated 29 May 2009 and
Resolution3 dated 1 July 2009 in C.T.A. EB No. 456.

THE FACTS

In accordance with Section 28(A)(5)4 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1997, petitioner withheld and
remitted to respondent on 21 October 2003 the amount of PHP 67,688,553.51, which represented the fifteen
percent (15%) branch profit remittance tax (BPRT) on its regular banking unit (RBU) net income remitted to
Deutsche Bank Germany (DB Germany) for 2002 and prior taxable years.5

Believing that it made an overpayment of the BPRT, petitioner filed with the BIR Large Taxpayers Assessment and
Investigation Division on 4 October 2005 an administrative claim for refund or issuance of its tax credit certificate in
the total amount of PHP 22,562,851.17. On the same date, petitioner requested from the International Tax Affairs
Division (ITAD) a confirmation of its entitlement to the preferential tax rate of 10% under the RP-Germany Tax
Treaty.6

Alleging the inaction of the BIR on its administrative claim, petitioner filed a Petition for Review7 with the CTA on 18
October 2005. Petitioner reiterated its claim for the refund or issuance of its tax credit certificate for the amount of
PHP 22,562,851.17 representing the alleged excess BPRT paid on branch profits remittance to DB Germany.

THE CTA SECOND DIVISION RULING8

After trial on the merits, the CTA Second Division found that petitioner indeed paid the total amount of PHP
67,688,553.51 representing the 15% BPRT on its RBU profits amounting to PHP 451,257,023.29 for 2002 and prior
taxable years. Records also disclose that for the year 2003, petitioner remitted to DB Germany the amount of EURO
5,174,847.38 (or PHP 330,175,961.88 at the exchange rate of PHP 63.804:1 EURO), which is net of the 15%
BPRT.

However, the claim of petitioner for a refund was denied on the ground that the application for a tax treaty relief was
not filed with ITAD prior to the payment by the former of its BPRT and actual remittance of its branch profits to DB
Germany, or prior to its availment of the preferential rate of ten percent (10%) under the RP-Germany Tax Treaty
provision. The court a quo held that petitioner violated the fifteen (15) day period mandated under Section III
paragraph (2) of Revenue Memorandum Order (RMO) No. 1-2000.

Further, the CTA Second Division relied on Mirant (Philippines) Operations Corporation (formerly Southern Energy
Asia-Pacific Operations [Phils.], Inc.) v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue9 (Mirant) where the CTA En Banc ruled
that before the benefits of the tax treaty may be extended to a foreign corporation wishing to avail itself thereof, the
latter should first invoke the provisions of the tax treaty and prove that they indeed apply to the corporation.

THE CTA EN BANC RULING10

The CTA En Banc affirmed the CTA Second Division’s Decision dated 29 August 2008 and Resolution dated 14
January 2009. Citing Mirant, the CTA En Banc held that a ruling from the ITAD of the BIR must be secured prior to
the availment of a preferential tax rate under a tax treaty. Applying the principle of stare decisis et non quieta
movere, the CTA En Banc took into consideration that this Court had denied the Petition in G.R. No. 168531 filed by
Mirant for failure to sufficiently show any reversible error in the assailed judgment.11 The CTA En Banc ruled that
once a case has been decided in one way, any other case involving exactly the same point at issue should be
decided in the same manner.

The court likewise ruled that the 15-day rule for tax treaty relief application under RMO No. 1-2000 cannot be
relaxed for petitioner, unlike in CBK Power Company Limited v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.12 In that case,
the rule was relaxed and the claim for refund of excess final withholding taxes was partially granted. While it issued
a ruling to CBK Power Company Limited after the payment of withholding taxes, the ITAD did not issue any ruling to
petitioner even if it filed a request for confirmation on 4 October 2005 that the remittance of branch profits to DB
Germany is subject to a preferential tax rate of 10% pursuant to Article 10 of the RP-Germany Tax Treaty.

ISSUE

This Court is now confronted with the issue of whether the failure to strictly comply with RMO No. 1-2000 will
deprive persons or corporations of the benefit of a tax treaty.

THE COURT’S RULING

The Petition is meritorious.

Under Section 28(A)(5) of the NIRC, any profit remitted to its head office shall be subject to a tax of 15% based on
the total profits applied for or earmarked for remittance without any deduction of the tax component. However,
petitioner invokes paragraph 6, Article 10 of the RP-Germany Tax Treaty, which provides that where a resident of
the Federal Republic of Germany has a branch in the Republic of the Philippines, this branch may be subjected to
the branch profits remittance tax withheld at source in accordance with Philippine law but shall not exceed 10% of
the gross amount of the profits remitted by that branch to the head office.

By virtue of the RP-Germany Tax Treaty, we are bound to extend to a branch in the Philippines, remitting to its head
office in Germany, the benefit of a preferential rate equivalent to 10% BPRT.

On the other hand, the BIR issued RMO No. 1-2000, which requires that any availment of the tax treaty relief must
be preceded by an application with ITAD at least 15 days before the transaction. The Order was issued to
streamline the processing of the application of tax treaty relief in order to improve efficiency and service to the
taxpayers. Further, it also aims to prevent the consequences of an erroneous interpretation and/or application of the
treaty provisions (i.e., filing a claim for a tax refund/credit for the overpayment of taxes or for deficiency tax liabilities
for underpayment).13

The crux of the controversy lies in the implementation of RMO No. 1-2000.

Petitioner argues that, considering that it has met all the conditions under Article 10 of the RP-Germany Tax Treaty,
the CTA erred in denying its claim solely on the basis of RMO No. 1-2000. The filing of a tax treaty relief application
is not a condition precedent to the availment of a preferential tax rate. Further, petitioner posits that, contrary to the
ruling of the CTA, Mirant is not a binding judicial precedent to deny a claim for refund solely on the basis of
noncompliance with RMO No. 1-2000.

Respondent counters that the requirement of prior application under RMO No. 1-2000 is mandatory in character.
RMO No. 1-2000 was issued pursuant to the unquestioned authority of the Secretary of Finance to promulgate rules
and regulations for the effective implementation of the NIRC. Thus, courts cannot ignore administrative issuances
which partakes the nature of a statute and have in their favor a presumption of legality.

The CTA ruled that prior application for a tax treaty relief is mandatory, and noncompliance with this prerequisite is
fatal to the taxpayer’s availment of the preferential tax rate.

We disagree.

A minute resolution is not a binding precedent

At the outset, this Court’s minute resolution on Mirant is not a binding precedent. The Court has clarified this matter
in Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue14 as follows:

It is true that, although contained in a minute resolution, our dismissal of the petition was a disposition of the merits
of the case. When we dismissed the petition, we effectively affirmed the CA ruling being questioned. As a result, our
ruling in that case has already become final. When a minute resolution denies or dismisses a petition for failure to
comply with formal and substantive requirements, the challenged decision, together with its findings of fact and legal
conclusions, are deemed sustained. But what is its effect on other cases?

With respect to the same subject matter and the same issues concerning the same parties, it constitutes res
judicata. However, if other parties or another subject matter (even with the same parties and issues) is involved, the
minute resolution is not binding precedent. Thus, in CIR v. Baier-Nickel, the Court noted that a previous case, CIR v.
Baier-Nickel involving the same parties and the same issues, was previously disposed of by the Court thru a minute
resolution dated February 17, 2003 sustaining the ruling of the CA. Nonetheless, the Court ruled that the previous
case "ha(d) no bearing" on the latter case because the two cases involved different subject matters as they were
concerned with the taxable income of different taxable years.

Besides, there are substantial, not simply formal, distinctions between a minute resolution and a decision. The
constitutional requirement under the first paragraph of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution that the facts and
the law on which the judgment is based must be expressed clearly and distinctly applies only to decisions, not to
minute resolutions. A minute resolution is signed only by the clerk of court by authority of the justices, unlike a
decision. It does not require the certification of the Chief Justice. Moreover, unlike decisions, minute resolutions are
not published in the Philippine Reports. Finally, the proviso of Section 4(3) of Article VIII speaks of a decision.
Indeed, as a rule, this Court lays down doctrines or principles of law which constitute binding precedent in a decision
duly signed by the members of the Court and certified by the Chief Justice. (Emphasis supplied)

Even if we had affirmed the CTA in Mirant, the doctrine laid down in that Decision cannot bind this Court in cases of
a similar nature. There are differences in parties, taxes, taxable periods, and treaties involved; more importantly, the
disposition of that case was made only through a minute resolution.

Tax Treaty vs. RMO No. 1-2000

Our Constitution provides for adherence to the general principles of international law as part of the law of the
land.15 The time-honored international principle of pacta sunt servanda demands the performance in good faith of
treaty obligations on the part of the states that enter into the agreement. Every treaty in force is binding upon the
parties, and obligations under the treaty must be performed by them in good faith.16 More importantly, treaties have
the force and effect of law in this jurisdiction.17

Tax treaties are entered into "to reconcile the national fiscal legislations of the contracting parties and, in turn, help
the taxpayer avoid simultaneous taxations in two different jurisdictions."18 CIR v. S.C. Johnson and Son, Inc. further
clarifies that "tax conventions are drafted with a view towards the elimination of international juridical double
taxation, which is defined as the imposition of comparable taxes in two or more states on the same taxpayer in
respect of the same subject matter and for identical periods. The apparent rationale for doing away with double
taxation is to encourage the free flow of goods and services and the movement of capital, technology and persons
between countries, conditions deemed vital in creating robust and dynamic economies. Foreign investments will
only thrive in a fairly predictable and reasonable international investment climate and the protection against double
taxation is crucial in creating such a climate."19

Simply put, tax treaties are entered into to minimize, if not eliminate the harshness of international juridical double
taxation, which is why they are also known as double tax treaty or double tax agreements.

"A state that has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations those modifications
that may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken."20 Thus, laws and issuances must
ensure that the reliefs granted under tax treaties are accorded to the parties entitled thereto. The BIR must not
impose additional requirements that would negate the availment of the reliefs provided for under international
agreements. More so, when the RP-Germany Tax Treaty does not provide for any pre-requisite for the availment of
the benefits under said agreement.

Likewise, it must be stressed that there is nothing in RMO No. 1-2000 which would indicate a deprivation of
entitlement to a tax treaty relief for failure to comply with the 15-day period. We recognize the clear intention of the
BIR in implementing RMO No. 1-2000, but the CTA’s outright denial of a tax treaty relief for failure to strictly comply
with the prescribed period is not in harmony with the objectives of the contracting state to ensure that the benefits
granted under tax treaties are enjoyed by duly entitled persons or corporations.

Bearing in mind the rationale of tax treaties, the period of application for the availment of tax treaty relief as required
by RMO No. 1-2000 should not operate to divest entitlement to the relief as it would constitute a violation of the duty
required by good faith in complying with a tax treaty. The denial of the availment of tax relief for the failure of a
taxpayer to apply within the prescribed period under the administrative issuance would impair the value of the tax
treaty. At most, the application for a tax treaty relief from the BIR should merely operate to confirm the entitlement of
the taxpayer to the relief.

The obligation to comply with a tax treaty must take precedence over the objective of RMO No. 1-2000. Logically,
1âwphi1

noncompliance with tax treaties has negative implications on international relations, and unduly discourages foreign
investors. While the consequences sought to be prevented by RMO No. 1-2000 involve an administrative procedure,
these may be remedied through other system management processes, e.g., the imposition of a fine or penalty. But
we cannot totally deprive those who are entitled to the benefit of a treaty for failure to strictly comply with an
administrative issuance requiring prior application for tax treaty relief.

Prior Application vs. Claim for Refund


Again, RMO No. 1-2000 was implemented to obviate any erroneous interpretation and/or application of the treaty
provisions. The objective of the BIR is to forestall assessments against corporations who erroneously availed
themselves of the benefits of the tax treaty but are not legally entitled thereto, as well as to save such investors from
the tedious process of claims for a refund due to an inaccurate application of the tax treaty provisions. However, as
earlier discussed, noncompliance with the 15-day period for prior application should not operate to automatically
divest entitlement to the tax treaty relief especially in claims for refund.

The underlying principle of prior application with the BIR becomes moot in refund cases, such as the present case,
where the very basis of the claim is erroneous or there is excessive payment arising from non-availment of a tax
treaty relief at the first instance. In this case, petitioner should not be faulted for not complying with RMO No. 1-2000
prior to the transaction. It could not have applied for a tax treaty relief within the period prescribed, or 15 days prior
to the payment of its BPRT, precisely because it erroneously paid the BPRT not on the basis of the preferential tax
rate under

the RP-Germany Tax Treaty, but on the regular rate as prescribed by the NIRC. Hence, the prior application
requirement becomes illogical. Therefore, the fact that petitioner invoked the provisions of the RP-Germany Tax
Treaty when it requested for a confirmation from the ITAD before filing an administrative claim for a refund should be
deemed substantial compliance with RMO No. 1-2000.

Corollary thereto, Section 22921 of the NIRC provides the taxpayer a remedy for tax recovery when there has been
an erroneous payment of tax. The outright denial of petitioner’s claim for a refund, on the sole ground of failure to
1âw phi 1

apply for a tax treaty relief prior to the payment of the BPRT, would defeat the purpose of Section 229.

Petitioner is entitled to a refund

It is significant to emphasize that petitioner applied – though belatedly – for a tax treaty relief, in substantial
compliance with RMO No. 1-2000. A ruling by the BIR would have confirmed whether petitioner was entitled to the
lower rate of 10% BPRT pursuant to the RP-Germany Tax Treaty.

Nevertheless, even without the BIR ruling, the CTA Second Division found as follows:

Based on the evidence presented, both documentary and testimonial, petitioner was able to establish the following
facts:

a. That petitioner is a branch office in the Philippines of Deutsche Bank AG, a corporation organized and
existing under the laws of the Federal Republic of Germany;

b. That on October 21, 2003, it filed its Monthly Remittance Return of Final Income Taxes Withheld under
BIR Form No. 1601-F and remitted the amount of ₱67,688,553.51 as branch profits remittance tax with the
BIR; and

c. That on October 29, 2003, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas having issued a clearance, petitioner remitted
to Frankfurt Head Office the amount of EUR5,174,847.38 (or ₱330,175,961.88 at 63.804 Peso/Euro)
representing its 2002 profits remittance.22

The amount of PHP 67,688,553.51 paid by petitioner represented the 15% BPRT on its RBU net income, due for
remittance to DB Germany amounting to PHP 451,257,023.29 for 2002 and prior taxable years.23

Likewise, both the administrative and the judicial actions were filed within the two-year prescriptive period pursuant
to Section 229 of the NIRC.24

Clearly, there is no reason to deprive petitioner of the benefit of a preferential tax rate of 10% BPRT in accordance
with the RP-Germany Tax Treaty.

Petitioner is liable to pay only the amount of PHP 45,125,702.34 on its RBU net income amounting to PHP
451,257,023.29 for 2002 and prior taxable years, applying the 10% BPRT. Thus, it is proper to grant petitioner a
refund ofthe difference between the PHP 67,688,553.51 (15% BPRT) and PHP 45,125,702.34 (10% BPRT) or a
total of PHP 22,562,851.17.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court of Tax Appeals En
Banc Decision dated 29 May 2009 and Resolution dated 1 July 2009 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one
is hereby entered ordering respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue to refund or issue a tax credit certificate in
favor of petitioner Deutsche Bank AG Manila Branch the amount of TWENTY TWO MILLION FIVE HUNDRED
SIXTY TWO THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FIFTY ONE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (PHP
22,562,851.17), Philippine currency, representing the erroneously paid BPRT for 2002 and prior taxable years.

SO ORDERED.

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