Mangelen StatCon Digest 12/6/19

- the scheme falls within the purview of the

Caltex Phil, INC. v. Palomar, GR no. L- provisions aforesaid and declined to grant
19650 (1966) the requested clearance.
DECISION
-it is nevertheless a "gift enterprise" which is
ISSUE: - WON the proposed "Caltex equally banned by the Postal Law, and in his
Hooded Pump Contest" violates the Postal letter of December 10, 1960 not only denied
Law the use of the mails for purposes of the
proposed contest but as well threatened that
FACTS: if the contest was conducted, "a fraud order
will have to be issued against it (Caltex) and
In the year 1960 the Caltex (Philippines) all its representatives
Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Caltex)
conceived and laid the RTC’S RULING: PETITION HAS MERIT
groundwork for a promotional scheme
calculated to drum up patronage for its oil
products. Denominated "Caltex Hooded COURT’S RULING:
Pump Contest", it calls for participants
therein to estimate the The term 'lottery' extends to
actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at all schemes for the distribution of prizes by
each Caltex station will dispense during a chance, such as policy playing, gift
specified period. Participation is to be open exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs,-
indiscriminately to all "motor vehicle etc., and various forms of gambling.
owners and/or licensed drivers", and no fee
or consideration is required to be paid, no The three essential elements of a lottery are:
purchase of Caltex products required to be First, consideration; second, prize; and third,
made. chance. The elements of prize and chance
are too obvious in the disputed scheme to be
Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not the subject of contention. In respect to the
only as amongst the media for publicizing last element of consideration, the law does
the contest but also for the transmission of not condemn the gratuitous distribution of
communications relative thereto, property by chance, if no consideration is
representations were made by Caltex with derived directly or indirectly from the party
the postal authorities for the contest to be receiving the chance, but does condemn as
cleared in advance for mailing, having in criminal schemes in which a valuable
view sections 1954 (a), 1982 and 1983 of consideration of some kind is paid directly
the Revised Administrative Code, or indirectly for the chance to draw a prize.

Nowhere in the said rules is any requirement

PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT: that any fee be paid, any merchandise be
-the contest does not violate the anti-lottery bought, any service be rendered, or any
provisions of the Postal Law. value whatsoever be given for the privilege
to participate
RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS:
Viewed from all angles or turned inside out,
the contest fails to exhibit any discernible
Mangelen StatCon Digest 12/6/19

consideration which would brand it as a

lottery.

In our appraisal, the scheme does not only

appear to be, but actually is, a gratuitous
distribution of property by chance.

Thus enlightened, we join the trial court in

declaring that the "Caltex Hooded Pump
Contest" proposed by the appellee is not a
lottery that may be administratively and
adversely dealt with under the Postal Law.

"Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or

chance does not constitute 'lottery', if it is
not resorted to as a device to evade the law
and no consideration is derived, directly or
indirectly, from the party receiving the
chance, gambling spirit not being cultivated
or stimulated thereby.

-We find no obstacle in saying the same

respecting a gift enterprise. In the end, we
are persuaded to hold that, under the
prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law
which we have heretofore examined, gift
enterprises and similar schemes therein
contemplated are condemnable only if, like
lotteries, they involve the element of
consideration. Finding none in the contest
here in question, we rule that the appellee
may not be denied the use of the mails for
purposes thereof.

Recapitulating, we hold that the petition

herein states a sufficient cause of action for
declaratory relief, and that the "Caltex
Hooded Pump Contest" as described in the
rules submitted by the appellee does not
transgress the provisions of the Postal Law.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed
from is affirmed. No costs.
Mangelen StatCon Digest 12/6/19

articles for purposes of computing the

advance sales tax, assuming that
PHILIPPINE-AMERICAN DRUG respondent's ruling dated June 21, 1954, as
COMPANY, petitioner, vs. COLLECTOR quoted in the 5th paragraph hereof, was
OF INTERNAL REVENUE and COURT issued in accordance with law and reflects
OF TAX APPEALS, respondents. the correct interpretation thereof
G.R. No. L-13032 | 1959-08-31
RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS:
ISSUE: DOES THE SAID BANK -Collector of Internal Revenue invokes
CHARGE FALL UNDER THE SAME Section 183-(B), as amended, of the
CATEGORY OF THE CHARGES National Internal Revenue Code which
ENUMERATED IN ART. 183 OF THE provides: SEC. 183. Payment of percentage
TAX CODE AS INCLUDED IN THE taxes. - xxx xxx xxx (B) Sales tax on
TAXABLE VALUE OF IMPORTED imported articles. When the articles are
GOODS, AND THEREFORE, MUST BE imported, the percentage taxes established in
DECLARED FOR TAX PURPOSES? section one hundred eighty-four, one
hundred eighty-five, and one hundred
FACTS: eighty-six of this Code shall be paid in
-That during the period from February 14, advance by the importer, in accordance with
1951 to December 31, 1954, petitioner did regulations promulgated by the Secretary of
not for purposes of computing the advance Finance and prior to the release of such
sales tax on its importations include as part articles from customs' custody, based on the
of the landed cost the difference (P.015) import invoice value thereof, certified to as
between the amount actually paid by it to the correct by the Philippine Consul at the port
bank on said importations computed at the of origin if there is any, including freight,
rate of P2.015 for every U.S. dollar and the postage, insurance, commission, customs
value of the imported goods computed at the duty and all similar charges, plus one
legal rate of P2.00 for every U.S. dollar hundred per centum of such total value in
the case of articles enumerated in section
-That the difference of P0.015 represents the one hundred and eighty-four; fifty per
premium on the dollar charged by the bank centum of such total value in the case of
and paid by the petitioner in the purchase of articles enumerated in section one hundred
foreign exchange and eighty-five; and twenty-five per centum
in the case of articles enumerated in section
-That in November 4, 1955, respondent one hundred and eighty-six
demanded from petitioner (Demand No.
13756) the payment of the sum of PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
P10,243.13 as deficiency advance sales tax -petitioner contends that the difference of
P0.015 which it paid to a local bank in the
-That the only question involved in this case purchase of foreign exchange to cover the
is whether or not the difference of P0.015, importations in question cannot be included
representing the premium on the dollar in the assessment for the purpose of
charged by the bank to the importer- determining the advance sales tax because
petitioner and paid by it in the purchase of they are not similar to the charges
foreign exchange (U.S. dollar), should form specifically enumerated in the law
part of the landed cost of the imported
Mangelen StatCon Digest 12/6/19

-assails the legality of the assessment those charges therein enumerated, "plus one
because, it is claimed, retroactive effect is hundred per centum of such total value in
being given to the ruling of the Collector of the case of articles enumerated in section
June 21, 1954 which is void for lack of one hundred and eighty-four; fifty per
approval by the Secretary of Finance, and is centum in case of articles enumerated in
made to apply to transactions long closed in section one hundred and eighty-five; and
the books of the taxpayer twenty-five per centum in the case of
articles enumerated in section one hundred
and eighty-six." In other words, the mark-up
COURT RULING: IN FAVOR OF prescribed by law is to be considered in
RESPONDENT addition to the invoice value and all
- the law requires that it be included in the incidental expenses of importation
assessment not only the import invoice value
of merchandise, which includes freight, Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Tax
postage, insurance, commission, and Appeals being in accordance with the
customs duty, but all other similar charges evidence and the applicable law, the same is
which would necessarily increase the landed hereby affirmed, with costs against the
cost of the merchandise imported, which, in appellant. It is so ordered.
our opinion, should include the difference of
P0.015 paid by petitioner to a local bank in
the purchase of foreign exchange to carry
out the importation

- it cannot be denied that the intention of the

law is to include all charges that may be
paid by the importer to bring the importation
into the country. In other words, all items of
expense that may be incurred by the
importer in bringing the importation into the
country and which would necessarily
increase the landed cost must be deemed
included in the phrase "all similar charges"
mentioned in the law. The doctrine of
ejusdem generis is but a rule of construction
adopted as an aid to ascertain and give effect
to the legislative intent when that intent is
uncertain or ambiguous, but the same should
not be given such wide application that
would operate to defeat the purpose of the
law. In other words, the doctrine is not of
universal application. Its application must
yield to the manifest intent of Congress.

the law requires that the importer should pay

the advance sales tax based on the import
invoice value of the merchandise, including
Mangelen StatCon Digest 12/6/19

ALEJANDRA TORRES ET AL., SABINA to the possession of the chattels and to

VERGARA VDA, DE TORRES ET foreclose their mortgages thereon.
AL.,plaintiffs-appellees, vs. FRANCISCO
LIMJAP, Special Administrator of the estate DEFENDANT’S ANSWER TO BOTH
of the deceased Jose B. Henson, defendant- CASES:
appellant. - That the chattel mortgages (Exhibit A, in
G.R. No. 34385 | 1931-09-21 G. R. No. 34385 and Exhibit A, in G. R. No.
34386) are null and void for the lack of
ISSUE: WON the defendant wrongfully sufficient particularly in the description of
interpreted the provision of the last the property mortgaged
paragraph of section 7 of Act No. 1508.
- That the chattels which the plaintiffs
FACTS: sought to recover were not the same
- These two actions were commenced in the property described in the mortgage
Court of First Instance of Manila on April - also filed a counterclaim for damages in
16, 1930, for the purpose of securing from the sum of P20,000 in the first case and
the defendant the possession of two drug P100,000 in the second case
stores located in the City of Manila, covered
by two chattel mortgages executed by the COURT’S RULING: IN FAVOR OF
deceased Jose B. Henson in favor of the PLAINTIFF
plaintiffs.
- appellant attacks the validity of the
Plaintiff alleged that Jose B. Henson, in his stipulation in said mortgages authorizing the
lifetime, executed in their favor a chattel mortgagor to sell the goods covered thereby
mortgage (Exhibit A) on his drug store at and to replace them with other goods
Nos. 101-103 Calle Rosario, known as thereafter acquired. He insists that a
Farmacia Henson, to secure a loan of stipulation authorizing the disposal and
P7,000, although it was made to appear in substitution of the chattels mortgaged does
the instrument that the loan was for P20,000. not operate to extend the mortgage to after-
Plaintiff also alleged that they were the heirs acquired property, and that such stipulation
of the late Don Florentino Torres; and that is in contravention of the express provision
Jose B. Henson, in his lifetime, executed in of the last paragraph of section 7 of Act No.
favor of Don Florentino Torres a chattel 1508, which reads as follows:
mortgage (also Exhibit A) on his three drug
stores known as Henson's Pharmacy, "A chattel mortgage shall be deemed to
Farmacia Henson and Botica Hensonina, to cover only the property described therein
secure a loan of P50,000, which was later and not like or substituted property
reduced to P26,000, and for which, Henson's thereafter acquired by the mortgagor and
Pharmacy at Nos. 71-73 Escolta, remained placed in the same depository as the
as the only security by agreement of the property originally mortgaged, anything in
parties. the mortgage to the contrary
notwithstanding."
Lastly, plaintiff alleged that the defendant
violated the terms of the mortgage and that, When said Act was placed on our statute
in consequence thereof they became entitled books by the United States Philippine
Commission on July 2, 1906, the primary
Mangelen StatCon Digest 12/6/19

aim of that law-making body was and is hereby affirmed, with costs. So
undoubtedly to promote business and trade ordered.
in these Islands and to give impetus to the
economic development of the country.
Bearing this in mind, it could not have been
the intention of the Philippine Commission
to apply the provision of section 7 above
quoted to stores open to the public for retail
business, where the goods are constantly
sold and substituted with new stock, such as
drug stores, grocery stores, dry- goods
stores, etc. If said provision were intended to
apply to this class of business, it would be
practically impossible to constitute a
mortgage on such stores without closing
them, contrary to the very spirit and purpose
of said Act.

-In the interpretation and construction of a

statute the intent of the law-maker should
always be ascertained and given effect, and
courts will not follow the letter of a statute
when it leads away from the true intent and
purpose of the Legislature and to
conclusions inconsistent with the spirit of
the Act

- the provision of the last paragraph of

section 7 of Act No. 1508 is not applicable
to drug stores, bazars and all other stores in
the nature of a revolving and floating
business; (b) that the stipulation in the
chattel mortgages in question, extending
their effect to after- acquired property, is
valid and binding; and (c) that the lower
court committed no error in not permitting
the defendant-appellant to introduce
evidence tending to show that the goods
seized by the sheriff were in the nature of
after-acquired property.

For all of the foregoing, we are of the

opinion and so hold that the judgment
appealed from is in accordance with the
facts and the law, and the same should be
Mangelen StatCon Digest 12/6/19

ALFREDO T. ROMUALDEZ, Petitioner, Engineer Island Shops including some of its

versus The Honorable SANDIGANBAYAN equipment and machineries from Jose
(Fifth Division) and the PEOPLE of the Panganiban, Camarines Norte needed by
PHILIPPINES, Respondents. BASECO in its shipbuilding and ship repair
G.R. No. 152259 | 2004-07-29 program for the amount of P5,000,000.00.
'Contrary to law.'
ISSUE: WON the term “intervene” is vague
in Section 5 of RA 3019. ARGUMENTS:

FACTS: RESPONDENT
-no valid preliminary investigation was
"[The People of the Philippines], through the conducted in the instant case. He asserts that
Presidential Commission on Good if a preliminary investigation could be said
Government (PCGG), filed on July 12, 1989 to have been conducted, the same was null
an information before [the anti-graft court] and void having been undertaken by a
charging the accused [with] violation of biased and partial investigative body.
Section 5, Republic Act No. 3019,[5] as -THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
amended. DUE PROCESS OF LAW OF
[PETITIONER] WAS VIOLATED
'That on or about and during the period from DURING THE PRELIMINARY
July 16, 1975 to July 29, 1975, in Metro INVESTIGATION STAGE IN THE
Manila, Philippines, and within the FOLLOWING WAYS:
jurisdiction of [the Sandiganbayan], said 'A. NO VALID PRELIMINARY
[petitioner], brother-in-law of Ferdinand E. INVESTIGATION WAS CONDUCTED IN
Marcos, former President of the Philippines, THE INSTANT CASE; AND 'B. THE
and therefore, related to the latter by affinity PRELIMINARY INVESTIGA- TION WAS
within the third civil degree, did then and CONDUCTED BY A BIASED AND
there wil[l]fully and unlawfully, and with PARTIAL INVESTIGATOR
evident bad faith, for the purpose of 'II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF
promoting his self-interested [sic] and/or [PETITIONER] TO BE INFORMED OF
that of others, intervene directly or THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE
indirectly, in a contract between the ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM WAS
National Shipyard and Steel Corporation VIOLATED 'III. PURSUANT TO
(NASSCO), a government-owned and ARTICLE VII, SECTION 17 OF THE 1973
controlled corporation and the Bataan CONSTITUTION, [PETITIONER] IS
Shipyard and Engineering Company IMMUNE FROM CRIMINAL
(BASECO), a private corporation, the PROSECUTION 'IV. THE CRIMINAL
majority stocks of which is owned by former ACTION OR LIABILITY HAS BEEN
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, whereby the EXTINGUISHED BY
NASSCO sold, transferred and conveyed to PRESCRIPTION'"[6]
the BASECO its ownership and all its titles
and interests over all equipment and
facilities including structures, buildings, RULING: PETITION HAS NO MERIT.
shops, quarters, houses, plants and
expendable and semi-expendable assets,
located at the Engineer Island known as the Applicability of Statutory Construction
Mangelen StatCon Digest 12/6/19

any manner in any business, transaction,

-As to petitioner's claim that the term contract or application with the government.
intervene is vague, this Court agrees with As we have explained, it is impossible for
the Office of the Solicitor General that the the law to provide in advance details of how
word can easily be understood through such acts of intervention could be
simple statutory construction. The absence performed. But the courts may pass upon
of a statutory definition of a term used in a those details once trial is concluded. Thus,
statute will not render the law "void for the alleged vagueness of intervene is not a
vagueness," if the meaning can be ground to quash the information prior to the
determined through the judicial function of commencement of the trial.
construction.[43] Elementary is the principle
that words should be construed in their In sum, the Court holds that the challenged
ordinary and usual meaning. provision is not vague, and that in any event,
the "overbreath" and "void for vagueness"
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void doctrines are not applicable to this case.
merely because general terms are used
therein, or because of the employment of
terms without defining them;[44] much less
do we have to define every word we use.
Besides, there is no positive constitutional or
statutory command requiring the legislature
to define each and every word in an
enactment. Congress is not restricted in the
form of expression of its will, and its
inability to so define the words employed in
a statute will not necessarily result in the
vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as
the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be
gathered from the whole act.

[I]t is a well-settled principle of legal

hermeneutics that words of a statute will be
interpreted in their natural, plain and
ordinary acceptation and signification,[45]
unless it is evident that the legislature
intended a technical or special legal meaning
to those words.[46] The intention of the
lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained
philologists and lexicographers - to use
statutory phraseology in such a manner is
always presumed."[47] The term intervene
should therefore be understood in its
ordinary acceptation, which is to "to come
between."[48] Criminally liable is anyone
covered in the enumeration of Section 5 of
RA 3019 -- any person who intervenes in
Mangelen StatCon Digest 12/6/19

CYNTHIA S. BOLOS 1980 before the Family Code took effect. It

Petitioner,vs.DANILO T. BOLOS, relied on the ruling of this Court in Enrico v.
Respondent. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli3 to the effect that
G.R. No. 186400 | 2010-10-20 the "coverage [of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC]
extends only to those marriages entered into
ISSUE: WON A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC during the effectivity of the Family Code
entitled "Rule on Declaration of Absolute which took effect on August 3, 1988."
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages," is applicable to
marriages solemnized before the effectivity RULING: PETITION DEVOID OF MERIT
of the Family Code.
From the arguments advanced by Cynthia,
FACTS: the principal question to be resolved is
On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
(Cynthia) filed a petition for the declaration entitled "Rule on Declaration of Absolute
of nullity of her marriage to respondent Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of Voidable Marriages," is applicable to the
the Family Code, docketed as JDRC No. case at bench.
6211.
Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-
Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA SC is also applicable to marriages
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 solemnized before the effectivity of the
seeking to annul the orders of the RTC as Family Code. According to Cynthia, the CA
they were rendered with grave abuse of erroneously anchored its decision to an
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of obiter dictum in the aforecited Enrico case,
jurisdiction, to wit: 1) the September 19, which did not even involve a marriage
2006 Order which denied due course to solemnized before the effectivity of the
Danilo's appeal; 2) the November 23, 2006 Family Code.
Order which denied the motion to reconsider She added that, even assuming arguendo
the September 19, 2006 Order; and 3) the that the pronouncement in the said case
January 16, 2007 Order which declared the constituted a decision on its merits, still the
August 2, 2006 decision as final and same cannot be applied because of the
executory. Danilo also prayed that he be substantial disparity in the factual milieu of
declared psychologically capacitated to the Enrico case from this case. In the said
render the essential marital obligations to case, both the marriages sought to be
Cynthia, who should be declared guilty of declared null were solemnized, and the
abandoning him, the family home and their action for declaration of nullity was filed,
children. after the effectivity of both the Family Code
As earlier stated, the CA granted the petition in 1988 and of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC in
and reversed and set aside the assailed 2003. In this case, the marriage was
orders of the RTC. The appellate court solemnized before the effectivity of the
stated that the requirement of a motion for Family Code and A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal while the action was filed and decided after
under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply the effectivity of both.
in this case as the marriage between Cynthia
and Danilo was solemnized on February 14,
Mangelen StatCon Digest 12/6/19

Danilo, in his Comment,6 counters that

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable
because his marriage with Cynthia was
solemnized on February 14, 1980, years
before its effectivity. He further stresses the
meritorious nature of his appeal from the
decision of the RTC declaring their marriage
as null and void due to his purported
psychological incapacity and citing the mere
"failure" of the parties who were supposedly
"remiss," but not "incapacitated," to render
marital obligations as required under Article
36 of the Family Code.

The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-

11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The
coverage extends only to those marriages
entered into during the effectivity of the
Family Code which took effect on August 3,
1988.7 The rule sets a demarcation line
between marriages covered by the Family
Code and those solemnized under the Civil
Code.

The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to

petitioner's interpretation that the phrase
"under the Family Code" in A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC refers to the word "petitions"
rather than to the word "marriages."

A cardinal rule in statutory construction is

that when the law is clear and free from any
doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for
construction or interpretation. There is only
room for application.9 As the statute is
clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must
be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation. This is
what is known as the plain-meaning rule or
verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim,
index animi sermo, or "speech is the index
of intention." Furthermore, there is the
maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or
"from the words of a statute there should be
no departure."
Mangelen StatCon Digest 12/6/19

Francisco vs. House of Representatives Representatives as a collective body has yet

(2003) to act on it as a collective body.
G.R. No. 160261 | 2003-11-1
COURT RULING: The second
impeachment complaint filed was in
ISSUE: WON the term “initiate” as used in violation of Section 5 of Article XI of the
Art. XI Section 5 of the Constitution was Constitution. The Petition, in terms of
rightfully interpreted in the case at bar. statutory construction, has merit.

FACTS: - The act of "initiating" included the act of

-Former President Estrada filed an taking initial action on the complaint,
impeachment complaint against Chief dissipates any doubt that indeed the word
Justice Hilario Davide Jr., as well as seven "initiate" as it twice appears in Article XI (3)
Associate Justices for “culpable violation of and (5) of the Constitution means to file the
the Constitution, betrayal of public trust, and complaint and take initial action on it.
other high crimes. The House Committee on
Justice dismissed the complaint. "Initiate" of course is understood by
ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to
After less than a year, a second begin, to commence, or set going.
Impeachment Complaint was filed against
Chief Justice Davide. This was accompanied Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is
by a “Resolution of not a single act. It is a comlexus of acts
Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at consisting of a beginning, a middle and an
least a third of all the Members of the House end. The end is the transmittal of the articles
of Representatives. of impeachment to the Senate. The middle
consists of those deliberative moments
After that, a lot of instant petitions were leading to the formulation of the articles of
filed against the House of Representatives, impeachment. The beginning or the initiation
arguing that the filing of the second is the filing of the complaint and its referral
Impeachment Complaint is unconstitutional to the Committee on Justice.
since it violates the Constitution’s Section 5
The framers intended "initiation" to start
of Article XI stating that “no impeachment
with the filing of the complaint. In
proceedings shall be initiated against the
his amicus curiae brief, Commissioner
same official more than once within a period
Maambong explained that "the obvious
of one year.”
reason in deleting the phrase "to initiate
impeachment proceedings" as contained in
On the other hand, the House of
the text of the provision of Section 3 (3)
Representatives argued that it did not violate
was to settle and make it understood once
Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution,
and for all that the initiation of impeachment
since the term “initiate” did not mean “file”,
proceedings starts with the filing of the
and that the clause “within one year” that
complaint, and the vote of one-third of the
prohibited the initiation of impeachment
House in a resolution of impeachment does
proceedings against the same officials
not initiate the impeachment
wasn’t violated since the complaint against
proceedings which was already initiated by
CJ Davide and the seven other Associate
the filing of a verified complaint under
Justices wasn’t initiated since the House of
Mangelen StatCon Digest 12/6/19

Section 3, paragraph (2), Article XI of the

Constitution."