LEGAL RESEARCH FINALS REVIEWER (19-20)

MAGLUCOT- AW V. MAGLUCOT 329 SCRA 78

DOCTRINE: Parties to a partition proceeding, who elected to take under partition, and who took possession of the portion allotted to them, are
estopped from questioning the title to partition allotted to another party.

FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for the recovery of possession and damages alleging that they are the owners of lot no. 1639-D which was
originally part of lot no.1639 which was covered by OCT no. 67 issued in the names of Hermogenes Olis, Pascual Olis, Bartolome Maglucot,
Anselmo Lara, and Tomas Maglucot. Subsequently, Tomas and respondent's predecessor-in-interest filed a petition to subdivide the lot into
six portions and was granted. Then in 1963, respondents rented portions of lot 1639-d paying rentals therefore. They likewise built houses on their
corresponding leased lots. However, in 1992, they stopped paying rentals claiming ownership over the subject lot. Petitioners maintained that
there was a valid partition and that the respondents are stopped from claiming to be co-owners of the subject lot in view of their agreement in
1946 and ruled that the sketch plan and tax declarations relied upon by petitioners are not conclusive evidence to partition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents are estopped from questioning the title to partition.

HELD: YES. Parties to a partition proceeding, who elected to take under partition, and who took possession of the portion allotted to them, are
estopped from questioning the title to partition allotted to another party. Here, respondents already occupied the lots in accordance with
the sketch plan. This occupation continued until this action was filed. They cannot now be heard to question the possession and ownership
of the other co-owners who took exclusive possession of lot 1639-d also in accordance with the sketch plan. Also, the payment of rentals reveals
that respondents' possession of the land is that of a holder and not as owner thereof. One who possess as a mere holder acknowledges in
another a superior right which he believes to be ownership. Hence, petitioners were in possession of the subject lot in the concept of an owner from
1952 up to the time the present action was commenced. Petition was granted.

The payment of rentals by respondents reveal that they are mere lessees. As such, the possession of respondents over Lot No. 1639-D is that of a
holder and not in the concept of an owner. One who possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes to be
ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong. Since the possession of respondents were found to be that of lessors of petitioners, it goes without
saying that the latter were in possession of Lot No. 1639-D in the concept of an owner from 1952 up to the time the present action was commenced.

JURISDICTION OF SC REGARDING CASES ON APPEAL/NATURE OF CA DECISIONS

Preliminary, this Court recognizes that "the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals via Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is limited to reviewing errors of law. Findings of fact of the latter are conclusive, except in the following instances: (1) when the findings are
grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when
there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6)
when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence
on record." 20 This case falls under exceptions (7), (8) and (10) in that the findings of facts of the CA are in conflict with that of the RTC, are mere
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based and are premised on absence of evidence but are contradicted by the
evidence on record. For these reasons, we shall consider the evidence on record to determine whether indeed there was partition.

INTERLOCUTORY/FINAL JUDGMENT OR ORDER

The true test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is: Does it leave something to be done in the trial court with
respect to the merits of the case? If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does not, it is final. The key test to what is interlocutory is when there is something
more to be done on the merits of the case. 24 An order for partition is final and not interlocutory and, hence, appealable because it decides the rights
of the parties upon the issue submitted.

ESTOPPEL

In technical estoppel, the party to be estopped must knowingly have acted so as to mislead his adversary, and the adversary must have placed
reliance on the action and acted as he would otherwise not have done. Some authorities, however, hold that what is tantamount to estoppel may
arise without this reliance on the part of the adversary, and this is called, ratification or election by acceptance or benefits, which arises when a party,
knowing that he is not bound by a defective proceeding, and is free to repudiate it if he will, upon knowledge, and while under no disability, chooses
to adopt such defective proceeding as his own. 39 Ratification means that one under no disability voluntarily adopts and gives sanction to some
unauthorized act or defective proceeding, which without his sanction would not be binding on him. It is this voluntary choice, knowingly made, which
amounts to ratification of what was therefore unauthorized, and becomes the authorized act of the party so making the ratification.

PAROL PARTITION
On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of equity have enforce oral partition when it has been completely or
partly performed.

Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid and enforceable at law, equity will proper cases where the parol partition
has actually been consummated by the taking of possession in severalty and the exercise of ownership by the parties of the respective portions set
off to each, recognize and enforce such parol partition and the rights of the parties thereunder. Thus, it has been held or stated in a number of cases
involving an oral partition under which the parties went into possession, exercised acts of ownership, or otherwise partly performed the partition
agreement, that equity will confirm such partition and in a proper case decree title in accordance with the possession in severalty.

In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partition may be sustained on the ground of estoppel of the parties to assert the rights of a
tenant in common as to parts of land divided by parol partition as to which possession in severalty was taken and acts of individual ownership were
exercised. And a court of equity will recognize the agreement and decree it to be valid and effectual for the purpose of concluding the right of the
parties as between each other to hold their respective parts in severalty.

A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have acquiesced in and ratified the partition by taking possession in
severalty, exercising acts of ownership with respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of the partition.

A number of cases have specifically applied the doctrine of part performance, or have stated that a part performance is necessary, to take a parol
partition out of the operation of the statute of frauds. It has been held that where there was a partition in fact between tenants in common, and a
part performance, a court of equity would have regard to enforce such partition agreed to by the parties.

DECISIONS ARE RENDERED BY COURTS, NOT BY THE PERSONS WHO DRAFT THEM

Finally, this Court takes notice of the language utilized by counsel for petitioners in their petition for review on certiorari.1âwphi1 Thrice in the
petition, counsel for petitioners made reference to the researcher of the CA. First, he alluded to the lack of scrutiny of the records and lack of study
of the law "by the researcher." 60 Second, he cited the researcher of the CA as having "sweepingly stated without reference to the record" 61 that
"[w]e have scanned the records on hand and found no evidence of any partition." Finally, counsel for petitioners assailed the CA decision, stating
that "this will only show that there was no proper study of the case by the researcher." 62

Any court when it renders a decision does so as an arm of the justice system and as an institution apart from the persons that comprise it. Decisions
are rendered by the courts and not the persons or personnel that may participate therein by virtue of their office. It is highly improper and unethical
for counsel for petitioners to berate the researcher in his appeal. Counsel for petitioner should be reminded of the elementary rules of the legal
profession regarding respect for the courts by the use of proper language in its pleadings and admonished for his improper references to the
researcher of the CA in his petition. A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive, or menacing language or behavior before the courts.

TING vs. VELEZ-TING G.R. No. 166562 March 31, 2009

Facts: On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to petitioner and while their youngest child was only two years old, Carmen
filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed
that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their marriage, which, however, only became manifest
thereafter.

On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void. The RTC gave
credence to Dr. Onate’s findings and the admissions made by Benjamin in the course of his deposition, and found him to be psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. On October 19, 2000, the petitioner appealed to the CA, reversing the trial court’s
decision.

Issue: Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of psychological incapacity for the declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code has been realized.

Ruling: No. By the very nature of case involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and understood to give weight to the expert opinions furnished
by psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedent, gravity and
incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are not conditions in granting petitions for declaration of
nullity of marriage. At best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In
fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination
of the person concerned need not be resorted to. The trial court, as in any other given case presented before it, must always base its decision not
solely on the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.

Each case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
Far from abandoning Molina, we simply suggested the relaxation of the stringent requirements set forth therein, cognizant of the explanation given
by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC), viz.:

To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of the psychological incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written
report of an accredited psychologist or psychiatrist have proved to be too expensive for the parties. They adversely affect access to justice o poor
litigants. It is also a fact that there are provinces where these experts are not available. Thus, the Committee deemed it necessary to relax this
stringent requirement enunciated in the Molina Case. The need for the examination of a party or parties by a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and
the presentation of psychiatric experts shall now be determined by the court during the pre-trial conference.

But where, as in this case, the parties had the full opportunity to present professional and expert opinion of psychiatrists tracing the root cause,
gravity and incurability of a party’s alleged psychological incapacity, then such expert opinion should be presented and according, be weighed by the
court in deciding whether to grant a petition for nullity of marriage. The petition for review on certiorari is granted.

STARE DECISIS

The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final decisions. It is based on the
principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument. Basically, it is a
bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issues, necessary for two simple reasons: economy and stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle is
entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code.

official’s qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment or election invalid is properly the subject of a quo warranto petition, provided
that the requisites for the commencement thereof are present. Contrariwise, acts or omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of integrity,
being a continuing requirement but nonetheless committed during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected official, cannot be
the subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of something else, which may either be impeachment if the public official concerned is impeachable
and the act or omission constitutes an impeachable offense, or disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.

Anent the seventh issue: Prescription does not lie against the State.

The rules on quo warranto provides that “nothing contained in this Rule shall be construed to authorize an action against a public officer or employee
for his ouster from office unless the same be commenced within one (1) year after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold
such office or position, arose”. Previously, the one-year prescriptive period has been applied in cases where private individuals asserting their right
of office, unlike the instant case where no private individual claims title to the Office of the Chief Justice. Instead, it is the government itself which
commenced the present petition for quo warranto and puts in issue the qualification of the person holding the highest position in the Judiciary.

Section 2 of Rule 66 provides that “the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, when directed by the President of the Philippines, or when upon
complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that any case specified in the preceding section can be established by proof must commence
such action.” It may be stated that ordinary statutes of limitation, civil or penal, have no application to quo warranto proceeding brought to enforce
a public right. There is no limitation or prescription of action in an action for quo warranto, neither could there be, for the reason that it was an action
by the Government and prescription could not be plead as a defense to an action by the Government.

That prescription does not lie in this case can also be deduced from the very purpose of an action for quo warranto. Because quo warranto serves to
end a continuous usurpation, no statute of limitations applies to the action. Needless to say, no prudent and just court would allow an unqualified
person to hold public office, much more the highest position in the Judiciary. Moreover, the Republic cannot be faulted for questioning Sereno’s
qualification· for office only upon discovery of the cause of ouster because even up to the present, Sereno has not been candid on whether she filed
the required SALNs or not. The defect on Sereno’s appointment was therefore not discernible, but was, on the contrary, deliberately rendered
obscure.

Anent the eighth issue: The Court has supervisory authority over the JBC includes ensuring that the JBC complies with its own rules.

Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution provides that “A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court.”
The power of supervision means “overseeing or the authority of an officer to see to it that the subordinate officers perform their duties.” JBC’s
absolute autonomy from the Court as to place its non-action or improper· actions beyond the latter’s reach is therefore not what the Constitution
contemplates. What is more, the JBC’s duty to recommend or nominate, although calling for the exercise of discretion, is neither absolute nor
unlimited, and is not automatically equivalent to an exercise of policy decision as to place, in wholesale, the JBC process beyond the scope of the
Court’s supervisory and corrective powers. While a certain leeway must be given to the JBC in screening aspiring magistrates, the same does not give
it an unbridled discretion to ignore Constitutional and legal requirements. Thus, the nomination by the JBC is not accurately an exercise of policy or
wisdom as to place the JBC’s actions in the same category as political questions that the Court is barred from resolving. [yourlawyersays]

[READ: Justice Leonen’s dissenting opinion: Q&A Format]

With this, it must be emphasized that qualifications under the Constitution cannot be waived or bargained by the JBC, and one of which is that “a
Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence. “Integrity” is closely related to, or if not,
approximately equated to an applicant’s good reputation for honesty, incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical
standards.” Integrity is likewise imposed by the New Code of Judicial Conduct and the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Court has always
viewed integrity with a goal of preserving the confidence of the litigants in the Judiciary. Hence, the JBC was created in order to ensure that a member
of the Supreme Court must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence.

Anent the ninth issue: The filing of SALN is a constitutional and statutory requirement.

Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution states that “A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be
required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth.” This has likewise been required by RA 3019 and RA 6713.
“Failure to comply” with the law is a violation of law, a “prima facie evidence of unexplained wealth, which may result in the dismissal from service
of the public officer.” It is a clear breach of the ethical standards set for public officials and employees. The filing of the SALN is so important for
purposes of transparency and accountability that failure to comply with such requirement may result not only in dismissal from the public service
but also in criminal liability. Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713 even provides that non-compliance with this requirement is not only punishable by
imprisonment and/or a fine, it may also result in disqualification to hold public office.

Because the Chief Justice is a public officer, she is constitutionally and statutorily mandated to perform a positive duty to disclose all of his assets and
liabilities. According to Sereno herself in her dissenting opinion in one case, those who accept a public office do so cum onere, or with a burden, and
are considered as accepting its burdens and obligations, together with its benefits. They thereby subject themselves to all constitutional and
legislative provisions relating thereto, and undertake to perform all the duties of their office. The public has the right to demand the performance of
those duties. More importantly, while every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral
righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the Judiciary.

Noncompliance with the SALN requirement indubitably·reflects on a person’s integrity. It is not merely a trivial or a formal requirement. The
contention that the mere non-filing does not affect Sereno’s integrity does not persuade considering that RA 6713 and RA 3019 are malum prohibitum
and not malum in se. Thus, it is the omission or commission of that act as defined by the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that determines
whether or not the provision has been violated. Malice or criminal intent is completely immaterial.

Anent the tenth issue: Sereno chronically failed to file her SALNs and thus violated the Constitution, the law, and the Code of Judicial Conduct.

In Sereno’s 20 years of government service in UP Law, only 11 SALNs have been filed. Sereno could have easily dispelled doubts as to the filing or
nonfiling of the unaccounted SALNs by presenting them before the Court. Yet, Sereno opted to withhold such information or such evidence, if at all,
for no clear reason. The Doblada case, invoked by Sereno, cannot be applied, because in the Doblada case, there was a letter of the head of the
personnel of the branch of the court that the missing SALN exists and was duly transmitted and received by the OCA as the repository agency. In
Sereno’s case, the missing SALNs are neither proven to be in the records of nor was proven to have been sent to and duly received by the Ombudsman
as the repository agency. The existence of these SALNs and the fact of filing thereof were neither established by direct proof constituting substantial
evidence nor by mere inference. Moreover, the statement of the Ombudsman is categorical: “based on records on file, there is no SALN filed by
[Sereno] for calendar years 1999 to 2009 except SALN ending December 1998.” This leads the Court to conclude that Sereno did not indeed file her
SALN.

For this reason, the Republic was able to discharge its burden of proof with the certification from UP HRDO and Ombudsman, and thus it becomes
incumbent upon Sereno to discharge her burden of evidence. Further, the burden of proof in a quo warranto proceeding is different when it is filed
by the State in that the burden rests upon the respondent.

In addition, contrary to what Sereno contends, being on leave does not exempt her from filing her SALN because it is not tantamount to separation
from government service. The fact that Sereno did not receive any pay for the periods she was on leave does not make her a government worker
“serving in an honorary capacity” to be exempted from the SALN laws on RA 6713. [yourlawyersays]

Neither can the clearance and certification of UP HRDO be taken in favor of Sereno. During the period when Sereno was a professor in UP, concerned
authorized official/s of the Office of the President or the Ombudsman had not yet established compliance procedures for the review of SALNs filed
by officials and employees of State Colleges and Universities, like U.P. The ministerial duty of the head of office to issue compliance order came about
only on 2006 from the CSC. As such, the U.P. HRDO could not have been expected to perform its ministerial duty of issuing compliance orders to
Sereno when such rule was not yet in existence at that time. Moreover, the clearance are not substitutes for SALNs. The import of said clearance is
limited only to clearing Sereno of her academic and administrative responsibilities, money and property accountabilities and from administrative
charges as of the date of her resignation.

Neither can Sereno’s inclusion in the matrix of candidates with complete requirements and in the shortlist nominated by the JBC confirm or ratify
her compliance with the SALN requirement. Her inclusion in the shortlist of candidates for the position of Chief Justice does not negate, nor supply
her with the requisite proof of integrity. She should have been disqualified at the outset. Moreover, the JBC En Banc cannot be deemed to have
considered Sereno eligible because it does not appear that Sereno’s failure to submit her SALNs was squarely addressed by the body. Her inclusion
in the shortlist of nominees and subsequent appointment to the position do not estop the Republic or this Court from looking into her qualifications.
Verily, no estoppel arises where the representation or conduct of the party sought to be estopped is due to ignorance founded upon an innocent
mistake

Anent the eleventh issue: Sereno failed to properly and promptly file her SALNs, again in violation of the Constitutional and statutory requirements
.
Failure to file a truthful, complete and accurate SALN would likewise amount to dishonesty if the same is attended by malicious intent to conceal the
truth or to make false statements. The suspicious circumstances include: 1996 SALN being accomplished only in 1998; 1998 SALN only filed in 2003;
1997 SALN only notarized in 1993; 2004-2006 SALNs were not filed which were the years when she received the bulk of her fees from PIATCO cases,
2006 SALN was later on intended to be for 2010, gross amount from PIATCO cases were not reflected, suspicious increase of P2,700,000 in personal
properties were seen in her first five months as Associate Justice. It is therefore clear as day that Sereno failed not only in complying with the physical
act of filing, but also committed dishonesty betraying her lack of integrity, honesty and probity. The Court does not hesitate to impose the supreme
penalty of dismissal against public officials whose SALNs were found to have contained discrepancies, inconsistencies and non-disclosures.

Anent the twelfth issue: Sereno failed to submit the required SALNs as to qualify for nomination pursuant to the JBC rules.

The JBC required the submission of at least ten SALNs from those applicants who are incumbent Associate Justices, absent which, the applicant ought
not to have been interviewed, much less been considered for nomination. From the minutes of the meeting of the JBC, it appeared that Sereno was
singled out from the rest of the applicants for having failed to submit a single piece of SALN for her years of service in UP Law. It is clear that JBC did
not do away with the SALN requirement, but still required substantial compliance. Subsequently, it appeared that it was only Sereno who was not
able to substantially comply with the SALN requirement, and instead of complying, Sereno wrote a letter containing justifications why she should no
longer be required to file the SALNs: that she resigned from U.P. in 2006 and then resumed government service only in 2009, thus her government
service is not continuous; that her government records are more than 15 years old and thus infeasible to retrieve; and that U.P. cleared her of all
academic and administrative responsibilities and charges.

These justifications, however, did not obliterate the simple fact that Sereno submitted only 3 SALNs to the JBC in her 20-year service in U.P., and that
there was nary an attempt on Sereno’s part to comply. Moreover, Sereno curiously failed to mention that she did not file several SALNs during the
course of her employment in U.P. Such failure to disclose a material fact and the concealment thereof from the JBC betrays any claim of integrity
especially from a Member of the Supreme Court. [yourlawyersays]

Indubitably, Sereno not only failed to substantially comply with the submission of the SALNs but there was no compliance at all. Dishonesty is
classified as a grave offense the penalty of which is dismissal from the service at the first infraction. A person aspiring to public office must observe
honesty, candor and faithful compliance with the law. Nothing less is expected. Dishonesty is a malevolent act that puts serious doubt upon one’s
ability to perform his duties with the integrity and uprightness demanded of a public officer or employee. For these reasons, the JBC should no longer
have considered Sereno for interview.

Moreover, the fact that Sereno had no permit to engage in private practice while in UP, her false representations that she was in private practice
after resigning from UP when in fact she was counsel for the government, her false claims that the clearance from UP HRDO is proof of her compliance
with SALNs requirement, her commission of tax fraud for failure to truthfully declare her income in her ITRs for the years 2007-2009, procured a
brand new Toyota Land Cruiser worth at least P5,000,000, caused the hiring of Ms. Macasaet without requisite public bidding, misused P3,000,000
of government funds for hotel accommodation at Shangri-La Boracay as the venue of the 3rd ASEAN Chief Justices meeting, issued a TRO in Coalition
of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines v. COMELEC contrary to the Supreme Court’s internal rules, manipulated the disposition of the
DOJ request to transfer the venue of the Maute cases outside of Mindanao, ignored rulings of the Supreme Court with respect to the grant of
survivorship benefits which caused undue delay to the release of survivorship benefits to spouses of deceased judges and Justices, manipulated the
processes of the JBC to exclude then SolGen, now AJ Francis Jardeleza, by using highly confidential document involving national security against the
latter among others, all belie the fact that Sereno has integrity.

Anent the thirteenth issue: Sereno’s failure to submit to the JBC her SALNs for several years means that her integrity was not established at the time
of her application

The requirement to submit SALNs is made more emphatic when the applicant is eyeing the position of Chief Justice. On the June 4, 2012, JBC En Banc
meeting, Senator Escudero proposed the addition of the requirement of SALN in order for the next Chief Justice to avoid what CJ Corona had gone
through. Further, the failure to submit the required SALNs means that the JBC and the public are divested of the opportunity to consider the
applicant’s fitness or propensity to commit corruption or dishonesty. In Sereno’s case, for example, the waiver of the confidentiality of bank deposits
would be practically useless for the years that she failed to submit her SALN since the JBC cannot verify whether the same matches the entries
indicated in the SALN.

Anent the fourteenth issue: Sereno’s ineligibility for lack of proven integrity cannot be cured by her nomination and subsequent appointment as
Chief Justice.

Well-settled is the rule that qualifications for public office must be possessed at the time of appointment and assumption of office and also during
the officer’s entire tenure as a continuing requirement. The voidance of the JBC nomination as a necessary consequence of the Court’s finding that
Sereno is ineligible, in the first place, to be a candidate for the position of Chief Justice and to be nominated for said position follows as a matter of
course. The Court has ample jurisdiction to do so without the necessity of impleading the JBC as the Court can take judicial notice of the explanations
from the JBC members and the OEO. he Court, in a quo warranto proceeding, maintains the power to issue such further judgment determining the
respective rights in and to the public office, position or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires.

Neither will the President’s act of appointment cause to qualify Sereno. Although the JBC is an office constitutionally created, the participation of the
President in the selection and nomination process is evident from the composition of the JBC itself.
An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee should
possess the qualifications required by law. While the Court surrenders discretionary appointing power to the President, the exercise of such discretion
is subject to the non-negotiable requirements that the appointee is qualified and all other legal requirements are satisfied, in the absence of which,
the appointment is susceptible to attack.

Anent the fifteenth issue: Sereno is a de facto officer removable through quo warranto

The effect of a finding that a person appointed to an office is ineligible therefor is that his presumably valid appointment will give him color of title
that confers on him the status of a de facto officer. For lack of a Constitutional qualification, Sereno is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice
and is merely holding a colorable right or title thereto. As such, Sereno has never attained the status of an impeachable official and her removal from
the office, other than by impeachment, is justified. The remedy, therefore, of a quo warranto at the instance of the State is proper to oust Sereno
from the appointive position of Chief Justice.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Quo Warranto is GRANTED.

Sereno is found DISQUALIFIED from and is hereby adjudged GUILTY of UNLAWFULLY HOLDING and EXERCISING the OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE.
Accordingly, Sereno is OUSTED and EXCLUDED therefrom.

The position of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is declared vacant and the Judicial and Bar Council is directed to commence the application
and nomination process.

This Decision is immediately executory without need of further action from the Court.

Sereno is ordered to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from receipt hereof why she should not be sanctioned for violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Code of Judicial Conduct for transgressing the sub judice rule and for casting aspersions and ill motives to the Members of the
Supreme Court.

RE: SHOW CAUSE ORDER IN THE DECISION D ATED MAY 11, 2018 IN G.R. NO. 237428 (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
REPRESENTED BY SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA v. MARIA LOURDES P.A SERENO)

FACTS: The instant administrative matter is an offshoot of Republic of the Philippines v. Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, hereinafter referred to as the
quo warranto case or proceedings against Sereno.

Respondent contends that she should not be judged on the stringent standards set forth in the CPR and NCJC, emphasizing that her participation in
the quo warranto case is not as counsel or a judge as a party-litigant and that the imputed acts against respondent did not create any serious and
imminent threat to the administration of justice to warrant the Court’s exercise of its power of contempt in accordance with the “clear and present
danger” rule.
ISSUE: May respondent be held administratively liable for her actions and public statements as regards the quo warranto case against her during its
pendency?

HELD: Yes. The Court found respondent miserably failed to discharge her duty as a member of the Bar to observe and maintain the respect due to
the court and its officers. Specifically, respondent violated CANON 11 of the CPR, which states that:
CANON 11- A LAWYER SHALL BE OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON
SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.

The Court is, thus, reluctant to accept respondent’s position that she should be treated as an ordinary litigant in judging her actions. The fact that
respondent was not the judge nor the counsel but a litigant in the subject case does not strip her off her membership in the Bar, as well as her being
a Member and the head of the highest court of the land at that time. Her being a litigant does not mean that she was free to conduct herself in less
honorable manner than that expected of a lawyer or a judge.

Sub Judice Rule

Sub Judice is a Latin term which refers to matters under or before a judge or court; or matters under judicial consideration. In essence, the sub judice
rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to pending judicial proceedings. The restriction applies to litigants and witness, the public in
general, and most especially to members of the Bar and the Bench. All told, respondent’s reckless behavior of imputing ill motives and malice to the
Court’s process is plainly evident in the present case. Her public statements covered by different media organizations incontrovertibly brings the
Court in a position of disrepute and disrespect, a patent transgression of the very ethics that members of the Bar are sworn to uphold.

Respondent’s liability having been established

The Court in exercising its disciplinary authority in administrative matters, however, this Court has always kept in mind that lawyers should not be
hastily disciplined or penalized. Despite the severity of the offenses committed by respondent, the Court are constrained to suspend the application
of the full force of the law and impose a lighter penalty. Mindful of the fact that respondent was removed and disqualified as Chief Justice as a result
of quo warranto proceedings, suspending her further from the law practice would be too severe to ruin the career and future of respondent. The
Court is also not inclined to merely disregard respondent’s length of service in the government, specifically, when she was teaching in the University
of the Philippines, as well as during her incumbency in this Court. Further, the fact that, per available record, respondent has not been previously
found administratively liable is significant in determining the imposable penalty. These factors have always been considered by the Court in the
determination of proper sanctions in such administrative cases.
The Court after deep reflection and deliberation, in lieu of suspension, respondent is meted the penalty of REPRIMAND with a STERN WARNING.

SENATOR LEILA M. DE LIMA VS HON. JUANITA GUERRERO, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC OF MUNTINLUPA

FACTS: The Senate and the House of Representatives conducted several inquiries on the proliferation of dangerous drugs syndicated at the New
Bilibid Prison (NBP), inviting inmates who executed affidavits in support of their testimonies. These legislative inquiries led to the filing of the four
consolidated criminal cases against the Petitioner. The DOJ Panel of Prosecutors (DOJ Panel) was directed to conduct the requisite preliminary
investigation.

Petitioner alleged evident partiality on th e part of the DOJ Panel, the petitioner contended that the DOJ prosecutors should inhibit themselves and
refer the complaints to the Office of the Ombudsman. The DOJ Panel proceeded with the conduct of the preliminary investigation and in its Joint
Resolution dated February 14, 2017, recommended the filing of Informations against petitioner De Lima.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash, mainly raising the following: the RTC lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged against petitioner; the DOJ Panel
lacks authority to file the Information; the Information charges more than one offense; the allegations and the recitals of facts do not allege the
corpus delicti of the charge; the Information is based on testimonies of witnesses who are not qualified to be discharged as state witnesses; and the
testimonies of these witnesses are hearsay.

On February 23, 2017, respondent judge issued the presently assailed Order finding probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against De
Lima and her co-accused. Thereafter, petitioner repaired to this court via a petition praying for granting a writ of certiorari annulling and setting aside
the Oder date 23 February 2017, the Warrant of Arrest dated the same date, and the Order dated 24 February 2017 of the RTC Muntinlupa City.

ISSUES:
Procedural Issues:
1) Whether or not the petition should be dismissed outright for the falsity in the jurats committed by Petitioner De Lima
2) Whether or not the pendency of the Motion to Quash the Information before the trial court renders the instant petition premature
3) Whether or not petitioner, in filing the present petition, violated the rule against forum shopping given the pendency of the Motion to
Quash the Information

Substantive Issues:
1) Whether the Regional Trial Court or the Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction over the violation of the Republic Act No. 9165
2) Whether or not the respondent gravely abused her discretion in finding probable cause to issue the Warrant of Arrest against petitioner

HELD:

Procedural Issues
1) Yes. Petitioner De Lima did not sign the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping and Affidavit of Merit in front of the notary
public. This is contrary to the jurats (i.e., the certifications of the notary public at the end of the instruments) signed by Atty. Tresvalles-Cabalo that
the documents were "SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me." Notably, petitioner has not proffered any reason to justify her failure to sign the
Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping in the presence of the notary. There is, therefore, no justification to relax the rules and excuse
the petitioner's non-compliance therewith. All things considered, the proper course of action was for it to dismiss the petition.

2) Yes. Under the prayer, petitioner asks for a writ of certiorari annulling the Order dated February 23, 2017 finding probable cause, the
warrant of arrest and the Order dated February 24, 2017 committing petitioner to the custody of the PNP Custodial Center. Clearly petitioner seeks
the recall of said orders to effectuate her release from detention and restore her liberty. She did not ask for the dismissal of the subject criminal case.
Nowhere in the prayer did petitioner explicitly ask for the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 17-165. What is clear is she merely asked the respondent
judge to rule on her Motion to Quash before issuing the warrant of arrest.

In view of the foregoing, there is no other course of action to take than to dismiss the petition on the ground of prematurity and allow respondent
Judge to rule on the Motion to Quash according to the desire of petitioner.

3) Yes. Forum shopping exists when the following elements are present: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties representing the same
interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the
two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata
in the action under consideration.

All these requisites are present in this case.

The presence of the first requisite is at once apparent. The petitioner is an accused in the criminal case below, while the respondents in this case, all
represented by the Solicitor General, have substantial identity with the complainant in the criminal case still pending before the trial court.
As for the second requisite, the arguments and the reliefs prayed for are essentially the same. In both, petitioner advances the RTC's supposed lack
of jurisdiction over the offense, the alleged multiplicity of offenses included in the Information; the purported lack of the corpus delicti of the charge,
and, basically, the non-existence of probable cause to indict her. And, removed of all non-essentials, she essentially prays for the same thing in both
the present petition and the Motion to Quash: the nullification of the Information and her restoration to liberty and freedom.

To restate for emphasis, the RTC has yet to rule on the Motion to Quash. Thus, the present petition and the motion to quash before the R TC are
simultaneous actions that do not exempt petitions for certiorari from the rule against forum shopping.
Substantive Procedure:
1) The Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction. The prefatory statements and the accusatory portions of the Information repeatedly provide that
the petitioner is charged with "Violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, Section 5, in relation to Section 3(jj), Section 26(b), and
Section 28, Republic Act No. 9165." From the very designation of the crime in the Information itself, it should be plain that the crime with which the
petitioner is charged is a violation of RA 9165. As this Court clarified in Quimvel vs. People, the designation of the offense in the Information is a
critical element required under Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court in apprising the accused of the offense being charged.

Read as a whole, and not picked apart with each word or phrase construed separately, the Information against De Lima goes beyond an indictment
for Direct Bribery under Article 210 of the RPC. As Justice Martires articulately explained, the averments on solicitation of money in the Information,
which may be taken as constitutive of bribery, form "part of the description on how illegal drug trading took place at the NBP." The averments on
how petitioner asked for and received money from the NBP inmates simply complete the links of conspiracy between her, Ragos, Dayan and the NBP
inmates in willfully and unlawfully trading dangerous drugs through the use of mobile phones and other electronic devices. As such, with the
designation of the offense, the recital of facts in the Information, there can be no other conclusion than that petitioner is being charged not with
Direct Bribery but with violation of RA 9165. In this case, RA 9165 specifies the RTC as the court with the jurisdiction to "exclusively try and hear cases
involving violations of [RA 9165)."

2) No. In the present case, the respondent judge had no positive duty to first resolve the Motion to Quash before issuing a warrant of arrest.
There is no rule of procedure, statute, or jurisprudence to support the petitioner's claim. Rather, Sec.5(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court required
the respondent judge to evaluate the prosecutor's resolution and its supporting evidence within a limited period of only ten (10) days.

It must be emphasized that in determining the probable cause to issue the warrant of arrest against the petitioner, respondent judge evaluated the
Information and all the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation conducted in this case. It may perhaps even be stated that the
respondent judge performed her duty in a manner that far exceed what is required of her by the rules when she reviewed all the evidence, not just
the supporting documents. The Court rules that she certainly discharged a judge’s duty in finding probable cause for the issuance of a warrant.

KNIGHTS OF RIZAL VS DMCI HOMES, INC., CITY OF MANILA, NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR CULTURE AND THE ARTS, AND
NATIONAL HISTORICAL COMMISSION OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts:

On 1 September 2011, DMCI Project Developers, Inc. acquired a 7,716.60-square meter lot in the City of Manila, located near Taft Avenue, Ermita.
Said lot was earmarked for the construction of DMCI-PDI’s Torre de Manila condominium project. On 5 July 2012, the City of Manila’s Office of the
Building Official granted DMCI-PDI a building permit, allowing it to build a 49-storey with basement and 2 penthouse level residential condominium
on the property.

On 24 July 2012, the City Council of Manila issued Resolution no. 121 urging the Building Official to temporarily suspend the building permit of DMCI-
PDI, citing among others that the Torre de Manila will rise high above the back of Rizal Park, and would dwarf the statue of our national hero. Both
the City of Manila and DMCI-PDI sought the opinion of the National Historical Commission of the Philippines (NHCP) on the mater. The NHCP
chairperson maintained that the Torre de Manila project site is outside the boundaries of the Rizal Park and well to the rear of the Rizal monument;
thus, cannot possibly obstruct the frontal view of the monument.

On 26 November 2013, the City of Manila issued another resolution, reiterating its directive in their first resolution urging the City of Manila’s building
officials to suspend the DMCI-PDI’s building permit. This was due to an online petition against the Torre de Manila project which garnered around
7,800 signatures. On 23 December 2013, the Manila Zoning Board of Adjustments and Appeals (MZBAA) issued a resolution recommending the
approval of DMCI-PDI’s application for variance, and on 16 January 2014, the City Council of Manila issued a resolution adopting the former’s
resolutions, which states that the City Council of Manila finds no reason to deny the recommendation of the MZBAA and hereby confirms all
previously issued permits, licenses and approvals issued for Torre de Manila.

Arguments of the Knights of Rizal

The Knights of Rizal filed a Petition for Inunction seeking a temporary restraining order and later a permanent restraining order against the
construction of DMCI-PDI’s Torre de Manila. They assert that:

1. The completed Torre de Manila structure will forever ruin the sightline of the Rizal monument in Luneta Park.

2. The Rizal monument, as a national treasure, is entitled to “full protection of the law”, and the national government must abate the act or
activity that endangers the nation’s cultural heritage “even against the wishes of the local government hosting it.”
3. The Torre de Manila project is a nuisance per se because “the despoliation of the sight view of the Rizal monument is a situation that annoys
everyone or offends the senses of every Filipino who honors the memory of our national hero.”

4. The Torre de Manila project violates the NHCP’s Guidelines on Monuments Honoring National Heroes, Illustrious Filipinos and Other
Personages, which state that monuments should assert a visual dominance over its surroundings

5. The DMCI-PDI’s construction was commenced and continues in bad faith.

Arguments of DMCI

1. The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over the action.

DMCI-PDI argues that the SC has no original jurisdiction over actions for injunction. Even if the Court assumes concurrent jurisdiction, DMCI-PDI
maintain that the petition should have been filed with the Regional Trial Court under the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, and because the petition
involves questions of fact.

DMCI also argues that the Knights of Rizal’s petition is in lieu of the exemption granted by the City of Manila’s MBZAA, and that the proper forum for
this case should be the MBZAA and not the Supreme Court. Should the petitioner fail there, it should appeal the same to the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB).

DMCI also argues that since the Rizal monument has been declared a national treasure, the power to issue a cease and desist order is lodged with
the appropriate cultural agency under Sec. 25 of Republic Act no. 10066 or the National Cultural Heritage Act of 2009.

2. The Knights of Rizal have no legal right or interest to file or persecute this action.

The purposes of the Knights of Rizal, as a corporation, do not include the preservation of the Rizal monument as a cultural historical heritage site.
According to DMCI, the Knights of Rizal failed to show that it suffered an actual or threatened injury.

3. Torre de Manila is not a nuisance per se.

DMCI reiterates that it obtained all the necessary permits, licenses, and certificates for the Torre’s construction. DMCI also refutes the claim that the
Torre de Manila would dwarf all other structures around it, as there are other tall buildings even closer to the Rizal monument itself. (Eton Baypark
Tower and Sunview Palace)

4. DMCI-PDI acted in good faith in constructing Torre de Manila

DMCI claims that bad faith cannot be attributed to their corporation because the Torre de Manila project was within the “lawful exercise of [its]
rights”.

5. The Knights of Rizal are not entitled to a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a writ of Injunction.

DMCI argues that the Knights of Rizal failed to establish a clear and unmistakeable right to enjoin the construction of Torre de Manila, much less
request its demolitioN. They emphasized that granting the Knights of Rizal’s application for injunctive relief would constitute an unjust taking of
property without due process of law.

Arguments of the City of Manila

1. The writ of mandamus cannot be issued because no property or substantive right in favor of the Knights of Rizal is being affected, nor
entitled to judicial protection.
2. The issuance and revocation of a building permit is a discretionary act or duty performed by the proper officer, and the remedy of
mandamus is available only to compel the performance of a ministerial duty.
3. The construction of the Torre de Manila did not violate any existing law, since the edifice is well behind the line of sight of the Rizal
monument.

Issue:

Can the Court issue a writ of mandamus against the officials of the City of Manila to stop the construction of DMCI-PDI’s Torre de Manila project?

Ruling:

The petition for mandamus lacks merit and must be dismissed. In Manila Electric Company vs Public Service Commission, the Court held that what is
not expressly or impliedly prohibited by law may be done except when the act is contrary to morals, customs and public order. In this case, there is
no allegation and proof that the Torre de Manila project is “contrary to morals, customs and public order” or that it brings harm, danger or hazard
to the community. DMCI complied with the standards set under the pertinent laws and local ordinances to construct its project.
There is no law prohibiting the construction of the Torre de Manila due to its effect on the background view, vista, sightline or setting of the Rizal
monument.

The Court ruled further that a mandamus did not lie against the City of Manila. A mandamus is issued when there is a clear legal duty imposed upon
the office or the officer sought to be compelled to perform an act, and the party seeking mandamus has a clear legal right to the performance of that
act. In the case at bar, such factors were missing, as nowhere was it found in the ordinance, or in any law or rule for that matter, that the construction
of the Torre de Manila building outside the Rizal Park was prohibited if such was within the background sightline or vision of the Rizal monument.
The Court only issues a writ of mandamus in cases where there has been a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or palpable
excess of justice. In this case, there can be no determination by the Supreme Court that the City of Manila has been negligent or remiss its duty under
their ordinances considering that this determination will involve questions of fact.

LAGMAN VS MEDIALDEA

Facts:

These are consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of the extension of the proclamation of martial law and suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year from January 1 to December 31, 2018.

On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao for a period not exceeding sixty (60) days, to address the rebellion mounted by members of the
Maute Group and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).

On May 25, 2017, within the 48-hour period set in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President submitted to the Senate and the House of
Representatives his written Report, citing the events and reasons that impelled him to issue Proclamation No. 216. Thereafter, the Senate adopted
P.S. Resolution No. 388 while the House of Representatives issued House Resolution No. 1050, both expressing full support to the Proclamation and
finding no cause to revoke the same.

On July 18, 2017, the President requested the Congress to extend the effectivity of Proclamation No. 216. In a Special Joint Session on July 22, 2017,
the Congress adopted Resolution of Both Houses No. 2 extending Proclamation No. 216 until December 31, 2017.

In a letter to the President, through Defense Secretary Lorenzana, AFP Chief of StaffGeneral Guerrero, recommended the further extension of martial
law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year beginning January 1, 2018 “for compelling
reasons based on current security assessment.” On the basis of this security assessment, Secretary Lorenzana wrote a similar recommendation to
the President “primarily to ensure total eradication of DAESH-inspired Da’awatul Islamiyah Waliyatul Masriq (DIWM), other like-minded Local/Foreign
Terrorist Groups (L/FTGs) and Armed Lawless Groups (ALGs), and the communist terrorists (CTs) and their coddlers, supporters and financiers, and
to ensure speedy rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction efforts in Marawi, and the attainment of lasting peace, stability, economic development
and prosperity in Mindanao.”

Acting on said recommendations, the President, in a letter dated December 8, 2017, asked both the Senate and the House of Representatives to
further extend the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year,
from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018, or for such period as the Congress may determine.

On December 13, 2017, the Senate and the House of Representatives, in a joint session, adopted Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 further extending
the period of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year, from January 1, 2018 to
December 31, 2018.

Issues:

PROCEDURAL
1. Whether or not the petitioners’ failure to attach Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 fatal to their petitions.
2. Whether or not the President should be dropped as party respondent.
3. Whether or not the Congress was an indispensable party to the consolidated petitions.
4. Whether or not the Court was barred by the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment from examining the persistence of rebellion in Mindanao.
5. Whether or not the petitioners may invoke the expanded (certiorari) jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution in seeking review of the extension of Proclamation No. 216.
6. Whether or not the manner in which Congress deliberated on the President’s request for extension of martial law is subject to judicial review.
7. Whether or not the Congress has the power to extend and determine the period of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus.
8. Whether or not the President and the Congress had sufficient factual basis to extend Proclamation No. 216.
9. Whether or not there is necessity to impose tests on the choice and manner of the President’s exercise of military powers.
10. Whether or not the petitioners were able to comply with all the requisites for the issuance of an injunctive writ.
Rulings:

1ST ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners’ failure to attach Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 fatal to their petitions. NO.
The Court held that since Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 is an official act of Congress, the they can take judicial notice thereof. Section 1, Rule 129
of the Rules of Court provides that a court can take judicial notice of the official acts of the legislative department without the introduction of
evidence. Moreover, the Court noted that respondents annexed a copy of the Resolution to their Consolidated Comment.

2ND ISSUE: Whether or not the President should be dropped as party respondent. YES.

The Court held that the President should be dropped as party respondent considering that he enjoys the presidential immunity from suit. The Court
reiterated their ruling in Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo, to wit:
It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such.
Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance
of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs
his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of
the Government.

3RD ISSUE: Whether or not the Congress was an indispensable party to the consolidated petitions. YES.

The Court held that in cases impugning the extension of martial law for lack of sufficient factual basis, the entire body of the Congress, composed of
the Senate and the House of Representatives, must be impleaded, being an indispensable party thereto.

The Court further ruled that in these consolidated petitions, petitioners are questioning the constitutionality of a congressional act, specifically the
approval of the President’s request to extend martial law in Mindanao. Clearly, therefore, it is the Congress as a body, and not just its leadership,
which has interest in the subject matter of these cases.

4TH ISSUE: Whether or not the Court was barred by the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment from examining the persistence of rebellion in
Mindanao. NO.

The Court held that as to the second requirement, there was np identity of issues between the Lagman and Padilla cases, on one hand, and the case
at bar.

Conclusiveness of judgment, a species of the principle of res judicata, bars the re-litigation of any right, fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or
necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits. In order to successfully
apply in a succeeding litigation the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, mere identities of parties and issues is required.
The issue put forth by petitioners in the earlier Lagman case, which this Court already settled, refers to the existence of a state of rebellion which
would trigger the President’s initial declaration of martial law, whereas the factual issue in the case at bar refers to the persistence of the same
rebellion in Mindanao which would justify the extension of martial law.
The fact that petitioners are not barred from questioning the alleged persistence of the rebellion in these consolidated petitions is also supported by
the transitory nature of the Court’s judgment on the sufficiency of the factual basis for a declaration of martial law.

Verily, the Court’s review in martial law cases is largely dependent on the existing factual scenario used as basis for its imposition or extension. The
gravity and scope of rebellion or invasion, as the case may be, should necessarily be re-examined, in order to make a justiciable determination on
whether rebellion persists in Mindanao as to justify an extension of a state of martial law.

5TH ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners may invoke the expanded (certiorari) jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution in seeking review of the extension of Proclamation No. 216. NO.

The Court reiterated their earlier ruling in Lagman case where they emphasized that the Court’s jurisdiction under the third paragraph of Section 18,
Article VII is special and specific, different from those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII. It was further stressed therein that the standard
of review in a petition for certiorari is whether the respondent has committed any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in the performance of his or her functions, whereas under Section 18, Article VII, the Court is tasked to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of
the President’s exercise of emergency powers.

Hence, the Court concluded that a petition for certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or Section 5 of Article VIII is not the proper tool to review the sufficiency
of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

The Court added that to apply the standard of review in a petition for certiorari will emasculate the Court’s constitutional task under Section 18,
Article VII, which was precisely meant to provide an additional safeguard against possible martial law abuse and limit the extent of the powers of the
Commander-in-Chief.
Finally, the Court held that a certiorari petition invoking the Court’s expanded jurisdiction is not the proper remedy to review the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the Congress’ extension of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ.

PRELIMINARIES ON MARTIAL LAW

Congressional Check on Martial Law

Congressional check on the President’s martial law and suspension powers thus consists of:
1. The power to review the President’s proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and to revoke such
proclamation or suspension. The review is “automatic in the sense that it may be activated by Congress itself at any time after the proclamation or
suspension is made.” The Congress’ decision to revoke the proclamation or suspension cannot be set aside by the President.
2. The power to approve any extension of the proclamation or suspension, upon the President’s initiative, for such period as it may determine, if the
invasion or rebellion persists and public safety requires it.

Joint executive and legislative act

When approved by the Congress, the extension of the proclamation or suspension, as described during the deliberations on the 1987 Constitution,
becomes a “joint executive and legislative act” or a “collective judgment” between the President and the Congress.

6TH ISSUE: Whether or not the manner in which Congress deliberated on the President’s request for extension of martial law is subject to judicial
review. NO.

The Court ruled that they cannot review the rules promulgated by Congress in the absence of any constitutional violation. Petitioners have not shown
that the above-quoted rules of the Joint Session violated any provision or right under the Constitution.

Construing the full discretionary power granted to the Congress in promulgating its rules, the Court, in the case of Spouses Dela Paz (Ret.) v. Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, et al. explained that the limitation of this unrestricted power deals only with the imperatives of quorum, voting and
publication. It should be added that there must be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the
result which is sought to be attained.

In the instant case, the rules in question did not pertain to quorum, voting or publication. Furthermore, deliberations on extending martial law
certainly cannot be equated to the consideration of regular or ordinary legislation. The Congress may consider such matter as urgent as to necessitate
swift action, or it may take its time investigating the factual situation. This Court cannot engage in undue speculation that members of Congress did
not review and study the President’s request based on a bare allegation that the time allotted for deliberation was too short.

7TH ISSUE: Whether or not the Congress has the power to extend and determine the period of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus. YES.

Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is indisputably silent as to how many times the Congress, upon the initiative of the President, may
extend the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus.

What is clear is that the ONLY limitations to the exercise of the congressional authority to extend such proclamation or suspension are (1) that the
extension should be upon the President’s initiative; (2) that it should be grounded on the persistence of the invasion or rebellion and the demands
of public safety; and (3) that it is subject to the Court’s review of the sufficiency of its factual basis upon the petition of any citizen.

Section 18, Article VII did not also fix the period of the extension of the proclamation and suspension. However, it clearly gave the Congress the
authority to decide on its duration; thus, the provision states that that the extension shall be “for a period to be determined by the Congress.”

Commissioner Jose E. Suarez’s proposal to limit the extension to 60 days was not adopted by the majority of the Commission’s members. The framers
evidently gave enough flexibility on the part of the Congress to determine the duration of the extension. Plain textual reading of Section 18, Article
VII and the records of the deliberation of the Constitutional Commission buttress the view that as regards the frequency and duration of the
extension, the determinative factor is as long as “the invasion or rebellion persists and public safety requires” such extension.

8TH ISSUE: Whether or not the President and the Congress had sufficient factual basis to extend Proclamation No. 216. YES.

Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution requires two factual bases for the extension of the proclamation of martial law or of the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus: (a) the invasion or rebellion persists; and (b) public safety requires the extension.
Rebellion persists as to satisfy the first condition for the extension of martial law or of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

The reasons cited by the President in his request for further extension indicate that the rebellion, which caused him to issue Proclamation No. 216,
continues to exist and its “remnants” have been resolute in establishing a DAESH/ISIS territory in Mindanao, carrying on through the recruitment and
training of new members, financial and logistical build-up, consolidation of forces and continued attacks.

AFP General Guerrero also cited, among others, the continued armed resistance of the DAESH-inspired DIWM and their allies. Moreover, The AFP’s
data also showed that Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) are now acting as instructors to the new members of the Dawlah Islamiyah.

Also, it does not necessarily follow that with the liberation of Marawi, the DAESH/ISIS-inspired rebellion no longer exists. Secretary Lorenzana, during
the Congress’ Joint Session on December 13, 2017, explained that while the situation in Marawi has substantially changed, the rebellion has not
ceased but simply moved to other places in Mindanao.

Acts upon which extension was based posed danger to general public
The Court also ruled that the acts, circumstances and events upon which the extension was based posed a significant danger, injury or harm to the
general public.

The Court added that the information upon which the extension of martial law or of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall
be based principally emanate from and are in the possession of the Executive Department. Thus, “the Court will have to rely on the fact-finding
capabilities of the Executive Department; in tum, the Executive Department will have to open its findings to the scrutiny of the Court.”

The Executive Department did open its findings to the Court when the· AFP gave its “briefing” or “presentation” during the oral arguments, presenting
data, which had been vetted by the NICA, “based on intelligence reports gathered on the ground,” from personalities they were able to capture and
residents in affected areas, declassified official documents, and intelligence obtained by the PNP. According to the AFP, the same presentation, save
for updates, was given to the Congress. As it stands, the information thus presented has not been challenged or questioned as regards its reliability.

The facts as provided by the Executive and considered by Congress amply establish that rebellion persists in Mindanao and public safety is significantly
endangered by it. The Court, thus, holds that there exists sufficient factual basis for the further extension sought by the President and approved by
the Congress in its Resolution of Both Houses No. 4.

9TH ISSUE: Whether or not there is necessity to impose tests on the choice and manner of the President’s exercise of military powers. NO.

The Court reiterated their ruling in the earlier Lagman case that the determination of which among the Constitutionally given military powers should
be exercised in a given set of factual circumstances is a prerogative of the President. The Court’s power of review, as provided under Section 18,
Article VII do not empower the Court to advise, nor dictate its own judgment upon the President, as to which and how these military powers should
be exercised.

10TH ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were able to comply with all the requisites for the issuance of an injunctive writ. NO.

By jurisprudence, to be entitled to an injunctive writ, petitioners have the burden to establish the following requisites: (1) a right in esse or a clear
and unmistakable right to be protected; (2) a violation of that right; (3) that there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ
to prevent serious damage; and (4) no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.

Petitioners anchored their prayer for the issuance of an injunctive writ on respondents’ gross transgressions of the Constitution when they extended
the martial law in Mindanao for one year. The Lagman petition likewise alleges that petitioner Villarin, a Davao City resident, is personally prejudiced
by the extension or martial law in Mindanao “which would spawn violations of civil liberties of Mindanaoans like petitioner Villarin who is a steadfast
critic of the Duterte administration and of the brutalities committed by police and military forces”.

The alleged violations of the petitioners’ civil liberties do not justify the grant of injunctive relief. The petitioners failed to prove that the alleged
violations are directly attributable to the imposition of martial law. They likewise failed to establish the nexus between the President’s exercise of
his martial law powers and their unfounded apprehension that the imposition “will target civilians who have no participation at all in any armed
uprising or struggle”. Incidentally, petitioners failed to state what the “civil liberties” specifically refer to, and how the extension of martial law in
Mindanao would threaten these “civil liberties” in derogation of the rule of law. Evidently, petitioners’ right is doubtful or disputed, and can hardly
be considered a clear legal right, sufficient for the grant of an injunctive writ.

This Court cannot rely on speculations, conjectures or guesswork, but must depend upon competent proof and on the basis of the best evidence
obtainable under the circumstances. We emphasize that the grant or denial of an injunctive writ cannot be properly resolved by suppositions,
deductions, or even presumptions, with no basis in evidence, for the truth must have to be determined by the procedural rules of admissibility and
proof.

Incidentally, there is nothing in the Constitution, nor in any law which supports petitioners’ theory. Such purported human right violations cannot be
utilized as ground either to enjoin the President from exercising the power to declare martial law, or the Congress in extending the same. To sanction
petitioners’ plea would result into judicial activism, thereby going against the principle of separation of powers.

As discussed above, petitioners are not left without any recourse. Such transgressions can be addressed in a separate and independent court action.
Hence, petitioners can lodge a complaint-affidavit before the prosecutor’s office or file a direct complaint before the appropriate courts against erring
parties.

DAVID VS. MACAPAGAL ARROYO

Facts: These seven (7) consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and
General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners contend that respondent
officials of the Government, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic institutions, are actually trampling upon the very freedom
guaranteed and protected by the Constitution. Hence, such issuances are void for being unconstitutional.
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state
of national emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: "The President. . .
whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .," and in my capacity as their Commander-
in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all
forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and
regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a
State of National Emergency.
Bases for proclamation, among others:
1. political opposition have conspired with authoritarians of the extreme Left represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right,
represented by military adventurists – the historical enemies of the democratic Philippine State
2. these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring down the President
3. the claims of these elements have been recklessly magnified by certain segments of the national media
4. actions are adversely affecting the economy
5. these activities give totalitarian forces of both the extreme Left and extreme Right the opening to intensify their avowed aims to bring
down the democratic Philippine State
6. activities above-described, their consequences, ramifications and collateral effects constitute a clear and present danger to the safety and
the integrity of the Philippine State and of the Filipino people

I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Chief of the PNP, as well as the officers and men of the AFP and PNP, to immediately carry out
the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence.

Exactly one week after the declaration of a state of national emergency and after all these petitions had been filed, the President lifted PP 1017.

This issue was brought about by certain plots to unseat GMA, including the plan of B/Gen Danilo Lim to join the ouster plot and various meetings
that included personalities such as Peping Cojuanco and Pastor Boy Saycon.

Despite the ban on political rallies that the GMA administration saw as being organized for purposes of destabilization, various social groups including
KMU staged rallies in Metro Manila. During the dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA, police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a
professor at the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list
Akbayan.

Operatives raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila. The raiding team confiscated news stories by reporters, documents, pictures, and mock-ups of
the Saturday issue.

Also, on February 25, 2006, the police arrested Congressman Crispin Beltran, representing the Anakpawis Party and Chairman of Kilusang Mayo Uno
(KMU), while leaving his farmhouse in Bulacan. The police showed a warrant for his arrest dated 1985. Beltran’s lawyer explained that the warrant,
which stemmed from a case of inciting to rebellion filed during the Marcos regime, had long been quashed. Beltran, however, is not a party in any of
these petitions.

Attempts were made to arrest Anakpawis Representative Satur Ocampo, Representative Rafael Mariano, Bayan Muna Representative Teodoro Casiño
and Gabriela Representative Liza Maza. Bayan Muna Representative Josel Virador was arrested at the PAL Ticket Office in Davao City. Later, he was
turned over to the custody of the House of Representatives where the "Batasan 5" decided to stay indefinitely.

In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners Randolf S. David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress;
(2) itis a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly.

Issue:
1) Whether the Supreme Court can review the factual bases of PP 1017.
2) Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional.

Held:
1. Yes, but the petitioners must show that the President’s decision is bereft of factual basis.
From the principle of separation of powers, the system of checks and balances stems, and "under which the President is supreme, x x x only if and
when he acts within the sphere allotted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in the
Judicial Department, which in this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme."

“In times of war or national emergency, the President must be given absolute control for the very life of the nation and the government is in great
peril. The President, it intoned, is answerable only to his conscience, the People, and God."

Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyo’s exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing PP 1017, is totally bereft of factual basis. A reading of
the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with
supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the
defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the
Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military.
Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in
issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid.
Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, President Arroyo was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress
what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty.

2. Partially. (See dispositive portion)

The warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to P.P. 1017, were NOT valid. Searches, seizures and arrests are normally
unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides for the following circumstances of valid warrantless arrests: Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and neither of the provisions on in flagrante nor hot pursuit warrantless arrests justifies petitioner David’s
warrantless arrest. During the inquest for the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of B.P. 880, all that the arresting officers could invoke was
their observation that some rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the incentive “Oust Gloria Now” and their erroneous assumption that petitioner David
was the leader of the rally. Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor ordered his immediate release on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. He noted
that petitioner David was not wearing the subject t-shirt and even if he was wearing it, such fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting to sedition.

[2] No, the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribune’s offices conducted pursuant to P.P. 1017 was NOT valid.
The search and seizure in the Daily Tribune premises is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct
of search and seizure. Section 4 requires that a search warrant be issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witness he may produce. Section 8
mandates that the search of a house, room, or any other premise be made in the presence of lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family
or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. And Section 9 states
that the warrant must direct that it be served in the daytime, unless the property is on person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case
a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. All these rules were violated by the CIDG operatives.

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are partly granted. The Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a call by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not
related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the provision in PP 1017
declaring national emergency under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not authorize the
President to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest without prior legislation.
G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is "necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence." Considering that "acts of terrorism" have not yet been defined
and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during
their rallies, in the absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP
880; the imposition of standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and
whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other materials, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

OCAMPO VS. ENRIQUEZ

Facts: During the campaign period for the 2016 Presidential Election, then candidate Rodrigo R. Duterte (Duterte) publicly announce that he would
allow the burial of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos) at the Libingan ng Mga Bayani (LNMB). Duterte Whether or not the May 9, 2016
election. At noon of June 30, 2016 Duterte formally assumed his office at the Rizal Hall in the Malacañan Palace. On August 7, 2016, the Secretary of
National Defense Delfin N, Lorenzana issued a Memorandum to the Chief of the Armed forces of the Philippines (AFP), General Ricardo R. Visaya
regarding the interment of Marcos at the LNMB. On August 9, 2016, AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez, respondent, issued a directive to the
Philippine Army on the Funeral Honors and Services for President Marcos. Dissastisfies with the preceding events, A petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition was filed by Ocampo, along with other human rights advocates and human rights violation victims.

Issue:
Whether or not President Duterte’s determination to have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB and the issuance and implementation of
such violates Section 17 of Article VII.

Held:

No. The President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance with the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence. As the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) logically reasoned out, while the Constitution is a product of our collective history as a people, its entirety should not be interpreted
as providing guiding principles to just about anything remotely related to the Martial Law period such as the proposed Marcos burial at the LNMB.
Further, Sec. 17 of Art. VII pertaining to the duty of the President to "ensure that the laws be faithfully executed," is not violated by public
respondents. Being the Chief Executive, the President represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials
and employees of his or her department. Under the 389
Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power to take "necessary and proper steps" to carry into execution the law. The mandate is self-
executory by virtue of its being inherently executive in nature and is intimately related to the other executive functions. It is best construed as an
imposed obligation, not a separate grant of power. The provision simply underscores the rule of law and, corollarily, the cardinal principle that the
President is not above the laws but is obliged to obey and execute them. Moreover, the presidential power of control over the Executive Branch of
Government is a self-executing provision of the Constitution and does not require statutory implementation, nor may its exercise be limited, much
less withdrawn, by the legislature. As the incumbent President, he is free to amend, revoke or rescind political agreements entered into by his
predecessors, and to determine policies which he considers, based on informed judgment and presumed wisdom, will be most effective in carrying
out his mandate.
Consistent with President Duterte's mandate under Sec. 17, Art. VII of the Constitution, the burial of Marcos at the LNMB does not contravene R.A.
No. 289, R.A. No. 10368, and the international human rights laws cited by petitioners.

his is not at all unexpected because the LNMB is distinct and separate from the burial place envisioned in R.A. No 289. The parcel of land subject
matter of President Quirino's Proclamation No. 431, which was later on revoked by President Magsaysay's Proclamation No. 42, is different from that
covered by Marcos' Proclamation No. 208. The National Pantheon does not exist at present. To date, the Congress has deemed it wise not to
appropriate any funds for its construction or the creation of the Board on National Pantheon. This is indicative of the legislative will not to pursue, at
the moment, the establishment of a singular interment place for the mortal remains of all Presidents of the Philippines, national heroes, and patriots.
Perhaps, the Manila North Cemetery, the Manila South Cemetery, and other equally distinguished private cemeteries already serve the noble purpose
but without cost to the limited funds of the government.

Even if the Court treats R.A. No. 289 as relevant to the issue, still, petitioners' allegations must fail. To apply the standard that the LNMB is reserved
only for the "decent and the brave" or "hero" would be violative of public policy as it will put into question the validity of the burial of each and every
mortal remains resting therein, and infringe upon the principle of separation of powers since the allocation of plots at the LNMB is based on the grant
of authority to the President under existing laws and regulations. Also, the Court shares the view of the OSG that the proposed interment is not
equivalent to the consecration of Marcos' mortal remains. The act in itself does not confer upon him the status of a "hero." Despite its name, which
is actually a misnomer, the purpose of the LNMB, both from legal and historical perspectives, has neither been to confer to the people buried there
the title of "hero" nor to require that only those interred therein should be treated as a "hero." Lastly, petitioners' repeated reference to a "hero's
burial" and "state honors," without showing proof as to what kind of burial or honors that will be accorded to the remains of Marcos, is speculative
until the specifics of the interment have been finalized by public respondents.

This Court cannot subscribe to petitioners' logic that the beneficial provisions of R.A. No. 10368 are not exclusive as it includes the prohibition on
Marcos' burial at the LNMB. It would be undue to extend the law beyond what it actually contemplates. With its victim-oriented perspective, our
legislators could have easily inserted a provision specifically proscribing Marcos' interment at the LNMB as a "reparation" for the HRVVs, but they did
not. As it is, the law is silent and should remain to be so. This Court cannot read into the law what is simply not there. It is irregular, if not
unconstitutional, for Us to presume the legislative will by supplying material details into the law. That would be tantamount to judicial legislation.

ARROYO VS SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS: Petitioners in this case are former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and former Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) Budget and
Accounts Officer Benigno Aguas. The Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan with plunder as defined by, and penalized under Section 2 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No. 7659 the following: (1) GMA, (2) Aguas, (3) former PCSO General Manager and Vice Chairman
Rosario C. Uriarte, (4) former PCSO Chairman of the Board of Directors Sergio O. Valencia, (5) former members of the PCSO Board of Directors, and
(6) two former officials of the Commission on Audit (COA).

The information read:

…[the] accused…all public officers committing the offense in relation to their respective offices and taking undue advantage of their respective official
positions, authority, relationships, connections or influence, conniving, conspiring and confederating with one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and/or acquire. Directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of THREE
HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE MILLION NINE HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIFTEEN PESOS (PHP365,997,915.00), more or less,
through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or similar schemes or means, described as follows:

(a) diverting in several instances, funds from the operating budget of PCSO to its Confidential/Intelligence Fund that could be accessed and withdrawn
at any time with minimal restrictions, · and converting, misusing, and/or illegally conveying or transferring the proceeds drawn from said fund in the
aforementioned sum, also in several instances, to themselves, in the guise of fictitious expenditures, for their personal gain and benefit;

(b) raiding the public treasury by withdrawing and receiving, in several instances, the above-mentioned amount from the Confidential/Intelligence
Fund from PCSO’s accounts, and or unlawfully transferring or conveying the same into their possession and control through irregularly issued
disbursement vouchers and fictitious expenditures; and

(c) taking advantage of their respective official positions, authority, relationships, connections or influence, in several instances, to unjustly enrich
themselves in the aforementioned sum, at the expense of, and the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
XX
The Sandiganbayan eventually acquired jurisdiction over most of the accused, including petitioners. All filed petitions for bail, which the
Sandiganbayan granted except those of the petitioners. Their motions for reconsideration were denied. GMA assailed the denial of her petition for
bail before the Supreme Court. However, this remains unresolved.
After the Prosecution rested its case, the accused separately filed their demurrers to evidence asserting that the Prosecution did not establish a case
for plunder against them. The Sandiganbayan granted the demurrers and dismissed the case against the accused within its jurisdiction, except for
petitioners and Valencia. It held that there was sufficient evidence showing that they had conspired to commit plunder. Petitioners filed this case
before the Supreme Court on certiorari before the Supreme Court to assail the denial of their demurrers to evidence, on the ground of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

ISSUES:

1.) Procedural Issue: WON the special civil action for certiorari is proper to assail the denial of the demurrers to evidence – YES.

PROSECUTION: The petition for certiorari of GMA was improper to challenge the denial of her demurrer to evidence.

HELD: Certiorari is proper since the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying GMA’s demurrer to evidence.

General rule: The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail such an interlocutory order issued by the trial court because of the
availability of another remedy in the ordinary course of law. Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court expressly provides, “the order
denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before
judgment.”

Exception: “In the exercise of our superintending control over other courts, we are to be guided by all the circumstances of each particular case ‘as
the ends of justice may require.’ So it is that the writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial” (citing Ong
v. People [G.R. No. 140904, October 9, 2000]).

2.) Substantive Issue: WoN the Prosecution sufficiently established the existence of conspiracy among GMA, Aguas, and Uriarte – NO.

A. As regards petitioner GMA

HELD: The Supreme Court rejected the Sandiganbayan’s declaration in denying GMA’s demurrer that GMA, Aguas, and Uriate had conspired and
committed plunder. The Prosecution did not sufficiently allege the existence of a conspiracy among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte.

A perusal of the information (quoted above) suggests that what the Prosecution sought to show was an implied conspiracy to commit plunder among
all of the accused on the basis of their collective actions prior to, during and after the implied agreement. It is notable that the Prosecution did not
allege that the conspiracy among all of the accused was by express agreement, or was a wheel conspiracy or a chain conspiracy. This was another
fatal flaw of the Prosecution.

Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080 (Plunder Law) requires in the criminal charge for plunder against several individuals that there must be a main
plunderer and her co-conspirators, who may be members of her family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or
other persons. In other words, the allegation of the wheel conspiracy or express conspiracy in the information was appropriate because the main
plunderer would then be identified in either manner. Citing Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, “The gravamen of the conspiracy charge…is that each of them,
by their individual acts, agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for
former President Estrada.”

Such identification of the main plunderer was not only necessary because the law required such identification, but also because it was essential in
safeguarding the rights of all of the accused to be properly informed of the charges they were being made answerable for.

In fine, the Prosecution’s failure to properly allege the main plunderer should be fatal to the cause against the petitioners for violating the rights of
each accused to be informed of the charges against each of them.

In People v. Sandiganbayan, this Com1 explained the general rule that the grant of a demurrer to evidence operates as an acquittal and is, thus, final
and unappealable, to wit:

The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is ''filed after tile prosecution had rested its case," and when the same is granted,
it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting
in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused." Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to
evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in double jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there.

PROSECUTION: GMA, Uriarte and Aguas committed acts showing the existence of an implied conspiracy among themselves, thereby making all of
them the main plunderers. The sole overt act of GMA to become a part of the conspiracy was her approval via the marginal note of “OK” of all the
requests made by Uriarte for the use of additional intelligence fund. By approving Uriaiie’s requests in that manner, GMA violated the following:

a. Letter of Instruction 1282, which required requests for additional confidential and intelligence funds (CIFs) to be accompanied with detailed,
specific project proposals and specifications; and
b. COA Circular No. 92-385, which allowed the President to approve the release of additional CIFs only if there was an existing budget to cover the
request.

HELD: GMA’s approval of Uriarte’s requests for additional CIFs did not make her part of any design to raid the public treasury as the means to amass,
accumulate and acquire illgotten wealth. Absent the specific allegation in the information to that effect, and competent proof thereon, GMA’s
approval of Uriarte’s requests, even if unqualified, could not make her part of any criminal conspiracy to commit plunder or any other crime
considering that her approval was not by any means irregular or illegal.

a. An examination of Uriarte’s several requests indicates their compliance with LOI No. 1282. The requests, similarly worded, furnished:

(1) the full details of the specific purposes for which the funds would be spent;

(2) the explanations of the circumstances giving rise to the necessity of the expenditure; and

(3) the particular aims to be accomplished.

The additional CIFs requested were to be used to protect PCSO’s image and the integrity of its operations. According to its terms, LOI No. 1282 did
not detail any qualification as to how specific the requests should be made.

b. The funds of the PCSO were comingled into one account as early as 2007. Consequently, although only 15% of PCSO’s revenues was appropriated
to an operation fund from which the CIF could be sourced, the remaining 85% of PCSO’s revenues, already co-mingled with the operating fund, could
still sustain the additional requests. In short, there was available budget from which to draw the additional requests for CIFs.

PROSECUTION: GMA had known that Uriarte would raid the public treasury, and would misuse the amounts disbursed. This knowledge was imputed
to GMA by virtue of her power of control over PCSO.

HELD: The Prosecution seems to be relying on the doctrine of command responsibility to impute the actions of subordinate officers to GMA as the
superior officer. The reliance is misplaced, for incriminating GMA under those terms was legally unacceptable and incomprehensible.

The application of the doctrine of command responsibility is limited, and cannot be true for all litigations. This case involves neither a probe of GMA’s
actions as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, nor of a human rights issue (compare to Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo
[G.R. No. 191805, November 15, 2011]).

B. As regards Aguas

HELD: Aguas’ certifications and signatures on the disbursement vouchers were insufficient bases to conclude that he was into any conspiracy to
commit plunder or any other crime. Without GMA’s participation, he could not release any money because there was then no budget available for
the additional CIFs. Whatever irregularities he might have committed did not amount to plunder, or to any implied conspiracy to commit plunder.

involvement in the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Scam. Initially, Enrile in an Omnibus Motion requested to post bail, which the
Sandiganbayan denied. On July 3, 2014, a warrant for Enrile's arrest was issued, leading to Petitioner's voluntary surrender.

Petitioner again asked the Sandiganbayan in a Motion to Fix Bail which was heard by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner argued that: (a) Prosecution had
not yet established that the evidence of his guilt was
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution;

4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be
denied.

With such succinct but clear rules now incorporated in the Rules of Court, trial judges are enjoined to study them as well and be guided accordingly.
Admittedly, judges cannot be held to account for an erroneous decision rendered in good faith, but this defense is much too frequently cited even if
not applicable. A number of cases on bail having already been decided, this Court justifiably expects judges to discharge their duties assiduously. For
judge is called upon to exhibit more
circumstances, none appearing to obtain at present, wherein a clear pattern of abuse of the legislative power of inquiry might be established,
resulting in palpable violations of the rights guaranteed to members of the executive department under the Bill of Rights. In such instances, depending
on the particulars of each case, attempts by the Executive Branch to forestall these abuses may be accorded judicial sanction.
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE

This privilege, based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, exempts the executive from disclosure requirements applicable to the
ordinary citizen or organization where such exemption is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive responsibilities involved in
maintaining governmental operations, and extends not only to military and diplomatic secrets but also to documents integral to an appropriate
exercise of the executive’ domestic decisional and policy making functions, that is, those documents reflecting the frank expression necessary in
intra-governmental advisory and deliberative communications.
Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a
sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to
justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose
information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption
inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.

Whenever an official invokes E.O. 464 to justify his failure to be present, such invocation must be construed as a declaration to Congress that the
President, or a head of office authorized by the President, has determined that the requested information is privileged, and that the President has
not reversed such determination. Such declaration, however, even without mentioning the term "executive privilege," amounts to an implied claim
that the information is being withheld by the executive branch, by authority of the President, on the basis of executive privilege. Verily, there is an
implied claim of privilege.

The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly
asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. That is impermissible.

JAMES IMBONG VS PAQUITO OCHOA (RH LAW)

Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive
Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), challengers from various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword
that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the
controversy, as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions-in-intervention. The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law
be declared unconstitutional.

ISSUES: After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court has synthesized and refined them to the following principal
issues:

PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
1. Power of Judicial Review
2. Actual Case or Controversy
3. Facial Challenge
4. Locus Standi
5. Declaratory Relief
1. x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now
is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead
of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This
can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that –… in case of doubt, the Constitution should be
considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing. . . .
2. Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would
give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the
will of
decided to work together and jointly administer the National Artist Award. They reviewed the guidelines for the nomination, selection and
administration of the National Artist Award. An administrative