Bringing E Money To The Poor. Successes and Failures PDF
Bringing E Money To The Poor. Successes and Failures PDF
Bringing E Money To The Poor. Successes and Failures PDF
Finance
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E-money to the Poor: Successes and Failures. Directions in Development. Washington, DC: World Bank.
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Foreword xi
Acknowledgments xiii
About the Authors xv
Abbreviations xvii
Overview 1
Background 1
Motivation and Evidence 3
Target Audience 5
Methodology: Country Selection and Financial
Inclusion Status 5
Organization of This Volume 10
Notes 12
Bibliography 13
Boxes
1.1 “Financial Inclusion”: A Working Definition 18
2.1 Cash versus Electronic Payments 43
2.2 Doing Digital Finance Right: The Case for Stronger
Customer Risk Mitigation 50
4.1 M-Pesa: A Backstory and an Alternative Perspective 67
4.2 Reserve Bank of India Regulatory Reforms, 2014 76
Figures
1.1 Share of Adults with a Financial Services Account,
by Region, 2014 24
1.2 Share of South Asian Adults with a Financial Services Account,
by Country, 2014 25
1.3 Share of South Asian Adults with a Financial Services Account,
by Gender and Country, 2014 26
1.4 Access to Finance in South Asia: Supply-Side Data, 2010 27
1.5 Poverty, Financial Exclusion, and Financial Vulnerability
Indicators in South Asia, 2014 28
1.6 Remittances and Other Resource Flows to Developing
Countries, 1990–2015 30
2.1 Sample Relative Costs of Payment System Infrastructure,
from Bank Branches to Mobile Phone 43
2.2 Stages and Shifts from a Cash-Heavy to a Cash-Lite Society 45
II.1 Number of Active Mobile Money Services Worldwide,
by Region, 2001–14 61
4.1 Financial Access Strand in Kenya, 2006 65
4.2 Financial Access Trends in Kenya, 2006–13 68
4.3 Use of Financial Services in Kenya, by Type, 2006–13 69
4.4 Zero-Balance Trends in Jan Dhan Yojana Accounts, India,
2014–15 73
4.5 Number of 2G and 3G/4G Connections in India, 2008–17 75
4.6 Financial Access Strand in Thailand, 2013 85
4.7 Financial Access Strand in Thailand, by Region, 2013 85
4.8 Average Time to Financial Service Touchpoints in
Thailand, 2013 89
5.1 Market Share of Sri Lankan Mobile Service Providers, 2014 109
5.2 Schematic of End-to-End Interoperable eZ Cash System 111
5.3 Comparing Mobile Money Use in Tanzania and Kenya,
2007–13 113
5.4 Active Subscriber Market Shares of Tanzanian Mobile Service
Providers, 2014 114
5.5 Financial Account and Mobile-Phone Penetration, Indonesia
versus Selected Asian Countries, 2014 115
5.6 Mobile Money Awareness in Indonesia, 2014 116
Maps
O.1 Universal Financial Access 2020 Focus Countries 2
4.1 Distribution of Financial Institution Branches, Automated
Machines, and EFTPOS Terminals in Thailand, by
Region, 2013 87
5.1 Number of Live Mobile Money Services for the Unbanked,
by Country, 2014 128
6.1 Global Participation in Biometric ID Programs, by Region, 2012 157
Tables
O.1 Selection Criteria for Case Study Countries 6
O.2 Use of Transaction Accounts, Case Country Comparison, 2014 7
1.1 Estimated Financial Inclusion Gap, Globally and by Region, 2008 23
1.2 South Asia Remittance Receipts, by Country, 2009–13 31
2.1 Differences between Electronic Money and Virtual Currency
Schemes 41
4.1 Jan Dhan Yojana Account Status, by Bank Type, May 2015 71
• In Kenya, the rate of financial inclusion more than doubled in five years to
reach nearly 70–75 percent of the adult population. Innovation took the form
of a mobile money application (M-Pesa) by the country’s leading mobile phone
operator. A cooperative and enabling relationship between the regulator and
the operator helped M-Pesa become the country’s retail payment platform.
• In South Africa, the key innovation was the use of a biometrically secure,
“chipped” open-debit MasterCard as the platform for social transfer payments.
Financial access was extended to 10 million of the country’s poor, pushing
financial inclusion up to 86 percent of the population. The essential element
of success was the cooperation between the Social Security Agency, the private
creator of the biometrically enabled card, and a local bank.
We hope that these rich case studies stimulate debate and encourage policy
makers, regulators, financial service providers, and mobile network operators to
move forward on access to finance, especially for the poor. Their initiative, enthu-
siasm, and cooperation are needed to make universal financial inclusion a reality
in South Asia.
Martin Rama
Chief Economist, South Asia Region
The World Bank
This study was written by Thyra A. Riley (now retired) in her role as sector coor-
dinator and lead specialist, and by Anoma Kulathunga, senior financial sector
specialist––both of the World Bank’s Finance and Markets Global Practice,
South Asia region.
The authors are especially grateful to Martin Rama, chief economist of the
South Asia region, who provided invaluable support and guidance as the chair-
man of the peer-review process by which this program of study was undertaken
and published. The authors also thank Henry Bagazonzya and Niraj Verma, prac-
tice managers of the South Asia region’s Finance and Markets Global Practice,
under whose supportive auspices this product was brought to final fruition.
The authors express special appreciation for the ex officio moral support and
intellectual contributions of Christopher Dooley (senior adviser, United Nations
Capital Development Fund); Ranee Jayamaha (former deputy governor of the
Central Bank of Sri Lanka); William F. Steel (adjunct professor, University
of Ghana, Legon, and former World Bank senior adviser on microfinance and
small enterprise); and Martin Melecky (lead economist, Office of the Chief
Economist, South Asia region).
Valuable feedback and comments were provided by World Bank peer reviewers:
Simon Bell, global lead, SME Finance, Finance and Markets Global Practice;
Martin Kanz, economist, Development Economics Chief Economist’s Office;
Harish Natarajan, lead financial sector specialist, Payment Systems Development
Group, Finance and Markets Global Practice; Douglas Pearce, practice manager,
Financial Infrastructure and Access, Finance and Markets Global Practice; and
Maja Andjelkovic, senior financial sector specialist on behalf of the Innovation and
Entrepreneurship Team of the Trade and Competitiveness Global Practice.
Country e-money landscapes were prepared by World Bank or International
Finance Corporation Country Office colleagues: Sabin Shrestha, senior financial
sector specialist; Nazir Ahmad III, private sector specialist (Afghanistan); and
Santosh Pandey, senior financial sector specialist (Nepal); as well as by country-
based financial consultants: Muhymin Chowdhury (Bangladesh); Ranee Jayamaha
(Maldives); Caroline Pulver (Kenya); and K. R. Ramamoorthy (India).
The authors are deeply indebted to the World Bank publications team: Jewel
McFadden, acquisitions editor; Paola Scalabrin, acquisitions editor; Stephen
Pazdan, publishing associate; Mary A. Anderson, our copy editor; and Gwenda
Larsen, our proofreader.
Last, and most important, the authors recognize the invaluable contributions
and vision of the business leaders, central bank regulators, and international
donors that incorporate e-money as a delivery mechanism to provide access to
financial services to the poor. The cases and frameworks discussed in this study
are built on the authors’ in-country fieldwork and interviews with these leaders,
their staff, their clients, and the users of e-money. The generous access provided
has made the richness of this study possible—with our very sincerest thanks!
Thyra A. Riley, now retired, was sector coordinator and lead specialist of the World
Bank’s Finance and Markets Global Practice, South Asia region. Over a 30-year
career at the World Bank, she served in several corporate management, knowledge
management, and lead financial sector specialist positions in several regions of the
world, including Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Middle East and
North Africa. As the knowledge manager for the Micro, Small Enterprise, and
Rural Finance Thematic Group, she led knowledge-sharing engagements that
brought together leading international microfinance practitioners with African
country leaders, policy makers, and donors interested in learning from the best-
practitioners themselves. Riley also led several projects and knowledge-sharing
engagements with the South African government during the postapartheid devel-
opment of the country’s policy framework for micro and small enterprises. She has
written extensively about lessons learned from high-impact development inter-
ventions, focusing on approaches that have mainstreamed access by the poor to
financial services through innovative means including traditional microfinance and
digitally enabled financial services. She was a visiting fellow in finance at the Sloan
School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Riley holds a bach-
elor’s degree in development economics from Stanford University and a master’s
degree in public and international affairs from Princeton University.
Currencies
Currency conversions that appear in the text were current as of the time of writing
(in 2015).
B Thai baht
K Sh Kenya shilling
R$ Brazilian real
R South African rand
Rf Maldivian rufiyaa
Rs Indian rupees
SL Rs Sri Lanka rupees
T Sh Tanzania shilling
I’m confident digital tools will allow us to ignite significant progress, opening a broader
path to the goal of universal access to basic accounts by 2020. But access is just an
interim step. The full benefit of financial inclusion depends on households and small
businesses actively using a range of affordable and effective financial services, coupled
with financial education and consumer protection. That is a much taller order.
—Queen Máxima of the Netherlands, United Nations Secretary-General’s
Special Advocate for Inclusive Finance for Development, UNSGSA Annual
Report 2015
Background
Financial sector development can aid economic growth and create private and
social benefits, especially in countries at lower levels of development (Cull,
Ehrbeck, and Holle 2014; Sahay et al. 2015). An important aspect of financial
development to address the shared prosperity objective is the extension of
financial intermediation services to low-income brackets of the population.
Access to financial and payment services, including savings, credit, and social
welfare transfers, facilitates better financial inclusion and enables improved
income distribution and inclusive growth. Although financial inclusion is mostly
a foregone conclusion in the developed world, in developing countries it often
remains sporadic or at best informal for those at the base of the pyramid.1
Limited financial inclusion severely impacts financial stability, financial security,
and poor people’s economic mobility, thus effectively impeding the achievement
of shared prosperity and development. The Global Financial Development Report
2014 suggests that public policy can achieve potentially large effects on financial
inclusion through reforms (World Bank 2014). The evidence provided from
the World Bank’s Doing Business data (World Bank 2017) and Enterprise
Surveys2 indicates that improvements in the legal, regulatory, and institutional
environments—which tend to be useful for development in general—can also
have a favorable effect on financial inclusion.
The Universal Financial Access 2020 (UFA2020) goal to enable 2 billion
financially excluded adults to gain access to a transaction account—an initia-
tive established during the 2015 World Bank and International Monetary
Fund (IMF) Spring Meetings—focuses on 25 countries where 73 percent of
all financially excluded people live (map O.1).3 The largest shares of unbanked
25 73%
of the world’s financially excluded.
focus
countries =
Source: World Bank, from 2014 Global Findex and International Monetary Fund (IMF) Financial Access Survey data. © World Bank. http://www
.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialinclusion/brief/achieving-universal-financial-access-by-2020. Permission required for reuse.
people are in India (which accounts for about 21 percent of the world’s finan-
cially excluded working-age population) and China (with about 12 percent).
The other top-priority countries include Bangladesh and Pakistan, with about
4 percent and 5 percent, respectively, of the world’s financially excluded
population. Thus, three South Asian countries that account for 30 percent of
the world’s financially excluded people represent 40 percent of the UFA2020
target population.
South Asia plays a key role in the global development arena, with the
world’s largest working-age population, a quarter of the world’s middle-class
consumers, the world’s greatest number of poor and undernourished people,
and several fragile states of global geopolitical importance. Led by India,
strong inclusive growth in South Asia could potentially change the face of
global poverty. Although the modern microfinance industry—which emerged
in South Asia in the 1970s with organizations such as Grameen Bank of
Bangladesh—has contributed meaningfully to expanding outreach and access
in the region, data show that the number of people with access to formal
financial services falls short of the potential that we associate with the
impressive levels of financial access and inclusive growth in the emerging
markets of East Asia.
• In Kenya, the rate of financial inclusion more than doubled in five years
to reach nearly 70–75 percent (depending on methodology) of the adult
This study also draws lessons from experiences in several other countries:
India, Indonesia, Maldives, and the Philippines. Some of these countries have
taken important initial steps to create the potential for rapid expansion of finan-
cial inclusion, while others have encountered obstacles that have limited their
success.
In most instances, reform packages are country-specific. For this reason,
there is considerable uncertainty as to which countries or initiatives reflect
best practice. Nevertheless, pursuing cross-country studies of successful prac-
tices or policy initiatives, along with international dialogue, can flatten the
learning curve and speed up policy learning by highlighting common traits,
implementation issues, and operational successes. Furthermore, to effectively
counter underlying barriers to financial access for underserved groups, even
within a single country, it appears to be important to follow an integrated
approach that considers the entire ecosystem at different stakeholder levels,
as explained in chapter 3.
This study also aims to identify new approaches to improving financial
inclusion in South Asia. It documents innovative uses of technology in the
form of digital financial services operating within a balanced regulatory
Target Audience
The target audience for this study comprises national regulators, policy makers,
and market practitioners of digital financial services, primarily in the South Asia
region. Given the growing interest in e-money and digital payment solutions—and
in light of ongoing initiatives in most South Asian countries—developing a
knowledge-sharing platform both in the form of this volume and in a seminar
would allow for an interactive knowledge exchange between practitioners from
the case-study countries and their South Asian counterparts. The case study
analysis, combined with descriptions of South Asian country financial and
e-money landscapes, provides an excellent base for more-comprehensive diag-
nostic studies in the future on the digital financial potential of South Asian
countries. Researchers, experts, and private sector service providers should also
find the study informative.
basic financial access for their poor populations by consciously developing the
financial and payment ecosystem using digital means.
This selection process yielded six suitable countries (table O.1): four fast mov-
ers (Kenya, South Africa, Sri Lanka, and Thailand) that have successfully pursued
e-money initiatives that have also yielded transformational levels of financial
inclusion, including use of e-money by the poorest;9 and two early movers
(Maldives and the Philippines) where the momentum implementing e-money
has stalled or failed to reach its full potential but remains promising. In addition,
the study reviews the possible game-changing initiatives undertaken by a South
Asian country and a Southeast Asian country where critical enablers could be
identified but the outcomes cannot yet be documented: specifically, India’s
establishment of a unique identification system and Indonesia’s steps to achieve
interoperability among providers to help overcome geographic challenges to
outreach.
These case studies offer in-depth analysis of the elements of some innovative
e-money initiatives that have influenced project outcomes and digital financial
landscapes in terms of expansion of financial access and inclusion. The analysis
focuses on stakeholders at all levels, highlighting common critical elements or
“game changers” that fast movers have implemented, but which the early movers
overlooked, preventing them from reaching their full potential.
Received wages
In the past year 19.2 27.5 35.1 33.2 22.3 24.7 32.4
In the past year, rural 18.9 24.6 34.2 29.5 22.9 23.5 27.6
In the past year, income, poorest 40% 14.4 14.7 29.6 25.0 17.3 18.9 25.6
In cash 86.2 56.9 82.0 37.9 69.7 74.0 50.1
Into an account at a financial institution 20.1 48.7 18.0 79.1 32.1 33.6 54.3
Through a mobile phone 1.5 25.5 0.0 11.7 0.0 0.4 1.2
Source: 2014 Global Findex Survey data, http://datatopics.worldbank.org/financialinclusion/.
Note: — = not available. Not all questions were asked in all countries. The 2014 Global Findex Survey did not calculate global averages
for these indicators.
Although promising outcomes are observed in each of the cases, the heavy
presence of cash as the dominant choice of payments highlights the persistent
challenges at the entry level of getting people to fully embrace e-money as
the pathway to a fuller array of financial services including savings, credit, and
insurance.
than 62 percent of adults identify ATMs as their main mode of withdrawal, com-
pared with the upper-middle-income country average of 56 percent. Nevertheless,
people use ATMs mainly for cash withdrawal, even though banks have enabled
these customized ATMs to also handle utility, travel, and person-to-person pay-
ments at relatively low cost. Although mobile money is available in Thailand, it
is not used to a significant degree: only 1.3 percent of all adults have a mobile
account. Debit card ownership is fairly high, at 55 percent, but debit card use
(8 percent) is lower than the East Asia and Pacific, upper-middle-income country,
and world averages (15 percent, 20 percent, and 23 percent, respectively).
In India, cash dominates all types of transactions, and financial inclusion
numbers are comparatively low (appendix A, table A.1). However, the impact of
the recent digital financial inclusion drive in India (described in Part II of this
volume, chapters 4 and 6) is evident when the 2011 and 2014 numbers are com-
pared: adults with accounts increased from 35 percent in 2011 to 53 percent by
2014. This impressive growth bodes well for achievement of the goals for
UFA2020. However, the transaction comparison shows cash dominance in all
areas, representing a challenge for the government and financial institutions alike.
The share of adults with mobile accounts is 2.4 percent, comparing favorably to
regional and world averages (2.6 percent and 2 percent, respectively), although
transactions using mobile money are negligible (except for receipts of payments
for agriculture products). Encouraging people to move away from cash would be
a priority for India.
The Philippines is included as a case study because mobile money initiatives
originated in the Philippines in 2001, long before Kenya’s M-Pesa mobile money
platform started in 2007. Given the constraints on brick-and-mortar financial
institutions due to the archipelagic nature of the country, one would have
expected mobile money to flourish. However, only 4 percent of adults have
mobile money accounts (appendix A, table A.4). While this rate is higher than
the regional and lower-middle-income country averages (0.4 percent and
2.5 percent, respectively), it compares poorly with the 28 percent of adults who have
bank accounts. The Philippines’ total rate of financial inclusion—31 percent—is
less than half the strong rate of financial inclusion in East Asia and the Pacific,
where adult inclusion averages 69 percent. Remittance numbers are higher
(34 percent receiving and 21 percent sending), but these are undertaken mainly
through money transfer operators (mostly pawnshops). All transaction types
reveal cash dominance. The discussion of the Philippines case study in Part II of
this volume (chapters 4 and 6) will highlight the reasons why mobile money
failed to gain traction.
The case of Indonesia, as noted earlier, represents achievement of interop-
erability to help overcome geographic challenges to inclusion. On most finan-
cial indicators, Indonesia remains below average in the region despite
substantial progress between 2011 and 2014 (appendix A, table A.2).
The share of adults with an account at a financial institution rose from
20 percent in 2011 to 36 percent in 2014, still below the averages of 42 percent
for lower-middle-income countries and 69 percent for East Asia and the Pacific.
Part II presents the empirical evidence on critical enablers that are game
changers in successful e-money deployments, as follows:
Part III draws on the lessons of experience to distill guiding principles for suc-
cess and measures that would help avoid deficiencies that have constrained the
pace of scaling-up in several South Asian countries, as follows:
Notes
1. Throughout this volume, “developing countries” refers to low- and middle-income
economies as defined in the World Bank’s Income Classifications, based on estimates
of gross national income (GNI) per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas
method. As of July 1, 2016, low-income economies are those with 2015 GNI per
capita of US$1,025 or less. Middle-income economies are those with 2015 GNI per
capita of US$1,026 to US$12,475 (“upper-middle-income” economies having 2015
GNI per capita of US$4,036 to US$12,475). “Developed countries” refers to
high-income economies, which are those with 2015 GNI per capita of US$12,476 or
more. Classification by income does not necessarily reflect development status.
For more information, see https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase
/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups.
2. Enterprise Surveys refer to firm-level surveys of a representative sample of an econo-
my’s private sector. The surveys cover a broad range of business environment topics
including access to finance, corruption, infrastructure, crime, competition, and perfor-
mance measures. Since 2002, the World Bank has collected these data from face-to-
face interviews with top managers and business owners in over 155,000 companies in
148 economies. For more information about the Enterprise Surveys, see http://www
.enterprisesurveys.org/.
3. For more about the UFA2020 initiative, see the overview brief on the World Bank
website: http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialinclusion/brief/achieving
-universal-financial-access-by-2020.
4. Data also from Global Findex 2014 Survey, http://datatopics.worldbank.org
/financialinclusion/. The name of “M-Pesa,” Kenya’s mobile-phone–based branchless
banking service, is derived from M for mobile and “pesa” (Swahili for money).
5. South Africa has issued 10 million cards covering 16 million beneficiaries.
6.
Data from Global Findex 2014 Survey, http://datatopics.worldbank.org
/financialinclusion/.
7. The total inclusion figure differs from that in the Global Findex 2014 data (appendix A,
table A.7) because the BOT (2014) methodology differs from that of Findex. Among
other differences, 7.8 percent of households that voluntarily do not use financial services
are not considered “excluded” in the BOT survey, so they are implicitly counted within
the BOT (2014) “inclusion” figure.
8. Findex data come from the Global Findex Database, http://datatopics.worldbank.org
/financialinclusion/. The data are compiled using the Gallup World Poll Survey and
measure how adults in 143 economies around the world manage their day-to-day
finances and plan for the future.
9. Also treated in this study (chapter 5) along with South Africa as exemplary social
grant transfer payment programs are Mexico’s Oportunidades and Brazil’s Bolsa
Família programs, which were considered for in-depth case study fieldwork.
The choice was made to pursue fieldwork and in-depth treatment of South Africa’s
biometric chipped debit card program because it is considered a more flexible
e-money product as an effective entry point into the financial system by the poor.
That is, poor grant recipients can use their chipped card at any bank ATM or point of
sale (POS). By comparison, the prepaid cards used in Mexico and Brazil are “closed
loop” and are primarily used for identifying the grant beneficiary for cash-in/cash-out
transactions at limited locations.
10. Figure may differ from other data sources depending on definitions and methodology.
FSD Kenya and CBK (2013) provide a 70 percent figure for overall financial inclusion
in Kenya.
11. Figures depend on definitions and methodology. For Thailand, for example, BOT
(2014) reports somewhat higher figures for financial inclusion than the Findex Survey
2014.
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Part I introduces the topic of financial inclusion (chapter 1), discusses its impor-
tance, presents definitions, and explains how digitizing money, payments, and
other financial transactions can facilitate inclusion of the unbanked and finan-
cially underserved population (chapter 2). It also sets forth the key stakeholders
in the process of applying digital innovations to achieve greater financial inclusion
(chapter 3).
According to Kempson and Whyley (1999a, 1999b), there are five major
forms of exclusion:
• Access exclusion, where segments of the population remain excluded from the
financial system because of either remoteness or the process of risk manage-
ment of the financial system
• Condition exclusion, when exclusion occurs because of conditions that are
inappropriate for some people
• Price exclusion, when financial products are unaffordable
• Savings help households manage cash flow spikes, smooth consumption, and
build working capital.
• Access to formal savings options can boost household welfare.
• Insurance can help poor households mitigate risk and manage shocks.
• New types of payment services can reduce transaction costs and seem to
improve a household’s ability to manage shocks through shared risks.
• Financial access improves local economic activity: at the macroeconomic level,
empirical evidence shows that financial inclusion is positively correlated with
growth and employment.
• Financial inclusion can improve the effectiveness and efficient execution of
government payment of social safety net transfers (government-to-person, or
G2P, payments), which play an important role in ensuring the welfare of many
poor people.
• Financial innovation can significantly lower transaction costs and increase
reach, which is enabling new private sector business models that help address
other development priorities.
Table 1.1 Estimated Financial Inclusion Gap, Globally and by Region, 2008
Share using
Adult population Using financial Not using financial financial services
Region (millions) services (millions) services (millions) (%)
Middle East and North Africa 191.70 63.28 128.42 33
Central Asia and Eastern Europe 381.87 195.00 186.87 51
East Asia 1,471.20 607.90 863.29 41
High-income OECD 588.94 539.65 49.29 92
Latin America and the Caribbean 387.13 136.82 250.31 35
South Asia 1,039.50 435.76 603.74 42
Sub-Saharan Africa 370.02 74.43 295.60 20
Total 4,430.35 2,052.83 2,377.52 46
Sources: Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch 2013, based on Honohan 2008.
Note: OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. “Adult population” is defined as ages 15 years and older. “Financial
services” includes both formal and semiformal financial services (that is, from unregulated microfinance institutions but not from mobile
money accounts).
Figure 1.1 Share of Adults with a Financial Services Account, by Region, 2014
South Asia 46
Sub-Saharan Africa 34
Middle East 14
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Percent
In terms of financial access, South Asia ranks above the Middle East and
Sub-Saharan Africa regions, with around 46 percent of the adult population hav-
ing accounts (figure 1.1).5 Thus the financial inclusion gap—measured in terms
of the number of adults without an account in a formal financial institution or a
mobile money account as the proxy—is around 54 percent.6
In recent times, retail payment systems development in Asia as a whole
has been impressive, although growth rates in South Asia have been low
relative to those in East Asia (China, Japan, and the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea) and in Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore,
and Thailand). It is also noted that technology-driven retail payment ser-
vices have clearly demonstrated their contribution to reducing poverty
(especially in East Asian and Southeast Asian countries) by ensuring the
availability and affordability of financial services—in other words, financial
inclusion.
However, until recently, no meaningful correlation has been established
between payment services and poverty reduction, although some prelimi-
nary attempts to establish such a relationship are now apparent (as in Cull,
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch 2013). As such, the potential of retail pay-
ment services as a poverty reduction measure has still not been explored
fully, primarily because of the narrow range of indicators used to measure
poverty reduction as well as the labeling of payment services as an informa-
tion and communication technology (ICT) or information technology (IT)
enabler rather than as a business proposition or a potential measurement of
the social well-being of the people. Ideally, this perception will change with
Figure 1.2 Share of South Asian Adults with a Financial Services Account, by Country, 2014
Sri Lanka 83
India 53
Nepal 34
Bhutan 34
Bangladesh 31
Pakistan 13
Afghanistan 10
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Percent
Figure 1.3 Share of South Asian Adults with a Financial Services Account, by Gender and
Country, 2014
India 62.5
42.6
Bhutan 39.0
27.7
Nepal 36.7
31.3
Bangladesh 32.9
25.2
Afghanistan 15.8
3.8
Pakistan 14.2
3.0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Percent
Male Female
45
40
35
Total score, 2004–08
30
25
20
15
10
tio h
tio ic
op ts
op ts
tio M
tio M
tra nc
tra ph
pe un
pe un
tra AT
tra AT
n
n
le
le
n
n
ne bra
ne ra
00 co
00 co
ne ic
ne ic
pe og
,0 ac
,0 ac
pe aph
pe aph
pe hic
ch em
r 1 sit
r 1 an
r
r
ra
og
pe po
og
pe Lo
D
og
Ge
De
m
Ge
De
an
br
70
65
59
60
50
40
Percent
35
30
24
20
10
0
Total adults Financially Below US$1.25 Below US$2
excluded adults a day a day
The fact that South Asia accounts for a third of the world’s poor (World
Bank 2016) indicates the challenge that these financial inclusion indicators
pose for addressing poverty in the region. However, one needs to be prudent in
interpreting these statistics or generalizing the results, as they may not have
fully captured the more recent technology-based financial services that are
being successfully delivered in some countries in South Asia, especially in
Bangladesh, India, and Sri Lanka.
Age dependency on the working-age population is another important
dimension that cannot be ignored, especially when considering a country’s
poor.9 At the base of the pyramid, living with less money means having very
little control over economic outcomes and virtually no ability to save for
unforeseen events. The ramifications of financial exclusion for working-age
adults inevitably pass on to their dependents. In South Asia, the age depen-
dency ratios of the young (ages 0–14 years) and old (ages 65 years and older)
are 46.4 percent and 7.9 percent, respectively.10 Therefore, in South Asia,
there are nearly 55 dependents per 100 working-age adults, on average.
Thus, the total financially excluded population in South Asia can be considered
to exceed 1.5 times the number of working-age adults identified as financially
excluded.
Figure 1.6 Remittances and Other Resource Flows to Developing Countries, 1990–2015
700
600
FDI
500
US$, billions
400 Remittances
300
e
91
01
20 1
90
92
93
98
99
00
02
03
08
09
10
94
04
95
96
05
06
97
07
20 f
20 f
f
12
1
13
14
15
19
20
20
19
19
19
19
19
20
20
20
20
20
20
19
20
19
19
20
20
19
20
20
Source: Ratha, Ayana Aga, and Silwal 2012, from World Bank estimates and World Development Indicators Database.
Note: FDI = foreign direct investment; ODA = official development assistance. e = estimated; f = forecast. “Developing countries” refers to low- and
middle-income economies as defined in the World Bank’s Income Classifications. As of July 1, 2016, low-income economies had 2015 gross
national income (GNI) per capita of US$1,025 or less. Middle-income economies had 2015 GNI per capita of US$1,026 to US$12,475.
while for Sri Lanka remittances offset as much as 85 percent of the country’s
trade deficit in 2010 (Samuel 2016).
Remittances have become a significant source of external funding in the
developing world in general, having quadrupled in the past decade, with an
apparent opportunity to increase flows to South Asia. According to the
International Organization for Migration (IOM), more than 105 million people
around the world are migrant workers seeking better opportunities in a foreign
country.11 Global international remittances in 2012 were estimated at US$514
billion, a 10.8 percent increase from 2011, including US$401 billion sent to
developing countries (Klapper and Singer 2014).
For South Asian countries, remittances have been a stable source of
income, with strong growth potential mostly driven by steady economic
opportunities in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.12 Nepal is
among the top recipients of migrant remittances in the world:13 in 2012, the
share of remittances reached 25 percent of its gross domestic product
(GDP) and climbed to a staggering 29 percent of GDP by 2013 (table 1.2).
In 2012, India was the top recipient in the world in terms of value, with
over US$70 billion in receipts; Pakistan was seventh on the list of top earn-
ers, with remittance receipts totaling US$14 billion (Ratha, Ayana Aga, and
Silwal 2012).
agents are largely absent in rural areas, mobile money may offer a solution to
these problems.
Although the world has recognized remittance flows as a key contributor
to poverty alleviation, little effort has been devoted to improving payment
instruments and services through which remittances flow from one country
to another or from remitter to receiver. Many remitters are frustrated at the
remitting point (capturing end) because of the nonavailability of direct pay-
ment instruments and the high cost of transactions. Remittance receivers, for
their part, are equally frustrated at the receiving end (disbursement point)
because of delays in crediting accounts (transmission delays or bank floats)
and high commissions or fees.
Recent innovations by the nonbank money transfer service providers (such
as Western Union and MoneyGram) have helped to speed transfer services, but
at a cost to remitters and, in some instances, to the remittance receivers as well.
Banks have made few attempts to speed up remittance flows at affordable
costs in a satisfactory manner. The remittance corridors that have been estab-
lished have remedied bank-based remittance issues to some extent, although
further improvements can be made to payment instruments and services.
It is clear that there is a huge opportunity for South Asian countries to
improve financial inclusion—particularly for the poorer segments of the
population—by using innovative methods, tools, and applications to harness
inward remittance flows. Effective e-money solutions should provide benefits to
customers in terms of proximity, safety, reliability, cost, usability, and diversified
services that match the needs of the customers, who would, in most cases,
otherwise be excluded from the formal financial system.
Notes
1. Findex data from the Global Findex Database, http://datatopics.worldbank.org
/financialinclusion/. Findex data are compiled using the Gallup World Poll Survey
and measure how adults in 143 economies around the world manage their
day-to-day finances and plan for the future. The indicators are constructed using
survey data from interviews with more than 150,000 nationally representative and
randomly selected adults over the 2014 calendar year (approximately 1,000 people
from each country).
2. For the 2014 Global Findex Survey data, see http://datatopics.worldbank.org
/financialinclusion/.
3. Global Findex 2014 Survey data, http://datatopics.worldbank.org/financialinclusion/.
4. In 2015 the international extreme poverty and poverty lines were reestimated at
US$1.90 and US$3.10 per person per day, respectively, using 2011 purchasing power
parity (PPP) exchange rates. The previous extreme poverty and poverty lines had been
US$1.25 and US$2.50 per person per day, respectively, using 2005 PPP exchange
rates.
5. Global Findex 2014 Survey data, http://datatopics.worldbank.org/financialinclusion/.
6. Although, according to the Honohan (2008) study (table 1.1), 58 percent of South Asian
adults do not use or have access to available financial services, the Findex 2011
data showed the rate of financial exclusion to be around 67 percent, and the 2014
Findex exclusion rate is calculated to be around 54 percent (figure 1.1). The difference
in data collection methodologies may account for the different estimates. Honohan’s
study is based on household surveys as well as on data from banks and microfinance
institutions, many of which may not qualify as “formal” by the Findex definition. The
Findex data are culled from a random sampling survey. Arguably, Honohan’s study
includes more variables and data points that may explain South Asia’s microfinance
phenomena and the region’s higher level of inclusion when compared with Findex
2011 data. The Global Findex 2014 data include not only accounts at formal financial
institutions but also formal transaction accounts, such as mobile money.
7. The other South Asian exception, Maldives, is not included in the Global Findex
dataset.
8. The number of adults represents around 35 percent of South Asia’s total population.
9. The age dependency ratio is a measure showing the number of dependents (ages 0–14
years and over 65 years) in relation to the total working-age population (ages 15–64
years).
10. Age dependency ratios are based on data from the Global Findex Survey 2014 (http://
datatopics.worldbank.org/financialinclusion/) and the World Bank’s 2015 World
Development Indicators dataset (http://data.worldbank.org/products/wdi).
11. For this and other data on international labor migration, see the IOM website: https://
www.iom.int/labour-migration.
12. The GCC member states include Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and
the United Arab Emirates.
13. Country remittance data (as a share of GDP) are from the World Bank’s 2015 World
Development Indicators Database (http://data.worldbank.org/products/wdi).
14. The cost of sending money to East Asia and the Pacific remained substantially stable
during the period, at 8.1 percent, while in Latin America and the Caribbean, the cost rose
marginally to 6.8 percent (World Bank 2015b). The average for the Middle East and
North Africa declined to 8.2 percent, while in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, the aver-
age cost was 6 percent including the Russian Federation (7 percent excluding Russia).
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What Is E-money?
The World Bank (2012) defines electronic money (e-money) instruments as
access mechanisms to prefunded accounts held at banks or nonbank institu-
tions that can be used through the Internet, payment cards, or mobile phones.
Such instruments have the potential to further reduce the dependence on
paper-based payment instruments by dramatically broadening access to elec-
tronic payments for a larger number of consumers, especially unbanked and
underbanked consumers.
According to the definition in the “Electronic Money Directive” issued by the
European Union, “electronic money” is monetary value as represented by a claim
on the issuer that is (a) stored electronically (including magnetically); (b) issued
on receipt of funds of an amount not less in value than the monetary value
issued; and (c) accepted as a means of payment by undertakings other than those
of the issuer (ECB 2009).
It is not necessary for e-money to be associated with a bank in making the
payment transaction, because e-money acts as a prepaid bearer instrument.
Table 2.1 Differences between Electronic Money and Virtual Currency Schemes
Aspect Electronic money schemes Virtual currency schemes
Money format Digital Digital
Unit of account Traditional currency (euro, Invented currency (Linden Dollars,a
U.S. dollars, pounds, etc.) that bitcoins, and other types) without
have legal tender status legal tender status
Acceptance By undertakings other than Usually within a specific virtual
the issuer community
Legal status Regulated Unregulated
Issuer Legally established electronic Nonfinancial private company
money institution
Supply of money Fixed Not fixed (depends on issuer’s
decisions)
Possibility of redeeming Guaranteed (and at par value) Not guaranteed
funds
Supervision Yes No
Type(s) of risk Mainly operational Legal, credit, liquidity, and
operational
Source: ECB 2012.
a. Linden Dollars are a currency used in the virtual world Second Life (SL), whereby SL users buy from and sell to one another
using the Linden, which is exchangeable for U.S. dollars or other currencies on market-based currency exchanges.
Virtual currency schemes such as Bitcoin are a form of e-money; however, unlike
virtual currency, the link between e-money and the fiat currency against which
the e-money is issued remains intact, because funds are expressed in units of that
currency such as U.S. dollars or euros (table 2.1).
It should also be noted that there is an ongoing debate on whether e-money
can be considered “money.” The principal objections raised, as discussed by Geva
and Kianieff (2005), are the following: First, e-money does not provide a distinct
unit of account. Second, payment with e-money may not be anonymous, because
the third-party obligor may keep a record of each transfer. Third, e-money may
be created other than by withdrawal from a reservable deposit with a commer-
cial bank, so as to undermine the central bank’s hold on monetary policy. Fourth,
e-money cannot constitute legal tender. However, these conditions can be
addressed (though not entirely eliminated) if e-money is universally accepted
and if the economy becomes truly digital.
The impact of developing e-money on a country’s monetary policy is a funda-
mental concern. Essentially, monetary policy is aimed at preserving price stabil-
ity; to do that, the monetary authority manages the money supply through
various policy tools. If e-money is created by converting cash or deposit accounts,
there won’t be new money creation, hence no additional impact on monetary
policy. Consequently, digital financial applications typically ensure that the total
value of e-money is mirrored in a bank account in the banking system. Although
the bank account can earn interest on the balance, e-money in the digital pay-
ment system cannot.
Payment systems enable people and businesses to pay bills, buy goods and
services, remit money, and collect dues. Moreover, they help governments and
regulators to pay salaries, pensions, and other remunerations, disburse social
grants and other benefits; and collect taxes, fees, and dues from the general
public. Transformative innovations in the payment systems offer alternative
digital channels, such as real-time payments using mobile phones and smart-
phones, cards, and Internet, thereby enabling faster, more secure, and more effi-
cient services at lower cost. While some of these options may not work for the
financially excluded, others, such as ubiquitous access to mobile phones, can
enable efficient and low-cost payment alternatives to traditional methods.
Tarazi (2011) highlighted the cost implications of branch versus branchless
banking, demonstrating that significant savings can be achieved in moving toward
branchless banking, which would positively affect the value propositions
involved in offering services to poor people (figure 2.1). Often, digitizing pay-
ments is the first step toward becoming a cash-lite society. Many countries may
not go beyond this point, but even so, the impact of this measure alone on finan-
cial inclusion would be significant.
Figure 2.1 Sample Relative Costs of Payment System Infrastructure, from Bank Branches to Mobile Phone
$250,000
Traditional
branch $50,000
$10,000
Branch
in store
ATM
$2,000
Agent with
POS terminal
$400
Agent with
mobile
$0
No agent
(cashless)
Source: Tarazi 2011. © Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP). Reproduced, with permission, from CGAP. Further permission required for reuse.
Note: ATM = automated teller machine; POS = point of sale. Dollar amounts shown indicate the approximate capital cost of each
technology.
Even today, many central banks and policy makers in the bankcentric develop-
ing countries consider payments as part of information and communication
technology (ICT) and information technology (IT) and continue to ignore the
potential of mobile-based payment systems. This is primarily because of igno-
rance and also a vested interest in traditional financial service providers—that is,
banks and approved financial institutions.
On the contrary, many advanced-country central banks have appointed
national payment councils (NPCs) to educate all stakeholders involved in pay-
ment system development for both large-value and retail payments. Although a
tremendous amount of progress has been achieved in advanced markets such as
Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, little or no achievement is recorded
in developing- and emerging-country NPCs.
Some central banks have become “onlookers” as market practitioners, and
financial market infrastructure (FMI) providers have overtaken them by
keeping up with emerging trends in technology. In this context, it is imperative
to enhance the capacities and knowledge of senior policy makers and regulators
as to the wide-ranging benefits of payment system development when it comes
to achieving broader social and economic advantages—including those related
to effective monetary management, the establishment of financial system
stability, poverty reduction, and the promotion of financial inclusion and access
to finance.
In most developing countries, adopting these systems can be a revolutionary
experience by providing access to a previously unbanked population. Digitizing
payments can lead to tangible efficiencies in the form of huge cost savings and
increased efficiency for payers, as in the following examples:
Main payment Mainly paper Mixture: paper and Mainly electronic Almost all electronic
instruments (typically cash; maybe electronic (cards (mobile used for bill (use of mobile and/or
in use some checks) used at ATMs, some payments and card at point of sale
online banking) remittances) through inter-
connected switches)
Source: BFA 2012. © Bankable Frontier Associates (BFA). Reproduced, with permission, from BFA. Further permission required for reuse.
Note: ATM = automated teller machine; B2P = business-to-person; G2P = government-to-person; POS = point of sale; P2B = person-to-business;
P2P = person-to-person.
The BFA (2012) study recognizes that these shifts may not always be
linear; however, each shift can bring significant benefits in terms of cost, reli-
ability, safety, proximity, and even access to new markets and opportunities
for users.
The earlier examples from Brazil, Kenya, and Mexico provide evidence to
amply demonstrate that the use of innovative e-money and digital payment solu-
tions has brought previously excluded people into the formal financial system.
These developments are encouraging for cash-based South Asian countries,
where only 46 percent of adults are financially included.2 Moving away from
cash, therefore, would continue to open access to the formal financial system for
many of South Asia’s unbanked.
• Political economy risks stem from vested interests that resist the introduc-
tion of disruptive technologies, as well as legal and regulatory risks arising
from lack of governance codes, payments laws, Anti-Money Laundering and
Combatting Funding of Terrorism (AML/CFT) laws, other laws and
regulations.
• Cybersecurity risks may result from the failure to enable institutions with the
capacity to ensure the efficient functioning of systems and protect against
cyberthreats.
• Risks to the payments system may compromise system functions if the service
providers do not adequately understand the digital customer base or the infra-
structure requirements.
• Principal-agent risks must be addressed to minimize revenue losses, fines and
other reprimands by the regulators, fraudulent activities and corruption, and
loss of reputation.
• Risks to customers result not only from inadequate information and under-
standing of e-money but also from lack of consumer protection and ade-
quate redress mechanisms, identity theft, and liquidity-related issues, among
others.
Cybersecurity Risks
In promoting financial inclusion through digital payment instruments and chan-
nels, policy makers and regulators should also pay attention to external disruptive
elements such as cybercrimes that can compromise databases and the function-
ing of technology-based products and services. Although policy makers have
urged market participants to work together to combat cybercrimes, service pro-
viders in most emerging and developing markets have not taken such calls seri-
ously enough. Nor have they consented to coordinate or cooperate with peers in
reducing costs involved in establishing preventive measures, including legal and
regulatory measures.
In general, high-value payment systems, such as real-time gross settlement
systems, are closely monitored, and service providers observe best practice and
work within rigorous regulatory frameworks. As such, high-value payment
systems are relatively safer than retail payment services, which consist of an
array of payment instruments and channels, mostly digital. Retail service pro-
viders include nonbank institutions, whose commitment to prudent payment
services can be questionable, given the scale and use of ad hoc infrastructure
platforms. Whereas potential damage to a high-value payment system can be
far more severe, given the high volume and value as well as the criticality of
such transactions, retail payment services also require prudence and effective-
ness in surveillance and monitoring.
The Bank for International Settlements Committee on Payments and
Market Infrastructures (BIS/CPMI) 24 guidelines4 are important to ensure
that digital services and devices are safe and do not exclude the poor, as these
guidelines have been prepared to capture operations of all financial market
infrastructure providers and participants. In the local context, the applicability
of some of the existing legal and regulatory frameworks may not be adequate
to cover digital payment services. Hence, policy makers and regulators may
need technical advice and support from international organizations in dealing
with external disruptions such as cybercrime.
Although relatively small in value, a cyberthreat against retail and micro-
level digital finance service providers can have serious consequences for the
poor and vulnerable. The micro-level service providers can be wiped out, while
the clientele can lose their lifetime savings and wealth (if any), even under a
mild form of cyberattack. Unfortunately, because of heavy competition as well
as their small scale and lower profitability, many service providers in developing
countries do not appear sufficiently concerned about the potential impacts of
cyberattacks to observe international best practice cyber protocols and security
guidelines intended to cushion the impact of cyberthreats. In this regard, efforts
are needed by both international and national bodies that deal with cyber-
threats to coordinate and promote the observance of international protocols
and best practice by DFS providers.
and focus mostly on the large-value systems. The case studies reflect the impor-
tance of developing e-money, as defined in this report, as an integral part of a
country’s national payments framework that is covered by the payments law
and enabling provisions.
Principal-Agent Risks
The principal-agent risk or problem arises because the MNO or DFS provider
must depend upon a network of agents to provide on-the-ground services
directly to the customer. Because of the large geographical distribution of
agents, network management often is employed to monitor and manage agent
performance and ensure that agent incentives are aligned with those of the
principal, the DFS provider. Agents and agent networks introduce new opera-
tional, financial crime, and consumer risks, many of which are due to the physi-
cal distance between agents and the provider or the agent network manager and
the resulting challenges to effective training and oversight. Operational risks
include fraud, agent error, poor cash management by the agent, and poor data
handling. In addition to the financial crime risks of fraud and theft (including
data theft), agents may fail to comply with AML/CFT rules regarding customer
due diligence, handling records, and reporting suspicious transactions. Agents
may also take actions that reduce transparency (for example, on pricing, terms,
and recourse), engage in abusive treatment of customers (including overcharging),
or fail to handle customer data confidentially (McKee, Kaffenberger, and
Zimmerman 2015).
Box 2.2 Doing Digital Finance Right: The Case for Stronger
Customer Risk Mitigation
Research in 16 countries concerning customers’ perceptions of and experiences with digital
financial services (DFSs) revealed seven perceived risk areas:
• Inability to transact due to network or service downtime. This most commonly cited risk area
can lead to risky customer behaviors such as leaving cash with an agent to conduct a trans-
action later when the network is back up. It also presents challenges if customers need
money urgently and cannot cash out until the network resumes.
• Insufficient agent liquidity. This is the second most common risk-related area that com-
monly prevents customers from transacting and accessing their money. This problem
particularly plagues bulk payment recipients (such as G2P [government-to-persons]
recipients): because many receive their transfers all on the same day and want to cash out
immediately, agents struggle to meet liquidity demands. The recipients are often among
the poorest in a country, and the extra fees and the delay in receiving their benefits can
seriously affect their ability to meet basic needs.
• Complex and confusing user interfaces. This customer risk is exemplified by the difficult-to-
resolve experience of a user who sends money to a wrong number, which often also
results in financial loss. Difficulties with the menu also cause many customers to seek
assistance conducting transactions, requiring them to share private information (such as
their personal identification number [PIN]) with an agent, family member or friend—
exposing them to potential fraud by the person providing help.
• Inadequate provider recourse. Complaints and dispute resolution options are unclear, caus-
ing the customer to lose time, money, and mobile-phone airtime to either travel to cus-
tomer care centers or wait on hold for call center staff who may or may not be able to solve
the problem.
• Nontransparency of fees and other terms. This issue prevents customers from fully under-
standing the details of services and leaves them vulnerable to agent misconduct and
price fraud.
• Fraud perpetrated on customers. Customers can experience fraud at the hands of provider
employees or external fraudsters who use “social engineering” scams such as phony pro-
motions to obtain money or information from unsuspecting customers.a Agents can also
perpetuate fraud by charging unauthorized fees.
• Inadequate privacy and protection of customers’ personal data. Disclosure of data-handling
practices is often weak, with details available only on a website to which few consumers
have access and in “legalese” that is difficult to understand.
Notes
1. Data from the Poverty Topic Overview, World Bank, http://www.worldbank.org/en
/topic/poverty/overview. US$2 a day represents the median poverty line of d
eveloping
countries in 2005 purchasing power parity (PPP) terms (Chen and Ravallion 2010).
2. South Asian financial inclusion data from the Global Findex Survey 2014, http://
datatopics.worldbank.org/financialinclusion/.
3. This opposition persists despite the fact that the target clientele for digital payments
are generally the unbanked and the poor, whose market needs, multitude of small
transaction values, and remote locations are extremely costly and not at all interesting
to traditional financial institutions.
4. In June 2014, the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) was
renamed as the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) under a
new charter. Hence the BIS/CPSS 24 guidelines issued in 2012 (BIS and IOSCO
2012) were renamed the BIS/CPMI 24 guidelines.
Bibliography
Babatz, G. 2013. “Sustained Effort, Saving Billions: Lessons from the Mexican
Government’s Shift to Electronic Payments.” Evidence Paper, Better Than Cash
Alliance, New York.
BFA (Bankable Frontier Associates). 2012. “The Journey toward ‘Cash Lite’: Addressing
Poverty, Saving Money, and Increasing Transparency by Accelerating the Shift to
Electronic Payments.” BFA study for the Better Than Cash Alliance, Somerville, MA.
BIS and IOSCO (Bank for International Settlements and International Organization of
Securities Commissions). 2012. Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures. Basel:
BIS; Madrid: IOSCO.
Bruno, P., F. Istace, and M. Niederkorn. 2014. “The Future of Global Payments.” Excerpt
from “Global Payments 2014: A Return to Sustainable Growth Brings New
Challenges,” a report of the Financial Services Practice, McKinsey & Company,
New York.
Chen, S., and M. Ravallion. 2010. “China Is Poorer than We Thought, but No Less
Successful in the Fight against Poverty.” In Debates on the Measurement of Global
Poverty, edited by S. Anand, P. Segal, and J. Stiglitz, 327–40. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
ECB (European Central Bank). 2009. “Electronic Money Directive (2009/110/EC).”
Directive 2009/110/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
16 September 2009. Official Journal of the European Union L 267: 7–17.
———. 2012. Virtual Currency Schemes. Frankfurt: ECB.
FSD Kenya and CBK (Financial Sector Deepening Kenya and Central Bank of Kenya).
2013. “FinAccess National Survey 2013: Profiling Developments in Financial Access
and Usage in Kenya.” Survey results report, FSD Kenya and CBK, Nairobi.
Geva, B., and M. Kianieff. 2005. “Reimagining E-money: Its Conceptual Unity with Other
Retail Payment Systems.” In Current Developments in Monetary and Financial Law,
Volume 3, 669–705. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
Godinho, M. Mira. 2010. “Economic Development Revisited: How Has Innovation
Contributed towards Easing Poverty?” In INNOVATION: Perspectives for the
21st Century, 269–85. Madrid: BBVA.
Introduction
In examining how financial inclusion can be advanced through the use of digital
channels, four levels of stakeholders that are essential to financial inclusion
pathways can be identified:
• Policy makers must provide leadership and vision in setting the policy agenda,
and regulators should develop an enabling, nonprohibitive regulatory environ-
ment that may be iteratively layered as the market matures.
• Enabling institutions should develop a rich ecosystem and infrastructure in
which digital finance can grow.
• DFS providers should develop and operate various digital solutions and options
that create, preserve, and enhance positive value propositions for the custom-
ers who are predominantly from the base of the pyramid.
• Customer preferences should be identified, and customers must be given the
opportunity to acquire financial education to better understand how they can
benefit from financial inclusion and use digital financial services to manage
their needs as well as access other economic opportunities in a much more
cost-effective manner.
Bibliography
BIS and IOSCO (Bank for International Settlements and International Organization of
Securities Commissions). 2012. Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures. Basel:
BIS; Madrid: IOSCO.
The main reasons why people lack access to formal financial systems seem
to be similar across the globe. Those reasons include poverty, lack of proximity,
cost, not having documentation or identification, lack of financial literacy, low
acceptability, risk aversion, and low levels of trust. Cultural factors also play an
important role. Banks and most formal financial institutions are unwelcoming to
the poor, whose numerous and tiny transactions would be unacceptably costly
for most formal institutions to handle. Even microfinance institutions require a
group dynamic for savings and lending to the poor.
The technology for going digital and enhancing financial inclusion is sound
and proven, the concept is appealing to both policy makers and donor com-
munities, and service providers have found it to be a viable business case.
However, successful adoption and deployments are still few and far between.
To date, cash remains the preferred medium of transactions in developing
countries and even in many developed countries. So what is holding back
application of digital systems and e-money for the delivery of affordable,
accessible, and appropriate financial products, especially to people who are
excluded from or underserved by formal financial markets?
Almost all of the transformational technologies are proven and available as
off-the-shelf solutions that need little or no customization, at affordable prices.
Hence, it is reasonable to expect that successful deployments—such as the M-Pesa
mobile money platform in Kenya and social grants transferred through a biometric-
enabled debit MasterCard in South Africa—could easily be replicated. However,
such expectations have often met with disappointment when restrictions,
insufficient underlying conditions, or other challenges constrained attempted
deployments from achieving the kind of traction shown by those success stories.
Digital finance and payment services have transformed the lives of many
people across the globe. The Mobile Economy 2015—a report by the London-
based Groupe Speciale Mobile Association (GSMA)—counted 255 live mobile
money services across 89 markets as of December 2014. The number of regis-
tered mobile accounts also grew to reach 299 million, with a majority of the
accounts in Sub-Saharan Africa (figure II.1).
Nevertheless, the full potential of mobile money deployments remains
untapped in some regions, such as Latin America and South Asia, partly because
of regulatory barriers. Realizing the role that nonbank mobile money providers
can play in fostering financial inclusion and economic growth, an increasing
number of regulators are establishing new regulatory frameworks for mobile
money. In 47 out of 89 markets where mobile money is available, regulation now
allows both banks and nonbanks to provide mobile money services in a sustain-
able way, the GSMA report found.
The main purpose of Part II of this volume is to understand which factors
enable successful deployment of digital money initiatives and why so few coun-
tries have succeeded in becoming fast movers with tremendous results. The study
investigates the extent to which barriers are unique to each market, e-money
deployment mechanisms, client segments and country context, and what lessons
can be applied more generally.
Through analysis and examination of the case study countries and their
respective e-money deployments, Part II of this volume identifies a set of critical
enablers that have shaped the successes by unlocking value that allows for trans-
formational outcomes. “Critical enablers” are game changers in enhancing the
effectiveness and efficiency of e-money schemes in a transformative manner.
They could be either general social enablers or program-specific enablers that
help overcome major barriers to service proliferation. The lessons learned can
benefit countries that plan to launch or are already in the process of launching
similar initiatives, by identifying early implementation priorities.
At the macro level, such enablers include progressive policy leadership and an
enabling, nonprohibitive regulatory environment. At the meso and micro levels,
Figure II.1 Number of Active Mobile Money Services Worldwide, by Region, 2001–14
260 255
240 232
220
200
180 174
Number of active mobile money services
120 116
100
80
66
60
38
40
20 16
10
4 5 6
1 1 1
0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Source: Groupe Speciale Mobile Association (GSMA), The Mobile Economy 2015 (London: GSMA, 2015). © GSMA. Reproduced, with permission,
from GSMA; further permission required for reuse.
Introduction
According to World Bank 2014 Global Findex data, 2 billion largely poor people
worldwide lack access to a financial transaction account, of which 30 percent
live in three South Asian countries—Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan.1 As such,
governments and policy makers are prioritizing strategies and policies to make
poverty reduction and economic development a reality, especially for the rural
poor. Policy makers have to broaden their scope and commitment to make mean-
ingful investments in responding positively to market innovations that open up
new ways of delivering financial services. In doing so, while enabling inclusion
strategies, policy makers will have to also ensure compatibility with financial
stability and consumer protection.
Achieving financial inclusion requires greater emphasis and understanding
of the poor and rural markets to establish a suitable enabling environment.
Peake (2012) sums this up as follows:
The rural customer segment has distinct characteristics compared with its urban
counterpart. In most countries, agriculture and related activities represent a signifi-
cant percentage of rural incomes, which typically result in seasonal flows and ebbs
of income. Rural actors ... face greater constraints in terms of distance, travel times
and infrastructure development ... so trust plays a huge role in engaging with them.
Rural areas are also known to have lower literacy levels, lower mobile handset pen-
etration rates and poorer network coverage. Finally, rural consumers are typically
slower to adopt new brands and products but are also slower to give them up.
The factors cited by Peake apply broadly to people at the base of the pyramid,
regardless of their geographical location. This understanding drives the policy
leadership and regulatory efforts in certain developing countries to design and
create policy and regulatory frameworks for innovative strategies to include the
poor—or at times to allow for market developments in advance of regulatory or
policy reforms.
• Why the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) allowed M-Pesa to launch in a regulatory
vacuum
• Why India’s Jan Dhan Yojana program has the potential to be the flagship
financial inclusion plan of the decade
• How Thailand’s joint policy and regulatory vision contributes to enhanced
financial inclusion in the country
• How Sri Lanka ensures that regulations keep pace with technological advance-
ments that drive market developments
• How proactive policy leadership could enable two early movers—the
Philippines and Maldives—to reach their full potential
• M-Pesa could legally operate mobile-money business, and in doing so, it would
not be conducting banking business;
0 20 40 60 80 100
Percent
• The risk management structure was adequate for consumer protection; and
• The pooled trust account in a reputable commercial bank, where money
collected by Safaricom’s agents is deposited, ensured that there would be no
intermediation and also satisfactorily addressed the consumer credit risks.
CBK realized that, under the existing laws such as the Banking Act, they
could not formally license or directly regulate the nonbanking institution on
money transfer. However, it had full supervisory oversight of the pooled trust
accounts that M-Pesa would hold with the commercial banks. Furthermore,
the CBK Act (which established CBK in 1966) granted CBK broad powers
to establish, regulate, and supervise payment and settlement systems. At the
time CBK was considering the M-Pesa proposal, the National Payment
Systems bill was still in draft mode. Instead of blocking the launch of M-Pesa
until the National Payment Systems bill was passed, CBK issued a letter of
no objection to Safaricom with conditions for consumer protection, preven-
tion of money laundering, and regulatory reporting requirements.
M-Pesa was launched in March 2007 (see box 4.1). To its credit, CBK asked
Safaricom to undertake two comprehensive technical assessments by Consult
Hyperion2 to evaluate the operational risk and efficiency of the M-Pesa plat-
form; cleared the legal issues; and, once M-Pesa was launched, got a demand-
side survey done through the Financial Sector Deepening (FSD) Kenya Trust in
2008. Although Kenya was not yet compliant with the Financial Action Task
Force’s (FATF) Anti-Money Laundering and Combatting Funding of Terrorism
(AML/CFT) guidelines, Vodafone (the majority shareholder of Safaricom,
which developed M-Pesa) ensured that the platform complied with its own
international standards as well as with Kenyan legislation.
CBK came under tremendous pressure—from a disgruntled banking
community, the political leaders, and the media—for allowing a nonbank to enter
the payment space. The commercial banks were hostile to what they perceived as
Safaricom’s entrance into their field of financial service delivery. This hostility was
exacerbated by the fact that the banks were not permitted to commence agency
banking until 2010. However, having done its due diligence, CBK was able to
convince the political leaders of the merits of using this unconventional route to
enhance financial inclusion, and also used the opportunity to highlight the gaps
in the regulatory system due to not yet having payments laws in place.
Thereafter, CBK and the Ministry of Finance issued joint statements
informing the public of the due diligence process conducted by CBK and also
gave assurance on the operational safety of M-Pesa. CBK relied on moral sua-
sion and mutual cooperation with Safaricom. The CBK’s National Payment
System Department deliberately focused its oversight of M-Pesa—and of all
subsequent mobile money services—on the integrity of the information technol-
ogy (IT) platform and the service delivery system, and it continually monitors
transaction flows and operations. Soon after M-Pesa’s 2007 launch, CBK also
conducted an audit of M-Pesa to confirm that M-Pesa is not a savings instrument.
which partnered with its affiliate Safaricom in Kenya to conduct workshops with
financial institutions to identify the barriers to increasing access to financial services.
A partnership was formed between a microfinance institution (MFI), a bank, and
Safaricom to develop a pilot to enable microfinance loans to be paid with the help of
mobile phones. (Cook 2015)
Funding from DFID through a competitively awarded challenge grant allowed a pilot to
be launched taking a “test and learn” approach. In 2007, there were no regulations applicable
to a mobile money service. The Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) took the brave step of allowing the
innovation to move ahead, taking a risk-based approach. M-Pesa was launched in March 2007
focusing on its core money transfer function, marketed as “Send Money Home.”
It is suggested that the government’s bold regulatory decision to allow the launch of
M-Pesa without the tight regulatory restrictions found in many other countries was driven by
the following key factors:
First, the business model had been thoroughly piloted and tested as a project under the
regulatory radar with flexible funding from FSD Trust.
Second, the government was the majority shareholder in the company that stood to ben-
efit and had a dominant market position, meaning that
• Risk to the company from failure of the program was relatively small;
• Risk to the financial system likewise was relatively small, since the government was a
backer; and
• Competitors were not in a strong position to lobby against the dominant, government-
owned company—and they probably had no idea that M-Pesa would be so successful.
That CBK was willing to take a risk was also quite likely a legacy of the success of K-Rep
Bank as a microfinance commercial bank, which had helped change attitudes in CBK as it
supported legislation enabling MFIs to be licensed separately from banks.
Sources: Cook 2015; Safaricom information from Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Safaricom.
All these good practices have enabled CBK to develop the necessary robust regu-
latory framework subsequent to commencement of M-Pesa’s actual operation.
0.8
0 20 40 60 80 100
Percent
Formal prudential Formal registered Excluded
Formal nonprudential Informal
(including mobile money)
80
70
Percentage of population
61.6
60
50
39.1
40
29.2 29.5 27.7 28.4
30
20 17.1
13.5 13.5
9.3 9.1
10
1.8 3.5 3.5
0 0.0
Bank usage SACCO usage MFI usage Informal group MFSP usage
usage
2006 2009 2013
If crores of Indians are outside the ambit of organized financial services because
they do not have a bank account even after 68 years of independence, I call it
financial untouchability. Gandhiji ended social untouchability, it is our mission
to eradicate this kind of untouchability now to fight poverty.
—Narendra Modi, prime minister of India, at the launch of
Jan Dhan Yojana, August 28, 2014
deposits (current and savings) but cannot provide credit facilities; and (b) “small
finance banks,” which can offer a wide range of deposit (current, savings, and
time deposits) and credit products, primarily microcredit, and also provide pay-
ment and remittance services.
The importance of this yet-to-be-proven payments bank concept is that it
enables institutions with wide-reaching agent networks such as mobile net-
work operators (MNOs) to offer payment transactions in a scaled-up fashion.
Their challenge would be to match the already low-cost alternative transmis-
sion mechanisms that thrive in India and to attract customers to deposit with
them. At some point in time, regulators will have to rethink the prohibition
on payment banks offering credit products. The basic premise is that there
has to be a business use case for them to proliferate.
Table 4.1 Jan Dhan Yojana Account Status, by Bank Type, May 2015
No. of RuPay Balance in
No. of accounts (millions)
debit cards accounts Share of accounts
Bank type Rural Urban Total (millions) (Rs, billions) with zero balance (%)
Public sector banks 67.48 56.44 123.92 115.92 134.80 53.70
Regional rural banks 23.98 4.20 28.18 20.58 30.48 54.09
Private banks 3.85 2.68 6.53 5.88 9.92 49.65
Total 95.31 63.31 158.62 142.38 175.20 53.60
Source: PMJDY 2015.
Note: “RuPay” refers to a domestic debit card scheme launched in 2012 (initially called IndiaPay) by the National Payments Corporation of India as
an alternative to foreign gateways with high transaction costs such as MasterCard and Visa and to consolidate various payment systems in India.
Rs = Indian rupees.
and a RuPay Kisan credit card; and an overdraft facility of Rs 5,000 activated
after six months of operation of the account. An incentive of life insurance cover-
age of Rs 30,000 was offered for those opening accounts before January 26, 2015
(celebrated as Republic Day in India) (Economic Times 2014).
Phase I of the scheme targeted three goals in the first year of implementation:
universal access to banking facilities, provision of financial literacy, and provision
of basic banking services. Phase II (August 15, 2015, to August 15, 2018) included
the creation and development of a Credit Guarantee Fund to cover defaults in
overdraft accounts and to provide microinsurance8 and unorganized sector pen-
sion schemes. Coverage of households in hilly, tribal, and difficult areas and
including every adult or student in all households is also planned.
The second phase is important because recent (2013) National Sample
Survey Office (NSSO) data show that there are close to 57.7 million small-scale
business units, mostly sole proprietorships, that undertake trading, manufacturing,
retail, and other small-scale activities (Debu C 2015). Comparatively, organized
sector and larger companies employ 12.5 million individuals. Today, the
micro- and small-business segment is unregulated and without financial support
from the formal banking system.
The promised Credit Guarantee Fund (Phase II activity) was launched in April
2015 as the Micro Units Development and Refinance Agency Ltd. (MUDRA)
Bank, with capital of Rs 200 billion (US$3.13 billion) and a credit guarantee fund
of Rs 30 billion to address the issue of lack of access to funds faced by small entre-
preneurs. Although the government had considered evolving the MUDRA Bank to
be the regulatory body for MFIs, this plan did not proceed. Nevertheless, MUDRA
provides its services to small entrepreneurs outside the service area of regular
banks, by using “last mile” agents. About 5.77 crore (57.7 million) small businesses
have been identified as target clients using the NSSO survey of 2013. Only 4 percent
of these businesses get finance from regular banks.
Figure 4.4 Zero-Balance Trends in Jan Dhan Yojana Accounts, India, 2014–15
90
81.5
79.4
80 76.8 76.9 76.3
75.9 73.1
76.0 74.3
75.5 73.3
73.9 72.7 68.5
70 72.4 67.3
70.5 70.2
67.8 62.8
66.6 61.0
60 61.9 57.9
57.3
57.2 56.8 55.9
50
Percent
40
30
20
10
0
Sept. 30, Oct. 31, Nov. 29, Dec. 31, Jan. 31, Feb. 28, March 31,
2014 2014 2014 2014 2015 2015 2015
Regional rural banks Overall Public sector banks Private banks
The accident insurance will come into effect only if at least one transaction
takes place within a 45-day period. The overdraft facility will depend on the
balance in the account. Given the poverty and illiteracy among the target
groups, a comprehensive awareness campaign is a must. The trend in zero-
balance accounts is downward-sloping, which is encouraging (figure 4.4).
Hence, it looks as if the government’s awareness campaign is working.
The saving on leakages that occur in various subsidy schemes will more than
compensate for the cost of this massive exercise of financial inclusion. Leakages
are estimated to be between Rs 500 billion and Rs 750 billion (around 5 percent
of GDP).
Realizing that incentives are needed to keep these accounts from remaining
or turning dormant, the government is inclined to channel all benefits, including
state and local government benefits, through these accounts. Though DBTs and
the mandate for continued eligibility for accident insurance coverage are incen-
tives to operate the bank account, there is nevertheless the risk that many
accounts not covered under DBTs may fall into dormancy. Even for accounts
covered by DBTs, operations may be confined to receiving the DBT remittances
and withdrawal. However, notwithstanding the realities of how poor people
operate basic no-frills accounts, the potential for a program to bring millions of
unserved people into the formal financial system is a remarkable feat.
+31%
1,200 3/4G 1,159
1,103
1,043
982
1,000 919
894 327 409
Mobile connections, millions
600 526
2
0
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
3G and 4G 2G
System for Mobiles (GSM) mobiles and not on Code Division Multiple Access
(CDMA) mobiles.10 A platform common to all banks—instead of each bank hav-
ing to develop its own platform—is a strategic move by NPCI to help banks focus
on customers while NPCI manages the technology behind the platform. NUUP
is currently available in 11 languages. NPCI and the regulators successfully
brought in all 12 MNOs.
NUUP is using the Immediate Payment Service (IMPS) platform, which is a
real-time interoperable payment mechanism by NPCI. IMPS offers an instant,
24-hour, 7-days-a-week interbank electronic funds transfer service through mobile
phones. IMPS transfers money instantly within banks across India through mobile,
Internet, and automated teller machines (ATMs), which is not only safe but also
economical both in financial and nonfinancial terms. There are no charges on
NUUP transactions. However, IMPS fund transfer charges would be applicable.
in the world. Emboldened by the support and facilitation received from the
Central Bank, Telecommunication Regulatory Commission and our custodian
bank [Hatton National Bank], we are confident that this pioneering initiative
to deliver a nationwide Mobile Money will deliver an unprecedented level of
financial inclusion through the empowerment of millions of Sri Lankan citizens
with electronic money transfer and payment facilities.
—Hans Wijayasuriya, group chief executive, Dialog Axiata PLC,
at the launch of eZ Cash, June 2012
CBSL decided to allow mobile money services through MNOs after making
sure that necessary safeguards are in place. It is a trailblazer in enabling tech-
nological innovations by setting up benchmark regulatory practices that are
both progressive and nonprohibitive. CBSL enacted necessary laws early on.
It created a level playing field where both banks and nonbanks including
MNOs can offer digital money; established enabling regulatory and oversight
functions that are not overtly restrictive; ensured that customer rights and
information are well protected; and worked with stakeholders across the board
to understand market needs and innovations. These positive reforms did not
happen overnight.
Legislative Background
Being a pioneer in the South Asia region to adopt technology-based financial
services, Sri Lanka has broader legislation than its regional neighbors for payment
systems and electronic transactions—and a wide range of payment instruments
and payment services to support the country’s banking and finance industry.
CBSL has always been at the helm, providing leadership, guidance, and a legisla-
tive framework to enable such developments.
The most significant decade in terms of regulatory enactments relating to
payment reforms and e-money in Sri Lanka has been the 2001–10 period.
Under the central bank’s modernization project that commenced in 2001,
CBSL’s objectives have been redefined by an amendment to the Monetary Law
Act in 2002 to recognize financial system stability as a statutory objective in
addition to the price and economic stability objective. Starting with this
momentous amendment, a series of other important financial regulatory laws
were enacted during this period.12 Additionally, several amendments were
introduced to the existing laws to facilitate new payment and settlement sys-
tems and processes (Jayamaha 2014).13
The rapid pace of the passage of these laws indicates the proactive leadership
of CBSL in establishing the core legal infrastructure required to facilitate the
developments of electronic transactions and mobile payments. As part of the
payment systems modernization undertaken in 2001, to improve efficiency and
enhance the level of integrity, the Payment and Settlements Systems Act (PSSA)
was enacted as the comprehensive legislation governing payment, clearing, and
settlement systems. The Act provided CBSL with oversight and regulatory pow-
ers over the national payment system as well as payment systems and money
transfer service operators. PSSA was the key legislation that enabled nonbanks to
offer mobile money services.
The Electronic Transactions Act of 2006 provided the underlying framework
for electronic and mobile transactions, based on the model laws developed by the
United Nations (UN) Commission on International Trade Law, which recognizes
and enables enforceability of electronic transactions, and the UN Electronic
Communications Convention. Three fundamental policy-related principles form
the basis of the Act: (a) technology neutrality, (b) functional equivalence, and (c)
party autonomy. Technology neutrality is ensured by not dictating the technology
Institutional Infrastructure
The ICTA of Sri Lanka, the government’s apex information and communication
technology (ICT) institution, ably supported CBSL in establishing key legislation
and a comprehensive information security framework for the financial sector to
ensure greater consumer confidence as the financial sector transitions toward a
cash-lite electronic mode. ICTA addressed the legal validity and enforceability of
electronic transactions—the main concerns for the financial community in tran-
sitioning to electronic mode—by spearheading the enactment of the Electronic
Transactions Act in 2006.
take the lead. TRCSL is agreeable and pledges support to cooperative efforts to
ensure smooth implementation of regulatory initiatives.
• An operator that provides cellular mobile telephone services under the author-
ity of a license issued under the Sri Lanka Telecommunications Act (No. 25 of
1991) as amended; or
• A company registered under the Companies Act (No. 7 of 2007) having an
unimpaired capital of at least Rs 150 million or such other amount deter-
mined by the Central Bank, other than a company limited by guarantee, an
offshore company, or an overseas company, within the meaning of the
Companies Act.
just by dialing in. A low initial registration burden for basic wallet size reduces
customer resistance to registration and hence enables faster growth in the use of
mobile money.
Regulatory Oversight
Due to the very nature of mobile transactions, mobile money initiatives are
deemed to be low-value, low-risk systems. Hence, oversight and monitoring of
service providers is not expected to be as extensive as supervision conducted for
banks and other financial institutions that are also subject to prudential norms
such as the Basel Core Principles (BIS 2012). However, the magnitude of mobile
money proliferation in Kenya suggests that such initiatives have the potential to
become systemically important payment systems.
Because of the innovative nature of these initiatives, often the laws and regula-
tions have gaps and gray areas that create oversight challenges and may lead to
negative reactions by the regulatory authorities. For example, in 2014, China’s
central bank suspended mobile payments initiated through Quick Response
(QR) codes amid security concerns regarding the identification process involved
with those transactions. The bank’s decision immediately affected China’s two
largest third-party mobile payments providers: Alibaba Group Holding Ltd.
(which operates Alipay) and Tencent Holdings Ltd.19 In Kenya, M-Pesa func-
tioned for more than seven years without a regulatory framework before CBK
was able to pass the National Payment System Regulations in 2014.
In Sri Lanka, having the PSSA enacted in 2005 afforded greater clarity and
transparency to the oversight role of CBSL, and the Act legally empowered the
CBSL to regulate, supervise, and monitor the payment systems and service pro-
viders. Thus, understanding the need for legal certainty,20 CBSL issued regula-
tions under PSSA to license the mobile payment service providers.21 Thereafter,
mindful of the innovative nature of mobile money services and lessons learned
from previous mobile money deployments that failed to gain traction, CBSL
issued the Mobile Payments Guidelines (No. 2 of 2011) for Custodian Account
Based Mobile Payment Services, which provides the monitoring framework for
nonbank service providers to operate. Issued under the PSSA, these regulations
and guidelines ensure that the regulation and oversight function supports pay-
ment system stability and also instills public confidence in mobile money ser-
vices. The reporting requirements and regulatory and oversight provisions are
clearly set out in the guidelines. Moreover, CBSL has also entrusted the custodian
bank of the licensed service provider with the additional responsibilities of for-
mulating KYC and CDD procedures for the service provider, monitoring and
supervision of the service provider for compliance with regulations and guide-
lines, and auditing of all e-money accounts with the service provider (an MNO
in this case).
Customer Protection
In line with good-practice prudential requirements, CBSL requires the MNOs to
“ring-fence” the customers’ funds in custodian accounts at licensed commercial banks.
74 23 2 1
0 20 40 60 80 100
Percent
Banked Formal other Informally served Excluded
1
Bangkok 86 12 1
Central 75 20 4 1
1
North 76 22 1
Northeast 70 27 2 1
South 70 26 3 1
0 20 40 60 80 100
Percent
Banked Formal other Informally served Excluded
four regions of the country, with the Bangkok area showing higher access
through banks at 86 percent (figure 4.7).
The high level of access can be attributed to the deliberate policies pursued
by the Royal Thai government (RTG) over the years to extend financial services
to the underserved and unserved population. These policies have been largely
Map 4.1 Distribution of Financial Institution Branches, Automated Machines, and EFTPOS
Terminals in Thailand, by Region, 2013
North
Central Northeast
South EFTPOS
Source: BOT 2013. © Bank of Thailand. Reproduced, with permission, from Bank of Thailand; further permission
required for reuse.
Note: EFTPOS = electronic funds transfer at point of sale; SFIs = specialized financial institutions.
37
Bank branch
21
36
Post office
26
35
ATM
19
29
Market
20
8
Grocery store
7
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Average time to touchpoint, minutes
Rural Urban
Source: ADB 2013a, based on FinScope Thailand 2013 Survey. © Asian Development Bank (ADB).
Reproduced, with permission, from ADB; further permission required for reuse.
Note: ATM = automated teller machine.
mobile money solutions, would be the most cost-effective way to improve access
to finance and payment services in these areas.
Banks also offer fund transfers competitively through their ATM networks
(56,851 ATMs throughout Thailand in 2013 [BOT 2013]). ATM transfers are
done free of charge within the same bank, while charges between two different
banks cost around B 30 (about US$0.90). If the ATM of a different bank is used
for withdrawals, up to four transactions per month are free of charge, while trans-
actions beyond the fourth will have a B 10 fee. Moreover, Thailand Postal
Company also acts as a banking agent to commercial banks and uses its 1,295
post offices to perform banking services. (Unlike retail shop payment agents, post
offices are allowed to accept deposits.) The above analysis indicates that banks
dominate the funds transfer and remittance markets.
Table 4.2 Financial Service Providers in Thailand, by Customer and Transaction Type, 2013
Customer type Loans Savings Utility payments Remittances
Farmer BAAC BAAC 7–11, door-to-door ATM, postal orders
Poor villager Village Fund, BAAC, banks, 7–11, door-to- ATM, postal orders
BAAC, informal or door, utilities
moneylenders CDD savings group office
Poor urban NBFI, Banks 7–11, trade outlets ATM
dweller moneylenders,
pawnshops
Middle class Banks, NBFI, Banks 7–11, trade ATM, cashiers’
credit union outlets, banks checks
Businessman Banks, NBFI Banks Banks ATM, cashiers’ checks
Source: ADB 2013b.
Note: ATM = automated teller machine; BAAC = Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives; CDD = Community
Development Department; NBFI = nonbank financial institution; “Village Fund” refers to the Village and Urban Revolving
Fund, a semiformal microcredit institution established by the government to make credit available to the villages.
the game, mobile money hasn’t scaled up to the levels initially predicted.
By 2014, active mobile money users were still fewer than 7 million on a com-
bined subscriber base of over 105 million mobile subscribers. In 2014, 69 percent
of the population had neither an account in a formal financial institution nor a
mobile money account—hence were excluded from the formal financial
sector.28
The archipelagic structure of around 7,100 islands in the Philippines poses a
big challenge to financial access, with most people living a great distance from
financial services. Transporting money also has serious security concerns in the
islands. As of 2014, more than 605 of 1,634 cities and municipalities did not have
banks, and around 8 million people were living in these unserved areas (BSP
2015).29 Conversely, almost 43 percent of all deposit accounts in the Philippines,
amounting to 71 percent in value terms, were in the National Capital Region,
commonly known as Metro Manila, with a population of just over 12 million of
the Philippines’ 100 million population (Tayag 2014).
At a glance, therefore, the Philippines seems to be the ideal place for mobile
money to proliferate. Mobile-phone penetration is over 110 percent, and the
country is called the texting capital of the world, with over a billion texts sent
every day (GSMA 2014).30 The Philippines has the eighth largest number of
Facebook users in the world, and 36 percent of the population use the Internet.
Furthermore, the average monthly remittances from overseas Filipinos to their
beneficiaries in the Philippines have exceeded US$2 billion since 2013 (Martin
2017).31 Moreover, the policy makers and regulators are flexible in enabling
innovative money services to function. Hence the low mobile money user num-
bers continue to baffle the mobile money experts. While there can be many
constraints for mobile money adoption and digital inclusion in the Philippines,
this study examines the policy and regulatory aspects that help or hinder this
process.
In the absence of such broader powers, it appears that some of the regulations
issued by BSP have had unintended consequences. Given the earlier blacklisting
by FATF, BSP had issued detailed AML/CFT guidelines, which were very restric-
tive on the use of agents. According to Circular No. 471 of 2005, all agents have
to be registered with the BSP as remittance agents by providing appropriate
documentation and are subjected to the AML Act. Such agents also have to
attend mandatory AML training seminars typically held in Manila.39 Additionally,
according to the guidelines, every time funds are transmitted or received
(cash-in/cash-out), the agents are mandated to maintain originator information
by requiring the sender to fill out personal information, recipient, and source of
funds, among other things. Transaction records are supposed to be kept for five
years. The ID check is carried out once, using one of the 20-plus ID types
approved by the BSP.40
Furthermore, the agents cannot perform opening of new accounts. Such oner-
ous rules are deterrents to the scaling-up of agent networks. As a result, the
outreach of the MNOs has been limited, and people who want to use these
services are discouraged. Authorities could consider allowing nonbank agents to
open customer accounts, allowing remote registrations with lower thresholds,
and allowing for tiered KYC procedures to encourage more agents and customers
to participate in the mobile money schemes.
Mobile money services are trying to gain traction in the payment and
funds transfer space against stronger and more established alternative chan-
nels, such as pawnshops for money transfer and banks or payment centers for
bill payment. It is, therefore, crucial that mobile money providers offer a
cheaper, less complicated solution to attract the lower-value segments.
Hence, simpler regulatory guidelines would enable mobile money providers
to compete in the low-income market by providing consumers with a low-cost and
effective option, thereby addressing many of the Philippines’ financial access
issues.
inhabited islands in 26 atolls, and one-third of the inhabited islands have a popu-
lation of less than 500, while 71 percent of the inhabited islands have fewer than
1,000 people (MMA 2015). Although the number of bank accounts exceeded
the population by 2014, people living in the outer islands and atolls experience
difficulties in accessing financial products and services through traditional
banking outlets and existing financial infrastructure such as bank branches,
Internet banking, ATMs, and POS terminals.
The wide geographical dispersion and lack of financial institutions and
infrastructure translates into high transaction costs, decreased financial acces-
sibility, and greater security risks for people living and working in the atolls.
For example, people reportedly often send their ATM cards along with their
Social Security and personal identification numbers (PINs) through their
friends or relatives to withdraw cash (pension money, remittances, and other
receivables) from ATMs located in Malé or other islands where ATM services
are available. Thus, cash remains the dominant payment instrument in the
islands and outer atolls. Table 4.3 illustrates the increase in cash in circulation
from 2007 to 2014.
Bank of Maldives (BML) is the largest commercial bank, with 27 branches (of
which 20 are in atolls), 8 mobile Dhoni units,42 and 68 active ATMs (of which
27 are located in atolls). As of April 2014, the government of Maldives owned
62 percent of the shares of BML. The Bank recently launched self-service bank-
ing through 22 multifunctional ATMs installed across Malé and introduced its
first U.S. dollar ATM at BML headquarters in Malé. To facilitate payment
requirements of outer islands and atolls, BML operates an agent-based banking
solution backed by BML banking agents in 70 islands through Internet banking
and 3,610 POS card terminals (of which 1,087 POS merchants are in atolls
including resorts). BML provides clearing and settlements through its own
switch. According to BML, there is now a branch presence in every atoll in the
country except one.
From BML’s point of view, it is neither economical nor scalable to provide
agent-based banking services to all islands and atolls. In a rudimentary form,
BML operates cash-back POS facilities as part of its agent-based banking services.
By 2016, BML had announced plans to facilitate full person-to-person (P2P)
transactions through app-based mobile-phone banking facilities (already started)
and real-time POS transactions. This commitment was not fully realized.
Meanwhile, many of the islands are still being served by BML’s Dhoni cash
distribution system and limited agent-based banking facilities. However, anec-
dotal evidence suggests that Dhoni banking is unreliable in some atolls, and the
payment services offered by BML are unaffordable, even for those who live in
Malé, because of relatively high transaction costs—a consequence of BML’s
dominant position. For example, BML’s own card customers are required to pay
2.5 percent of the total value of a transaction for using BML’s own POS machines,
which is relatively high compared with other countries in the South Asia region.
Hence, BML’s branch network, agent network, and infrastructure, although
expanding, still leave many smaller outlying islands unserved.
On the other hand, operations of the other commercial banks (established as
branches of foreign banks), with the exception of Maldives Islamic Bank Pvt.
Ltd., are largely confined to Malé and mostly serve the corporate clients.
Although Maldives Islamic Bank shows interest in community banking, other
commercial banks have little interest in developing banking services in the outer
atolls. A few nonbank institutions also operate POS acquisition services in resorts.
Hence, in terms of availability and affordability of financial products and services,
the solutions to date seem to have fallen short in providing adequate financial
and payment services.
minimize the cost of interfacing for the participating banks, such as various
reporting systems and a “Converter Gateway” to facilitate payments. However,
BML refused to participate despite the MOU.
Unfortunately, the regulator (MMA) was unable to persuade BML to par-
ticipate in a national system that was designed to help provide access to a
large segment of the society, and the major shareholder (Ministry of Finance
and Treasury) was unwilling to interfere in BML’s business decision. The project,
therefore, was closed in 2013, having only operationalized the real-time gross
settlement (RTGS) system and part of the automated clearinghouse (ACH)
and unable to operationalize the mobile banking and the interoperable pay-
ment switch. As a result, the outer islands and atolls still have limited finan-
cial access.
“Maldives: Enabling a Non-Bank Mobile Money Solution.” The grant has pro-
vided the source of funds for expert advisory assistance to MMA, the govern-
ment, and Maldives’ MNOs to help implement (according to international best
practice) custodian and trustee arrangements, risk mitigation and consumer
protection, legal and regulatory amendments, and payment system oversight and
coordination mechanisms.
Progress is slowly but surely being made. The enabling regulation for MNO-
led mobile money solutions has been provided for under the Maldives Monetary
Authority Act while Maldives’ Payment Law still awaits enactment in Parliament.
With enabling regulation in place, both MNOs have activated e-wallets. While
interoperability and other synergies are still to come, the country is committed
to learning from the lessons of international good practice and to providing
greater levels of financial access to its citizens.
Notes
1. Global Findex Survey 2014 data, http://datatopics.worldbank.org/financialinclusion/.
2. Consult Hyperion was the lead information technology (IT) consultancy company
that developed the M-Pesa software.
3. Kenya financial inclusion data from Global Findex Survey 2014, http://datatopics
.worldbank.org/financialinclusion/.
4. The retail payments system includes automated clearinghouse (ACH) transactions,
automated teller machine (ATM) switches (Kenswitch and PesaPoint), over-the-counter
remittances, credit or debit card and point-of-sale systems, and e-money schemes
(mobile money and virtual money).
5. The “National Payment System Regulations, 2014” issued August 1, 2014, under the
National Payment System Act (No. 39 of 2011).
6. “Banking Correspondent” refers to a financial model in India whereby a representative
is authorized to offer services such as cash transactions where the lender does not have
a branch.
7. “Self-help group,” in this context, refers to a village-based financial intermediary com-
mittee that is most common in India, usually composed of 10–20 women.
8. Microinsurance is the protection of low-income people (those living on between
approximately US$1 and US$4 per day) against specific perils in exchange for regu-
lar premium payment proportionate to the likelihood and cost of the risks involved.
This definition is the same as one might use for regular insurance except for the
clearly prescribed target market: low-income people. The target population typically
consists of persons ignored by mainstream commercial and social insurance schemes,
as well as persons who have not previously had access to appropriate insurance
products.
9. Aadhaar unique ID and its link to DBTs are discussed in chapter 6 as a critical enabler.
For more information about the unique ID program, see the Unique Identification
Authority of India’s website: http://uidai.gov.in/.
10. CDMA (Code Division Multiple Access) and GSM (Global System for Mobiles) are
shorthand for the two major radio systems used in cell phones.
India; Italy; Japan; the Republic of Korea; Mexico; the Netherlands; the Russian
Federation; Saudi Arabia; Singapore; South Africa; Sweden; Switzerland; Turkey;
the United Kingdom; and the United States.
24. These costs include higher direct costs such as fees as well as indirect costs such as
transport costs, loss of daily wages, and so on.
25. Bank of Thailand Notification No. SorNorSor. 9/2553: Guideline for Appointing
Banking Agents. (In terms of the guidelines, agent activities are restricted depending
on the type.)
26. By 2016, there were more than 9,542 7-Eleven stores throughout Thailand, 44 percent
of them in the Bangkok area. For more about CP All Public Company Ltd., see “CP
All,” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CP_All.
27. ITMX was founded by the Thai Bankers’ Association as the ATM Pool Co. Ltd. in
1993, renamed as National ITMX in 2005. Created to satisfy Thailand’s requirement
to keep up with continuing global advancement in electronic commerce and payment
systems, its business policy follows the BOT’s Payment Systems Roadmap 2004.
28. Financial inclusion data from the 2011 and 2014 Global Findex Surveys, http://
datatopics.worldbank.org/financialinclusion/.
29. The Central Bank of the Philippines’ (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, or BSP) National
Strategy for Financial Inclusion states that the presence of other financial service pro-
viders such as pawnshops, remittance agents, money changers or foreign exchange
dealers, e-payment service providers, mobile banking agents, nonstock savings and loan
associations (NSSLAs), and credit cooperatives have helped significantly to enhance
the access to financial products and services in the unbanked areas. Accordingly, this
relates to 50,000 touchpoints, reducing the unserved municipalities from 36 percent
to 12 percent (196 municipalities); however, the number of adults with accounts
remains unchanged (BSP 2015).
30. However, unique mobile subscribers were 50.9 million in 2014, with an average of
two SIMs per subscriber (GSMA 2014).
31. In 2014, 38 percent of Filipino adults were receiving remittances from a family mem-
ber abroad. There were more than 10 million overseas Filipinos in 2013. Remittances
reached an equivalent of 8.5 percent of the country’s GDP in 2014 (BSP 2015).
32. Overseas Filipinos send an average of US$2 billion per month in international remit-
tances, equivalent to 8.5 percent of GDP (BSP 2015).
33. Circular No. 240 of 2000 required all banks to obtain prior approval from BSP before
launching e-banking services, while Circular No. 269 of 2000 set out the approval
process for a new e-banking service.
34. The SMART Money service earns a commission on the bank interchange fee charged
to merchants using banks other than BDO.
35. The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO)
is a nonprofit organization providing thought leadership and guidance on internal
control, enterprise risk management, and fraud deterrence.
36. Circular No. 511 of 2006.
37. Circular No. 542 of 2006.
38. A draft Payment and Settlement bill is in the parliament.
39. The BSP has agreed to allow EMIs to train their own agents and now allows them to
register many remittance agents with a single application. However, regulations are
yet to reflect these amendments.
40. There is no national ID in the Philippines, and the impact of having 20+ types of ID
documents is discussed in chapter 6, “Unique Identification.”
41. This case study was informed by the Policy Note entitled “Maldives: A Mobile Money
Operator-Based Mobile Money Solution,” prepared by Anoma Kulathunga and Ranee
Jayamaha (South Asia Finance and Markets Global Practice) as one of two outputs
from a World Bank mission to Maldives March 1–13, 2015. The mission team was led
by Thyra Riley.
42. Bank of Maldives PLC (BML), as Maldives' largest bank, provides financial services
throughout the country’s hundreds of atoll islands through 177 cash agents, 12 Self-
Service Banking Centers, and 5 Dhoni Banking Units.“Dhoni” refers to a traditional
multipurpose boat used in the Maldives. Dhoni Banking Units—comprising BML staff
teams—make over 2,000 trips a year to the distant atolls and outer atoll islands to pay
salaries and pensions, and to provide cash management services to agents and ATMs.
43. “Keesa” is Dhivehi for “wallet.”
44. Maldives has two MNOs: Dhiraagu and Ooredoo.
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Introduction
The development of digital services offers a huge opportunity to advance financial
inclusion and develop new markets through business models that are viable for
the base of the pyramid. A critical first step is to ascertain that a conducive digital
ecosystem and infrastructure are in place that can reach down to the poor and
vulnerable. For innovative digital financial initiatives to become reliable conduits
for financial inclusion, they must be accessible quickly and efficiently to promote
fast, reliable, simple, and affordable solutions. A major challenge is putting in place
all of the elements needed to go the last mile in terms of connectivity.
This chapter focuses on the critical meso- and micro-level elements of
interoperability; agent network management; mobile money add-on applications;
and biometric-enabled, card-based grant payment disbursement systems. The
analysis highlights the efficiency and proactive use of each of these elements by the
case study countries in delivering results and reaching meaningful scale. In terms of
financial inclusion, scaling-up does not mean just commercial viability; it implies
reaching the unbanked masses in a sustainable manner. The case studies discussed
in this chapter have reached or have shown the potential to reach scale and have
demonstrated how the ecosystem and infrastructure can be used as a digital rail
system to deliver an array of affordable services to the poor and the vulnerable.
Results from the World Bank survey on innovations in retail payment instru-
ments and methods highlight that the majority of innovative products and
mechanisms have limited interoperability, meaning that information cannot flow
seamlessly between different operating systems and platforms (World Bank
2012a). Less than 20 percent of the products were reported to be fully or
partially interoperable. Around 25 percent of the products and services sup-
ported some mechanism to exchange funds with traditional payment products.1
Although interoperability is considered to be best practice, evidently it is the
exception rather than the norm.
Most digital financial systems launched are closed-loop systems and propri
etary. Hence, the ability for the customers to transact with another service using
a different provider’s platform is limited. On the other hand, enhancing the value
proposition to the customers and furthering the social agenda through interoper-
ability may have costs in terms of possible higher rates,2 lower levels of account-
ability, and lower levels of investment resulting from greater difficulty in capturing
revenues relative to proprietary or closed-loop systems. Hence, it is necessary to
evaluate what level of interoperability a country should aim for based on the
financial landscape, the desired or targeted level of deepening, and the strategic
policy agenda. Ideally, payment system interoperability involves the ability of the
various players such as banks, nonbank financial institutions, payment system
providers, mobile network operators (MNOs), card acquirers, governments, busi-
nesses, and customers to send, receive, and process funds, documents, and other
instruments electronically through a common channel.
“Interoperability” is defined as “a situation in which payment instruments
belonging to a given scheme may be used in platforms developed by other
schemes, including in different countries. Interoperability requires technical com-
patibility between systems, but can only take effect where commercial agreements
have been concluded between the schemes concerned” (World Bank 2012a). In
the context of retail payment, multiple levels of interoperability are identified:
systemwide, cross-system, and infrastructure-level. A system that has only system-
wide interoperability enables competition among the participants of that system;
a system that has cross-system interoperability enables competition between
systems; and a system that has infrastructure-level interoperability enables the
same infrastructure to be used to support multiple payment mechanisms.
Given the focus on mobile money as a digital means of reaching the under-
served, the study examines interoperability as one of the critical elements in
enhancing financial and payment access to the poor. When a country has more
than one MNO offering their own mobile money solutions on proprietary plat-
forms with their own operating rules and networks of agents, measures to
achieve interoperability among MNOs are likely to be needed to optimize
outreach to customers who are not served or who are underserved by the bank-
ing community and to benefit from economies of scale, as well as to discourage
anticompetitive practices.
In reality, mobile networks are interoperable at a technical level, just as banks
are. Banks are able to allow customers of another bank to use their automated
teller machines (ATMs) at a higher fee, as do mobile networks and service pro-
viders for calls between them. Although interoperability may exist at this techni-
cal level, at a functional or more practical level, such limited interconnectivity is
not optimal.
In terms of mobile money interoperability, the important types are platform-
level interoperability (which permits customers of one service to send money to
customers of another service); agent-level interoperability (which permits agents
of one service to serve customers of another service); and customer-level interop-
erability (which permits customers to access their account through any sub-
scriber identification module [SIM]).
The most successful mobile operation, Kenya’s M-Pesa, is not a model for
interoperability as it is a closed-loop system. If an M-Pesa account holder wants
to send money to a non-Safaricom phone, they can do so and M-Pesa will gener-
ate a one-time code for them. The recipient will have to take this code to an
M-Pesa agent and must cash out; it is not possible to add to his or her e-wallet.
Hence, interoperability was not a factor in M-Pesa’s success.
Although M-Pesa’s market dominance acted as a barrier to interoperability,
interestingly, the recently passed Kenya National Payment System Regulations
2014 require “open systems capable of becoming interoperable with other pay-
ment systems in the country and internationally.” This newly minted provision in
the regulations helped the Kenyan Competition Authority to end agent exclusiv-
ity, so that agents are able to offer their services to any MNO.
Countries such as Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, and Thailand have
launched mobile money initiatives with diverse types of interoperability. Experiences
from these countries are summarized in the subsections that follow.
Sri Lanka: World’s First Full End-to-End Interoperable Mobile Money System
When Dialog Axiata, Sri Lanka’s leading MNO, launched Sri Lanka’s pioneering
mobile money service, eZ Cash, in June 2012, Sri Lanka already had high inclu-
sion numbers, with banks and nonbank financial institutions serving all parts of
the island. The Global Findex Survey 2014 shows that 83 percent of adults had
formal accounts in 2014, up from 69 percent in 2011.3 In 2014, the share using
financial institutions for saving and borrowing were 31 percent and 18 percent,
respectively. Genderwise, Sri Lanka has the highest equality in the South Asia
region, with 83 percent of adult women having accounts. Furthermore, the poor-
est also show very high inclusion numbers at 80 percent, while adults in rural
areas recorded a high 83 percent (table 5.1).
From the beginning, Dialog Axiata understood that mobile money would be
one more option for the Sri Lankans, and that they would not likely be able to
have an exclusive large footprint. They further realized that to compete with the
already established financial sector, the products and services that Dialog offered
would have to be tailored to the customers and provide more in terms of cost-
effectiveness, convenience, and value. Because not many Sri Lankans use credit
cards or similar card instruments, Dialog championed the small but voluminous
transactions that the banking sector was unlikely to pursue.
Table 5.1 Financial Inclusion in Sri Lanka Relative to South Asia and Lower-Middle-Income
Countries, 2014
Percentage
Sri Lanka:
Population, ages 15+ years: 15.3 million
GNI per capita: US$3,170
Lower-middle-
income
Survey item Sri Lanka South Asia countries
Account (ages 15+ years)
All adults 82.7 46.4 42.7
Women 83.1 37.4 36.3
Adults belonging to the poorest 40% 79.8 38.1 33.2
Young adults (ages 15–24) 85.2 36.7 34.7
Adults living in rural areas 83.4 43.5 40.0
Figure 5.1 Market Share of Sri Lankan Mobile Service Providers, 2014
3.1 million,
14%
4.64 million,
21%
4.86 million,
22%
Dialog Axiata Etisalat Hutch
SLT Mobitel Bharti Airtel
Lanka
Table 5.2 Transaction Cost Comparison for eZ Cash and mCash (continued)
Transaction type eZ Cash (SL Rs) Mobitel mCash (SL Rs)
Payment of goods at appointed merchants FREE FREE
Mini statement FREE FREE
Detailed printed statement 200 200
Balance check FREE FREE
Change PIN FREE FREE
Institutional payment FREE FREE
Sources: “eZ Cash Transaction Charges,” http://www.Ezcash.lk/pricing.php; “Transaction Limits and Charges,” Mobitel mCash,
http://www.mobitel.lk/mcash#Transaction Limits & Charges.
Note: CEB = Ceylon Electricity Board; LECO = Lanka Electricity Company (Private) Ltd.; NWSDB = National Water Supply and
Drainage Board; PIN = personal identification number; SL Rs = Sri Lanka rupees.
eZ Cash merchants around the country, and will continue to manage this agent
network, while adding any customer service networks of the new providers on
request. Dialog has also added to the network the flagship stores of Etisalat and
the Hutch shops that are located around the country. Dialog also manages the
back office and overall customer service issues that arise during the transactions.
But issues faced by customers that the two MNOs bring into the service will be
the responsibility of the respective MNO.
The system is enabled under the Payment and Settlement Systems Act
(No. 28 of 2005) by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL) (figure 5.2). Hatton
National Bank acts as the custodian bank for the entire eZ Cash service, and the
trust agreement is administered by Deutsche Bank. A third-party service pro-
vider (KPMG)4 acts as the customer profile manager between the eZ Cash
platform and Etisalat and Hutch, so that none of the MNOs have access to the
customer profiles of the other.
The cost and fee structure is the same within the interoperable system. Sending
money is free below SL Rs 500 (US$4) and sending more costs SL Rs 5 (US$0.03),
while the fee for receiving money is staggered and ranges from SL Rs 5 (US$0.03)
to SL Rs 100 (US$0.75).5 As can be seen by these low, affordable fees, the MNOs
pass on value to consumers.
As for revenue sharing between Dialog and the other two providers, the trans-
action revenue from the eZ Cash service is shared with Dialog and covers the use
of the eZ Cash brand, eZ Cash platform, and merchant network. Etisalat and
Hutch save by not having to develop the mobile cash operation. As a result, shar-
ing (for a fee) the eZ Cash platform is a win-win situation for all.
Retail
Internet/e-commerce
Utility/e-government
Customer profile manager Modern channel
(managed by third party;
ex. E&Y/KPMG/PWC) Merchant network
Partner network
User experience (#111#)
aligned to eZ Cash
Tariffs aligned to
World’s first ever end-to-end interoperable mobile payments system eZ Cash
featuring common merchant/northbound partners, top-up/withdrawal P2P—at engagement
network and uniform consumer experience stage
Source: GSMA 2014. © Dialog Axiata. Reproduced, with permission, from Dialog Axiata; further permission required for reuse.
Note: E&Y = Ernst & Young; P2P = person-to-person; PWC = PricewaterhouseCoopers.
Figure 5.3 Comparing Mobile Money Use in Tanzania and Kenya, 2007–13
25
21.9
Annual transaction values, US$, billions
20
17.8 17.7
15 13.5
10.6
10 8.4
5.4
5 3.4
1.9
0.18 0.6
0.1
0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Kenya Tanzania
(CRDB Bank and National Microfinance Bank) as well as the Bank of Tanzania
to craft a set of operational regulations for interoperability. Once the standards
are adopted, a common technical switch can be operationalized, if desired.
According to the International Finance Corporation (IFC 2015), the Tanzanian
mobile market is fairly evenly distributed among the larger three players, without
undue market dominance of any one player (figure 5.4). Hence, there is a healthy
competitive environment and broad customer awareness of mobile payments as
a tested and proven service. For the process of establishing interoperability of
mobile financial services, this meant that there was relative parity in negotiating
power between market actors and greater value in interoperating for both cus-
tomers and providers because of the potential number of connections. Global
Findex 2014 data show that the percentage of adults included had jumped from
11 percent in 2011 to 40 percent in 2014, with 32 percent included through
mobile accounts.11 If interoperability works as planned, Tanzanians will not only
be able to send money through the network but also connect to banks as well.
In the meantime, Tigo and Vodacom signed the mobile money interoperability
agreement in February 2015, thereby connecting M-Pesa and Tigo Pesa custom-
ers in Tanzania. Nearly 4 million Tigo Pesa customers and 7 million M-Pesa cus-
tomers will be able to transact with each other. The process is still ongoing, and
it remains to be seen how much fruit this collaboration will bear. Another impor-
tant interconnect collaboration is happening between the East Africa region’s
two biggest mobile money operators, Vodafone Group and MTN Group. This
will enable convenient and affordable international remittances between M-Pesa
customers in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Mozambique, and
Tanzania and MTN Mobile Money customers in Rwanda, Uganda, and Zambia.
Hence, interoperability seems to be picking up in the Africa region.
Zantel,
3%
Airtel Money,
21%
Vodacom M-Pesa,
47%
Tigo Pesa,
29%
Regulatory Bottlenecks
Regulatory barriers have inhibited the growth of agent and branchless banking
in Indonesia. The central bank, Bank of Indonesia (BI), did not allow agency
banking. Any person providing money transfer or cash withdrawal service needed
160
140
Market penetration, percent
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
Indonesia Malaysia Thailand Vietnam
Debit card penetration
Bank account penetration
Mobile-phone penetration
transfer and cash out money from any location across each other’s network.
Cash-ins are currently a cost for each mobile money deployment but may lead
to other more lucrative businesses, such as bill paying, other payment services,
banking, and so on.
Most important in this operation is the continuous dialogue among the
members. They still need to iron out many issues, some of them industrywide,
others system-specific. A primary concern is the protocol for customer grievance
and redress. They have already decided to address each operation bilaterally, and
end-of-the-day net settlement is to be done by the custodian bank in real time
with the BI payment system. Managing Anti-Money Laundering and Combatting
Funding of Terrorism (AML/CFT) regulations and training staff to perform KYC
and customer due diligence (CDD) duties in a tiered fashion and moving toward
risk-based supervision are other important aspects.
These measures are expected to lead customers to develop faith in the system
and, over time, to transition toward e-money transactions. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that many people still do not understand the value of mobile banking.
A survey carried out by Financial Inclusion Insights (FII 2015) found that only
around 3 percent of Indonesians were aware of the concept of mobile money,
and those who were aware had heard of only one type of service (figure 5.6).
Awareness raising is very important.
Indonesian Inclusion
Many Indonesians don’t have access to banks, but they do have access to mobile phones that could provide
financial services—yet few have ever heard of such mobile services.
Borrowed from 42
friends or family 42 Own or can 84
borrow a
mobile phone 68
Percentage of respondents
Percentage of respondents
Saved at a 27 Own a 72
financial institution 15 mobile phone 52
Adults with 26
debit cards 11
Have heard of a 8
money mobile
Borrowed from a 13 provider 3
financial institution 9
0 10 20 30 40 50 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Percent Percent
2014 2011 Urban Rural
Source: Schonhart 2015. Adapted with permission from Dow Jones, Inc. Further permission required for reuse.
Note: Left chart: Survey conducted of 1,000 respondents May 18–13, 2011, and May 3–June 4, 2014. Margin of error is +/−3.6 percentage points.
Right chart: Survey of 6,000 respondents conducted August–November 2014. No margin of error provided.
Banks in Indonesia are fully interoperable and have established their payment
and clearing services and ATMs. However, agent banking is yet to pick up. The
majority of ATM transactions are actually payments, not cash withdrawals, indi-
cating that there is a demand for self-service electronic payments. Opening up
interoperable services for MNO-led e-money is a smart early move, and MNOs
have gained on the banks. By building consumer trust and awareness, they can
secure this potentially untapped market. Either way, with a broader range of com-
petitive services to choose from, consumers will be the winners.
The world’s best innovative solution or product could fail to achieve its objec-
tives if the last mile problem is not solved in a cost-effective manner. Making the
final connection between consumers and the service or the product has often
proven to be disproportionately expensive to solve, or sometimes may be forgot-
ten in the focus on technological and other important problems. Chevrollier and
Schmidt (2014) sum up this reality:
A majority of the population in developing economies live in rural areas often
accessible only by poor quality road infrastructure. Furthermore, geographical isola-
tion or limited access to relevant information disconnects populations in many
developing countries from any business value chain. The consequence—which can
affect both urban and rural populations—is that products providing essential value
either do not reach the intended customers or are more expensive or lower quality
than the standard products that are accessible by other populations.
These challenges hold for financial services as well. Comparing case study
experiences of success in e-money deployments in some cases with inability to
reach a seemingly feasible target in others, the manner in which the last mile
problem is addressed is a critical element that often makes the difference. Even
if all the key elements appear to be in place—progressive regulators pass enabling
regulations, an innovative technology model exists that would be seamless in
operation, and there is supporting physical infrastructure or connectivity—if the
human element of the customer is not taken care of, the intended goal of wide-
spread, low-cost access to financial services by the poor may not be achieved.
According to the GSMA (2014), on average, there were 2.3 million mobile
money agent outlets globally in developing countries in 2014 (figure 5.7).
This is 4.3 times the average density of bank branches in these markets, which
2.5
2.0
Access points, millions
1.5
1.0
0.5
Agent Recruitment
Before the launch of M-Pesa, it was difficult to imagine the entrance of an MNO
into the field of financial services. The existing network of dealers that Safaricom
used to distribute airtime seemed the obvious choice to facilitate M-Pesa transac-
tions by providing cash-in/cash-out (CI/CO) services. An airtime dealer is an
independent company, typically with 5–20 retail outlets, selling airtime, mobile
phones, and other goods. These dealers quickly agreed to become M-Pesa agents
because of their trust in the Safaricom brand. Agents have to register the customers
by performing KYC/CDD checks, educate customers on available digital options,
and perform CI/CO functions.
To support rapid growth, Safaricom initially had to ensure that enough agents
were recruited to provide a viable service for users and, subsequently, balance
the number of agents with the numbers of customers to ensure that agents had
profitable businesses while customers did not face overcrowding and long wait-
ing times. The service was going to be successful only if a large network of agents
and customers was quickly established. Despite some initial lag in the growth of
agents relative to the growth of customers, engagement of agents picked up in
2009 and brought the agent-customer ratio down from a peak of 1 to 1,000 in
mid-2008 to about 1 to 600 by the end of 2009, and subsequently kept pace
(figure 5.8) (Davidson and Leishman 2012; Jack and Suri 2014). If Safaricom
had gotten the pace of scale-up wrong, M-Pesa could easily have failed.
In the early stages, Safaricom was able to use its reputation to bridge the gap
in trust that is typical for new products and services. Agents trusted that Safaricom
could launch a new profitable service, and consumers trusted Safaricom’s brand
enough to experiment with the new system. Safaricom enjoys greater consumer
confidence and trust than do many banks, and it is still Kenya’s most admired
brand. To support the launch and growth of M-Pesa, Safaricom needed to build
an ecosystem of actors. Each actor needed to be incentivized for Safaricom to
grow M-Pesa without compromising the quality of customer service.
20 100
Customers, millions
80
Agents, thousands
15
60
10
40
5
20
0 0
8
4
7
9
00
01
01
01
01
01
00
00
-2
-2
-2
-2
-2
-2
-2
-2
ar
ar
ar
ar
ar
ar
ar
ar
M
M
M
Customers Agents
Source: Safaricom.
The roles and responsibilities of these different actors have necessarily evolved
over the course of M-Pesa’s existence. That evolution has been pivotal to
M-Pesa’s success as it grew from start-up (albeit with sound corporate backing)
into a major provider. The roles and responsibilities of agents, aggregators, agent
network managers (ANMs), and superagents are summarized in table 5.3 and
detailed in table 5.4.
Incentive Structure
Since M-Pesa’s launch, agents have been incentivized to acquire customers for
M-Pesa with a K Sh 40 (US$0.47) commission paid when they sign a customer and
a further K Sh 40 when that customer makes his or her first deposit into an M-Pesa
account. A staggered commission is also given to agents for each deposit that they
receive and each withdrawal that they facilitate. It is free for customers to sign up
and free to deposit, with charges levied on withdrawals and P2P payments.
Safaricom invested heavily in its agent channel. Commissions to agents to register
4 million customers cost the company US$5 million (Mas and Morawczynski 2009).
Superagent
• Direct relationship with Safaricom (usually a bank)
• Purchases e-money from Safaricom and sells to agents
• Accepts deposits of cash from agents
• Retains 1% commission on e-float sales
• Deposits funds into M-Pesa trust account
Aggregator
• Agent with direct relationship with Safaricom
• Purchases e-money from superagent (or Safaricom)
• Deposits cash with superagent (or into M-Pesa trust account)
• Recruits, trains, and monitors a group of agents (subagents)
• Manages cash and e-money for group of agents
• Retains 20% of subagent’s commission
Agent
• Agent with direct relationship with Safaricom
• Purchases e-money from superagent (or Safaricom)
• Deposits money with superagent (or into M-Pesa trust account)
• Registration of M-Pesa customers
• Depositing cash into registered customers’ M-Pesa accounts
• Processing cash withdrawals for registered M-Pesa customers
• Processing cash withdrawals for nonregistered M-Pesa customers
• Customer education
• Compliance with Safaricom AML and KYC policies
• Compliance with Safaricom business practices
• Branding of their outlets per Safaricom-provided guidelines
Subagent
• Registered with Safaricom
• Purchases e-money from its aggregator
• Deposits cash with aggregator or into bank account of aggregator
• Customer care and compliance as per agent
Agent network managers
• Firms tasked by Safaricom to provide agent training and monitoring
• Check branding of M-Pesa agents
• Circulate branding materials, posters, and M-Pesa registers
• Carry out mystery shopper checks on AML and KYC compliance
Source: World Bank.
Note: AML = anti-money laundering; KYC = know your customer.
important for rural agents, where M-Pesa brings cash into the villages; the cash is
spent locally, usually in an agent’s shop.
M-Pesa generated nearly three times more revenue than mobile-phone airtime
revenue for the typical agent. Average daily commissions for selling airtime were
US$3.78 compared with average daily commissions of US$10.65 from M-Pesa
transactions. (This had to be offset by the agent’s cost of travel to the nearest
bank branch, which cost up to US$5, as well as lost revenue if the shop was
closed during travel.)14
The business case for individual agent outlets depended on their costs of rent
and wages (if it was not an owner-operated business), the return on their capital
tied up in the M-Pesa float, and any losses to theft. At the average number of
transactions, an M-Pesa agent needs US$1,341 to maintain his or her float and
cash balances. The cost of capital may be a borrowing cost or an opportunity cost.
Many aggregators strongly discourage borrowing to maintain working capital,
because the additional expense undermines the profitability of the business. For
the average agent, the largest proportion of costs is associated with rebalancing—
that is, management of liquidity between cash and e-float—estimated at US$1.13
per daily transaction; although the introduction of more superagents may have
lowered this cost over time. The average M-Pesa agent was profitable at 53 trans-
actions per day, but only if wages and rent were low.
Awareness Building
At the same time that it was incentivizing agents to promote the service, Safaricom
invested in a massive advertising campaign with the simple proposition: “Send
Money Home.” The advertising budget was spent in a big splash to support the rapid
uptake of service. M-Pesa offered just three features: the ability to cash-in and cash-
out at agents’ locations; send money P2P; and buy airtime direct from Safaricom.
As M-Pesa began to take off, Safaricom had to invest in regular system
upgrades. This massive investment can be seen in Safaricom’s financial results for
fiscal year 2008, the first year of M-Pesa’s launch: capital expenditures were up
by 41 percent, and sales and advertising were up by 92 percent. To execute this
massive project, Safaricom had ensured buy-in from senior management, includ-
ing from the chief executive officer (CEO), and established a dedicated business
unit to manage M-Pesa. It is estimated that Safaricom spent US$30 million over
the first three years to launch M-Pesa (Omwansa and Sullivan 2012).
Agent Structure
MNOs such as Safaricom have a built-in advantage as mobile money service
providers because of their experience in building and managing agent networks
for the distribution of airtime. Safaricom’s approach to agent network manage-
ment grew from airtime distribution, but it evolved over time to ensure a consis-
tent customer experience and a viable business proposition for agents. As M-Pesa
grew, Safaricom needed to constantly balance the number of agents with the
number of customers; this was to ensure high enough commissions for agents
without overcrowding outlets so much as to cause customer dissatisfaction.
Agent Agent
Subagent
head office head office
Agent Agent
outlet Agent outlet Agent
Agent outlet Agent outlet
outlet outlet
Cash e-float
Note: Blue arrows indicate deposit of cash. Orange arrows indicate e-float crediting.
The initial arrangement of players in the M-Pesa system is shown in figure 5.9,
panel a. During this initial period Safaricom directly recruited M-Pesa agents from
its pool of existing airtime dealers. These agents offered M-Pesa service through
the outlets that they directly owned. In these early days, M-Pesa agents were
required to have an outlet in at least three provinces; this was later relaxed to
three outlets, and they could have subagents (figure 5.9, panel b). Safaricom
maintained a direct contractual relationship with all agents at this time. Figure 5.9
also shows the flows of cash and e-float between the various parties, a process
described in the “Expanding E-float and Cash Management” subsection.
transaction books, and registration books. They also distribute marketing and
branding materials and make sure that these are properly displayed at all M-Pesa
outlets, including M-Pesa tariff posters.
By 2011 Top Image was monitoring more than 80 percent of M-Pesa agents
(23,000). At the time, Top Image had a team of 92 trade development representa-
tives across the country monitoring M-Pesa agents (250 agents per trade develop-
ment adviser). During fortnightly visits these representatives use a 10-point
checklist to assess the agent outlet. Items that are checked include whether the
outlet has enough cash and e-float and whether the logbooks are in good order.
They also carry out “mystery shopper” checks on their KYC and AML procedures.
Safaricom now uses a number of ANMs in addition to Top Image to provide
it with information about the M-Pesa agent network and its performance. Firms
like Top Image are paid a fixed fee for their service, rather than being offered a
commission split. This is to ensure that they independently monitor agent
outlets, and that there is not a disincentive to report poor compliance—with
Safaricom’s KYC and AML procedures, for example.
As businesspeople clamored to become M-Pesa agents, existing agents made
informal arrangements with outlets that they did not own or operate (figure 5.10).
While these subagent outlets were not owned by the original M-Pesa agent, they
served to supplement the outlet distribution. Thus the roles of aggregator and sub-
agent evolved organically as an informal arrangement that had the tacit approval of
Safaricom. Among the more than 10,000 M-Pesa agents, over 50 percent were
subagents of aggregators. Agents acting as aggregators usually retain 20–30 percent
of subagents’ commissions, but sometimes as much as 50 percent. There were a
number of problems with subagents, who did not have a direct relationship with
Safaricom, in particular inconsistent branding, inadequacy of float, and poor
M-Pesa Safaricom
trust account M-Pesa
Aggregator Subagent
Subagent
Subagent
Subagent
Cash e-float
Note: Blue arrows indicate deposit of cash. Orange arrows indicate e-float crediting.
she will not be able to accept any more cash deposits, and an agent who has
run out of cash cannot process cash-outs. The management of liquidity is
essential to ensure continuous customer service. Hence, Safaricom provides
training on this essential activity. Agents manage liquidity by depositing cash
in a bank account in exchange for e-float. This active management of liquidity
is referred to as “rebalancing.”
Safaricom issues e-money to agents on a 1-to-1 ratio against the money
held in the M-Pesa trust account; hence, no money is created. Since M-Pesa’s
inception, the funds of all M-Pesa customers have been held separate from
Safaricom in a trust account held by a prudentially regulated bank. The
Commercial Bank of Africa (CBA) held the first M-Pesa trust account. (CBA
continues to hold an M-Pesa trust account, but the monies are now also split
between three additional banks in Kenya to reduce risk.) In the early days,
Safaricom was centrally issuing e-float to aggregators, who then distributed it
to their subagents. The process did not appear to be well automated, as delays
of two to four days in issuing e-float were regularly reported by agents. This
tied up agents’ working capital and limited the volume of business that they
could support.
To provide greater liquidity and much speedier rebalancing for agents,
Safaricom introduced the “superagent” concept (figure 5.11). In May 2009,
Safaricom unveiled its first M-Pesa superagent, Kenya Commercial Bank
(KCB). Safaricom also made an agreement with KCB to provide collateral back-
ing for agents at favorable rates. KCB additionally provided overdraft protection
M-Pesa Safaricom
trust account M-Pesa
Superagent
(bank)
Aggregator Agent
Subagent
Subagent
Subagent
Cash e-float
Note: Blue arrows indicate deposit of cash. Orange arrows indicate e-float crediting.
for agents’ working capital delivered through M-Pesa. Safaricom has continued
to recruit banks as superagents to provide vital liquidity services to the agent
network. Superagents deposit funds directly into an M-Pesa trust account and are
issued with e-float by Safaricom, which they then sell to agents for a 1 percent
commission. Although it is still possible for agents to buy e-float directly from
Safaricom, in practice this is done infrequently. Banks, acting as superagents, pro-
vide agents with dedicated tellers in their branches and instant delivery of e-float
after a cash deposit. Barclays Bank and Ecobank joined as superagents shortly
after KCB, helping to formalize a new financial ecosystem of which banks are an
essential part. (Superagents were then also able to offer bulk payment services to
their corporate customers via M-Pesa.) Most agents rebalance their cash/e-float
holdings daily with the help of the bank network.
Another tool to assist agents in e-float management is the management SIM,
which enables aggregators to speedily credit e-float to subagents. Aggregators can
use an online interface that allows for more streamlined and speedy e-float
management. Subagents either deposit float with their aggregator or directly into
the aggregator’s bank account. Through the management SIM, the aggregator is
notified when a subagent has made a cash deposit at the bank, and hence they
immediately release e-float. This eliminates the delay incurred when waiting for
subagents to present teller deposit slips to the aggregator. The speed of rebalanc-
ing allows agents to be more flexible with their working capital; if they are in an
urban area, where the predominant activity is taking deposits, they can hold
more in e-float.
To summarize, Safaricom controls the business strategy for M-Pesa and sets
the rules for the various actors. Safaricom defines the requirements for becoming
an agent and manages the overall recruitment process, but it is the aggregators
who select and manage these agents for vetting by the ANM and for approval
by Safaricom. Agent training and monitoring is outsourced to an ANM like
Top Image. The agents are responsible for providing their own phone and start-
up capital. Banks act as superagents to rebalance agent e-float and cash levels
on demand.
Because each market is different, it is hard to generalize the M-Pesa model and
expect that a similar mobile deployment would necessarily thrive in another
country environment. What is more important is to appreciate how M-Pesa
understood the agent network as a critical enabler and evolved it dynamically to
suit the market’s needs. The levels in the network were not predetermined but
evolved to fill a gap or to formalize a practice that seemed to work. Safaricom
was a dynamic, hands-on manager that realized early on that, left to its own
devices, sooner or later the market would find a solution, and ensured that this
took place within established boundaries.
payment systems to operate reliably. One option that addresses this pain-
point is Eseye’s innovative machine-to-machine (M2M) technology. By
embedding SIM chips into solar-powered lighting units, Eseye has created a
remote device management system enabling prepaid and pay-as-you-go
(PAYG) financing via M-Pesa in East Africa. Prepaid customers buy
exactly as much light as they need, while PAYG customers see their lights
go out if they miss a payment. The payment options enabled by Eseye’s
technology and its relationship with M-Pesa circumvent infrastructure short-
comings in East Africa by operating through mobile channels. Without this
technology, customers would have to pay up front or borrow in order to
purchase the system. With it, many more people are gaining access to solar
lighting.
—Monica Brand Engel and Jackson Scher, “Four Barriers—and Four
Solutions—to Financial Inclusion through Payment Innovations”
Map 5.1 Number of Live Mobile Money Services for the Unbanked, by Country, 2014
Source: GSMA 2014. © GSMA. Reproduced, with permission from GSMA; further permission required for reuse.
Note: GSMA data from the Mobile Money for the Unbanked (MMU) Deployment Tracker, the 2014 Global Adoption Survey of Mobile Financial
Services, and MMU estimates and forecasts. The countries surveyed included those classified by the World Bank in 2014 as “developing countries”
plus four countries that were not on that list: Chile, Qatar, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates.
MNO network
Take cash-in/ Hold deposits,
for data Move money
cash-out settle (Forex)
transmission
MNO Bank
MNO MNO-led
Source: Gencer 2009. © mPay Connect. Reproduced, with permission from mPay Connect; further permission required for reuse.
Note: FI = financial institution; MNO = mobile network operator.
Sustainability of mobile money services need not focus solely on providing the
basic functions of CI/CO, bill payment, and money transfer. Moving along the
value chain for an MNO starting from simple CI/CO to becoming a full-fledged
banking agent is a possibility, depending upon the regulatory framework in a
country (figure 5.12). The possibility of being a platform for the digital ecosys-
tem for millions of subscribers is an enticing prospect. Government payments,
social grant programs, and payrolls are some of the services that could be deliv-
ered via mobile money platforms. In Kenya, applications (apps) have been
designed by independent private sector developers. In partnership and by fee-
sharing agreements with Safaricom, M-Pesa has provided the infrastructural
foundation upon which these value-added services have been built, thereby
greatly extending M-Pesa’s digital connections and thus Kenya’s movement
toward a cash-lite society.
M-Pesa M-Pesa
2007
2013
• CI/CO at agents • CI/CO at agents
• P2P national • P2P national
• Airtime top-up • Airtime top-up
• CO ATMs
• Bill payment
• Link to banking products
• Merchant payments
• Bulk payments
• P2P international
Merchant Payments
M-Pesa was designed for individual use—which is fine if you are paying your taxi
driver, as he just uses his personal account—but how do individual tellers in a shop
reconcile M-Pesa with their till? Consumers in Kenya pay US$12.8 billion to other
consumers (30 percent of their payments), but they pay US$29 billion to busi-
nesses (69 percent of their payments). The balance of US$0.3 billion (1 percent
of payments) is paid to the government (Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation
2013). The greater opportunity is therefore in merchant acceptance.
At the end of 2010, Safaricom entered into its first merchant agreement,
which would allow customers to pay with M-Pesa at the supermarket
chains Naivas and Uchumi. By 2011, however, M-Pesa had only 100 individual
stores signed up, and it took an innovative merchant acquirer, Kopo Kopo
users on its platform (Matinde 2013). The JamboPay service provides value to
merchants by aggregating multiple payment channels such as M-Pesa, Airtel
Money, yuCash, Orange Money, Visa and MasterCard debit and credit cards, as
well as direct bank account debiting and crediting. JamboPay was the 2013–14
winner of the Google Innovation Award in the financial sector category.
One of the first service enhancements was the use of ATMs to provide M-Pesa
account holders, who are not bank account holders, with 24-7 access to cash. This
approach was pioneered in Kenya, but the relatively low stock of ATMs (fewer
than 2,500) limited the extension of mobile money. This approach is much more
interesting in countries with large numbers of ATMs—for example in Thailand,
where more than 50,000 ATMs can be used for mobile money CI/CO (Pénicaud
and Katakam 2014). Another service, the bill payment function, was designed as
a way for customers to pay their utility bills directly from their phones without
having the inconvenience of waiting in long lines. Kenya’s electricity utility was
the first company to accept bill payment through M-Pesa.
M-Pesa’s huge customer base is larger than that of any bank or other financial
sector organization in Kenya. As a result, after banks initially criticized the system
and even lobbied the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) to close it down, they started
joining M-Pesa. Postbank was the first bank to join M-Pesa as an agent, just five
months after launch. Today numerous banks and MFIs are linked to M-Pesa,
enabling them to receive funds from customers through the bill-pay function, and
smaller numbers of banks have a USSD link that integrates their customers’
accounts with M-Pesa, enabling their customers to move money to and from
M-Pesa 24 hours a day (table 5.6).
10
M-Shwari savings accounts, millions
9.2
9 8.1
8 7.6
7.0
7
6 5.0
4.8
5 4.0
4
2.9
3
2
1
0
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
2013 2014
Period
This microloan product is serving the base of the pyramid with a minimum loan
size of just K Sh 100 (US$1.15), a maximum loan size of K Sh 20,000
(US$235), and an average loan size of K Sh 305 (US$3.50). Loans are for
30 days and have a 7.5 percent fee. The majority of loans (70 percent) are
repaid before the one-month due date. Backers suspect that this is an indication
of the importance of this line of credit to individuals. Subsequent loan limits are
based on the levels of regular savings with M-Shwari and customers’ repayment
history on the initial loan.
These customers are below the threshold of most MFIs. M-Shwari is a very
different product from a typical MFI loan, which takes a long time to obtain
while a group is formed and savings are accumulated as security against a loan.
In addition, this product provides a confidential service on an individual basis.
CBA spent two years in product development for M-Shwari, using data
from the FinAccess Survey and receiving some assistance from Financial Sector
Deepening (FSD) Kenya (FSD Kenya and CBK 2013). The survey showed that
people believe savings should be free and held with a trusted person or institu-
tion. Focus group discussions revealed that individuals want their bank both close
and far. M-Pesa, people said, made it too easy to access one’s money. They needed
structure to help them with savings discipline, but they also wanted flexibility.
CBA uses the digital footprint that users develop through their use of M-Pesa
and airtime purchases to prescore them for credit. This allows CBA to offer a truly
unsecured loan. CBA then makes a real-time query of the National Population
Register to verify identity. (CBA is the first nongovernment user of the database.)
CBA is happy to remain in the background of this product, given the reputation
of Safaricom versus the banks in Kenya. The aim was for the product to break
even in a little under two years, but it broke even in just eight months.
Kilimo Salama Plus: Crop Insurance. In February 2011 UAP Insurance and the
Syngenta Foundation extended their insurance product for smallholder farmers
with Safaricom and M-Pesa. The low-cost mobile-phone payment and data system
is linked to automated, solar-powered weather stations to issue an insurance pol-
icy and rapidly compensate farmers for investments in seeds, fertilizer, and other
inputs that are lost to either drought or flood. Kilimo Salama (“safe farming”) is
the largest agricultural insurance program in Africa and the first to use mobile-
phone technology to speed access and payouts to rural farmers. Farmers purchase
Kilimo Salama Plus through local agrodealers, who use a camera phone to scan a
special bar code that sends the policy to UAP over Safaricom’s mobile data net-
work. Premiums are collected at the store and sent via M-Pesa to UAP.
This index-based weather insurance relies on the data collected and relayed
from 30 weather stations. When data from a particular station indicate rainfall is
either 15 percent above or below historical averages and hence likely to signifi-
cantly reduce crop yields, all farmers with a policy registered with that station
automatically receive payouts directly to their M-Pesa accounts at the end of
the growing season. Kilimo Salama is supported by the International Finance
Mbao Pension Scheme. The Mbao pension scheme targets the estimated 8.9 million
informal workers in various sectors of the economy. At the press launch of the
scheme in June 2011, the chairman of the Retirement Benefits Authority looked
forward to a scenario in which beneficiaries were provided for in old age and funds
were raised for investment in the Kenyan economy. Unfortunately, although con-
tributions may be received electronically, a physical application form must be
collected from Mbao chapter offices, and pension payments currently have to
be made by check. The scheme is gaining in popularity, and by the end of 2012
membership stood at 40,000 (RBA 2013).
“Mbao” refers to the K Sh 20 note (US$0.23), which is the daily minimum
contribution required by this individual pension plan. The Kenya National Jua
Kali Cooperative Society developed this defined contribution scheme for the
informal sector. The project started with a nine-month pilot project in which
11,000 informal sector workers made contributions through the bill payment
function on M-Pesa or Airtel Money. Any Kenyan over the age of 18 years is
eligible to join this individual pension plan. To join, a membership fee of K Sh
100 is paid, and a commitment is made to contribute at least K Sh 100 per week.
The fund is run professionally with a conservative investment strategy focused
on investment in money market and fixed income securities. The KCB acts as
custodian, the Co-op Trust part of the Cooperative Bank invests the funds, and
administration is by Eagle Africa Insurance Brokers.
Linda Jamii: Health Insurance. “Linda Jamii,” Swahili for “protect the family,” is a
private medical care insurance that uses M-Pesa to collect premiums and to
make benefit payouts. In November 2012 Changamka Microhealth and Britam
Insurance Company launched the mechanism, which allows people to save small
amounts of money over time toward purchasing health insurance. They started a
pilot with Safaricom in May 2013 and have 2,000 households enrolled to date.
Customers can save in a premium deposit facility on M-Pesa and purchase health
insurance once they accumulate K Sh 6,000. They then have an additional six
months to pay the outstanding K Sh 6,000.
Changamka’s strategies to address barriers to coverage include exclusive sav-
ings toward health care expenses, flexible timing of payments, affordable access
to plans, and use of available mobile technology. In addition, the microinsurance
program benefits health care providers, because the electronic operating plat-
form reduces the administrative burden on hospitals and clinics. The product
targets the estimated 35 million uninsured in Kenya. Changamka plans to scale
up this initiative nationally (Gathara 2013).
To subscribe to the service, users dial *525# and follow the directions. After
subscription there is a requirement to complete the registration process by visit-
ing the nearest Linda Jamii agent outlet at Britam offices, Safaricom shops,
M-POS
The growth of alternative delivery channels to provide financial services has been
called “branchless banking,” because it relies on the use of channels other than
traditional bank branches. Using these alternative channels holds the prospect of
extending access to financial services because of the potential for a dramatic
reduction in the cost of provision.
In addition to mobile money, another exciting emerging technology is being
used in Kenya: M-POS, a card reader attached to a smartphone creating a low-
cost POS center for use by smaller merchants. Because of its lower cost, it has
the potential to massively increase card acceptance infrastructure and hence card
use. (See figure 5.15 for a comparison of costs for various channels.)
Challenges to M-Pesa
Although M-Pesa is truly inspiring innovators in Kenya and globally to develop
apps to provide services using the M-Pesa payment platform as the digital con-
nector, the biggest complaint from app developers is the reluctance of Safaricom
to share the M-Pesa API with them. API is the technology that allows two soft-
ware programs to communicate with each other and allows any potential service
developer to get linked directly to the mobile money account in M-Pesa instead
of a bank account or credit card for payment.
With more than 12 million active accounts, it is no surprise why all devel-
opers want to have access to M-Pesa. Everyone in the application developer
Figure 5.15 Average Capital Expenditure Costs for Financial Service Providers in
Kenya, by Channel
Branch 100,000
ATM 20,000
POS 2,000
M-POS 80
Mobile phone
30
(Internet-enabled)
Sources: Branch, ATM, and POS costs from FSD Kenya 2013; M-POS and mobile-phone costs from expert
interviews in November 2013.
Note: ATM = automated teller machine; M-POS = mobile point of sale; POS = point of sale.
community has been waiting for ages for Safaricom to release an M-Pesa API
that would enable them to build innovative, value-added services on the
M-Pesa platform or to link up already developed apps. In 2015, Safaricom took
initial steps to open its API to the public to help developers build platforms
that can use M-Pesa for quick payments. However, this promise has been there
for some time, and the delay had led to independent development of open-
source M-Pesa APIs. However, “the systems are not yet in place to facilitate
seamless integration into Safaricom’s platforms,” and opening up would entail
technical, financial, risk management, and market implications for M-Pesa to
consider (Morawczynski 2015). Nevertheless, opening up the M-Pesa API
could be beneficial for the communities that otherwise do not get served.
Figure 5.16 Share of Adults Receiving Government Transfers, by Region and Payment
Method, 2014
25
21
20
15 15
15 13
10 8
7
5 3
0
East Asia Europe High-income Latin Middle South Sub-Saharan
and Pacific and OECD America East Asia Africa
Central economies and the
Asia Caribbean
Using other method In cash only Into an account
while the federal government, through the Ministry of Social Development, over-
sees the registry, defines eligibility requirements, and cross-checks data within the
registry. Caixa plays a distinct role in implementing BFP by managing the database,
assigning identification numbers, and finally distributing grants.
In terms of payment method, around 1 percent of the recipients receive cash,
while 15 percent receive the grants through basic bank accounts held with Caixa.
These are no-frills accounts, easier and faster to open by regulation, and offering
four withdrawals free each month. Monthly balances are limited to R$2,000
(US$575). A majority of the recipients, around 84 percent, get their grants using
a limited-purpose card—the Social Card. This card is linked to a nontransactional
account that requires withdrawal of the grant within 90 days in one transaction
from the day of the deposit and does not allow other deposits. There is a nominal
fee for the withdrawal. If money is not withdrawn, the grant recipient will lose
that particular payment—the reason why the Findex 2014 Survey found that
close to 88 percent of grant recipients withdraw all the money right away.
Caixa has a very effective network of payment agents of over 36,000
points of service in all municipalities of the country, including 2,780 branches,
24,756 retail agents, and 10,954 lottery outlets (CGAP 2011). A majority of the
recipients (around 61 percent) withdraw money at lottery centers. Caixa is con-
ducting pilot studies on collecting biometrics, use of mobile phones and enhanc-
ing the touchpoints. Efficient administration and good targeting have enabled
BFP to achieve its success at a very low cost.
Ten years after its inception, BFP has been key to helping Brazil cut its
extreme poverty by more than half—from 9.7 percent of the population in 2003
to 4.3 percent in 2013. Most impressive, and in contrast to other countries,
income inequality also fell markedly, by 15 percent, to a Gini coefficient of 0.527
(Wetzel 2013). Given the structure of the payment process, the Social Card
remains a transactions card and not a savings mechanism for most grant
recipients. However, efficient targeting by the CadÚnico registry, wide distribu-
tion of agent touchpoints, and effective management of the whole process have
made BFP a powerful tool in fighting poverty.
poverty across Latin America’s second biggest country in terms of the size of its
population and economy (Constantine 2014).
Prospera is also promoting beneficiaries’ access to higher education and formal
employment. Additionally, Prospera is facilitating access to financial services
(savings, microcredit, and insurance), thereby enhancing social inclusion of
the country’s poorest citizens (World Bank 2014). The Social Development
Secretariat (SEDESOL) is working to develop an integrated social information
system to identify the poor, and it hopes to have a system similar to the Cadastro
Único in Brazil.
The payments under Oportunidades were made bimonthly through the state-
owned development bank, Bansefi. However, 66 percent of payments were made
in cash. The rest were distributed through Bansefi accounts: 16 percent through
savings accounts with magnetic-stripe cards; 12 percent through Bansefi prepaid
accounts operated through smart cards; and the remaining 6 percent through
Bansefi passbook accounts. In 2012, the amount transferred to 6.5 million benefi-
ciaries was Mex$63.78 billion (US$3.9 billion). Given that most beneficiaries
live in rural, hard-to-reach areas, SEDESOL has been continually trying out
various new payment partners and options—Telecomm (the state telegraph
company), gas stations, cooperatives, and Diconsa stores,19 to name a few.
In 2010 the government mandated SEDESOL to centralize the electronic
payments of the grant program. As a result, all payments were outsourced to
Bansefi, with Telecomm and Diconsa as subcontractors. Where banking infra-
structure is available, the beneficiaries are issued a no-fee open debit card to be
used at any ATM or POS terminal,20 and the rest are issued a biometric closed
debit card that can cash out only at Bansefi, Telecomm, or Diconsa touchpoints.
Even though Diconsa stores have the physical outreach, the National Banking
and Securities Commission approved fewer than 290 stores as banking agents.
Hence this method, too, failed to gain traction. By 2012, only 20 percent went
through open cards, with the rest paid in cash at either fixed points (20 percent)
or at temporary points (61 percent) (Babatz 2013).
The lesson is that mandatory regulatory action alone will not bring about the
desired results, unless backed by a well-designed strategic plan. Furthermore,
proximity to payment touchpoints is especially important in programs that serve
the rural poor. Transaction cost is not the only thing poor people worry about; hid-
den opportunity costs of travel, loss of daily wages, or even the safety of carrying
cash are all factored into the decision of choosing payment alternatives. The posi-
tive impacts of this conditional cash transfer program can be fully realized by
addressing these issues, possibly through innovative use of digital solutions.
banking product, helping them build a stronger future for themselves, their families
and their communities.
—Ann Cairns, president of international markets, MasterCard,
during award presentation to the South African Social Security
Agency (SASSA), August 20, 2013
South Africa has seven major social security grant programs: Old Age, War Veteran’s,
Disability, Grant in Aid, Child Support, Foster Child, and Care Dependency.
Eligibility for each grant is dependent on an income-based means test. Administered
by the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA), the grants are financed
through general tax revenues collected on a national basis. As of June 2015, there
were 16.78 million grant recipients (about 31 percent of the total population).
Over the five years from 2009–13, social grants were around 3.4 percent of the
GDP, and this trend is expected to continue (National Treasury, South Africa 2013).
2014 75 5 6 14
2013 75 4 5 16
2012 67 6 8 19
2011 63 5 5 27
2010 63 5 9 23
2009 60 4 10 26
2008 63 3 11 24
2007 60 4 11 25
2006 51 7 9 33
2005 47 8 8 37
2004 46 4 12 39
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Share of respondents, percent
Banked Other formal (nonbank) Informally served only Not served
beneficiaries have reregistered in the new system. With 10–12 million SASSA
cards issued, fraudulent grant applications have been minimized and administra-
tion costs reduced by distributing all grant payments electronically.24
As part of the SASSA reregistration process, each recipient has a bank account
opened for them, which is offered free of monthly charges by Grindrod Bank.
Recipients can deposit funds into their bank account via electronic funds transfer
(EFT) or third-party bank transfer. The SASSA Debit MasterCard can be used
anywhere MasterCard is accepted, and grant recipients can use it like a normal
debit card to make purchases, check their account balances, and withdraw cash
without incurring transaction charges at selected South African retailers. Recipients
can also withdraw cash at any ATM, although normal banking charges apply.
According to Net 1, unlike a traditional credit or debit card where the opera-
tion of the account occurs on a centralized computer, each of the SASSA
smart cards effectively operates as an individual bank account for all types of
transactions. Although the SASSA card is a single-wallet system, it is possible
to enable multiple e-wallets on a single card, where each wallet can be tied
to specific payment partners. For example, education grants could only be acti-
vated when used to pay school fees. This could potentially enhance cash
management capabilities of the beneficiaries and ensure grants are used for the
intended purpose.
Notes
1. The questionnaire was designed to capture innovations resulting in new products as
well as innovations in processing. A total of 101 central banks completed the survey
and reported 173 innovative retail payment products or product groups. Many central
banks provided information on a product group basis and not individual products (see
World Bank 2012a).
2. If providers have proprietary technical and usage standards, interoperability would
entail higher cost of compliance.
3. For all Global Findex Survey 2014 data, see http://datatopics.worldbank.org
/financialinclusion/. For the Findex findings on Sri Lanka, see appendix A, table A.6.
4. KPMG is a leading audit and adviser services provider.
5. Sri Lanka also has the world’s lowest rates for fixed broadband Internet, around US$5
per month, resulting from a high level of competition among the suppliers and an
explicit aim from the government to keep the cost to a minimum (ITU 2012).
6. The global mobile industry converges on Barcelona annually for the Mobile World
Congress, with the 2015 edition attracting a record 93,000 delegates and over 2,000
exhibitors. For more information, see DailyFT (2015).
7. Standard setting can also suppress the incentives to innovate and, hence, sometimes
can restrict competition by curbing such innovative business models.
8. 1LINK is the leading shared ATM network of Pakistan.
9. Global Findex Survey 2014, http://datatopics.worldbank.org/financialinclusion/.
10. The team was supported by the International Finance Corporation (IFC) of the World
Bank Group, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the Financial Sector Deepening
(FSD) Trust, and Groupe Speciale Mobile Association (GSMA) (GSMA 2014).
11. For all Global Findex Survey 2014 data, see http://datatopics.worldbank.org
/financialinclusion/.
12. According to the Findex data, the entire 36 percent have access through formal bank
accounts and only 0.4 percent through mobile accounts. (Note: there may be sampling
issues underlying these numbers.) For more of the Findex 2014 data on Indonesia,
see appendix A, table A.2.
13. Indonesia’s six current mobile money service providers and scheme names include
Telkomsel: T-Cash (begun in 2007); Indosat (Ooredoo): Dompetku (2008); XL
(Axiata): XL Tunai (2012); mCoin: mCoin (2012); BTPN (Bank): Wow! (2013); and
Bank Mandiri: e-Cash (2013).
14. M-Pesa revenue and expenditure data from Safaricom and authors’ field interviews.
15. G2C is also called government-to-persons (G2P).
16. The registry contains data on over 23 million low-income families and 78 million
people. Estimates based on the 2010 census data show that there are 20 million low-
income families in Brazil (67 million people), or 35 percent of the total Brazilian
population. Therefore, there is 114.5 percent coverage. Its biggest program is the BFP.
This is a huge undertaking, given that Brazil is the fifth largest country in the world
(8.5 million square kilometers) (Mostafa 2014).
17. Established in 1861, Caixa is a government savings bank.
18. It started as Pronasol in 1989, and was renamed Progresa in 1997 and Oportunidades
in 2002.
19. Diconsa stores are small stores owned and operated by local communities; there are
over 20,000 of such stores, mostly in rural Mexico.
20. Fees are paid by Bansefi.
21. For all Global Findex Survey 2014 data, see http://datatopics.worldbank.org
/financialinclusion/. For the Findex findings on South Africa, see appendix A, table A.5.
22. EMV stands for Europay, MasterCard, and Visa—the three companies that originally
created the standard. EMV is a technical standard for smart payment cards and for
payment terminals and ATMs that can accept them. EMV cards are smart cards
(also called chip cards or IC cards) that store their data on integrated circuits rather
than magnetic stripes, although many EMV cards also have stripes for backward
compatibility. They can be contact cards, which must be physically inserted (or
“dipped”) into a reader, or contactless cards, which can be read over a short distance
using radio-frequency identification technology. Payment cards that comply with
the EMV standard are often called chip-and-PIN or chip-and-signature cards, depend-
ing on the exact authentication methods required to use them.
23. Real-time but offline.
24. Because many of the beneficiaries are underage or too old to collect funds, collection
can be delegated to dependents or nominees, who in turn may be grant beneficiaries.
Multiple grant beneficiaries can be loaded onto a single SASSA Debit MasterCard.
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Wetzel, D. 2013. “Bolsa Família: Brazil’s Quiet Revolution.” News item, World Bank
website: http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/opinion/2013/11/04/bolsa-familia-Brazil
-quiet-revolution.
World Bank. 2012a. “Innovations in Retail Payments Worldwide: A Snapshot. Outcomes
of the Global Survey on Innovations in Retail Payment Instruments and Methods.”
Consultative Report, World Bank, Washington, DC.
———. 2012b. “Developing a Comprehensive National Retail Payments Strategy.”
Consultative Report, World Bank, Washington, DC.
———. 2014. “A Model from Mexico for the World.” Feature story, World Bank website,
November 19. http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/11/19/un-modelo
-de-mexico-para-el-mundo.
Unique Identification
Introduction
Unique national identification (ID) is a critical component of a digital money
system. The ability of the service provider to accurately identify its current and
potential customers is central to providing digital-money services, such as mobile
money or prepaid-card-based government grant programs. One important reason
why M-Pesa was able to roll out the mobile money initiative so quickly—while
also addressing the know-your-customer (KYC) concerns—is because Kenya has
an established national ID system.
In Sri Lanka too, mobile network operators (MNOs) leveraged the existing
national ID system put in place by the national government and the mandatory
registration of subscriber identification module (SIM) cards when launching
mobile money solutions. The Central Bank of Sri Lanka relaxed its KYC
requirements, adopting a more proportionate approach to customer due dili-
gence (CDD) based on the e-wallet size. Similarly, Thailand’s biometric smart
ID enabled wider reach in banking access, while in South Africa, biometrics
were introduced to the social security system, to register or identify grant
recipients.
The success of mobile money and scaling-up depends on speeding up account
opening and minimizing steps in transacting. Overly strict requirements regard-
ing the identification and verification of customers tend to restrain the impact of
efforts to increase financial inclusion. For example, strict application of CDD
requirements may exclude people lacking official documentation from entering
the regulated financial system. Strict CDD procedures may also lead financial
institutions to pass on costs to the customer, resulting in a disincentive (especially
for the poor) and thus may push them toward informal service providers.
Although such measures may be appropriate risk mitigation measures for regu-
lated financial institutions, they may result in marginalization and exclusion of
poor people from financial intermediary functions and payments mechanisms
that enhance poor peoples’ coping capability.
In terms of Financial Action Task Force (FATF) guidelines as endorsed by the
Bank for International Settlements (BIS), from an Anti-Money Laundering and
Asia
41 surveyed cases,
Latin America and covering 648 million
the Caribbean people (est.)
34 surveyed cases,
covering 280 million Africa
people (est.) 75 surveyed
cases, covering
288 million
people (est.)
Source: Gelb and Clark 2013. © Center for Global Development (CGD). Reproduced, with permission, from CGD; further permission
required for reuse.
and social and cultural issues involved in getting people to consent to biometric
ID methods. A further question is how well the data security and safeguard
measures, and other operational aspects in using biometrics, would work in
developing-country settings.
In the mobile money world, mandatory registration of prepaid SIM cards is
viewed by governments and regulators as a counterterrorism measure enabling
efficient KYC assessment, especially in developing countries. In the developed
world where self-regulation is highly valued, privacy rights have discouraged
such practices. As highlighted in the Groupe Speciale Mobile Association white
paper (GSMA 2013), mandating SIM registration can have unintended negative
consequences, such as loss of access to communications services when mobile
users’ SIM cards are deactivated; restricted access due to possible geographic
limitations on where SIM cards can be registered or purchased; and emergence
of black markets for fraudulently registered or stolen SIM cards. However, estab-
lishing such a registry opens up more options for the users. Hence, it is up to the
policy makers to harmonize the regulations with market needs after consulting
with industry to analyze costs, benefits, and implementation options.
A national ID system provides not only verification of a person’s identity, but
also addresses acceptable and approved basic KYC protocols for accessing
finance and payment systems. The case studies analyzed in this chapter highlight
why having a unique ID (UID) is a foundational and critically important enabler
toward scaling up e-money initiatives while managing risks. The case studies
focus on
• How lack of a UID can be a limitation in terms of scaling up digital finance for
disaster relief programs and financial inclusion schemes;
• How transformative responses to the ID barrier enable millions of people to
access financial services in a hassle-free manner; and
• How digital identity enhances customer experience in moving toward a cash-
lite society.
Not directly addressed in this volume are the political economy dimensions
where vested interests actively hinder development, application, spread, and use
of a unique identifier. By definition, a UID in any environment allows traceability
by the tax authorities; enables AML/CFT compliance; and eliminates opportuni-
ties for leakages (fraudulent receipt of subsidies and social transfers), black
market transactions, tax avoidance, and theft. Linkage of UID across financial
sector databases and with phone and utility authorities promotes transparency
and traceability, which are also challenges.
creative solutions that employ biometrics, for example, or that use group gather-
ings, where the identified identify the unidentified.
—USAID-Citi Mobile Money Accelerator Alliance,
“10 Ways to Accelerate Mobile Money”
2 Driver’s License
5 Police Clearance
6 Postal ID
7 Voter’s ID
8 Barangay Clearance/Certificate
14 Seaman’s Book
Table 6.1 Acceptable ID Documentation for Financial Services in the Philippines (continued)
Form of ID Sample
15 Alien Certificate of Registration
17 Certification from the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons —
18 Department of Social Welfare and Development ID
20 Company ID —
21 Student’s ID or School ID (as beneficiary for remittances or fund transfers) —
Other types of valid IDs not listed in the 2008 BSP circular
1 Tax Identification Number (TIN ID)
5 Consular ID —
6 Permit to Carry Firearms
7 Company/Office ID —
8 Philippine Overseas Employment Association ID —
9 PRA Special Resident Retiree Visa ID —
10 Unified Multipurpose ID (UMID) —
Source: “Top 31 Valid ID’s Required in the Philippines,” affordableCebu website: http://www.affordablecebu.com/load/philippine_government
/top_28_valid_id_39_s_required_in_the_philippines/5-1-0-109#ixzz3bY8UUSZJ.
Note: BSP = Central Bank of the Philippines. — = not available.
BSP was given the authority and responsibility to regulate pawnshops since
1972, they remain the least-regulated businesses that fall under BSP.
For service providers, too, lack of a universally accepted ID is a barrier when
it comes to account opening and operating. With no universal national ID, the
financial sector must rely on other forms of ID, which not all customers may
have. The institutions have to manage their risk profiles while adhering to KYC
Figure 6.1 Use and Awareness of Payment System Providers in the Philippines, 2010
90
83
80 78
75
Share of users, percent (n = 1,000)
69 68
70
60
50 47 46
39
40 35
30 30 28 28
30 25 25
21 23 21
20 17
10
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4 4
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and CDD guidelines set out by the authorities. Additional training and capacity
building will be needed to carry out an acceptable level of due diligence.
Regulators can set risk-based measures such as limited transaction amounts and
reporting thresholds to ensure financial access. Also, the agents will have to be
given clear guidelines and training on performing KYC and CDD duties using
acceptable ID documents. Again, anecdotal evidence shows that confusion
remains widespread, making customers apprehensive about going to a formal
financial institution.
UID is important in the provision of government welfare disbursements and
disaster recovery management. Using a UID to verify identification and entitle-
ment, and making the payments accordingly, could address the leakage and inef-
ficiencies in some transfer programs based on cash. Coupled with switching to
electronic payments, this could save the government a considerable amount of
money that could be channeled back to the welfare schemes. The Philippines is
one of the most disaster-prone countries in the world. Hence, streamlining its
disaster recovery program in terms of providing assistance is important for the
country. In the aftermath of super typhoon Haiyan in 2013, the Philippines’
primary statistics office revived calls for a national ID system to speed up the
process of identifying calamity victims—both the dead and the missing—and to
offer financial assistance to the surviving victims.
The Philippines had begun to move a step closer to getting a UID card. The
House endorsed Bill No. 5060 (the proposed Filipino Identification Act) for Senate
passage on May 20, 2015, which had been expected to greatly streamline govern-
ment transactions and promote more efficient service delivery. The proposed ID
system would bring all existing government-initiated ID systems into a single
integrated ID system. Once effectively implemented, the ID will provide proof of
identity, status, age, and address for admission to all learning institutions, employ-
ment purposes, voting identification, transactions in banking and financial institu-
tions, and provision of benefits or privileges afforded by law to senior citizens.
The House of Representatives had also approved a bill requiring the registra-
tion of all prepaid mobile-phone SIM cards. If Bill 5231 had become law, it
would cover tens of millions of existing and future prepaid mobile-phone users.
At present, anyone can buy a prepaid SIM card and use it without filling out any
form or being asked to present an identification card. Under the bill, as proposed,
sale may be denied if the buyer does not present valid and clear proof of identity.
In most countries SIM card registration with national ID is taken as the basic
threshold in setting risk-based tiered systems for KYC and CDD purposes. As of
May 2017, the Filipino Identification System (FilSys) had not yet been passed
into law.
By beginning to seriously consider the UID issue, the Philippines is addressing
one of the key conditions for mobile money proliferation. In a country already
facing unique geographical barriers to financial access, enabling government
programs to go digital and mobile offers a crucial step toward financial inclusion.
Steered by BSP as a forward-thinking and enabling regulator, the effort to lower
these macro-level barriers should improve the ability of the unbanked population
to access the mainstream financial sector in pursuit of economic opportunities.
30 855,197,481
27 833,709,544
24 812,221,607
Number of Aadhaars, millions
21 790,733,670
Cumulative Aadhaars
18 769,245,733
15 747,757,796
12 726,269,859
9 704,781,922
6 683,293,985
3 661,806,048
0 640,318,111
14
4
14
4
14
5
15
15
01
01
01
01
01
01
01
20
20
20
20
20
l-2
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ar
ay
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Month values Cumulative values
126
Number of Aadhaars, millions
108
90
72
54
36
18
0
ra
es a
an
es a
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ra
ad ta
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ar
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Figure 6.4 Aadhaar Registration, by Gender and Age Group in India, 2015
100
77.3
80
Percentage of Aadhaars
60
40
21.5
20
1.2
0
0 to less than 5 to less than 18 years and
5 years 18 years above
Age and gender percentage of total Aadhaars
Female Male Transgender
Vakrangee
Softwares Ltd.,
47,126,300
Swathy Smartcards
Hi-Tech Pvt.,
41,421,518
Karvy Data
Management Services,
41,059,624
Others (267),
305,935,793
Wipro Ltd.,
40,369,312a
Interoperable
Only one number per
platform for multiple
person
applications
Source: UIDAI 2012a. © Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI). Reproduced, with permission, from
UIDAI; further permission required for reuse.
The cost of providing banking services to the poor, who transact in small
amounts, is a limitation. Banks consider such “micropayments” unattractive
because the transaction costs are relatively high. Aadhaar enables an efficient,
cost-effective payment solution (AEPS) for promoting financial inclusion.
AEPS is a bank-led model that allows online interoperable financial inclusion
transactions at POS (also called micro-ATMs) that are operated by a BC or BC
subagent, appointed by banks using the Aadhaar authentication. Unlike an
ATM, the cash-in/cash-out functions of the micro-ATM are performed by an
operator, thus bringing down the cost of the device and the cost of servicing the
customer. The micro-ATM supports deposits, withdrawals, fund transfers, and
balance inquiries. Once successfully deployed, the AEPS payment mechanism
will allow account access from anywhere through any delivery channel online in
real time, thus enabling an efficient and cost-effective remittance transfer system
within India. In addition, a variety of other services such as microcredit, micro-
insurance, and micropensions can be offered on top of this solution.
Though Aadhaar was a policy initiative by the previous government, it has
received support from the present government. The Prime Minister’s Office
(PMO) has directed the Planning Commission to collect data on Aadhaar and
DBT schemes in 300 priority districts where Aadhaar enrollment is currently
over 60–70 percent, as well as information on Aadhaar and DBT with respect to
five key government schemes: MGNREGA, pensions, scholarships, Public
Distribution System, and LPG (Tewari 2014). The Indian government subsidizes
food, fuel, and fertilizers, with the total subsidy bill earmarked in the 2015 bud-
get at a massive Rs 2.5 trillion (around 2 percent of GDP). A significant portion
of these funds is believed to be wasted because of improper targeting, middlemen,
corruption, and duplication. Hence the Aadhaar-enabled DBT system could
eventually address this massive leakage.
Table 6.2 Key Differences between Aadhaar and the National Population Register
Aadhaar National Population Register
Voluntary Mandatory
UIDAI issues a number Only a register
For identity and authentication Signifies resident status and citizenship
Based on other forms of documentation and identification Based on census information
Note: UIDAI = Unique Identification Authority of India.
The importance of a UID for success in scaling up mobile money or digitized gov-
ernment benefit programs was discussed in the two case studies earlier in this
chapter. Although in the real world, a person’s identity can be established and
verified using identity cards and documents along with personal face-to-face
verifications, in the digital world identity verification has to rely on digital identi-
ties. A digital identity is an online or networked identity adopted or claimed in
cyberspace by an individual, organization, or electronic device. These users may
also project more than one digital identity through multiple communities. In terms
of digital identity management, key areas of concern are security and privacy.
Because digital identities created by individuals are inherently weak, and such
identities are linked to online websites, e-mail addresses, or domains, security
becomes a key consideration. The Mobile Connect Sri Lanka case study focused
on how digital identity management allows consumers to move seamlessly from
cash to cash-lite transactions through digital services. This is neither a costly
operation nor meant only for expensive transactions. On the contrary, for average
consumers, digital identity solutions such as Mobile Connect offer privacy pro-
tection, reduce the risk of identity theft, and simplify the login experience for a
range of services, such as retail, health care, government, and banking, among
others (Finextra 2014).
for fixed broadband Internet, around US$5 per month, resulting from a high
level of competition among the suppliers and the government’s explicit aim to
keep the cost to a minimum (ITU 2012).
There are currently five mobile operators in Sri Lanka. Dialog Axiata, the mar-
ket leader, and Sri Lanka Telecom Mobitel have a combined market share of over
65 percent, with around 9.5 million and 5 million customers, respectively. To date,
the top four market players have all offered MNO-led mobile money services.
Mobile Connect
In February 2014, Groupe Speciale Mobile Association (GSMA) announced
the launch of a collaborative initiative, supported by leading mobile operators
(including Axiata Group Berhad, China Mobile, China Telecom, Etisalat,
KDDI, Ooredoo, Orange, Tata Teleservices, Telefónica, Telenor, Telstra, and
VimpelCom), to develop an innovative, interoperable ID that would allow
consumers to securely access a wide array of digital services using their
mobile-phone account for authentication (GSMA 2014). The first interoper-
able beta trial of Mobile Connect was launched by Dialog and Mobitel com-
panies in Sri Lanka jointly in July 2014. WSO2, another Sri Lanka-based
company, provided the Identity Server on OpenID Connect protocol, thereby
providing broad interoperability across the mobile operators and online ser-
vice providers.
The result is the world’s first multioperator Mobile Connect solution that
provides an out-of-band medium for authenticating a user to any service
provider without requiring a password. The identity given under Mobile
Connect is a form of a “validated” identity. The user’s credentials are always
stored with the “home” entity (the “identity provider”). When the user logs
into a service, instead of providing credentials to the service provider, the
service provider trusts the identity provider to validate the credentials.
So the user never provides credentials directly to anybody but the identity
provider.
66%
Would recommend THE SERVICE AS
AUTHENTICATED VIA USSD CHANNEL. mobile connect. EASY TO USE.
90% 66%
72% WOULD
RECOMMEND REPORTED
SAID IT WAS
THEIR OPERATOR
FOR HAVING REPORTED CONSISTENCY ACROSS
IMPROVED EASIER THAN
OTHER LOG-IN
MOBILE CONNECT. DIFFERENT WEBSITES. PRIVACY. METHODS.
Source: GSMA 2015. © Groupe Speciale Mobile Association (GSMA). Reproduced, with permission, by GSMA; further permission
required for reuse.
Note: USSD = unstructured supplementary service data.
Future Pathways
In Sri Lanka Mobile Connect is now available as a service for the entire cus-
tomer base of both Dialog and Mobitel, totaling more than 15 million subscrib-
ers, and the companies are actively mobilizing service partners. Joint marketing
and public awareness campaigns are ongoing. Dialog Axiata and Sri Lanka
Telecom Mobitel won a special award at the European Identity Conference
2015, for the Mobile Connect implementation with the WSO2 Identity Server
(BusinessWire 2015.)
By 2015, the GSMA had already announced that 17 MNOs had launched the
Mobile Connect service in 13 countries, with plans for additional launches
and beta trials to follow. The GSMA’s Mobile Connect service enables customers
to create and manage a universal identity that will securely authenticate them
and allow them to safely access mobile and digital services such as e-commerce,
banking, health, and digital entertainment as well as e-government portals via
their mobile phones.
Because digital identity reduces the uncertainties inherent in transactions
effected from a distance, using digital identity has huge potential for developing
countries. Given the proliferation of mobile phones in developing countries,
mobile identity can be used effectively in a variety of ways. There are different
levels of security, from low-level website access to highly secure bank-grade
authentication. This can be effectively used by government welfare schemes,
Notes
1. A single country may have multiple cases (up to 15, for India) involving different
actors at the state, local, and national levels. The total population being targeted is
estimated.
2. iPhone 5S and Samsung Galaxy S5 and subsequent-generation phones come with
fingerprint scanners.
3. BSP Circular No. 608 Series of 2008.
4. Sari-Sari (“variety”) are little convenience stores.
5. Under the “business correspondent” model, nongovernmental organizations/
microfinance institutions set up under Societies/Trust Acts, Societies registered under
Mutually Aided Cooperative Societies Acts or the Cooperative Societies Acts of
States, section 25 companies, registered nonbanking finance companies not accepting
public deposits, and Post Offices may act as business correspondents (RBI 2006).
6. The DBT of LPG scheme, PAHAL (Pratyaksh Hanstantrit Labh).
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This study has examined how macro-, meso-, micro-, and customer-level actors
can lead, engage, and influence the policies, regulations, processes, and ecosys-
tems to achieve greater financial inclusion through critical game-changing
measures that foster innovative digital solutions. The experiences of the countries
studied, both within and outside the South Asia region, have revealed many
useful lessons that can be used as guiding principles to enhance financial inclu-
sion in South Asia and in the developing world as a whole.
Part III aims to distill the guiding principles and measures that would help
avoid the deficiencies and pitfalls that have constrained the pace of scaling-up
in several countries, and to suggest (in chapter 8) how they could be applied
to help change the digital landscape in South Asia (summarized in chapter 7)
as well as in developing countries more generally (chapter 9). Even though the
game-changing elements discussed in this study, and digital finance per se, can-
not be considered a panacea for persistent financial exclusion problems, the
lessons discussed here provide valuable options for policy makers and market
players in addressing shortfalls in the use and reach of financial services.
Introduction
South Asia consists of eight countries at different stages of economic development,
with widely varying economic characteristics and attributes. With nearly
40 percent of the developing world’s poor living in the region (World Bank
2015) and 54 percent of the region’s adult population (585 million) financially
excluded,1 addressing the financial inclusion gap is critically important.
Comparison of Findex data across the regions reveals that the South Asia region
lags behind the East Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, and Latin America
and the Caribbean regions in the percentage of adults with accounts, females with
accounts, and the poorest 40 percent with accounts in formal financial institutions
(table 7.1). On the other hand, the percentage of young adults (ages 15–24 years)
with accounts in South Asia compares well with the other regions.
Even though the mobile account ownership indicator for South Asia is the
second highest behind Sub-Saharan Africa, at 2.6 percent, considerable efforts
are needed to push the mobile account ownership numbers closer to the
11.5 percent achieved in Sub-Saharan Africa. South Asia shows limited owner-
ship and use of debit cards and credit cards (8.5 percent and 2.6 percent,
respectively). Although automated teller machines (ATMs) seem to be the
preferred method of cash withdrawal (31.1 percent), the region scores rela-
tively low on receipts of wages and government grants to accounts (3.5 percent
and 3.1 percent, respectively) and utility bill payments using an account
(2.7 percent). These gaps represent opportunities to use digital means to reach
the poor and unbanked in a more meaningful manner.
Before examining the applicability of the lessons and guiding principles from
the case study countries, it is important to diagnose the digital landscape and
readiness of each country. Detailed country reports based on publicly available
information and data gathered from different sources are summarized in
an “at-a-glance” matrix in chapter annex 7A, table 7A.1. This chapter also
reviews the status of South Asian countries in terms of the key themes at differ-
ent levels of analysis, as a basis for applying the lessons of experience and guiding
principles in chapter 8.
Macro-Level Strategies
At the macro level (of policy makers, regulators, and donors), a few of the South Asian
countries have started aligning policies and strategies on financial inclusion as a
national agenda. Lack of a clear national strategy—as well as changes in strategy
when governments change—has resulted in inconsistent policies and discontinu-
ity of results-oriented programs. The region’s countries vary widely in their
approaches, although several have made progress:
• India now has a clear direction and vision, and the country has embarked on a
financial inclusion strategy focused heavily on digital financial inclusion
modalities.
• Pakistan has not yet formulated a comprehensive digital agenda for financial
inclusion, although its high-value payment system is digitized, and it report-
edly launched a national financial inclusion strategy in 2015.
• Sri Lanka does not have a national-level, comprehensive financial inclusion
strategy, but the country has a clear information and communication technol-
ogy (ICT) and e-government policy, and the Central Bank has pursued use of
digital finance for financial inclusion under its payment systems policy agenda.
• Bangladesh is also driving financial inclusion as part of its strategic plan, and it
has a national ICT policy that promotes digitization.
However, because MNOs are outside the ambit of the financial regulatory
authorities, special dispensations are often necessary to permit these nonbanks
and MNOs to enter the payment space to provide mobile-phone–based e-money
solutions to the poor and the unbanked. India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka have
enacted Payment and Settlement Laws. The other South Asian countries have no
payment laws but have used the provisions in the central bank or the monetary
authority Acts to issue relevant regulations for this purpose. Bangladesh has
drafted a Payment Law, and Maldives has submitted a bill to the parliament. All
countries have Anti-Money Laundering and Combatting Funding of Terrorism
(AML/CFT) laws or regulations covering financial transactions, many of which
are being reviewed.
Among the South Asian countries, Sri Lanka has the most comprehensive set
of enabling laws and regulations for digital finance and facilitating nonbanks to
enter into the payment space. It continues to adopt a flexible approach toward
promoting nonbank entry, but within the applicable legal framework.
Micro-Level Models
South Asian countries are heavily bankcentric, and financial system development
is usually driven through regulations. Although countries have recognized the
financial inclusion gaps and tried to find solutions, most of them still favor bank-
led models over MNO-led mobile money solutions.
India passed legislation permitting “payment banks” and “small finance banks,”
and deposit accounts in those entities are eligible for risk-proportionate know-
your-customer (KYC) procedures. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) also amended
the regulation enabling nonbank entities to be banking correspondents. This will
enable nonbank entities, including mobile operators, and the national postal
Customer-Level ID Systems
The lack of a unique identity has been a continuing problem in the South Asia
region, and these countries will need to introduce digital ID systems to enable
the lower-income population to access formal financial institutions. India
now has provided a long-term solution: the Unique Identification Authority
of India (UIDAI)’s Aadhaar program is continuing the process of assigning ID
numbers to all citizens, having already issued 855 million IDs (68 percent of
the population).
Afghanistan, Bhutan, Maldives, and Sri Lanka have unique IDs, and Sri Lanka
is also planning to go for a biometric ID system that would solve many issues
related to fake IDs submitted at the time of opening a bank or transactional
accounts. Afghanistan came out with a digital ID (electronic-Tazkera) in 2015.
Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Nepal have multiple IDs, as does Pakistan—although
it now offers a Computerized National Identity Card (CNIC) by NADRA that
verifies users’ biometric data. NADRA also does biometric verification when
registering a new subscriber identification module (SIM) card.
Although all South Asian countries have data on grant recipients, India and
Pakistan have developed biometric-enabled databases, which is a significant step
forward. South Asia could learn from South Africa’s successful experience with
a biometric ID system (as discussed in chapter 6), which has managed to avoid
some of the KYC and customer due diligence and AML/CFT issues.
National financial
inclusion strategy
being drafted
National digital No: Commitment Yes: Digital No Yes No No Yes: as part of No explicit agenda
financial agenda to Better than Cash Bangladesh Vision financial inclusion
Alliance; 2021 strategy
government-formed
Digital Finance
Committee to
oversee the salary
payments of civil
servants
National ICT No Yes: Digital No Yes No No Draft national ICT Yes: e-government
policy or Bangladesh Vision policy of 2012
e-government 2021
policy
table continues next page
Table 7A.1 Digital Financial Landscape in South Asia: At a Glance (continued)
Digital finance
enabler Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka
National payment No Being done Being done Yes No No Not clear whether No: need to assess
strategy there is a the long-term
long-term strategy
strategy
2. Legal and regulatory (enabling laws and regulations)
Payment and No No (draft act) No Yes Bill stage No Yes, but restrictive Yes
settlement law
Payment Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes: NRB IT Policy, Yes Yes
regulations under #2068 under
other laws (central NRB Act
bank law,
monetary
authority law, or
banking act)
AML/CFT law or Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
financial
transaction law or
regulations
Financial No No No: through Yes: also No No No No: only through
consumer other acts and banking financial
protection law or regulations ombudsman ombudsman and
regulations CBSL mechanisms
Electronic funds Yes: e-money issuer Yes No Yes: regulations No No Yes Yes
transfer law or regulations 2011 under RBI Act
regulations
table continues next page
187
Table 7A.1 Digital Financial Landscape in South Asia: At a Glance (continued)
188
Digital finance
enabler Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka
A. MACRO-LEVEL POLICIES, STRATEGIES, LAWS, AND REGULATIONS (continued)
2. Legal and regulatory (enabling laws and regulations) (continued)
Electronic or No No No India IT Act No No No Yes
computer 2000, IT
transactions law or (Amendment)
digital finance law Act 2008 deals
with electronic
Payment devices offenses
fraud law No No No Same as above No No No Yes
Computer crimes
law No No No Same as above No No No Yes
Digital finance
enabler Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka
Credit information Public credit registry Credit information Credit registry Credit registry Public credit Private credit Public credit Yes: credit
bureau and bureau and collateral registry information bureau registry information
Unified collateral No collateral
secured registry bureau and
registry Online platform registry No collateral Secured No collateral
transaction electronic
registry transaction law registry
registry However, not fully No collateral searchable
available; registry
operationalized? registry collateral
not implemented registry (need
amendment to
law)
Regional policy
advocates or
networks Member Member Member Member Member Member Member Member
Regional payment
council (SAARC)
Common national No Yes, being Yes Yes No Yes: three switches No Yes
payment switch enhanced
available?
ATM network Yes: mainly in Kabul Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
available? city
ATM network No, but encouraged Partially No Yes No No Yes Yes
interoperable?
EFTPOS network Some Yes Yes Yes Yes: BML Yes Yes Yes
available?
MNOs providing Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
services on behalf
of micro-level
players
table continues next page
189
190
Digital finance
enabler Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka
Services provided Cash-in/cash-out, bill Merchant or bill None Airtime top-up Bill/merchant Wallet-to-wallet Merchant Merchant payment
by nonbank-led pay, merchant pay, payment payment transfers payment
Link to other P2P transfer
mobile money remittance, salary
payments, MFI loan Other bulk payment banking P2P transfer Wallet top-up from Airtime top-up (domestic)
initiatives,
products (domestic) a bank account
including OTC disbursement or P2P transfer Loan Airtime top-up
repayment (domestic) Bill payment Airtime top-up Wallet-to-merchant disbursement
Bill payment
and online or repayment
Airtime top-up, link International Other bulk payments Depending on
to other banking remittances payment International
products provider, NFC to
(inward only) Prepaid cards for remittances
P2P transfer bus services,
wallet top-up
Airtime top-up, (domestic) P2P transfer international
G2P, B2P (depending on (domestic) remittance,
service provider) government
Link to other Other bulk pension payments
banking products payment
Bill payment
Mobile
microinsurance
Mobile money No No No No No No No NFC-enabled
applications? remittance app,
Mobile Connect ID
Social grant Banks and financial State-owned Commercial Yes: Aadhaar- BML (state- State-owned Banks, MFIs State banks.
disbursement institutions commercial banks, banks enabled Jan owned commercial banks Samurdhi, and
agency MFIs Dhan Yojana commercial Divineguma banks
Government accounts and bank)
pensions and state bank
national solidarity
program
Method of social Bank accounts, MFIs Bank account, Accounts, cash Cash or bank BML accounts Account or cash Cash or bank Bank accounts
grant BEFTN, MFS, cards account or or cash mobile-phone
disbursements cards? banking or
prepaid cards
191
Note
1. Data from the Global Findex Survey 2014, http://datatopics.worldbank.org
/financialinclusion/.
Bibliography
World Bank. 2015. Global Monitoring Report 2014/2015: Ending Poverty and Sharing
Prosperity. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Introduction
While the previous chapter’s summary of the digital landscape in South Asia
cannot replace an in-depth diagnostic assessment of how best to digitize the
delivery of financial services in each country, it provides a basis for applying
the lessons and principles that emerged from the analysis provided in Part II.
The case study countries provided insight into how game-changing critical
enablers can enhance the effectiveness of, or help overcome barriers to, digital
financial interventions at the macro, meso, micro, and customer levels. South Asia
region countries can benefit from strong actions by the key stakeholders to give
priority to these critical enablers and provide the vision, direction, regulatory
adaptations, and resources to ensure their effective implementation.
Macro Level
Leadership and National Policies
National-level policy commitment, progressive leadership, and consistency
are important enablers. It is an imperative for governments, policy makers,
and regulators to clearly announce the objectives of policies for financial inclu-
sion and e-money, as well as the specific areas of focus for defined time periods.
Implementation authorities may simply ignore vague or unclear public policy
statements or be stymied by changes in policy when the government changes.
Countries should have a national policy for financial inclusion and a digital
financial agenda (including information and communication technology [ICT]
policy and e-government) to ensure that the strategy is implemented broadly
to reach the unbanked and the underbanked.
Most South Asian countries have yet to develop these strategies. Among the
case study countries, India’s Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana financial inclusion
strategy is a clear example of how commitment to a major national strategy can
drive significant efforts to bring poor people into the formal financial system and
use digital mechanisms to reach them in a cost-effective manner.
Meso Level
Financial Infrastructure Development
The widely dispersed poor population in many South Asian countries is a key
challenge for establishing the infrastructure needed to expand financial inclusion.
Connectivity, national switches, interoperability, and agent network management
are critical components of digital finance models. Coordination among macro-level
policy makers and regulators, meso-level institutions, and micro-level service
providers is key.
National retail payment providers, ICT agencies, and credit information bureaus
are some examples of meso institutions that can enable infrastructure
development—yet these remain largely undeveloped in most South Asian countries.
Since all eight South Asian countries are members of the South Asian Association
for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Payments Council, it should incorporate digi-
tal finance as a priority agenda for financial inclusion at the regional level.
Meso-level enablers are evident in several of the case study countries.
In Thailand, the proactive Thai Bankers’ Association helps drive the policy that
provides for the spread of ubiquitous automated teller machines (ATMs) through-
out the country. Sri Lanka’s ICTA (ICT agency) drives the e-government program,
and LankaClear (retail infrastructure provider) promotes the corporate theme of
“A World beyond Cash” in moving toward a fully interoperable common payment
switch. The forward-thinking National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI)
facilitates strategic implementation of its dynamic inclusion policy.
Micro Level
MNO-Led Mobile Money Model
Despite its clear advantages in terms of proximity and services to the targeted poor
and unbanked population in hard-to-reach rural areas and islands, the MNO-led
model is still not popular in the South Asia region. Only Afghanistan and Sri Lanka
operate full-fledged MNO-led mobile money solutions. Maldives has launched
its own MNO-led mobile money solution. And Bangladesh has bKash, which is
owned by BRAC Bank.
A recent Groupe Speciale Mobile Association (GSMA) article (di Castri
2013) concludes that regulators in a number of countries (including Colombia,
Ghana, Guatemala, India, Nigeria, and South Africa) have been reluctant to
grant MNOs mobile money licenses because they are (a) afraid that the MNOs
could scale up very quickly and dominate the formal financial sector; (b) con-
cerned that regulators would be unable to control such growth and use it to
deepen access to finance; and (c) nervous about the ability of MNOs to safeguard
customers’ money as effectively as banks. But in many other markets, the regula-
tor has been able to design prudential regulations and market conduct frame-
works that help to make nonbank e-money providers sound and effective.
Interoperability
Interoperability is another important enabler for MNOs to enhance their out-
reach and efficiency. However, not many countries in South Asia (or elsewhere)
have MNOs that interoperate. The best example is Sri Lanka, which launched
the world’s first end-to-end interoperable mobile money solution: three MNOs
operate a single wallet sharing merchants and agents, with firewalls built in so
they cannot access others’ subscriber information. Indonesia represents another
interoperability concept, with four MNOs interoperating but retaining four indi-
vidual wallets. Through such mechanisms, customers stand to benefit from lower
cost as well as a larger number of touchpoints.
Mobile Applications
While there are around 265 live mobile money deployments in the world—with
another 102 planned1—only M-Pesa has served as a basis for the development of
significant value-added services by app developers who enjoy the benefits of
low-cost, extensive outreach and convenience to customers. In Sri Lanka, the
MNOs are taking small steps in the right direction by enabling government pen-
sion disbursements, tax payments, and international remittances. In some cities,
near-field communications (NFC)–enabled, contactless smart cards can be topped
up and used to pay the bus fare.
Customer Level
Unique Identification
A unique ID is a key element in digital finance. It enables basic KYC subscriber
identification module (SIM) registration and avoids paper-based, tardy AML/CFT
and KYC and CDD processes that tend to exclude and discourage the unbanked
poor. The plethora of documents required at the time of opening mobile or
e-money accounts has put off the poor and pushed them to over-the-counter
(OTC) transactions to avoid paper-based procedures. Bangladesh’s bKash system
and Pakistan’s Telenor systems are experiencing OTC-related issues.
In the South Asia region, except for Bangladesh and Nepal, other countries
have unique ID. Pakistan has the National Database and Registration Authority
(NADRA)-issued Computerized National Identity Card (CNIC), and Afghanistan
is planning to roll out the electronic Tazkera. India has Aadhaar ID, which is
biometric-enabled and linked to bank accounts. In addition, Sri Lanka mobile
subscribers have a Digital Connect online ID that can be used for authentication
for online purchases.
Note
1. Data from GSMA’s Mobile Money Tracker: http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelop
ment/programmes/mobile-money-for-the-unbanked/insights/tracker.
Bibliography
di Castri, S. 2013. “What Could We Learn from Nigeria Barring MNOs from Participating
in the Mobile Money Market?” Groupe Speciale Mobile Association blog, April 29.
http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/programme/mobile-money/what
-could-we-learn-from-nigeria-barring-mnos-from-participating-in-the-mobile-money
-market.
Klapper, L., and D. Singer. 2014. “The Opportunities of Digitizing Payments: How
Digitization of Payments, Transfers, and Remittances Contributes to the G20 Goals of
Broad-Based Economic Growth, Financial Inclusion, and Women’s Economic
Empowerment.” Report No. 90305, prepared for the G20 Australian Presidency,
World Bank, Washington, DC.
Conclusions
Introduction
In the developing world as a whole, lack of money is the most commonly
reported reason for being unbanked. Other reasons for not having access to
formal financial services (through a bank, credit union, savings and credit coop-
erative, post office, or microfinance institution) include lack of proximity and the
costs associated with maintaining an account. The wide accessibility of mobile-
phone and digital technologies offers the potential to reduce disparities by gen-
der and area (urban or rural).
Technology-based solutions offer a tremendous opportunity to transform
the landscape of access to financial services for typically underserved groups,
such as the poor, women, and remote populations. Digital or e-money can be
enabled by mobile phones, branchless banking, point-of-sale (POS) transactions,
prepaid or smart cards, and well-organized agent networks. These decentral-
ized modalities have the capacity to reach the unbanked masses in a safe,
simple, reliable, convenient, and cost-effective manner, enabling them to
manage small transactions, including personal and government payments as
well as remittance transfers.
Greater financial inclusion means higher potential for the poor to participate
and share in their country’s economic growth. Although the services avail-
able through e-money at present do not represent the full range of services avail-
able through financial institutions, they nevertheless enable those at the bottom
of the pyramid to formally conduct certain basic financial transactions, and they
can increasingly be linked to bank accounts and other means of accessing a more
complete range of financial services.
This study has highlighted Kenya, South Africa, Sri Lanka, and Thailand as
countries where the private sector and nonbank entities have applied technology
and innovative thinking to successfully address inclusion issues, supported by
flexibly designed policies and regulations.
Kenya more than doubled the rate of financial inclusion in five years to reach
nearly 70 percent of the adult population as a direct result of innovations
associated with the M-Pesa mobile money application, which has evolved
into the country’s dominant retail payment platform. M-Pesa has especially ben-
efited the poor and unbanked, who previously had limited and costly access to
traditional bank and financial infrastructure.
South Africa has issued some 10 million biometrically secure debit MasterCards
as the platform for social transfer payments, thereby extending financial access to
16 million poor beneficiaries, with the country’s banked and financially included
population reaching 75 percent and 86 percent, respectively.
Sri Lanka’s government and central bank proactively developed the country’s
legislative framework to support establishment of an excellent payment systems
infrastructure, and possibly the best regulatory framework in the region to govern
e-money for e-commerce and e-government. The result is the world’s first
end-to-end interoperable mobile payment solution, reaching over 83 percent of
the population.
Thailand’s efficient coordination of strategies and policies toward payment
services and reduction of infrastructure costs—partly through the deployment of
thousands of multicapacity automated teller machines (ATMs) and automated
deposit machines (ADMs) throughout the country—has led to nearly 100 percent
financial inclusion.
These findings, complemented by experiences from several other countries
that are laying the foundations, reveal how e-money and other digital technologies
can transform the financial inclusion landscape for the poor and underserved.
This chapter summarizes the key lessons from the case study experiences that
can be applied broadly to expand financial inclusion throughout the developing
world.
Experience shows that private providers can work cooperatively to make com-
mon elements of the system work cost-effectively while competing for custom-
ers on the retail end, when the infrastructure and incentives have been
established to level the playing field and provide neutrality across providers.
Hence it is incumbent on governments and central banks to lay the regulatory
and infrastructural foundation for private actors to do so profitably and to
facilitate market forces to drive the players toward the desired results.
Agents represent a further key element in utilizing e-money to extend the
outreach of financial services, given that the number of mobile money agents is
typically 4 to 10 times the number of bank branches. However, managing agent
networks requires a delicate balance between ensuring the profitability of each
agent and providing enough touchpoints that consumers can be served quickly
and efficiently.
(government policy makers, central banks, and other regulators); meso- and
micro-level institutions (financial institutions and MNOs, and their associations
and facilitating organizations); and consumers (through advocacy agencies and
survey data). Key objectives for such coordination are to balance the interests of
the different actors, ensure that the playing field is level, and, above all, strike the
right balance among expanding outreach, mitigating risks to the stability and
security of the system, and protecting the consumers.
The lessons provided in this study are intended to help flatten the learning
curve for taking advantage of e-money and other innovations to extend access
to financial services, especially for South Asian and other developing countries.
By establishing a conducive legal and regulatory framework and providing
appropriate incentives to both private providers and customers, countries can
accelerate financial inclusion to promote a more inclusive society and shared
prosperity.
Table A.1 India against Benchmarks for South Asia and Lower-Middle-Income Countries
Percentage
Population, ages 15+ years: 887.9 million
GNI per capita: US$1,570
South Lower-middle- World
Survey item India Asia income average
Account (ages 15+ years)
All adults 53.1 46.4 42.7 61.5
Women 43.1 37.4 36.3 58.1
Adults belonging to the poorest 40% 43.9 38.1 33.2 54.0
Young adults (ages 15–24 years) 43.2 36.7 34.7 46.3
Adults living in rural areas 50.1 43.5 40.0 56.7
Table A.1 India against Benchmarks for South Asia and Lower-Middle-Income Countries (continued)
Percentage
Table A.2 Indonesia against Benchmarks for East Asia and Pacific and Lower-Middle-Income Countries
Percentage
Table A.2 Indonesia against Benchmarks for East Asia and Pacific and Lower-Middle-Income Countries (continued)
Percentage
Population, ages 15+ years: 177.7 million
GNI per capita: US$3,580
East Asia Lower-middle- World
Survey item Indonesia and Pacific income average
Financial institution account (ages 15+ years)
All adults, 2014 35.9 68.8 41.8 60.7
All adults, 2011 19.6 55.1 28.7 50.6
Mobile account (ages 15+ years)
All adults 0.4 0.4 2.5 2.0
Access to financial institution account (ages 15+ years)
Has debit card, 2014 25.9 42.9 21.2 40.1
Has debit card, 2011 10.5 34.7 10.1 30.5
ATM is the main mode of withdrawal (% with an account), 2014 70.9 53.3 42.4 —
ATM is the main mode of withdrawal (% with an account), 2011 51.1 37.0 28.1 48.3
Use of account in the past year (ages 15+ years)
Used an account to receive wages 6.6 15.1 5.6 17.7
Used an account to receive government transfers 3.0 8.1 3.3 8.2
Used a financial institution account to pay utility bills 2.9 11.8 3.1 16.7
Other digital payment in the past year (ages 15+ years)
Used a debit card to make payments 8.5 14.8 9.6 23.2
Used a credit card to make payments 1.1 10.8 2.8 15.1
Used the Internet to pay bills or make purchases 5.1 15.6 2.6 16.6
Domestic remittances in the past year (ages 15+ years)
Sent remittances 17.9 16.6 14.2 —
Sent remittances via a financial institution (% senders) 52.4 36.9 30.9 —
Sent remittances via a mobile phone (% senders) 3.6 8.7 7.7 —
Sent remittances via a money transfer operator (% senders) 8.7 18.5 18.3 —
Received remittances 31.0 20.6 17.8 —
Received remittances via a financial institution (% recipients) 36.3 29.0 26.0 —
Received remittances via a mobile phone (% recipients) 0.2 4.9 5.7 —
Received remittances via a money transfer operator (% recipients) 7.9 15.8 16.6 —
Savings in the past year (ages 15+ years)
Saved at a financial institution, 2014 26.6 36.5 14.8 27.4
Saved at a financial institution, 2011 15.3 28.5 11.1 22.6
Saved using a savings club or person outside the family 25.2 6.0 12.4 —
Saved any money 69.3 71.0 45.6 56.5
Saved for old age 27.1 36.5 12.6 23.9
Saved for a farm or business 22.6 21.3 11.8 13.8
Saved for education or school fees 33.3 30.7 20.0 22.3
Credit in the past year (ages 15+ years)
Borrowed from a financial institution, 2014 13.1 11.0 7.5 10.7
Borrowed from a financial institution, 2011 8.5 8.6 7.3 9.1
Borrowed from family or friends 41.5 28.3 33.1 26.2
Borrowed from a private informal lender 2.9 2.5 8.5 4.6
Borrowed any money 56.6 41.2 47.4 42.4
Borrowed for a farm or business 11.7 8.3 9.2 7.1
Borrowed for education or school fees 12.2 7.1 10.1 7.7
Outstanding mortgage at a financial institution 5.5 8.0 4.7 10.4
Source: Global Findex 2014 Survey, http://datatopics.worldbank.org/financialinclusion/.
Note: ATM = automated teller machine; GNI = gross national income; — = not available.
Table A.3 Kenya against Benchmarks for Sub-Saharan Africa and Low-Income Countries
Percentage
Population, ages 15+ years: 25.6 million
GNI per capita: US$1,160
Sub-Saharan World
Survey item Kenya Africa Low-income average
Account (ages 15+ years)
All adults 74.7 34.2 27.5 61.5
Women 71.1 29.9 23.9 58.1
Adults belonging to the poorest 40% 63.4 24.6 19.4 54.0
Young adults (ages 15–24 years) 66.4 25.9 20.2 46.3
Adults living in rural areas 73.0 29.2 24.8 56.7
Table A.3 Kenya against Benchmarks for Sub-Saharan Africa and Low-Income Countries (continued)
Percentage
Population, ages 15+ years: 25.6 million
GNI per capita: US$1,160
Sub-Saharan World
Survey item Kenya Africa Low-income average
Credit in the past year (ages 15+ years)
Borrowed from a financial institution, 2014 14.9 6.3 8.6 10.7
Borrowed from a financial institution, 2011 9.7 4.8 11.7 9.1
Borrowed from family or friends 60.5 41.9 34.9 26.2
Borrowed from a private informal lender 7.3 4.7 6.5 4.6
Borrowed any money 79.2 54.5 52.5 42.4
Borrowed for a farm or business 24.3 12.8 12.2 7.1
Borrowed for education or school fees 33.5 12.3 10.9 7.7
Outstanding mortgage at a financial institution 12.1 5.2 4.1 10.4
Source: Global Findex 2014 Survey, http://datatopics.worldbank.org/financialinclusion/.
Note: ATM = automated teller machine; GNI = gross national income; — = not available.
Table A.4 The Philippines against Benchmarks for East Asia and Pacific and Lower-Middle-Income Countries
Percentage
Population, ages 15+ years: 64.8 million
GNI per capita: US$3,270
Lower-
East Asia middle- World
Survey item Philippines and Pacific income average
Account (ages 15+ years)
All adults 31.3 69.0 42.7 61.5
Women 37.9 67.0 36.3 58.1
Adults belonging to the poorest 40% 17.8 60.9 33.2 54.0
Young adults (ages 15–24 years) 19.0 60.7 34.7 46.3
Adults living in rural areas 27.5 64.5 40.0 56.7
Financial institution account (ages 15+ years)
All adults, 2014 28.1 68.8 41.8 60.7
All adults, 2011 26.6 55.1 28.7 50.6
Mobile account (ages 15+ years)
All adults 4.2 0.4 2.5 2.0
Access to financial institution account (ages 15+ years)
Has debit card, 2014 20.5 42.9 21.2 40.1
Has debit card, 2011 13.2 34.7 10.1 30.5
ATM is the main mode of withdrawal (% with an account), 2014 67.1 53.3 42.4 —
ATM is the main mode of withdrawal (% with an account), 2011 62.5 37.0 28.1 48.3
Use of account in the past year (ages 15+ years)
Used an account to receive wages 6.3 15.1 5.6 17.7
Used an account to receive government transfers 4.0 8.1 3.3 8.2
Used a financial institution account to pay utility bills 1.0 11.8 3.1 16.7
Other digital payment in the past year (ages 15+ years)
Used a debit card to make payments 11.9 14.8 9.6 23.2
Used a credit card to make payments 2.2 10.8 2.8 15.1
Used the Internet to pay bills or make purchases 3.5 15.6 2.6 16.6
table continues next page
Table A.4 The Philippines against Benchmarks for East Asia and Pacific and Lower-Middle-Income Countries (continued)
Percentage
Population, ages 15+ years: 64.8 million
GNI per capita: US$3,270
Lower-
East Asia middle- World
Survey item Philippines and Pacific income average
Domestic remittances in the past year (ages 15+ years)
Sent remittances 21.3 16.6 14.2 —
Sent remittances via a financial institution (% senders) 17.0 36.9 30.9 —
Sent remittances via a mobile phone (% senders) 16.2 8.7 7.7 —
Sent remittances via a money transfer operator (% senders) 70.5 18.5 18.3 —
Received remittances 34.1 20.6 17.8 —
Received remittances via a financial institution (% recipients) 12.1 29.0 26.0 —
Received remittances via a mobile phone (% recipients) 10.8 4.9 5.7 —
Received remittances via a money transfer operator (% recipients) 58.0 15.8 16.6 —
Table A.5 South Africa against Benchmarks for Sub-Saharan Africa and Upper-Middle-Income Countries
Percentage
Population, ages 15+ years: 37.5 million
GNI per capita: US$7,410
Sub- Upper-
South Saharan middle- World
Survey item Africa Africa income average
Account (ages 15+ years)
All adults 70.3 34.2 70.5 61.5
Women 70.4 29.9 67.3 58.1
Adults belonging to the poorest 40% 57.8 24.6 62.7 54.0
Young adults (ages 15–24 years) 53.5 25.9 58.1 46.3
Adults living in rural areas 70.0 29.2 68.8 56.7
table continues next page
Table A.5 South Africa against Benchmarks for Sub-Saharan Africa and Upper-Middle-Income Countries (continued)
Percentage
Table A.6 Sri Lanka against Benchmarks for South Asia and Lower-Middle-Income Countries
Percentage
Population, ages 15+ years: 15.3 million
GNI per capita: US$3,170
Lower-
middle- World
Survey item Sri Lanka South Asia income average
Account (ages 15+ years)
All adults 82.7 46.4 42.7 61.5
Women 83.1 37.4 36.3 58.1
Adults belonging to the poorest 40% 79.8 38.1 33.2 54.0
Young adults (ages 15–24 years) 85.2 36.7 34.7 46.3
Adults living in rural areas 83.4 43.5 40.0 56.7
Table A.6 Sri Lanka against Benchmarks for South Asia and Lower-Middle-Income Countries (continued)
Percentage
Population, ages 15+ years: 15.3 million
GNI per capita: US$3,170
Lower-
middle- World
Survey item Sri Lanka South Asia income average
Credit in the past year (ages 15+ years)
Borrowed from a financial institution, 2014 17.9 6.4 7.5 10.7
Borrowed from a financial institution, 2011 17.7 8.7 7.3 9.1
Borrowed from family or friends 9.0 31.4 33.1 26.2
Borrowed from a private informal lender 2.4 10.9 8.5 4.6
Borrowed any money 29.1 46.7 47.4 42.4
Borrowed for a farm or business 3.1 8.6 9.2 7.1
Borrowed for education or school fees 4.4 8.9 10.1 7.7
Outstanding mortgage at a financial institution 7.7 3.8 4.7 10.4
Source: Global Findex 2014 Survey, http://datatopics.worldbank.org/financialinclusion/.
Note: ATM = automated teller machine; GNI = gross national income; — = not available.
Table A.7 Thailand against Benchmarks for East Asia and Pacific and Upper-Middle-Income Countries
Percentage
Population, ages 15+ years: 54.8 million
GNI per capita: US$5,340
Upper-
East Asia middle- World
Survey item Thailand and Pacific income average
Account (ages 15+ years)
All adults 78.1 69.0 70.5 61.5
Women 75.4 67.0 67.3 58.1
Adults belonging to the poorest 40% 72.0 60.9 62.7 54.0
Young adults (ages 15–24 years) 70.6 60.7 58.1 46.3
Adults living in rural areas 78.2 64.5 68.8 56.7
Table A.7 Thailand against Benchmarks for East Asia and Pacific and Upper-Middle-Income Countries (continued)
Percentage
Population, ages 15+ years: 54.8 million
GNI per capita: US$5,340
Upper-
East Asia middle- World
Survey item Thailand and Pacific income average
Other digital payment in the past year (ages 15+ years)
Used a debit card to make payments 7.9 14.8 19.9 23.2
Used a credit card to make payments 3.7 10.8 14.4 15.1
Used the Internet to pay bills or make purchases 4.4 15.6 15.3 16.6
Bringing E-money to the Poor: Successes and Failures examines the lessons of success from four country case
studies of “gazelles”—Kenya, South Africa, Sri Lanka, and Thailand—that leapt from limitation to innovation by
successfully enabling the deployment of e-money technology. These countries have thereby transformed the
landscape of financial access to their poor. In addition, two country case studies (Maldives and the Philippines)
yield lessons learned from constraints that stalled e-money deployments. Because technology is not a silver
bullet, the case studies also explore other strategic elements that need to be in place for a country to expand
access to financial services through digital technology.
ISBN 978-1-4648-0462-5
SKU 210462