Desiderius Erasmus, Martin Luther-Discourse On Free Will (Milestones of Thought in The History of Ideas) (1985) PDF

DISCOURSE ON FREE WILL
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Erasmus - Luther
DISCOURSE ON
FREE WILL
Translated and edited by
ERNST F. WINTER
CONTINUUM-NEW YORK
2002
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INTRODUCTION
LUTHER repeatedly described The Enslaved Will (De servo

arbitrio, 1525) and his Catechism (1529) as the best expres-
sions of his thought. He had been aroused to write this
fierce tract because of Erasmus' On Free Will (De libero
arbitrio, 1524). And Erasmus, though originally sympa-
thetic to the reform movement within Christendom—he
himself relates a popular expression, "Erasmus laid the egg
which Luther hatched"—again attacked the Lutheran
version of reform. Erasmus was afraid of religious disturb-
ances. He was also prompted by friends, lay- and church-
men, to become partisan in the "great debate" of his time.
Consequently, Erasmus and Luther argued over what they
and their contemporaries thought was the characteristic
difference between the evolving Catholic and Protestant
positions concerning human nature, namely, the question of
the freedom of the will. Their often heated discourse
reveals, however, as much (if not more) about their sub-
jective modes of thinking and about the atmosphere of this
transition period from late Renaissance and Northern
Humanism to Protestantism and post-Tridentine Catholi-
cism, as about the perennial problem of man's free will. But
in the history of ideas this discourse gains an added signifi-
cance. It displays some of the possibilities and limitations
of Christian Humanism. It sheds light on the subsequent
development of modern thought. While the tools of both
protagonists are often medieval, many of their insights and
the issues themselves seem decidedly modern.
Well into the eighteenth century the Latin original of
Erasmus was still being read. The Enlightenment had its
picture of Erasmus, as did Romanticism and Liberalism in
the nineteenth century. It is significant that the present
Erasmus renaissance is revising all past pictures and, in
v
VI INTRODUCTION
particular, is attempting to show how orthodox, even

Thomistic, Erasmus had been in his Christianity; that he is
not just the "father of modernity" (cf. Bouyer and
Mesnard), but more complex; that he has much to say on
current problems. Equally significant is the reevaluation of
Luther as a truly religious and committed man, who is not
simply responsible for the modern age, but who also pro-
duced both conservative and liberal consequences to his
thought.
The following introductory remarks introduce the reader
to an obviously complex subject. A mere sketch of the life,
works, temperament, and some views of both protagonists
suffices to show how fascinatingly timely their topics have
remained. The selected bibliography serves as a guide for
further study.
Desiderius Erasmus was born in Rotterdam probably in
1466. He was the illegitimate son of a priest and a physi-
cian's daughter, a fact that depressed Erasmus all his life.
Both parents died early. The boy who had never experi-
enced family life craved for the rest of his days to be liked
and appreciated. He was born into a time of turmoil and of
partisanship. He obtained a good education at the famous
school of the Brethren of the Common Life at Deventer
(1474-1484). They instilled in him their pious "devotio
moderna," a lay spirituality deeply affecting Northern
Humanism. He became a monk and ordained priest at the
Augustinian monastery at Steyn (1486-1493). His poor
health and love for humanistic studies, plus dislike for the
monks, gained him a temporary dispensation, which even-
tually Pope Leo X arranged in permanence. Leaving the
monastery—as it turned out later—for good, he turned first
to the University of Paris (1495). The budding humanist
scholar was disappointed. Scholastic subtleties only in-
creased the Humanists' antipathies to Aristotle, dialectic,
and Scholasticism. Erasmus, too, protested against system-
atic philosophy. Instead, classical philology, a virgin field of
endeavor, attracted him. To place it in the service of reli-
gion was a sentiment strengthened on repeated visits to
INTRODUCTION vii
England, where he met devout Humanists like Golet and

St. Thomas More. Study, writing, good companionship, and
collecting valuables filled much of his life thereafter. He
discovered and edited Lorenzo Valla's critical Annotations
to the Vulgate (1505). His study of Greek and trips to
Italy enriched his horizon. In Praise of Folly (1511) was a
biting satire on human nature. The Church did not escape
unscathed. The new Bible translation and critical edition of
the Greek text, the Novum Instrumentum (1516), marked
progress in higher textual criticism. And, although some
great universities like Louvain, Oxford and Cambridge
proscribed all his writings, many Renaissance churchmen
actively sympathized with the "Erasmian reform" spirit.
The 95 Theses a year thereafter (1517) ended this spirit's
chances for success. A more radical approach to reform had
commenced. Soon a much broader popular response than
Erasmus ever had had for his wit was to accompany one
Martin Luther. Fourteen years younger than Erasmus, he
was born in Eisenach in 1483 to a mining family of peasant
stock. In some respects he had strikingly similar experiences
to Erasmus: studying at a Brethren school and imbibing
the "devotio moderna"; experiencing the insecurity of home
life and friction with his family; entering the Augustinian
monastery of Erfurt (1505), after being nearly killed by
lightning. Otherwise, however, profound differences existed.
Erasmus had found inspiration in the Platonists, St. Jerome,
Origen. Luther found his in St. Paul, St. Augustine.
Erasmus, fond of humanistic studies, a comfortable life,
correspondence with all the famed in the world, acquired
increasingly growing popularity and domestic serenity. He
became the acknowledged cosmopolitan head of the "res-
publica litteraria," writing in brilliant Latin. Luther's
powerful German could not move Erasmus, who used to
advantage the polished style of Renaissance tract literature,
which, while pious, was quite witty. The Adagia (1500) are
popularized Humanism. In short, Erasmus felt proud to be
a "humanist genius."
Luther, on the other hand, felt happiest when seriously
viii INTRODUCTION
concerned with the things of God. The Nominalist teaching

of Gabriel Biel, a follower of William of Occam's philoso-
phy, deepened Luther's problematic concern for the mean-
ing of life, his own in particular. He could not find an
answer in the classics, though he absorbed much learning.
He turned increasingly to the consolation of faith. Still
young, he was given the important chair of theology at
Wittenberg (1512). When preparing his lectures, he
turned completely from humanistic learning and Scholastic
theology to a biblical exegesis of his own inspiration. In
1515 he found his desperate queries answered in the Epistle
to the Romans (1, 17), in the concept of "justification by
faith." Erasmus' New Testament helped him gain further
insights.
Erasmus at first affirmed much in Luther, but increas-
ingly objected to his "extremism and rough manners." The
years 1517 and 1520 brought serious estrangements. The
humanist followers of Luther wished Erasmus on their side,
especially Melanchthon, who remained an ardent admirer
of Erasmus all his life. But Luther's three fighting chal-
lenges to authority, as it existed in the Europe of his day,
the Address to the German Nobility, The Babylonian Cap-
tivity of the Church and The Liberty of a Christian,
brought the breach with Rome. In the same year a Roman
bull, Exsurge Domine (1520), chastized Luther. He an-
swered with the Assertions, which among other things,
denied the free will. Erasmus hated to be drawn into this
controversy and moved from Louvain to Basel (1521). The
New Pope Adrian VI, a practical Netherlander, an old
school friend of Erasmus, was genuinely interested in reform
and wanted to see Erasmus do something, even come to
Rome. Erasmus tried to shield his "neutrality" by suggest-
ing both ill health and his favorite idea of a truce. A jury
of independent scholars (including himself) ought to be
able to settle the commotion with due reason. Luther, from
the other side, sarcastically counseled Erasmus not to get
involved and to disturb his love of peace. Erasmus replied
to him that he greatly feared Satan's power might be delud-
INTRODUCTION IX
ing Luther. Finally, responding to both outward prodding

and inner conviction ("At least / cannot be accused of
abandoning the Gospel to the passions of men") Erasmus
wrote in one sitting his Diatribe sen collatio de libero
arbitrio, a classic treatise against Luther. It appeared Sep-
tember 1, 1524 in Basel.
The Pope, the Emperor, and Henry VIII (who himself
had received the title "Defender of Faith" for writing
against Luther (1521), congratulated Erasmus. The world
considered the little book a beautifully written and in-
genious tract. The issue was joined. Despite detractions by
the "heavenly prophets," the outbreak of bloody peasant
uprisings, and personal problems, Luther soon finished his
four-times-longer answer, De servo arbitrio (December,
1525). The answer was as unsystematic as Erasmus' piece,
but powerful in its conviction and denial of the freedom of
the will. Erasmus was stung. His peace was gone. Luther
must be answered. The resulting two lengthy volumes,
Hyper aspistes Diatribae adversus servum arbitrium M.
Lutheri (1526, 1527), are more careful than his earlier
work. Luther is castigated as the destroyer of civil, religious,
and cultural order and harmony. In a sense Erasmus offers
a detailed explanation of Christian Humanism and human-
istic theology, as he conceived both. But not even his con-
ciliatory and pacific On Restoring Concord in the Church
(1533), concluding with the admonition "tolerate each
other," was able to bridge the enmity. His common sense
and uncomplicated tolerance could not satisfy the com-
mitted seeker for truth. The conflict raged.
While this great duel did not resolve the thorny question
of the freedom of the will, it did illustrate the basic views
on the nature of man and God held by most contemporaries
in the West at that time. These views reached into the past
and were to rise to great importance with the coming of the
national, industrial, democratic state. Their relevance today
contribute to the Erasmian renaissance.
Luther's part in the debate is the emphasis on Chris-
tianity as dogmatic religion. He wants to solve the issue
X INTRODUCTION
theologically. For Erasmus Christianity is morality, a sim-

plicity of life and of doctrine. He wants to resolve the
problem philosophically. In current terminology, Erasmus
displays an anthropological concern, but employs essentially
theological tools, without being or ever wanting to be a
theologian. Luther fashions his own theological tools, with-
out much interest in systematic structure. Erasmus has deep
pastoral concern. Luther desires the truth to shine forth
and the whole church to accept his witness to a personal
commitment. He is therefore distressed by Erasmus' differ-
ing commitment, his "philosophy of Christ." Luther abhors
and ignores the Renaissance search for Christian Human-
ism, and he is furiously suspicious of Erasmus' intellectuality
("Du bist nicht fromm!"). The Renaissance Church had
pulled the world to herself, art, reason, science, life.
Luther's religious seriousness and polemics against the
"reason of this world" helped decisively in cutting this
Renaissance Church wide open. What is more important,
tolerance or commitment? Where is truth?
The two protagonists become symbolic for two camps,
unable to meet. Erasmus defines free will: "By freedom of
the will we understand in this connection the power of the
human will whereby man can apply to or turn away from
that which leads unto eternal salvation." Luther says that
man is unable to do anything but continue to sin, except for
God's grace. The whole work of man's salvation, first to
last, is God's. Both proceed from different vantage points.
Erasmus dismisses both the excessive confidence in man's
moral strength, held by the Pelagians, and what he believed
to be St. Augustine's view, the excessive hopelessness of a
final condemnation passed on man. He identified Luther
with the latter. Erasmus calls Scripture to help in outlining
his reasonable and conciliatory middle way, really a philo-
sophical and pragmatic statement of man's essential free-
dom. Luther interprets this to mean assigning free will to
divine things, because his interest lies in practical imple-
mentation of a classical Christian paradox, which he
thought solved. His solution is "faith alone sets us free."
INTRODUCTION XI
Consult the footnotes (especially I/I; 111/2,3/10,11; V/8).

Erasmus tries to skirt the difficulties that Luther's problem-
atic mind discovers in much of the Church's age old
interpretation of this Christian paradox.
Modern commentators recognize dimly in Erasmus a
budding interest in theodicy. With it he influenced thinkers
for the next centuries (especially from Leibnitz to Kant).
His definition of free will "lives," because it is for the sake
of "living man." Already in his Antibarbari, a defense of
good learning in a Platonic setting, written while still in
the monastery, Erasmus makes a keen distinction between
two spheres of human existence, one based on pious faith
and the other on critical scholarship. For him man is the
only being who is capable of being at one and the same
time moral and scientific. Luther, fiery and committed, is
really interested in the grace of God. Erasmus seeks the
theological and intellectual virtues in the dawning modern
age.
The original of Erasmus has no subheadings or paragraphs.

The chapter and subheadings here used follow in the main the
division of the work, as acknowledged by Luther and others.
Special thanks are due to Professors Paul Oskar Kristeller and
Frederick W. Locke and to Reverend Herbert Musurillo for read-
ing the entire manuscript and for making valuable suggestions. To
the publishers, for their constructive comments on the manuscript
and their care in producing this volume, my added appreciation.
For any errors, none but the translator is responsible.
ERNST F. WINTER
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
MORTIMER JEROME ADLER, The Idea of Freedom: A Dialectical

Examination of the Conception of Freedom, New York,
Doubleday, 1958
Louis BOUYER, G.O., Erasmus and His Times, tr. by F. X.
Murphy, C.Ss.R., Westminster, Md., Newman, 1959
E. CASSIRER, P.O. KRISTELLER, J.H. RANDALL, JR., The Renais-
sance Philosophy of Man, University of Chicago Press, 1948
(1956)
ERIK H. ERIK SON, Young Man Luther; A Study in Psycho-
analysis and History, New York, Norton, 1958
JOHANNES HESSEN, Luther in katholischer Sicht, Grundlegung
eines okumenischen Gespraches, Bonn, L. Rohrscheid, 1949
JOHAN HUIZINGA, Erasmus and the Age of Reformation, New
York, Harper, 1924 (1957)
PIERRE MESNARD, Erasme de Rotterdam, essai sur le libre arbitre,
Algiers, R. Chaix, 1945
J. I. PACKER AND O. R. JOHNSTON, Martin Luther on the Bond-
age of the Will, Westwood, N.J., F.H. Revell, 1958
MARGARET MANN PHILLIPS, Erasmus and the Northern Renais-
sance, London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1949
Xll
CONTENTS
Part I ERASMUS : The Free Will
I. Preface: Man and Truth 3

II. Introduction: Objective Criterion for
Truth 13
III. Old Testament Proofs Supporting the
Free Will 21
IV. New Testament Proofs Supporting the
FreeWill 37
V. Apparent Proofs against the Free Will . 46
VI. Luther's Proofs against the Free Will . 61
VII. Postscript on Apparent Proofs against
the Free Will 69
VIII. Summary and Conclusion 79
Part II LUTHER: The Bondage of the Will
Introduction
I. 97
IL
Refutation of Erasmus' Preface . . . 100
III.
Refutation of Erasmus' Introduction . . 115
IV.
Refutation of Erasmus' Old and New
Testament Proofs Supporting the Free
Will 119
V. Comments on Erasmus' Treatment of
Passages Denying Free Will 128
VI. Summary on the Bondage of the Will . 134
VII. Conclusion 137
Xlll
Part One
ERASMUS
THE FREE WILL

I
A D I A T R I B E OR S E R M O N
CONCERNING FREE WILL
Desiderius Erasmus of Rotterdam
PREFACE: MAN AND TRUTH

AMONG the many difficulties encountered in Holy Scripture
—and there are many of them—none presents a more per-
plexed labyrinth than the problem of the freedom of the
will. In ancient and more recent times philosophers and
theologians1 have been vexed by it to an astonishing degree,
1
Arguments criticizing the free will are easier to find and to pre-
sent than those in its defense and explanation. Early Greek views
were already varied and obscure. The Eleatics, Democritus and the
Stoics generally opposed the freedom of the will. The Pythagoreans,
Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and Epicurus attempted various explana-
tions in its defense. Cf. Dom David Amand, Fatalism et liberte dans
I'antiquite grecque, Louvain, 1945. Socrates and Plato held that the
good, being identical with the true, imposes itself irresistably on the
will and the intellect, once it is clearly known and understood. Evil
results from ignorance. Aristotle disagrees partly and appeals to ex-
perience. Vice is voluntary. Chance plays a role in some actions.
The irresistible influence of his Prime Mover, however, makes the
conception of a genuine moral freedom a difficulty for him. Epicu-
rus advocated free will, in order to assuage man's fear caused by
belief in irresistible fate.
Medieval thought developed a complex theology of the free will.
Preeminent among the theologians is St. Augustine of Hippo who
taught the freedom of the will against the Manichaeans, but the
necessity of grace against the Pelagians. This two-fold apologetic
gave rise later to interpretation differences, of which the Erasmus-
Luther controversy is just one example. St. Thomas Aquinas de-
veloped some aspects of Augustine's teachings. Will is rational
appetite. Free will becomes simply the elective power for choosing
3
4 DISCOURSE ON FREE WILL
but, as it seems to me, with more exertion than success on

their part. Recently, Garlstadt and Eck restored interest in
the problem, debating it, however, with moderation.2 Soon
thereafter, Martin Luther took up the whole controversy
once more—and in a rather heated fashion—with his
formal Assertion concerning the freedom of the will.3 And
different forms of desired beatitudes. How are man's future acts not
necessary, despite God's infallible prevision? God does not exist in
time: past and future alike are ever present. How about God's
omnipotent providence? Does it infringe on man's freedom by its
perfect control over all happenings? Two schools of thought among
the Scholastics, both logically continuing certain of Aquinas' teach-
ings, came to the fore. This Scholasticism irritated both Erasmus
and Luther. It developed the finer points, often ignored by Erasmus
and challenged by Luther's assertions. The Dominican or Thomist
school saw God as premoving man in accord with his free nature.
Divine foreknowledge and God's providential control of the world's
history are in harmony with man, who is by nature and definition a
free cause. Animals are not. They are in harmony with their nature,
adopting particular courses by necessity. The Jesuit or Molinist
school does not think this explains freedom of the human will suffi-
ciently. They conceive the relation of divine action to man's will
to be concurrent rather than promotive, exempting God more
clearly from all responsibility for man's sin.
Some of the complexity with which generations of thinkers have
been grappling can be found in the Erasmus-Luther debate. In a
sense it is a disorganized summary of the classical and medieval
debates. Thereafter, beginning perhaps with Spinoza, a new ration-
alism enters the debate. Of this Erasmus is something of a pre-
cursor, exuding reasonableness on his part. For an up-to-date
presentation of the entire panorama, see Mortimer J. Adler, The
Idea of Freedom: A Dialectical Examination of the Conception of
Freedom (see Biblography).
2
Andreas Carlstadt (1480-1541), a pioneer of the Protestant
Reformation, was asked by Luther to defend his Thesis of 1517 at
a public disputation ("Divine grace and human free will") at the
University of Leipzig (June 27, 1519). He later came to oppose
Luther as a "compromiser."
Johann Maier von Eck (1486-1543), German Catholic theolo-
gian, challenged Carlstadt to this debate. He remained foremost
among those working for the overthrow of Luther.
3
Erasmus refers to Assertio omnium articulorum D. Mart. Luth.
per bullam Leonis X damnatorum (1520) in the Weimar edition
ERASMUS: THE FREE WILL 5
4
although more than one has answered his Assertion, I, too,
encouraged by my friends, am going to try to see whether,
by the following brief discussion, the truth might not
become more visible.
1) Luther's Supposed Infallibility

Here some will surely close their ears and exclaim, "Oh
prodigy! Erasmus dares to contend with Luther, a fly with
an elephant?" In order to assuage such people, I only want
to state at this point, if they give me the time for it, that I
have actually never sworn allegiance to the words of
Luther. Nobody should therefore consider it unseemly if
I should openly disagree with him, if nothing else, as one
man from another. It is therefore by no means an outrage
to dispute over one of his dogmas, especially not, if one, in
order to discover truth, confronts Luther with calm and
scholarly arguments. I certainly believe that Luther will
not feel hurt if somebody differs in some instances from
his opinion, because he permits himself not only to argue
against the decisions of all the doctors of the church, but
of Luther's works (henceforth referred to as W.A., i.e., Weimarer
Ausgabe), W.A. VII, p. 91 ff. Luther himself seems to have pre-
ferred his freer German rendition, Grund und Ursache aller Artikel
D. Martin Luther, so durch romische Bulle unrechtlich verdammt
sind, W.A. VII, p. 309 ff. Article 36, restating the 13th Heidelberg
thesis, asserts that the free will is a mere fiction. Article 31 asserts
that a pious man sins doing good works. Article 32 asserts that a
good work is a mortal sin. Cf. chapter IV, footnote 5.
* Among the major tracts against Luther we find, besides Eck's

Obelisci (1518), the following: Henry VIII, Assertio septem sacra-
mentorum (1521), which earned him the title Defender of the
Faith; St. Thomas More, Eruditissimi vivi Gul. Rossi opus legans
quo pulcherrime retegit ac refellit insanas Lutheri calumnias (1523),
written at the request of Henry VIII, in answer to Luther's reply to
the royal Assertio; St. John Fisher, The sermon of lohan the
bysshop of Rochester made agayn ye peverisyous doctryn of Martin
Luther (1521), on which Erasmus relied heavily. Gf. chapter VI,
footnote 1.
also appeals against all schools, church councils and Popes.

Since he asserts this freely and openly, his friends must not
hold it against me if I do likewise.
2) Objectivity and Scepticism

Let no one misinterpret our battle. We are not two
gladiators incited against each other. I want to argue only
against one of Luther's teachings, illuminating, if this be
possible, in the subsequent clash of scriptural passages and
arguments, the truth, the investigation of which has always
been the most reputable activity of scholars. There will be
no invective, and for two reasons: it does not behoove
Christians so to act; and moreover, the truth, which by
excessive quarreling is often lost, is discovered with greater
certainty without it.
I am quite aware that I am a poor match in such a
contest; I am less experienced than other men, and I have
always had a deep-seated aversion to fighting. Conse-
quently I have always preferred playing in the freer field
of the muses, than fighting ironclad in close combat. In
addition, so great is my dislike of assertions that I prefer
the views of the sceptics wherever the inviolable authority
of Scripture and the decision of the Church permit—a
Church to which at all times I willingly submit my own
views, whether I attain what she prescribes or not. And as
a matter of fact, I prefer this natural inclination to one I
can observe in certain people who are so blindly addicted
to one opinion that they cannot tolerate whatever differs
from it. Whatever they read in Holy Scripture, they distort
to serve the opinion to which they have once and for all
enslaved themselves. Their case is like that of the young
man who loves a girl so much that he fancies he sees her
image everywhere. Or to use a better comparison: they
are like those who in the heat of battle turn everything at
hand, be it a pitcher or a plate, into a missile. Are people
thus affected able to form an objective judgment? Or is
it not rather the result of such disputations that both con-
testants part spitting upon each other in contempt? There
will always be many such people, the kind the Apostle
Peter describes as, "the unlearned and the unstable," such
as "distort the Scriptures to their own destruction" (2 Peter
3,16).
3) Having an Open Mind

For these reasons then, I must confess that I have not
yet formed a definite opinion on any of the numerous tradi-
tional views regarding the freedom of the will; all I am
willing to assert is that the will enjoys some power of free-
dom. My reading of Martin Luther's Assertion was quite
unprejudiced, except that I felt towards him a favor such
as a lawyer feels towards a hard pressed defendant.
Though Luther's argument is defended with every means at
his disposal and presented with great verve, I must honestly
confess that he has not yet convinced me.
If someone wishes to declare me slow-witted or ignorant
on account of all this, I would not want to argue the point,
provided it is permitted for intellectually weaker persons to
argue with better endowed ones for the sake of learning.
Moreover, Luther himself attributed very little to erudition,
but a great deal to the Spirit who instills at times in the
intellectually weak what he denies to the wise. This I am
saying to those who loudly proclaim that Luther has more
learning in his little finger than Erasmus in his entire body
—which I am not now going to refute. As hostile as those
people wish to be in this affair, they will have to admit that
my case shall not be weakened by the judgment of a few
foolhardy people, if I concede to Luther in this disputation
that he should not be burdened with the preceding judg-
ment of doctors, councils, scholars, popes and emperors.
Even if I have understood what Luther discusses, it is alto-
gether possible that I am mistaken. Therefore, I merely
want to analyze and not to judge, to inquire and not to
dogmatize. I am ready to learn from anyone who advances
something more accurate or more reliable, though I would
rather persuade mediocre minds not to argue too stubbornly

on such matters. It harms Christian concord more than it
helps piety.
4) Difficulties in the Scripture

Holy Scripture contains secrets into which God does not
want us to penetrate too deeply, because if we attempt to
do so, increasing darkness envelopes us, so that we might
come to recognize in this manner both the unfathomable
majesty of divine wisdom and the feebleness of the human
mind. Pomponius Mela, for instance, speaks of a certain
Corycian grotto5 which at first entices intruders by its
charm, and later frightens them and fills them with terror
because of the majesty of the indwelling divinity. Conse-
quently, when we have reached such a point, I think it
prudent and more pious to exclaim with Paul, "Oh, the
depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge
of God! How incomprehensible are his judgments and how
unsearchable his ways!" (Romans 11,33), and with Isaiah,
"Who hath forwarded the spirit of the Lord? Or who hath
been his counselor?" (Isaiah 40,13), rather than to try to
explain what surpasses the measure of the human mind.
Much will have to wait for that time when we shall see no
longer in a mirror and in an enigma, but shall contemplate
in its glory the unveiled face of the Lord.
5) Essence of Christian Piety

In my opinion the implications of the freedom of the
will in Holy Scripture are as follows: if we are on the road
to piety, we should continue to improve eagerly and forget
what lies behind us; if we have become involved in sin,
we should make every effort to extricate ourselves, to
accept the remedy of penance, and to solicit the mercy of
6
Pomponius Mela, Spanish geographer in the first century AD
and author of an early universal geography, De situ orbis. The
Corycian Cave, or "cave of myth," is a stalactite grotto on the
southern slope of Mt. Parnassus, near Delphi, Greece, and played
a role in Greek mythology.
the Lord, without which neither the human will nor its
striving is effective; for all evil let us consider ourselves
responsible, but let us ascribe all good to Divine Benevo-
lence alone, for to It we owe even what we are; and in all
things must we believe that whatever delightful or sad
happens to us during life, God has caused it for our salva-
tion, and that no injustice can come from Him who is by
nature just, even if something should befall us which we
deem undeserved; nobody should despair of forgiveness by
a God who is by nature most merciful. In my opinion, it
used to be sufficient for Christian piety to cling to these
truths.
6) Man's Limited Capacity to Know

Men were not wont to intrude upon these concealed, even
superfluous questions with irreligious curiosity, namely,
whether God's foreknowledge is contingent; whether our
will can contribute anything to our eternal salvation, or
whether it simply undergoes the action of operative grace;
whether everything we do, good or evil, is done out of mere
necessity, or whether we are rather in a state of passive
acceptance. Some things God wishes to remain totally
unknown to us, such as the day of our death and the day
of the last judgment. "It is not for you to know the times
or dates which the Father has fixed by his own power"
(Acts 1,7). Or, "But of the day or hour no one knows,
neither the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but the Father
only" (Mark 13,32).
In other instances God wishes that we investigate by
venerating Him in mystic silence. Therefore Holy Scripture
contains numerous passages which have puzzled many,
without ever anyone succeeding in completely clarifying
them. For example, there is the question of the distinction
of the persons in God; the union of the divine and human
natures in Christ; the problem of irremissible sin.6
Other things He wanted us to know with the utmost
6
Mark 3, 29.
IO DISCOURSE ON FREE WILL
clarity, as for example, the precepts for a morally good life.

This is obviously the word of God which one does not have
to fetch down from high heaven, or a distant sea, but which
one rather finds near at hand, namely in our mouths and in
our hearts.7 This indeed must be learned well by all. The
remaining is better committed to God. It is more devout to
adore the unknown than to investigate the unexplorable.
How many quarrels have arisen from investigations into
the distinction of persons in the Holy Trinity, the manner
of procession of the Holy Spirit, the virgin birth? What
disturbances have been caused in the world by the fierce
contentions concerning the conception of the virgin mother
of God? What are the results of these laborious investiga-
tions except that we experience a great loss of concord, and
love each other less, while we wish to know too much?
Besides, there are certain kinds of truth which, even
though they could be known, would nonetheless be unwisely
offered for indiscriminate consideration. Perhaps what the
sophists used to say about God, that, given his nature, he is
present as much in the cavity of a beetle as in heaven, has
some truth to it (I blush to reproduce their actual shameful
remark).8 It would be unprofitable to discuss this matter
publicly. Furthermore, the assertion that there are three
gods, even if it can be truly stated dialectically, would
certainly cause great offense, if presented to the untutored
masses. Were I certain—which is not the case—that con-
fession, as we have it now, was neither instituted by Christ,
nor could ever have been invented by man, and conse-
quently nobody could require it, and that furthermore no
satisfaction is needed for offenses committed, I would
nonetheless fear to publicize such an opinion, because, from
what I can see, most men are prone to moral turpitude.
Now, obligatory confession restrains or at least moderates
this propensity.9 There exist certain sicknesses of the body
7
Deuteronomy 30, 11-14 and Romans 10, 6-8.
8
Luther, as well as Erasmus, criticized some Scholastics as "so-
phists," i.e., those well versed in specious reasoning and arguments.
9
Luther strongly criticized confession.
ERASMUS: THE FREE WILL n
which it is the lesser evil to bear than to remove, as for
example, if we had to bathe in the warm blood of
slaughtered children in order to remove leprosy. There are,
indeed, errors which it is better to ignore, than to eliminate.
Paul has differentiated between the permissible and the
expedient.10 The truth may be spoken but it does not serve
everyone at all times and under all circumstances. If I were
certain that a wrong decision or definition had been reached
at a synod, it would be permissible but not expedient to
speak the truth concerning it. Wicked men should not thus
be offered an occasion to disdain the authority of the
Fathers, especially when they have conscientiously and
scrupulously made decisions. I would prefer to say that at
the time of the decision they acted on the evidence they
had, and later practical exigencies persuade us to modify
their judgments.
7) Unsuitableness of Luther's Teachings

Let us assume the truth of what Wycliffe11 has taught
and Luther has asserted, namely, that everything we do
happens not on account of our free will, but out of sheer
necessity. What could be more useless than to publish this
paradox to the world? Secondly, let us assume that it is
true, as Augustine has written somewhere, that God causes
both good and evil in us,12 and that he rewards us for his
good works wrought in us and punishes us for the evil deeds
done in us. What a loophole the publication of this opinion
would open to godlessness among innumerable people? In
particular: mankind is lazy, indolent, malicious, and, in
addition, incorrigibly prone to every impious outrage. How
many weak ones would continue in their perpetual and
10
1 Corinthians 2, 1-6. Erasmus prefers throughout using the
Latin for "expedient," rather than the word "prudential."
11
John Wycliffe (1330-1384), one of the early influential English
reformers tried, as a philosophical realist, to explain predestination
and free will.
12
Erasmus was admittedly not well versed in Augustinian theology
and philosophy.
laborious battle against their own flesh? What wicked

fellow would henceforth try to better his conduct? Who
could love with all his heart a God who fires a hell with
eternal pain, in order to punish there poor mankind for his
own evil deeds, as if God enjoyed human distress? Most
people would react as they are sketched above. People are
universally ignorant and carnal-minded. They tend towards
unbelief, wickedness and blasphemy. There is no sense in
pouring oil upon the fire.
Thus Paul, the prudent disburser of the divine word,
frequently consults charity and prefers to pursue what
serves the neighbor, rather than what is permissible. Among
the mature he speaks with the wisdom he possesses. But
before the weak he displays no other knowledge but that of
Jesus Christ, the crucified.13 Holy Scripture knows how to
adjust its language to our human condition. In it are
passages where God is angry, grieved, indignant, furious;
where he threatens and hates. Again in other places he has
mercy, he regrets, he changes his intentions. This does not
mean that such changes really take place in the nature of
God. These are rather modes of expression, benefitting our
weakmindedness and dullness. The same prudence should,
I believe, adorn all who have taken up preaching the
divine word. Some things can be noxious, because like wine
for the feverish, they are not fitting. Hence such matters
might be treated in discourses among the educated or also
in theological schools, although it is not expedient even
there I think unless done with caution. Definitely, it seems
to me, it is not only unsuitable, but truly pernicious to carry
on such disputations when everybody can listen.
In short, one should be persuaded to waste neither time
nor ingenuity in such labyrinths; neither to refute nor to
endorse Luther's teachings. Perhaps I deserve the reproach
of having been too verbose in this preface. But all of it
appears more important than the disputation proper.
13
1 Corinthians 2, 1-6.
II
INTRODUCTION:
OBJECTIVE CRITERION FOR
TRUTH
SINCE Luther recognizes no authority of any author, how-
ever approved, except that of the canonical books, I gladly
accept this diminution of labor. Both among the Greeks
and the Latins exist innumerable thinkers who deal
explicitly or cursorily with the freedom of the will. It would
have been a formidable task to gather all the quotations
for and against free will; to explain every passage as well
as to refute it. This irksome exertion would have been
wasted on Luther and his friends, particularly since they
not only hold different opinions, but also contradict them-
selves extensively.
8) Authority of the Church Fathers

Nevertheless I wish to remind the reader, if he thinks we
are holding the scale to Luther's, with our scriptural pass-
ages and firm reasoning, that he now visualize in addition
the entire long list of most erudite men who have enjoyed
the approval of many centuries up to the present day, and
among whom most have distinguished themselves by an
admirable knowledge of Scripture, and commended them-
selves by their piety. Some gave their lives as testimony to
the teachings of Christ which they had defended in their
writings. Such among the Greeks are: Origen, Basil,
Chrysostom, Cyril, John Damascene and Theophylactus;
among the Latins: Tertullian, Cyprian, Arnobius, Hilary,
Jerome and Augustine. I could also mention Thomas
13
Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Durandus of Saint-Pourgain, John

Capreolus, Gabriel Biel, Giles of Rome, Gregory of Rimini
and Alexander of Hales.1 Their powerful and subtle argu-
mentation, in my opinion, nobody can completely disdain,
not to speak of the authoritative decisions of many uni-
versities, councils and popes.
From Apostolic times to this day no author has hitherto
completely denied the freedom of the will, save Manichaeus
and John Wycliffe alone.2 Lorenzo Valla's authority, who
1
Origen (185-254) was one of the most prolific writers of the
early Church. His interests in Platonism and in giving philosophy
a recognized place in the creeds of the Church made him a contro-
versial figure. Erasmus was particularly influenced by his scriptural
commentaries.
St. Basil the Great (330-? 379-?), early Church Father, as was
St. John Chrysostom (344?-407). St. Cyril (315?-386?), bishop of
Jerusalem. St. John of Damascus (675-749), theologian and doctor
of the Eastern Church. Quintus Septimius Florens Tertullianus
(160P-230?), ecclesiastical writer and creator of Christian Latin
literature, was one of the most original and controversial Christian
writers. He influenced Erasmus. St. Cyprian (200-258), African
bishop; St. Hilary (died 367), bishop of Poitiers, France; St. Am-
brose of Milan (339-397), Latin Church Father. St. Jerome (340-
420) is best known for his classical translation of the Old, and
revision of the New Testament, known as the Vulgate Bible. St.
Augustine of Hippo (354-430), bishop and Church Father. St.
Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), theologian and philosopher, called
the Angelic Doctor. Duns Scotus (1265?-1308?), medieval theolo-
gian at Oxford and Cologne. Durandus of Saint-Pour fain (d.
1332), philosopher and theologian with a vast literary production,
known as Doctor resolutissimus. John Capreolus (d. 1444), theolo-
gian, called Prince of Thomists. Gabriel Biel (d. 1495), German
scholastic philosopher, influenced Luther and Melanchthon. Giles
of Rome (1245-1316), Italian theologian and philosopher, called
Doctor fundatissimus. Alexander of Hales (d. 1245), English phi-
losopher and theologian.
2
Manichaeus, Mani or Manes (his followers are called Mani-
chaeans) was a Gnostic teacher (d. 273), preaching an eclectic
creed composed of wild fancies and some Hebrew, Buddhist, and
Christian concepts, centering around the realms of light and dark-
ness, good and evil. Augustine was for nine years a Manichaean,
preceding his conversion to Christianity.
almost seems to agree with them, has little weight among
theologians.3 Manichaeus' teaching has always been sharply
rejected by all the world. Yet, it is questionable whether it
would not serve better than Wycliffe's. The former explains
good and evil by the two natures in man, but in such a way
that we owe the good acts to God on account of his crea-
tion, and because we can, despite the power of darkness,
implore the creator for help. This can help us to sin less
and to do good more readily. If everything reduces itself
to pure necessity, where does Wycliffe leave us any room
for prayer or our own striving?
To return to what I have been saying before. Once the
reader of my disputation recognizes that my fighting equip-
ment is equal to that of the adversary, let him decide for
himself, whether to attribute more to the decisions of all
the many scholars, orthodox faithful, saints, martyrs, theo-
logians of ancient and more recent times; of all the uni-
versities, as well as of the many councils, bishops and popes,
or more to the private opinions of one or two men. I don't
want to make the number of voices or the rank of the
speakers decide an issue, as is customary in human as-
semblies. I know it happens frequently that the better party
is voted down by the majority. I know what the majority
esteems is not always the best. I know, when investigating
truth, there is no harm in adding to the diligence of one's
predecessors. I admit that it is right that the sole authority
of Holy Scripture surpasses the voices of all mortals.
But we are not involved in a controversy regarding Scrip-
ture. The same Scripture is being loved and revered by
both parties. Our battle concerns the sense of Scripture. If
3
Lorenzo Valla (1405-1457) was foremost among Italian Hu-
manists. He, too, wrote a dialogue on free will. See Cassirer et al.,
The Renaissance Philosophy of Man, University of Chicago Press,
1948 pp. 147-182. Both Erasmus and Luther claimed him. In a
sense Valla anticipated Erasmus, Ulrich von Hutten, and Luther in
his philosophical, critical and exegetical works. (Ibid., p. 154).
Erasmus edited Valla's Annotationes in Novum Testamentum, criti-
cal of the Vulgate's version.
ingenuity and erudition contribute anything to scriptural

interpretation, what could be more acute and perspicacious
than the Greek mind? How about wide scriptural reading?
Nor have the Latins been wanting in either. If they were
by nature less fruitful than the Greeks, they equaled them
in industriousness and accepted their helpful inheritance.
If, on the other hand, one looks more to a virtuous course
of life than to erudition, it is obvious which men stand on
the side of free will. Let us set aside what the lawyers call an
odious comparison. I do not wish to compare some heralds
of this new gospel with the older ones.
9) Inspiration by the Holy Spirit

At this point someone may object: what is the need of
an interpreter when Scripture itself is quite clear? If it is
really so clear, why have all the excellent people here acted
like blind men for so many centuries, especially in so im-
portant a matter as my opponents hold it to be? If nothing
were dark in Scripture, what need for prophecy was there
even during apostolic times? This was the gift of the Spirit.
Now, it is questionable whether this charismatic gift has
ceased, like the power to heal and the gift of tongues did
cease. If it did not cease, one has to ask, to whom was it
transferred? If this talent and grace of prophecy have been
transferred to everybody, any interpretation becomes highly
problematical; if to nobody, we would still not have an
assured interpretation, since even scholars are toiling with
obscurities; if to the successors of the Apostles, then they
will object that many of them completely lacked the
apostolic spirit. And yet, other things being equal, we can
presume with greater probability that God communicated
His Spirit to those who have been ordained, just as one
considers it more probable that grace will flow to the
baptized, rather than to the non-baptized.
Let us admit that the possibility actually exists for the
Spirit to reveal to a simple layman what is not revealed to
many scholars, since indeed Christ thanks His Father for
4
revealing to little ones, that is, those simple and foolish in
the eyes of this world,5 what He concealed from the wise
and prudent ones, that is, the scribes, pharisees, and phi-
losophers. Dominic and Francis might have been such fools,
if they could have followed their own spirit. But since St.
Paul during his own lifetime, when the gift of the Spirit
was alive, had already to order His verification, that is,
whether His manifestation really came from God,6 what
shall happen during our worldly times? How can we judge
the Spirit? According to erudition? On both sides we find
scribes. According to conduct? On both sides there are
sinners. True, on one side stands the entire choir of saints
who steadfastly held to the freedom of the will. They state
the truth, but they were human. Yet I am comparing men
to men, instead of men to God.
If it is objected: what can large numbers contribute to
an understanding of the Spirit? I answer: what can a small
number of people? If they object: what can a bishop's
miter contribute to an understanding of Holy Scripture? I
answer: what can a hood and cowl? If they say: what can
philosophical understanding contribute? I answer: what
can ignorance? If they say: what can a congregated synod,
in which perhaps nobody is inspired by the Spirit, con-
tribute to an understanding of Scripture? I answer: what
can the private gathering of a few contribute, none of
whom probably has the Spirit?
10) Miracles and Exemplary Life

Paul exclaims, "Do you seek a proof of the Christ who
speaks in me?" (2 Corinthians 13,3). Apostles were believed
only if their doctrines were accompanied by miracles. But
nowadays anybody demands faith from others by affirming
his having the evangelical spirit. The apostles had to rout
vipers, heal the sick, raise the dead, confer the gift of
4
Matthew 11, 25.
5
1 Corinthians 1, 27.
6
1 Corinthians 12, 3; words are actually taken from 1 John 4, 1.
tongues by the laying on of hands. Only thus were they

believed and hardly even thus, since they taught paradoxes.
Nowadays certain people present even greater paradoxes7 to
common opinion! Nonetheless, none of them has come
forward who could heal just one lame horse. If at least
some of them would demonstrate, not quite a miracle, but
yet the sincerity and simplicity of an apostolic life, it could
take the place of the missing miracle amongst us more slow-
witted people.
I do not want to accuse Luther, whom I don't know
personally, but whose writings have made a mixed impres-
sion on me. I am addressing this to others who are better
known to me and who interrupt us by saying, "They were
simply men," every time we advance an interpretation by
an orthodox elder for the purpose of understanding a con-
troversial passage. When we ask, what are the marks of a
true scriptural interpretation, since both sides are repre-
sented only by human beings, their answer is "The mark of
the Holy Spirit." If you ask why the Holy Spirit should
have forsaken the side which is also distinguished by
miracles, and be found rather amongst them, they answer
as if during all these hundreds of years there had been no
Gospel in the world. If one misses among them a conduct
of life commensurate with the Spirit, they answer that they
are saved by faith and not by works. If one misses miracles,
they say these have stopped long ago and are no longer
needed, since now the light of Scripture shines so wonder-
fully. If one contests that Scripture is clear in our case,
otherwise so many excellent men would also have been
blind, one has moved in a full cycle to the beginning of the
argument.
11) Infallible Church

Let us assume that he who has the Spirit is sure of the
meaning of Scripture. How can I also possess the certainty
which the other pretends to have? What can I do when
7
Luther called his 1517 theses "theological paradoxa."
several persons claim different interpretations, but each
one swears to have the Spirit? Moreover, since the Spirit
does not inspire the same person with everything, some who
have the Spirit may be mistaken on a point.
This then I want to reply to those who discard without
hesitation the old interpretation of sacred books, and
instead submit their own, as if an oracle had proclaimed it.
Finally, even though Christ's Spirit might permit His people
to be in error in an unimportant question on which man's
salvation does not depend, no one could believe that this
Spirit has deliberately overlooked error in His Church for
1300 years, and that He did not deem one of all the pious
and saintly Church Fathers worthy enough to be inspired,
with what, they contend, is the very essence of all evangeli-
cal teaching.
12) Plea for Gentle Listening

But now, in order finally to conclude, let the others
decide what they wish to assume for themselves. I for my
part do not arrogate to myself doctrine, nor sanctity, nor do
I depend on my intellect. I simply want to offer with
earnestness what moves my soul. If someone undertakes to
teach me, I would not consciously oppose truth. If my
opponents, however, prefer to slander me, although I dis-
pute truthfully and without slander, rather than quarrel,
then everyone will miss the Spirit of the Gospels among
those who continuously speak of it. Paul exhorts, "But him
who is weak in faith, receive" (Romans 14,1). Christ will
not extinguish a smoking wick.8 The Apostle Peter says, "Be
ready always with an answer to everyone who asks a reason
for the hope that is in you. Yet, do so with gladness and
fear" (1 Peter 3,15-16). If my opponents respond, "Erasmus
is like an old wine-skin9 unable to hold the new wine which
they offer to the world," and if their self-confidence is so
great, they at least ought to consider us as Christ did
8
Matthew 12, 20.
9
Matthew 9, 17.
2O DISCOURSE ON FREE WILL
Nicodemus, and as the Apostles did Gamaliel.11 The Lord

10
did not repel the former, who, though ignorant, was desir-
ous of learning. Nor did the Apostles spurn Gamaliel who
desired to suspend his judgment until the nature of the
matter would show by what spirit it was being led.
13) Definition of Free Will

I have completed half of this work. To those whom I
have convinced, as I intended, that it were better not to
cavil and quibble about such questions, especially not before
the common people, I will not have to present the further
proof to which I shall now proceed, hoping that truth will
prevail everywhere, which will perhaps sparkle from a
comparison of scriptural passages like fire struck from flint.
Nobody can deny that Sacred Scripture contains many
passages stating the obvious freedom of the human will. On
the other hand, there are some passages which seem to deny
the former. Yet, it is certatin that Scripture cannot contra-
dict itself, since all passages are inspired by the same Spirit.
Therefore, we shall first examine those passages which
confirm our view and then we shall try to dispose of those
that seem to be opposed.
By freedom of the will we understand in this connection
the power of the human will whereby man can apply to or
turn away from that which leads unto eternal salvation.
10
John 3.
11
Acts 5, 34.
Ill
OLD TESTAMENT PROOFS
SUPPORTING THE FREE WILL
14) Ecclesiasticus 15: Choose Good or Evil
Those who take a free will for granted usually quote
Ecclesiasticus 15, 14-18:
God made man from the beginning, and left him in the
hand of his own counsel. He added his commandment and
precepts. If thou wilt keep the commandments and per-
form acceptable fidelity forever, they shall preserve thee.
He hath set water and fire before thee; stretch forth thy
hand to which thou wilt. Before man is life and death,
good and evil, that which he shall choose shall be given
him.
I do not expect that anybody will question the authority
of this book because it was of old not contained in the
Hebraic canon, as Jerome indicates. The Church of Christ
has received it into her canon with great unanimity. Inci-
dentally, I do not quite see why the Hebrews decided to
exclude it from their canon, while at the same time includ-
ing Solomon's Proverbs and the Canticle of Canticles. Who-
ever has read attentively can readily guess why the Jews
excluded from their canon the last two books of Esdras,
the story of Susanna and of the dragon Bel, attached to the
book of Daniel, as well as the books Judith and Esther and
a few others. They numbered these among the apocrypha.1
But in Ecclesiasticus certainly nothing disturbs the reader.
1
Apocrypha, a term used to describe that body of religious litera-
ture closely associated with the Old and New Testament, but re-
garded as noncanonical Jewish or Christian scriptures.
21
15) Adam and Eve

The above passage then makes us realize that Adam, the
first man, was created with an uncorrupted reason which
could distinguish between the desirable and the sinful. In
addition, he had received also an uncorrupted will, but
which remained quite free, if he wished, to choose also evil.
All the angels were created in the same way before the
revolt against God by Lucifer and his followers. Afterwards,
in those angels who fell, the will was so completely cor-
rupted, that they could not perform any meritorious act.
In those who remained faithful, their good will was so
strengthened that it became henceforth impossible for them
to choose evil. In man, will was so good and so free that
even without additional grace it could have remained in a
state of innocence, though not without the help of grace
could it attain the blessedness of eternal life, as the Lord
Jesus promised his people. Even if all this cannot be proved
by clear scriptural testimony, it has been expounded with
good foundation by orthodox Church Fathers. Incidentally,
in Eve obviously not only the will was weakened, but also
reason and intellect, the fountain of all good or all evil. It
seems that the snake succeeded in persuading her that the
Lord's prohibition to eat from the tree of life was vain. In
Adam it seems rather that the will was weakened more
because of his immoderate love for his wife to whose desires
he gave preference over obedience to God's commandments.
Yet also his reason had, I think, been weakened, which is
the source of the will.
16) Man before and after Receiving Grace; Reason and

Revelation
Our power of judgment—whether we call it nous, i.e.,
mind or intellect, or rather logos, i.e., reason—has only been
obscured by sin, and not extinguished. Our will, considered
as ability to choose or to avoid, had thus been worsened to
a degree, so that it could not improve itself by its own
natural means; it had lost its freedom and was obliged to
serve the sin to which it once willingly assented. But, by the
grace of God which forgives sin, the freedom of the will has
been restored to such a degree that according to the
Pelagians eternal life can now be gained even without the
help of further grace.2 This happens in such a manner that,
first, one owes his salvation to the will of God, who both
created and restored free will; and according to the ortho-
dox, because of the help of divine grace, which always aids
his effort, man can persevere in the right state without,
however, being freed of his propensity to evil, which stems
from the remains of sin once committed. Just as the sin
of our first parents was passed on to their descendants, so
we also inherited the propensity to sin. Sin-absolving grace
can to a degree aid in our overcoming of sin, but not
extirpate it. Not that grace could not accomplish this, but
because it does not profit us.
In those without extraordinary grace3 the reason is
darkened, but not extinguished. Probably the same occurs
to the power of the will: it is not completely extinct, but
unproductive of virtuous deeds. What the eyes are for the
body, reason is for the soul. Reason is partly illumined by
an innate light inborn in us, though not in equal measure
in all, as the psalmist sings: "Raise the light of thy counte-
nance above us, O Lord!" (Psalm 4,7). And reason is
partly illumined by divine precepts and Holy Scripture,
2
Pelagius, a British monk of the late 4th and early 5th centuries
AD, was a contemporary of Augustine. His followers were known
as Pelagians. His doctrine, Pelagianism, taught that the will is free
only when influenced neither toward good nor toward evil. Man is
endowed with original perfection. Augustine formed his own views
on original sin and divine grace in opposition to Pelagianism, de-
clared heretical by the Church Council of Ephesus (431). The
Semi-Pelagians of the later 5th century taught a modified form,
condemned in 529. Erasmus' interpretation of Pelagianism is less
critical than that of the Church. Luther thus inclines to classify
Erasmus as a Pelagian, something he distinctly abhors.
3
Extraordinary grace (gratia peculiaris) prepared, according to
the Scholastics, for the reception of final sanctifying grace. Cf. also
footnote 11.
wherefore our psalmist sings,4 "Thy words are a light to my

footsteps."
17) Law of Nature, Law of Good Works, Law of Faith

Therefore we are born under three kinds of laws: the
law of nature, the law of good works, and the law of faith,
to use Paul's expression.5
The Law of Nature, carved deeply into the minds of all,
tells Scythians as well as Greeks that it is unjust to do to
another what one does not wish to suffer himself. Without
the help of Scripture and without the light of faith, phi-
losophers have gained a knowledge of divine kindness and
greatness by observing the created world. They have left us
many moral precepts which bear an astounding resem-
blance to the precepts of the Gospels. We possess many of
their sayings, encouraging virtue and detesting turpitude.
Thus it seems probable that they had a will tending to
moral good, but incapable of eternal salvation, unless grace
be added through faith.
The Law of Good Works, on the other hand, issues
commands and sanctions them with punishment. It in-
creases sin and causes death, not because it is evil, but
because it requires good works which, without grace, we
could not possibly perform.
The Law of Faith which, posing even more difficult
commandments than the law of works, makes what would
be impossible, not only easy but also pleasant, as long as we
are supported by abundant grace. Thus faith heals our
reason which has suffered through sin, and charity helps
our weakened will to act.
To a certain extent the Law of Good Works was
expressed in Genesis 2,16, "From every tree of the garden
you may eat; but from the tree of the knowledge of good
and evil you must not eat; for the day you eat of it, you
4
Erasmus' text states Psalm 113. Actually, it is a free rendition of
Psalm text frequently quoted.
8
Romans 2, 14 and 3, 27.
must die." Furthermore, Moses has handed down a Law
of Good Works in Exodus 20, 13, and in Deuteronomy
5,17: "You shall not kill"; and "whoever strikes a man a
mortal blow must be put to death" (Exodus 21,12). "You
shall not commit adultery" (Exodus 20,14). "If a man
commits adultery with his neighbor's wife, he shall be put
to death" (Leviticus 20,10; cf. John 8,5). But what says
the law of faith, which commands us to love our enemies,6
and to carry our daily cross,7 and to value our life but
little? 8 "Do not be afraid, little flock, for it pleased your
father to give you the kingdom" (Luke 12,32, Matth. 5,3).
In John 16,33: "Take courage, I have overcome the
world." And in Matthew 28,20: "Behold, I am with you
all days, even unto the consummation of the world." This
law the Apostles illustrated when they themselves departed
cheerfully from the Sanhedrin, though having just been
scourged for the sake of the name of Jesus.9 Thus Paul in
his Philippians 4,13 asserts: "I can do all things in him who
strengthens me."
All this is contained in Ecclesiasticus 15,15: "He added
his commandments and precepts." To whom? In the begin-
ning he personally transmitted them to the first two
humans. Later to the Jewish people through Moses and the
prophets. The law announced the will of God. It placed
sanctions on disobedience, and it promised reward to
obedient man. Otherwise God through creation allows to
their will the power of choice which he gave free and move-
able in both directions. Therefore, "if thou wilt keep the
commandments and offer acceptable fidelity forever, they
shall preserve thee," and again "stretch forth thy hand to
which thou wilt" (Ecclesiasticus 15,16-17). If the differ-
ences of good and evil and the will of God had remained
hidden from man, the wrong choice could not be imputed
to man. Had the will not been free, sin could not be at-
5
6 Matthew 5, 44.
7 Luke 9, 23.
8 Matthew 10, 39, Luke 14, 26, John 12, 25 and 1 John 2, 15.
9 Acts 5, 40 f.
tributed to man, since it ceases to be sin if it is not volun-

tary, the only exception being when error or obligation
arises out of [deliberate] sin. It is clear that a woman is
not to blame for being ravished.
Although this quotation from Ecclesiasticus applies espe-
cially to our first parents, it is in a certain sense valid for
Adam's entire progeny. But how could it concern us, if
there were no faculty of free will in us? Although the free
will has been wounded through sin, it is not extinct; though
it has contracted a paralysis, making us before the reception
of grace more readily inclined towards evil than good, free
will has not been destroyed. Only to the extent that mon-
strous crimes or the habit of sin, having become our second
nature, dim at times the judgment of our intellect and bury
thereby the free will, does the former seem destroyed and
the latter dead.
18) Freedom and Grace according to Pelagius and Duns

Scotus
Views concerning the capacity of our free will after the
Fall of Man and before the reception of grace differ aston-
ishingly among ancient and modern thinkers, with one or
the other aspect being emphasized. Whoever wanted to
counter despair or a false sense of security, and thereby
spur man to hope and aspiration, has actually overrated the
freedom of the will.
Pelagius taught that no new grace was needed once grace
had liberated and healed the free will of man. Thus the
free will by itself was deemed sufficient to achieve eternal
salvation. But we owe salvation solely to God without whose
grace the will of man could not be effectively free to achieve
good. The strength of soul, with which man can pursue the
good he knows and avoid all evil, is in itself a gift of the
creator who could have made a frog instead of man.
Whoever agrees with Duns Scotus,10 is more favorable
10
Cf. chapter II, footnote 1. Duns Scotus, known also as Doctor
subtilis, became founder of Scotism, traditional philosophy of the
to the freedom of the will, whose power they believe to be

so great that inasmuch as a man has not received redeeming
grace, could nevertheless by his natural powers perform
good works, by which he could properly, though not
deservedly, merit sanctifying grace.11 For these are the terms
they employ.
19) Freedom and Grace according to St. Augustine and

the Reformers
Diametrically opposed is the view that all morally good
deeds [without grace] are detestable in God's sight no less
than criminal deeds such as murder and adultery, because
they do not originate in faith nor in love of God. This
judgment is obviously too severe. The fact remains that
there have been philosophers who possessed some knowl-
edge of God, and hence perhaps also some trust and love
Franciscan Order, and differing in some respects from Thomism.
Free will he held as the immediate cause of its volition. God has no
immediate efficacy. Without free will there would be no possibility
to sin. During the Renaissance Scotists opposed the classical re-
vival. Most of the Scotist philosophy and theory has been rele-
gated to the background today.
11
Erasmus' discussion of grace suffers from obscurities. He was
not well disposed to any scholastic terminology and failed to define
clearly his own definitions. He does not enter into the controversy
on the nature of sufficient and efficacious grace. He merely stresses
the patristic argument that grace is necessary. Owing to its gratui-
tous character, grace cannot be earned by strictly natural merits,
either in strict justice (meritum de condigno), i.e., according to
worthiness, or as a matter of fitness (meritum de congruo), i.e., ac-
cording to equity. Erasmus also uses the terms gratia gratum
faciens (ingratiating grace) for sanctifying grace and gratia peculi-
aris for extraordinary grace. Joined to free will these terms can be
reduced to gratia praeveniens et cooperans. A prevenient (oper-
ative) grace is an antecedent act of the soul. A subsequent (co-
operating) grace usually presupposes a deliberate act of the will.
All these graces "help man to perform salutary acts" (ad salutem).
See especially Section 20 on the four varieties of grace in Erasmus'
own words. For an orthodox survey see articles on "Grace" by J.
Pohle, The Catholic Encyclopedia, New York, 1909, Volume VI,
pp. 689-714.
of God, and did not act solely out of vainglory's sake, but
rather out of love of virtue and goodness, which, they
taught, was to be loved for no other reason but that
it is good. For, whether a man who risks death for his
country out of vainglory performs a morally good act in
the general concrete or in the morally abstract, I do not
know.
St. Augustine and his followers give a greater stress to
the role of grace, as Paul also affirms it at every oppor-
tunity, because they are all conscious of how it debases
true piety if man relies solely on his own strength. Thus
Augustine challenges the view that man, subject to sin,
can better himself or act to save himself. Only undeserved
divine grace can spur man supernaturally to wish that
which will lead to eternal life. This is known to some as
prevenient grace. Augustine calls it operative grace. For
him faith, through which we enter eternity, is also a free
gift of God. So is charity an additional gift of the Spirit.
Augustine calls it cooperative grace. It assists those who
strive until they have reached their goal. Although free
will and grace together accomplish the same work, grace
is the leading cause and not just a concomitant one. But
some are divided even on this opinion and say: if one
considers the act according to its nature, then the will of
man is the more important cause; if one considers, how-
ever, the meritorious aspects of the act, then grace is the
more important.
Now, it appears that faith which evinces our desire to do
salutary things, and charity which wishes us not to be
frustrated in our desire, are not distinct in time, as they
are different in their nature. Both can however be inten-
sified in time.
20) Four Varieties of Grace

Since grace means a freely given gift, we may enumerate
three or four varieties of grace.
The first kind of grace we possess by nature. Sin has
corrupted, but not extinguished it, as we said before, and
some call it the natural influence. Even the most obstinate
sinner will retain this grace which is common to all man-
kind. Thus, everyone is free to speak or to keep silent, to sit
or to stand up, to help the poor, to read holy books, to
listen to sermons. Some now hold that such acts in them-
selves can in no way lead to eternal life. Others assert
that such works, because of God's immense goodness can
prepare for the reception of grace, and can move God to
be merciful. True, some deny that this can happen without
special grace. Therefore, this first kind of grace, common
to all, is seldom called grace. Yet, it actually is such. For
God as creator, conservor and governor of this world
every day achieves greater miracles than the healing of a
leper or the exorcism of demons. But we don't call these
divine acts of maintaining the world miracles, because they
are obvious to us every day.
A second variety is extraordinary grace. God through
mercy moves the undeserving sinner to contrition. But God
does not yet infuse that ultimate grace which can eliminate
his sin and make him once more pleasing to Himself. Thus
a^ sinner aided by this second kind of grace, which we had
called operative, is displeased with himself. Yet, though he
has not abandoned the inclination to sin, he is capable of
giving alms, can pray, practice pious exercises, listen to
sermons, request pious people to intercede for him with
God, and thus by means of these and other ethically good
works, apply in a way for obtaining the ultimate grace.
The goodness of God does not refuse to any mortals this
second grace. The mercy of God offers everyone favorable
opportunities for repentance. One needs only to attach the
rest of one's own will to God's help, which merely invites
to, but does not compel to betterment. Furthermore, one
finds the opinion, that it is within our power to turn our
will towards or away from grace—just as it is our pleasure
to open or close our eyes against light. It is incompatible
with the infinite love of God for man that a man's striving
with all his might for grace should be frustrated. Through
that grace, which they call sanctifying, if he inspires to it

with all his power, it results that no sinner should be
overconfident, none again should despair. No one perishes
except through his own fault.
There are then first natural grace, second an exciting
or operative grace, which is, to be sure, imperfect, third
an efficient grace, which we have called cooperative, and
which promotes that which is begun, and fourth a grace
which leads to the final goal. The last three are sup-
posedly one and the same grace, even though according
to its operation in us, we call it by different names. Thus,
the first excites, the second promotes and the third leads
to the goal.
21) Views of Thomists, Carlstadt, and Luther
There are then those who are quite removed from

Pelagius in ascribing more to grace and hardly anything
to the free will, though not completely abolishing it. They
deny that man could desire anything good without extra-
ordinary grace, that he can initiate, continue and reach
the goal without the guiding and continuous help of divine
grace. Such an opinion appears quite probable, because it
leaves man the possibility of exerting himself and striving,
and nevertheless relinquishing to him nothing which he
could solely ascribe to his own powers.12
But more objectionable is the opinion of those who
emphatically affirm that the will in itself can only commit
sin and that only grace can cause good; and this grace
operates not through or with the will but merely within
the will; in such wise that the will is in this case like wax
in the hands of the sculptor; that it takes on any form
pleasing to the craftsman.13 These people, I think, have so
12
Appears an oversimplification of the Thomistic position.
13
Sketch of Carlstadt's view.
great a fear of and distrust of meritorious human acts
that they go too far.14
Yet, worst of all is obviously the opinion of those who
maintain that the free will is an empty name and that
neither among the angels, nor Adam, nor us, nor before
or after receiving grace did it or could it accomplish any-
thing;15 that rather God causes in us evil as well as good,
and that everything happens of mere necessity.
22) A Textual Criticism of Ecclesiasticus
Hence I shall discuss these latter two opinions. In all

this I have been somewhat lengthy to make it easier for
the lay reader to understand the remaining argumentation
—I am writing as a layman for laymen. At first I have
quoted Ecclesiasticus [15, 14-18] which seems best to
demonstrate the origin and power of the free will. Now
we shall peruse somewhat more quickly the remaining
scriptural evidence.
But first we must take note of the fact that the Aldine
edition16 has a different text from the Latin one used in
the Church. "They shall preserve thee"17 is missing in the
Greek manuscripts. Even Augustine, although quoting this
text a number of times, does not add these words either.
Probably one ought to read Trot^rat instead of Trot^crat.18
14
"Ut praeter casam" refers to a proverb of Terence (195P-159
BC), Phormio 768, Roman writer of comedies, "ita fugias, ne
praeter casam," i.e., when in flight avoid your own house. It means
in Erasmus "to go too far."
15
Luther's view.
16
Aldina refers to a Venetian printing (1518) of the Greek text.
17
Ecclesiasticus 1 % 16.
18
One must recall that Erasmus had worked on the Greek version
of the Bible. This was not only an important development in Bibli-
cal textual criticism, but also a great help to Luther's Bible trans-
lation. Present higher criticism considers this example by Erasmus
a bit pedantic. Cf. the Greek text of Ecclesiasticus 15, 15: ". . . and
to perform its faithfulness, will be of thine own good pleasure."
23) Additional Old Testament Proofs

Now God has offered already in paradise the choice
between life and death. If you obey my laws you shall live;
if you disobey, you must die; beware of evil and choose
the good. In the same vein he spoke to Cain: "Why are
you angry and why are you downcast? If you do well, will
you not be accepted; but if you do not well, will not sin
crouch at the door? Its desire is for you, but you must
master it" (Genesis 4,6-7). Here reward is in prospect
for whoever chooses the good, and punishment for whoever
prefers evil. Simultaneously this passage shows that bad
inclinations can be overcome and that they don't neces-
sitate sinning. With this passage agrees also the Lord's
saying to Moses: "I have set before you life and death.
Choose the good and follow me."19 Could it be stated any
more plainly? God shows what is good and what is evil.
He offers as recompense death or life. He relinquishes to
man the freedom of choice. It would be ridiculous to
command one to make a choice, if he were incapable of
turning in either direction. That's like saying to someone
who stands at the crossroads "choose either one," when
only one is passable. Again in Deuteronomy 30,15-19:
Here, then, I have today set before you life and prosperity,
death and doom. If you obey the commandments of the
Lord, Your God, which I enjoin on you today, loving him,
and walking in his ways, and keeping his commandments,
statutes and decrees, you will live and grow numerous, and
the Lord, your God, will bless you in the land you are en-
tering to occupy. If, however, you turn away your hearts
and will not listen, but are led astray and adore and serve
other gods, I tell you now that you will certainly perish;
you will not have a long life on the land which you are
crossing the Jordan to enter and occupy. I call heaven and
earth today to witness against you: I have set before you
life and death, the blessing and the curse. Choose life,
then, that you and your descendants may live.
19
This appears to be a free rendition of Deuteronomy 30, 19.
You hear again and again of preparing, choosing, pre-
venting, meaningless words, if the will of man were not
also free to do good, and not just evil. Otherwise it would
be like addressing a man whose hands are tied in such a
manner that he can reach with them only to the left, "To
your right is excellent wine, to your left you have poison.
Take what you like."
The above agrees also with what the Lord says in Isaiah:
"If you be willing and harken to me, you shall eat the
good things of the land. But if you will not, and will
provoke me to wrath, the sword shall devour you" (Isaiah
1,19). Assuming man has no will to do good, or even, as
some assert, neither good nor evil, what is the meaning then
of "if you be willing" and "if you will not"? It would be
more fitting [for God] to say, "if I will" and "if I will
not." Since the above is often said to sinners, I do not see
how one can avoid attributing to them also a free will
capable of choosing the good, because the will presumes
certitude and discernment—unless, of course, one prefers
to speak only of an emotion or a rationalization.
Furthermore, in the same prophet we read: "If you
seek, seek; return, come" (Isaiah 21,12). What is the use
of urging people to return and to come, if they are quite
unable to do so? Is it not like telling one bound in chains,
whom you do not want to untie, "get up, come and follow
me"? Also :"Assemble yourselves and come, and draw near
together" (Isaiah 45, 20), and "Be converted to me, and
you shall be saved" (Isaiah 45, 22). Again: "Arise, arise
. . . shake yourself from the dust. . . . loose the bonds from
off thy neck" (Isaiah 52, 1-2). The same in Jeremiah 15, 19:
"If thou wilt be converted, I will convert thee . . . and if
thou shalt separate the precious from the vile, thou shalt
be as my mouth." Free choice is implied in "if thou shalt
separate."
Zachariah indicates even clearer the effort of the free
will: "Turn ye to me, saith the Lord, and I will turn you,
saith the Lord of hosts" (Zachariah 1,3). And the Lord
says: "If the wicked one do penance for all his sins which
he hath committed, and do justice and judgment. . . I will

not remember all his iniquities that he hath done" (Ezekiel
18, 21), as well as, "But if the just man turn himself away
from his justice, and do iniquity. . ." (Ezekiel 18,24).
In this chapter the words "turn away, do commit" are often
repeated, both in an evil and a good sense. But where are
those who say that man does nothing, but endures every-
thing through operative grace? In Ezekiel 18,31: "Cast
away from you all your transgressions," and "Why will
you die, O house of Israel?" And in Ezekiel 33,11: "I
desire not the death of the wicked . . . turn ye ... and
come." Would a pious God deplore the death of his people,
which he himself is causing? If he does not wish our death,
we must impute it to our own will, if we perish. Certainly
nothing can be imputed to one unable to do good or evil.
That mystic psalmist would be exhorting in vain people not
in control of their will: "Turn away from evil and do good,
seek after peace and pursue it."20
But how little is accomplished by quoting selections of
this sort. The entire Holy Scripture is filled with such
exhortations. In Joel 2,12: "Be converted to me with all
your heart." In Jonah 3,8: "Let them turn everyone from
his evil way." In Isaiah 46,8: "Return, ye transgressors,
to the heart." "And be converted everyone from his evil
way, that I may repent me of the evil that I think to do
unto them for the wickedness of their doings" (Jeremiah
26,3), and "If you will not hearken to me to walk in my
law" (Jeremiah 26,4). Scripture desires nothing but con-
version, ardor, and improvement. All these exhortations
would lose their meaning if really necessity were to deter-
mine good or evil acts. Just as senseless would be the many
promises, threats, remonstrances, reproaches, entreaties,
blessings and maledictions, addressed to willing and un-
willing ears, as the following: "I see how stiffnecked this
people is" (Exodus 32,9); "O my people, what have I
done to thee" (Micheas 6,3); "They cast away my statutes"
20
In the text Erasmus refers to Psalms 36 which, however, con-
tains no such passage. He may actually have had Psalm 33, 15 in
mind, which David sang feigning madness before Abimelech.
(Ezekiel 20,13); "O that my people would hearken to
me, that Israel would walk in my ways" (Psalm 80,14);
"Who is the man . . . that he may see good? Then guard
thy tongue from evil" (Psalm 33, 13-14).
Furthermore, whenever the word "will" is used, it im-
plies free will. Doesn't the reader of such passages ask:
why do you [God] make conditional promises, when it
depends solely on your will? Why do you blame me, when
all my works, good or bad, are accomplished by you, and
I am only your tool? Why blame me, when it is neither in
my power to preserve what you gave me, nor to keep away
the evil you implant in me? Why do you implore me, when
everything depends on you anyhow and can be carried out
only by your will? Why bless me, as if I had done my
duty, when everything is your achievement? Why do you
curse me, when I have merely sinned through necessity?
What is the purpose of all the many commandments, if it
is impossible for anybody to keep them? Of course, there
are those who deny that man, as much as he may be
justified by faith and charity, can fulfill God's command-
ments. They insist that all good works, because done accord-
ing to the "flesh," must lead to damnation, unless a merciful
God, for the sake of their faith, pardons them.
But again the Lord's words spoken through Moses in
Deuteronomy 30, 11-14 are plain. The fulfillment of the
commandment is not only possible for us, but even easy.
For this command which I enjoin on you today is not too
mysterious and remote for you. It is not up in the sky, that
you should say, "Who will go up in the sky to get it for us
and tell us of it, that we may carry it out?" Nor is it across
the sea, that you should say, "Who will cross the sea to get
it for us and tell us of it, that we may carry it out?" No, it
is something very near to you, already in your mouths and
in your hearts; you have only to carry it out.
This quotation concerns the greatest of all the command-
ments, to turn to the Lord your God with all your heart
and your whole soul. Or what does it mean to hear, to obey,
to turn, if it is not within your power?
I don't want to take any further pains and collect such
quotations, since Scripture abounds in them. It is like

looking for water in the ocean. Consequently, as already
stated, a large part of Scripture would obviously be in-
effectual if one accepts the last two of the above-mentioned
three opinions [against the freedom of the will].21
Finally, there are several places in Scripture which
obviously ascribe contingency to God, yes, even a certain
mutability. For example in Jeremias 18,8 and 10:
// that nation against which I have spoken, shall repent of
their evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought
to do to them . . . If it shall do evil in my sight, that it
obey not my voice, I will repent of the goal that I have
spoken to do unto it.
Now we know very well that Scripture in this instance,
as in many others, speaks in human terms. God is not
confused by mutability. Actually, one only says of God that
he has abandoned his anger and has become merciful after
we have bettered ourselves and he deigns us worthy of his
grace; conversely, that he has deprived us of grace and has
become angry whenever we have changed for the worse
and he punishes and humbles us.
The prophet Isaias spoke to Ezechias in 4 Kings 20,1:
"Thou shalt die and not live." But soon after much weep-
ing the same prophet assures with his message: "I have
heard thy prayer, and I have seen thy tears, and behold I
have healed thee," etc. And again in 2 Kings 12,10 Nathan
tells David: "The sword shall never depart from thy house"
etc. But no sooner has David said: "I have sinned against
the Lord," Nathan says to David: "The Lord also hath
taken away thy sin; thou shalt not die." As in these, so in
other passages, it is improper to think of a changeable God.
Yet, we cannot but realize that there dwells a flexible will
in us. If necessity guides it towards evil, how can sin be
attributed to it? Or if it is guided by necessity towards
good, why does God change from anger to mercy, since
we deserve also in this case no requital?
21
Meaning the views of Carlstadt and Luther. Cf. Section 21.
IV
NEW TESTAMENT PROOFS

SUPPORTING THE FREE WILL
THUS far the discussion has centered on proofs taken from
the Old Testament. Some people could dispute these, had
they not all been of the kind of those that were not abol-
ished but received more probatory strength through the
Gospels. Let us therefore turn to the books of the New
Testament.
In the New Testament we meet first of all the place
where Christ weeps over the destruction of Jerusalem.1
Jerusalem, Jerusalem! Thou who killest the prophets, and
stonest those who are sent to thee! How often would I have
gathered thy children together, as a hen gathers her young
under her wings, but thou wouldst not!
If all had happened merely through necessity, could Jeru-

salem not have been justified in answering the weeping
Lord, "Why do you torment yourself with useless weeping?
If it was your will that we should not listen to the prophets,
why did you send them? Why do you blame us for what
you willed, while we have acted merely out of necessity?
You wished to collect us, but you did not will this within
us, rather caused us not to wish it." [In reality,] however,
the words of the Lord do not blame a necessity in the Jews,
but rather their wicked and obstinate will: I wanted to
gather you, but you did not want it.
1
Matthew 23, 37.
37
24) Commandments and Exhortations; Reward and

Punishment
Again: "If thou wilt enter into life, keep the command-
ments" (Matth. 19,17). How could one ask somebody "if
thou wilt be perfect, go, sell what thou hast" (Matth.
19,21). "If anyone wishes to come after me, let him deny
himself, and take up his cross daily, and follow me" (Luke
9,23). Although this is a very difficult commandment,
nevertheless the appeal is to the will. Subsequently, "For
he who would save his life will lose it" (Luke 9,24).
Wouldn't even the clearest commandment of Christ be
senseless, if we could expect nothing from the human will?
"Amen, amen I say to you" and again "Amen I say to
you" (Matth. 5,22 and 28). "If you love me, keep my
commandments" (John 14,15). How often does John alone
impress this upon us! The word "if" does not at all imply
necessity, as, for example, "If you abide in me, and if my
words abide in you" (John 15,7), as well as, "If thou
wilt be perfect" (Matth. 19,21).
When Scripture talks of good and bad works, as well as
of reward, I don't understand how necessity fits in. Neither
nature, nor necessity can earn merit. Our Lord Jesus says
moreover, "Rejoice and exult, because your reward is
great in heaven" (Matth. 5,12).
What does the parable of the laborers in the vineyard
tell us? Are there workers who don't work? Each one
received contractually one denarius as a kind of remuner-
ation for his work. One hears this objection: a reward is
something God owes us, because he has pledged his will
to us, in case we believe in his promise. However, faith
itself is a work and the free will participates to a consid-
erable measure in it by turning to or away from faith.
Why was the servant praised who had increased the fortune
of his master by his diligence, and why was the idle one
damned, if man in such a case was not responsible?2 And
2
Matthew 25, 14-30.
again in Matthew 25,35 Christ mentions not necessity, but
the good works of men, when he invites all to participate
in his eternal kingdom. You gave me to eat, you gave me
to drink, you took me in, you clothed me and so on. Again
those on his left hand he does not reproach with necessity,
but with the willing omission of works: you have seen me
hungry, here was an opportunity for a good work, but you
did not give me to eat, etc.
The entire Gospel is filled with exhortations. "Come to
me, all you who labor and are burdened" (Matth. 11,28),
"watch" (Matth. 24,42), "pray" (Matth. 5,44), "ask . . .
seek . . . knock" (Matth. 7,7). "take heed . . . beware"
(Mark 8,15). What is the meaning of these many parables
concerning the word of God which "we should preserve"
(Matth. 13,1-8)? Concerning the bridegroom whom we
should hasten to meet (Matth. 25,1-13); concerning the
thief coming at night, digging for treasures (Matth. 24,43;
1 Thessalonians 5,2); concerning the house which must be
built on rock (Matth. 7,24). Of course, these parables are
to spur us to exertion, diligence and zeal, and not to our
ruin by being indifferent towards the grace of God. These
words would be superfluous and powerless, if everything
could be reduced to necessity.
The same can be said of evangelical threats: "But woe
to you, Scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites" (Matth. 23,13),
"Woe to the Corozaim!" (Matth. 11,21). Futile would
also be reproaches like, "O unbelieving generation, how
long shall I be with you? How long shall I put up with
you?" (Mark 9,18). "Serpents, brood of vipers, how are
you to escape the judgment of hell?" (Matth. 23,33). The
Lord speaks, "Therefore, by their fruits you will know
them" (Matth. 7,20). "Fruits" mean to him works, and
these he designated to be ours. But they could not be ours,
if all happened of necessity. He prays on the cross, "Father,
forgive them, for they do not know what they are doing"
(Luke 23,34). How much correcter would it have been to
justify them, that they had no free will, and were incapable
of acting differently, even if they had wished to do so.
Again John says, "He gave the power of becoming sons

of God to those believing in his name" (John 1,12). How
could power to become children of God be given to those
who are not yet sons of God, if there is no freedom of the
will? When some had taken offense at the words of the
master and had fallen away from him, he said to his
disciples: "Do you also wish to go away?" (John 6,68).
Had the former fallen away out of necessity rather than
their own impulse, why did he ask the others, whether
they too were going to leave him?
But we don't want to bore the reader with the enumer-
ation of all such passages. They exist in such profusior
that they occur easily to everyone by themselves.
25) God's Judgment

Now we want to investigate whether also in Paul, the
zealous advocate of grace, who storms the works of [the
Jewish] laws, we find something which implies the freedom
of the will. Thus we meet above all a passage in the Epistle
to the Romans: "Dost thou despise the riches of his good-
ness and patience and long-suffering? Dost thou not know
that the greatness of God is meant to lead thee to repent-
ance?" (Romans 2,4). How could the disdain of a com-
mandment be imputed, if there is no free will? And how
could God invite us to do penance, when he has caused
impenitence? And how could a condemnation be justified,
when the judge himself has compelled the [committing
of an] outrage? But Paul had just finished saying, "and we
know that the judgment of God is according to truth
against those who do such things" (Romans 2,2). Here
he speaks of "doing," and of a judgment according to
truth. Where is mere necessity? Where is the will that
merely suffers? Mark well whom Paul does blame for evil:
"But according to thy hardness and unrepented heart, thou
dost treasure up to thyself wrath in the day of wrath, and
of the revelation of the just judgment of God who will
render to every man according to his works" (Romans
2,5). The reference here is to a just judgment of God and
to works which deserve punishment. If God ascribes to us
only his own good works which he performs through us,
and we thus earn glory, honor and immortality, then his
goodness appears plausible. Although even in such a case
the Apostle adds, "life eternal indeed he will give to those
who by patience in good works seek glory and honor and
immortality" (Romans 2,7). But how could it be justified
that "wrath and indignation . . . tribulation and anguish"
(Romans 12,8-9) shall be visited upon the transgressor, if
he is doing nothing freely, but everything through necessity?
26) Running the Race

Would not already the Pauline parable of the runner,
the prize and the crown of victory be untenable, if nothing
were attributed to our striving? In 1 Corinthians 9,24 we
read: "Do you not know that those who run in a race, all
indeed run, but one receives the prize? So run as to obtain
it." And [he adds], "they [run] indeed to receive a
perishable crown, but we an imperishable one." A prize
can only be won by somebody who has fought. Only one
who had earned it can receive it as a presentation. Further-
more: "Fight the good fight of the faith, lay hold on the
life eternal" (1 Timothy 6,12). Wherever a competition
takes place, we are dealing with a voluntary striving, and
there exists the danger that a relaxation in endeavor will
deprive one of the prize. This is completely different where
everything happens through necessity. Also: "And again,
one who enters a contest is not crowned unless he has
competed according to the rules" (2 Timothy 2,5). And
[two verses] before: "Conduct thyself in work as a good
soldier of Christ Jesus" (2 Timothy 2,3). The industrious
husbandman is mentioned (2 Timothy 2,6). The competi-
tor obtains a prize, the soldier his reward, the countryman
his harvest. The same: "I have fought the good fight, I
have finished the course, . . . For the rest, there is laid up
for me a crown of justice, which the Lord, the just Judge,
will give me in that day" (2 Timothy 4,7). Such words as

fight, crown, just judge, to give, to fight,—to me—seem
difficult to be reconciled with mere necessity, whereby the
will does absolutely nothing but endure.
27) Warding off the Works of Darkness

But also[ the Apostle] James attributed human sin not
to necessity, nor to a God operating within us, but to
depraved concupiscence. "Let no man say when he is
tempted, that he is tempted by God. . . But everyone is
tempted by his own passion. Then when passion has con-
ceived, it brings forth sin" (James 1,13-15).
The sins of man, Paul calls "the works of the flesh,"
and not the works of God.3 He obviously designates as
"flesh" what James calls concupiscence. In the Acts of the
Apostles this question is put to Ananias: "Why has Satan
tempted thy heart?" (Acts 5,3). Paul, too, attributes evil
deeds to the spirits of the air about us who work on the
unbelievers.4 "What harmony is there between Christ and
Belial?" (2 Corinthians 6,15). "Either make the tree good
and its fruits good, or make the tree bad and its fruits bad"
(Matth. 12,33). How can some people dare to ascribe to
an unsurpassably good God the worst of fruits? Although
Satan can entice human concupiscence by external means,
or also by internal ones, rooted in human circumstances,
the enticement itself does not necessitate sinning, as long
as we want to combat it and implore divine aid. Just the
same, when the Spirit of Christ excites us to good deeds,
it does not constitute a compulsion, but rather an aid.
With James agrees also Ecclesiasticus 15,21: "He hath
commanded no man to do wickedly, and he hath given
no man license to sin." Now, compulsion is even more
than a commandment. Even clearer is what Paul writes:
"If anyone, therefore, has cleansed himself from these, he
will be a vessel for honorable use" (2 Timothy 2,1). How
3
Galatians 5, 19.
4
Ephesians 2, 2.
could someone keep clean, if he is totally incapable of
doing anything?
I know that this is a mode of figurative expression. For
the moment I am quite satisfied that it contradicts those
who want to ascribe everything to mere necessity. The
same mode of expression is found in 1 John 3,3: "And
everyone who has this hope in Him makes himself holy,
just as He is holy." I again admit to my opponents that
this is a mode of expression. They also must permit us to
employ occasionally figurative usage of words. But it is im-
pudent for them to interpret "he makes himself holy" to
mean "he is made holy by God, whether he likes it or not."
"Let us lay aside the works of darkness" (Romans 13,12),
"Strip off the old man with his deeds" (Golossians 3,9),
exclaims Paul. How can we be commanded to lay aside
something, if we are incapable? The same: "To wish is
within my power, but I do not find the strength to accom-
plish what is good" (Romans 7,18). Paul obviously admits
here that it is in the power of man to want to do good.
28) Virtuous Endeavors Unite with Divine Grace

Now the will to do good works is in itself a good work.
Otherwise an evil will could not be something bad. Nobody
denies that already the will to kill is something evil. And
again, "The spirits of the prophets are under the control
of the prophets" (1 Corinthians 14,32). Whoever is driven
by the Holy Spirit is influenced by it, yet is also free to
keep silent about it. How much freer is the volition of man!
Those, to be sure, who are driven by a fanatical spirit can
not keep quiet, even if they wanted to, and often don't
understand themselves what they are saying.
Here belongs also the passage admonishing Timothy:
"Do not neglect the grace granted thee" (1 Timothy 4,14).
This declares that it is in our power to turn away from
offered grace. The same in another passage: "His grace
in me has not been fruitless" (1 Corinthians 15,10). The
Apostle informs us that he has not left unused divine grace.
How could he assert this, if he had done nothing? "Do

you according to your part strive diligently to supply your
faith with virtue" (2 Peter 1,5), and so on. And a little
further on: "Therefore, brethren, strive even more by good
works to make your calling and election sure!" (2 Peter
1,10). Here the Apostle wants our virtuous endeavors to
unite with divine grace, in order to reach perfection gradu-
ally through righteous deeds.
But I fear it could seem to some that this is an im-
moderate heaping together of passages encountered every-
where in Scripture. When Paul writes: "All Scripture is
inspired by God and useful for teaching, for reproaching,
for converting, for instructing in justice. . ." (2 Timothy
3, 16), there would obviously be no room for all this, if
everything happened on account of pure and unavoidable
necessity. What purpose would the many eulogies about
pious men in Ecclesiasticus 44 serve, if human zeal deserved
nothing? What's the meaning of obedience, praised every-
where, if man in his good as well as evil works is just a
tool of God's, like the hatchet for the carpenter?
29) Luther's Assertion

We all would be such tools, if the teachings of Wycliffe
were true. Accordingly, everything happens on account of
pure necessity, be it before or after the reception of grace;
may they be good, evil or ethically indifferent works.
Luther agrees with this. In order to forestall anybody accus-
ing me of inventing this, let me quote his own words taken
from his Assertio.5
This article must be revoked. I have expressed it improp-
erly, when I said that the free will, before obtaining grace,
is really an empty name. I should have said straightfor-
wardly that the free will is really a fiction and a label
6
Luther burned the Papal Bull, Exsurge Domine, condemning 42
of his propositions as heretical (June 15, 1520), and wrote in
answer the Assertio. See chapter I, footnote 3. Erasmus wrote much
of his Diatribe against this Article 36 of the Assertio.
without reality, because it is in no man's power to plan any
evil or good. As the article of Wycliffe, condemned at
Constance, correctly teaches: everything takes place by
absolute necessity.
I have deliberately omitted many passages from the Acts
[of the Apostles] and the Apocalypse [of St. John], other-
wise I might be boring the reader. Suffice it to say that
many passages have, not without reason, induced intelligent
and pious men not to abandon free will completely. [In
conclusion] it is not at all true that those who trust in
their own works are driven by the spirit of Satan and
delivered to damnation.
V
APPARENT PROOFS AGAINST

THE FREE WILL
IT is now time to consider from another angle some scrip-
tural testimony that seems completely to contradict the free-
dom of the will. Such we meet, of course, here and there
in Holy Scripture. However, two passages are especially
important and more obvious than the others, and both are
dealt with by the Apostle Paul in such a manner that at
first one has the impression he thinks nothing at all of
human works and of the capacity of the free will.
30) First Scriptural Passage: Pharaoh's Hardened Heart

One passage is Exodus 9,12 and 16 which Paul treats
in Romans 9,14:
But the Lord made Pharaoh obstinate, and he would not
listen to the laws of God . . . But this is why I have spared
you: to show you my power and to make my name resound
throughout the earth.
And Paul explains this by quoting a similar passage from
Exodus 33,19 in his Epistle to the Romans:
For he says to Moses, "I will have mercy on whom I have
mercy, and I will show pity to whom I will show pity."
So then there is the question not of him who wills nor of
him who runs, but of God showing mercy.
The second passage is from Malachi 1,2 and is treated
by Paul in Romans 9,11-13.
46
Was not Esau brother to Jacob, saith the Lord, and I have
loved Jacob, but have hated Esau.
Paul explains it thus:
Before the children had yet been born, or had done aught
of good or evil, in order that the selective purpose of God
might stand, depending not on deeds, but on him who
calls, it was said to her [Rebecca}, "the older shall serve
the younger," as it was written " 'Jacob I have loved, but
Esau I have hated."
Since it is obviously contradictory that God, who is not

only just, but also merciful, should have hardened the
heart of a man, in order to show his might by the former's
evilness, Origen resolves the difficulty in the third book of
his Commentary on St. John1 as follows: God permitted
an occasion of induration, but the guilt is Pharaoh's. His
malice caused him to become more obstinate, rather than
penitential. Just as after the same rain well-tended land
produces the best fruit, neglected land however thorns and
thistles; just as wax becomes soft and clay hard under the
same sun, so God's gentleness, tolerating a sinner, causes a
change of mind in one and a hardening in evil in another.
God shows mercy to him who remembers his goodness and
betters himself. However, he hardens him who remembers
his goodness and betters himself. However, he hardens him
who, though obtaining a respite for a change of mind, does
not care for God's goodness and becomes worse. [Origen]
presents a figurative expression, customary in popular ser-
mons, marking such a one as culprit who gives occasion
for a [bad] deed, [as for example] when a father would
say to his son that he has ruined him, because the former
had not punished the latter immediately for a certain
offense.
1
See Book 3, ch. I, 10 of Treplapx<ov, the Greek actually quoted
in Erasmus text. See also chapter II, footnote E.
4» DISCOURSE ON FREE WILL
31) Man Wills Evil

Isaias employs a similar mode of expression: "Why hast
thou made us to err, O Lord, from thy ways? Why hast
thou hardened our heart, that we should not fear thee?"
(Isaias 63,17). According to Origen this passage Jerome
interprets to mean: God hardens a sinner, when he does
not castigate him, and he pities a sinner, when he summons
him to do penance, by means of afflictions. Thus the Lord
exclaims angrily in Osee 4,14: "I will not visit upon your
daughters when they shall commit fornication." On the
other hand, he punishes out of pity when he speaks: "I
will punish their crimes with a rod, and their sin with
stripes" (Psalms 88,33).
Jeremias uses the same mode of expression: "Thou hast
deceived me, O Lord, and I am deceived: thou hast been
stronger than I, and thou hast prevailed" (Jeremias 20,7).
A deceiver is here meant to be someone who does not
restrain one from an aberration. Origen considers such atti-
tude more conducive to a perfect healing, just as the
experienced surgeon values a slow healing of a wound,
permitting the pus to exude more readily. The result is a
more lasting cure. Origen also notices that the Lord said:
"But this is why I have spared you" (Exodus 9,16), rather
than "created you." Otherwise the Pharaoh could not be
called godless, since "God saw that all he had made was
very good" (Genesis 1,31). In reality Pharaoh was created
with a will enabling him to move in both directions. He
has turned evil on his own account, since he preferred to
follow his own inclination, rather than obey God's
commandments.
32) God Uses Free Will

This malice of Pharaoh God has utilized for his honor
and for the salvation of his people; thus revealing even
better that it is vain of man to oppose the will of God. In
the same manner a clever king or a "pater familias" will
use the hardness of men, however odious it may be to him,
in order to punish villains. Nevertheless, the free will is not
violated when the outcome of an event is in God's hands,
and when God according to his hidden decision guides
men differently from what they have resolved. Just as he
guides the intentions of the villains to benefit the pious, so
the intentions of the latter miss their goal if God's grace
does not assist them. This is what Paul means when he
says: "So then there is question not of him who wills nor
of him who runs, but of God showing mercy" (Romans
9,16). God's mercy precedes our will, accompanies it, and
gives it fruitfulness. Nevertheless it remains that we wish,
run and attain, except that all this we must ascribe to God,
to whom we belong with everything we are.
33) God's Foreknowledge

The knotty point how God's foreknowledge is compatible
with our free will has often been amplified. But in my
opinion Lorenzo Valla2 has been most successful at it: Fore-
knowledge does not cause what is to take place. Even we
know many things which will be happening. They will not
happen because we know them, but vice versa. An eclipse
of the sun does not occur because astronomers predict it,
but it can be predicted, precisely because it will take place.
34) God's Predestination

More difficult becomes the question when we consider
God's will or determination, meaning that God wills that
which He knows beforehand. Somehow He must wish the
foreknown, seeing that He does not prevent it though he
could do so. This is what Paul means when he comments:
"For who resists his will?" (Romans 9,19). "He has mercy
on whom he will, and whom he will he hardens" (Romans
9,18). Assuming a king could do, unopposed, as he pleases,
2
This is the other of Erasmus' two references to Valla. Cf. ch. II,
footnote 3.
then everything he wishes would be called his "doing."

Thus it might appear that God's will, which is the first
cause of all that happens, seems to deprive us of the free
will. Paul does not discuss this question, rather he scolds
those who want to investigate it, "O man, who art thou
to reply to God?" (Romans 9,20). However, he scolds the
man who would impiously complain, just as a master might
well say to his stubborn servant that he should not inquire
after the why of a given order, but rather carry it out.
The master's answer would be different if an understanding
and willing servant desires modestly to know why the
master wants something to be done which appears to be
useless.
God had wanted the Pharaoh to perish miserably. He
was justified in wishing this, and it was good that the
tyrant did perish. The will of God, however, did not force
him to persist in his wrong. Thus a master may give an
order to a servant whose bad character he knows. Such
an order may offer the opportunity for sin and, caught in it,
his punishment may serve as a lesson to others. The master
knows beforehand that the servant will sin, and thus display
his real character; in a certain sense, he wills his destruction
and his sin. Nonetheless, this does not excuse the servant,
for he sins out of his own malice. He has deserved that his
malice be known to all and be punished. But where could
you assume the beginning of merit where there is eternal
necessity and where there is no free will?
35) Efficiency of the Good Will of Man

When we were saying that God often permits an action
to end differently than planned by men, it does not hold
true in most cases, and it happens more frequently among
evil than good people. The Jews crucified the Lord with
the purpose of removing him completely. This wicked plan
God turned to the honor of his son, and to the welfare of
the entire world. That centurion Cornelius who competed
for God's favor with good works, obtained what he wished
for.3 Paul, too, finished the race and won the victory crown
for which he competed.4
36) Primary and Secondary Causes

I do not want to investigate here whether God, who is
without any doubt the first and principal cause of all hap-
penings, effects some things only through secondary causes,
eliminating himself from those, or whether he is causing
everything in the sense of the primary cause, with secondary
causes only cooperating, but without necessity. It can cer-
tainly not be doubted that God, if he wants to, can deflect
the natural effect of all secondary causes into its opposite.
He could effect in a natural manner that something be-
comes cool and moist through fire, hard and dry through
water, shaded by the sun, that streams will not run and
rocks will flow, that poison becomes nourishment and food
poison. Thus the three youths in the Babylonian furnace
remained uninjured, while the Chaldeans were destroyed
by its heat.5 When God performs such, we speak of a
miracle. In this way he can also deprive the palate of its
taste, the eyes of their judgment, stupefy the powers of the
intellect, memory and will. In this manner he compels men
to do what he has decided. This he did with Balaam who
came to curse and when he could not, was not responsible
for what he was saying.6 But such expectations should not
be generalized. For even in these cases God wished every-
thing for just reasons, which are, however, not always
known to us. His will cannot be resisted. Yet, indisputably
man often opposes this "ordained will," as the scholastics
call it. Or did Jerusalem not oppose, when it refused to
be gathered in, though this was God's will?7
4 Acts
3
4
10.
2 Timothy 4, 7 f.
5
Daniel 3, 19 ff.
6
Cf. Numbers 23.
7
Matthew 23, 37.
37) Conditional and Unconditional Necessity

But someone may object, saying that for two reasons
necessity governs the results of an action: namely, neither
can the foreknowledge of God be a delusion, nor his will
be hindered. I answer: not every necessity excludes the
freedom of the will. For example, God the Father neces-
sarily generates the Son. At the same time He generates
Him willingly, since He is not forced [from outside His
nature] to do so.
In human life there can also be a necessity which does
not yet exclude the freedom of the will. God knew before-
hand, and because he did, he somehow wished that Judas
would betray the Lord. If you consider God's infallible
foreknowledge and his unchangeable will, Judas had to
betray the Lord. Nevertheless, Judas could have changed
his will. He certainly would not have had to give in to an
evil one. But what if he had changed? Well, even then
God's foreknowledge would not have been wrong and his
will not hindered, because in such a case he would have
known and willed that change also.
If one wants to discuss the matter with scholastic
subtlety, one may assume in such cases a determination of
the consequent act, but not of the actor.8 These are the
usual terms. Admittedly, Judas had to betray the Lord, if
God wished this with his eternally effective will. But it is
contested that he had to betray him for that reason, since
he accomplished the evil deed rather on the strength of
his own evil will.
8
On predestination Erasmus is very elementary and orthodox. He
does not enter into the problem of the "foreseen merits" of the
just but merely states Valla's view that foreknowledge is not pre-
determination. Scholastic philosophy distinguishes antecedent neces-
sity (necessitas consequentis) from consequent necessity (necessitas
consequentiae]. As God foresees the free acts of men, Erasmus
argues, they are determined not by antecedent necessity, a neces-
sity which would determine the free will of the agent, but by con-
sequent necessity, the historical fact that, granted free choice, the
act would inevitably take place.
ERASMUS: THE FREE WILL S3
It is not my purpose here to pursue such subtleties.
What Exodus 7 has been saying about God's hardening
the Pharaoh's heart could be accepted in the Pauline ver-
sion: "God has given them up to a reprobate sense"
(Romans 1,18), thus sin and punishment of sin coincide
in this case. Whomever God abandons to a reprobate sense
has deserved it, as Pharaoh did, who wished not to dismiss
the Israelites, although he was warned by many signs; or
like the philosophers who worship wood and stones, though
knowing God's supernatural perfection. Wherever there is
pure and perpetual necessity, there can be neither guilt nor
virtue. One cannot deny that every human act is accom-
panied by a divine act, because every action is a reality,
indeed a certain good, as for example to wish to or actually
embrace an adulteress. The evil of an action does not pro-
ceed from God, but from our own will, except, as men-
tioned above, one might state that God is the cause of the
evil of the human will only insofar as he leaves the will to
itself and does not turn it aside by grace. It is just as
one might say we ruin a man by not stopping his ruin,
though we could do so. But this is enough concerning the
first scriptural proof.
38) Second Scriptural Passage: Jacob and Esau: Election

and Rejection
Now to the second, the one of Esau and Jacob, of whom
was prophesied already before their birth: "The elder shall
serve the younger" (Genesis 25,23).9 This prophecy does
not explicitly refer to the salvation of man. Without asking
for his will, God can wish a man to be a servant or a
pauper, and nevertheless not to be excluded from eternal
salvation. When Paul adds the passage from Malachias 1,2:
"I have loved Jacob but have hated Esau," one should not
accept it literally, for God does not love the way we love,
nor does he hate anyone. Such passions are not of God's
essence. Moreover, what I really want to say, the prophet
9
Gf. Erasmus, Section 30.
speaks in his passage obviously not of a hatred which

damns man eternally, but of a temporal difficulty. It is the
same when one speaks of God's anger and fury. The passage
censured those who wished to rebuild Edom, though God
wanted it to remain in ruins.
Now, [let us look at] the metaphorical interpretation
that God does not elect all the gentiles, nor hate all the
Jews, but chooses certain ones from among both. This
testimony of Paul (Romans 9,24) serves less in refuting
the freedom of the will, than in dampening the arrogance
of the Jews, who believed that the Gospel's grace was to be
theirs alone by virtue of their descent from Abraham. They
abhorred the gentiles and did not wish to admit them to
the community of evangelical grace. This Paul explains:
"Even us whom he has called not only from among the
Jews but also from among the gentiles" (Romans 9,24).
Since God hates and loves only with righteous justification,
hatred and love are no more standing in the way of free
will, whether happening before or after the birth of man.
When He already hates a man before his birth, it is because
He knows for sure that he will do something odious; when
after his birth, it is because he is actually doing something
hateful. The Jews, who had been God's chosen people, have
been rejected. The gentiles, on the other hand, not being
the chosen people, have been received. Why have the Jews
been cut off from the olive tree? Because they did not want
to believe. And why have the gentiles been grafted unto it?
Because they obeyed the Gospels. Paul himself gives us that
reason: "They were broken off because of unbelief"
(Romans 11,20), i.e., because they did not want to believe.
Furthermore, [Paul] awakens hope in the broken-off
branch that it could again be grafted on, if people would
abandon their disbelief and would wish to believe. He
warns the grafted-on branch that it might be chopped off,
if it would turn away from the grace of God. "Whereas
thou by faith standest. Be not high-minded, but fear"
(Romans 11,20), and again, "Lest you should be wise in
your own conceits" (Romans 11,25). It is quite evident
that Paul's purpose is to dampen the conceit of gentiles as
well as of Jews.
39) Third Scriptural Passage: Clay in the Potter's Hand

A third scriptural passage [of the opponents] is Isaiah
45,9;
Woe to him that gainsayeth his maker, a shard of the
earthen pots! Shall the clay say to him that fashioned it:
what art thou making, and thy work is without hands?
And even more explicitly in Jeremiah 18,6:

Can't I do with you as this potter, O house of Israel? Be-
hold, as clay is in the hand of the potter, so are you in my
hand.
These passages are to prove more in Paul, than they in-
tended to prove in the original writings of the prophets.
Paul interprets them thus.10
Or is not the potter master of his clay, to make from the
same mass one vessel for honorable, another for ignoble
use? But what if God, wishing to show his wrath and to
make known his power, endured with much patience
vessels of wrath, ready for destruction, that he might show
the riches of his glory upon vessels of mercy, which he
has prepared unto glory?
In both quotations the prophets rebuke the people mur-

muring against the Lord, while afflicted for their own
betterment, just as Paul rejects their godless talk by
exclaiming, "O man who art thou to reply to God?"
(Romans 9,20). In this case we are obliged to submit to
God, like moist clay to the potter's hands. Truly, our free
will is thereby not completely cancelled out, because it is
not impossible for our will to work together with the divine
will for our eternal salvation. Thus follows in Jeremias
soon the exhortation to do penance. We have already
10
Romans 9, 21-23.
quoted this passage.11 It would be a useless exhortation if

everything happened of necessity.
Paul aims not at completely excluding free will, but
rather aims at rebuffing the godlessly grumbling Jews, who
have been rejected from the grace of the Gospels on
account of their obstinate unbelief, while the gentiles have
been accepted because of their faith. It is obvious from the
following passage in 2 Timothy 2,20-21:
But in a great house there are vessels not only of gold and
silver, but also of wood and clay; and some are for hon-
orable uses, but some for ignoble. If anyone, therefore, has
cleansed himself from these, he will be a vessel for honor-
able use, sanctified and useful to the Lord, ready for every
good work.
Such parables used in Holy Scripture are very instructive,
but are not applicable in all instances. How stupid to say
to a chamberpot of Samian clay, "if you keep yourself
clean, you will be a useful and noble vessel." It makes
sense, however, to say this to a vessel endowed with in-
tellect. After such an admonition it can accommodate itself
to the will of the Lord. Because otherwise, if man would
really be only for God what the clay is in the potter's hand,
no one but the potter could be held responsible for the
vessel, especially, if the potter himself has also mixed and
conditioned the clay according to his will. Consequently,
a vessel incapable of self-determination, and thus incapable
of guilt, would be thrown into eternal fire.
Let us therefore interpret the parable as one employed
for explaining grace. Because if we wish to apply all parts
of it superstitiously to our opinion, we would be saying
many ridiculous things. The potter makes vessels to be
abused, but not before their preceding guilt. So he has
discarded some Jews on account of their disbelief. Con-
versely, he has created among the gentiles vessels for noble
use, on account of their faith. If one wants to drive us
into a corner with scriptural quotations and wishes to take
11
Jeremiah 18, 8 ff. See also its quotation on p. 30.
the parable of the potter and his clay literally, why do they
not permit us also this concluding sentence: "If any one,
therefore, has cleansed himself" (2 Timothy 2,21). This
would amount to a contradiction in Paul. While he makes
in a preceding passage everything depend on the hand of
God, here he places everything in the hands of man.
Nevertheless, both passages are sound. One has this, the
other that action in mind: the former wants to stop godless
grumbling, the latter wishes to awaken zeal, and to protect
as much from [a false sense of] security as from despair.
40) Other Similar Passages

Similarly it is in Isaiah 10,15:
Shall the axe boast itself against him that cutteth with it?
Or shall the saw exalt itself against him by whom it was
drawn? As if a rod should lift itself up against him that
lifteth it up, and a staff exalt itself, which is but wood.
These words are directed against a godless king whose
hardness God uses to chastise his people. He ascribed to his
own wisdom and strength that which could only happen
because God permitted it, although he was only a tool of
divine wrath. Yes, he was a tool, but a living and intelligent
one. If an axe and saw would be such, too, then it would
make sense to say of them that together with the craftsman
they work on something by themselves. Servants are, as
Aristotle teaches, living tools of their masters. Such would
also be axes, saws, hatchets, ploughs, if they could move on
their own, like those tripods which Vulcan manufactured
in such a manner that they could intervene in battle by
themselves.12 The master commands and orders what is
needed. The servant can accomplish nothing without his
master. Nevertheless nobody would say that a servant who
obeys the commands of his master is completely inactive.
Moreover, the parable, as employed, aims not at contra-
12
Read about the work of Hephaestus (Greek for Vulcan) in the
Iliad, Bk. XVIII, 375 and 418 S.
dieting the freedom of the will, but at dampening the

arrogance of a godless king who ascribes to his power and
wisdom, rather than to God, what he had accomplished.
It is also not difficult to refute the proof which Origen
cites from Ezekiel 36,26: "I will take away the stony heart
out of your flesh, and will give you a heart of flesh." This
is a metaphor. Similarly a teacher could say to a pupil with
deficient Latin, "I'll drive that barbaric manner of speech
out of you yet, and will drum classical Latin into you."
Nonetheless [the teacher] would have to demand indus-
triousness of his student, even while the latter could not
learn to speak differently, except with the help of the
teacher. What is a stony heart? It is a rude heart, stub-
bornly malicious. And what is a heart of flesh? It is a docile
heart, obeying divine grace. Assuming a free will, it is none-
theless manifest that an obstinate heart cannot soften ' j
true penance except with the aid of heavenly grac^. He
who grants docility demands that you exert yourscif to be
taught.
41) Union of Grace and Freedom

David prayed, "Create a pure heart in me" (Psalm 50,2).
Paul in turn says: "If anyone has cleansed himself" (2
Timothy 2,21). Ezekiel exclaims: "Make yourself a new
heart, and a new spirit" (Ezekiel 18,31). David in turn
cries out: "And a resolute spirit renew within me" (Psalm
50,12) and prays: "And blot out all my iniquities" (Psalm
50,11). John in turn says: "And everyone who has this
hope in him makes himself holy just as he also is holy"
(1 John 3,3). David begs: "Deliver me from the penalty
of blood" (Psalm 50,16). A prophet calls out: "Loose the
bonds from thy neck, O captive daughter of Sion" (Isaias
52,2). Also Paul: "Let us therefore lay aside the works of
darkness" (Romans 13,12). Also Peter: "Lay aside there-
fore all malice, and all deceit, and pretense ..." (1 Peter
2,1). Paul says: "Work out your salvation with fear and
trembling" (Philippians 2,12), though in 1 Corinthians 12,6
he says: "[He is] the same God, who works all things in
all."
More than six hundred such proofs can be found in Holy
Scripture. If man could effect nothing, why do they ad-
monish us to work? If man can effect something, why say
that God alone works all things in all? By utilizing and
distorting one set of passages, man appears impotent. By
emphasizing in partiality the other set, man will be doing
everything. Now, if man could do nothing, there would be
no room for merit and guilt; consequently also none for
punishment and reward. If on the other hand man were
to do all, there would be no room for grace, which is very
often mentioned and emphasized by Paul. The Holy Spirit
can not contradict himself. The canonical books of Holy
Scripture originated under his inspiration. Their inviolable
sublimity is acknowledged and affirmed by both parties in
the dispute. Therefore one must find an interpretation
which resolves this seeming contradiction.
Whoever wants to abolish the freedom of the will, will be
interpreting "Stretch forth thy hand to which thou wilt"
(Ecclesiasticus 15,17) to signify that grace will stretch out
its hand according to its will. "Make yourself a new heart"
(Ezekiel 18,31) signifies that the grace of God will create
for you a new heart. "And everyone who has this hope in
him makes himself holy" (1 John 3,3) signifies that grace
sanctifies him. "Let us therefore lay aside the works of dark-
ness" (Romans 15,12) signifies that grace may lay them
aside. Very often we read in Holy Scripture he has done
justice, he has done inequity. One would have to interpret
this to mean that God has exercised justice in one and has
done injustice in the other.
If I were now to propose the interpretation of orthodox
Church Fathers or Church Councils, I would soon be inter-
rupted with the objection that these are only human.13
And I am not permitted to say against the most violent and
distorted interpretation of Luther that he too is only
13
Recall the argument of Erasmus, the Humanist, concerning
"human" in chapter I.
human? Of course, the opponent would be victorious, were

it permissible to interpret Scripture according to his mo-
mentary whim, while we would not be permitted to follow
the interpretations of the Church Fathers, nor produce our
own.
The passage "stretch forth thy hand to which thou wilt"
(Ecclesiasticus 15,17) is, of course, so clear that it needs no
interpretation. It means that grace will stretch out your
hand at will.14 The interpretation of the most trustworthy
Doctors of the Church, on the contrary, must be a dream,
if we do not want to call it the imputation of Satan, as
others did.
Now, the quoted passages which seem to contradict each
other are easily reconciled, if we join together our will with
the help of divine grace. Instead of this clear solution when
mentioning the parable of the potter (Isaias 45,9), and the
axe (Isaias 10,15), they attack us with words which they
want to be understood literally, since this is advantageous
to their cause. Yet in this other case, they abandon unhesi-
tatingly the words of Holy Scripture, and offer an inter-
pretation which is almost as bold as saying, "[Pope] Peter
wrote," while another interprets this as meaning that some-
one else in the house writes and not he, Peter.
14
Is meant ironically, of course. This frequent type of jocundity
belongs to the Humanist style just as do the Humanists' antipathies
for scholastic subtleties and dialectical complexities, and their love
for pagan classics, stylistic predilection, and witty disputation.
VI
LUTHER'S PROOFS AGAINST

THE FREE WILL
WE WANT to examine1 now how valid are Martin Luther's
[arguments] with which he wishes to topple the freedom
of the will from its throne.
42) Weakness of Human Nature

He quotes a passage from Genesis: "My spirit shall not
remain in man forever, since he is flesh" (Genesis 6,3).
Scripture understands by "flesh" here not simply a godless
passion, as Paul sometimes uses it when commanding the
mortification of the flesh,2 but rather the weakness of our
nature inclined towards sin, as Paul again implies when he
calls the Corinthians carnal, as little children in Christ,
with no capacity yet for solid doctrines.3
Moreover Jerome remarks in his Hebraic Questions4 that
the Hebrew differs from our Latin text, namely, "my spirit
will not judge these men in eternity, because they are
[merely] flesh." These words betray God's gentleness rather
than severity. "Flesh" refers to man, by nature weak and
inclined to evil. In turn God's wrath is called "spirit."
1
Here the reader will find a strong reliance on the Bishop of
Rochester, Fisher's treatment. Cf. chapter I, footnote 4.
2
Romans 8, 13.
3
1 Corinthians 3, 1 ff.
4
Cf. chapter II, footnote 1. The so-called Hebraic questions of
investigations are found in Jerome's De situ et nominibus hebrai-
corum, which is a translation of the Onomasticon of Eusebius, with
Jerome's additions and corrections.
61
Accordingly, God affirms he does not want to retain man

for eternal punishment, but rathertDut of mercy [he wants]
to punish him already here [on earth]. This utterance
refers not to all mankind, but only to the men of those days,
terribly corrupted by abominable vices. It states explicitly
"these men." God did not just refer to all men of those
days, because Noah, for example, was praised as a just man
agreeable to God.
43) Inclination to Evil

One can contradict in the same way [what Luther
quotes]: "The inclination of man's heart is evil from his
youth" (Genesis 8,21), and "Man's every thought and all
the inclination of his heart were only evil" (Genesis 6,5).
The tendency towards evil existing in most men does not
completely cancel out the freedom of the will, even when
one cannot overcome evil without the help of divine grace.
If, however, a change of mind depends never on the human
will, but everything is accomplished by God according to
some necessity, why has man then been granted a time
interval for doing penance? "His lifetime shall be one
hundred and twenty years" (Genesis 6,3). According to
Jerome's Hebraic Questions this passage refers not to the
lifetime of man, but to the time of the Great Flood. It was
offered to man, as~£i chance" of changing their minds, if they
wished to. Or if they did not wish to, to merit divine
punishment as a people contemptuous of the Lord's
leniency.
44) Forgiving Grace

Furthermore [Luther] quotes Isaias 40,2: "She hath
received of the Lord double for all her sins." Jerome inter-
prets this as referring to divine punishment and not the
forgiveness of sin. True, Paul says: "Where the offenses
have abounded, grace has abounded yet more" (Romans
5,20). It does not follow from this that before the reception
of sanctifying grace man cannot prepare himself with the
help of God and morally good works for the favor of divine
grace. We read of the centurion Cornelius, who was not
yet baptized nor filled with the Holy Spirit: "Thy prayers
and thy alms have gone up and have been remembered in
the sight of God" (Acts 10,4). If all works done before the
reception of the highest grace were evil, is it then evil works
that must gain God's favor for us?
45) Spirit and Flesh

From the same chapter in Isaias [Luther] also quotes
(Isaias 40,6-8):
All flesh is grace, and all glory thereof as the flower of the
field. The grass is withered, and the flower is fallen, be-
cause the spirit of the Lord has blown upon it . . . But the
Lord endureth forever.
It seems to me that this passage has been forced [by
Luther] to refer to grace and free will. Jerome maintains
that "spirit" signifies divine wrath, and "flesh" the natural
weakness of man, which has no power against God, and
"flower" the vainglory resulting from good luck in material
transactions. The Jews prided themselves in their temple,
their circumcision, their sacrifice,5 and the Greeks prided
themselves in their wisdom.6 Since, however, the wrath of
God has manifested itself in the Gospel, all this pride and
haughtiness has come to naught.
But man is not entirely flesh. There are, too, the soul and
the spirit by which we strive towards the honorable. This
part of the soul we call reason, or ^ye/Mw/cdv, i.e., the direc-
tive faculty. Or should one presume that philosophers did
not strive for the honorable, though they taught it to be
a thousand times better to suffer death than commit an
infamous action, even if we could know beforehand that
men would not notice and God would forgive it? But fallen
5
Romans 2, 17 ff.
6
nature judges often wrongly, as the Lord says, "You do not

know of what manner of spirit you are" (Luke 9, 55).7
It was just such an erroneous judgment when the dis-
ciples, desiring revenge, appealed to the story of Elias
requesting heavenly fire to consume two leaders with their
fifty men.8 Even in good men the human spirit is different
from God's Spirit, as Paul says: "The Spirit himself gives
testimony to our spirit that we are sons of God" (Romans
8,16). If someone wants to contend that even the most
distinguished human quality is nothing but flesh, i.e. a
godless disposition, it would be easy to agree, except that he
first prove this assertion from Scripture.
"That which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which
is born of the Spirit is spirit" (John 3,6). John teaches that
those who believe the Gospels are born of God (1 John 5,1)
and become children of God (John 1,12), yes, even gods
(John 10,34). And Paul distinguishes the carnal man who
does not understand the divine, from the spiritual who
judges everything rightly.9 And on another occasion he
speaks again of a new creature in Christ.10 If the entire
man, even the one reborn through faith, were nothing else
but flesh,11 where is the spirit born of Spirit, the fact of
being children of God, and the new creature? I wish to be
enlightened on that! Until then I like to appeal to the
authority of the Church Fathers who teach that certain
germinal concepts of the ethical good are within man by
7
This passage seems a good example of the Erasmian spirit of
common sense and conciliation. He wants to avoid the extremes
on either side of the controversy. He seems to be saying: man is
not all flesh; with his reason he can strive for many good things;
but reason is dimmed by the fallen nature of man; therefore man's
reason needs the enlightenment of God's Spirit. This is the burden
of the quotes from Luke and Paul.
8
Luke 9, 54.
9
1 Corinthians 2, 14 ff.
10
u
This is not precisely what Luther would say, but a typical ex-
ample of Renaissance liking for exaggeration. Though Erasmus
decries' this, he, too, falls prey to it at times.
his nature, and that he consequently recognizes and follows
in some way the ethical good, although coarser inclinations
are added, enticing him to the opposite.
Finally, the will capable of turning here and there is
generally called a free will, despite its more ready assent to
evil than to good, because of our remaining inclination to
sin. Yet no one is forced to do evil unless he consents.
46) Divine Guidance

Luther then quotes from Jeremiah: "I know, O Lord,
that the way of a man is not his; neither is it in a man to
walk, and to direct his steps" (Jeremiah 10,23). This per-
tains to the occurrence of happy and unhappy circum-
stances, rather than the possibility of a free will. Frequently
man plunges profoundly into misfortune, when he is very
careful to avoid it. This does not eliminate the freedom of
the will—neither among those hit by misfortune, because
they did not forsee its coming, nor among those causing it,
because they don't humiliate the enemy with the same
intention as does God, namely by castigating. If one none-
theless forces these words to apply to the freedom of the
will, everyone would have to admit that without the grace
of God nobody can keep the right course in life. Our daily
prayer is: "Lord, my God, make smooth thy way before
me" (Psalm 5,9). Nonetheless, we continue to strive with
all our strength. We pray: "Incline, O God, my heart to
thy precepts" (Psalm 118,36). Whoever begs for help does
not abandon his undertaking.
Furthermore [Luther] quotes: "It is the part of man to
prepare the soul and of the Lord to govern the tongue"
(Proverbs 16,1). [I say:] This also concerns what can
happen or does not happen, without him thereby loosing
eternal salvation. But how could man resolve this [freely]
in his heart, when Luther firmly maintains that everything
happens of necessity? In the same chapter it says: "Lay
open thy works to the Lord, and thy thoughts shall be
directed" (Proverbs 16,3).' It reads "thy works" and "thy
thoughts." Both words could not be said, if God works

everything in us, both good and evil. "By mercy and truth
iniquity is redeemed" (Proverbs 16,6). These and many
other passages from the Proverbs support the acceptance
of a free will.
Now, [Luther] quotes from the same chapter: "The
Lord hath made all things for himself; the wicked also for
the evil day" (Proverbs 16,4). [I answer: ] God has created
nothing evil by its nature. Nevertheless in his unfathomable
wisdom he turns all things, even evil, to our advantage and
to his glory. Even Lucifer was not created as the evil one,
but rather, since his voluntary defection, God set him aside
for eternal punishment, in order to train the pious ones by
his malice, and to punish the godless.
It does not become any more difficult when [Luther]
quotes: "As the divisions of waters, so the heart of the king
is in the hand of the Lord" (Proverbs 21,1). [I say:] The
one who guides does not necessarily force. Nonetheless, as
mentioned before, nobody denies that God could forcefully
influence the thinking capacity of man, expel his original
intentions and inculcate another, yes, even deprive him of
his intellect. But this does not change the fact that normally
speaking our wills are free.
If that is Solomon's opinion which Luther here interprets,
namely that all hearts are in the hand of the Lord, why
does he proclaim it to be something special with the heart
of a king? This passage agrees even more so with what we
read in Job 34,30: "Who maketh a man that is a hypocrite
to reign for the sons of the people?" The same in Isaias 3,4:
"And I will give children to be their princes, and the
effeminate shall rule over them." When God, propitious to
his people, inclines the heart of a king towards good, he
is not necessarily forcing the will. Instead, to incline [the
heart]to evil means that [God] offended by the sins of a
people, does not recall the soul of a foolish, rapacious,
warring and despotic prince [to come to his senses], but
permits him to be senselessly driven by his passions, in order
to castigate the people through [ the- king's Ljnalice. Should
it happen that God drives such a guilty king to evil, it
would be wrong to form a generalization from such a
special case.
Such proofs as Luther assembles then from the Proverbs
could be gathered in huge numbers. But this would serve
more their accumulation than their victory. Rhetoricians
generally throw such arguments about them. Most of the
time these can be applied conveniently to an interpretation
favorable to free will, or to one against it.
47) Nothing without Christ

Ludier considers Christ's saying in John 15,5: "Without
me you can do nothing," just as accurate a javelin as the
one Achilles used. In my opinion it is possible to respond
in more than one way. First, "unable to do" usually means
to be unable to reach what one strives for. This does not
exclude the possibility of the striver proceeding in some way
just the same. In this sense it is completely correct that we
can do nothing without Christ. He speaks of the evangelical
fruit which can be found only among those who abide in
the life on the vine, i.e. in Jesus Christ. Paul uses this mode
of speaking when he says: "So then neither he who plants
is anything, nor he who waters, but God who gives the
growth" (1 Corinthians 3,7). That which is considered of
little moment and is of no value is called "nothing." The
same: "[If I] do not have charity, I am nothing" (1 Corin-
thians 13,2). Followed by: ". . . it profits me nothing" (1
Corinthians 13,3), and again: "He calls things that are not
as though they were" (Romans 4,17). Once more, he calls,
according to Osee, those who are not his people, despised
and rejected ones.12 A similar mode of expression is con-
tained in the Psalms: "I am a worm and not a man"
(Psalm 21,7).
If one were to press this expression "nothing," then it
would not be possible to sin without Christ. I believe Christ
means here his grace, if one does not want to escape to an
" Romans 9, 25 ff quoting Osee 1, 9 and 2, 24.
already discarded [view] that sin is nothing [real]. Yet

even this [not being without Christ] is in a sense correct,
since without Christ we would neither be here, nor live, nor
move. [My opponents] grant that sometimes the free will
without grace is capable of sin. Even Luther has held this
at the beginning of his Assertio.
VII
POSTSCRIPT ON APPARENT
PROOFS AGAINST THE FREE
WILL
48) Reasonable Interpretation of Additional Passages1
Here belong the words of John the Baptist "No one can
receive anything unless it is given to him from heaven"
(John 3,27). Hence it does not follow that we lack the
faculty or use of free will. The fact that fire warms us,
comes from heaven; the fact that we seek by a natural
impulse the useful and avoid the harmful, comes from
heaven; the fact that after sin the will is excited to better
efforts comes from heaven; the fact that we can obtain
grace pleasing to God through our tears, almsgiving and
prayers, comes from heaven. In the meantime our will is
not inactive, even if man can reach the goal of his striving
only with the final assistance of grace. But since it is a
minimum which we contribute, the entire affair is attrib-
uted to God. Just as a mariner steering his ship safely
through a heavy storm into port does not say, "I have saved
my ship," but rather "God has saved it." Nevertheless his
art and zeal were not idle. Similarly, a farmer does not say
when taking a rich harvest into his barn, "I have produced
this year's rich harvest," but rather "God has given it."
Who would say, however, that the farmer has contributed
1
This refers to the passage on grace (John 3, 27), God speak-
ing through men (Matthew 10, 20), the pulling power of grace
(John 6, 44), thinking in God, but living in man (2 Corinthians
3, 5), and the origin of all good to be found in God (1 Corin-
thians 4, 7).
69
nothing to the prospering of the fruits of the earth? Among

common sayings are these: God has given you beautiful
children, though their father has helped to generate them;
God restored my health, though the doctor helped along;
the king has overcome his enemies, though generals and
soldiers have contributed their good share. Nothing can
grow, if heaven does not send the rain. Nevertheless, good
soil produces good fruits, while bad soil can produce no
good fruits. But since human endeavor alone accomplishes
nothing without divine help, everything is attributed to
divine benefaction. "Unless the Lord build the house, they
labor in vain who build it. Unless the Lord guard the city,
the guards watch in vain" (Psalms 126,1). In the meantime
the builders and the guards do not cease in their building
and in their vigilance.
Furthermore in Matthew 10,20: "For it is not you who
are speaking, but the Spirit of your Father who speaks
through you." This passage seems at first sight to annul the
freedom of the will. But in fact it wants to free us from
distressing anxiety, when premeditating on what to say in
behalf of Christ, Otherwise it would be a sin, if preachers
were to prepare themselves carefully for their sacred
sermons. Not everyone should expect that, because the
Spirit once inspired uncouth disciples, he too would be able
to preach as if he had been given the gift of tongues. This
may have happened once, nonetheless [the recipient] had
to conform his will to the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, and
acted together with him. This is obviously the duty of the
free will. Or should we assume that God has spoken to us
through the mouth of the Apostles, as he did with Balaam
through the mouth of a donkey?2
A passage from John could drive us further into the
corner: "No one can come to me unless the Father who
sent me draw him" (John 6,44). The word "draw" seems
to point to necessity and exclude the free will. But actually
it is a nonviolent drawing. It causes a person to want a
2
Numbers 22, 23 ff.
thing just as readily as he can refuse it. And as we show a
little boy an apple and he comes running; a sheep a willow
twig and it follows, so God moves our soul by his grace and
we give ourselves willingly.
In the same way is to be understood what John says:
"No one conies to the Father but through me" (John 14,6).
As the father glorifies the son, and the son the father, so the
father draws [us humans] to the son, and the son to the
father. Yet we are drawn in such a way that we soon run
willingly. Thus we read: "Draw me: we will run after
thee" (Canticles 1,3).
In the Pauline letters there are also passages which seem
to destroy completely any influence of the free will. "Not
that we are sufficient of ourselves to think anything, as from
ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God" (2 Corinthians
3,5). One can save the free will in two ways here.
First, several orthodox [Church] Fathers distinguished
three steps in human action: (1) thinking, (2) willing and
(3) doing. In the first and third steps they attributed no
operation to the free will. Grace alone causes our Spirit to
think good things; by grace alone is he guided to carry out
the thought. But in the middle step, i.e., the willingness,
both grace and human will are effective. The main cause
is grace, and the secondary one our will. Since the whole is
attributed to the one who has executed all things, it is
improper of man to claim a good action for himself, since
even the fact that he consented and cooperated with divine
grace, is God's gift.
Secondly, the preposition "from" points to the origin and
source, and therefore Paul distinctly states "of ourselves" as
"from ourselves," i.e., "out of ourselves."3 This could also
be said by someone who admits man to be able to effect
good by natural powers, since he does not possess these of
himself either.
For who would deny that all good has its origin in God
3
Erasmus distinguishes in his text a nobis from ex nobis, Paul
using the former, by explaining with the Greek d<£' eavrwv ws e£
iavTwv.
72 DISCOURSE ON FREE WILT-
as a source? Paul inculcates this, in order to deprive us of

our arrogance and overconfidence, as also when he says:
"What hast thou that thou hast not received? And if thou
hast received it, why dost thou boast as if thou hast not
received it?" (1 Corinthians 4,7). You hear vainglory being
restrained in this saying. This is what the servant, too,
would hear who accounted to his master for the profit made
on usury.4 If he attributed to himself his well-invested
labors, [the master may ask] what have you received that
you did not possess? And nevertheless, the master praises
him tor his untiring strenuous efforts.
The same song is sung in James 1,17: "Every good gift
and every perfect gift is from above," and Paul in Ephesians
1,11: "Him who works all things according to the counsel
of his will." These words aim at this that we should not
arrogate anything to us, but attribute everything to the
grace of God who has called us while we turned away from
him, has cleansed us through faith, and who has also
granted that our will can cooperate with his grace, although
the latter by itself would be completely sufficient and in
no need of any help coming from the human will.
49) To Rule and to Effect

The passage in Philippians 2,13, "For it is God who of
his own good pleasure works in you both the will and the
performance," does not exclude the free will. If you relate
"of his good pleasure" to man, as Ambrose of Milan does,
you'll understand that the good will cooperates with the
effective grace. Just before (Philippians 2,12) we read:
"Work out your salvation with fear and trembling." One
can conclude from this that both God works in us, and that
our will and effort strive solicitously with God. Nobody
should have to reject this interpretation, because, as stated,
immediately preceding is the passage "work out your salva-
tion"—£pya£ea0e, which signifies more correctly "to toil,"
than the word evepyea-, which is attributed to God, God
* Matthew 25, 20 ff.
being 6 evepyw, the one who effects and rules. But evepyei
refers to that which effects and impels. But even granted
that both ruling and effecting mean the same, this passage
teaches us clearly that both God and man work.
What could man effect if our will were the same for God
as the clay for the potter? "For it is not you who are speak-
ing, but the spirit of your father who speaks through you"
(Matthew 10,20) .5 This was said to the Apostles. Neverthe-
less we read in the Acts: "Then Peter, filled with the Holy
Spirit, said to them" (Acts 4,8). How could the two contra-
dictory statements be reconciled, according to which not
man, but the Spirit speaks, and accordingly to which Peter
speaks filled with the Holy Spirit, unless the Spirit speaks
in the Apostles in such a manner that at one and the same
time while speaking obediently to the Spirit it is also true
that they do not speak, not in the sense of not acting [i.e.,
making speech], but in the sense that they are not the first
cause of their sermons.
We also read about Stephen: "And they were not able
to withstand the wisdom and the spirit who spoke" (Acts
6,10). And yet he himself spoke before the Sanhedrin.
Paul says: "It is now no longer I that live, but Christ
lives in me" (Galatians 2,20), and nevertheless, according
to Paul the just man lives by faith (Romans 1,17). How
is it that he does not live, when he is living? Because he as-
cribes it to the Spirit of God that he is living.
Equally: "Yet not I, but the grace of God within me"
(1 Corinthians 15,10). If Paul had done nothing, why did
he state before that he has done something? Not only that,
he even said: "In fact I have labored more than many
of them" (1 Corinthians 15,10). If it is true what he says,
why does he correct this, as if he had spoken incorrectly?
The correction obviously does not intend that one should
think he had done nothing, but he wanted to avoid the
appearance of having attributed to his own strength what
he had accomplished with the help of divine grace. The
5
Cf. Erasmus, Section 48.
correction aimed at the suspicion of insolence and not at

the possibility of cooperation in action.
God does not want man to attribute everything to him-
self, not even when he merits it. "When you have done
everything that was commanded you, say "we are un-
profitable servants: we have done what it was our duty to
do1" (Luke 17,10). Would he not distinguish himself who
keeps all the commandments of God? I do not know
whether such a man can be found anywhere. And yet,
those who might accomplish this are told to say "we are
unworthy servants." Nobody denies their accomplishments;
rather are they taught to avoid dangerous arrogance.
Man says one thing, God another. Man says he is a
servant, an unworthy one at that. What does God say?
"Well done, good servant" (Luke 19,17); "No longer do
I call you servants, but friends" (John 15,15). He calls
them "brethren" (John 20,17) instead of "servants." And
those who call themselves unworthy servants, God calls his
sons.6 And indeed those who have just called themselves
servants God summons: "Gome, blessed of my Father"
(Matthew 25,34), and they hear of their good deed, of
which they themselves knew nothing.
I believe it to be an excellent key to the understanding
of Holy Scriptures, if we pay attention to what is meant
in each passage. Once one recognizes this, one will find it
proper to select from the parables and examples such as
are to the point. In the parable of the steward, who about
to be relieved of his post, falsifies the notes of his master's
debtors, there is much that does not add to the sense of the
parable.7 Only this can be gathered from it, that everyone
should strive to distribute most freely, thereby aiding his
neighbor, the gifts he has received from God, before death
overtake him.
The same concerns the parable we just mentioned above:
• Romans 9, 26.
7
Luke 16, 1-9.
But which of you is there, having a servant plowing or
tending sheep, who will say to him on his return from the
field, "Come at once and recline at table!" But will he not
say to him, "Prepare my supper, and gird thyself and serve
me till I have eaten and drunk; and afterwards thou thy-
self shall eat and drink?" Does he thank that servant for
doing what he commanded him? I do not think so.
The sum total of this parable is that one ought simply
to obey the commandments of God and do zealously one's
duty without claiming any praise for it.
Otherwise the Lord himself dissents from this parable
when he gives himself as a servant, while granting his dis-
ciples the honor of reclining at table.8 He also expresses
thanks when he exclaims: "Well done good servants"
(Luke 19,17), and "Gome blessed" (Matthew 25,34).
Thus, he is not saying: "The Lord will judge you unworthy
of grace, unprofitable servants, after you have done every-
thing," but rather says: "You say, we are unprofitable
servants" (Luke 17,10). Paul who worked more than all
the rest calls himself the least among the Apostles and
unworthy to be called Apostle.9
Similarly: "Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing?
And yet not one of them will fall to the ground without
your Father's leave" (Matthew 10,29). First we must bear
in mind what the Lord is discussing. He does not wish to
teach the so-called forced necessity of all happenings. His
example aims rather at taking from his disciples their fear
of men. They should realize that they stand under God's
protection, and that no man can harm them without his
permission. This he will only do if it furthers them and
the gospel. Paul says: "Is it for the oxen that God has
care?" (1 Corinthians 9,9). Obviously the subsequent re-
marks of the Evangelist contain an hyperbole, i.e. an ora-
torical exaggeration, "As for you, the very hairs of your
head are all numbered" (Matthew 10,30). How much
8
John 13, 4 ff.
9
hair falls daily to the ground; is it also counted? So, what

is the purpose of this hyperbole? Obviously that which
follows it, "Therefore, do not be afraid" (Matthew 10,21).
Just as these modes of expression have the purpose to
remove the fear of man and to strengthen his trust in God,
without whose providence nothing happens, so the above
quotations do not purport to abolish the free will, but to
deter us from arrogance which the Lord hates. The best is
to attribute everything to the Lord. He is mild and will
not only give what is ours, but also that which belongs to
him.
How could one state that the prodigal son10 had squan-
dered his portion of the property, if he never had a part
of it in his hands? What he possessed he had received
from the father. We too acknowledge that all the gifts of
nature are gifts of God. He possessed his portion even at
the time his father has still retained it in his hands and
indeed possessed it more securely. What does it mean that
he demanded his portion and separated himself from his
father? Obviously it means that man claims title for him-
self to the gifts of nature, and does not use them to fulfill
God's commandments, but to satisfy his carnal desires.
What is the meaning of this hunger? It means an affliction
by which God goads on the sinner's disposition to know
and to abhor himself, and to undertake the desired return
to the father. What signifies the son speaking to himself,
planning to confess and to return home? It signifies the
will of man turning towards grace, which has stimulated
him, and which, as stated, one calls the prevenient one.11
What signifies the father who hastens to meet his son? He
signifies the grace of God which furthers our will, so that
we can accomplish that which we wish.
This interpretation, even if it were my own invention,
would certainly be more probable than that of my oppo-
nents who interpret "stretch forth thy hand to which thou
10
11
Cf. Luke 15, 11 f.
Cf. chapter III, footnote 3 and 11.
wilt" (Ecclesiasticus 15,17) to mean, "the grace of God
stretches out your hand at will," only in order to "prove"
that the will of man can accomplish nothing.12 Since my
interpretation, however, is handed down from the orthodox
Fathers, I do not see why one should despise it. This per-
tains also to the poor widow placing her two mites, i.e.,
her entire property, into the treasury.13
I ask, what merit can he gain who owes completely
to him from whom he received these forces all he is able
to do by his natural intelligence and free will? Nevertheless,
God credits us precisely with this that we do not turn our
hearts away from his grace, and that we concentrate our
natural abilities on simple obedience. This proves at least
that man can accomplish something, but that nevertheless
he ascribes the sum total of all his doings to God, who is
the author whence orginates man's ability to unite his
striving to God's grace. This is what Paul means, when
he says: "By the grace of God I am what I am" (1 Cor-
inthians 15,10). He recognizes the author. But when you
hear, "His grace has not been fruitless" (ibid.), then you
recognize the human will, whose striving cooperates with
divine help. The same is indicated when it says: "Not I,
but the grace of God with me" (ibid.). For in Greek it is
f) avv ifioi.
And the Hebrew prophet of wisdom wished that divine
wisdom assist him; standing at his side and working with
him.14 She assists as a moderator and helper, like an archi-
tect supporting his assistant, ordering what is to be done,
showing the correct method. If he commences to do some-
thing wrongly, she will recall him, and as soon as he fails,
she hastens to his aid. The work is ascribed to the architect,
without whose help nothing could have been accomplished.
Nevertheless nobody would say, that helpers and appren-
tices have no share in the work whatsoever. What the
architect is for the apprentice, grace is for our will.
12
Cf. Erasmus, Section 41.
18
Mark 12, 41 ff.
" Wisdom 9, 10.
Therefore Paul says. "In like manner the Spirit also

helps our weakness" (Romans 8,26). One does not call
another weak who can do nothing, but one whose strength
is insufficient for completing his undertaking. Nor is he
called a helper who does everything alone. All Scripture
exclaims: help, aid, assistance and support. But who could
be designated as helper unless he helped one doing some-
thing? The potter does not "help" the clay in the forming
of a vessel, nor the carpenter his axe in the making of a
bench.
50) Free Will and Good Works Made Possible through

Grace
We oppose those who conclude like this: "Man is unable
to accomplish anything unless God's grace helps him.
Therefore there are no good works of man." We propose
the rather more acceptable conclusion: Man is able to
accomplish all things, if God's grace aids him. Therefore
it is possible that all works of man be good.
As many passages as there are in Holy Scripture men-
tioning [God's] help, as many are there establishing the
freedom of the will. These passages are innumerable. I
would have won already, if it depended on the mere
number of proofs.
VIII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

51) Need for a Moderate Opinion
Up to now we have been compiling scriptural passages
establishing the freedom of the will, while conversely others
seem to cancel it out completely. Since the Holy Spirit,
who inspired both, can not contradict himself, we are
forced, whether we like it or not, to seek a more moderate
opinion.
When one has arrived at this view, others at that view,
both reading the same Scripture, it is due to the fact that
each looked for something else and interpreted that which
he read for his own purpose. Whoever pondered the great
religious indifference of man and the great danger of
despairing of salvation, has, while trying to avert this calam-
ity, succumbed unsuspectingly to another danger, and has
ascribed too much to the free will. The others instead—
who considered how enormously dangerous for true piety
the trust of man in his own prowess and merits can be,
and how unbearable the arrogance of certain persons is
who boast of their good works and sell them to others
according to measurement and weight like selling oil and
soap—having very studiously avoided this danger, have
either diminished the freedom of the will so that it could
contribute absolutely nothing to good works, or they have
eliminated it all together by introducing an absolute neces-
sity in all happenings.
79
52) Some Reformers3 Views Justified

Evidently these people considered it quite apt for the
simple obedience of a Christian that man depend com-
pletely on the will of God when he places his entire trust
and all his hopes in his promises; when he, conscious of
his own wretchedness, admires and loves his immense
mercy which he gives us plentifully without charge; when
he, furthermore, subjects himself completely to his will, no
matter whether he wants to save or destroy him; when he
accepts no praise whatsover for his good works, and rather
ascribes all glory to His grace, thinking that man is nothing
else but a living tool of the divine Spirit, which the latter
has cleansed and sanctified for himself through his un-
deserved goodness, and which he guides and governs
according to his inscrutable wisdom; furthermore, when
there exists nothing anybody could claim as his own accom-
plishment, and when he hopes for eternal life as reward
for steadfast faith in God, not because he had earned it
by his own good works, but because the goodness of God
was pleased to promise that reward to those who have
trust in him; whereby, consequently, man has the duty to
beg God assiduously for imparting and augmenting his
Spirit in us, to thank him for every success and to adore
in all cases God's omnipotence, to admire everywhere his
wisdom, and to love everywhere his goodness.
These utterances are also very praiseworthy to me, be-
cause they agree with Holy Scripture. They conform to
the creed of those who died once and for all to this world,
through their baptism have been buried with Christ, and
after the mortification of the flesh live henceforth with the
Spirit of Jesus, into whose body they have been ingrafted,
through faith.1 This is incontestably a pious and captivating
conception, which takes from us every conceit, which trans-
fers all glory and confidence to Christ, which expels from
us the fear of men and demons, and which, though making
1
Meant is the Mystical Body of Christ, Cf. Romans 6, 4.
us distrustful of our human potentialities, makes us none-
theless strong and courageous in God. This we applaud
freely, up to the point of exaggeration [which we want to
avoid].
53) Errors and Injustice in the Reformers

But the rational soul in me has many doubts when I
hear the following: there is no merit in man; all his
works, even the pious ones, are sin; our will can do no
more than the clay in the potters hand; everything we do
or want to do is reduced to unconditional necessity.
First, why do you read so often that the saints, rich in
good work, have acted with justice, have walked upright
in the sight of God, never deviating to the right or to the
left, if everything is sin, even what the most pious does
-—[in fact] such a sin that one for whom Christ has died
would nonetheless be condemned to inferno, were it not
for God's mercy?
Secondly, why does one so often hear of reward, if there
is no merit it all? How would disobedience of those follow-
ing God's commandments be praised, and disobedience be
damned? Why does Holy Scripture so frequently mention
judgment, if merit cannot be weighed at all? Or why must
we stand before the seat of judgment if nothing has hap-
pened according to our will, but everything according to
mere necessity? It is disturbing to think of all the many
admonitions, commandments, threats, exhortations and
complaints, if we can do nothing, but God's unchangeable
will causes the willing as well as the carrying out in us.
He wants us to pray perseveringly. He wants us to watch,
to fight and to struggle for the reward of eternal life. Why
does he continuously want to be asked, when he has al-
ready decided whether to give us or not to give us, and
when he himself, unchangeable, is unable to change his
resolutions? Why does he command us to strive laboriously
for what he has decided to give freely? God's grace fights
and triumphs in us when we are afflicted, ejected, derided,
tortured and killed. Such atrocities the martyrs suffered.

Nonetheless [such a martyr] is to have no merit. Indeed,
it is called a sin, if he submits his body to tortures, in the
hope of heavenly life. But why would an exceedingly merci-
ful God wish to be thus engaged with his martyrs? Gruel
would appear a man if he did not give, unless having
tortured to despair, that which he had [already] decided
to bestow freely upon his friend.
Perhaps, as soon as one confronts this obscurity in the
divine decision, one ought to adore that which we are not
supposed to comprehend, so that man says, "he is the Lord,
he can do everything he wishes, and since he is by nature
good, everything he wills can only be very good." It is still
plausible enough to say that God crowns his gifts in us;
he permits his benefits to be our advantage; he deigns with
undeserved goodness to attribute to us what he has caused
in us, well deserved, as it were, if we trust in him, and in
order to obtain immortality. But I don't know how those
can be consistent who exaggerate God's mercy towards the
pious in such a way as to permit him to be almost cruel
against the others.
A goodness which imputes to us its excellence might pos-
sibly be tolerable to a pious soul. But it is difficult to ex-
plain how it is compatible with justice (not to speak with
mercy), to condemn the others, in whom God did not
deign to cause good, to eternal tortures, although on their
own they could not possibly effect any good, since they
either possessed no free will, or only one good for sinning.
54) Two Illustrative Stones

If a king were to give enormous booty to one who had
done nothing in a war, and to those who had done the
fighting barely just their salary, he could respond to the
murmuring soldiers: am I injuring you by giving the others
freely and gratuitously? But really, how could one consider
him just and gentle, if he crowned magnificently for his
victory a general whom he had furnished with machines,
troops, money and all supplies aplenty for war, while an-
other, whom he had thrown into war without armaments,
he ordered put to death on account of the war's unhappy
ending? Before dying, could he not say with justice to the
king: why do you punish me for what happened through
your fault? If you had equipped me similarly, I would have
won too.
Again, if a lord emancipates an undeserving servant,
he can answer the remaining grumbling servants: You lose
nothing if I am kind to this one; you still have your
measure. Everybody would judge the lord cruel and unjust
though, were he -to have his servant flogged for his stature,
or protruding nose, or some other lack of elegance. Would
he not be justified in complaining against the lord who
had him flogged: why should I suffer punishment for
something that is not in my power to change? And he
would be quite justified in saying this if it were in the
lord's power to change the defects of the servant's body,
just as it is in the hand of God to change our will. Or if
the lord had given the servant that which now offends him,
like cutting off his nose, or hideously deforming his face
with scars, just as God, according to the opinion of some,
has worked all evil in us. Or take the example of a lord
giving orders to do a great deal to a servant lying in
chains, "go here, do that, run, come back," and threatens
him greatly if he were not to obey. But [the lord] did not
set [the servant] loose, rather he flogged the disobedient
fellow. Would not the servant justly consider the lord in-
sane and cruel, if he had him flogged to death because he
had not done that which was not in his power?
55) Reservations Concerning Justification by Faith

[Let us continue:] In this affair they greatly exalt faith
and love of God. We hold these equally dear. We are
convinced that the life of Christians is so contaminated
with wickedness, stemming from nothing else but from the
coldness and drowsiness of our faith which is a superficial
belief in words, while, according to Paul, he is justified

who within his heart believes. I do not especially want to
quarrel with those who attribute everything to faith as the
fountainhead, although it seems to me that faith and love,
and love and faith come about and nurture each other
mutually. Certainly faith is nurtured by love, as the flame
in a lamp is nurtured by the oil. For we have greater faith
in him whom we love dearly. There is no scarcity of voices
who, more correctly, take faith as the beginning of sal-
vation and not its sum total. But we don't want to argue
about that.
56) Exaggerating and Underrating

But care should be taken not to deny the freedom of the
will, while praising faith. For if this happens, there is no
telling how the problem of divine justice and mercy could
be solved.
The ancients could not explain such difficulties. Some
felt compelled to assume two gods: one for the Old Testa-
ment, who was able to be only just, but not simultaneously
merciful, and one for the New Testament, who could only
be merciful, but not just. This godless idea Tertullian has
sufficiently refuted.2 Mani, as already mentioned,3 fancied
two natures in man, one which is incapable of not sinning,
and one incapable of not doing good. Pelagius, who was
concerned about God's justice, attributed more to free will
than to necessity. Not too distant from this position are the
[Scotists] who ascribe to human will at least the ability to
earn with natural powers through ethically good works that
highest grace, by which we are justified. They seem to me
to be inviting man to strive by affirming good hope in
obtaining salvation. Also Cornelius by giving alms and by
praying* has merited being instructed by Peter, like Philip
2
Found in Tertullian's largest extant work, Adversus Marcionem
(c. 207). Cf. chapter II, footnote 1.
3
Gf. chapter II, footnote 2.
4
Acts 10, 4 f.
5
instructed the [Ethiopian] eunuch. When Augustine
searched zealously for Christ in the Epistles of Paul, he
deserved finding him. Here we could state, in order to
assuage those who permit man no possibility for any good
unless indebted to God, that we owe our entire life work
to God, without whom we could accomplish nothing; fur-
thermore, that the free will contributes very little to an
effect; finally, that it is also a work of divine grace that
we can turn our heart to the things of salvation and co-
operate with grace. Augustine gained a more unfavorable
view of the free will, because of his fight with Pelagius than
he had held before. Luther, on the other hand, who at
first attributed something to the free will, has come to
deny it completely in the heat of his defense. Thus Ly-
curgus was criticized by the Greeks because in his hatred
of drunkenness he ordered the vines cut down,6 whereas
by adding a little more water to the wine drunkenness
would have been avoided without losing the use of wine.
57) Human Nature and Salvation

In my opinion the free will could have been so defined
as to avoid overconfidence in our merits and the other
disadvantages which Luther shuns, as well as to avoid such
as we recited above, and still not lose the advantages which
Luther admires. This, it seems to me, is accomplished by
those who attribute everything to the pulling by grace
which is the first to excite our spirit, and attribute only
something to human will in its effort to continue and not
withdraw from divine grace. But since all things have three
parts, a beginning, a continuation and an end, grace is
attributed to the two extremities, and only in continuation
does the free will effect something. Two causes meet in
this same work, the grace of God and the human will, grace
6
Acts 8, 26 ff.
6
Lycurgus (9th century B.C.), Spartan lawgiver. Seems a con-
fusion with Domitian. See Suetonius, Lives of the Caesars, Domi-
tian, VII, 2.
being the principal cause and will a secondary, since it is

impotent without the principal cause, while the latter has
sufficient strength by itself. Thus, while the fire burns
through its natural strength, the principal cause is still
God, who acts through the fire. God alone would indeed
suffice, and without Him fire could not burn. Due to this
combination, man must ascribe his total salvation to divine
grace, since it is very little that the free will can effect,
and even that comes from divine grace which has at first
created free will and then redeemed and healed it. Thus
are placated, if they can be placated, those who will not
tolerate that man has some good which he does not owe
to God. He owes this also to God, but in another way and
under another title. Just as an inheritance coming in equal
share to the children, is not called a benevolence, because
it belongs by common law to all. If beyond this common
right a donation is made to this or that child, it is called
liberality. But children owe gratitude to their parents also
under the title of their inheritance.
I will try to express in parables what we have been
saying. Even the healthy eye of a man does not see in the
darkness, and when it is blinded, it does not see anything
in light either. Thus the will can do nothing, though free,
if withdrawing from grace. But the one with good eyes can
close his eyes before the light and see nothing. He can also
turn his eyes away. They will not see what he could have
seen. The one with blind eyes owes his gratitude in the
first place to God, and only then to the doctor. Before
sinning our eyes were healthy. Sin has ruined them. Who-
ever sees, what can he pride himself in? He can impute to
himself his cautious closing and turning away of the eyes.
Listen to another parable. A father raises his child, which
is yet unable to walk, which has fallen and which exerts
himself, and shows him an apple, placed in front of him.
The boy likes to go and get it, but due to his weak bones
would soon have fallen again, if the father had not sup-
ported him by his hand and guided his steps. Thus the
child comes, led by the father, to the apple which the
father places willingly into his hand, like a reward for his
walking. The child could not have raised itself without
the father's help; would not have seen the apple without
the father's showing; would not have stepped forward
without the father's helping his weak little steps; would
not have reached the apple without the father's placing it
into his hand. What can the child claim for himself? Yet,
he did do something, but he must not glory in his own
strength, since he owes everything to the father.
Let us assume it is the same with God. What does the
child do? As the boy is being helped up, he makes an
effort and tries to accommodate his weak steps to the
father's guidance. The father could have pulled him against
his will. A childish whim could have refused the apple.
The father could have given the apple without his running,
but he would rather give it in this manner, because it is
better for the boy. I readily admit that our striving con-
tributes less to the gaining of eternal life, than the boy's
running at the hand of his father.
58) Criticism of Carlstadt: Grace and Freedom like

Soul and Body
Here we saw how little is attributed to the freedom of
the will. Nevertheless to some it still seems too much. They
want only grace to act in us, and want our will only to
suffer [passively], like a tool of the Divine Spirit, so that
the good can, under no circumstances, be called ours, unless
divine goodness imputes it to us freely. Grace is effective
in us not through the free will, but within free will, just as
[they say] the causality of the potter is within the clay
and not through it.
Whence comes then the mention of the crown and the
reward? It is said that God crowns his gifts in us, and
orders that his favor be our reward. Whatever he has
effected in us, he gives, in order to make us worthy of part-
nership in his celestial kingdom. Here I don't see how they
define a free will which effects nothing. For, if they said
that moved by grace it acts simultaneously, it would be

easier to explain. Just as according to the natural philoso-
phers our body obtains its first movements from the soul,
without which it could not move at all, yet it not only does
move, but also moves other things, and just as a partner
of work participates also in its honor. If God so works in
us as the potter on the clay, what good or evil could be
imputed to us? For, we must not bring into this discussion
the soul of Jesus Christ, who too was a tool of the Divine
Spirit. And if the weakness of the body stands in the way
of man meriting anything, so [Christ] before his death was
terrified: he wished that not his will, but that of the
Father be done.7 And nonetheless they acknowledge this
[will] to be the fountain of merit, though depriving all
other saints of all the merit of their good works.
59) Addressed to Luther

Those who deny any freedom of the will and affirm abso-
lute necessity, admit that God works in man not only the
good works, but also evil ones. It seems to follow that inas-
much as man can never be the author of good works, he
can also never be called the author of evil ones. This opin-
ion seems obviously to attribute cruelty and injustice to
God, something religious ears abhor vehemently. (He
would no longer be God if anything vicious and imperfect
were met in him). Nonetheless those holding such an im-
plausible view have an answer: He is God; He is able to
do only the best and most beautiful. If you observe the
fittingness of the universe, even what is evil in itself, is good
in it and illustrates the glory of God. No creature can
adjudge the Creator's intentions. Man must subject him-
self completely to them. In fact, if it pleases God to damn
this or that one, nobody must grumble, but accept what
pleases him, and be convinced that he does everything for
the best. What would come of it if man were to ask God
why he did not make him an angel? Wouldn't God answer
7
Matthew 26, 39.
rightly: you impudent one! If I had made you a frog, could
you then complain? The same, if the frog disputes with
God: why have you not made me a peacock, conspicuous
for its multicolored feathers? Would not God be justified
in saying: ungrateful one! I could have made you a fungus
or a bulb, but now you jump, drink and sing. Again, if a
basilisk or snake were to say: why have you made me a
deadly animal hated by all, and not a sheep? What would
God answer? Doubtlessly he would say: I like it this way.
It suits the decoration and order of the universe. You have
suffered as little injury as all the flies, gnats and other
insects. Each I have fashioned to appear as a miracle for
him who contemplates it. And a spider, is she not a beau-
tiful animal, even if different from the elephant? Truly,
there is a greater miracle in the spider than in the elephant.
Are you not satisfied in being a perfect animal in your
kind? Poison was not given to you to kill others with, but
to protect yourself and your little ones. Just as oxen have
horns, lions have claws, wolves teeth, horses hoofs. Every
animal has its utility. The horse bears burdens, the ox
plows, the donkey and dog help at work, the sheep serves
man for food and clothing, and you are needed for making
medicine.
60) Further Exaggeration and Difficulties

But let us cease reasoning with those devoid of reason.
We began our disputation with man, created in the image
and likeness of God, and for whose pleasure He created
all things. We note that some are born with healthy bodies
and good minds, as though born for virtue, again others
with monstrous bodies and horrible sickness, others so stupid
that they almost have fallen to the level of brute animals,
some even more brutish than the brutes, others so disposed
toward disgraceful passions, that it seems a strong fate is
impelling them, others insane and possessed by the devils.
How will we explain the question of God's justice and
mercy in such cases? Shall we say with Paul: "O the
QO DISCOURSE ON FREE WILL
depth . . ." (Romans 11,33)? I think this would be better

than to judge with impious rashness God's decisions, which
man cannot explore. And truly, it is even more difficult to
explain how God crowns his favors in some with immortal
life, and punishes his misdeeds in others with eternal suffer-
ing. In order to defend such a paradox they resort to other
paradoxes and to maintain the battle against their adver-
sary. They immensely exaggerate original sin which sup-
posedly has corrupted even the most excellent faculties of
human nature, makes man incapable of anything, save only
ignoring and hating JDod, and not even after grace and
justification by faith can he effect any work which wouldn't
be sin. They make that inclination to sin in us, remaining
after the sin of our first parents, an invincible sin in itself,
so that not one divine precept exists which even a man
justified by faith could possibly keep. All the command-
ments of God have supposed no other purpose than to
amplify the grace of God, which, irrespective of merit,
grants salvation.
However, they seem to me to minimize God's mercy in
one place, in order to enlarge it elsewhere, in the same
manner, as one placing parsimoniously before his guests a
very small breakfast, in order to make dinner appear more
splendidly; or just as imitating a painter who darkens that
[part of a canvas] which will be closest to the spot he
wishes to be emitting the light in the picture.
At first they make God almost cruel, who, because of
somebody else's sin, rages against all mankind, cruel espe-
cially since those who sinned have done penance and were
punished severely as long as they lived. Secondly, when
they say that even those justified by faith can do nothing
but sin, so that loving and trusting God we deserve God's
hatred and disfavor: doesn't this diminish divine grace that
man justified by faith can still do nothing else but sin?
Moreover, while God has burdened man with so many
commandments which have no effect other than to make
him hate God more and make his damnation more severe,
does this not make God a harsher tyrant than even Dio-
nysius of Sicily, who zealously issued many laws which, as
he suspected, would not be observed by the multitude,
unless strictly enforced? At first he closed his eyes to this,
but soon, seeing that almost everybody transgressed in some
way, began to call them to account, rendering them all
punishable. And yet, God's laws were such that they could
have easily been observed if only men had wanted to do so.
I do not want to investigate now, why they teach it to
be impossible for us to keep all of God's commandments,
for that is not our purpose here. We wish to show how
they, by eagerly enlarging grace on account of salvation,
have actually obscured it in others. I do not see how such
[views] can endure. They liquidate the freedom of the
will and teach that man is driven by the Spirit of Christ
whose nature cannot bear fellowship with sin. At the same
time, they say man does nothing but sin after having
received grace.
Luther seems to enjoy such exaggerations. He pushes
other people's exaggerations even further, driving out bad
knots with worse wedges, as the saying goes. Some had dar-
ingly advanced another exaggeration, selling not only their
own, but also the merits of all the saints. What kind of
works [is meant]: songs, chanting the psalms, [eating of]
fishes, fasting, dressing [simply], titles? Thus Luther drove
one nail through with another, when he said the saints had
no merits whatsoever, and that the works of even the most
pious men were sin and would adduce eternal damnation
if faith and divine mercy had not come to the rescue. The
other side was making a considerable profit with confession
and reparation. Human conscience was thereby exceedingly
entangled. Likewise, all kinds of strange things were related
concerning purgatory. The opponents [i.e. Luther] correct
these mistakes by saying confession is the Devil's invention,
and should not be required, and they think no satisfaction
is necessary for sin, because Christ has atoned for the sin
of all; and think there is no purgatory. One side goes so
far as to say that the orders of any prior of a monastery
are binding under pain of hell, while they have no scruples
in promising eternal life to those who obey them. The

opponents answer this exaggeration by saying that all the
orders of popes, councils and bishops are heretical and
anti-Christian. The one side exalts papal power in an exag-
gerated way, the other side speaks of the pope such that I
do not dare to repeat it. Again, one side says the vows of
monks and priests fetter man forever under punishment
of hell, the others say such vows are godless and not to be
made, and once made, to be broken.
61) Differences between Exhortation and Doctrine

The whole world is now shaken by the thunder and
lightning born of the collision of such exaggerations. If
both sides hold fast to their exaggeration, I foresee such a
battle as between Achilles and Hector: since both were
headstrong, only death could separate them. True, there is
the popular saying, if you want to straighten a curved stick,
bend it in the opposite direction. But this applies to the
correction of morals. I do not know whether to employ it
in matters of dogma.
In the case of exhortations and dissuasion I see sometimes
a place for an exaggeration. If one wishes to encourage the
timid man, one would be right in exhorting: "Don't fear,
God will speak and do everything in you." And in order
to dampen a man's godless insolence, you might profitably
say, man can do nothing but sin; and to those who de-
mand that their dogmas be thought equal to the canonical
books say that all men are liars.
When in the investigation of truth, however, axioms are
propounded, I believe one must not use paradoxes, because
they are so similar to riddles. I like moderation best.
Pelagius attributes much too much to the free will; Scotus
attributes quite a bit. But Luther mutilates it at first by
amputating its right arm. And not content with this, he
has killed the freedom of the will and has removed it all
together.
I like the sentiments of those who attribute a little to the
freedom of the will, the most, however, to grace. One must
not avoid the Scylla of arrogance by going into the Charyb-
dis of desperation and indolence. In resetting a disjointed
limb, one must not dislocate it in the opposite direction,
but put it back in its place. One must not fight with an
enemy in such a manner that turning the face, you are
caught off guard.
According to this moderation man can do a good, albeit
imperfect work; man should not boast about it; there will
be some merit, but man owes it completely to God. The
life of us mortals abounds in many infirmities, imperfections
and vices. Whoever wishes to contemplate himself, will
easily lower his head.8 But we do not assume that even a
justified man is capable of nothing but sin, especially be-
cause Christ speaks of rebirth and Paul of a new creature.
* Why, you ask, is anything attributed to the freedom of
the will, then? It is in order to justify blaming the godless
ones who resist spitefully the grace of God; to prevent
calumnies attributing cruelty and injustice to God; to pre-
vent despair in us; to prevent a false sense of security; to
stimulate our efforts. For these reasons the freedom of the
will is asserted by all. Yet it is, however, ineffectual without
the continuous grace of God, in order not to arrogate any-
thing to ourselves. Someone says, what's the good of the
freedom of the will, if it does not effect anything? I answer,
what's the good of the entire man, if God treats him like
the potter his clay, or as he can deal with a pebble?
62) Final Conclusions

Hence, if it has sufficiently been demonstrated, this
matter is as follows: It does not promote piety to investi-
gate this any further than must be, especially before those
who are unlearned. We have proven that our opinion is
more evident in scriptural testimony than the opinion of
the opponents. It is a fact that Holy Scripture is in most
instances either obscure and figurative, or seems, at first
8
"Crista" means comb of a rooster.
sight, to contradict itself. Therefore, whether we like it or

not, we sometimes had to recede from the literal meaning,
and had to adjust its meaning to an interpretation. Finally,
it has been plainly shown how many unreasonable, not to
say absurd things follow, if we eliminate the freedom of
the will. It has been made plain that the opinion, as I have
been elucidating it, when accepted, does not eliminate the
pious and Christian things Luther argues for—concerning
the highest love of God; trie rejection of exclusive faith in
merits, works and our strength; the complete trust in God
according to his promises. Hence, I want the reader to
consider whether he thinks it is fair to condemn the opin-
ion offered by the Church Fathers, approved for so many
centuries by so many people, and to accept some paradoxes
which are at present disturbing the Christian world. If the
latter are true, I admit freely to my mental sloth and in-
ability to grasp. I know for certain that I am not resisting
the truth, that I love from the bottom of my heart true
evangelical liberty, and that I detest everything adverse to
the Gospels. Thus I am here not as a judge, as I said at
the outset, but as a disputer. Nevertheless, I can truly affirm
that I have served religiously in this debate, as was de-
manded once upon a time of judges trying matters of life
and death. Though I am an old man, I'm neither ashamed
nor irked to be taught by a younger if he teaches with
evangelical gentleness more evident truths.
Here some will say: Erasmus should learn about Christ
and disregard human prudence. This nobody understands,
unless he has the Spirit of God.
Now, if I do not yet understand what Christ is, certainly
we must have gone far astray from our topic and goal,
though I should love nothing more than to learn which
Spirit so many doctors and Christian people possessed—
because it seems probable that the people believed what
their bishops have already taught for thirteen centuries—
who did not understand this.
I have come to the end. It is for others to judge.
Part Two
LUTHER
THE BONDAGE OF THE WILL

I
INTRODUCTION*
To THE Venerable Master Erasmus of Rotterdam, Martin

Luther wishes Grace and Peace in Christ.
[600] That I have been so long in answering your
Diatribe on the free will, venerable Erasmus, has happened
against the expectation of all and against my usual wont,
because thus far I have not only gladly embraced such
opportunities for writing, but have also freely searched for
them. . . I concede to you openly, a thing I have never
done before, that you not only surpass me by far in literary
prowess and intellectuality (which we all grant to you as
your due, and the more so, since I am a barbarian occupied
with the barbarous), but that you have in two ways also
dampened my spirits and impetuousness, and slackened my
strength before the battle began. First, because artfully you
debate this matter with wonderful and continuous restraint,
preventing thereby my becoming angry with you. [601]
Second, because by chance or fortune or fate you say noth-
ing on so great a subject which has not already been stated
before, and you say even less, and attribute more to free
will than the Sophists1 hitherto did (I shall speak more of
this later), so that it seeemed quite superfluous to answer
your invalid arguments.
I have already often refuted them myself. And Philip
* Gf. W.A. 600-602. This is the standard reference to the Weimar
edition, Weimarer Ausgabe, of Luther's works.
1
Luther calls the Scholastics such, because he condemns their
theology as sophistry.
97
Melanchthon has trampled them underfoot in his unsur-

passed book Concerning Theological Questions.21 His is a
book which, in my judgment, deserves not only being im-
mortalized, but also being included in the Church's canon,
in comparison with which your book is, in my opinion, so
contemptible and worthless that I feel great pity for you
for having defiled your beautiful and skilled manner of
speaking with such vile dirt. . . To those who have drunk
of the teaching of the Spirit in my books, we have given
in abundance and more than enough, and they easily
despise your arguments. But it is not surprising that those
reading without the Spirit are tossed like a reed with every
wind. . . . Hence, you see, I lost all desire to answer you,
not because I was busy, or because it would have been a
difficult task, nor on account of your great eloquence, nor
for fear of you, but simply because of disgust, indignation
and contempt, which, if I say so, expresses my judgment
of your Diatribe. . . [602] If I do answer, it is because
faithful brethren in Christ press me to it. . . And who
knows but that God may even condescend to visit you,
dearest Erasmus, through me, His poor weak vessel, and
that I may (which from my heart I desire of the Father of
mercies through Jesus Christ our Lord) come to you in this
book in a happy hour and gain a dearest brother. For
although you write wrongly concerning free will, I owe
you no small thanks, because you have confirmed my own
view. Seeing the case for free will argued with such great
talents, yet leaving it worse than it was before, is an evident
proof that free will is a downright lie. It is like the woman
of the gospel: the more the physicians treat her case, the
worse it gets.3
Therefore I shall be even more grateful if you gain
greater certainty through me, just as I have gained in assur-
ance through you. But both are the gift of the Spirit, and
not the work of our own endeavors. So we should pray to
2
Loci Theologici, 1521
s Cf. Luke 8, 43 and Mark 5, 26
LUTHER: THE BONDAGE OF THE WILL 99
God that He will open my mouth, and your and all men's
hearts: that He may be the teacher in the midst of us,
who may in us speak and hear.
My friend Erasmus, may I ask you to suffer my lack of
eloquence, as I in return will bear with your ignorance in
these matters. God does not give everything to each and
we cannot all do everything. As Paul says, "Now there are
varieties of gifts, but the same Spirit" (1 Corinthians 12,4).
It remains, therefore, that these gifts render a mutual
service. One with his gift bear the burden of the other's
lack. Thus we shall fulfill the law of Christ.4
* Cf. Galatians 6, 2
II
REFUTATION OF ERASMUS'
PREFACE*
(Erasmus 2 & 3)
Assertions in Christianity
To begin with, I would like to review some parts of your

Preface in which you attempt to disparage our case and
to embellish your own.
First, I notice that, as in your other works, you censure
me for obstinacy of assertion. Here in this book you say
your "dislike of assertions is so great that you prefer the
views of the sceptics wherever the inviolable authority of
Scripture and the decisions of the Church permit; though
you gladly submit your opinion whether you comprehend
what she prescribes or not." Such outlook appeals to you.
[603] I assume (in courtesy bound) that you say these
things from your charitable mind and love of peace. If,
however, another had said it, I should, perhaps, have
attacked him in my usual way. And even you, well-meaning
as you are, I ought not to allow to err in this matter. Not
to delight in assertions is not the mark of a Christian heart.
Indeed, one must delight in assertions to be a Christian at
all! To avoid misunderstandings, let me define assertion. I
mean a constant adhering to and affirming of your position,
avowing and defending it, and invincibly persevering in
* W.A. 603-639
100
it. ... Far be it from us Christians to be sceptics and
academics!9
Let there be men who assert twice as determined as the
very Stoics themselves! I pray you, how often does the
Apostle Paul require that assurance of faith, that is, a most
certain and firm assertion of conscience. In Romans 10,10
he calls it confession, "and with the mouth profession of
faith is made unto salvation." And Christ says, "Therefore,
everyone who acknowledges me before me, I also will
acknowledge him before my Father in heaven" (Matthew
10,32). Peter commands us to give a reason of the hope
that is in us.6
But what's the need for so many proofs? Nothing is more
known and characteristic among Christians than assertions.
Take away assertions and you take away Christianity.
Indeed, the Holy Spirit is given to Christians from heaven,
so that He may in them glorify Christ and confess Him
even unto death. And to die for what you confess and
assert is not an assertion? What a clown I would hold a
man to be who does not really believe, nor unwaveringly
assert the things he is reproving others with! Why, I would
send him to Anticyra! 7
[604] But I am the biggest fool, losing words and time
on something clearer than the sun. What Christian can
bear that assertions should be deprecated? That would be
to deny at once all piety and religion, like asserting that
piety, religion and all dogmas are nothing at all. Why do
you assert your "dislike of assertions" and your preferring
an open mind?
5
See Erasmus, section 2, on scepticism. Academics refers in gen-
eral to the "intellectuals," and in particular to the Platonists, the
generations of members of the Academy. Sceptics were members
of the so-called Middle and New Academy.
6
1 Peter 3, 15, "Be ready always with an answer to everyone who
asks a reason for the hope that is in you."
7
Anticyra, a name of three Grecian health resorts in Thessaly,
Phocis and Locris, famous for the hellebore which grew there and
which was in high repute as a medicine to clear the brain and cure
stupidity.
But you remind me, and rightly so, that you were not
referring to confessing Christ and His doctrines. And in
courtesy to you, I give up the right of which I normally
avail myself and refrain from judging your heart. I leave
this for another time, or to other writers. In the meantime,
I admonish you to correct your tongue and your pen, and
to refrain henceforth from using such expressions. How-
ever upright and honest your heart may be, your words,
which are the index of the heart, they say, are not so. ...
No Liberty to Be a Sceptic
. . . What a Proteus8 is the man talking about "inviolable
authority of Scriptures and the decisions of the Church"!
—as if you had the greatest respect for the Scriptures and
the Church, when in the same breath you explain that
you wish you had the liberty to be a sceptic! What
Christian could talk like this? . . . A Christian will rather
say this: I am so against the sentiments of sceptics that,
so far as the weakness of the flesh permits, I shall not
only steadfastly adhere to the sacred writings everywheres,
and in all parts of them, and assert them, but also I wish
to be as positive as possible on nonessentials that lie out-
side Scriptures, because what is more miserable, than
uncertainty. . . . [605] . . ., In short, your words amount
to this, that it matters little to you what anyone believes
anywheres, as long as the peace of the world is undis-
turbed. . . You seem to look upon the Christian doctrines
as nothing better than the opinions of philosophers and
men. Of course, it is stupid to wrangle and quarrel over
these, as nothing results but contention and disturbance
of the public peace. . . So you wish to end our fighting
as an intermediate peacemaker. . . Allow us to be assertors.
You go ahead and favor your sceptics and academics, till
8
Allusion to Proteus, "the old man of the sea" of Greek myth-
ology, refers to his power of assuming many different shapes and
forms; being changeable.
Christ calls you too! The Holy Spirit is no sceptic, and
what He has written into our hearts are no doubts or
opinions, but assertions, more certain and more firm than
all human experience and life itself.
(Erasmus 4)
Clarity of Scriptures
[606]. . . I hope you credit Luther with some acquaint-
ance with and judgment in the sacred writings. If not,
beware and I'll wring the admission from you! This is the
distinction which I make (for I too am going to act a
little the rhetorician and logician): God and the Scriptures
are two things, just like God and creation are two things.
Nobody doubts that in God many things are hidden of
which we know nothing. , . But that there are in Scriptures
some things abstruse and not quite plain, was spread by the
godless Sophists, whom you echo, Erasmus. They have
never yet produced one article to prove this their madness.
Satan has frightened men from reading the sacred writings,
and has rendered Holy Scriptures contemptible, so as to
ensure his poisonous philosophy to prevail in the church.
I admit that many passages in Scriptures are obscure and
abstruse. But that is due to our ignorance of certain terms
and grammatical particulars, and not to the majesty of
the subject. This ignorance does not in any way prevent
our knowing all the contents of Scriptures. What things
can Scriptures still be concealing, now that the seals are
broken, the stone rolled from the door of the sepulchre, and
that greatest of all mysteries brought to light: Christ be-
came man; God is Trinity and Unity; Christ suffered for
us and will reign forever? Are not these things known and
proclaimed even in our streets? Take Christ out of Scrip-
tures and what will you find remaining in them? All the
things contained in the Scriptures, therefore, are made
manifest (even though some passages containing unknown
words are yet obscure). But it is absurd and impious to
IO4 DISCOURSE ON FREE WILL
say that things are obscure, because of a few obscure words,

when you know the contents of Scriptures being set in the
clearest light. And if the words are obscure in one place,
yet they are clear in another. . .
(Erasmus 5 & 6)
The Crucial Issue: Knowing Free Will
[609]. . . You draft for us a list of those things which
you consider sufficient for Christian piety. Any Jew or
Gentile utterly ignorant of Christ could easily draw up the
same, because you do not mention Christ in a single letter.
As though you thought that Christian piety is possible
without Christ, if God be but worshipped with one's whole
heart as being a "naturally most benign God." What shall
I say here, Erasmus? You ooze Lucian from every pore;
you swill Epicurus by the gallons.9 If you consider this sub-
ject not necessary to Christians, I ask you to withdraw from
the debate. We have no common ground. I consider it vital.
[610] If, as you say, it be irreligious, curious, super-
fluous to know whether God's foreknowledge is contingent;
whether our will can contribute anything pertinent to our
eternal salvation, or whether it simply endures operative
grace; whether everything we do, good or evil, is done out
of mere necessity, or whether we are rather enduring, what
then, I ask, is religious, serious and useful knowledge? This
is weak stuff, Erasmus. Das ist zu viel!w
It is difficult to attribute this to your ignorance, because
9
Lucian, 2nd century A.D. Greek author, born in Syria, died in
Egypt. He is famous for his many rhetorical and satirical narratives,
mostly in dialogue form. His reputation was that of one of the
wittiest ancients. He ridiculed the Christian religion.—Epicurus,
3rd century B.C. Greek teacher and founder of Epicureanism, born
in Samos, died in Athens. He regarded belief in supernaturalism as
a superstition and denied the existence of providential gods.
10
Luther has become so upset in quoting the above from Erasmus
that he exclaims in German, "that's too much," in the midst of his
Latin.
you are now old, you have lived among Christians and
you have long been studying the sacred writings. You leave
me no room for excusing or thinking well of you. And yet
the Papists pardon and put up with these outrageous state-
ments, because you are writing against Luther. Without a
Luther in the case, they would tear you apart. Here I must
speak like Aristotle when arguing with his master Plato:
Plato is my friend, but truth must be honored above all.
Granted you have but little understanding of Scripture and
Christian piety, surely even an enemy of Christians ought
to know what Christians do, consider useful and necessary.
But you, a theologian and teacher of Christianity, wanting
to write an outline guide for Christianity, forget your
own sceptical way. Otherwise you would vacillate as to
what is profitable and necessary for Christians. In fact, you
defy your own principles and make an unheard of assertion
that here is something nonessential. If it is really unessen-
tial, and not surely known, then neither God, Christ, the
gospel, faith nor anything else even of Judaism, let alone
Christianity, is left. In the name of the immortal God,
Erasmus, how wide a window, how big a field are you
opening up for attack against you.
. . . [611] . . . The essence of Christianity which you
describe. . . is without Christ, without the Spirit, and
chillier than ice. . . You plainly assert that the will is
effective in things pertaining to eternal salvation, when
you speak of its striving. And again you assert that it is
passive, when saying that without the mercy of God it is
ineffective. But you fail to define the limits within which
we should think of the will as acting and as being acted
upon. Thus you keep us in ignorance as to how far the
mercy of God extends, and how far our own will extends;
what man's will and God's mercy really do effect. That
prudence of yours carries you along. You side with neither
party and escape safely through Scylla and Charybdis, in
order that coming into open sea, overwhelmed and con-
founded by the waves, you can then assert all that you now
deny, and deny all that you now assert! . . .
IOD DISCOURSE ON FREE WILL
. . . [613] It is not irreligious, curious or superfluous,

but extremely wholesome and necessary for a Christian to
know whether or not his will has anything to do in matters
pertaining to salvation. This, let me tell you, is the very
hinge upon which our disputation turns. It is the crucial
issue between you and me. It is our aim to inquire what
free will can do, in what it is passive, and how it is related
to the grace of God. If we know nothing of these things,
we shall know nothing whatsoever of Christianity, and
shall be worse off than all the heathens. Whoever does not
understand this, let him confess that he is not a Christian.
But he who derides and ridicules it, should know that he is
the greatest foe of Christians. . . It is necessary to distin-
guish most clearly between the power of God and our own,
between God's works and ours, if we are to live a godly life.
Foreknowledge of God
. . . [615] . . . In this book, therefore, I shall harry
you and all the Sophists until you shall define for me the
power of free will. And I hope so to harry you (Christ
helping me) as to make you heartily repent ever having
published your Diatribe. It is then essentially necessary
and wholesome for Christians to know that God foreknows
nothing contingently, but that he foresees, purposes and
does all things according to His immutable, eternal and
infallible will. This thunderbolt throws free will flat and
utterly dashes it to pieces. Those who want to assert it
must either deny this thunderbolt or pretend not to see
it. . .
Tyranny of Laws
. . . [624] . . . In the remaining example concerning
confession and satisfaction, it is wonderful to observe with
what dexterous prudence you proceed. . . You denounce
the common people, because in their depravity they abuse
the preaching of freedom from confession and satisfaction
for their own carnal liberty. And now you say that the
necessity of making confession restrains them to some
extent. . . Why, with this reasoning you bring upon us
the universal tyranny of the Papal laws, as useful and
wholesome; because by them also the depravity of the com-
mon people is restrained. I shall not inveigh against this
passage, as it deserves. I'll just state briefly: a good theo-
logian teaches that the common people should be restrained
by the external power of the sword when they do evil, as
Paul teaches (Romans 13,1-4). But their conscience must
not be fettered by false laws, and thereby be tormented for
sins there where God had willed to be no sins at all. For
consciences are bound by the law of God alone. So that
Papal tyranny, which falsely terrifies and murders the souls
within, and uselessly exhausts the bodies without, is to be
banished forthwith. Although it binds men to confession
and other burdens by external pressure, it fails to restrain
their minds, which are only the more provoked into the
hatred of both God and men. Such external butchery of
the body is in vain. It just makes for hypocrites. So that
tyrants, with such laws, are nothing but raving wolves,
robbers and plunderers of souls. And now you, an excellent
counselor of souls, recommend to us once more these bar-
barous soul-murderers, who fill the world with blasphem-
ing, vain hypocrites solely in order to restrain them a little
from outward sin. . .
(Erasmus 7)
The Christian's Peace
. . . [625] . . . You make it clear that this peace and
tranquility of the flesh are to you far more important than
faith, conscience, salvation, the word of God, the glory of
Christ and God himself. Therefore, let me tell you, and I
beg you to let it sink deep into your mind, I am concerned
with a serious, vital and eternal verity, yes such a funda-

mental one, that it ought to be maintained and defended
at the cost of life itself, and even though the whole world
should not only be thrown into turmoil and fighting, but
shattered in chaos and reduced to nothing. If you don't
grasp this, or if you are not moved by this, then mind your
own business, and leave us to whom God has given it to
grasp and to be affected by it. . .
[626] May Christ grant, I for one desire and hope so,
that your heart may not be, as your words certainly imply,
in agreement with Epicurus, considering the word of God
and the future life to be mere stories. . . It is constantly
the case with the word of God that because of it, the world
is thrown into confusion. Christ openly declares: "I come
not to send peace but a sword" (Matthew 10,34). And in
Luke: "I come to send fire upon the earth" (Luke 12,49);
so in Paul, "in tumults" (2 Corinthians 6,5) etc. . . . The
world and its god11 cannot and will not bear the word of
the true God. And the true God cannot and will not keep
silence. Since these two gods are at war with each other,
how can there be anything else throughout the whole world,
but uproar?
Therefore, to wish to silence this turmoil is really to
want to hinder the word of God and stop its course. For
wherever it comes, the word of God comes to change and
renew the world. . . It is the Christian's part to expect
and endure these things. . . I see indeed, my dear Erasmus,
that you deplore the loss of peace and concord in many of
your books. . . But I am sorry that I find it necessary to
teach so great a theologian as yourself these things like a
schoolboy, when you ought to be a teacher of others. . .
Christian Liberty
. . . [627] . . . The doctrine that confession and satisfac-
tion ought to be free, you either deny, or you do not know
11
Cf. 2 Corinthians 4, 4.
that there exists a word of God. I for my part know for sure
that there is a word of God which asserts Christian liberty,
in order that we may not be ensnared into bondage by
human traditions and human laws. . . The prince of this
world does not allow that the laws of the Popes and his
bishops be kept in liberty. His intention is to entangle and
bind consciences. This the true God will not bear. There-
fore, the word of God and the traditions of men oppose each
other in irreconcilable discord. . .
[628] And as to your fear that many depraved persons
will abuse this liberty, this must be considered among those
turmoils, as part of that temporal leprosy which we must
bear, and the evil we must endure. . . You are ridiculous
enough to misquote Paul.12 But Paul does not speak of
teaching or of teaching doctrinal truth, as you confound his
words and twist their meaning to please you. On the con-
trary, he would have the truth spoken everywhere, at all
times, and in every way. He is even delighted when Christ
is preached out of envy and hatred, and plainly says so.13
"Provided only that in every way, whether in pretense or in
truth, Christ is being proclaimed" . . . Truth and doctrine
should always be preached openly and firmly, without com-
promise or concealment . . .
. . . [629] . . . If we ask you to determine for us when,
to whom, and how truth is to be spoken, could you give an
answer? . . . Perhaps you have in mind to teach the truth
so that the Pope does not object, Caesar is not enraged,
bishops and princes are not upset, and furthermore no
uproar and turmoil are caused in the wide world, lest many
be offended and grow worse? . . . His Gospel which all need
should not be confined to any place or time. It should be
preached to all men, at all times and in all places. I have
already proved above that what is written in Scriptures is
plain to all, and is wholesome, and must be proclaimed
13
1 Corinthians 6, 12, "All things are lawful for me, but not all
things are expedient."
13
Philippians 1, 18.
IIO DISCOURSE ON FREE WILL
abroad, as you wrote yourself in your Paraclesis14 with

much more wisdom then than now. Those who are unwill-
ing for souls to be redeemed, like the Pope and his ad-
herents, let it be left to them to bind the word of God and
keep men from life and the kingdom of heaven. . . . [630]
With the same prudence you advise that wrong decisions
made in councils should not be openly acknowledged, lest
ground for denying the authority of the fathers be thus
afforded. This is indeed just what the Pope wanted you to
say! And he hears it with greater pleasure than the Gospel
itself. He will be most ungrateful, if he does not honor you
in return with a cardinal's cap, together with all the
revenues belonging to it ... I must tell you again: men's
ordinances cannot be observed together with the word of
God, because the former bind consciences and the latter
looses them. . . . The authority of the Fathers is therefore
nothing . . . for Christ is a higher authority.
Spontaneity of Necessitated Acts

[632] You say: Who will endeavor to reform his life? I
answer: Nobody! No man can! God has no time for your
self-reformers, for they are hypocrites. The elect who fear
God will be reformed by the Holy Spirit. The rest will
perish unreformed. Note how Augustine does not say that
the works of none or of all are crowned, but that the works
of some are. "Therefore there will be some who reform
their lives."
You say, by our doctrine a floodgate of iniquity is
opened. Be it so. Ungodly men are part of that evil leprosy
spoken of before. Nevertheless, these are the same doctrines
which throw open to the elect, who fear God, a gateway to
righteousness, an entrance into heaven, a way unto God . . .
These truths are published for the sake of the elect, that
they may be humbled and brought down to nothing and so
14
A book published in 1516 in which Erasmus pleads for the
study of Christian philosophy.
LUTHER: THE BONDAGE OF THE WILL in
be saved. The rest resist this humiliation. They condemn
the teaching of self-desperation. They wish to have left a
little something that they may do themselves. Secretly they
continue proud, and enemies of the grace of God.
. . . [634] . . . As to the other paradox you mention, that
whatever is done by us, is not done by free will, but of mere
necessity, let us briefly consider it, lest we should let such
a pernicious remark go unchallenged. I observe: if it be
proved that our salvation is not of our own strength or
counsel, but depends on the working of God alone (which
I hope I shall clearly prove later in the main discussion),
does it not evidently follow that when God is not present to
work in us, everything we do is evil, and that we of neces-
sity act in a way not availing unto our salvation? For if it is
not we ourselves, but God only, who works salvation in us,
it follows that nothing we do before His working in us
avails unto salvation. By necessity I do not mean compul-
sion. I meant what they term the necessity of immutability.
That is to say, a man void of the Spirit of God does not do
evil against his will, under pressure, as though taken by the
neck and forced into it, ... but he does it spontaneously
and willingly. And this willingness and desire of doing evil
he cannot, by his own strength, eliminate, restrain or
change. He goes on still desiring and craving to do evil. And
if external pressure compels him to act outwardly to the
contrary, yet the will within remains averse and chafes
under such constraint. But it would not thus rise in indigna-
tion, if it were changed, and made willing to yield to a
constraining power. This is what we mean by the necessity
of immutability: that the will cannot change itself, nor
give itself another bent, but, rather, the more it is resisted,
the more it is irritated to crave, as its indignation proves.
This would not be the case if it were free or had a free
will. . . .
. . . [635] On the other hand, when God works in us, the
will is changed under the sweet influence of the Spirit of
God. It desires and acts not from compulsion, but respon-
sively of its own desire and inclination. It cannot be
altered by any opposition. It cannot be compelled or over-

come even by the gates of hell. It still goes on to desire,
crave after and love that which is good, just as once it
desired, craved after and loved evil . . . Thus the human
will is like a beast of burden. If God rides it, it wills and
goes whence God wills; as the Psalm says, "I was as a beast
of burden before thee" (Psalm 72,22). If Satan rides, it
wills and goes where Satan wills. Nor may it choose to
which rider it will run, nor which it will seek. But the riders
themselves contend who shall have and hold it.
Grace and Free Will

. . . [636] And now, what if I prove from your own
words, in which you assert the freedom of the will, that
there is no such thing as free will at all? What, if I should
show that you unwittingly deny what you labor with so
much sagacity to affirm? If I fail here, I promise to revoke
all that I wrote against you in this book; and all that your
Diatribe advances against me shall be confirmed!
You make the power of free will small and utterly in-
effective apart from the grace of God.15 Acknowledged?
Now then, I ask you: If God's grace is wanting, or if it be
taken away from that certain small degree of power, what
can it do for itself? You say it is ineffective and can do
nothing good. Therefore it will not do what God or His
grace wills. And why? Because we have now taken God's
grace away from it, and what the grace of God does not do
is not good. Hence it follows that free will without the grace
of God is not free at all, but is the permanent bond-slave
and servant of evil, since it cannot turn itself unto good.
This being determined, I allow you to enlarge the power of
free will as much as you like, make it angelic, divine, if you
can. But once you add this doleful postscript, that it is
15
Luther may here be referring to sections 15, 16 or 20 in
Erasmus.
ineffective apart from God's grace, you at once rob it of all
its power. What is ineffective power, but plainly no power
at all. Therefore, to say that free will exists and has power,
though ineffective, is, what the Sophists call a contradiction
in terms. It is like saying, free will is something which is not
free.
. . . [638] But, if we do not want to drop this term alto-
gether (which would be the safest and most Christian thing
to do), we may still use it in good faith denoting free will
in respect not of what is above him, but of what is below
him. This is to say, man should know in regard to his goods
and possessions the right to use them, to do or to leave
undone, according to his free will. Although at the same
time, that same free will is overruled by the free will of
God alone, just as He pleases. However, with regard to
God, and in all things pertaining to salvation or damnation,
man has no free will, but is a captive, servant and bond-
slave, either to the will of God, or to the will of Satan.
Summary of Preface
These observations on the heads of your Preface embrace
nearly the entire subject under debate, almost more so than
the following body of the book. The essence of it all could
have been summed up in the following "dilemma":16 Your
Preface complains either of the words of God or of the
words of men. If the latter, it is all written in vain. If the
former, it is all blasphemy. Wherefore it would have saved
much trouble, if it had been plainly mentioned whether we
were disputing concerning the words of God, or the words
of men. But this will, perhaps, be handled in your Introduc-
tion which follows, or in the body of the work itself . . . We
teach nothing save Christ crucified. But Christ crucified
brings all these doctrines along with Himself, including
16
Luther uses "dilemma" in an original sense of a syllogistic
argument which presents an antagonist with two (or more) alterna-
tives, equally conclusive against him, whichever alternate is chosen.
"wisdom also among those that are perfect." No other

wisdom may be taught among Christians than that which
is "hidden in a mystery," and this belongs only to the
"perfect"— and not to the sons of a Judaizing, legal-
minded generation, who, without faith, boast of their
works!
Ill
REFUTATION
OF ERASMUS' INTRODUCTION*
(Erasmus 8)
Denying Church Fathers' Authority
[639] . . . At the beginning of our disputation proper you
promised to argue according to the canonical books, "since
Luther recognizes no [extracanonical] authority." [640]
Very well! I welcome your promise . . . You tell us that you
are much influenced by so great a number of the most
learned men . . . Biblical scholars, holy martyrs, many re-
nowned for miracles, together with the more recent theo-
logians, many schools, councils, bishops and popes. In a
word, on your side, you say, is learning, ability, number
greatness, courage, holiness, miracles, while on my side
there are only Wycliffe and Lorenzo Valla . . . [642] B
tell me this: was anyone of them made a saint, did anyone
of them receive the Spirit or work miracles in the name of
the free will, or by the power of the free will, or to confirm
the free will? Far from it, you will say, but in the name and
by the power of Jesus Christ were all those things done, and
for the confirmation of the doctrine of Christ. . . Wherefore
your appeal to the holiness, the Spirit and the miracles of
the Fathers is pointless. These do not prove the free will,
*W.A. 639-661
"5
Il6 DISCOURSE ON FREE WILL
but the doctrine of Jesus Christ which contradicts free

will . . . [649] . . . Those who assert the free will . . . in
blindness and ignorance, pick that which the Fathers,
stumbling in the weakness of their flesh have said in favor
of free will, and oppose it to that which the same Fathers,
in the power of the Spirit, have elsewhere said against free
will. . . . So did that disgusting Faber of Constance.17
(Erasmus 9-12)
Invisible Church and Clarity of Scriptures
. . . [650] . . . The Creed which we all hold runs thus,
"I believe in the holy catholic Church" . . . [651] . . . Show
me under the kingdom of the Pope one single bishop dis-
charging his office. Show me a single council at which they
dealt with matters of religion, and not with gowns, dignities,
revenues and other profanities, which only the mad could
consider pertaining to the Holy Spirit! Nevertheless they
are called the Church . . . And yet even under them Christ
has preserved His Church, though it is not called the
church. How many saints do you imagine the inquisition
having burned and killed, such as John Hus?18 No doubt,
many holy men of the same spirit lived in those times.
Why don't you rather marvel at this, Erasmus, that in
general there were, from the beginning of time, superior
talents, greater learning a more ardent pursuit among
pagans than among Christians and the people of God? As
Christ Himself declares, "The children of this world . . .
are more prudent than the children of light" (Luke 16,8)
. . . [652] . . . Therefore, what shall we do? The Church is
" Johannes Faber, suffragan bishop of Constance had just (1524)
published his Malleus in Haeresin Lutheranam.
18
Bohemian religious reformer (1369-1415). Acquainted with
Wycliffe's teachings, he wrote against transsubstantiation, papal
primacy, etc. and made Scriptures the sole rule in religious matters.
He was sentenced to death by the Council of Constance and burned
at the stake July 6, 1415.
hidden, the saints are unknown. What and whom shall we
believe? . . . [654] . . . Scriptures, [because] they are
called a way and a path, doubtless because of their perfect
certainty . . . [656] . . . Wherefore, if the doctrine of free
will is obscure and ambiguous it is no concern of Christians
and the Scriptures, and should therefore be left alone . . .
But if it does concern Christians and Scriptures, it ought to
be clear, open and manifest, just like all the other articles
of faith which are quite evident. For all the articles held
by Christians should be most evident to themselves and
also supported against adversaries by such plain and mani-
fest scriptures as to stop all their mouths, so that they can
make no reply . . . [659] . . . But why need enlarge? Why
not conclude the dicussion with this your Introduction and
give my verdict against you in your own words, according
to Christ's saying, "by thy words thou wilt be justified, and
by thy words^thou wilt be condemned'^? (Matthew 12,37).
For you say that Scriptures are noTclear upon this point.
And then suspending all judgment, you discuss throughout
your book only the pros and cons on each side! That's why
you wish to call it a Diatribe, i.e., discussion, rather than an
Apophasis, i.e., denial . . .
Luther's Conclusion
. . . [661] . . . So I conclude this small part of the Dis-

putation. By Scriptures being obscure, nothing certain ever
has been or could be defined concerning free will. This is
according to your own testimony. In the lives of all the
men from the beginning of the world, nothing has ever been
disclosed to favor free will. I have proved that above. To
teach something that is neither described by one word
within Scripture, nor evinced by a single fact outside Scrip-
ture, is inappropriate for Christian doctrine, though appro-
priate for the very fables of Lucian. . .
Il8 DISCOURSE ON FREE WILL
Division of Luther's Work

. . . Thus I might here have concluded the whole of this
free will discussion. Even the testimony of my adversaries
is for me and against themselves . . . But as Paul commands
us to stop the mouths of vain talkers,19 let us now proceed
to the disputation proper, handling the subject in the order
in which the Diatribe proceeds: we will first confute the
arguments which are brought forward in support of free
will; secondly, we shall defend our own arguments that are
being attacked; finally, we shall contend for the grace of
God against free will.
19
Gf. Titus 1, 11.
IV
REFUTATION
OF E R A S M U S ' OLD AND NEW
TESTAMENT PROOFS
SUPPORTING THE FREE WILL*
(Erasmus 13)
Refuting Erasmus3 Definition of Free Will
[662] Let us first of all, as is proper, begin with your defini-
tion of free will: "Under free will we understand in this
connection the ability of the human will whereby man can
turn toward or turn away from that which leads unto
eternal salvation."
Shrewdly you have stated a bare definition, without
explaining any of its parts (as others do). Perhaps you
feared more shipwrecks than one. I am therefore forced to
investigate the several parts myself. Upon closer examina-
tion the thing defined is undoubtedly of a greater extent
than the definition. The Sophists call such a definition
vicious, i.e., when a definition fails to cover fully the thing
defined. For I have shown above that free will belongs to
none but God alone. You are perhaps right in assigning to
man a will of some sort, but to credit him with free will
in the things of God is going too far. For the term free will
means in its proper sense for everybody a will that can and
does do God-ward whatever it pleases, restrained by no law
and no command . . . Here then at the outset, the definition
* W.A. 661-699
119
12 O DISCOURSE ON FREE WILL
of the term and the definition of the thing are at odds. The
term signifies one thing and what is really meant is another.
It would indeed be more correct to call it "vertible-will"
or "mutable-will." In this way Augustine and after him the
Sophists diminished the glory and force of the term free,
adding this limitation, called "vertibility of free will" . . .
The clear parts of the definition then are these: "the
ability of the human will," "whereby a man can," and
"unto eternal salvation." But the following are blind gladia-
tors:20 "turn toward," "that which leads," and "turn away"
. . . [663] I suppose, then that this "ability of the human
will" means a power, or faculty, or disposition, or aptitude
to will or not to will, to choose or refuse, to approve or dis-
approve, and to perform what other actions belong to the
will. Now, what it means for the same power to "turn
toward" or to "turn away," I do not see, unless it be the
very willing or not willing, choosing or refusing, approving
or disapproving, that is, the very action of the will itself.
Thus we must suppose that this power is a kind of some-
thing that comes between the will and the action itself,
something by which the will itself elicits the action of
willing or not willing, or by which the action itself of will-
ing or not willing is elicited. It is impossible to imagine or
conceive of anything else. If I am mistaken, blame the
author who gave the definition, and not me who examines
it. For it is justly said among lawyers, "The words of one
speaking obscurely, when he can speak more plainly, should
be interpreted against him." And here I don't want to hear
anything about our modern theologians21 and their subtle-
ties. For the sake of understanding and teaching, we must
state matters very plainly. And as to those words, "which
lead unto eternal salvation," I suppose they mean the words
20
Luther uses here a Latin term "Andabatae," denoting glad-
iators who fight blindfolded. Just as ineffective are the enumerated
parts of the definition.
21
"Modernos" refers to the Nominalist branch of Scholasticism.
They taught the "via moderna." Luther received much of his edu-
cation from Nominalists.
and works of God, which are offered to the human will
that it might apply itself to or turn away from them. I call
both the law and the gospel the "words of God." The law
requires works, the gospel faith. There is nothing else that
leads to the grace of God, or unto eternal salvation, but the
word and the work of God, because grace, or the Spirit is
the very life to which the words and work of God lead us.
But this life or salvation is an eternal matter, incompre-
hensible to the human capacity, as Paul shows, out of
Isaiah in 1 Corinthians 2,9. "Eye has not seen or ear
heard, nor has it entered into the heart of man, what things
God has prepared for those who love him."
. . . [664] Upon the authority of Erasmus then, free will
is a power of the human will which can of itself will and
not will the word and work of God, by which it is to be
led to those things which are beyond its capacity and com-
prehension. If it can will and not will, it can also love and
hate. If it can love and hate, it can, to a degree, keep the
law and believe the gospel. For it is impossible, if you can
will and not will, that you should not be able by that will
to begin some kind of work, even though another should
hinder you from completing it. And therefore since death,
the cross and all the evils of the world are numbered among
the works of God that lead to salvation, the human will can
will its own death and perdition. Yes, it can will all things
when it can will the contents of the words and works of
God. What can there be anywhere below, above, within or
without the word and work of God, but God Himself? But
what is here then left to grace and the Holy Spirit? This is
plainly to ascribe divinity to free will! For to will to
embrace the law and the gospel, not to will sin, and to will
death, belongs to the power of God alone, as Paul testifies
in more places than one.
This means that no one since the Pelagians has written
of free will more correctly than Erasmus. For I have said
above that free will is a divine term and signifies a divine
power. So far only the Pelagians have ever assigned to it
such, power. The Sophists, whatever their views, don't claim
anything like this. Erasmus by far outstrips the Pelagians,

for they assign this divinity to the whole free will, while
Erasmus assigns it to half only. The Pelagians divide free
will into two parts, the power of discernment and the
power of choice, attributing the one to reason, and the
other to will. The Sophists do the same. But Erasmus,
setting aside the power of discernment, exalts the power of
choice alone. Thus he makes a lame half free will into a
god. What do you suppose he would have done, had he set
out describing the whole of free will?
. . . [665] Do you see, my friend Erasmus, that by this
definition you betray, unwittingly, I presume, that you
know nothing at all of these matters, or that you write
thoughtlessly upon the subject, knowing neither what you
say nor what you affirm? As I said before, you say less
about and attribute more to free will than all the rest. You
fail to describe the whole free will, and yet you assign to it
all things. The Sophists, or at least their father Peter
Lombard22 presents a much more tolerable view. He says
that free will is the faculty of discerning, and the choosing
good, if grace is with it, but evil, if grace be wanting. He
plainly agrees with Augustine that free will of its own
power cannot do anything but fall, nor avail unto anything
but to sin. Accordingly, Augustine in his second book
against Julian calls it a slave will rather than a free will.
(Erasmus 17-21)
Erasmus3 Three Views on Free Will
[667] Then you invent a fourfold grace, so as to assign
a sort of faith and charity even to the philosophers. And
with this [you also invent] a threefold law, of nature, of
22
Peter Lombard was a 12th century scholar and traditionally the
first doctor of the University of Paris. From 1159 he was also bishop
of Paris. As a teacher of theology he wrote Sententiarum Libri
Quatuor, which gave him the surname Master of Sentences. Luther,
too, was trained by this classical scriptural commentary.
works, and of faith, so as to assert boldly that the precepts
of the philosophers agree with the precepts of the gospel . . .
Out of one opinion concerning free will you make three.
The first opinion, of those who deny that man can will good
without special grace, who deny that it can make progress,
perfect, etc., seems to you severe, though very probable.
And this you approve, because it leaves to man desire and
effort, but does not leave anything that he may ascribe to
his own power. The second opinion, of those who contend
that free will avails for nothing but sinning and that grace
alone works good in us, etc., seems to you more severe still.
And the third opinion, of those who say that free will is an
empty phrase, and God works in us both good and evil, and
all that comes to pass is of mere necessity, seems to you
most severe. You profess to be writing against those last
two.
Do you know what you are saying, friend Erasmus? You
are here presenting three opinions, as if belonging to three
different sects, simply because you fail to realize that it is
the same subject, stated by us, spokesmen of the same party,
only in different ways and words. Let me show you your
carelessness and sleepy stupidity of your own judgment.
I ask you, how does your previous definition of free will
square with this first opinion which you confess to be very
probable? For you said that free will is a power of the
human will by which a man can turn towards good,
whereas here you say approvingly that man without grace
cannot will good. The definition affirms what its example
denies. Hence there are found in your free will a yes and a
no. In one and the same doctrine and article in the same
breath you approve and condemn us; approve and con-
demn yourself. [668] Do you believe that to apply itself
to what pertains unto eternal salvation, a power your defini-
tion assigns to free will, is not good? If there is so much
good in free will that it could apply itself unto good, it
would have no need of grace. Therefore, the free will which
you define is one, and the free will you defend is another.
Erasmus, outstripping others, has now two free wills, and

they militate against each other.
But setting aside the free will which the definition de-
fines, let us consider the opposite one which this opinion
proposes. You grant that man without special grace cannot
will good (for we are not now discussing what the grace of
God can do, but what man can do without grace); you
grant then that free will cannot will good. This is nothing
else but granting that it cannot apply itself to what pertains
unto eternal salvation, which was the essence of your defini-
tion. Furthermore, a little earlier, you stated that the
human will after sin is so depraved that it has lost its
liberty and is compelled to serve sin, and cannot recall itself
to a better state. And if I am not mistaken, you make the
Pelagians to be of this opinion. Now here, I believe, my
Proteus has no way to escape. He is caught and held fast
by his own plain words: that the will having lost its liberty
is tied and bound in slavery to sin. Oh noble free will!
which having lost its liberty, is declared by Erasmus him-
self to be the slave of sin! Yet, when Luther asserted this,
nothing so absurd was ever heard of! Nothing was more
useless than the proclaiming of this paradox. So much so,
that even the Diatribe had to be written against him! . . .
. . . [669] But perhaps this is the dream of the Diatribe
that between these two, the "ability to will good" and the
"inability to will good," there may be a middle ground, i.e.,
to will is absolute, without respect to good and evil. So that
by a logical subtlety we may steer clear of the rocks and say
that in the will of man there is a certain willing which
indeed cannot will good without grace, but which neverthe-
less does not forthwith will only evil. It is a sort of mere
abstract willing, pure and simple, either upward unto God
by grace, or downwards unto evil by sin. But then what
becomes of your statement that when it has lost its liberty
it is compelled to serve sin? Where then is that desire and
effort that you left it? Where is its power to apply itself to
that which pertains to eternal salvation? For that power of
applying itself unto salvation cannot be a mere willing,
unless the salvation itself is said to be nothing. Nor again
can that desire and endeavor be a mere willing, because
desire must strive and aim for something (such as good),
and cannot go forth into nothing, nor be absolutely inactive.
In a word, wherever the Diatribe turns, it cannot keep clear
of inconsistencies and contradictory assertions, nor avoid
making that very free will which it defends, as much a
prisoner as it is itself. In attempting to free the will it gets
so entangled that it ends up bound together with free will
in bonds indissoluble!
(Erasmus 14-16, 22-23)

Erasmus' Gonfusion in Scriptural Proofs
. . . [673] . . . [you are employing] Arguments of Lady
Reason . . . Reason, by her conclusions and syllogisms
interprets and twists the Scriptures of God whichever way
she likes, I shall enter upon this dispute willingly and with
confidence, knowing that her babblings are folly and
absurdity, especially when she attempts to make a show of
her wisdom in divine matters.
First then, I should demand of her how it can be proven
that the free will in man is signified and implied wherever
the phrase "if thou wilt," "if thou shalt do," "if thou shalt
hear" are used. She will say, because the nature of words
and the common use of language among men seem to
require it. Therefore, she judges of divine things and words
according to the customs and things of men. What can be
more perverse than that, when the former are heavenly and
the latter earthly? Thus like a fool she exposes herself as
thinking of God only as of man . . . [677] . . . Wherefore,
the words of the law are spoken, not that they might assert
the power of the will, but that they might illuminate the
blindness of reason. Thus it may seem that its own light is
nothing and the power of the will is nothing. "Through
law comes the recognition of sin" says Paul (Romans 3,20).
He does not say the abolition or avoidance of sin. The

whole nature and design of the law is to give knowledge,
and that of nothing else save of sin, and not to discover or
communicate any power whatever. This knowledge is not
power, nor does it bring power, but it teaches and shows
that there is no power here, but great weakness. And what
else can the knowledge of sin be, but the knowledge of our
weakness and evil? He does not state that through the law
comes knowledge of power or of goodness. All the law does,
according to Paul's testimony, is to make sin known. It is
from this passage that I derive my answer to you: by the
words of law man is admonished and taught what he ought
to do, and not what he can do ... [685] . . . God in his
own nature and majesty is to be left alone. In this respect
we have nothing to do with Him, nor does He wish us to
deal with Him. We have to do with Him as far as He is
clothed in and delivered to us by His word . . . God
Preached deplores the death which He finds in His people,
and which He desires to remove from them . . . But God
Hidden in majesty neither deplores, nor takes away death,
but works life and death and all things; nor is He kept
bound to His Word, but has kept Himself free over all
things. The Diatribe is deceived by its own ignorance in
making no distinction between God Preached and God
Hidden, i.e. between the Word of God and God Himself.
. . . [692] ... The New Testament proper consists of
promises and exhortations, just as the Old Testament
proper consists of laws and threats. In the New Testament
the gospel is preached. This is nothing else than the word
that offers the Spirit and grace for the remission of sins,
obtained for us by Christ crucified. It is entirely free, given
through the mere mercy of God the Father, thus favoring
us unworthy creatures who deserve damnation rather than
anything else. After this follow exhortations. They are
intended to animate those who are already justified and
have obtained mercy to be diligent in the fruits of the Spirit
and of the righteousness given them, to exercise themselves
in love and good works, and to bear courageously the cross
and all the other tribulations of this world. This is the whole
sum of the New Testament. But how little Erasmus under-
stands of this matter is manifest in not knowing how to
distinguish between the Old and the New Testaments. For
he sees nothing anywhere but laws and precepts by which
men may be formed in good manners. But what the rebirth,
renewal, regeneration and the whole work of the Spirit are,
he does not see.
. . . [699] . . . And why is it necessary to review one by
one all the passages cited from Paul,23 a collection only of
imperative and conditional passages, in which Paul exhorts
Christians to the fruits of faith? The Diatribe by its ap-
pended conclusion proceeds to envisage a free will whose
power is so great that it can do without grace all things
Paul prescribes in his exhortations. Christians, however, are
not led by a free will, but are driven by the Spirit of God,
as Romans 8, 14 tell us. To be driven is not to act or do
oneself. But we are so seized as a saw or an ax is handled
by a carpenter . . .
. . . Let us consider now the later part where the Diatribe
attempts to refute my arguments, i.e., those by which free
will is utterly abolished. Here you shall see what the smoke
of a man can do against the thunder and lightning of God!
23
The major portion of this chapter in Luther is a detailed ex-
egetical analysis of many scriptural passages. These have been
omitted here.
V
COMMENTS
ON E R A S M U S ' T R E A T M E N T OF
PASSAGES DENYING FREE WILL*
(Erasmus 30)
Figures of Speech
. . . [700] . . . In this part of the discussion the Diatribe
invents a new trick of eluding the clearest passages, i.e., it
will have it that in the clearest and simplest passages there
is a trope (figure of speech). And as before, when speaking
in defense of free will it eluded the force of all the impera-
tive and conditional passages of the law by tacking on
conclusions and similes, so now, where it speaks against me,
it twists all the words of divine promise and declaration,
just as it pleases, by discovering a figure of speech in them
. . . Let this be our sentiment: that no implication or figure
is to be allowed to exist in any passage of Scriptures . . . We
should adhere everywhere to the simple, pure and natural
meaning of the words, according to the rules of grammar
and the habits of speech which God has given unto men . . .
[702] . . . For me this is a serious cause. I want to be as
certain about the truth as I can, in order to settle men's
consciences. I must act very differently. I say then that it
is not enough for you to say there may be a figure. I must
*W.A. 699-756
128
inquire whether there need be and must be a figure. And
if you do not prove that there must necessarily be a figure,
you achieve nothing . . . The Word of God must be taken
in its plain meaning, as the words stand . . .
. . . [703] . . . Let this, therefore, be a fixed and settled
point: if the Diatribe cannot prove that there is a figure in
these passages which it seeks to overthrow, then it is com-
pelled to grant me that the words must be understood
according to their literal meaning, even though it should
prove that the same figure is contained in ail the other
scriptural passages and commonly used by everyone. By
gaining this one point, all my arguments which the Diatribe
sought to refute are at the same time defended. Thus its
refutation is found to achieve nothing.
(Erasmus 31 & 32)

Evil in Man
. . . [709] . . . Perhaps it will be asked how can God be

said to work evil in us, in the same way as He is said to
harden us, to give us up to our desires, to cause us to err,
etc.?
We should indeed be content with the words of God
and simply believe what they say, for the works of God are
utterly indescribable. However, to humor Reason, i.e.,
human folly, I will just act the fool and the stupid fellow
for once, and try by a little babbling, if I can make any
impression upon it ...
Now then, Satan and man, being fallen and abandoned
by God, cannot will good, i.e., things which please God or
which God wills, but are ever turned in the direction of
their own desires, so that they cannot but seek out their
own . . . So that which we call the remnant of nature in
Satan and wicked man, as being the creatures and work of
God, is no less subject to divine omnipotence and action
I3O DISCOURSE ON FREE WILL
than all the rest of the creatures and works of God. Since
God moves and works all in all, He necessarily moves and
works even in Satan and wicked man. But he works accord-
ing to what they are and what He finds them to be, i.e.,
since they are perverted and evil, being carried along by
that motion of Divine Omnipotence, they cannot but do
what is perverse and evil. Just as it is with a man riding a
horse lame on one foot or on two feet. His riding corre-
sponds to what the horse is. That is, the horse moves badly.
But what can the man do? He is riding this horse together
with sound horses. This one goes badly, though the rest go
well. But it cannot be otherwise, unless the horse be made
sound.
Here you see then that when God works in and by evil
man, evil deeds result. Yet God cannot do evil Himself,
for he is good. He uses evil instruments, which cannot
escape the sway and motion of His Omnipotence. The
fault which accounts for evil being done when God moves
to action lies in these instruments which God does not allow
to lie idle . . . Hence it is that the wicked man cannot but
always err and sin, because under the impulse of divine
power he is not permitted to remain motionless, but must
will, desire and act according to his nature . . . [710] ...
We are subject to God's working by mere passive necessity
. . . God is incessantly active in all His creatures, allowing
none of them to keep holiday . . . He cannot but do evil by
our evil instrumentality, although He makes good use of
this evil for His own glory and for our salvation. . . . [712]
. . . God is God, for whose will no cause or reason may be
laid down as its rule and measure. For nothing is on a level
with it, not to speak higher. It is itself the measure of all
things. If any rule or measure, or cause or reason existed
for it, it could no longer be the will of God. What God wills
is not right because He ought to or was bound to so will.
On the contrary, what takes place must be right, because
He so wills it.
(Erasmus 33-37)
Foreknowledge and Necessity
. . . [715] Let the Diatribe invent and go on inventing,
let it cavil and cavil again, if God foreknew that Judas
would be a traitor, Judas became a traitor of necessity, and
it was not in the power of Judas, nor of any creature, to
alter it, or change his will from that which God had fore-
seen . . . [716] ... If God be not deceived in that which
he foreknows, then that which He foreknows must of neces-
sity come to pass. Otherwise, who could believe His
promises, who would fear His threatenings, if what He
promised or threatened did not necessarily ensue? How
could He promise or threaten, if His foreknowledge deceives
Him or can be hindered by our mutability? This supremely
clear light of certain truth manifestly stops all mouths, puts
an end to all questions, gives forever victory over all evasive
subtleties . . .
. . . [719] . . . Of course, this seems to give the greatest
offense to common sense or natural reason, that God, who
is proclaimed as being so full of mercy and goodness, should
of His own mere will abandon, harden and damn men, as
though delighted in the sins and great eternal torments of
the miserable. It seems iniquitous, cruel, intolerable to think
thus of God. It has given offense to so many and many
great men down the ages. And who would not be offended?
I myself have been offended at it more than once, even
unto the deepest abyss of despair, so far that I wished I had
never been made a man. That was before I knew how
healthgiving that despair was and how near it was to grace.
This is why so much toil and labor has been devoted to
excusing the goodness of God, and to accusing the will of
man. Here those distinctions have been invented between
the ordinary will of God and the absolute will of God,
between the necessity of consequence and the necessity of
the thing consequent, and many others. But nothing has

been achieved by these means beyond imposing upon the
unlearned, by vain words and by "the contradictions of
so-called knowledge." 24 For after all, a conscious convic-
tion has been left deeply rooted in the hearts of learned and
unlearned alike, whenever they have made a serious ap-
proach to this matter, so that they are aware that, if the
foreknowledge and omnipotence of God are admitted, we
must be under necessity . . .
Luther's Conclusion
[754] What I have to say on this point is as follows:
Man, before he is created to be man does and endeavors
nothing toward his being made a creature. And after he is
made and created, he does and endeavors nothing toward
his preservation as a creature. Both his creation and his
preservation come to pass by the sole will of the omnipotent
power and goodness of God, who creates and preserves us
without ourselves. Yet, God does not work in us without us,
because He created and preserves us for the very purpose
that He might work in us and we might cooperate with
Him, whether that occurs outside His kingdom and under
His general omnipotence, or within His kingdom and under
the special power of His Spirit. So I say that man, before
he is regenerated into the new creation of the Spirit's king-
dom does and endeavors nothing to prepare himself, and
when he is regenerated he does and endeavors nothing
toward his perseverance in that kingdom. The Spirit alone,
without ourselves, works both blessings in us, regenerating
us and preserving us when regenerated . . .
. . . [755] . . . I will not accept or tolerate that moderate
middle way which Erasmus would, with good intention, I
think, recommend to me: to allow a certain little to free
will, in order to remove the contradictions of Scripture and
24
Gf. 1 Timothy 6, 20.
the aforementioned difficulties. The case is not bettered,
nor anything gained by this middle way. Because, unless you
attribute all and everything to free will, as the Pelagians do,
the contradictions in Scripture still remain, merit and
reward, the mercy and justice of God are abolished, and all
the difficulties which we try to avoid by allowing this
certain little ineffective power to free will, remain just as
they were before. Therefore, we must go to extremes, deny
free will altogether and ascribe everything to God!
VI
SUMMARY
ON THE B O N D A G E OF THE W I L L *
[756] We are now coming to the last part of this book, in

which, as I promised, I am bringing forward my own
resources against free will. Not that I shall produce them
all, for who could do that within the limits of this small
book, when the whole Scriptures, in every letter and iota,
stand on my side? There is no need, because free will lies
vanquished and prostrate already . . .
Doctrine of Salvation by Faith in Christ

Disproves Free Will
. . . [767] . . . Paul now proclaims with full confidence
and authority: "But now the righteousness of God has been
made manifest independently of the Law, being attested by
the Law and the Prophets; the righteousness of God
through faith in Jesus Christ upon all who believe. For
there is no distinction, as all have sinned and have need of
the glory of God. They are justified freely by his grace
through the redemption which is in Christ Jesus, whom
God has set forth as a propitiation by his blood through
faith, etc." (Romans 3,21-25). Here Paul utters very
thunderbolts against free will. First, he says, the righteous-
ness of God without the law is manifested. He distinguishes
the righteousness of God from the righteousness of the Law,
because the righteousness of faith comes by grace, without
the law. This saying, "without the law" can mean nothing
*W.A. 756-786
i34
else, but that Christian righteousness exists without the
works of the law; the works of the law availing and effect-
ing nothing toward its attainment. As [Paul] says further
on: "For we reckon that a man is justified by faith inde-
pendently of the works of the law" (Romans 3,28). And
earlier he has said: "For by the works of the law no human
being shall be justified" (Romans 3,20). From all this it is
clearly manifest that the endeavor and effect of free will
are simply nothing. For if the righteousness of God exists
without the law, and without the works of the law, how
shall it not much more exist without free will? The supreme
concern of free will is to exercise itself in moral righteous-
ness, or the works of that law by which its blindness and
impotency derive their assistance. But this word "without"
abolishes all morally good works, all moral righteousness
and all preparations for grace. Scrape together every power
you can think of as belonging to free will and Paul will
still stand invincible saying, the righteousness of God exists
without it! And though I should grant that free will by its
endeavors can advance in some direction, namely, unto
good works, or unto the righteousness of the civil or moral
law, it does yet not advance towards God's righteousness,
nor does God in any respect allow its devoted efforts to be
worthy unto gaining His righteousness; for He says that
His righteousness stands without the law . . .
Personal Comfort in the Doctrine of Bondage

. . . [783] . . . As for myself, I frankly confess, that I
should not want free will to be given me, even if it could
be, nor anything else be left in my own hands to enable me
to strive after my salvation. And that, not merely, because
in the face of so many dangers, adversities and onslaughts
of devils, I could not stand my ground and hold fast my
free will—for one devil is stronger than all men, and on
these terms no man could be saved—but because, even
though there were no dangers, adversities or devils, I should
still be forced to labor with no guarantee of success and to
beat the air only. If I lived and worked to all eternity, my

conscience would never reach comfortable certainty as to
how much it must do to satisfy God. Whatever work it had
done, there would still remain a scrupling as to whether or
not it pleased God, or whether He required something
more. The experience of all who seek righteousness by
works proves that. I learned it by bitter experience over a
period of many years. But now that God has put my salva-
tion out of the control of my own will and put it under the
control of His, and has promised to save me, not according
to my effort or running, but. . . according to His own grace
and mercy, I rest fully assured that He is faithful and will
not lie to me, and that moreover He is great and powerful,
so that no devils and no adversities can destroy Him or
pluck me out of His hand . . . I am certain that I please
God, not by the merit of my works, but by reason of His
merciful favor promised to me. So that, if I work too little
or badly, He does not impute it to me, but, like a father,
pardons me and makes me better. This is the glorying
which all the saints have in their God!
VII
CONCLUSION*
[786] I shall here end this book, though prepared, if neces-

sary, to pursue this Discussion still further . . . And now,
my friend Erasmus, I entreat you for Christ's sake to keep
your promise. You promised that you would willingly yield
to him who taught better than yourself . . . I confess that
you are a great man, adorned with many of God's noblest
gifts, with talent, learning and an almost miraculous elo-
quence, whereas I have and am nothing, except to glory in
being a Christian.
Moreover, I give you hearty praise: alone, in contrast
to all others, you have discussed the real thing, i.e., the
essential point. You have not wearied me with those irrele-
vant points about the Papacy, purgatory, indulgences and
such trifles . . . For that I heartily thank you . . .
However, if you cannot treat this issue differently from
the way this Diatribe does, I pray you, remain content with
your own gift and study, adorn and promote literature and
the languages, as hitherto you have done to great advantage
and with much credit. I confess that your studies have also
helped me. For them I honor and sincerely respect you. But
God has not willed yet, nor granted you to be equal [to the
subject matter of this debate]. [787] I entreat you, do not
think me arrogant, when I pray that the Lord may speedily
make you as much superior to me in these matters, as you
are superior to me in all others. It is nothing new for God
to instruct a Moses by a Jethro, or to teach a Paul by an
*W.A. 786-787
i37
Ananias. And as to what you say, "you have greatly missed

the mark, if you are ignorant of Christ": I think you see
yourself how matters stand. But not all will err, if you or I
may err. God is glorified in a wonderful way in His saints!
So that we may consider those being saints that are farthest
from sanctity. Nor is it an unlikely thing that you, as being
a man, should fail to understand aright, and to note with
sufficient care, the Scriptures, or the sayings of the Fathers,
under whose guidance you imagine you cannot miss the
mark.
That you have failed is quite clear from this: "you assert
nothing, but have made comparisons." One who is fully
acquainted with the matter and understands it, does not
write like that. On the contrary, in this book of mine, I
have not made comparisons, but have asserted and still do
assert. I wish none to become judges, but urge all men to
submit!
May the Lord whose cause this is, enlighten you and
make you a vessel of honor and glory. Amen.

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What is the debate between Erasmus and Luther about?

What is the debate between Erasmus and Luther about?

How does Luther describe his views in his own writings?

How does Luther describe his views in his own writings?

DISCOURSE ON FREE WILL

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Translated and edited by

Copyright © 1961, 1989 by Frederick Ungar Publishing

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be

Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress Catalog Card No. 60-53363

LUTHER repeatedly described The Enslaved Will (De servo

particular, is attempting to show how orthodox, even

England, where he met devout Humanists like Golet and

concerned with the things of God. The Nominalist teaching

ing Luther. Finally, responding to both outward prodding

theologically. For Erasmus Christianity is morality, a sim-

Consult the footnotes (especially I/I; 111/2,3/10,11; V/8).

The original of Erasmus has no subheadings or paragraphs.

MORTIMER JEROME ADLER, The Idea of Freedom: A Dialectical

Part I ERASMUS : The Free Will

I. Preface: Man and Truth 3

Part II LUTHER: The Bondage of the Will

THE FREE WILL

PREFACE: MAN AND TRUTH

but, as it seems to me, with more exertion than success on

1) Luther's Supposed Infallibility

* Among the major tracts against Luther we find, besides Eck's

also appeals against all schools, church councils and Popes.

2) Objectivity and Scepticism

3) Having an Open Mind

rather persuade mediocre minds not to argue too stubbornly

4) Difficulties in the Scripture

5) Essence of Christian Piety

6) Man's Limited Capacity to Know

clarity, as for example, the precepts for a morally good life.

7) Unsuitableness of Luther's Teachings

laborious battle against their own flesh? What wicked

8) Authority of the Church Fathers

Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Durandus of Saint-Pourgain, John

ingenuity and erudition contribute anything to scriptural

9) Inspiration by the Holy Spirit

10) Miracles and Exemplary Life

tongues by the laying on of hands. Only thus were they

11) Infallible Church

12) Plea for Gentle Listening

Nicodemus, and as the Apostles did Gamaliel.11 The Lord

13) Definition of Free Will

15) Adam and Eve

16) Man before and after Receiving Grace; Reason and

wherefore our psalmist sings,4 "Thy words are a light to my

17) Law of Nature, Law of Good Works, Law of Faith

tributed to man, since it ceases to be sin if it is not volun-

18) Freedom and Grace according to Pelagius and Duns

to the freedom of the will, whose power they believe to be

19) Freedom and Grace according to St. Augustine and

20) Four Varieties of Grace

that grace, which they call sanctifying, if he inspires to it

21) Views of Thomists, Carlstadt, and Luther