Spaces of Struggle: Class, Hegemony and the Post-Apartheid State

By Christopher Webb
Student # 210712354

For Prof. Richard Saunders

The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be
born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear. – Antonio
Gramsci1

The cold, contemporary cast of power is couched between the lines of noble sounding
clauses in democratic-sounding constitutions. – Arundhati Roy 2

South Africa, like most other post-colonial states, exists within its own contradictions.

Its strength is rooted in a liberation struggle that sought racial and—for many—economic

emancipation, but its post-liberation trajectory has been tied to a system of global exploitation

that has furthered racial and economic inequalities. Liberation and freedom in South Africa are

currently constructed, shaped and defined in the politicized context of global neo-liberalism. In

order to understand the challenges and limits of liberation in South Africa, we must turn to a

close study of the ruling party of liberation the African National Congress (ANC), its policies,

and how it channels and retains power. As John Saul and Stephen Gelb articulated nearly three

decades ago:

Just as the ANC is at the centre of things, so the centre of things is increasingly within the ANC: the
continuing dialectic between this movement and the considerable revolutionary energies at play within
the society has become the single most important process at work in South Africa’s political economy.”3

In the absence of other organized progressive forces shaping South African politics this

statement remains true. However, in the spaces between state and society there has evolved

new forces of struggle seeking to channel these revolutionary energies. How has the ANC

responded to renewed calls for liberation 16 years after the end of apartheid, and is the ANC

still the political vanguard of these revolutionary aspirations? In short, who has benefitted from

the post-apartheid state and who is still waiting?

In this paper, I will argue that a new liberation politics exists in the interstitial tensions

2
between the state, market and society. In the Gramscian sense, it is autonomous of the state but

not independent of it.4 Saul and others have argued that these civil society groups, trade unions,

NGOs, church groups, women’s organizations, and veterans groups “mark the birth pangs of a

new struggle…against global structures and domestic elites.” I want to situate the core ideas of

this paper topic: ‘freedom’ and ‘liberation’ within the policies of the ANC state project and

attempts to redefine it by these civil society formations. To quote Lenin, I will suggest that we

take “one step forward, two steps back” and begin our investigation of the post-apartheid state

at the fiery conjuncture of its birth.5

The Crisis of Transition

The ANC’s 1955 Freedom Charter espoused the radical nationalist view that “the

mineral wealth beneath the soil, the Banks and monopoly industry shall be transferred to the

ownership of the people as a whole.”6 How then did property rights become enshrined in the

South African constitution of 1994, along with state support for foreign takeovers and en

masse privatizations through the neoliberal GEAR (Growth, Employment and Redistribution)

policy program?

While many scholars—and ANC leaders—argued that the ANC’s nationalist project

did not include socialism, there was an overwhelming expectation that majority rule would

include some form of racial redistribution.7 For Patrick Bond, the transition eroded

redistributive goals resulting in an “elite-pacting practice, which demobilized and disillusioned

the base…so as to gain formal access to power, even if it meant implementing policies and

projects from 1994-99 that were hostile to the majority.”8 According to Hein Marais, it was the

competing forces of domestic capital, global economic orthodoxy, post-Cold War geopolitics

and the demands of the African majority that led to an “unstable balance of class forces…that

3
is expressed in the ensemble of practices and policies that constitute South Africa’s

development strategy [today].”9 To many scholars and activists in South Africa, it is widely

acknowledged that the unequal negotiation process between the ANC and former National

Party (NP) resulted in the “replacement of racial apartheid with class apartheid: systematic

underdevelopment and segregation of the oppressed majority…”10

The high level of political protest and industrial action in the 1980s led some

commentators to characterize the South African situation as one “objectively ripe for

revolution.”11 But the result of the negotiations and the 1994 election—as important as they

were—“witness[ed] a kind of taming of the impulse towards genuine democratic

empowerment in South Africa”.12 Mass action was the key factor that forced the apartheid

government onto the path of reform, as South African Communist Party activist Jeremy Cronin

argued at the time of transitional negotiations:

It is critical that in the present we coordinate our principal weapon—mass support—so that we bring it to
bear effectively upon the constitutional negotiations process…Democracy is self-empowerment of the
people. Unless the broad masses are actively and continually engaged in the struggle, we will achieve
only the empty shell of a limited democracy.13

Forces of mass support, however, were unable to advance their claims in the post-apartheid

period—even with their former political vanguard in power. As Bond and Marais posit, the

ANC sought a deracialized capitalism that would fit within existing capitalist institutions. The

transition period thus allowed “whites to share power so as to facilitate a new round of capital

accumulation and dampen the class and community struggles that were making life

unprofitable.”14 For some involved in the transition negotiations like South African Communist

Party stalwart Joe Slovo, the moment presented the “the possibility of bringing about a

radically transformed political framework…[toward] real people’s power.” 15 What happened

to the potential and promises of this historic conjuncture in South African politics?

4
The Post-Apartheid Economy

The ANC’s 1994 election promise “A Better Life For All” was encapsulated in the

Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP). The RDP was a bid to accommodate

divergent economic, political and social interests in the form of a policy program that

“promised to lead just about everyone to their respective promised lands.”16 The RDP

combined policies of social welfare in the development sphere with neoliberalism in the

economic sphere. The program’s five-year targets included a million low-cost houses,

electrification of 2.5 million homes, massive job creation, redistribution of 30 per cent of

agricultural land, full reproductive rights, and health care and social welfare while also

promoting international competiveness and foreign direct investment.17 As Bond rightly points

out, the motor force behind such progressive goals was the legacy of concrete struggles.18

There is significant contestation, however, regarding the effectiveness of the RDP as corrective

platform to post-apartheid inequalities: The ANC’s willingness to pay back apartheid debt, cuts

to protective tariffs resulting in huge job losses, and insufficient housing subsidies and land

redistribution all point to the RDP as more rhetorical flourish than practical politics.

Nevertheless, within two years the influence of domestic and international capital prompted the

state to abandon this mildly redistributive policy for the homegrown structural adjustment

program known as the GEAR model.19

By 1996 Thabo Mbeki, future president of South Africa, was calling himself a

“Thatcherite” and supporting a self-imposed structural adjustment program that cut taxes to the

rich, dropped exchange controls and tariffs, and privatized state owned assets.20 Under GEAR,

around one hundred thousand jobs were lost each year alone and water, electricity, housing and

healthcare were taken from those who couldn’t afford it.21 The failure of GEAR as a

5
developmental model led to worsening racial, gender and class inequalities and increasing

unemployment.22 Needless to say, it won the full endorsement of business and International

Financial Institutions while receiving harsh criticism from the ANC’s historic allies the

Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and SACP.23

Increased privatization of state owned assets became part of GEAR’s restructuring

policy to increase efficiency and attract foreign investment while freeing up South African

capital to move around the world.24 Major South African conglomerates like Anglo American,

Old Mutual and SAB Miller encouraged trade liberalization polices that allowed them to move

their assets offshore and increase their profits globally. At home, GEAR did little to improve

the lives of poor and working class people in towns and cities across South Africa. The

country’s unemployment figures rose from 16 per cent in 1995 to 31.2 per cent in 2003 with

women’s unemployment in 2001 at 46 per cent.25

The impact of GEAR on the poor, women and those living in areas without adequate

housing or basic services was devastating. The majority of the population live off less than

R140 (about $15) per month and one in four black children do not have enough to eat. Annual

job losses of 1-4 per cent along with increases in water and electricity prices resulted in

millions of people being disconnected from water because they couldn’t pay.26 By 2002 over 6

million South Africans were HIV positive “and without access to the lifesaving medication

that, even a not completely neoliberal budget, could satisfy safely.”27 Land reform, another

central promise of the 1994 election campaign, was painfully slow with only 2.3 per cent of the

country’s land redistributed since the fall of apartheid.28

Such has been the horrendous legacy of economic orthodoxy in South Africa, and it

begs the question of who actually benefitted? White business was able to escape the

6
accumulation crisis of the 1980s and emerge safely into the neoliberal period, with pre-tax

profits back to 1960s apartheid-era levels.29 A handful of black businesspeople and

entrepreneurs were boosted to commanding ranks of the economy through affirmative action

and black economic empowerment policies. For the rest of the population, GEAR missed all its

purported targets of GDP growth, employment, investment and savings.30 But South Africans

did not take the ANC’s capitulation to international and domestic capital lightly. From the

trade unions, churches, women’s groups and youth organizations emerged a new form of

organizing and resistance to the state. Speaking at a South African Council of Churches

conference, Takatso Mofokeng told participants: “People should demand what they are entitled

to and use the methodology that works. GEAR didn’t come up for referendum. If people are

not happy about it they must stand up against it.”31

Redefining the National Democratic Revolution

In the midst of a global economic recession that cost South Africa an aggregate

negative 1.3 per cent GDP growth, the country hosted the 2010 FIFA World Cup.32 While

South Africa was experiencing its first economic recession since the end of apartheid, a total of

$107 Billion (U.S.) was set aside for infrastructure and stadium development. 33 It was

estimated that the World Cup would contribute approximately $5.5-billion to the economy and

create 415,000 jobs, but weeks after the closing ceremonies striking South African public

sector workers poured onto the streets with COSATU General-Secretary Zwelinzima Vavi

claiming “we have nothing to celebrate. We lost more than 1.1 million jobs.”34 It was apparent

to even the most naïve observer that the vast majority of poor and working class South

Africans had not benefitted from the much hyped-tourist dollars flowing in from abroad. There

existed an ever-increasing gap between those who benefitted from ANC polices—a new class

7
of black entrepreneurs and business owners—and the vast majority who have been excluded

from the fruits of South African capitalism. The construction of this new black capitalist class

has been strategically beneficial to the hegemonic project of the ANC.

The National Democratic Revolution (NDR) is a two-stage theory of liberation with

majority rule and deracialization occurring before a socialist transformation is possible—if that

was ever even on the cards for the ANC. As Southall argues, the NDR was stripped of its

radical character by Mbeki and others so “that the blackening of capitalism through BEE will

be the revolution’s end point.”35 Measured in terms of job creation and productive investments

BEE ventures show little sign of benefitting the larger population.36 This new black capitalist

class, however, has benefitted greatly from the government tender, procurement and

privatization polices.37 Southall makes the convincing argument that this system of business-

state patronage has been responsible for financing the ANC and personally enriching a small

elite connected to the ruling party.38 The ideological impact of this new black bourgeoisie

“speaks both to the tiny coterie of individuals able to capitalize on the opportunities created

and to the private yearnings of millions more.”39

This ideological conquest of society by the state, where liberation is defined as

deracialized capitalism, is part of the hegemonic project of the ANC. The function of

hegemony is “to raise the great mass of the population to a particular cultural and moral level

or type which corresponds to the needs of the productive forces of development, and hence to

the interests of the ruling class.”40 In Marais’ nuanced understanding of this project, the ANC

has been defined through the “concessions, discourse, affirmations and traditions that cultivate

an enveloping sense of common interest and consent.”41 This process allows the ruling party to

obscure its overwhelming support for capital through a web of ideals and policies—the ghosts

8
of the NDR, RDP and liberation struggle—as a way of securing support and legitimacy. Bond

describes it politically as a “talk left, walk right” strategy.42

Fanon warned that a rising African bourgeoisie would act as the intermediary for global

capitalism and “not follow its heroic path…but disappear with its soul set at peace into the

shocking ways of a traditional bourgeoisie.”43 The redefinition of the NDR as a tool of

enrichment for the elite rather than the vast majority is a sad indictment of the liberation

struggle and seemingly affirms Fanon’s warning. But the contradictions of ANC do not stem

merely from these ‘shocking ways’ of the bourgeoisie, but the tensions between it and the

majority of South African society. In the townships, streets and workplaces the ultimate goal of

the NDR is not seen as a distant memory, but something to be captured and defined by the

forces that catapulted the ANC to power in the first place.

Phansi ANC! Phansi! (Down with the ANC! Down!)

The ANC commands enormous support from the majority of the South African

population, and it remains the only political body capable of fulfilling the historically

redistributive goals of the liberation movement. “For its supporters, the very fate of the African

majority is lodged with the ANC.”44 Loyalty to the ANC is furthered through its tripartite

alliance partners COSATU and the SACP. Recall that South Africa's President Jacob Zuma

came to power in 2009 as a result, mainly, of trade union and South African Communist Party

mobilizations in 2006-08.45 Even though they have been described as “ANC cheerleaders and

occasional left critics,”46 the rank and file keeps the burner below the ANC burning and

occasionally it overheats. In May 2000, wide-ranging protests against unemployment brought 4

million workers onto the streets. COSATU declared their opposition to GEAR and promised

“rolling mass action if government and business fail to…stem job losses, stop privatization and

9
for the state to play a direct role in combating market imbalances.”47 The alliance is a useful

political tool for stabilizing South African corporatism, but it is limiting to many activists who

would go beyond the macro-economic policies of the ANC’s finance ministry. There remains,

according to Saul, a pressure from unionized workers and diverse civic movements that would

push the ANC toward “revolutionary reform.”48 With a recent COSATU sponsored labour/civil

society conference coming under fire from the ANC, the possibility of a progressive project

outside traditional party channels is of great concern to th ANC.49

The 2000s saw a renewed interest in civil society structures by both scholars of South

Africa and those working for change within the country. For liberals, it seemed to be a

counterweight to ANC authoritarianism and for radicals it represented the hope of a new

participatory socialism. But Glaser argues that these new civil society organizations have

limited potential and cannot serve as a substitute for state power and “still less is it available as

a weapon of classes and ideologies.”50 Moses Moyekiso, former president of the Alexandra

Civic Association and National Union of Metalworkers, sees civil society organizations as

necessary to “push any political party that may find itself in power for changes beneficial to the

masses…there may well be limits beyond which the party cannot go in terms of socialist

policy.”51 At the time of his comments, however, the base of social and political struggle was

centered in the Mass Democratic Movement and the underground ANC. The terrain has

changed and, as Bond and Marais argue, the ANC either marshals the consent of civil society

or violently demobilizes it as it did by shooting students protesting unaffordable tuition fees in

Kwa-Zulu Natal.52

A movement is growing in South Africa that would see the true goals of the NDR

fulfilled, but is it powerful enough to threaten the ANC’s hegemony as the arbiter of freedom

10
and liberation? In describing the emergence of civil society, Desai writes: “We are at the point

in South African history where something precious and powerful is coming into being.”53 What

that something is, however, remains unclear. Is it a push for ‘revolutionary reform’ within the

ANC, or is the ANC a neoliberal entity beyond reform? According to Salim Vally:

The post-apartheid state is primarily the guardian and protector of . . . dominant economic interests and
the guarantor of capitalist property relations. . . . [L]iberals view the state as an agent of a democratic
social order with no inherent bias toward any class or group. They fail to understand the elementary
truism that the state in a capitalist society is not neutral in relation to different classes. This
misconception is the fount from which all sorts of reformist illusions arise.54

In his writing on political spontaneity Franz Fanon recognized that there is always a

gap between the demands of the rank and file and their leaders, but can this gap eventually

constitute, as Bond hopes, “a new anti-neoliberal party umbrella”?55 Would a mass defection

from the ANC and a splintering of the tripartite alliance not further weaken the South African

Left?

There are no easy answers to these questions. They are debated by those reconnecting

electricity for the poor in Soweto and elites in the groomed gardens of Tuyn Huis. Pluralist

liberalism holds that these diverse voices are equally represented by the state, but poor people

in Chatsworth and Tafelsig have begun to see the hollowness of this assertion when they are

fired on by live ammunition while protesting against privatization and neoliberalism. Do their

actions present a new ‘politics of the possible’ in South Africa, or are they indicative of the

state’s failure to penetrate society? Mahmood Mamdani suggests that current Africanist

scholarship overemphasizes the role of civil society in the struggle to reform the state. In his

reading, the subject population was incorporated into the “arena of colonial power. The accent

is on incorporation not marginalization…no reform of contemporary civil society can by itself

unravel this decentralized despotism.”56 The new progressive project in his eyes, and in my

11
own, is to dismantle the forms of power that allowed the transition from apartheid to majority

rule to take place without significant economic changes for the vast majority of South Africans.

This involves revisiting Saul’s formulation of “structural reform…root[ed] in popular

initiatives in such a way as to leave a residue of empowerment…for the vast mass of the

population who thus strengthen themselves for further struggles.”57

The South African state in its current form, and we can also speak of the internal

corruption and anti-democratic nature of the ANC, is a barrier to the full development of the

majority of South Africans. South Africa’s GDP—even in a time of economic crisis—is higher

than any other major African country.58 It has the ability to make dramatically progressive

steps to reduce crime, combat HIV-AIDS, lower income inequality and poverty, but has

instead committed itself to corporate welfare and increased elite accumulation for a small

percentage of the black population. Despite this seeming betrayal, the ANC still registered 65

per cent of the popular vote in the 2009 elections. Paradoxically, it seems that the positive

accomplishments of the ANC—and they deserve their own research paper—outweigh spiraling

unemployment, inequality and declining social services. In the consciousness of many South

Africans, the path to freedom and liberation is “neither short nor linear…but in the residue of

experiences accumulated through countless personal and collective struggles.”59

12
NOTES

13
1
Antonio Gramsci, Selections From The Prison Notebooks (New York: Columbia University Press,
1975)
2
Arundhati Roy quoted in Ashwin Desai, We Are The Poors: Community Struggles in Post-
Apartheid South Africa (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2002), 67.
3
John Saul and Stephen Gelb, The Crisis in South Africa: Class Defense, Class Revolution (New
York: Monthly Review Press, 1981), 140.
4
Antonio Gramsci quoted in Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and
the Legacy of Late Colonialism (Princeton: Preinceton University Press, 1996), 15.
5
Vladimir Lenin, “One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: The Crisis In Our Party” Accessed November
15, 2010. http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1904/onestep/index.htm
6
“ANC Freedom Charter” Accessed on November 13, 2010. http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?
include=docs/misc/1955/charter.html
7
Southern African scholars Patrick Bond, John Saul, Hein Marais, and Dale McKinley recognize the
ANC as a nationalist party with its liberal trappings. Saul even argues that the ANC suffered from
“petty bourgeois African nationalism and quasi-Stalinist leftism” in The Next Liberation Struggle,
173.
8
Patrick Bond, “Ten Years of Democracy: A Review.” in Articulations: A Harold Wolpe Memorial
Lecture Collection, ed. A. Alexander (Durban: Centre for Civil, 2006), 37-38.
9
Hein Marais, South Africa: Limits To Change The Political Economy of Transition (London: Zed
Books, 2001), 230.
10
Bond, “Ten Years of Democracy: A Review,” 37.
11
John Saul, The Next Liberation Struggle: Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy in Southern Africa
(Toronto: Between The Lines Press, 2005), 173.
12
Saul, The Next Liberation Struggle, 177.
13
Jeremy Cronin quoted in Saul, The Next Liberation Struggle, 20.
14
Bond, “Ten Years of Democracy: A Review,” 37.
15
Joe Slovo quoted in Saul The Next Liberation Struggle, 179.
16
Marais, South Africa: Limits To Change The Political Economy of Transition, 238.
17
Bill Freund. “The RDP: Two reviews: I. Half full? . . .” Accessed on November 5, 2010.
http://www.africafiles.org/article.asp?ID=3993
18
Patrick Bond, The Elite Transition: From Apartheid to Neoliberalism in South Africa (London: Pluto Press, 2000), 95.
19
Ibid.
20
Saul, The Next Liberation Struggle, 215.
21
Ashwin Desai, We Are The Poors: Community Struggles in Post-Apartheid South Africa (New
York: Monthly Review Press, 2002), 10.
22
Bond, “Ten Years of Democracy: A Review,” 40.
23
Gretchen Bauer and Scott Taylor, Politics in Southern Africa: State and Society in Transition
(London: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2005), 269.
24
Bond, Elite Transition, 85.
25
Bond, “Ten Years of Democracy: A Review,” 41.
26
Desai, We Are The Poors, 10
27
Ibid., 11.
28
Bond, “Ten Years of Democracy: A Review,” 46.
29
Ibid., 42.
30
Saul, The Next Liberation Struggle, 209.
31
Takatso Mofokeng quoted in Saul, The Next Liberation Struggle, 224.
32
Chris Webb, “Selling South Africa: Poverty, Politics and the 2010 FIFA World Cup.” Accessed on
November 2, 2010. http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/333.php
33
Ibid.
34
Eve Fairbanks, “Did the World Cup Wreck South Africa?” Accessed on November 20, 2010.
http://www.newsweek.com/2010/09/03/how-the-world-cup-wrecked-south-africa.html
35
Roger Southall, “The ANC For Sale? Money, Morality & Business in South Africa,” Review of
African Political Economy No. 116 (2008): 284.
36
Marais, South Africa: Limits To Change The Political Economy of Transition, 243.
37
Southall, “The ANC For Sale?,” 283.
38
Ibid., 285.
39
Marais, South Africa: Limits To Change The Political Economy of Transition, 243.
40
Antonio Gramsci quoted in Marais, South Africa: Limits To Change The Political Economy of
Transition, 232.
41
Ibid., 234.
42
Patrick Bond, Talk Left, Walk Right: South Africa's Frustrated Global Reforms (Pietermaritzburg:
University of Kwazulu Natal Press, 2005)
43
Frantz Fanon, The Wretched Of The Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1963), 150.
44
Marais, South Africa: Limits To Change The Political Economy of Transition, 246.
45
Patrick Bond, “South Africa: 20 years after Mandela's release, class apartheid continues”
Accessed on November 20, 2010. http://links.org.au/node/1515
46
Saul, The Next Liberation Struggle, 224.
47
Ibid., 220.
48
Saul, John. The Next Liberation Struggle, 192.
49
Jeremy Cronin, “Whose Terrain?” Umsebenzi Online Vol. 9, No 22 (2010).
http://www.sacp.org.za/main.php?include=pubs/umsebenzi/2010/vol9-22.html
50
Daryl Glaser, “South Africa and the Limits of Civil Society,” Journal of Southern African Studies
Vol 5. No. 1 (1997): 5.
51
Moses Mayekiso quoted in John Saul, Recolonization and Resistance in Southern Africa in the
1990s (Toronto: Between The Lines Press, 1993), 90.
52
Desai, We Are The Poors, 151.
53
Ibid., 149.
54
Salim Vally quoted in Steven Friedman and Shauna Mottiar, “A Rewarding Engagement? The
Treatment Action Campaign and the Politics of HIV/AIDS,” Politics & Society Vol. 33 No. 4 (2005):
551.

55
Bond, “Ten Years of Democracy: A Review,” 59.
56
Mamdani, Citizen and Subject, 17.
57
Saul, Recolonization and Resistance in Southern Africa in the 1990s, 143.
58
Bond, “Ten Years of Democracy: A Review.”
59
Marais, South Africa: Limits To Change The Political Economy of Transition, 245.

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