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G.R. No. L-43342 October 30, 1978

COMMERCIAL UNION ASSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED and NORTH BRITISH & MERCANTILE
INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED, petitioners,
vs.
LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY and THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.

Quasha, Asperilla, Zafra, Tayag & Ancheta for petitioners.

Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo for private respondent.

In resolving the principal issue in the case at bar, whether the appeal interposed by private
respondent was perfected on time although the record on appeal was filed within the period prayed
for in an ex parte motion for extension of time, which motion was not served to the adverse party but
was addressed to the Clerk of Court requesting him to submit it for the court's resolution upon
receipt thereof, the most fundamental consideration in the mind of the Court is that which will best
serve the ends of justice and assist the parties to obtain a just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of the action or proceeding pursuant to and in compliance with Rule 1, Section 2,
which provides:

Sec. 2. Construction. — These rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote

their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding.

This is the overriding and paramount rule which guides every doctrine and pronouncement of this
Court in construing the provisions of the Rules of Court. While the earlier cases pertinent to the issue
command mandatory compliance with Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, the
weight of the authorities recently promulgated by the Supreme Court culminating in Amante v.
Suñga, 64 SCRA 192 and Pimentel v. Court of Appeals, 64 SCRA 475 tend towards liberally giving
every litigant the assistance in obtaining a fair, expeditious and reasonable determination of his
rights as he seeks recourse to the court of law for justice without technicalities and without strict
adherence to the letter of the Rules, thereby promoting their objective. "The new rules are really
simple and liberal and, in the language of Professor Sunderland, 'the purpose which they seek to
accomplish to eliminate technical matters by removing the basis for technical objections, to make it
difficult as impossible for cases to go off on procedural points, and to make litigation as inexpensive,
as practicable and as a convenient, as can be done.' " (Vol. XIII, University of Cincinnati Law
Review, No. 1) (Co Tiamco vs. Diaz, etc., 75 Phil. 672, 681).

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G.R. No. 125290 August 9, 2000

MARIO BASCO y SALAO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
A supplemental pleading subsequently filed to remedy the previous absence of notice will not cure
the defect nor interrupt the tolling of the prescribed period within which to appeal. In Cledera v.
Sarmiento, citing Manila Surety v. Bath, this Court ruled:

We are not impressed by the argument that the supplement filed by the appellants on May
30 should be deemed retroactive as of the date the motion for reconsideration was filed and,
therefore, cured the defect therein. To so consider it would be to put a premium on
negligence and subject the finality of judgments to the forgetfulness or whims of parties-
litigants and their lawyers. This of course would be intolerable in a well-ordered judicial
system.

[A]ppellants were or should have been alerted to the fact that their motion for reconsideration
of May 12 did not interrupt the period for appeal when they received the court's order of May
21, 1959, wherein it was stated that what appellants had filed was not even a motion and
presented no question which the court could decide.

Nonetheless, procedural rules were conceived to aid the attainment of justice. If a stringent
application of the rules would hinder rather than serve the demands of substantial justice, the former
must yield to the latter. Recognizing this, Section 2, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court specifically provides
that:

SECTION 2. Construction. — These rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote

their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
of every action and proceeding. (Emphasis ours.)

The liberal construction of the rules on notice of hearing is exemplified in Goldloop Properties, Inc. v.
CA:21

Admittedly, the filing of respondent-spouses' motion for reconsideration did not stop the
running of the period of appeal because of the absence of a notice of hearing required in
Secs. 3, 4 and 5, Rule 15, of the Rules of Court. As we have repeatedly held, a motion that
does not contain a notice of hearing is a mere scrap of paper; it presents no question which
merits the attention of the court. Being a mere scrap of paper, the trial court had no
alternative but to disregard it. Such being the case, it was as if no motion for reconsideration
was filed and, therefore, the reglementary period within which respondent-spouses should
have filed an appeal expired on 23 November 1989.

But, where a rigid application of that rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of
justice, then the rule may be relaxed, especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged
defect in the questioned final and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the
recitals contained therein. Technicalities may thus be disregarded in order to resolve the
case. After all, no party can even claim a vested right in technicalities. Litigations should, as
much as possible, be decided on the merits and not on technicalities.

Hence, this Court should not easily allow a party to lose title and ownership over a party
worth P4,000,000.00 for a measly P650,000.00 without affording him ample opportunity to
prove his claim that the transaction entered into was not in fact an absolute sale but one of
mortgage. Such grave injustice must not be permitted to prevail on the anvil of technicalities.

Likewise, in Samoso v. CA, the Court ruled:

22
 But time and again, the Court has stressed that the rules of procedure are not to be applied
in a very strict and technical sense. The rules of procedure are used only to help secure not
override substantial justice (National Waterworks & Sewerage System vs. Municipality of
Libmanan, 97 SCRA 138 [1980]; Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 72 SCRA 120 [1976]). The
right to appeal should not be lightly disregarded by a stringent application of rules of
procedure especially where the appeal is on its face meritorious and the interests of
substantial justice would be served by permitting the appeal (Siguenza v. Court of Appeals,
137 SCRA 570 [1985]; Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corporation v. National Labor
Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 76595, May 6, 1998). . . .

In the instant case, it is petitioner's life and liberty that is at stake. The trial court has sentenced him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and his conviction attained finality on the basis of mere
technicality. It is but just, therefore, that petitioner be given the opportunity to defend himself and
pursue his appeal. To do otherwise would be tantamount to grave injustice. A relaxation of the
procedural rules, considering the particular circumstances herein, is justified.

Considering that there is sufficient evidence before the Court to enable it to res

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G.R. No. 201601 March 12, 2014

MARYLOU CABRERA, Petitioner,

vs.
FELIX NG, Respondent.

the three-day notice requirement is not a hard and fast rule. When the adverse party had been
afforded the opportunity to be heard, and has been indeed heard through the pleadings filed in
opposition to the motion, the purpose behind the three-day notice requirement is deemed realized. In
such case, the requirements of procedural due process are substantially complied with. Thus, in
Preysler, Jr. v. Manila Southcoast Development Corporation, the Court ruled that:
21

The three-day notice rule is not absolute. A liberal construction of the procedural rules is proper
where the lapse in the literal observance of a rule of procedure has not prejudiced the adverse party
and has not deprived the court of its authority. Indeed, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court
provides that the Rules should be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a
just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. Rules of procedure are
tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, and courts must avoid their strict and rigid
application which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice.

In Somera Vda. De Navarro v. Navarro, the Court held that there was substantial compliance of the
rule on notice of motions even if the first notice was irregular because no prejudice was caused the
adverse party since the motion was not considered and resolved until after several postponements
of which the parties were duly notified.

Likewise, in Jehan Shipping Corporation v. National Food Authority, the Court held that despite the
lack of notice of hearing in a Motion for Reconsideration, there was substantial compliance with the
requirements of due process where the adverse party actually had the opportunity to be heard and
had filed pleadings in opposition to the motion. The Court held:
This Court has indeed held time and again, that under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of
Court, mandatory is the requirement in a motion, which is rendered defective by failure to comply
with the requirement. As a rule, a motion without a notice of hearing is considered pro forma and
does not affect the reglementary period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading.

As an integral component of the procedural due process, the three-day notice required by the Rules
is not intended for the benefit of the movant. Rather, the requirement is for the purpose of avoiding
surprises that may be sprung upon the adverse party, who must be given time to study and meet the
arguments in the motion before a resolution of the court. Principles of natural justice demand that
1âwphi1

the right of a party should not be affected without giving it an opportunity to be heard.

The test is the presence of opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to study the motion and
meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based. x x x 22

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G.R. No. 171872 June 28, 2010

FAUSTO R. PREYSLER, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
MANILA SOUTHCOAST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.

As an integral component of the procedural due process, the three-day notice required by the
Rules is not intended for the benefit of the movant. Rather, the requirement is for the purpose
of avoiding surprises that may be sprung upon the adverse party, who must be given time to
study and meet the arguments in the motion before a resolution of the court. Principles of
natural justice demand that the right of a party should not be affected without giving it an
opportunity to be heard.

The test is the presence of opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to study the
motion and meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based. x x x

A close perusal of the records reveal that the trial court gave petitioner ten days within which to
comment on respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner filed its Opposition to the Motion on
November 26, 2001. In its 14-page Opposition, it not only pointed out that the Motion was defective
for not containing a notice of hearing and should then be dismissed outright by the court; it also
ventilated its substantial arguments against the merits of the Motion and of the Supplemental Motion
for Reconsideration. Notably, its arguments were recited at length in the trial court’s January 8, 2002
Joint Resolution. Nevertheless, the court proceeded to deny the Motions on the sole ground that
they did not contain any notice of hearing.

The requirement of notice of time and hearing in the pleading filed by a party is necessary only to
apprise the other of the actions of the former. Under the circumstances of the present case, the
purpose of a notice of hearing was served.15 (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to comply with the three-day notice rule.
However, the Court of Appeals overlooked the fact that although respondent received petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration six days after the scheduled hearing on 26 February 2004, the said
hearing was reset three (3) times with due notice to the parties. Thus, it was only on 6 August 2004,
or more than five months after respondent received a copy of petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration, that the motion was heard by the RTC. Clearly, respondent had more than
sufficient time to oppose petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. In fact, respondent did oppose the
motion when it filed its Motion to Dismiss dated 9 August 2004. In view of the circumstances of this
case, we find that there was substantial compliance with procedural due process. Instead of
dismissing petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration based merely on the alleged procedural lapses,
the RTC should have resolved the motion based on the merits.

Furthermore, the RTC likewise erred in dismissing petitioner’s Omnibus Motion for allegedly failing to
comply with the three-day notice requirement. The RTC found that the notice of hearing of
petitioner’s Omnibus Motion which was set to be heard on 12 November 2004 was received by
respondent on 9 November 2004. The RTC held that the service of the notice of hearing was one
day short of the prescribed minimum three days notice. 1avvph!1

We disagree. Section 4 of Rule 15 provides that "[e]very written motion required to be heard and the
notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the
other party at least three (3) days before the date of the hearing, unless the court for good
cause sets the hearing on shorter notice." Thus, the date of the hearing should be at least three days
after receipt of the notice of hearing by the other parties. In this case, the petitioner’s Omnibus
Motion was set for hearing on 12 November 2004. Thus, to comply with the notice requirement,
respondent should have received the notice of the hearing at least three days before 12 November
2004, which is 9 November 2004. Clearly, respondent’s receipt on 9 November 2004 (Tuesday) of
the notice of hearing of the Omnibus Motion which was set to be heard on 12 November 2004
(Friday), was within the required minimum three-days’ notice. As explained by Retired Justice Jose
Y. Feria in his book, Civil Procedure Annotated, when the notice of hearing should be given:

The ordinary motion day is Friday. Hence, the notice should be served by Tuesday at the
latest, in order that the requirement of the three days may be complied with.

If notice be given by ordinary mail, it should be actually received by Tuesday, or if not claimed from
the post office, the date of the first notice of the postmaster should be at least five (5) days before
Tuesday.

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G.R. No. 196877 November 21, 2012

ELOISA R. NARCISO, Petitioner,

vs.
ESTELITA P. GARCIA, Respondent.

What is more, Narciso had the right to file a motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s order
denying her motion to dismiss. No rule prohibits the filing of such a motion for reconsideration. Only
after the trial court shall have denied it does Narciso become bound to file her answer to Garcia’s
complaint. And only if she did not do so was Garcia entitled to have her declared in default.
Unfortunately, the CA failed to see this point.

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G.R. No. 199133 September 29, 2014

ESPERANZA TUMPAG, substituted by her son, PABLITO TUMPAG BELNAS, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
SAMUEL TUMPAG, Respondent.

It is well-settled that jurisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by law, not by the parties’ action or
conduct, and is, likewise, determined from the allegations in the complaint. Under Batas
14 15

Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, the jurisdiction of Regional Trial
16 17

Courts over civil actions involving title to, or possession of, real property, orany interest therein, is
limited to cases where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos
(₱20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos
(₱50,000.00), except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings. 18

Here, the petitioner filed a complaint for recovery of possession of real property before the RTC but
failed to allege in her complaint the property’s assessed value. Attached, however, to the petitioner’s
complaint was a copy of a Declaration of Real Property showing that the subject property has a
market value of ₱51,965.00 and assessed value of ₱20,790.00. The CA was fully aware ofthis
attachment but still proceeded to dismiss the petitioner’s complaint:

Record shows that the complaint was filed with the Regional Trial Court on December 13, 1995.
There is no allegation whatsoever in the complaint for accion publiciana concerning the assessed
value of the property involved. Attached however to the complaint is a copy of the Declaration of
Real Property of subject land which was signed by the owner stating that its market valueis ₱51,965
and its assessed value is ₱20,790.00.(Emphasis ours) 19