G.R. No. L-4043 - Cervantes v. Auditor General
G.R. No. L-4043 - Cervantes v. Auditor General
G.R. No. L-4043 - Cervantes v. Auditor General
SYLLABUS
DECISION
REYES , J : p
It is argued, however, that Executive Order No. 93 is null and void, not only
because it is based on a law that is unconstitutional as an illegal delegation of
legislative power to the executive, but also because it was promulgated beyond the
period of one year limited in said law.
The second ground ignores the rule that in the computation of the time for doing
an act, the rst day is excluded and the last day included (Section 13 Rev. Ad. Code.) As
the act was approved on October 4, 1946, and the President was given a period of one
year within which to promulgate his executive order and that order was in fact
promulgated on October 4, 1947, it is obvious that under the above rule the said
executive order was promulgated within the period given.
As to the rst ground, the rule is that so long as the Legislature "lays down a
policy and a standard is established by the statute" there is no undue delegation. (11
Am. Jur. 957). Republic Act No. 51 in authorizing the President of the Philippines,
among others, to make reforms and changes in government-controlled corporations,
lays down a standard and policy that the purpose shall be to meet the exigencies
attendant upon the establishment of the free and independent Government of the
Philippines and to promote simplicity, economy and e ciency in their operations. The
standard was set and the policy xed. The President had to carry the mandate. This he
did by promulgating the executive order in question which, tested by the rule above
cited, does not constitute an undue delegation of legislative power.
It is also contended that quarters allowance is not compensation and so the
granting of it to the petitioner by the NAFCO board of directors does not contravene the
provisions of the NAFCO charter that the salary of the chairman of said board who is
also to be general manager shall not exceed P15,000 per annum. But regardless of
whether quarters allowance should be considered as compensation or not, the
resolution of the board of directors authorizing payment thereof to the petitioner
cannot be given effect since it was disapproved by the Control Committee in the
exercise of the powers granted to it by Executive Order No. 93. And in any event,
petitioner's contention that quarters allowance is not compensation, a proposition on
which American authorities appear divided, cannot be insisted on behalf of o cers and
employees working for the Government of the Philippines and its instrumentalities,
including, naturally, government-controlled corporations. This is so because Executive
Order No. 332 of 1941, which prohibits the payment of additional compensation to
those working for the Government and its instrumentalities, including government-
controlled corporations, was in 1945 amended by Executive Order No. 77 by expressly
exempting from the prohibition the payment of quarters allowance "in favor of local
government o cials and employees entitled to this under existing law." The
amendment is a clear indication that quarters allowance was meant to be included in
the term "additional compensation", for otherwise the amendment would not have
expressly excepted it from the prohibition. This being so, we hold that, for the purposes
of the executive order just mentioned, quarters allowance is considered additional
compensation and, therefore, prohibited.
In view of the foregoing, the petition for review is dismissed, with costs.
Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor and Bautista Angelo, JJ.,
concur.