Case 118CV03708FBJO - First Amended Complaint

Case 1:18-cv-03708-FB-JO Document 38 Filed 01/29/19 Page 1 of 51 PageID #: 118
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
) CASE NO. 1:18-cv-03708 (FB)(JO)

ETHEL YOUNG, an individual, KATHLEEN )
D. HAYDEN, an individual, and STERLYN )
BROWN, Administrator of the Estate of )
SYLVIA BROWN and Administrator of the )
Estate of DENISE HYLTON, an individual, on FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION
)
behalf of themselves and all others similarly COMPLAINT
)
situated, )
) DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. )
)
)
JPMORGAN CHASE, N.A. )
)
Defendant. )
)
)
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs KATHLEEN D. HAYDEN, ETHEL YOUNG, and STERLYN BROWN, the
Administrator of the Estate of Sylvia Brown and the Administrator of the Estate of Denise
Hylton (“Plaintiffs”), by and through their attorneys of record, file this First Amended Class
Action Complaint as of right and in accordance with the November 2, 2018 Scheduling Order on
behalf of themselves and all other persons who had residential mortgage loans originated or
previously owned by Washington Mutual Bank (“WMB”), and to whom Defendant
JPMORGAN CHASE, N.A. (“Defendant” or “Chase”), WMB’s successor in interest, has
represented, falsely, that it had an ownership interest in the loans, has charged and collected
payments from homeowners for these loans, and has attempted to foreclose, or has been
foreclosing, on these loans in its own name as mortgagee and beneficiary of the security
instruments, even though the residential mortgage loans allegedly had never been acquired by,
sold or transferred to Chase.
Plaintiffs hereby allege, on information and belief, except for information based on
personal knowledge, which allegations are likely to have evidentiary support after further
investigation and discovery, as follows:
THE PARTIES
1. Plaintiff Ethel Young is a resident of Illinois. On or about April 15, 2008,
Plaintiff Young made, executed and delivered to WMB a promissory note and a deed of trust
granting WMB a security interest in certain real property located in Matteson, Illinois. At some
point in time after September 25, 2008, Chase started billing Plaintiff Young and received
payments from her for the residential mortgage loan that previously was originated or owned by
WMB, and which was not owned by Chase.
2. Plaintiff Kathleen D. Hayden is a resident of California. On or about June 4,
2005, Plaintiff Hayden made, executed and delivered to WMB a promissory note and a deed of
trust granting WMB a security interest in certain real property located in Placentia, California.
At some point in time after September 25, 2008, Chase started billing Plaintiff Hayden and
received payments from her for the residential mortgage loan that was originated or previously
owned by WMB, and which was not owned by Chase.
3. Plaintiff Steryln Brown is a resident of Brooklyn, New York. He is the
Administrator of the Estate of Sylvia Brown and the Administrator of the Estate of Denise
Hylton. On or around July 23, 2001, Sylvia Brown, the late wife of Plaintiff Brown, and Denise
Hylton, the late mother of Plaintiff Brown, executed and delivered to WMB a promissory note
and deed of trust granting WMB a security interest in certain real property located in Brooklyn,
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New York. At some point in time after September 25, 2008, Chase started billing Sylvia Brown
and received payments from her and Plaintiff Brown on the residential mortgage loan that
previously was originated or owned by WMB and which was not owned by Chase.
4. Defendant JPMorgan Chase, N.A. (“Chase”) is a national bank with its
headquarters located at 270 Park Avenue, New York, New York. Chase took over WMB’s
deposit accounts after the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) accepted responsibility
for (or became the “Receiver” of) WMB and its assets on September 25, 2008. On or about
September 25, 2008, WMB was closed by the Office of Thrift Supervision and the FDIC was
named Receiver. Pursuant to the terms and conditions of a Purchase and Assumption Agreement
between the FDIC as Receiver of WMB and Chase dated September 25, 2008, Chase acquired
certain unspecified assets of WMB. However, Chase did not acquire hundreds or thousands of
the residential mortgage loans and/or loan commitments of WMB, and no schedule or inventory
of assets listing any specific WMB residential mortgage loan acquired by Chase exists or has
ever been produced or disclosed. However, on September 25, 2008, Chase did not take over or
become the owner of numerous residential mortgage loans which were originated or previously
owned by WMB and which were sold, securitized or held in trust prior to WMB’s collapse and
thus, were not assets of WMB on September 25, 2008.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
5. Jurisdiction and venue are proper in this Court.
6. This Court has original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1332(d)(2), as
amended by the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, because the matter in controversy, exclusive
of interest and costs, exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000 and is a class action in which some
members of the Class of plaintiffs are citizens of different states than Defendant. Further, greater
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than two-thirds of the Class Members reside in states other than the state in which Defendant is a
citizen.
7. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391(b)(2) because a
substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred, and the property of Plaintiff
Brown which is the subject of this action is situated, in this district and many of the acts and
transactions giving rise to this action occurred in this district and because Defendant (i) is
authorized to conduct business in this district and has intentionally availed itself of the laws
within this district; (ii) does substantial business in this district, and (iii) is subject to personal
jurisdiction in this district.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
8. On January 1, 2005, Washington Mutual, Inc.’s state savings bank, the former
Washington Mutual Bank, merged into Washington Mutual Bank, FA. Subsequently,
Washington Mutual Bank, FA changed its named to Washington Mutual Bank (“WMB”). WMB
was insured by the FDIC.
9. On or about September 25, 2008, WMB was closed by the Office of Thrift
Supervision and the FDIC was named Receiver. Pursuant to the terms and conditions of a
Purchase and Assumption Agreement between the FDIC as Receiver of WMB and Chase dated
September 25, 2008, Chase acquired certain unspecified assets of WMB. However, Chase did
not acquire hundreds of thousands of the residential mortgage loans and/or loan commitments of
WMB, including Plaintiffs’ residential mortgage loans. This is because prior to its collapse,
WMB did not retain an ownership interest in the majority of the residential mortgage loans
which it originated or closed. Instead, WMB’s business model relied heavily on selling and/or
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securitizing residential mortgage loans, especially subprime and underperforming loans, and
unloading these loans on investors.
WMB Sold Or Securitized The Majority Of Its Residential Mortgage Loans
10. A report from the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee into the origins of the
2008 financial crisis found that “from 2004 to 2008, WaMu [WMB] originated a huge number of
poor quality mortgages, most of which were then resold to investment banks and other investors
hungry for mortgage backed securities. For a period of time, demand for these securities was so
great that WaMu [WMB] formed its own securitization arm on Wall Street.”1
11. Indeed, in 2004, WMB issued $37.2 billion in residential mortgage backed
securities (“RMBS”) and was the sixth largest RMBS issuer in the United States. In 2005, WMB
doubled its production and issued $73.8 billion in RMBS, which made WMB the third largest
issuer of RMBS in the United States. By 2006, WMB issued $72.8 billion in RMBS and was the
second largest issuer in the United States behind Countrywide. From 2000 to 2007, WMB
securitized approximately $77 billion in subprime loans and approximately $115 billion in
Option ARM loans. From its sales and securitizations of residential mortgage loans, WMB “sent
hundreds of billions of dollars of toxic mortgages into the financial system.” See Report from the
U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee “Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: Anatomy of a
Financial Collapse,” April 13, 2011 at page 117, 226-227, 230.
12. Prior to its collapse, WMB originated or acquired billions of dollars of home
loans, including home loans originated by its subprime lender, Long Beach. WMB and Long
1
Report from the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee “Wall Street and the Financial Crisis:
Anatomy of a Financial Collapse,” April 13, 2011 at page 48.
https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/media/senate-investigations-
subcommittee-releases-levin-coburn-report-on-the-financial-crisis
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Beach then “sold or securitized the vast majority of their subprime loans” as well as other types
of residential mortgage loans. While WMB initially kept most of its Option ARMs in its
proprietary investment portfolio, WMB “eventually began selling or securitizing those loans as
well.” For other loans, such as fixed rate 30 year, Alt A, home equity, and jumbo loans, WMB
“kept a portion for its own investment portfolio, and sold the rest either to Wall Street investors,
usually after securitizing them, or to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.” See Report from the U.S.
Senate Permanent Subcommittee “Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: Anatomy of a Financial
Collapse,” April 13, 2011 at 116. WBM’s business model thus relied heavily on selling and
securitizing all types of residential mortgage loans, especially those at higher risk of default.
13. Indeed, “[b]y securitizing billions of dollars in poor quality loans,” WMB was
able to decrease its risk exposure. WMB thus “polluted the financial system with mortgage
backed securities which later incurred high rates of delinquency and loss.” Report from the U.S.
Senate Permanent Subcommittee “Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: Anatomy of a Financial
Collapse,” April 13, 2011 at 116.
14. From 2000 to 2007, WMB and Long Beach securitized approximately $77 billion
in subprime and home equity loans. In addition, WMB sold or securitized at least $115 billion in
Option ARM loans. Between 2000 and 2008, WMB sold over $500 billion in loans to Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac, “accounting for more than a quarter of every dollar in loans WaMu
originated.” Id.
15. WMB’s securitizations produced only residential mortgage backed securities
(“RMBS”). From 2004 to 2006, WMB and Long Beach securitized dozens of pools or prime,
subprime, Alt A, second lien, home equity and Option ARM loans. WMAB and Long Beach
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also sold pools of nonperforming loans, including nonperforming primary mortgages, second
lien and Option ARMs. Id. at 117.
16. WMB developed its own securitization arm, Washington Mutual capital
Corporation (“WCC”), a wholly owned subsidiary of WMB. In addition to issuing
securitizations of residential mortgage loans, WCC also conducted whole loan sales. WCC sold
WMB loans and RMBS securities to insurance companies, pension funds, hedge funds,
investment banks and other banks. WCC also sold WMB loans to Fannie and Freddie Mac. Id.
at 117-118.
17. To securitize its loans, WMB assembled and sold a pool of loans to a qualifying
special-purpose entity (“QSPE”), typically a trust, that it established for the purpose of selling a
pool of loans. The QSPE then issued RMBS securities secured by future cash flows from the
loan pool. The QSPE, working with WCC and often and investment banker, then sold the
RMBS securities to investors and used the sale proceeds to repay WMB for the cost of the loan
pool. Id. at 118-119. Washington Mutual Inc. generally retained the right to service the loans.
Id. at 119.
18. Washington Mutual, Inc.’s Form 10-Q filed with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission on June 30, 2008 explained at page 60 the process through which
residential mortgage loans were securitized and sold to QSPEs:
Off-Balance Sheet Activities
The Company transforms loans into securities through a process known as

securitization. When the Company securitizes loans, the loans are usually sold to a
qualifying special-purpose entity ("QSPE"), typically a trust. The QSPE, in turn,
issues securities, commonly referred to as asset-backed securities, which are
secured by future cash flows on the sold loans. The QSPE sells the securities to
investors, which entitle the investors to receive specified cash flows during the term
of the security. The QSPE uses the proceeds from the sale of these securities to pay
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the Company for the loans sold to the QSPE. These QSPEs are not consolidated
within the financial statements since they satisfy the criteria established by
Statement No. 140, Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and
Extinguishments of Liabilities. In general, these criteria require the QSPE to be
legally isolated from the transferor (the Company), be limited to permitted
activities, and have defined limits on the types of assets it can hold and the
permitted sales, exchanges or distributions of its assets.
19. Importantly, the QSPE or trusts, which purchased many of the residential
mortgage loans, were separate legal entities distinct from WMB.
20. On January 8, 2007, WMB issued a press release on Business Wire that it would
securitize the subprime mortgages originated by its Long Beach divisions using the WaMu Asset
Acceptance Corp. shelf registration, which is also used for WMB’s prime, Alt A conduit and
subprime conduit securitizations. The new trusts were to be designated “WaMu Asset-Backed
Cetificates, WaMu Series 200x-HEX Trust” and the first transaction using the new name was
expected to close in January and would use the ticker name WAMU 2007-HE1. The press
release explained that WMB originated the loans through its Long Beach division and sells thrm
into the securitization, that WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp. is the depositor which acquires the
loans from WMB and deposits them with the securitization trust, and that WaMu Asset-Backed
Certificates, WaMu Series 2007-HE1 Trust is the securitized trust which holds the loans and
issues the certificates to investors.
21. In February 2007, in light of escalating default rates on residential mortgage
loans, WMB increased its efforts to sell and off load residential mortgage loans, including certain
Option ARMs which had been identified as delinquency prone. Indeed, approximately $1.5
billion Option AMRs which previously were designated for the “hold for investment” portfolio
were transferred to the “hold for sale” portfolio. Approximately $1 billion of these loans were
assembled into a pool and securitized as WMALT 2007-OA3 in March 2007.
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22. Between 2000 and 2008, WMB also sold over $500 billion in loans to Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac. The majority of these loans involved lower risk, fixed rate mortgages,
but also included billions of dollars in higher risk Option ARMs. In 2005, WMB became the
second largest seller of mortgage loans to Freddie Mac. In April 2006, WMB signed a two year
contract with Freddie Mac in which it agreed to sell the majority of its conforming loans to
Freddie Mac.
23. Prior to the collapse of the subprime market in mid-2007, WMB “had sold or
securitized the majority of the loans it had originated or purchased, undermining the U.S. home
loan mortgage market with hundreds of billions of dollars in high risk, poor quality loans.”
Report from the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee “Wall Street and the Financial Crisis:
Anatomy of a Financial Collapse,” April 13, 2011 at 173.
24. Because most residential mortgage loans which WMB originated or acquired,
including Plaintiffs’ residential mortgage loans, had been sold, securitized and/or held in trust,
and thus were owned by hundreds of private investors prior to WMB’s collapse and the FDIC
Receivership, Chase never acquired these loans – and could not have acquired them- from WMB
or the FDIC.
No Schedule Of Inventory Identifying The WMB Residential Mortgage Loans

Allegedly Acquired By Chase Exists
25. On September 24, 2006, the Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”) closed WMB
and appointed the FDIC as receiver. The FDIC immediately sold WMB to Chase for $1.9
billion.
26. In addition to the fact that WMB’s business model relied heavily on securitizing
and selling residential mortgages, while retaining at most a servicing interest in the underlying
loans, there was no schedule or inventory of assets listing any specific WMB residential
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mortgage loan acquired by Chase. Indeed, no asset list identifying WMB residential mortgage
loans which were not securitized and sold, and thus remained on the books and records of WMB
at the time of its collapse, has ever existed or has ever been produced or disclosed.
27. In the matter captioned, JPMorgan Chase, N.A., as Successor in Interest to
Washington Mutual Bank v. Waisome, 2009 CA 005717 (Fifth Judicial Circuit, Lake County
Florida) the deposition of a former WMB employee and subsequent Chase employee, Lawrence
Nardi, revealed that a schedule showing which residential mortgage loans were owned outright
by WMB (asset loans) and which residential mortgage loans were securitized and not owned by
WMB was contemplated in connection with the purchase of WMB from the FDIC by Chase.
(May 9, 2012 Nardi Dep. at 57:19-24; 58:1-8). However, that schedule has never materialized in
any form. Indeed, Nardi testified that such a schedule simply does not exist. Id. at 58:1-8 (“I
know that there was a schedule contemplated in certain documents related to the purchase. That
schedule has never materialized in any form. We’ve looked for it in countless other cases.
We’ve never been able to produce it in any previous cases. It would certainly be a wonderful
thing to have, but it’s – as far as I know, it doesn’t exist.”)
28. In In Re Mario Polychronas, AW Mario Polycrhonas Intervivos Trust of 2004,
(CD. Cal. Bankruptcy) Case No.: 1:11-BK-18306, Neil F. Garfield, Esq. provided a Declaration
dated December 14, 2012, in which he recounted, under penalty of perjury, his November 14,
2013 telephone conversation with Robert C. Schoppe, who was the Receiver in Charge for the
FDIC as Receiver for WMB. Mr. Schoppe explained to Mr. Garfield that there was never an
instrument recorded with respect to the assignment of any mortgage loans in connection with the
Purchase and Assumption Agreement between the FDIC and Chase dated September 25, 2008.
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Mr. Schoppe further explained to Mr. Garfield that most of the residential mortgage loans had
been sold into securitized trusts prior to WMBs collapse.
29. In connection with the Purchase and Assumption Agreement, the FDIC had
been working on a document to be posted on Intralinks that addressed various bidder questions
about the proposed WMB transaction with Chase. Among the "Frequently Asked Questions"
(FAQs) was the following question and answer:
[Question:] Are the off-balance sheet credit card portfolio and mortgage
securitizations included in the transaction? Do you expect the acquirer to assume
the servicing obligations? If there are pricing issues associated with the contracts
(e.g., the pricing is disadvantageous to the assuming institution), can we take
advantage of the FDIC's repudiation powers to effect a repricing?
Answer: The bank's interests and obligations associated with the off-
balance sheet credit card portfolio and mortgage securitizations pass to the
acquirer. Only contracts and obligations remaining in the receivership are subject
to repudiation powers.
Thus, according to the FDIC, the mortgage securitizations were not included in Chase’s
purchase of WMB’s assets from the FDIC.
Chase Acquires The WMB Mortgage Servicing Platform
30. Although WMB sold the vast majority of the residential mortgage loans which it
originated or acquired prior to its collapse on September 25, 2008, WMB retained mortgage
servicing rights for many of these loans. WMB serviced these loans through three electronic
mortgage servicing package platforms or MSP Systems. The MSP Systems stored and tracked
information about the loans that WMB serviced, and whether those loans were owned by WMB
or other entities.
31. When Chase acquired certain assets of WMB from the FDIC on September 25,
2008, it acquired the WMB MSP Systems. Chase thus had access to the investor codes which
identified the entities which owned the mortgage loans for which WMB had retained the
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servicing rights. In or around September 2009, Chase consolidated the three WMB versions of
the MSP Systems into one version of the MSP System that contained all WMB-serviced loans.
32. Certain Investor Codes in the MSP Systems relate back to WMB and indicate that
the loans were not owned by WMB and had been sold to other entities or held in trust. For
example, the Investor Code AO1 in the Loan Transfer History File indicates that the loans were
held by Washington Mutual Asset Acceptance Corporation, a subsidiary of WMB which
securitized and sold residential mortgage loans to private investors. Upon information and
belief, all Investor Codes which began with the letters A through V indicated that the loans were
owned or held by private investors and were not owned by WMB. The Investor Code 369 in the
Loan Transfer History File indicates that the loans were held by Washington Mutual Mortgage
Securities Corporation. Chase did not purchase loans with Investor Codes A01 (Washington
Mutual Asset Acceptance Corporation) and Investor Code 369 (Washington Mutual Mortgage
Securities Corporation).
33. In the action captioned Fox v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A, et al, Case No.
BC602491 (California Superior Court, County of Los Angeles), Chase stipulated on June 7,
2017, that “Investor Code A01 in the Loan Transfer History File represents WaMu Asset
Acceptance Corporation,” that “Investor Code 369 in the Loan Transfer History File represents
Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities Corporation,” and that the presence of these Investor
Codes indicates that, “JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. did not purchase the loan from the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation.”
34. Neither Washington Mutual Asset Acceptance Corporation nor Washington
Mutual Mortgage Securities Corporation were part of the Purchase and Assumption Agreement
between Chase and the FDIC dated September 25, 2008, which states in relevant part:
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“Assets” means all assets for the Failed Bank purchased pursuant to Section 3.1. Assets
owned by Subsidiaries of the Failed Bank are not “Assets” within the meaning of this
definition.
35. Indeed, as of 2017, both Washington Mutual Asset Acceptance Corporation and
Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities Corporation were still active entities which filed regular
Asset Backed Security Reports with the SEC. Hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of loans
were securitized and sold by WMB through these two entities and then sold to investors. Chase
knows or has access to the identities of the investors in, and true owners of, these loans.
36. In addition to Washington Mutual Asset Acceptance Corporation and Washington
Mutual Mortgage Securities Corporation, WMB sold billions of dollars in residential mortgage
loans to three asset trusts: Washington Mutual Home Equity Trust 1, WaMu 2006-OA1 and
WAMU 2007-FLEX1. Chase did not acquire the residential mortgage loans in these three trusts
pursuant to the Purchase and Assumption Agreement with the FDIC dated September 25, 2008.
37. Chase has the ability to change the Investor Codes in the MSP System to indicate
that the loans are now “bank owned,” whether or not this is an accurate reflection of the loan
status. In the consolidation of the WBM MSP Systems in September 2009, Chase assigned itself
Investor ID 062 and designated all the loans in that portfolio as Chase-owned loans. Chase has
since designated for itself Investor ID A11, A70 and X62. Thus, Chase doctored its software to
show that it was the owner of loans which it did not own.
Chase Fabricates Documents Purporting to Show An Assignment Of Numerous

WMB Loans To Chase Many Years After September 25, 2008
38. There exist significant and fatal defects in the chain of title and mortgage
satisfaction recordings for numerous residential mortgage loans originated or previously owned
by WMB, thus preventing actual and lawful acquisition by Chase when it was neither mortgagee
nor beneficiary thereof. The substantial defects in the chain of title are additional evidence of
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Chase’s lack of ownership of Plaintiffs’ and other home owners’ loans which were originated by
WMB.
39. Chase has engaged in a pattern and practice of manufacturing documents out of
whole cloth to create the appearance of a proper chain of title and its alleged ownership of the
WMB-originated or closed residential mortgage loans. Importantly, Chase has made these
documents many years after WMB’s collapse on September 25, 2008. Chase would not need to
create documentary evidence, well after the fact, had Chase lawfully acquired the WMB-
originated loans in the first instance pursuant to the Purchase and Assumption Agreement.
40. Indeed, Chase has incurred, and has sought reimbursement from the FDIC for,
certain costs associated with WMB-originated residential mortgage loans that were not reflected
on the books and records of WMB as of September 25, 2008, including, but not limited to, costs
incurred by Chase for: (a) creating individual assignments of the associated mortgages/deeds of
trust and allonges in an effort to avoid liability for wrongful foreclosure on these mortgages; (b)
expunging records associated with WMB mortgages as a result of errors in mortgage
documentation occurring prior to September 25, 2008, including erroneously recorded
satisfactions of mortgages and associated legal fees and disbursements; and (c) so called
“correcting” of various defects in the chains of title for WMB mortgages occurring prior to
September 25, 2008. These unusual and suspicious activities- all of which relate to fabricating
documents and expunging records- show that Chase did not, and could not, actually and lawfully
acquire numerous WMB-originated residential mortgage loans. Moreover, by actively
expunging records associated with the WMB residential mortgages, Chase has further clouded
the chain of title on the WMB originated or closed loans.
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41. Where a homeowner with a residential mortgage loan originated or closed by
WMB has filed for bankruptcy and also is in foreclosure, it is not uncommon to see two versions
of the alleged “original” note being presented by Chase as the alleged owner of the loan. One
version of the alleged “original” note commonly bears an undated endorsement “in blank,” with
a later version of the note bears a robo-signed endorsement, commonly from one Cynthia Riley.
Remarkably, in Kelley v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Case No. 10-BK-05245 (N.D. Cal.
Bankr.), Cynthia Riley testified that she has never personally put an endorsement stamp on a
note while employed at WMB (from which she was laid off in November 2006) or while
employed at Chase, where she was hired in January 2009.
42. In Daee v. JPMorgan Chase, Case No. 3:13-cv- 1332 (M.D. Tenn.), the Court
sanctioned Chase for discovery abuses. In the underlying action, two allonges on the subject
Note were created by Chase employees purportedly in order to show Chase allegedly had
standing to foreclose on a residential mortgage loan originated by WMB. In its Supplemental
Responses to discovery dated March 30, 2015, Chase admitted that its employees created the
allonges without having personal knowledge of the facts or underlying transactions. When
sanctioning Chase for abuse of discovery, the Court in Daee recognized as highly problematic
the fact that “none of the employees of former employees of [Chase] have any personal
knowledge of the underlying transaction[s].”
43. In Proodian v. Washington Mutual Bank, F.A., JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. et al,
Case No. 2013-CA- 011730 (15th Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach Cty. Fla.), Matthew Dudas, a
Legal Specialist III for Chase, provided sworn testimony at his deposition held on December 12,
2017. With respect to an “Assignment of Mortgage” for Mr. Proodian’s WMB -originated
residential mortgage loan, which stated that the FDIC assigned the mortgage to Chase and Chase
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executed the assignment as “attorney in fact” for the FDIC on December 4, 2014, several years
after the September 25, 2008 Purchase and Assumption Agreement, Mr. Dudas testified at his
deposition that this was not a valid assignment and that the assignment “does not convey any
ownership to the loan.” At best, Mr. Dudas testified, Chase had acquired only loan servicing
rights. As set forth below, nearly identical, and thus invalid, assignments were used by Chase to
purport to show its alleged ownership of the WMB -originated or closed residential mortgage
loans of Plaintiff Young and Plaintiff Brown for the purpose commencing foreclosure
proceedings in Chase’s own name.
44. Chase’s use of highly questionable, if not outright false, documents to attempt to
assert ownership of residential mortgage notes and allegedly show chain of title for the purposes
of foreclosure has come under the scrutiny of the U.S. Department of the Treasury. In 2011, the
U.S. Comptroller of the Currency, through his national bank examiners and other staff of the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”), conducted an examination of Chase’s
residential real estate mortgage processes. The OCC identified “deficient and unsafe or unsound
practices in residential mortgage servicing and the Chase’s initiation and handling of foreclosure
proceedings.”
45. In a Consent Order between Chase and the OCC dated April 13, 2011, Chase
agreed, among other things, to implement within sixty (60) days of the Order:
b. processes to ensure that all factual assertions made in pleadings, declarations,

declarations, affidavits, or other sworn statements filed by or on behalf of the
Bank are accurate, complete, and reliable; and that affidavits and declarations are
based on personal knowledge or a review of the Bank’s books and records when
the affidavit or declaration so states; . . .
e. processes to ensure that the Bank has properly documented ownership of the
promissory note and mortgage (or deed of trust) under applicable state law, or is
otherwise a proper party to the action (as a result of agency or other similar status)
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at all stages of foreclosure and bankruptcy litigation, including appropriate

transfer and delivery of endorsed notes and assigned mortgages or deeds of trust
at the formation of a residential mortgage-backed security, and lawful and
verifiable endorsement and successive assignment of the note and mortgage deed
or trust to reflect all changes of ownership;
f. processes to ensure that a clear and auditable trail exists for all factual
information contained in each affidavit or declaration, in support of each of the
charges that are listed, including whether the amount is chargeable to the
borrower and/or claimable by the investor.
46. Despite the fact Chase never owned or lawfully acquired a substantial number, if
not the outright majority, of WMB originated or acquired residential mortgage loans, including
the loans of Plaintiffs and other members of the Class, Chase has been unlawfully collecting
and/or foreclosing on thousands of these residential mortgage loans originated or previously
owned by WMB, including the loans of Plaintiffs and other members of the Class, in its own
name as mortgagee and beneficiary of the security instruments.
47. Moreover, in violation of the April 13, 2011 Consent Order, Chase continues to
make false representations in loan related documents, has failed to provide a clear and auditable
trail for all factual information contained in each affidavit or declaration, including whether the
amount is chargeable to the borrower and/or claimable by the investor, has failed to properly
document ownership of the promissory note and mortgage (or deed of trust), including
appropriate transfer and delivery of endorsed notes and assigned mortgages or deeds of trust at
the formation of a residential mortgage-backed security, and lawful and verifiable endorsement
and successive assignment of the note and mortgage deed or trust to reflect all changes of
ownership.
48. Where the owner of the loan has written off or otherwise relinquished its interest
in the loan, in whole or in part, then the borrower is entitled to get the benefit of the amount of
the loan which was discounted by the owner. Chase’s failures to provide a clear and auditable
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trail for all factual information concerning Plaintiffs’ and other Class members’ residential
mortgage loans, including whether the amount is chargeable to the borrower and/or claimable by
the investor, and failure to reflect accurately all changes of ownership, have resulted in the
Plaintiffs and other borrowers not knowing whether their loan has been discounted or written off
by the true owner/investors and thus, not receiving the benefit of the bargain where the loan has
been discounted or relinquished by the owner/investors.
49. Chase has created and/or exacerbated a cloud upon the chain of title for the
WMB-originated or closed residential mortgage loans of Plaintiffs and other members of the
Class, which in turn, diminishes the fair market value of the mortgaged property, reduces the
amount of financing obtainable, prevents or inhibits payoff of the mortgage, and impedes both
short sales and regular sales because of the confusion created concerning which party is
rightfully entitled to payment as the mortgage creditor.
50. Chase continues to unlawfully claim ownership of WMB-originated or closed
residential mortgage loans, to represent that it has an ownership interest in the residential mortgage
loans, to charge, collect and retain payments made by borrowers thereon, and to institute wrongful
foreclosure proceedings in its own name.
51. Upon information and belief, Chase has collected from Plaintiffs and others
similarly situated, and retained for its own benefits, mortgage payments and fees that belong to
undisclosed investors and/or that have been written-off, charged-off, liquidated, compromised or
otherwise released by the undisclosed owners and investors without the recording of satisfactions.
Upon information and belief, numerous trustees for, and investors in, the WMB RMBS securitized
transactions have released their security interests or have simply walked away from these
investments - in some cases, many years ago.
18
Plaintiff Ethel Young
52. On or about April 16, 2008 Plaintiff Young made, executed and delivered to
WMB a Promissory Note in the principal sum of $176,000 for property located at 5751
Timberlane Road, Matteson, Illinois 60443. Pursuant to the Note, Plaintiff Young was obligated
to make monthly principal and interest payments. The Note was secured by a mortgage on the
real property located in Matteson, Illinois.
53. On June 1, 2008, Fannie Mae acquired Plaintiff Young’s loan. Fannie Mae held
Plaintiff Young’s note from June 1, 20018 until December 17, 2015.
54. At some point in time after September 25, 2008, Chase began charging and
receiving payments from Plaintiff Young and other members of the Class for mortgage payments
due for the residential mortgage loans originated or previously owned by WMB.
55. On or about May 1, 2011, Plaintiff Young defaulted on payments for her
mortgage loan which was originated or previously owned by WMB, and Chase initiated the
foreclosure proceedings in its own name against Plaintiff Young on or about August 26, 2011.
56. On January 16, 2012, Chase wrote to Plaintiff Young stating, inter alia, that
Fannie Mae, not Chase, was the owner of her residential mortgage loan for the property located
at 5751 Timberlane Road, Matteson, Illinois.
57. On or about February 5, 2013, Plaintiff Young filed for bankruptcy. After the
bankruptcy discharge, Chase continued to bill Plaintiff Young for mortgage payments on the
mortgage loan originated or previously owned by WMB.
58. On or around March 2, 2013, more than two years after Chase had commenced
foreclosure proceedings in its own name against Plaintiff Young for default on the WMB
mortgage for the property located at 5751 Timberlane Road, Matteson, Illinois, Chase purported
19
to assign itself Plaintiff Young’s mortgage which WMB- originated or previously owned and
which Fannie Mae obtained ownership of from WMB on or around June 1, 2008. . The
“Assignment of Mortgage” was signed by Audia Gardenhi, as the Vice President of JPMorgan
Chase Bank, National Association, and the Attorney-in -Fact for the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, as Receiver of Washington Mutual Bank F/K/A/ Washington Mutual Bank, FA.
The Assignment states “This Assignment is intended to further memorialize the transfer that
occurred by operation of law on September 25, 2008.”
59. This alleged Assignment was fraudulent, invalid and void for several reasons.
First, Chase had previously represented that Fannie Mae, not Chase, was the owner of Plaintiff
Young’s residential mortgage loan on January 16, 2012. Chase cannot assign itself a mortgage
which is owned by Fannie Mae. Indeed, Fannie Mae has confirmed that it, and not Chase,
possessed Plaintiff Young’s note from June 1, 2008 until December 17, 2015.
60. Second, upon information and belief, Audia Gardenhi was not both a Vice
President of Chase and an “attorney in fact” for the FDIC in March 2013.
61. Moreover, while the FDIC provided Chase with a limited power of attorney in
connection with the September 25, 2008 Purchase and Assumption Agreement, that limited
power of attorney automatically expired two years later on September 25, 2010. Indeed, in Ames
v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 298 Ga. 732, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 210 *** (March 7, 2016), the
FDIC represented that it had appointed Chase “to act as Attorney-in-Fact for the [FDIC] for the
limited purposed of transferring “any interest in real estate . . .and any personal appurtenant to
the real estate from the [FDIC] to [Chase] or to an affiliate of [Chase].” Id., at **2-3. In Ames,
the FDIC represented that this limited power of attorney was effective on September 25, 2008,
and “automatically revoked” on September 25, 2010. Id.
20
62. The March 2, 2013 “Assignment” of Plaintiff Young’s residential mortgage loan
is fraudulent, invalid and void for the additional reason that it was created out of whole cloth by
Nationwide Title Clearing – a document service provider. On its website,
www.netc.com/ntclink/Services/DocumentServices/Assignments.aspx, Nationwide Title
Clearing states that it “offers a complete resolution process for problem files and research
services, making it easy to procure and repair documents mandatory to transfer the loan or record
an assignment.” In other words, Nationwide Title Clearing “creates” or fabricates documents
after the fact which are missing in the chain of title to enable the recording of a fraudulent
assignment of mortgage.
63. On October 24, 2013, the Attorney General of Illinois entered a Final Consent
Decree with National Title Clearing to resolve allegations that it had violated the Illinois
Consumer Fraud Act and Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act in the course of its business of
creating, signing, and recoding documents in the public land records system in Illinois on behalf
of financial institutions or mortgage servicers within the mortgage industry. Pursuant to the
Final Consent Decree, National Title Clearing was required, inter alia, to “remediate any
document in Illinois that is found by a court to be a cloud on title or otherwise unlawful. . . [and]
also remediate any document when reasonably necessary to assist any person or borrower, or
when required by federal, state, or local law.”
64. On April 23, 2014, Plaintiff Young wrote to Chase requesting debt validation for
her mortgage loan.
65. On May 6, 2014, Chase responded to Plaintiff Young’s April 23, 2014 letter and
stated, “We have reviewed the loan and we maintain that you have undertaken a valid, binding
and legally enforceable obligation to us” and that “Chase will not tolerate attempts to avoid a
21
valid debt.” Chase further represented that Plaintiff’s loan was “closed, or originated, by
Washington Mutual Bank on April 15, 2008” and that “Chase acquired your loan in good faith.”
These statements were materially false and misleading. As set forth herein, upon information
and belief, Chase did not purchase or otherwise acquire Plaintiff Young’s mortgage from WMB
and had no right to represent that it had acquired her mortgage. Indeed, Fannie Mae, and not
Chase, was the holder of Plaintiff Young’s mortgage note, and owner of her residential mortgage
loan. Chase represented in this letter, however, that it had acquired Plaintiff Young’s mortgage
and that Fannie Mae was merely an investor in Plaintiff Young’s loan. This statement was
materially false, misleading and confusing because Fannie Mae, and not Chase, held Plaintiff
Young’s note at this time. Only one entity can be the note holder of the mortgage loan. Chase’s
representations omitted this material information and made it seem as if Chase, not Fannie Mae,
was the owner of Plaintiff Young’s mortgage loan to whom the debt was owed.
66. Chase rescheduled a foreclosure sale of Plaintiff Young’s property for July 17,
2014. That sale was cancelled because Plaintiff Young engaged in loss mitigation negotiations
with Chase, who continued to represent that it was the rightful owner of Plaintiff Young’s loan
when this was not true.
67. Over the next two years, Chase continued to represent, falsely, to Plaintiff Young
that it was the owner of her residential mortgage loan. Chase, moreover, proceeded to take steps
to foreclose on Plaintiff Young in its own name, despite the fact that it never owned her
residential mortgage loan. During this time, Plaintiff Young continued to attempt to work out a
loan modification agreement with Chase based on its false representations that it was the owner
of her loan.
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68. The records of Fannie Mae indicate that on December 17, 2015, Plaintiff Young’s
loan, which was owned by Fannie Mae and not Chase, was liquidated.
69. When a loan is liquidated, whether by way of payment in full, a disposition, a
refinance, a compromise, or a charge-off,2 the debt is settled, and the stated principal balance of a
liquidated loan is deemed to be zero.
70. Even though Plaintiff Young’s loan had been liquidated on December 17, 2015,
Chase continued to represent, falsely, to Plaintiff Young that it was the owner of her residential
mortgage loan and continued to pursue foreclosure proceedings in its own name against Plaintiff
Young.
71. In or around February 2016, Chase transferred servicing rights of Plaintiff
Young’s loan to Fay Servicing, LLC (“Fay”).
72. Nevertheless, despite having neither ownership of, nor servicing rights in,
Plaintiff Young’s residential mortgage loan, Chase rescheduled a foreclosure sale on Plaintiff
Young’s loan for February 9, 2016, which was then postposed until March 10, 2016, and then
cancelled due to further loss mitigation efforts between Chase and Plaintiff Young. Chase had
no right to pursue foreclosure against Plaintiff Young or to engage in loss mitigation efforts with
Plaintiff Young because it did not own Plaintiff Young’s residential mortgage loan, and the loan
had been liquidated on December 17, 2015. Moreover, in February 2016, Fay became the loan
servicer for Plaintiff Young’s residential mortgage loan. Thus, as of February 2016, Chase had
no legal interest whatsoever in Plaintiff Young’s residential mortgage loan, yet continued to act
as if it was both the owner and servicer of the loan.
2
Plaintiff Young did not refinance her residential mortgage loan at this time.
23
73. On May 26, 2016, Plaintiff Young’s property was sold in foreclosure by Chase,
and Chase was the successful bidder at the sale.
74. For the reasons set forth herein, Chase did not purchase or lawfully acquire
Plaintiff Young’s residential mortgage loan from WMB or the FDIC and had no right to
represent that it had an ownership interest in the mortgage, to commence foreclosure proceedings
in its own name, to engage in loss mitigation negotiation with Plaintiff Young, or to collect and
retain payments from Plaintiff Young on the residential mortgage loan. Indeed, from June 1,
2008 until December 17, 2015, Fannie Mae was the rightful owner of Plaintiff Young’s
residential mortgage loan, and Plaintiff Young’s loan was liquidated on December 17, 2015.
Plaintiff Kathleen D. Hayden
75. On or about June 4, 2005, Plaintiff Hayden made, executed and delivered to
WMB a Promissory Note in the principal sum of $60,000 for property located at 2082 Mariposa
Way, Placentia, California 92870. Pursuant to the Note, Plaintiff Hayden was obligated to make
monthly principal and interest payments. On or about June 4, 2005, Plaintiff Hayden made,
executed and delivered to WMB a Deed of Trust granting WMB a security interest in certain real
property located at 2082 Mariposa Way, Placentia, California.
76. At some point in time after September 25, 2008, Chase started billing and
receiving payments from Plaintiff Hayden and other members of the Class, for the residential
mortgage loans that were originated or previously owned by WMB, even though the loans did
not belong to Chase.
77. Thereafter, Plaintiff Hayden defaulted on her loan payments, and Chase initiated
foreclosure proceedings in its own name.
24
78. On or about August 19, 2011, Plaintiff Hayden filed for bankruptcy, and received
a Chapter 7 discharge on or about March 26, 2012.
79. After the bankruptcy discharge on March 26, 2012, Chase attempted to collect
loan payments from Plaintiff Hayden for the residential mortgage loan originated or previously
owned by WMB. In or around 2013, Plaintiff Hayden began receiving collection calls from a
debt collector requesting payment on behalf of Chase for the residential mortgage loan originated
or previously owned by WMB for the property located at 2082 Mariposa Way, Placentia,
California.
80. On September 23, 2015, Chase wrote to Plaintiff Hayden’s spouse concerning
Plaintiff Hayden’s mortgage account for the loan originated or previously owned by WMB for
the property located at 2082 Mariposa Way, Placentia, California. The upper righthand corner of
this letter stated, “LET’S SETTLE Three options to settle your account for much less than the
remaining balance.” In this letter Chase stated, “We understand that you’ve received a Chapter 7
bankruptcy discharge and you don’t have to pay any amount toward this account.” Chase went
on to represent “We also realize that we may hold the lien on the property that may keep you
from moving on.” This statement was materially false, deceptive and misleading because Chase
never acquired an ownership interest in Plaintiff Hayden’s loan which was originated or
previously owned by WMB. In this letter, Chase offered “to greatly reduce the remaining
balance of $59,654.91 on [Plaintiff’s] account, so it’s easier for you to settle this account once
and for all.” This statement was deceptive and misleading because Chase was not the owner of
Plaintiff Hayden’s residential mortgage loan and did not have the authority from the loan
owner(s) to enter into a settlement with Plaintiff Hayden.
25
81. On February 26, 2016, Chase wrote to Plaintiff Hayden regarding her mortgage
account for the loan originated or previously owned by WMB for the property located at 2082
Mariposa Way, Placentia, California. In the February 26, 2016 letter, Chase offered three
options to settle Plaintiff Hayden’s residential mortgage account balance for an amount less than
the settlement amounts offered in the September 23, 2015 letter. The upper righthand corner of
the February 26, 2016 letter stated “LET’S SETTLE. Three options to settle your account for
much less than the remaining balance.” In this letter Chase stated, “We understand that you’ve
received a Chapter 7 bankruptcy discharge and you don’t have to pay any amount toward this
account.” Chase went on to represent “We also realize that we may hold the lien on the property
that may keep you from moving on.” This statement was materially false and misleading
because Chase never acquired an ownership interest in Plaintiff Hayden’s loan which was
originated or previously owned by WMB. Chase, moreover, had no authority to “settle” any
account balance that Plaintiff Hayden may have had on this loan. In this letter, Chase offered a
“repayment plan” to Plaintiff Hayden, including the option of making 36 monthly payments at
$269.00.
82. Plaintiff Hayden accepted Chase’s “offer” of a repayment plan of $269.00 per
month as set forth in the February 26, 2016 letter and began making a monthly payment of
$269.00. Plaintiff Hayden continued to make these monthly payments to Chase for
approximately the next two years.
83. On January 26, 2018, Chase wrote to Plaintiff Hayden stating “We received your
check for $269.00 for your home equity account, but we can’t accept it because the account has
been settled, or you’re no longer responsible for the account. As a result, we’re returning your
payment. We’ve enclosed your check for $269.00.” However, Chase did not return any
26
previous payments made by Plaintiff Hayden on the mortgage loan originated or previously
owned by WMB.
84. Upon information and belief, the undisclosed owner(s), trustees and/or investors
in Plaintiff Hayden’s WMB-originated loan have, at some prior and undisclosed point in time,
released their security interest in, and ownership of, Plaintiff Hayden’s loan. Chase, however,
has not offered to reimburse Plaintiff Hayden for payments Plaintiff Hayden made to Chase
under the false representation that Chase, and not the undisclosed owners, trustees, and/or
investors, held an ownership interest in Plaintiff Hayden’s loan. Nor has Chase identified the
actual owners of Plaintiff Hayden’s loan. Plaintiff Hayden is thus unable to determine whether
the amounts she paid to Chase on her residential mortgage loan were actually owed and whether
the amounts paid to Chase were forwarded to the actual owner(s) of her loan.
85. For the reasons set forth herein, Chase did not purchase or lawfully acquire
Plaintiff Hayden’s residential mortgage loan for the property located at 2082 Mariposa Way,
Placentia, California from WMB or the FDIC and had no right to represent that it had an
ownership interest in the mortgage, to commence foreclosure proceedings in its own name, and
to collect and retain payments from Plaintiff Hayden on the mortgage loan.
Plaintiff Sterlyn Brown, as Administrator of the Estate of Sylvia Brown and Administrator
of the Estate of Denise Hylton
86. On or around July 23, 2001, Sylvia Brown, the late wife of Plaintiff Sterlyn Brown,
and Denise Hylton, the late mother of Plaintiff Sterlyn Brown, executed and delivered to WMB a
promissory note and deed of trust granting WMB a security interest in certain real property located
at 105-10 Avenue J, Brooklyn, New York 11236.
27
87. At some point after September 25, 2008, Chase started billing and receiving
payments from Sylvia Brown and other members of the Class for the residential mortgage loans
that were originated or previously owned by WMB, even though the loans did not belong to Chase.
88. On July 24, 2012, Sylvia Brown passed away, and Plaintiff Sterlyn Brown became
the Administrator of the Estate of Sylvia Brown. Plaintiff Brown was also the Administrator of
the Estate of Denise Hylton, his late mother. Plaintiff Brown continued to make monthly mortgage
payments to Chase for the mortgage originated or previously owned by WMB for the property
located at 105-10 Avenue J, Brooklyn, New York.
89. In or around November 1, 2013, Plaintiff Brown defaulted on the mortgage loan
payments.
90. On September 5, 2014, Chase commenced foreclosure proceedings in its own name
against Sylvia Brown as a result of default on the mortgage loan originated or previously owned
by WMB on the property located at 105-10 Avenue J, Brooklyn, New York. Chase represented in
the foreclosure complaint that Chase “is the current owner and holder of the subject mortgage and
note, or has been delegated the authority to institute a mortgage foreclosure action by the owner
and holder of the subject mortgage note.” This statement was materially false and misleading
because Chase did not acquire an ownership interest in a substantial number of the residential
mortgage loans originated or previously owned by WMB, including Sylvia Brown’s mortgage
loan, and had not been delegated authority by the owner and holder of the subject mortgage note
to commence foreclosure proceedings.
91. Chase also represented in the foreclosure complaint brought against Sylvia Brown
that if Chase “is not the original owner and holder of the subject note and mortgage then
information regarding the chain of title will be contained in Schedule “D”. In Schedule D to the
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foreclosure complaint, Chase represented “[t]he Note and Mortgage were transferred to JPMorgan
Chase Bank, National Association, and said transfer was memorialized by Assignment of
Mortgage executed on February 24, 2014.”
92. The so-called February 24, 2014 Assignment was signed by Kaila A. Murphy, as
both the Vice President of Chase and the “attorney in fact” for the FDIC. This alleged Assignment
of the Browns’ WMB-originated mortgage took place more than five years after Chase allegedly
acquired certain unspecified assets of WMB from the FDIC pursuant to the Purchase and
Assumption Agreement dated September 25, 2008.
93. Upon information and belief, Kaila A. Murphy was not a Vice President of Chase
and the “attorney in fact” for the FDIC in February 2014.
94. Indeed, as set forth in Ames v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 298 Ga. 732, 2016 Ga.
LEXIS 210 *** (March 7, 2016), in connection with the Purchase and Assumption Agreement,
the FDIC had appointed Chase “to act as Attorney-in-Fact for the [FDIC]” for the limited purposed
of transferring “any interest in real estate . . .and any personal appurtenant to the real estate from
the [FDIC] to [Chase] or to an affiliate of [Chase].” Id., at **2-3. However, this limited power of
attorney was effective on September 25, 2008, and “automatically revoked” on September 25,
2010. Id. Thus, the Assignment of Mortgage dated February 24, 2014 is false, invalid and void
because it was created more than three years after Chase’s limited power of attorney from the
FDIC was revoked.
95. The Assignment of Mortgage dated February 24, 2014 is false, invalid and void for
the additional reason that it was created out of whole cloth by Nationwide Title Clearing (which
appears as the presenter and returnee on the Assignment) – a document service provider. On its
website, www.netc.com/ntclink/Services/DocumentServices/Assignments.aspx, Nationwide Title
29
Clearing states that it “offers a complete resolution process for problem files and research services,
making it easy to procure and repair documents mandatory to transfer the loan or record an
assignment.” In other words, Nationwide Title Clearing “creates” or fabricates documents after
the fact which are missing in a chain of title to enable the recording of a fraudulent assignment of
mortgage.
96. The February 24, 2014 Assignment was generated by Nationwide Title Clearing
after Plaintiff Brown defaulted on the loan solely for the purpose of enabling Chase, who lacked
an ownership interest in the loan, to record the false assignment of the mortgage on March 26,
2014, in order to commence foreclosure proceedings.
97. On July 27, 2017, the law offices of Shapiro, DiCaro & Barak, LLC, as the agent
of Chase, wrote to Plaintiff Sterlyn Brown, as Administrator of the Estate of Sylvia Brown and the
Administrator of the Estate of Denise Hylton, concerning the mortgage loan originated or
previously owned by WMB. In this letter, Shapiro, DiCaro & Barak, LLC, as the agent of Chase
stated, “As of July 18, 2017, our client has advised us that the amount of debt is $248,463.03. The
creditor to whom the debt is owed is JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association.” This
statement was materially false and misleading because Chase was not the creditor to whom the
debt was owed by Plaintiff Brown, the Administrator of the Estate of Sylvia Brown and the
Administrator of the Estate of Denise Hylton, and Chase did not acquire an ownership interest in
the residential mortgage loan to Sylvia Brown and Denise Hylton which was originated or
previously owned by WMB.
98. On August 18, 2017, Plaintiff Brown wrote to Chase’s agent, the law offices of
Shapiro, DiCaro & Barak, LLC, disputing the debt referenced in the July 27, 2017 letter and asked
30
that he be provided all information and documenting evidencing the validity of the debt and the
true owner of the debt.
99. On September 5, 2017, the law offices of Shapiro, DiCaro & Barak, LLC, as the
agent of Chase, wrote to Plaintiff Sterlyn Brown, as Administrator of the Estate of Sylvia Brown
and Administrator of the Estate of Denise Hylton, concerning the mortgage loan to Sylvia Brown
which was originated or previously owned by WMB. In this letter, Shapiro, DiCaro & Barak,
LLC, as the agent of Chase, represented that “JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. is the current loan
servicer and holder of the Note and Mortgage.” This statement was materially false and misleading
because Chase did not acquire an ownership interest in the residential mortgage loan to Sylvia
Brown which was originated or previously owned by WMB, and the February 24, 2014
Assignment was false, invalid and void.
100. Chase made additional false representations to Plaintiff Brown concerning its
ownership of the residential mortgage loan for the property located at 105-10 Avenue J, Brooklyn,
New York, including providing Plaintiff Brown with an undated “Allonge to Mortgage Note”
which represented that JPMorgan Chase Bank NA was both the buyer and the seller of Sylvia
Brown’s mortgage. The undated Allonge was signed on behalf of Chase by Cory J. Settoon, Vice
President.
101. On October 12, 2017, Chase filed a foreclosure complaint in its own name against
Sterlyn Brown, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Sylvia Brown and as
Administrator of the Estate of Denise Hylton, for default on the mortgage originated or previously
owned by WMB. In this foreclosure complaint, Chase falsely represents that the Note and
Mortgage were transferred to JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association, and said transfer was
memorialized by an Assignment of Mortgage executed on February 24, 2014, and recorded March
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26, 2014. As alleged above, however, this Assignment and subsequent recording were false,
invalid and void.
102. For the reasons set forth herein, Chase did not purchase or properly acquire Denise
Hylton and Sylvia Brown’s mortgage from WMB, the FDIC or itself and had no right to represent
to Plaintiff Brown, as Administrator of the Estate of Sylvia Brown and Administrator of the Estate
of Denise Hylton, that it had an ownership interest in the residential mortgage loan, to collect and
retain payments from Plaintiff Brown on the loan, or to commence foreclosure proceedings in its
own name.
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS
103. Plaintiffs repeat, reallege, and incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs
of this Complaint as if set forth herein.
104. Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs bring this
action on behalf of themselves and a nationwide consumer class defined as follows and reserve
the right to amend the class definition:
All persons in the United States who had residential mortgage loans originated
or previously owned by WMB which were not acquired by Chase pursuant to the
Purchase and Assumption Agreement and who were charged by Chase and who
paid Chase for those loans as a result of Chase’s representation that it has or had
ownership interest in the loans during the applicable statute of limitations.
105. The proposed Class is so numerous that individual joinder of all its members is
impracticable. Due to the nature of Defendant’s operation involved, however, Plaintiffs believe
the total number of Class Members is in the thousands and members are numerous and
geographically dispersed across the United States. While the exact number and identities of the
Class Members are unknown at this time, such information can be ascertained through
32
appropriate investigation and discovery. The disposition of the claims of the Class Members in a
single class action will provide substantial benefits to all parties and to the Court.
106. There is a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact
involved affecting the Plaintiffs and the Class and these common questions of fact and law
include, but are not limited to, the following:
• Whether Defendant acquired the residential mortgage loans of Plaintiffs and other
members of the Class which were originated or previously owned by WMB;
• Whether Defendant falsely represents to consumers that it owns the WMB
residential mortgage loans and whether based on this representation it bills and
receives payments from Class Members, and/or or forecloses on those loans in its
own name;
• Whether Defendant had a duty to disclose to Plaintiffs and Class Members that it
never acquired the WMB-originated residential mortgage loans;
• Whether Defendant’s alleged conduct violates public policy;
• Whether the alleged conduct constitutes violations of the laws asserted herein;
• Whether Plaintiffs and Class Members have sustained monetary loss and the
proper measure of that loss;

• Whether Chase has been unjustly enriched by this conduct;
• Whether Chase has violated RESPA § 1024.36; and
• Whether Plaintiffs and Class Members are entitled to declaratory and injunctive
relief.
107. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class. Plaintiffs
and Class Members have been similarly affected by Defendant’s common course of conduct
since they all relied on Defendant’s false representations concerning its alleged ownership of
33
Class Members’ residential mortgage loans which were originated or previously owned by
WMB.
108. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the
Class. Plaintiffs have retained counsel with substantial experience in handling complex class
action litigation in general, and claims regarding consumer class actions in particular. Plaintiffs
and their counsel are committed to vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf of the Class and
have the financial resources to do so.
109. Plaintiffs and the members of the Class have suffered, and will continue to suffer,
harm as a result of the Defendant’s unlawful and wrongful conduct. A class action is superior to
other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the present controversy.
Individual joinder of all members of the Class is impracticable. Even if individual Class
Members had the resources to pursue individual litigation, it would be unduly burdensome to the
courts in which the individual litigation would proceed. Individual litigation magnifies the delay
and expense to all parties in the court system of resolving the controversies engendered by
Defendant’s common course of conduct. The class action device allows a single court to provide
the benefits of unitary adjudication, judicial economy, and the fair and efficient handling of all
Class Members’ claims in a single forum. The conduct of this action as a class action conserves
the resources of the parties and of the judicial system and protects the rights of class members.
Furthermore, for many, if not most, a class action is the only feasible mechanism that allows an
opportunity for legal redress and justice.
110. Adjudication of individual Class Members’ claims with respect to Defendant
would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of other members not parties to the
34
adjudication and could similarly impair or impede the ability of Class Members to protect their
interests.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

UNJUST ENRICHMENT
(By Plaintiffs and on Behalf of the Class as Against Defendant)
111. Plaintiffs repeat, reallege and incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs of
this Complaint as if set forth herein.
112. As alleged herein, Plaintiffs conferred a benefit upon Defendant. Defendant and
its affiliates received from Plaintiffs and Class Members benefits in the form of loan payments and
fees related to residential mortgage loans Defendant did not own.
113. Defendant has knowledge of this benefit, and solicited, voluntarily accepted, and
retained the benefit conferred.
114. Defendant has been enriched at the expense of Plaintiffs because Defendant
retained the benefits, but did not have the authority to release Plaintiffs from liability, or issue
determinations of loan satisfaction, because Defendant did not own the loans.
115. Defendant has been further enriched because Defendant received financial benefits
in the form of increased interest income based on the loan payments received from Plaintiffs and
Class Members.
116. It is against equity and good conscience to permit Defendant to retain the
aforementioned benefits.
117. Wherefore, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated Class
Members, demand an award against Defendant in the amounts by which Defendant has been
unjustly enriched at Plaintiffs’ and the Class Members’ expense, and such other relief as this Court
deems just and proper.
35
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

CONVERSION
119. As alleged herein, Defendant willfully interfered with Plaintiffs’ and Class
Members’ right to property in the form of their loan payments to Defendant.
120. Defendant willfully, intentionally, and substantially interfered with Plaintiffs’
property by soliciting, accepting, and retaining Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ loan payments
under false pretense that Chase owns the residential mortgage loans in question.
121. Defendant’s actions enabled it to collect loan payments from Plaintiffs and Class
Members that Defendant was not authorized to retain.
122. Plaintiffs and Class Members were harmed because they were deprived of the
amounts retained by Defendant.
123. Defendant’s accepting and retaining of Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ loan
payments caused Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ substantial damages.
Members, demand an award against Defendant in the amount by which Defendant collected from
Plaintiffs and the Class Members, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
36
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED
126. As alleged herein, Defendant collected, received, and retained money from
Plaintiffs and Class Members that Defendant was not authorized to retain. The payments
received and retained by Defendant were not used for the benefit of Plaintiffs and Class
Members, for instance in the form of loan balance reduction and/or satisfaction of loans, because
Defendant did not own the residential mortgage loans.
127. Defendant has not returned the payments it unlawfully received to Plaintiffs or
Class Members.
Members, demand an award against Defendant in the amounts by which Defendant received
from Plaintiffs and the Class Members, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

For Unlawful Business Practices
[Cal. Bus. and Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq.]
this Complaint as if set forth herein. Plaintiff Hayden brings this claim individually and on
behalf of a California subclass.
130. Chase is a “person” as that term is defined under Cal. Bus. and Prof. Code
§17201.
131. Cal. Bus. And Prof. Code § 17200 defines unfair competition as any unlawful,
unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice.

37
132. During the applicable statute of limitations, by and through the conduct described
in the preceding paragraphs, Defendant has engaged in deceptive, unfair and unlawful practices
by soliciting and receiving payments for residential mortgage loans Defendant did not own.
Defendants deceived Class Members by implying or representing that Defendant owned the
residential mortgage loans and was properly allowed to collect the debt, in violation of California
Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq., and has thereby deprived Plaintiff Hayden,
and the other members of the California subclass, of fundamental rights and privileges.
133. By and through the deceptive, unfair and unlawful business practices described in
this complaint, Chase has obtained valuable property, money, and services from Plaintiff
Hayden, and the other members of the California subclass, and has deprived them of valuable
rights and benefits guaranteed by law, all to their detriment.
134. Defendant’s deceptive, unfair and unlawful business practices, moreover, are in
violation, inter alia, of the Consent Order between Chase and the OCC dated April 13, 2011, and
RESPA § 1024.36.
135. All the acts described herein as are unlawful and in violation of public policy; and
in addition are immoral, unethical, oppressive, and unscrupulous, and thereby constitute
deceptive, unfair and unlawful business practices in violation of California Business and
Professions Code section 17200 et seq.
136. Plaintiff Hayden, and the other members of the California subclass, are entitled to,
and do, seek such relief as may be necessary to restore to them the money and property which
Chase has acquired, or of which Plaintiff Hayden, and other members of the California subclass,
have been deprived, by means of the above described deceptive, unfair and unlawful business
practices.
38
137. Plaintiff Hayden and the other members of the California subclass are further
entitled to, and do, seek a declaration that Defendant’s above described business practices are
deceptive, unfair and unlawful and that an injunctive relief should be issued requiring Defendant
to adhere its business practices and policies to California law, and restraining Chase from
engaging in any of the above described deceptive, unfair and unlawful business practices in the
future.
138. Plaintiff Hayden and the other members of the California subclass have no plain,
speedy, and/or adequate remedy at law to redress the injuries which they have suffered as a
consequence of the deceptive, unfair and unlawful business practices of Chase. As a result of the
deceptive, unfair and unlawful business practices described above, Plaintiff Hayden and the other
members of the California subclass have suffered and will continue to suffer irreparable harm
unless Chase is restrained from continuing to engage in these deceptive, unfair and unlawful
business practices. In addition, Chase should be required to disgorge the unpaid moneys to
Plaintiff and the other members of the California subclass.
139. Pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, Plaintiff Hayden
requests that the court award her and the other members of the California subclass reasonable
attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by them in this action.
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

VIOLATION OF THE ILLINOIS CONSUMER FRAUD AND DECEPTIVE
BUSINESS PRACTICES ACT
(Violation of 815 ILCS 505 et seq.)
140. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate all preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth
herein. Plaintiff Young brings this claim individually and on behalf of an Illinois subclass.
39
141. The elements of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices
Act, 815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. are “(1) a deceptive act or practice by the defendant; (2) defendant's
intent that plaintiff rely on the deception; (3) that the deception occur in a course of conduct
involving trade and commerce; and (4) damages.”
142. As alleged herein, Defendant engaged in a deceptive act of soliciting payments
from Plaintiff and Illinois subclass members on residential mortgage loans that Defendant did
not own and commencing and maintaining foreclosure proceedings in its own name against
Plaintiff and other Illinois subclass members when it did not have the right to do so because it
lacked an ownership interest in the loan. Defendant deceived debtors by falsely representing and
otherwise implying that Defendant owned the residential mortgage loans and was properly
allowed to collect the debt, either by collecting monthly mortgage payments or by commencing
foreclosure proceedings.
143. Defendant’s alleged unlawful conducted was intended to make debtors rely on the
deceptive acts, and believe they were required to make payments to Defendant to satisfy the loan
debts.
144. Defendant’s unlawful conduct alleged herein occurred in the course of mortgage
loan trade and commerce, an industry in which Defendant has years of experience.
145. Defendant’s unlawful conduct, moreover, is in violation, inter alia, of the Consent
Order between Chase and the OCC dated April 13, 2011, and RESPA § 1024.36.
146. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s unlawful actions, Plaintiff Young
and other members of the Illinois subclass made payments to Defendant even though Defendant
was not the holder or owner of the residential mortgage loans, and Plaintiff Young and other
members of the Illinois subclass were deprived of the amounts of their payments, and
40
satisfaction of their loans. Plaintiff Young and other members of the Illinois subclass were also
required to defend themselves in wrongful foreclosure proceedings and/or also lost their homes
in foreclosure proceedings brought in Defendant’s own name.
147. Plaintiff Young and other Illinois subclass nembers are entitled to seek recovery
of actual damages, injunctive relief, reasonable costs and attorney’s fees, and any other relief the
Court deems appropriate, pursuant to 815 ILCS 505/10a.
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION

VIOLATION OF NEW YORK GENERAL BUSINESS LAW, SECTION 349
148. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate all preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth
herein. Plaintiff Brown, as Administrator of the Estate of Sylvia Brown and Administrator of the
Estate of Denise Hylton, brings this claim individually and on behalf of a New York subclass.
149. Defendant’s conduct constitutes deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of
business, trade or commerce or on the furnishing of services in New York which affects the
public interest under N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. §349. Plaintiff Brown, as Administrator of the Estate of
Sylvia Brown and Administrator of the Estate of Denise Hylton, is a member of the consuming
public.
150. As fully alleged above, Defendant deceived debtors in New York by falsely
representing that it owned the residential mortgage loans of Plaintiff Brown and the other
members of the New York subclass. Based on these misrepresentations, Defendant solicited and
retained payments from, and commenced foreclosure proceedings in its own name against,
Plaintiff and other members of the New York subclass on loans that Defendant did not own.
151. Defendant’s conduct was materially misleading to Plaintiff Brown and members
of the New York subclass.
41
152. Defendant’s conduct, moreover, is in violation, inter alia, of the Consent Order
between Chase and the OCC dated April 13, 2011 and RESPA § 1024.36.
153. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’ violation of this statute, Plaintiff
Brown and the members of the New York subclass were injured and suffered damages.
154. The injuries to Plaintiff Brown and the members of the New York subclass were
foreseeable to Defendant and, thus the Defendant’s actions were unconscionable and
unreasonable.
155. Defendant is liable for damages sustained by Plaintiff Brown and the members of
the New York subclass to the maximum extent allowable under N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. § 349.
156. Pursuant to section 349 (h) of the New York General Business Law, Plaintiff
Brown and the New York subclass seek an order of this court enjoining Defendant from
continuing to engage in unlawful acts or practices and any other act prohibited by law, including
those set forth in the complaint.
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

VIOLATION OF THE OTHER STATES’ CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS
157. Plaintiffs restate, re-allege and incorporate by reference the foregoing paragraphs.
158. In the event that the Cal. Bus. And Prof. Code § 17200, Illinois Consumer Fraud
and Deceptive Business Practices Act, and N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. §349 do not provide redress to
Plaintiffs’ and all Class members’ claims against Defendant, the following alternative consumer
protection statutes provide a basis for redress to Plaintiffs and the Class based on Defendant’s
unfair, deceptive, unlawful and/or misleading acts:
a. The Alaska Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act, Alaska State. §§
45.50.471 et seq.;
b. The Arizona Consumer Fraud Act, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 44-1521, et seq.;
42
c. The Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Ark. Code Ann. §§ 4-88-101, et seq.;
d. The Colorado Consumer Protection Act, Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 6-1-101, et seq.;
e. The Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 42-110a, et seq.;
f. The Delaware Consumer Fraud Act, Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, §§2511 et seq. and/or
the Delaware Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, §2531, et seq.;
g. The District of Columbia Consumer Protection Procedures Act, D.C. Code Ann.
§28-3901, et seq.;
h. The Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 501.201,
et seq.;
i. The Georgia Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Ga. Code Ann. §§ 10-1-370,
et seq.;
j. The Hawaii Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 481A-1,
et seq. and/or Hawaii Rev. Stat. §§ 480-1, et seq.;
k. The Idaho Consumer Protection Act, Idaho Code §§ 48-601, et seq.;
l. The Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, Ill. Comp. Stat.
Ann. §§ 505/1 et seq.;
m. The Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act, Ind. Code Ann. §§ 24-5-0.5-1, et seq.;
n. The Kansas Consumer Protection Act, Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 50-623, et seq.;
o. The Kentucky Consumer Protection Act, Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 367.110, et seq;
p. The Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, §§ 205A, et seq.;
q. The Maryland Consumer Protection Act, Md. Com. Law. Code Ann. §§ 13-101, et
seq.;
43
r. The Massachusetts Regulation of Business Practice and Consumer Protection Act,
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 93A;
s. The Michigan Consumer Protection Act, Mich. Comp. Laws Ann §§ 445-901, et
seq.;
t. The Minnesota Prevention of Consumer Fraud Act, Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 325F.68,
et seq.;
u. The Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 407.010, et seq.;
v. The Nebraska Consumer Protection Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 59-1601, et seq.;
w. The New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A 56:8-1 et seq.;
x. The Nevada Trade Regulation and Practices Act, Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 598.0903 et
seq. and/or Nevada Rev. Stat. §41.600;
y. The New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann., §§ 358-A:1,
et seq.;
z. The New Mexico Unfair Practices Act, N.M. Stat. Ann., §§ 57-12-1, et seq.;
aa. North Carolina, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 75-1.1, et seq.;
bb. North Dakota, N.D. Gen. Stat. §§ 51-15-01, et seq.;
cc. The Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 1345.01, et seq.;
dd. The Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act, Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §§ 751, et seq.;
ee. The Oregon Unlawful Trade Practices Law, Or. Rev. Stat., §§ 646-605 et seq.;
ff. The Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, Pa. Stat.
Ann. tit. 73, §§ 201-1, et seq.;
gg. The Rhode Island Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act, R.I. Gen.
Law §§ 6-13.1-1, et seq.;
44
hh. The South Dakota Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act, S.D.
Codified Laws Ann. §§ 37-24-1, et seq.;
ii. The Texas Deceptive Trade Practices – Consumer Protection Act, Tex. Bus. &
Com. Code Ann. §§ 17.41, et seq.;
jj. The Vermont Consumer Fraud Act, Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, §§ 2451, et seq.;
kk. The Washington Consumer Protection Act, RCW 19.86.020 et seq.
ll. West Virginia, W.Va. Code §§ 46A-6-101, et seq.;
mm. Wisconsin, Wisc. Stat. Ann. §100.18; and
nn. The Wyoming Consumer Protection Act, Wyo. Stat. §40-12-101, et seq.
159. Plaintiffs and the Class have been injured as a direct and proximate result of
Defendant’s violations of the state consumer protection laws recited in this Count.
160. Plaintiffs and the Class have suffered and incurred actual damages as a direct and
proximate result of Defendant’s violations of the state consumer protection laws recited in this
Count, including, but not limited to, being deprived of the amounts of their payments made to
Chase as a result of the false representation that Chase was the owner of their residential
mortgage loan which previously had been originated or closed by WMB, having to defend
themselves in wrongful foreclosure proceedings and/or also losing their homes in foreclosure
proceedings brought falsely in Defendant’s own name, engaging in loss mitigation efforts with
Defendant, when it was not the owner of the residential mortgage loans, and diminution in
property value resulting from Chase’s clouding of the chain of title.
161. To the extent required to state a claim under any statute listed in this Count,
Plaintiffs and the Class reasonably relied on Defendant’s misrepresentations, unfair and
45
deceptive statements, and material omissions concerning its ownership of the WMB originated
or closed residential mortgage loans.
162. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the Class, demand judgment against
Defendant for compensatory damages, pre- and post-judgment interest, treble damages,
attorneys’ fees, injunctive and declaratory relief, costs incurred in bringing this action, and any
other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION

VIOLATION OF RESPA AND REGULATION X § 1024.36
163. Plaintiffs restate, re-allege and incorporate by reference the foregoing paragraphs.
164. The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, 12 U.S.C. §2601 et seq.
(“RESPA”), and Section 1024.36 of its implementing section Regulation X, 12 CFR 1024 et
seq., require loan servicers to comply with certain requirements for qualified written requests for
information from a borrower that includes the name of the borrower, information that enables the
servicer to identify the borrower’s mortgage loan account and states the information the
borrower is requesting with respect to the borrower’s mortgage loan.
165. RESPA § 1024.36(a)-(d)(1) provides that the loan servicer must investigate and
respond to an information request from a borrower by “(i) [p]roviding the borrower with the
requested information and contact information; or (ii) conducting a reasonable search for the
requested information and providing the borrower with a written notification that states that the
servicer has determined that the requested information is not available to the servicer, provides
the basis for the servicer’s determination, and provides contact information, including a
telephone number, for further assistance.” RESPA § 1024.36, moreover, requires servicers to
respond to “an information request for the identity of, and address or other relevant contact
information for, the owner or assignee of a mortgage loan” and to do so within 10 days after the
46
servicer receives the information request for the identify of the owner or assignee of a mortgage
loan. See RESPA § 1024.36(d)(1)-(2)(i)(A).
166. Defendant is a loan servicer and has violated RESPA Section 1024.36(d) by
failing to provide the identify of, and address or other relevant contact information for, the owner
or assignee of Plaintiffs’ residential mortgage loans, by providing false information in response
to Plaintiff’s qualified written requests for the identity of the owner of Plaintiffs’ mortgage loans,
and by failing to provide the required information within ten days of after receiving such request
for information.
167. On August 18, 2017, Plaintiff Brown wrote to Chase’s agent, the law offices of
Shapiro, DiCaro & Barak, LLC, disputing the debt referenced in the July 27, 2017 letter he
received from Chase and requested that he be provided all information and documenting
evidencing the validity of the debt and the owner of the debt. Plaintiff Brown’s August 18, 2017
written request to Chase’s agent was a qualified written request under RESPA.
168. On September 5, 2017, the law offices of Shapiro, DiCaro & Barak, LLC, as the
agent of Chase, responded to Plaintiff Brown’s August 18, 2017 request for information and
represented that “JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. is the current loan servicer and holder of the Note
and Mortgage.” This statement was materially false and misleading because Chase was not the
note holder and did not acquire an ownership interest in the residential mortgage loan to Sylvia
Brown which was originated or previously owned by WMB, and the February 24, 2014
Assignment was false, invalid and void. Chase failed to timely identify the true owner of
Plaintiff Brown’s residential mortgage loan or conduct a reasonable search for such information.
47
169. Similarly, on April 23, 2014, Plaintiff Young wrote to Chase requesting debt
validation, which included a request for the identity of the owner of her mortgage loan. Plaintiff
Young’s April 23, 2014 written request to Chase was a qualified written request under RESPA.
170. On May 6, 2014, Chase responded to Plaintiff Young’s April 23, 2014 letter and
stated, “We have reviewed the loan and we maintain that you have undertaken a valid, binding
and legally enforceable obligation to us” and that “Chase will not tolerate attempts to avoid a
valid debt.” Chase further represented that Plaintiff’s loan was “closed, or originated, by
Washington Mutual Bank on April 15, 2008” and that “Chase acquired your loan in good faith.”
These statements were materially false and misleading. As set forth herein, upon information
and belief, Chase did not purchase or otherwise acquire Plaintiff Young’s mortgage from WMB
and had no right to represent that it had acquired her mortgage. Indeed, Fannie Mae, and not
Chase, was the holder of Plaintiff Young’s mortgage note, and owner of her residential mortgage
loan. Chase represented in this letter, however, that it had acquired Plaintiff Young’s mortgage
and that Fannie Mae was merely an investor in Plaintiff Young’s loan. This statement was
misleading and confusing because Fannie Mae, and not Chase, held Plaintiff Young’s note at this
time.
171. Chase has violated RESPA §1024.36 by failing to timely identify the actual
owner of the residential mortgage loans of Plaintiff Brown and Plaintiff Young, which were
originated or closed by WMB. Upon information and belief, Chase has failed to timely and
accurately respond to qualified written requests from other members of the Class which request
information identifying the owner of their residential mortgage loans which were originated or
closed by WMB in violation of RESPA § 1024.36.
48
172. The three year statute of limitations for violation of RESPA § 1024.36 is subject
to equitable tolling where, as here, Defendant has perpetrated a wrongful scheme through the use
of common documentation, including documents and letters containing false and misleading
information which purport to memorializing Plaintiffs’ and each putative Class member’s
mortgage loan and Chase’s ownership thereof. Full participation in the loan process, including
attempts at loss mitigation and modification negotiations, by Plaintiffs and the other members of
the Class is sufficient to establish due diligence.
173. Plaintiff Brown, Plaintiff Young and other members of the Class have suffered
damages as a result of Defendant’s violation of RESPA § 1024.36, including, but not limited to,
making loan payments to Defendant, engaging in loan modification negotiations with Defendant,
and defending against foreclosure brought by Defendant in its own name as a result of
Defendant’s failure to timely identify the true owner of Plaintiffs’ and other Class member’s
residential mortgage loans which were originated or previously owned by WMB.
174. In addition to actual damages, Plaintiff Brown, Plaintiff Young and other
members of the Class are entitled to statutory damages as a result of Defendant’s violations of
RESPA § 1024.36.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Wherefore, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves, all others similarly situated and on behalf
of general public, pray for judgment against Defendant as to each and every cause of action,
including:
A. An order declaring this action to be a proper Class Action, and requiring an issuance of
Class Notice to Class Members;
B. An order awarding Plaintiffs and the proposed Class Members damages in the amount to
be determined at trial;
49
C. An order awarding restitution and disgorgement of the amounts Defendant improperly
took from Class Members;
D. An order awarding declaratory and injunctive relief as permitted by law or equity,
including enjoining Defendant from continuing the unlawful practices as set forth
herein, enjoining foreclosures commenced by Defendant on WMB- originated or
previously owned residential mortgage loans until Defendant provides competent
evidence of loan ownership, and otherwise requiring Defendant to identify the true and
lawful owners of Plaintiffs’ and other Class members’ loans;
E. An order that to the extent the real owner of any mortgage loans has released or forgiven
the debt in whole or in part, and Chase has continued to collect such released or forgiven
debt, that Chase be compelled to pay damages or make disgorgement in such amounts;
F. An order awarding attorneys’ fees and costs to Plaintiffs;
G. An award of punitive damages;
H. As award of statutory damages under RESPA § 1024.36; and
I. An order providing for any such further relief as may be just and proper.
Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury as to all claims so triable.
Dated: January 29, 2019 GISKAN SOLOTAROFF & ANDERSON LLP
/s/ Catherine E. Anderson

________________________________________
Catherine E. Anderson, Esq.
[email protected]
217 Centre Street, 6th Floor
New York, New York 10013
Tel: (212) 847-8315
Fax: (646) 964-9610
THE MARKHAM LAW FIRM

David R. Markham, Esq.
[email protected]
Maggie Realin, Esq.
[email protected]
Michael Morphew, Esq.
[email protected]
750 B Street, Suite 1950
50
San Diego, California 92101

Tel: (619) 399-3995
Fax: (619) 615-2067
LAW OFFICES OF BARRON E. RAMOS

Barron E. Ramos, Esq.
[email protected]
23120 Alicia Pkwy, Suite 200
Mission Viejo, California 92692
Tel: (949) 446-0180
Fax: (760) 994-1354
Counsel for Plaintiffs and the putative Class
51

Case 118CV03708FBJO - First Amended Complaint

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Case 1:18-cv-03708-FB-JO Document 38 Filed 01/29/19 Page 1 of 51 PageID #: 118

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

) CASE NO. 1:18-cv-03708 (FB)(JO)

Plaintiffs KATHLEEN D. HAYDEN, ETHEL YOUNG, and STERLYN BROWN, the

previously owned by Washington Mutual Bank (“WMB”), and to whom Defendant

JPMORGAN CHASE, N.A. (“Defendant” or “Chase”), WMB’s successor in interest, has

sold or transferred to Chase.

investigation and discovery, as follows:

1. Plaintiff Ethel Young is a resident of Illinois. On or about April 15, 2008,

WMB, and which was not owned by Chase.

2. Plaintiff Kathleen D. Hayden is a resident of California. On or about June 4,

owned by WMB, and which was not owned by Chase.

3. Plaintiff Steryln Brown is a resident of Brooklyn, New York. He is the

4. Defendant JPMorgan Chase, N.A. (“Chase”) is a national bank with its

thus, were not assets of WMB on September 25, 2008.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

5. Jurisdiction and venue are proper in this Court.

6. This Court has original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1332(d)(2), as

7. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391(b)(2) because a

jurisdiction in this district.

was insured by the FDIC.

unloading these loans on investors.

WMB Sold Or Securitized The Majority Of Its Residential Mortgage Loans

Financial Collapse,” April 13, 2011 at page 117, 226-227, 230.

Collapse,” April 13, 2011 at 116.

15. WMB’s securitizations produced only residential mortgage backed securities

lien and Option ARMs. Id. at 117.

Corporation (“WCC”), a wholly owned subsidiary of WMB. In addition to issuing

residential mortgage loans were securitized and sold to QSPEs:

Off-Balance Sheet Activities

The Company transforms loans into securities through a process known as

mortgage loans, were separate legal entities distinct from WMB.

issues the certificates to investors.

21. In February 2007, in light of escalating default rates on residential mortgage

assembled into a pool and securitized as WMALT 2007-OA3 in March 2007.

Anatomy of a Financial Collapse,” April 13, 2011 at 173.

No Schedule Of Inventory Identifying The WMB Residential Mortgage Loans

27. In the matter captioned, JPMorgan Chase, N.A., as Successor in Interest to

thing to have, but it’s – as far as I know, it doesn’t exist.”)

28. In In Re Mario Polychronas, AW Mario Polycrhonas Intervivos Trust of 2004,

been sold into securitized trusts prior to WMBs collapse.

(FAQs) was the following question and answer:

purchase of WMB’s assets from the FDIC.

Chase Acquires The WMB Mortgage Servicing Platform

held by Washington Mutual Asset Acceptance Corporation, a subsidiary of WMB which

Deposit Insurance Corporation.”

34. Neither Washington Mutual Asset Acceptance Corporation nor Washington

36. In addition to Washington Mutual Asset Acceptance Corporation and Washington

Chase Fabricates Documents Purporting to Show An Assignment Of Numerous

expunging records associated with WMB mortgages as a result of errors in mortgage

documentation occurring prior to September 25, 2008, including erroneously recorded

acquire numerous WMB-originated residential mortgage loans. Moreover, by actively

the chain of title on the WMB originated or closed loans.

41. Where a homeowner with a residential mortgage loan originated or closed by

employed at Chase, where she was hired in January 2009.

standing to foreclose on a residential mortgage loan originated by WMB. In its Supplemental

knowledge of the underlying transaction[s].”

proceedings in Chase’s own name.