Petition For Habeas Corpus and Complaint For

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ROSEMARY BENSON ROJAS, on behalf of herself and as
“next friend” on behalf of her child, “MJR.”
Petitioner-Plaintiff, in Pro Se Case No. ________________
)
Preston L. Parker, in his individual capacity,
as “Adoptive Maternal Step-Grandfather”
2963 Marideen St.
Dallas TX 75233
214-339-4331 (H)
xx¹(Cell)
Honorable Laura J. Birkmeyer, in her individual capacity and

in her official capacity as Judge, San Diego County Superior Court
Juvenile Dependency Court #6
5827 Meadow Lark Dr.
San Diego, CA 92123
Nick Macchione, in his official capacity as Director, Health and Human Services Agency/California
Department of Social Services ( aka, CPS/CWS) [hereinafter referred to as “CDSS”]
)
Washington, D.C. 92106; )
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, in his individual capacity )
and his official capacity as Director of )
Office of Refugee Resettlement (“ORR”) )
330 C. Street, SW )
Washington, D.C. 20201 )
)
John Doe 1, in his official capacity as )
ORR Federal Field Specialist for )
Bodencamp Children’s Shelter operated by )
Upbring/Lutheran Social Services of the )
South, Inc. located at 5517 S Alameda St, )
Corpus Christi, TX 78412, )
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
espondents-Defendants. )
PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS AND COMPLAINT FOR

DECLARATORY AND MONETARY RELIEF
Rosemary Benson Rojas, (“Rojas”) on both her own behalf and as “next friend” on the behalf of her
child, “MJR,” in pro persona, files this petition for habeas corpus and complaint for declaratory relief and
damages against Defendants (State of California, San Diego County Superior Court Judge(s), to vindicate
her substantive and procedural due process rights and equal protection rights under the Fifth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, her rights to be free from rbitrary and capricious agency a U.S.C. §
1158.
In support, Plaintiff states as follows:
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ntroduCTION
1.
Jeff Sessions, the Attorney General of this country, has admitted to discriminating against persons
based on their national origin; in fact, Sessions has unabashedly targeted asylum seekers who originate
from Central America. Specifically, as recent as April 11, 2018, Defendant Sessions delivered public
remarks on immigration enforcement announcing the “zero-tolerance” policy:
• “The lack of a wall on the southern border is an open invitation to illegal border crossings.”
• “But the increased crossings are also happening because of the loopholes in our laws being
exploited by illegal aliens and open border radicals every day… Unsurprisingly, the exploitation of this
‘credible fear’ loophole exploded.”
• “We can return UACs [Unaccompanied Alien Children] from Canada and Mexico relatively
quickly—but because of loopholes in our laws, the large numbers of UACs from Central America are not
able to be returned quickly. Instead they are released into the interior of the United States.”
2.
Following these statements, in the same public remarks, Sessions made thefollowing announcement:
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I have ordered each United States Attorney’s Office along the southwest border to have a zero
tolerance policy toward illegal entry. Our goal is to prosecute every case that is brought to us. There
must be consequences for illegal actions, and I am confident in the ability of our federal prosecutors t
carry out this new mission.
(Exhibit 10.)
3.
Sessions’ discrimination based on people originating from CentralAmerica becomes even more clear
when you juxtapose (1) his focus on“loopholes” based on the assertion of a credible fear with (2) the
fact that nearly90% of individuals in family facilities from Central American countries of ElSalvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras pass their credible or reasonable fearinterviews, something Sessions views as
“exploitation of this ‘credible fear’loophole.” See (Exhibit 9 at p. 10). Sessions has targeted Central
America. Simplyput, Session’s zero-tolerance policy is racist and discriminatory in a manner not
permitted by the Constitution, and this is not the first time Sessions has beeaccused of abusing his
authority to discriminate against people of color. See(Exhibit 12, Letters from Coretta Scott King,
imploring officials not to elevateSessions to a Federal Judgeship.)
4.
Even current Chief of Staff John Kelly has echoed Sessions’ intent todiscriminate upon people who
originate from Central American countries to
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cross the U.S. southern border. In March 2017, when Kelly was still Secretary ofHomeland Security, Kelly
made the case that separating children from theirfamilies could deter immigrants from illegally seeking
entry to the United States.
In an interview with CNN’s Wolf Blitzer, Blitzer asked Kelly if he wasconsidering separating
children from their parents:
“Let me start by saying I would do almost anything to deter the people from Central America
to getting on this very, very dangerous network that brings them up through Mexico to the United
States,” Kelly said.
Blitzer pressed him on the point: Is the Department of Homerity going to separate children from
their parents?
“Yes, I am considering, in order to deter more movement along this terribly dangerous network,
I am considering exactly that,” Kelly said. “They will be well cared for as we deal with their parents.”
(Exhibit 2, Published Video of John Kelly interview with CNN’s Wolf Blitzer,March 2017 at minute
mark 7:00.)
5.
n top of discriminating based on national origin/race to effectivelyseparate children from their

parents as a means of deterring Central Americano years ago (in October 2016) the Immigration and
Customs 5|Page
made recommendations which demonstrate that these Defendants are far fromerating in the best
interest of separated children. Those recommendationsnclude:
(1) ICE should “operationalize the presumption that . . . detention or the

separation of families for purposes of immigration enforcement or
management are never in the best interest of children.”
(2) “Children should not be separated from their parents in order to

continue to detain the adults, or to continue to hold the children by
placing them in ORR care.”
(3) “bona fide asylum seekers in general should not be needlessly detained,
[and] this is particularly true for children, whose best interests must be
paramount in all enforcement decisions pertaining to them. The harmful
effects of detention on children are well established.”
(4) “DHS should not use detention for the purpose of deterring future family
migration or punishing families seeking asylum in the U.S. Any contrary
policy is unlawful and ineffective.”
(5) “DHS should place families in regular proceedings . . . and in all but the
most unusual situations release them promptly as a family.”
(6) “DHS should generally exercise its authority to release family members,
together as a family, as soon as possible. . . . When DHS concludes that it
should, or must, release a child from family detention it should release the
child with her parent and siblings absent extraordinary circumstances,
given the traumatic and detrimental impact of that separation . . .”
(Exhibit 9, ICE Advisory Committee on Family Residential Centers, October 7,

2016, pp. 5-18) (hereafter referred to as the “ACFRC Report”) (emphasis added).
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6.
The Trump Administration may be unusual for modern democracies, butit’s not unique. The
Administration’s concentration of children in camp facilities,eparate from their parents, has been seen
before: in Nazi Germany, and inry times. The Administration’s doubled-down stance on this horrific
policy,mpts to silence bi-partisan opposition, has also been seen before, forle: Francoist Spain. Simply,
the Administration has embarrassed the veryghts and dignity of all people, not trample them.
7.
That said, Ms. V. has been released by the federal government, and withg Ms. V.’s child, ORR
continuesto wrongly characterize D. as an “unaccompanied” child, while knowing thatMs. V. came to the
United States with D., along with her government I.D. andD.’s birth certificate showing that Ms. V. is D.’s
parent, and while knowing Ms.V. is free and has demanded her child be released from ORR’s
concentrationamp of children. By mischaracterizing the child as “unaccompanied,” OR
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applies its procedures pursuant to the Trafficking s. Furthermore, it is a violation ofdue process to take a
designated asylum-seeker’s child—period. Regardless,upon release of the parent (Asylum seeking or
otherwise), the parent’s childshould be returned within 24 hours.
8.
That said, Defendant’s conduct of separating children from their parents atunconstitutional. Three
years ago, a similar presidentially sanctioned policy—thelease” policy—was deemed unconstitutional by
our nation’s district courty
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discriminating upon Plaintiff based upon her national origin, key governmenials, including White House
officials, have provided us with rock-solid proofpresent, this “deterrent”—ripping, literally, children from
the arms of theirthers and fathers—is being used against all families, including families seekingns just
like this one.
9.
Ms. V. brings this action to have the government reunite her with heroung child, D. from whom she
has been separated now for over one month. Ms.s released on bond after seeking asylum, making a
credible fear claim, andadjudged as not posing a flight risk or a danger to the community.
Nevertheless, Ms. V.’s daughter remains in federal custody.
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10.
Coming to this country to seek Asylum is legally permitted by our
Government. Consequently, forced separation of children from their parents,
who are seeking Asylum, is patently unlawful, demonstrating an intentional,
absolute disregard for the law to reach the unconstitutional result of deterring
migrants. These Defendants know that separating children from their parents
causes severe trauma to young children, especially those who are already
traumatized and are fleeing persecution in their home countries. The resulting
cognitive and emotional damage can be permanent. Simply put, the World
Community frowns upon the Trump Administration’s conduct, having long
condemned this type of conduct as violating the rights and dignity of people
worldwide.
11.
These Defendants also know full well that the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment protects Ms. V.’s interest in the care, control and custody of
her daughter, especially her interest in protecting her daughter from outrageous
government conduct that shocks the conscience, while offending contemporary
notion of decency and humanity. Likewise, the Fifth Amendment also protects
D.’s familial right to be raised and nurtured by her parents. There can be no
doubt that Defendant’s conduct shocks the conscience, as evidenced by strong bi-
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partisan congressional support and an executive order (by Trump himself)
designed, purportedly, to halt this outrageous conduct.
JURISDICTION
12.
This case arises under the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), and the Declaratory
Judgment Act, inter alia. The court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331.
13.
The court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (habeas
jurisdiction); and Art. I., § 9, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution (“Suspension
Clause”).
14.
Plaintiff’s child, D., is in custody for purposes of habeas jurisdiction.
15.
Plaintiff acknowledges that there is a circuit split on the interpretation of
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004), regarding who should be named in a
habeas petition for the release of a child from ORR. Plaintiff asserts that Scott
Lloyd, as the agency head of ORR, is the proper respondent for Habeas purposes.
See e.g., Santos v. Smith, 260 F.Supp.3d 598, 607-609 (2017).
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16.
Personal Jurisdiction is proper because Defendants transact business in
this District and thus are subject to personal jurisdiction in this Court.
IMMUNITY
17.
Plaintiff’s claims are not barred by Sovereign Immunity: “[Habeas Corpus]
writs, directed against government custodians, have never been regarded as
barred by sovereign immunity and play a major rule-of-law role in checking
unlawful deprivations of liberty.” Historically, habeas petitions have been
regularly used to review the legality of executive detention, receiving their
greatest protections in that context. Indeed, this protection is so great, it is not
limited to only addressing constitutional errors. Indeed, “in case after case,
courts answered questions of law in habeas corpus proceedings brought by
aliens challenging Executive [actions].”
VENUE
18.
Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because at least one of the
Defendants is subject to personal jurisdiction in this district with regards to this
action.
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PARTIES
19.
Plaintiff Ms. V. is a citizen of Guatemala and was born in 1988. She is the
mother of 12-year-old “D.”
20.
Defendant Kirstjen Nielsen is sued in her official capacity as the Secretary
of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), the agency which has
responsibility for enforcing the immigration laws of the United States. In this
capacity, she directs each of the component agencies within DHS: ICE, USCIS,
and CBP. As a result, Respondent Nielsen has responsibility for the
administration of the immigration laws pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1103, is
empowered to grant asylum or other relief, was a legal custodian of Plaintiff at
the time of separation, and is a custodian of Plaintiff’s child, D.
21.
Defendant Kevin K. McAleenan is sued in his official capacity as the

Acting Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”), the sub-
agency of DHS that is responsible for the initial processing and detention of
noncitizens who are apprehended near the U.S. border.
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22.
Defendant Alex Azar is sued in his official capacity as the Secretary of the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), a department of the
executive branch of the U.S. government which has been delegated with
authority over “unaccompanied” noncitizen children.
23.
Defendant Scott Lloyd is sued in his individual capacity and his official
capacity as the Director of the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), the
component of HHS which provides care of and placement for “unaccompanied”
noncitizen children. As a matter of law, Lloyd has the authority to order the
immediate release of D. to Ms. V. Lloyd condoned and ratified a policy that
prohibited D. from being released to Ms. V., despite knowing and verifying the
fact that Ms. V. is D.’s actual mother who came across the border with D. and
sought asylum with her. By condoning and ratifying this policy, Lloyd directly
participated in the action that has violated the rights of Ms. V. to the care,
custody, and control of her daughter, as protected by the Due Process Clause of
the U.S. Constitution.
24.
Defendant John Doe 1 is a Federal Field Specialist of the Office of Refugee
Resettlement (“ORR”), the component of HHS which provides care of and
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placement for “unaccompanied” noncitizen children. John Doe 1 is the ORR
Federal Field Specialist responsible for the Bodencamp Children’s Shelter
operated by Upbring/LSS, located at 5517 S Alameda St, Corpus Christi, TX
78412, the facility where D. is being held. As a matter of law, Doe 1 has the
authority to order the immediate release of D. to Ms. V. Despite reviewing the
identification and birth certificate, and therefore knowing and understanding
that Ms. V. is the rightful parent of D., Doe 1 has refused to order or otherwise
permit the immediate release of D. to Ms. V. By doing so, Doe 1 has violated the
substantive due process rights of Ms. V. Doe 1 is sued in his individual and
official capacities.
RELEVANT FACTS
a. “Zero Tolerance” and the Trump Administration’s separation of parents

from their young children
25.
Over the past year, the federal government has separated hundreds of
migrant families for no legitimate purpose.

26.
Numerous families are fleeing persecution and thus seeking asylum.
27.
Although there are no allegations that the parents are unfit or abusing
their children in any way, the government has forcibly separated them from their
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young children and detained the children, often far away, in facilities for
“unaccompanied” minors.
28.
Children who enter this country with their parents do not meet the plain
language definition of unaccompanied minors, a definition that states “the term
unaccompanied alien child means a child who – (A) has no lawful immigration
status in the United States; (B) has not attained the 18 years of age; and (C) with
respect to whom – (i) there is no parent of legal guardian in the United states; or
(ii) no parent or legal guardian in the United States is available to provide care
and physical custody.” 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2). As an initial matter, the children
that enter the United States with their parents naturally have that parent in the
United States, and that parent is available to provide care and physical custody.
Further, and significantly, both the Board of Immigration Appeals and Appellate
Courts “repeatedly have held that a parent’s status, intent, or state of mind is
imputed to the parent’s unemancipated minor child in many areas of

immigration law, including asylum.” As such, these children have the same
status as lawful asylum seekers as their parents imputed to them, failing to meet
the definition of unaccompanied minor for that reason as well.
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29.
There is overwhelming medical evidence that the separation of a young
child from his or her parent will have a devastating negative impact on the
child’s well-being, especially where there are other traumatic factors at work,
and that this damage can be permanent.
30.
The American Association of Pediatrics has recently denounced the
Administration’s practice of separating migrant children from their parents,
noting that: “The psychological distress, anxiety, and depression associated with
separation from a parent would follow the children well after the immediate
period of separation—even after the eventual reunification with a parent or other
family.”
31.
Such a situation could have long-term, devastating effects on young
children, who are likely to develop what is called toxic stress in their brain once
separated from caregivers or parents they trusted. This disrupts a child’s brain
development and increases the levels of fight-or-flight hormones in their bodies;
and this kind of emotional trauma could eventually lead to health problems,
such as heart disease and substance abuse disorders.
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32.
Furthermore, studies of detained immigrants have found negative physical
and emotional symptoms among detained children including: developmental
delay and poor psychological adjustment and high rates of posttraumatic stress
disorder, anxiety, depression, suicidal ideation, and other behavioral problems.
Expert consensus has concluded that even brief detention can cause
psychological trauma and induce long-term mental health risks for children.
Parents described “regressive behavioral changes in their children, including
self-injurious behavior, and aggression. See (Exhibit 11, “Detention of Immigrant
Children,” Pediatrics: Official Journal of the American Academy of Pediatrics,
March 13, 2017 (downloaded from www.aappublications.org/news on June 24,
2018.)
33.
As of the date of filing Ms. V.’s Complaint, over 13,000 mental health
professionals and 229 organizations have signed a petition urging President

Trump, Attorney General Jeff Sessions and several elected officials to stop the
policy of separating children from their parents. The petition says:
These children are thrust into detention centers often without an

advocate or an attorney and possibly even without the presence of
any adult who can speak their language. We want you to imagine for
a moment what this might be like for a child: to flee the place you
have called your home because it is not safe to stay and then embark
on a dangerous journey to an unknown destination, only to be
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ripped apart from your sole sense of security with no
understanding of what just happened to you or if you will ever see
your family again. And that the only thing you have done to deserve
this, is to do what children do: stay close to the adults in their lives for
security.
34.
That petition further says:
To pretend that separated children do not grow up with the shrapnel

of this traumatic experience embedded in their minds is to disregard
everything we know about child development, the brain, and
trauma.
35.
Prior Administrations detained migrant families but did not have a
practice of forcibly separating parents from their young children.
36.
According to reports, the government may soon adopt a formal national
policy of separating migrant families and placing the children in government
facilities for so-called unaccompanied minors.
37.
In effect, the Trump Administration adopted this child-separation policy in
April 2018 when Sessions announced a “Zero Tolerance” policy for all families
that cross the Southwest border, specifically directing U.S. Attorneys Offices of
Southern District of California, District of Arizona, District of New Mexico,
Western District of Texas, and the Southern District of Texas to criminally
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prosecute all Department of Homeland Security referrals of section 1325(a)
violations. As a result, when the parents are jailed for the formerly
administrative—now criminal—offense of crossing the border outside an official
port of entry, even when seeking asylum, the children—be they infants, toddlers,
pre-teens, or young teenagers—are separated from the parents and placed in
HHS custody.
38.
So, while the Trump Administration has used criminal law to justify
separating children from their parents, what the Administration cannot even
remotely explain or justify, rationally, is continuing the separation of children
whose parents assert Asylum and make a credible fear claim. Nor can the
Administration explain refusing to return children to their parents, who were
released—regardless of whether they sought asylum or were detained for a
misdemeanor offense.
39.
Over 2,300 immigrant children were separated from parents since Sessions
announced the “zero tolerance” policy in April, according to the Department of
Homeland Security, and upon information and belief, the majority of these 2,300
immigrant children are from Central American Countries.
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40.
On Monday, June 18, 2018, the United Nations’ top human rights official
entered the mounting furor over the Trump administration’s policy of separating
undocumented immigrant children from their parents, calling for an immediate
halt to a practice he condemned as abuse. On that same day, the president of the
American Academy of Pediatrics called the practice “child abuse.”
41.
There are non-governmental shelters that specialize in housing and caring
for families—including asylum seeking families—while their immigration
applications are adjudicated. There are also government-operated family
detention centers where parents can be housed together with their children,
should the government decide not to release them.
42.
On information and belief, the intent of Attorney General Sessions,
Homeland Security Secretary Nielsen, and White House Senior Advisor Stephen
Miller was to use the de-facto child separation policy as a bargaining chip to get
funding to build a “wall” on the southern border and overhaul immigration
laws.
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b. The real reason for child separation policy is deterrence: to deter asylum-
seeking families from immigrating to the United States for fear that their
children will be taken from them upon arrival without explanation
43.
In March 2017, when Kelly was still Secretary of Homeland Security, Kelly
made the case that separating children from their families could deter
immigrants from illegally seeking entry to the United States. In an interview with
CNN’s Wolf Blitzer, Blitzer asked Kelly if he was considering separating children
from their parents:
“Let me start by saying I would do almost anything to deter the

people from Central America to getting on this very, very dangerous
network that brings them up through Mexico to the United States,”
Kelly said.
Blitzer pressed him on the point: Is the Department of Homeland

Security going to separate children from their parents?
“Yes, I am considering, in order to deter more movement along this

terribly dangerous network, I am considering exactly that,” Kelly
said. “They will be well cared for as we deal with their parents.”
(Exhibit 2, Published Video of John Kelly interview with CNN’s Wolf Blitzer,
March 2017 at minute mark 7:00.)
44.
In February 2017, two weeks after Trump was inaugurated, a DHS official
named John Lafferty raised the idea of using family separation as a deterrent in a
town hall meeting for Citizenship and Immigration Services officials, according
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to documents obtained by NBC News. See (Exhibit 3, “Trump Administration
Discussed Separating Moms and Kids to Deter Asylum Seekers,” NBC News,
March 2017); (Exhibit 4, “EXCLUSIVE: Trump Administration Plans Expanded
Immigrant Detention,” MSNBC, March 2017.)
45.
On May 11, 2018, White House Chief of Staff John Kelly was interviewed
by NPR’s John Burnett and was asked about the child separation policy as a
deterrent:
Burnett: “Are you in favor of this new move announced by the attorney
general early this week that if you cross the border illegally even if you're a
mother with your children [we're going] to arrest you? We're going to
prosecute you, we're going to send your kids to a juvenile shelter?”
Kelly: “The name of the game to a large degree. Let me step back and tell
you that the vast majority of the people that move illegally into United
States are not bad people. They're not criminals. They're not MS-13. Some
of them are not. But they're also not people that would easily assimilate
into the United States into our modern society. They're overwhelmingly
rural people in the countries they come from – fourth, fifth, sixth grade
educations are kind of the norm. They don't speak English, obviously
that's a big thing. They don't speak English. They don't integrate well, they
don't have skills. They're not bad people. They're coming here for a reason.
And I sympathize with the reason. But the laws are the laws. But a big
name of the game is deterrence.”
Burnett: “Family separation stands as a pretty tough deterrent.”
Kelly: “It could be a tough deterrent — would be a tough deterrent. A

much faster turnaround on asylum seekers.”
Burnett: “Even though people say that's cruel and heartless to take a
mother away from her children?”
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Kelly: “I wouldn't put it quite that way. The children will be taken care of
— put into foster care or whatever. But the big point is they elected to
come illegally into the United States and this is a technique that no one
hopes will be used extensively or for very long.”
(Exhibit 5, Transcript of White House Chief of Staff John Kelly’s Interview with
NPR, May 2018.)
46.
On June 18, 2018, on Fox News’s “The Ingraham Angle,” A.G. Jeff Sessions
was asked by host Laura Ingraham if the policy of separating children from their
parents was intended as a deterrent:
Ingraham: “General Sessions, is this policy in part used as a deterrent? Are

you trying to deter people from bringing children or minors across this
dangerous journey? Is that part of what the separation is about?”
Sessions: “Fundamentally, we are enforcing the law. If you break into the
country …”
Ingraham: “But is it a deterrent, sir? Are you considering it a deterrent?”
Sessions: “I see that the fact that no one was being prosecuted for this was
a factor in a fivefold increase in four years in this kind of illegal
immigration. So, yes, hopefully people will get the message and come
through the border at the port of entry and not break across the border
unlawfully.”
(Exhibit 6, “Here are the Administration Officials Who Have Said that Family
Separation is Meant as a Deterrent,” The Washington Post, June 2018.)
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47.
On a conference call with reporters on Tuesday, June 19, 2018, HHS’s
acting assistant secretary, Steven Wagner, was explicit, according to a transcript
provided to The Washington Post by CNBC’s Christina Wilkie:
“We are staying one step ahead of the need,” Wagner said. “We expect
that the new policy will result in a deterrence effect, we certainly hope that
parents stop bringing their kids on this dangerous journey and entering
the country illegally. So we are prepared to continue to expand capacity as
needed. We hope that that will not be necessary in the future.”
(Exhibit 6.)
48.
Regarding June 25, 2018 statement by Defendant McAleenan that he has
temporarily suspended the prosecution of illegal border entry/attempt at illegal
border entry, Sessions and Trump have said that they will continue to prosecute
people for alleged criminal conduct of crossing the border, irrespective of if they
are seeking asylum (prosecution that has proven undoubted to lead to the
separation of families, which is known by Sessions and the President).

49.
In addition, White House press secretary Sarah Huckabee Sanders stressed
that the administration's reversal was only temporary because the government is
running out of resources. "We're going to run out of space," she said. "We're
going to run out of resources to keep people together."
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50.
Even further, in a tweet posted June 24, 2018, Trump said that
undocumented immigrants caught crossing the border should be sent to their
country of origin “immediately, with no Judges or Court Cases.”
c. Discrimination by National Origin and Race according to Sessions’ own

words
51.
On April 11, 2018, Defendant Sessions delivered remarks on immigration
enforcement announcing the “zero-tolerance” policy:
• “The lack of a wall on the southern border is an open invitation to illegal
border crossings.”
• “But the increased crossings are also happening because of the loopholes
in our laws being exploited by illegal aliens and open border radicals
every day. For example, the last Administration released large numbers of
illegal aliens who illegally crossed our border, but who claimed that they
were afraid to return home. Unsurprisingly, the exploitation of this

‘credible fear’ loophole exploded.”
• “We can return UACs from Canada and Mexico relatively quickly—but
because of loopholes in our laws, the large numbers of UACs from
Central America are not able to be returned quickly. Instead they are
released into the interior of the United States.”
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52.
Following these statements, in the same public remarks, Sessions made the
following announcement:
I have ordered each United States Attorney’s Office along the southwest
border to have a zero tolerance policy toward illegal entry. Our goal is to
prosecute every case that is brought to us. There must be consequences for
illegal actions, and I am confident in the ability of our federal prosecutors to
carry out this new mission.
(Exhibit 10.)
53.
It is clear by the above four facts, that Sessions is discriminating based on
national origin because he has targeted people because they originate from
central American nations.
54.
Sessions’ discrimination based on national origin becomes even more clear
when you juxtapose his focus on “loopholes” based on the assertion of a credible
fear with the fact that nearly 90% of individuals in family facilities from Central
American countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras pass their credible

or reasonable fear interviews. See (Exhibit 9 at p. 10). Sessions has targeted
Central America.
55.
Sessions has never directed U.S. Attorneys at any other border other than
the southwest border to implement a zero-tolerance policy.
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d. Executive Order issued but the administration has no plan to reunite
children and parents (including after their parent is released) and falsely
classifies children they have forcibly separated from their now-released
and U.S.-residing parent, as “unaccompanied”
56.
On June 20, 2018, President Donald Trump signed an executive order
purporting to end family separations, but this order is silent on the reunification
of parents and children who have already been separated—be those parents still
in detention or released and residing in the United States. See (Exhibit 7,
Executive Order, June 20, 2018.) Nor is this Executive Order retroactive, meaning
the Executive Order doesn’t apply to Plaintiff or Plaintiff’s daughter.
57.
On June 19, 2018, Beata Mejia-Mejia, a recently released asylum-seeking
mother whose child was inexplicably taken from her two days after being
detained, sued the federal government to get her son back and filed a motion for
a Temporary Restraining Order to that end. The government filed a response in
which it described Ms. Mejia-Mejia’s son as an “unaccompanied alien child” and

claimed that it was following procedures for releasing her son pursuant to the
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, as amended, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1232 (“TVPRA”). See (Exhibit 8, Mejia-Mejia v. ICE et al, 1:18-cv-1445, U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia, ECF 11, p. 2.)
28 | P a g e
58.
The TVPRA states that the term “unaccompanied alien child” has the
meaning given such term in section 279(g) of title 6.
59.
The Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended, (section 279(g) of title 6)
defines the term “unaccompanied alien child” as a child who
(A) has no lawful immigration status in the United States,
(B) has not attained 18 years of age, and
(C) who has no parent or legal guardian in the United States, or no
parent or legal guardian in the United States available to provide care
and physical custody. 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2) (emphasis added).
e. Ms. V. and her 12-year-old daughter D. are separated after seeking

asylum
60.
Ms. V. and her daughter, D., are from Central America (Guatemala).
61.
Ms. V. and her daughter D. are one of the many families that have recently
been separated by the government.
62.
Ms. V. and her daughter are seeking asylum in the United States.
29 | P a g e
63.
Ms. V. and her daughter crossed the U.S. border near San Luis, Arizona on
approximately May 19, 2018.
64.
They were immediately approached by border agents, and although their
native language is Spanish, they were able to communicate to the border guards
that they sought the storied protection of the U.S. government based on the
severe violence occurring in Guatemala.
65.
Ms. V. and her daughter D. were placed in a holding cell by border agents.
Approximately two days later, at 3:30 in the morning, immigration officials
forcibly separated 12-year-old D. from her mother. Men dressed in green
uniforms (border agents) told Ms. V. they needed to take her daughter and
would not tell her why. She witnessed other officers take children away from
their mothers and when those mothers asked why, the officers said, “because the
government says we can.”
66.
The border agents did not tell Ms. V. where they were taking her daughter
or when she would see her again.
30 | P a g e
67.
Ms. V. had her ID, the ID of her daughter, and her daughter’s birth
certificate, and CBP officials saw this paperwork prior to and after taking Ms.
V.’s daughter.
68.
When D. was taken away from her mother, that was the last time Ms. V.
saw her daughter.
69.
Ms. V. was subsequently transferred to Florence Detention Center and
then Eloy Detention Center. At Eloy, she spoke to an officer who was able to find
out that her daughter was in San Antonio, TX, but could not give her any more
information.
70.
On approximately June 4, Ms. V. was told that her daughter was
purportedly located in San Antonio, TX and given a phone number. Ms. V. has
not been given any paperwork to indicate the status or health condition of her
daughter.
31 | P a g e
71.
On information and belief, D. was housed in a detention facility for
“unaccompanied” minors run by the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) in
San Antonio, TX.
72.
On information and belief, D. is being held at Bodencamp Children’s
Shelter operated by Upbring/LSS, located at 5517 S Alameda St, Corpus Christi,
TX 78412.
73.
Until June 22, 2018, Ms. V. remained detained in the Eloy Detention Center
in the Phoenix, AZ area.
74.
On information and belief, Ms. V. asserted asylum after being detained by
border patrol and made a credible fear claim, and she was never prosecuted for
illegal entry into the U.S.

75.
Attempting to cross the border other than at a designated port of arrival
does not preclude any migrant from asserting asylum:
Any alien who is physically present in the United States or who arrives in
the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival and
including an alien who is brought to the United States after having been
interdicted in international or United States waters), irrespective of such
32 | P a g e
alien’s status, may apply for asylum in accordance with this section or,
where applicable, section 1225(b) of this title.
8 U.S.C. § 1158 (a)(1).
76.
Any immigrant present in the U.S., such as Ms. V. and her child,
irrespective of whether they immigrated through a designated port of arrival,
must be considered an applicant for admission into the country:
An alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who
arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival
and including an alien who is brought to the United States after having been
interdicted in international or United States waters) shall be deemed for
purposes of this chapter an applicant for admission.
8 U.S.C. § 1225 (a)(1).
77.
Immigrants who indicate an intention to apply for asylum or indicates a
fear of persecution must be referred for a “credible fear interview”:
If an immigration officer determines that an alien (other than an alien

described in subparagraph (F)) who is arriving in the United States or is
described in clause (iii) is inadmissible under section 1182(a)(6)(C) or
1182(a)(7) of this title and the alien indicates either an intention to apply for
asylum under section 1158 of this title or a fear of persecution, the officer
shall refer the alien for an interview by an asylum officer under
subparagraph (B).
8 U.S.C. § 1225 (b)(1)(A)(ii).
33 | P a g e
78.
Following a credible fear interview, if an asylum officer determines that an
asylum seeker has a “credible fear of persecution,” then there is a significant
possibility that the asylum seeker will be granted asylum:
For purposes of this subparagraph, the term “credible fear of persecution”

means that there is a significant possibility, taking into account the
credibility of the statements made by the alien in support of the alien’s claim
and such other facts as are known to the officer, that the alien could establish
eligibility for asylum under section 1158 of this title.
8 U.S.C. § 1225 (b)(1)(B)(v).
79.
The Northern Triangle countries of Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador
are undergoing a well-documented human rights crisis. 1
80.
The ACFRC Report indicated that nearly 90% of individuals in family facilities
from these countries pass their credible or reasonable fear interviews. (Exhibit 9 at p.
10).
1See, e.g., Diego Zavala, Fleeing for Our Lives: Central American Migrant Crisis,
AMNESTY USA (Apr. 1, 2016, 12:12 PM),
http://blog.amnestyusa.org/americas/fleeing-for-our-lives-central-american-
migrant-crisis/; Lily Folkerts, A Look at the Northern Triangle of Central
America in 2016: Sustained Violence and Displacement, LATIN AMERICA
WORKING GROUP (Aug. 15, 2016) http://www.lawg.org/action-center/lawg-
blog/69-general/1709-a-look-at-thenorthern-triangle-of-central-america-in-2016-
sustained-violence-and-displacement.
34 | P a g e
81.
On two occasions, Ms. V. was permitted to speak to her daughter on the
phone (no video).
82.
Ms. V.’s father put money into her account so that Ms. V. could make
phone calls to her daughter, while both were imprisoned. Ms. V. called multiple
times but could not reach anyone. When she finally reached someone, the person
told her to call back in ten minutes, and when she did she was able to speak to
her daughter. During this call, the staff member of the facility holding D.
remained on the line and would not let D. give Ms. V. too much information. D.
was crying on the phone and wanted to be reunited with her mom.
83.
After trying to reach her daughter again, Ms. V. finally got through to
someone, and this person claimed to be D.’s case manager. The case manager
says she was not there all the time because she is busy, so to please call and leave
a message with a call back number. Ms. V. explained that there was no way to
receive calls at the Eloy Detention Center, and the case manager said in that case
Ms. V. had to make an appointment to call back and try to reach her daughter.
35 | P a g e
84.
By continuing to call, Ms. V. was finally allowed to speak to her daughter a
second time, where her daughter was crying again, asking to be with her mother,
and that for most of the day she was kept in a small room, with terrible, cold
food, that she needed more clothes, that the facility was extremely cold, and that
she had to sleep with only an aluminum blanket and no pillow.
85.
Ms. V. and her daughter have been separated now for approximately four
weeks.
86.
For four weeks—so far—Ms. V. has been terrified that she would never see
her daughter again.
87.
On information and belief, 12-year-old D. is alone in a facility in Corpus
Christie, TX.
88.
D. is scared and misses her mother and wants to be reunited with her as
soon as possible.
36 | P a g e
89.
Every day that D. is separated from her mother causes her greater
emotional and psychological harm and could potentially lead to permanent
emotional trauma.
90.
Ms. V. is distraught and depressed because of the separation from her
daughter. In detention, she did not eat properly, lost weight, and was not
sleeping due to worry and nightmares.
91.
The government has no legitimate interest in separating Ms. V. and her
child.
92.
There has been no evidence, or even accusation, that D. was abused or
neglected by Ms. V.
93.
There is no evidence that Ms. V. is an unfit parent or that she is not acting
in the best interests of her child.
94.
Defendants released Ms. V. from custody on June 23, 2018 after posting
bond with the help of Libre by Nexus.
37 | P a g e
95.
Despite being lawfully released on bond, Defendants have not reunited
Ms. V. with her daughter, who remains detained at an ORR-overseen facility.
96.
Ms. V. is currently residing in the United States with the intent to remain
here indefinitely as she and her daughter await the adjudication of their
immigration proceedings.
97.
Ms. V. has demanded to be reunited with her daughter, and after being
released, she has repeatedly tried calling the number that she was connected to
the times she spoke to her daughter, but no one will answer the phone.
98.
Ms. V. fears direly for her daughter’s safety and wellbeing every moment
of every day that passes.

38 | P a g e
CAUSES OF ACTION
COUNT I
Claim for Habeas due to violating Substantive Due Process Clause
5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
(Claim for Habeas relief by Ms. V., as next friend of D., against Defendants Lloyd and
Doe 1 in their official capacities)
[The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless—

(1) He is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United
States or is committed for trial before some court thereof; or . . . (3) He is
in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States… 28 U.S. Code § 2241(c) (emphasis added).]
99.
All of the foregoing factual paragraphs are repeated and realleged as
though fully set forth herein.
100.
Historically, habeas petitions have been regularly used to review the
legality of executive detention, receiving their greatest protections in that
context. I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301-02, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.E.2d 347
(2001). Indeed, this protection is so great, it is not limited to only addressing

constitutional errors. Id.
101.
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies to all “persons”
on United States soil and thus applies to Ms. V. and her daughter.
39 | P a g e
102.
Ms. V. and her daughter have a liberty interest under the Due Process
Clause in remaining together as a family. Just as parents possess a fundamental
right with respect to the care, custody, and control of their children, children also
enjoy a familial right to be raised and nurtured by their parents.
103.
Although the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledges the “broad” latitude due
the Executive in the realm of immigration, Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79–80,
96 S.Ct. 1883, 48 L.Ed.2d 478 (1976), it cannot “abdicat[e]” its “legal responsibility
to review the lawfulness” of detention. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 700, 121 S.Ct. 2491.
The government's power over immigration, while considerable, “is subject to
important constitutional limitations.” Id. at 695, 121 S.Ct. 2491.
104.
Previous attempts by the federal government to use a policy of “no
release” to deter asylum seekers have been found to violate due process. In R.I.L.
v. Johnson, the federal government argued that “in determining whether an
individual claiming asylum should be released, ICE can consider the effect of
release on others not present in the United States. Put another way, it
maintain[ed] that one particular individual may be civilly detained for the sake
of sending a message of deterrence to other Central American individuals who
40 | P a g e
may be considering immigration.” R.I.L-R v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164, 188–89
(D.D.C. 2015). The Johnson court found that the government’s consideration of
the deterrence effect on whether to release asylum-seekers was “out of line with
analogous Supreme Court decisions,” noting that in discussing civil commitment
more broadly, the Court has declared such “general deterrence” justifications
impermissible. Id. (citing Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412, 122 S.Ct. 867, 151
L.Ed.2d 856 (2002) (warning that civil detention may not “become a ‘mechanism
for retribution or general deterrence’—functions properly those of criminal law,
not civil commitment”) (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 372–74, 117
S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see id. at 373, 117
S.Ct. 2072 (“[W]hile incapacitation is a goal common to both the criminal and
civil systems of confinement, retribution and general deterrence are reserved for
the criminal system alone.”)). The Johnson court further found that “a general-
deterrence rationale seems less applicable where—unlike pedophiles, see
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 354–55, 362, 117 S.Ct. 2072, or other violent sexual
offenders, see Crane, 534 U.S. at 409–11, 122 S.Ct. at 869—neither those being
detained nor those being deterred are certain wrongdoers, but rather individuals
who may have legitimate claims to asylum in this country.” R.I.L-R v. Johnson, 80 F.
Supp. 3d 164, 189 (D.D.C. 2015) (emphasis added).
41 | P a g e
105.
The separation of the Ms. V. from her daughter violates substantive due
process because it furthers no legitimate purpose, not to mention a compelling
governmental interest, and is outrageous conduct that infringes on Ms. V’s
interest in the care, custody, and control of her daughter. This is particularly true
because neither Ms. V. nor her daughter have been prosecuted for a crime.
106.
process because it shocks the conscience to use a policy of forcibly separating
children from their parents—and without any explanation to the child or the
parent—as a means to deter mass migration and to deter other asylum-seeking
families from entering the U.S. It also shocks the conscience to implement a zero-
tolerance policy that targets Central American migrants for discriminatory
treatment.
42 | P a g e
COUNT II
Claim for Habeas due to violating Procedural Due Process Clause

107.
108.
context. I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 301-02. Indeed, this protection is so great, it is
not limited to only addressing constitutional errors. Id.
109.
110.
43 | P a g e
111.
The separation of Ms. V. from her daughter also violates procedural due
process because it was undertaken without any hearing, and Ms. V. was not even
given any effective paperwork to indicate where her daughter is located or how
she can immediately contact her or retrieve her from detention.
COUNT III
Claim for Habeas due to Violating the International Convention on Civil and
Political Rights

112.

113.
44 | P a g e
114.
The ICCPR has been signed and ratified by the United States.
115.
Under Article 17 of the ICCPR “[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or
unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to
unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.” Article 23 states that “family is
the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by
society and the State.” Article 2 prohibits discrimination based on language or
national or social origin.
116.
By forcibly separating Ms. V. from her daughter, Plaintiff has been
subjected to arbitrary, unlawful, and unjustified interference with her family in
violation of the ICCPR.

45 | P a g e
COUNT IV
Claim for Habeas due to Violating the United Nations Convention Relating to
Status of Refugees and 8 U.S.C. § 1158

117.
118.
119.
The U.S. is party to 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees and
key provisions have been incorporated into U.S. law giving individuals a cause
for action for litigation. Under U.S. federal law “any alien who is physically
present in the United States or who arrives in the United States (whether or not
at a designated port of arrival and including an alien who is brought to the
46 | P a g e
United States after having been interdicted in international or United States
waters), irrespective of such alien’s status, may apply for asylum…” 8 U.S.C. §
1158.
120.
Because the right to seek asylum and the definition of refugee, which
stems from an international treaty, is directly incorporated into U.S. law, it
creates a legal cause for action for Ms. V.
121.
By interfering with Ms. V.’s parental rights to be with her 12-year-old
daughter, these Defendants have unlawfully interfered with her right to seek
asylum with her daughter and punished her for doing so by ripping her
daughter away from her after seeking asylum.
COUNT V
Claim for Declaratory Relief
under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201
due to violating Due Process Clause
5 Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
th
(Claim for Declaratory relief by Ms. V. against all Defendants in their official capacities)
122.
47 | P a g e
123.
on United States soil and thus applies to Ms. V.
124.
Clause in remaining together as a family, and Ms. V. possess a fundamental right
with respect to the care, custody, and control of her child.
125.
Although the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledges the “broad” latitude due
the Executive in the realm of immigration, Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79–80,
96 S.Ct. 1883, 48 L.Ed.2d 478 (1976), it cannot “abdicat[e]” its “legal responsibility
to review the lawfulness” of detention. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 700, 121 S.Ct. 2491.
The government's power over immigration, while considerable, “is subject to
important constitutional limitations.” Id. at 695, 121 S.Ct. 2491.
126.
Previous attempts by the federal government to use a policy of “no
release” to deter asylum seekers have been found to violate due process. In R.I.L.
v. Johnson, the federal government argued that “in determining whether an
individual claiming asylum should be released, ICE can consider the effect of
release on others not present in the United States. Put another way, it
48 | P a g e
maintain[ed] that one particular individual may be civilly detained for the sake
of sending a message of deterrence to other Central American individuals who
may be considering immigration.” R.I.L-R v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164, 188–89
(D.D.C. 2015). The Johnson court found that the government’s consideration of
the deterrence effect on whether to release asylum-seekers was “out of line with
analogous Supreme Court decisions,” noting that in discussing civil commitment
more broadly, the Court has declared such “general deterrence” justifications
impermissible. Id. (citing Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412, 122 S.Ct. 867, 151
L.Ed.2d 856 (2002) (warning that civil detention may not “become a ‘mechanism
for retribution or general deterrence’—functions properly those of criminal law,
not civil commitment”) (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 372–74, 117
S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see id. at 373, 117
S.Ct. 2072 (“[W]hile incapacitation is a goal common to both the criminal and
civil systems of confinement, retribution and general deterrence are reserved for
the criminal system alone.”)). The Johnson court further found that “a general-
deterrence rationale seems less applicable where—unlike pedophiles, see
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 354–55, 362, 117 S.Ct. 2072, or other violent sexual
offenders, see Crane, 534 U.S. at 409–11, 122 S.Ct. at 869—neither those being
detained nor those being deterred are certain wrongdoers, but rather individuals
49 | P a g e
who may have legitimate claims to asylum in this country.” R.I.L-R v. Johnson,
80 F. Supp. 3d 164, 189 (D.D.C. 2015) (emphasis added).
127.
process because it furthers no legitimate purpose, not to mention a compelling
governmental interest. This is particularly true because neither Ms. V. nor her
daughter have been charged with a crime.
128.
process because it shocks the conscience for all the reasons described above.
COUNT VI
under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201
for violation of Procedural Due Process Clause
(Claim for Declaratory relief by Ms. V. against all Defendants in their official capacities)
129.

130.
50 | P a g e
131.
132.
The separation of Ms. V. from her daughter also violates procedural due
process because it was undertaken without any hearing, and Ms. V. was not even
given any effective paperwork to indicate where her daughter is located or how
she can immediately contact her or retrieve her from detention.
COUNT VII
for violation of the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §
706(2)(C), by disregarding the requirements of, inter alia,
8 U.S.C. § 1232 (b),(c),(g);
6 U.S.C. § 279 (b),(g); and
8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)
(Claim for Declaratory relief by Ms. V. against Defendants Lloyd, Sessions, Nielsen, and
McAleenan in their official capacities)
133.
51 | P a g e
134.
Based on all the incorporated facts, the final agency action to separate
children from their parents, with respect to multiple statutes, to include 8 U.S.C.
§ 1232 (b),(c),(g); 6 U.S.C. § 279 (b),(g); 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a), and every other statute
that is relied upon by the Defendants to separate children from their parents, was
unlawful. All these statutes have permitted the Defendants to make a final
decision related to separating children from their families and maintain the
separation of Ms. V. from her child without consideration of the best interest of
her child, and these Defendants have absolutely abused their discretion with
regards to the implementation of these statutes. Furthermore, the manner in
which these statutes have been interpreted and implemented is fundamentally
unconstitutional. Therefore, Defendants have abused their discretion in an
arbitrary and capricious manner that has deprived Ms. V. of her rights to the
care, custody, and control of her child.
COUNT VIII
Bivens Claim for violating Plaintiff’s Equal Protection Rights
Under the U.S. Constitution
(Claim for Damages against Sessions in his individual capacity)
135.
52 | P a g e
136.
Based on all the facts to support this Count, Sessions violated Plaintiff’s
right to be free from discrimination based on her national origin, as Plaintiff is
from Guatemala, Central America, and Sessions personally instituted a
discriminatory policy aimed at all persons from Guatemala, amongst other
Central American Countries. Consequently, Plaintiff is entitled to all permissible
damages under controlling law against Sessions in his individual capacity.
COUNT IX
Bivens Claim for violating Plaintiff’s Due Process Rights Under the U.S.
Constitution
(Claim for Damages by Ms. V. against John Doe #1 and Scott Lloyd in their individual
capacities)
137.
138.
Based on the incorporated facts to support this Count, Defendants John

Doe 1 and Scott Lloyd violated Plaintiff’s Due Process Rights (both procedural
and substantive) by failing to release Ms. V’s Daughter while knowing there is
no lawful reason to continue holding her Daughter. Defendant Lloyd condoned
and ratified a policy that prohibited D. from being released to Ms. V., despite
knowing and verifying the fact that Ms. V. is D.’s actual mother who came across
53 | P a g e
the border with D. and sought asylum with her. By condoning and ratifying this
policy, Lloyd directly participated in the action that has violated the rights of Ms.
V. to the care, custody, and control of her daughter, as protected by the Due
Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. As for Defendant Doe 1, despite
reviewing the identification and birth certificate, and therefore knowing and
understanding that Ms. V. is the rightful parent of D., Doe 1 has refused to order
or otherwise permit the immediate release of D. to Ms. V. By doing so, Doe 1 has
violated the substantive due process rights of Ms. V. Thus, these Defendants
know that Ms. V is the lawful parent of D., yet refuse to release D. to Ms. V. As a
result, Plaintiff has suffered at the hands of these Defendants and is entitled to
compensatory damages as well as costs and fees of this action.
COUNT X
Punitive Damages
(Against Sessions and Doe 1 in their individual capacities)
Based on the foregoing, including intentional discrimination against
Plaintiff based on national origin, Defendants Sessions and Doe 1, must pay
punitive damages in order to be deterred from future like conduct. These
Defendants have intentionally violated the laws of this country and the laws of
nations.
54 | P a g e
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Petitioner-Plaintiff requests that the Court enter a judgment against
Respondents-Defendants and award the following relief:
A. Order Defendants to immediately release Ms. V.’s daughter into her
mother’s custody within 24 hours of the entry of said Order;
B. Enter judgment and declaratory judgment in favor of Plaintiff;
C. Award compensatory damages against Defendants Sessions and
Doe 1 in their individual capacities;
D. Award punitive damages against Defendants Sessions and Doe 1 in
their individual capacities;
E. Award costs and attorneys’ fees to Plaintiff;
F. Order all other relief that is just and proper.
Respectfully submitted this 26th day of June 2018,
/s/John M. Shoreman
John M. Shoreman (#407626)
MCFADDEN & SHOREMAN, LLC
1050 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
202-772-3188/202-204-8610 FAX
[email protected]
/s/ Mario B. Williams
Mario B. Williams (Ga. # 235254)
Pro Hac Vice Application Forthcoming
/s/Andrew R. Tate
Andrew R. Tate (Ga. # 518068)
55 | P a g e
NEXUS DERECHOS HUMANOS ATTORNEYS, INC.
44 Broad Street, NW, Suite 200
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
404-254-0442/ 703-935-2453 FAX
[email protected]
[email protected]
/s/ Julie Oinonen
Julie Oinonen (Ga. # 722018)
WILLIAMS OINONEN LLC
44 Broad Street, NW, Suite 200
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
404-654-0288/404-592-6225 FAX
[email protected]
56 | P a g e

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Honorable Laura J. Birkmeyer, in her individual capacity and

PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS AND COMPLAINT FOR

n top of discriminating based on national origin/race to effectivelyseparate children from their

(1) ICE should “operationalize the presumption that . . . detention or the

(2) “Children should not be separated from their parents in order to

(Exhibit 9, ICE Advisory Committee on Family Residential Centers, October 7,

Government. Consequently, forced separation of children from their parents,

who are seeking Asylum, is patently unlawful, demonstrating an intentional,

Community frowns upon the Trump Administration’s conduct, having long

designed, purportedly, to halt this outrageous conduct.

Constitution, the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), and the Declaratory

Plaintiff’s child, D., is in custody for purposes of habeas jurisdiction.

See e.g., Santos v. Smith, 260 F.Supp.3d 598, 607-609 (2017).

Personal Jurisdiction is proper because Defendants transact business in

Plaintiff’s claims are not barred by Sovereign Immunity: “[Habeas Corpus]

writs, directed against government custodians, have never been regarded as

barred by sovereign immunity and play a major rule-of-law role in checking

unlawful deprivations of liberty.” Historically, habeas petitions have been

regularly used to review the legality of executive detention, receiving their

greatest protections in that context. Indeed, this protection is so great, it is not

courts answered questions of law in habeas corpus proceedings brought by

aliens challenging Executive [actions].”

Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because at least one of the

Defendants is subject to personal jurisdiction in this district with regards to this

mother of 12-year-old “D.”

Defendant Kirstjen Nielsen is sued in her official capacity as the Secretary

and CBP. As a result, Respondent Nielsen has responsibility for the

administration of the immigration laws pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1103, is

empowered to grant asylum or other relief, was a legal custodian of Plaintiff at

the time of separation, and is a custodian of Plaintiff’s child, D.

Defendant Kevin K. McAleenan is sued in his official capacity as the

noncitizens who are apprehended near the U.S. border.

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), a department of the

authority over “unaccompanied” noncitizen children.

capacity as the Director of the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), the

component of HHS which provides care of and placement for “unaccompanied”

immediate release of D. to Ms. V. Lloyd condoned and ratified a policy that

the U.S. Constitution.

Defendant John Doe 1 is a Federal Field Specialist of the Office of Refugee

Resettlement (“ORR”), the component of HHS which provides care of and

Federal Field Specialist responsible for the Bodencamp Children’s Shelter

operated by Upbring/LSS, located at 5517 S Alameda St, Corpus Christi, TX

authority to order the immediate release of D. to Ms. V. Despite reviewing the

identification and birth certificate, and therefore knowing and understanding

a. “Zero Tolerance” and the Trump Administration’s separation of parents

migrant families for no legitimate purpose.

Numerous families are fleeing persecution and thus seeking asylum.

language definition of unaccompanied minors, a definition that states “the term

and physical custody.” 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2). As an initial matter, the children

imputed to the parent’s unemancipated minor child in many areas of

the definition of unaccompanied minor for that reason as well.

There is overwhelming medical evidence that the separation of a young

and that this damage can be permanent.

The American Association of Pediatrics has recently denounced the

Administration’s practice of separating migrant children from their parents,

period of separation—even after the eventual reunification with a parent or other

Such a situation could have long-term, devastating effects on young