Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Background
1.2 Problem statement and objectives
1.3 Research methodology
1.4 Delimitation and limitations of research
1.4.1 Delimitation
1.4.2 Limitations of study
1.5 Itinerary

1.1 Background
The 1960s was an epochal phase in the political history of Africa. Emerging
from the throes of colonialism and oppression, independence elites set out to
show the world that Africa was capable of giant strides. Such optimism was
fuelled by the economic boom of the 1940s to the 1960s - the consequence of a
steep increase in the prices of commodities such as cocoa, coffee and mineral
resources.1 Compared to Asian economies, African countries in the 1960s
showed better prospects and potential.2 In addition to this, many of the African
leaders who took over the reign of government from the colonialists had
received western education and as such were considered intellectually capable
of steering the administration of their countries.3 True to expectations,
ideologues such as Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere came up with
blueprints aimed at re-enacting a romantic pre-colonial African society, devoid
of socio-economic inequalities.

However, underlining this optimism were a number of stark realities. The Berlin
Conference of 1884/85 made Africa the most fragmented continent in the world.
                                                            
1
Meredith M, The state of Africa: A history of fifty years of independence. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball
Publishers (2005) 142.
2
See e.g. Roemer M, ‘Could Asian policies propel Africa’s growth?’ Available at
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/hiid/543.pdf (Accessed 10 November 2009).
3
See e.g. Dowden R, Africa: Altered states, ordinary miracles. London: Portobello Books (2008) 66-68.

1 
 
A number of post-colonial African countries were landlocked, had small
populations and were not economically viable.4 The nature of colonial
administration in Africa contributed a great deal to the disarticulated economies
and underdevelopment of most post-colonial African states. As Ake remarks,
unlike colonial experiences in the Americas, Europe and Asia, colonialism in
Africa was ‘statist’.5 Ake employs the term ‘statist’ to describe the arbitrary
colonial governance framework, which ensured the redistribution of land, forced
labour, restriction of economic activities by Africans and the suppression of
dissensions.6 Infrastructure was developed not as a means of improving the
lives of the people but simply as of a way of facilitating the collection and
distribution of commodities.7 Thus, the task of newly independent African states
was the restructuring the colonial economic structures into a viable machinery
of growth and development.

It was against this backdrop that the idea of regional integration was elevated to
a topical discourse. Together with domestic policies, regional integration was
seen as a tool for enhancing unity and meaningful socio-economic
advancement. According to post-independence elites like Nkrumah, regional
integration was the panacea for underdevelopment and prevention of
hegemonic threats.8 As such, the establishment of regional organisations was
regarded as utmost priority. Apart from pan-Africanism,9 another factor which
significantly influenced regional integration was the post-1945 worldwide
proliferation of regional integration initiatives. The integration efforts in Europe

                                                            
4
African states, according to Agyeman, are ‘plagued by the deficiency trilogy of smallness, unnaturalness
and illegitimacy’. Agyemen O, Pan Africanist - federalism, Center for Economic Research on Africa,
Montclair University, New Jersey (1990) 6. Available at
http://www.alpha.montclair.edu/~lebelp/CERAFRM035Agyeman1991.pdf (Accessed 20 March 2008).
5
See Ake C, Democracy and development in Africa. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution (1996) 1-
2.
6
Ibid, 2-3; see also Ake C, A political economy of Africa. New York: Longman (1981).
7
Ake (1996) 2; Ake (1981) 44-45.
8
See generally, Nkrumah K, Africa must unite. New York: Praeger (1963).
9
As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, pan-Africanism is an ideal that encapsulates both the racial
and geographical oneness of Africans.

2 
 
and the successful federal arrangement in the United States of America
provided a reference framework for proponents of a United States of Africa.10

In addition to the existing sub-regional integration initiatives, the Organisation of

African Unity (OAU) was created in 1963. The formation of the OAU was thus a
culmination of a pan-Africanism agenda of encouraging close collaboration
among African states, albeit it fell short of the political union envisaged by
Nkrumah. Owing to its minimal design as a framework for interaction, the OAU
could not provide the necessary fillip for a continental economic development.
As such, the 1960s and the 1970s witnessed the establishment of sub-regional
integration schemes as viable alternatives for enhancing regional
development.11 The idea was that these Regional Economic Communities
(RECs) would act as the building block for the eventual establishment of a
continental economic union.12 These RECs were primarily concerned with
issues of economic integration.13

Matters relating to good governance and democratic norms were considered by

African leaders as ‘high politics’ – which are better handled within the domestic
sphere. The enshrined principle of non-interference in the affairs of member
states ensured that the OAU simply played a spectator role amidst widespread
violations of human rights and the rule of law by a majority of its member states.
Ouguergouz notes that the increasing importance of human rights on the
international stage, especially the stiff international opposition to serious abuses
by some African dictators added impetus to the need for a continental

                                                            
10
See e.g. Nkrumah (1963); see also e.g. Asante S, Regionalism and Africa’s development. London:
Macmillan (1997) 2-3.
11
See e.g. Asante S, African development: Adebayo Adedeji’s alternative strategies. London: Hans Zell
Publishers (1991) 94.
12
Ibid, 96.
13
Other political concerns of the OAU were the fight against apartheid, resolution of conflicts and the
protection of refugees.

3 
 
framework for the protection of human rights.14 The African Charter on Human
and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) was eventually adopted in 1981.

The disappointing record of human rights violations since the adoption of the
ACHPR indicates the little regard attached to the consideration of democratic
norms as an indispensable component of regional integration in Africa. The
inability to entrench good governance and democratic norms is better
understood within the peculiar trajectory of political development in post-colonial
Africa. Post-colonial Africa is in a number of ways, an embodiment of
contradictions and ironies. Having made a substantial sacrifice in eliminating
colonialism and actualising basic human rights, the euphoria of independence
quickly dissolved into a rather traumatic experience. Post-independence leaders
adopted arbitrary laws reminiscent of the colonial era, which they had previously
criticised, in suppressing all forms of dissent and consolidating their new earned
powers.15 Instead of improving the lives of the citizenry, coercive policies were
put in place to ensure utmost conformity and obedience. Like a contagion,
military coups, corruption and one-party system became the norm. The promise
of show-casing how traditional African values can influence governance and
economic development gradually derailed amidst the rampant assault on
fundamental norms and values.16

Unlike the situation in parts of Asia, where the centralisation of power was also
used in enhancing economic development, African leaders’ obsession with
power resulted in the absence of concerted and meaningful development
policies.17 Although development was a dominant theme in the speeches of
African leaders, Ake views this more as a strategy of consolidating power than a

                                                            
14
Ouguergouz F, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A comprehensive agenda for human
dignity and sustainable development in Africa. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff (2003) 36-40.
15
Ake (1996) 3.
16
As noted above, ideology-driven post-colonial elites such as Nyerere and Kenyatta designed policies aimed at
providing governance with a distinct, Afro-centric feel. These include Ujamaa in Tanzania and Harambee in Kenya.
17
Ake (1996) 7. Also the transfer of powers to regional institutions was inconceivable as this would result
in the diminution of their territorial influence.

4 
 
framework for economic transformation.18 Underdevelopment and good
governance deficit further exposed African countries to internal conflicts and
acts of destabilisation.

It is within the above-described milieu that regional integration continues to

operate. The transformation of the OAU into the African Union (AU) should have
provided the opportunity for a re-evaluation of the integration process; instead it
has contributed to the entrenchment of the malaise. While espousing the EU
and the USA as ideal models, African leaders continue to engage in practices
which negate the principles that have made such institutions a success story. In
spite of the renewed attempt to include human rights and democratic norms as
part of regional integration framework, the situation on the ground shows that
the continent is still a long way from entrenching democratic standards. Unlike
the OAU, the AU and other RECs expressly espouse democratic norms as part
of their institutional framework. In addition, the constitutive instruments of these
bodies have created seemingly supranational legislative and (quasi) judicial
institutions. Given the prevalent erosion of democratic values and norms across
the continent, it is no wonder that these institutions have largely remained
ineffectual.

The conceptualisation of regional integration and democratic values as being

mutually exclusive requires some serious evaluation. The cumulative
consequence(s) of such a conception have been largely negative. At the
national level, good governance and human rights deficits has resulted in a dire
state of affairs, where such states have degenerated into corrupt, repressive
and conflict-ridden entities. With weak institutions and vaguely structured
development strategies, these states remain key obstacles to the regional
integration agenda. If the effectiveness of regional organisations depends on

                                                            
18
African leaders narrowly construed development as a project that would require utmost obedience and
conformity. To them, political opposition was an unnecessary distraction and impediment to the attainment
of effective and sustainable development. As such, the suppression of dissensions was a necessary
component of the march towards developmental state. See Ibid, 9.

5 
 
the existence of strong national institutions, a position which is absent in Africa,
then the state of integration in Africa requires utmost reconsideration. As such,
the task should be centred on re-evaluating the position of the present state of
regional institutions so that they not only embody ideals of democracy but also
become a major driver of entrenching fundamental values across the continent.

While the attachment to state sovereignty is a common problem in all

integration initiatives, it is more ingrained in Africa mainly because repressive
regimes owe their survival to the accumulation and retention of the state’s
coercive instruments. Sharing sovereign power with regional institutions would
likely raise questions about such regime’s claim to legitimacy. To prevent this,
the institutional framework of regional organisations is either deliberately
designed by political elites to be weak or institutional decisions are routinely
disregarded.

The foregoing exposition thus raises some fundamental questions. The first
challenges the seriousness of regional integration in Africa.19 In light of the
deficiency of political will among member states to create the necessary
operational environment at both the national and regional spheres, for the
success of regional integration, it needs to be asked whether there is a
conscious effort by the political elites to realise qualitative integration.
Conscious effort should, however, not be confused with grand speeches or
dictatorial zeal to impose a United States of Africa. This is because such calls
are made against the backdrop of debilitating factors such as the absence of
good governance, weak economic structures and dysfunctional institutional
frameworks. In this sense, there needs to be a nexus between democratic
ideals and the attempts at instituting integration initiatives.

                                                            
19
See e.g. Udombana J, ‘A harmony or a cacophony? The music of integration in the African Union treaty
and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development’. Indiana International and Comparative Law Review.
13 (2002), 202.

6 
 
This leads to the second question, namely whether a new path should be
carved for the realisation of a qualitative and viable integration process. Simply
put, is there a need for a paradigm shift in the conceptualisation of African
integration, from a narrowly construed idea to one which adopts democratic
norms as an indispensable prerequisite? In order to answer these questions,
one needs to consider salient issues such as:

• the functioning of sub-regional and continental institutions

• the state of national institutions
• cultivation of shared democratic norms and values
• the design of suitable national and regional development strategies

While regional integration is by no means the sole elixir to Africa’s problems, it

is a useful development strategy for addressing some of Africa’s challenges.
Africa’s peripheral position, economically and politically, on the global stage
requires a strategy that encompasses the pooling of resources and efforts. The
strengthening of linkages among African countries is thus essential for both
national and regional economic development. As indicated above, such
cooperation should be underpinned by adherence to democratic norms.

It is against this background that this study intends to engage in an investigation

of the feasibility of charting a nuanced course for continental integration.
Considering the challenges and failures of African integration to date, it is
pertinent to embark on a comprehensive and detailed study on how to reverse
the prevalent political context. In this regard, this thesis will focus on how the
AU can be re-positioned to address the numerous continental challenges.

7 
 
1.2 Problem statement and objectives
The core problem which this study intends to investigate is two-fold: a) whether
a supranational AU20 is feasible and b) if this is possible, what should the nature
of its institutional framework be?

In addressing these, an attempt will be made to provide answers to the

following pertinent questions:

• Can the AU supranationalise under the prevailing circumstances or

framework?
• If such possibility is remote, what are the obstacles and possible
remedial actions?
• What lessons can be learnt from previous and present supranational
attempts in Africa and Europe?
• Is there an existing framework for setting the AU on a supranational path
or should a new one be designed?
• If a new framework is designed, would such framework fit under the
prevailing structure or would it stand as an independent framework?
• To what extent can democratic values shape the institutional framework
of a future supranational AU?

Cumulatively, these questions seek to provide the answer to the ultimate

challenge of translating pan-Africanism or the idea of ‘Africa’ into a
transformative agenda. The premise of such exercise is the contextualisation of
the discourse on supranationalism, as a means of establishing its relevance to
African realities. Specifically, the hypothesis borders on the extent to which
supranationalism, through the AU, can help address the peculiar
developmental, political and economic, challenges of the African continent. To
what extent can traditional African values, which ensure broad-based

                                                            
20
A supranational AU, as will be discussed later, envisages an organisation that is autonomous from its
member states through its capacity to issue binding directives to its member states.

8 
 
community participation in matters which affect the common good, and
universal standards provide the democratic framework for deepening regional
integration and unity? The success of European supranationalism is instructive
as it presents the nexus between commitment to democratic ideals and the
proper articulation and implementation of supranational policies. The twin
sanctity of democratic institutions in member states and the autonomy of the
European Union (EU) are at the core of the (supranational) institutional
development of the EU. If any lesson needs to be drawn from the European
experience, it is essentially the imperative of infusing and clothing the trajectory
of regional integration with democratic ethos.

The task of this study is, therefore, to examine the politico-legal feasibility of
carving an integration path strictly based on adherence to democratic norms
and values. Against the backdrop of an ingrained philosophy of including all
African states in the integration process, coupled with the prevalent paucity of
good governance, this study seeks to formulate a nuanced methodology of
achieving a democratic supranational AU.

1.3 Research methodology

The methodology adopted by this study is primarily desk and library research.
The literature review included both primary and secondary sources. The primary
sources consulted comprise treaties, case laws and official documents of the
AU and other regional institutions. Secondary sources relied upon are books,
journals, newspaper articles, conference papers, working papers and relevant
internet sources.

In addition to the desk and library research, field visits were made to the Pan-
African Parliament (PAP) Secretariat and the United Nations Headquarters. The
visit to PAP Secretariat was aimed at collecting relevant documents and
attending a session of the PAP. The PAP session was useful for the
understanding and assessment of the functioning and relevance of the

9 
 
institution. With funding provided by the University of Pretoria, this two months,
June 1 – July 31 2009, were spent at the UN Office of Legal Affairs in New
York. The visit provided an opportunity to gain valuable insight into the
operations of an intergovernmental institution especially the compliance level of
member states and the development of international law.

The study applied a descriptive analysis in order to provide a detailed

foundation and framework. In this regard, the various theories underpinning the
core elements of the thesis are illustrated. In terms of formulating the
methodology of attaining supranationalism, including recommendations, the
study employs a prescriptive analysis. The comparative method is also used to
enrich the discussion on institutional development.

1.4 Delimitation and limitations of research study

1.4.1 Delimitation
Before outlining the limitations of this study, it is important to explain the
underlying logic of the broad approaches adopted by this study.

Continental approach: The discourse of supranationalism in this thesis is

restricted to continental integration. While the findings of this study are also
relevant to RECs, the AU has been selected for the following notable reasons.
Firstly, as a result of its continental reach, a supranational AU has a better
potential of making a meaningful impact on the integration trajectory. Secondly,
the fact that certain RECs are making appreciable advances, better than the AU
in some cases, towards supranationalism may result in a situation where these
institutions find it politically unwise to surrender their powers to the AU. It is thus
essential to establish a continental framework that makes the transferral of
power easy and beneficial to all parties.

Democratic approach: The overriding hypothesis of this study is the

consideration of democratic requisites as the primary determinant of a

10 
 
successful integration process. In this sense, adherence to democratic
standards is adopted as a ‘political filter’ for determining the membership of a
supranational AU. The fact that the prevalent ideology of limiting democratic
values to a secondary component of the integration process has not resulted in
any significant improvement, makes this approach an attractive and pertinent
alternative.

1.4.2 Limitations of study

There are a number of limitations to this study. Although literature is replete with
issues affecting African integration, there is a dearth of scholarly materials on
how unconditional membership impacts on African integration. Available studies
highlight the importance of democracy and good governance without
necessarily linking unconditional membership to the absence of shared norms
and values.

The study of regional integration is extensive and covers all facets of human
endeavours. Even within the adopted politico-legal approach of the study, there
is a wide-range of issues which shape the theories and practicalities of the
integration process. This study has, however, been restricted to how democratic
standards can influence supranational institutional development. The motivation
behind this is that the development of a qualitative supranational institution can
provide the requisite impetus for addressing the multiple issues under the
umbrella of integration.

Another limitation of this study is that as a result of resource constraints,

comprehensive research trips to the European Union (EU) and AU Secretariats
in Brussels and Addis Ababa respectively could not be undertaken. Interviews
with key officials and access to important documents would have provided
useful insights into the dynamics of the relationship between member states
and international institutions. Consequently, such field visits would have
mitigated the effect of the dearth of scholarly writings on this subject.

11 
 
In terms of the temporal scope of this study, the cut-off time is 31 December
2009. Regional integration, nay African integration is at an interesting phase,
with changes occurring rapidly. Important events and documents published post
cut-off date, especially impacting on the subject-matter, may render
recommendations made either obsolete or confirmed by subsequent events.

1.5 Itinerary
The introductory chapter sets out the background to the study, identifies the
problem that the study intends to investigate, the adopted methodology and the
limitations of the study.

Chapter two provides a conceptual framework of the study. It presents a

theoretical discussion of regional integration and supranationalism. It further
examines the theoretical dimensions of African integration, including the factors
that will impact on the integration process.

Chapter three provides a critical analysis of supranational attempts in Africa. It

starts by examining the institutional structures of selected sub-regional
institutions. In order to answer the question on why supranational attempts in
Africa have being unsatisfactory, this chapter explores the common politico-
legal and economic problems facing African integration.

Chapter four attempts to answer the research question of this thesis by

examining the feasibility of a supranational AU. It begins with a theoretical
meaning of international organisation and how it fits into the global governance
structure. It further provides an analysis of the AU, especially concerning its
establishment and the question on whether it can be described as a
supranational entity. It finally considers the essential pre-conditions for the
attainment of supranationalism.

12 
 
Chapter five builds on the points identified in chapter four by considering how
they can be channelled into the institutional transformation of the AU. It
examines the theories of (supranational) institution building and the different
perspectives on the quest for AU transformation. Furthermore, this chapter
attempts to present a detailed analysis of the institutional design of a future
supranational AU.

Finally, chapter six summarises the main findings, discusses further

recommendations and the significance of this study.

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

13 
 
 Chapter 2

Conceptual and theoretical framework of regional integration:

A politico-legal observation

Coming together is a beginning; keeping together is progress; working together is success –

Henry Ford21

2.1 Introduction

2.2 Regional integration: Different theoretical perspectives

2.2.1 Definitional focus

2.2.2 Theories of regional integration: A politico-legal concept

2.2.3 Regional integration and sovereignty: Is the two mutually

exclusive?

2.3 Regional integration in Africa: A contextual analysis

2.3.1 The idea of ‘Africa’: Tracing the philosophical underpinning

of unity

2.3.2 Theoretical perspectives on African integration

2.3.3 Searching for an elixir: Is regional integration beneficial to

Africa?

2.3.4 Is African integration possible?

2.4 Summary

                                                            
21
Cited in Covey S, Everyday Greatness. Nashville: Thomas Nelson (2006) 299.

14 
 
2.1 Introduction
The increasing powers and relevance of the EU in global realpolitik has evoked
a special interest in regional integration. Not only has the European experiment
in integration stimulated a significant global trend;22 it has also engendered a
multi-disciplinary focus on its phenomenal evolution into an organisation that
defies the traditional logic of public international law. While the EU remains an
international organisation, it functions like nation-states in respect of some
policies such as monetary, agriculture and trade. It is this distinctive quality that
sets the EU apart from other international organisations and also gives impetus
to the study of regional integration, especially supranationalism.

It is against this background that this chapter attempts to engage in a theoretical

excursion into this phenomenon and its impact on the global order. This chapter
is divided into two parts. In an attempt to put the integration narrative in
perspective, the first part will explore the definition of integration, its theoretical
manifestations - both political and legal - and lastly, the nagging question on the
compatibility of integration and sovereignty. To situate integration within an
African context, which forms the focus of the research, the second part begins
with the philosophical origins of African integration. It is then followed by an
exposition of the various theoretical perspectives on African integration. Next,
the inherent advantage(s) of integration in Africa are also discussed. Finally, the
possibility of African integration, the question that sets the tone for the
subsequent chapters, is considered.

2.2 Regional Integration: Different theoretical perspectives

In the past five decades, regional integration has benefited a great deal from
multi-disciplinary research and the empirical outputs of international

                                                            
22
Regional integration has been implemented in other parts of the globe – North America through the
North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); Latin America through the Southern Common Market
(MERCUSOR); Africa through the African Union (AU) and the various Regional Economic Communities
(RECs); South East Asia through the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN); Asia Pacific
through the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC); and the Caribbean through the Caribbean
Community and Common Market (CARICOM).

15 
 
organisations. Like any other field of human endeavour, the study of regional
integration lends itself to both abstraction and empiricism, either based on
theoretical suppositions or the resultant effect of inter-state cooperation vis-à-vis
granting powers to international organisations. In light of this, the various
manifestations of regional integration will be considered. It starts with an
attempt to define the concept of regional integration, then moves on to discuss
the theories of integration and lastly, considers the relationship between
national sovereignty and regional integration.

2.2.1 Definitional focus

Integration must be understood as part of the dynamics of post-World War II
international relations between states. Although the concept of integration is not
novel,23 the post-war realpolitik necessitated practical and more organised
connectedness between and among states. The realisation that certain
functions are transcendental and too multifaceted to be handled by nation
states has lent credence to the need for a global governance framework that
includes non-state actors.24 Lindseth explains this phenomenon in the following
words:

[T]he extensive delegation of normative power to the executive and technocratic

sphere after 1945 [was] reflective of a conscious effort by major political actors to
reinforce the nation-state by making it a more effective agent in the promotion of
public welfare, by insulating decision-making from the parliamentary interference
and factionalism and thereby pre-committing the state to a stream of purportedly
welfare-enhancing future policy choices.25

However, before defining regional integration, it is pertinent that a distinction is

made between the often confused concepts: ‘integration’ and ‘cooperation’.
While integration denotes a formal arrangement involving voluntary association
                                                            
23
Hay P, Federalism and supranational organisation: Patterns of new legal structure. Urbana: University
of Illinois Press (1966) 1-2.
24
Rosamond B, Theories of European integration. London: McMillan (2000) 33.
25
Lindseth P, ‘The contradictions of supranationalism: Administrative governance and constitutionalisation
in European integration since the 1950s’. Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review. 37/2 (2003) 382.

16 
 
between states in order to lose the factual attributes of sovereignty, cooperation
describes steps on the way to integration.26 In other words, cooperation
precedes integration and may not necessarily lead to formal integration
between states; it is rather a phase in the process of integration.27

Definitional problems of the concept of regional integration stem from the

varying intentions of theorists in respect of its purpose or termination point. The
termination point of a regional integration process will determine whether it is
political, economic, social or cultural. As Hay indicates, it is a political process
with varying applications and scope.28 Based on the study of the European
experiment at integration, Haas defines political integration as:

[T]he process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are
persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a
new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre
existing national states. The end result of a process of political integration is a
new political community, super imposed over the pre-existing ones.29

Although Haas sees the end result of the process of integration as ‘a new
political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones’,30 he equally
notes that the shifting of loyalties does not necessarily imply the repudiation of
national state or government; rather individuals may exercise multiple loyalties
based on the functional advantages to be derived from the ‘new centre’ or
nation states.31 This analysis reinforces the durability of nation states in the face
of changing dynamics of inter-states relations. This is further exemplified by the

                                                            
26
Haas E, ‘The study of regional integration: Reflections on the joy and anguish of pretheorising’.
International Organisation. 24/4 (1970) 610.
27
Ibid.
28
Hay (1966) 1. Since nation-states remain the dominant participant in international relations, the success
or failure of integration process largely depend on the political will and enthusiasm of nation-states. A case
in point is the relative success of the EU which has been attributed to the willingness, not at all times, of the
member states to relinquish parts of their national sovereignty.
29
Haas E, The uniting of Europe: Political, social and economic forces 1950-1957. Stanford: Stanford
University Press (1958) 16.
30
Ibid, 16.
31
Ibid, 14.

17 
 
assertion that integration is primarily driven by public officials (and also interest
groups) of member states.32

Hay describes integration as ‘the amalgamation of two or more units or of some

of their functions’.33 Cantori & Spiegel view integration as ‘the process of
political unification’ based on a ‘degree of similarity or complementarity’
between the political entities involved.34 Integration in this sense presupposes
an element of sameness in tradition, economic ideology and political goals.
From an economics perspective, Venables notes that regional integration
‘occurs when countries come together to form free trade areas or customs
union, offering members preferential trade access to each other’s markets’.35
Deutsch et al define integration as:

the attainment, within a territory, of a sense of community and of institutions and

practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a long time,
dependable expectations of peaceful change among its population.36

The above-mentioned definition views integration as an arrangement which

excludes conflict as a means of settling disputes among participating states.37
The emergence of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951
after a bitter and destructive continental war and the fact that there has not
been a recurrence of that tragic incident (at least among EU member states)
lends credence to the security-conception of integration.38

                                                            
32
Ibid, 17.
33
Hay (1966) 1.
34
Cantori L & Spiegel S, The international politics of regions – A comparative approach. Englewood
Cliffs: New Jersey: Prentice-Hall (1970) 10-11.
35
Venables A, ‘International trade: Regional economic integration’. International Encyclopaedia of Social
and Behavioural Sciences (2000) 1. Available at
http://www.econ.ox.ac.uk/members/tony.venables/regenc2.pdf (Accessed 25 November 2008).
36
Deutsch k, Political community and the north Atlantic area. New York: Greenwood Press (1957) 5
37
Ibid.
38
See e.g. O’Neill M, The politics of European integration. London: Routledge (1996) 10.

18 
 
Integration should however not be seen as a ‘big-bang’ occurrence, rather it
should be understood as a multi-layered process which happens over a length
of time. The length of time over which integration has persisted plays a
significant part in its consolidation.39 The trajectory of integration thus involves
crossing a minimalist threshold of political commitment of political actors to a
maximalist outcome, which entails the creation of a new political union.40 A
‘maximalist outcome’ or termination point of the regional integration process is
not necessarily dependant on the initial objectives of political actors, but on
variable factors influencing every step of the integration process. Therefore, to
view integration as a straight-forward, linear process - excluding the vagaries of
(sub) national political and economic forces - is not only unsound but also
ignores the realities of a state-centric global framework.

Table 2.1: Forms/stages of regional integration

Preferential An arrangement in which members apply lower tariffs
trade area to imports produced by other members than to
imports produced by non-members. Members can
determine tariffs on imports from non-members.

Free trade area A preferential trade area with no tariffs on imports

from other members. As in preferential trade areas,
members can determine tariffs on import from non-
members.

Customs union A free trade area in which members impose common

tariffs on non-members. Members may also cede
sovereignty to a single custom administration.

Common Market A customs union that allows free movement of the

factors of production (such as capital and labour)
across the national borders within the integration
area.

Economic union A common market with unified monetary and fiscal

                                                            
39
Deutsch et al (1957) 6.
40
O’Neill (1996) 12

19 
 
 policies including common currency.

Political union The ultimate stage of integration, in which members

become one nation. National governments cede
sovereignty over economic and social policies to a
supranational authority, establishing common
institutions and judicial and legislative processes –
including a common parliament

Source: Economic Commission for Africa, Assessing Regional Integration in Africa. Addis
Ababa: Economic Commission for Africa (2004) 10. [Hereinafter referred to as ECA (2004) ]

Writing on the stages or forms of regional integration, Caproso & Choi note that
‘at best we have a set of labels that may be useful for categorising the path of
members undergoing regional integration, rather than a natural sequence
through which all integrating states must pass’.41 In this sense, member states
may decide to start with a customs union and move right ahead to forming a
political union, without necessarily going through all the stages outlined above.
Ultimately, it is the degree of political will among member states that will
determine the pace of the integration process.

2.2.2 Theories of regional integration: A politico-legal concept

The European experiment in integration provided a fertile ground for a multi-
disciplinary study of the theories of regional integration. Every step of the
integration process inspired the propounding of new theoretical assumptions
and confirmed or refuted existing theories. Although integration is multi-
disciplinary, the works of theorists such as Haas, Mitrany, Moravcsik and Waltz
all present a political science/international relations narrative of integration. This
is understandable considering the highly political process that brings about the
process of integration. However, of equal importance is the legal implication of
integration. While political theorists have done extensive work on the theoretical
foundation of integration, it is the legal theorists who engage in explaining the

                                                            
41
See Caproso & Choi in Carlsnaes et al (2002) 483.

20 
 
evolutionary nature of integration and also the consequences of the integration
process on national and international politico-legal framework. It is against this
backdrop that this section will discuss the theories of integration under two
rubrics: legal and political.

a) Legal theories of integration

As Weiler puts it, any regional integration process is a creation of the law.42
After the political negotiations and compromises, member states kick-start the
process by agreeing on legal instruments such as Treaties, which clearly spell
out the rights and obligations of parties involved and also the programmes of
action.43 Making a distinction between the juridical and political theories of
integration, Weiler avers that:

Political theories of … integration [are] largely wedded to a certain notion about

the outcome of the process and embodied a certain predictive element about
continued progress. In addition, political theory laid great emphasis on the social,
political and economic substantive achievements and less emphasis on the ways
and means.44

Rather than focus on theoretical assumptions and conclusions, legal analysts

investigate the evolution and step-by-step implication(s) of integration
arrangements on member states. Legal theories of integration are thus based
on a ‘continuous progress of integration’,45 an analysis which is more concerned
with the interpretation and efficacy of treaty provisions dealing with integration,
the position of regional bodies in international law and the effects of laws
emanating from such regional bodies in member states.46

                                                            
42
Weiler J, The Constitution of Europe: Do the new clothes have an emperor? And other essays on
European integration. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1999) 221.
43
Ibid.
44
Weiler J, ‘The community system: The dual character of supranationalism’. Yearbook of European Law.
1 (1981) 270.
45
Ibid.
46
Hay (1966) 6-8.

21 
 
A key implication of regional integration is what international lawyers refer to as
the ‘internationalisation of constitutional law’ or ‘constitutionalisation of
international law’.47 Although these two concepts have different meanings, they
both have similar results. While the former denotes the emergence of
international parallel constitutions as a result of transfer of functions to regional
institutions, the latter explains the transformation of treaties into domestic-like
constitutions.48 These concepts jointly highlight the growing influence of
international organisations and the possibility (or existence) of an overarching
framework by which domestic constitutions should be measured.49 An
(un)intended consequence of an inter-state arrangement is a regulatory
framework or a semblance of national constitutional mechanism, which more or
less operates on familiar constitutional terminologies.50 In the context of
international organisations, ‘international constitutionalism’ or constitutionalism
provides a framework for uniform actions, attribution of powers and
implementation of shared values.51 (This will be discussed in detail in
subsequent chapters)

Another important element of the legal theory of integration, which draws

significantly from constitutionalism, is the concept of ‘conservatory principles’.
Based on the understanding that states remain the primary structure of
international relations, the conservatory principles aim to strike a balance
between the powers of states and international organisations.52 Regional bodies
are essentially a creation of states and derive their legitimacy from member

                                                            
47
Cottier T & Hertig M, ‘The prospect of 21st century constitutionalism’. Max Planck Yearbook of United
Nations Law. 7 (2003) 269-70.
48
Ibid, 270-271.
49
See e.g. Werner W, ‘Constitutionalisation, fragmentation, politicisation, the constitutionalisation of
international law as a janus-faced phenomenon’, Griffen’s View. 8/2 (2007)19-22.
50
As Cottier & Hertig highlights, some organisations such as FAO and UNESCO explicitly refer to their
founding treaties as ‘constitutions’ and the European Court of Justice termed EU founding treaties as ‘the
constitutional Charter of a Community based on the rule of law’. See Cottier & Hertig (2003) 277.
51
Werner (2007) 22; Weiler (1999) 221; Cottier & Hertig (2003) 271-272.
52
Dashwood A, Wyatt D, Arnull A & Ross M, European Union law. London: Sweet & Maxwell (2000)
151.

22 
 
states, so it is crucial that legal mechanisms are put in place to safeguard their
national interests.

The conservatory principles are further divided into four:53 subsidiarity,

attribution of powers, proportionality and flexibility. The subsidiarity principle
highlights the complementary role of international organisations by prescribing
that only matters which cannot be effectively dealt with at the national level
should be allocated to international organisations.54 The principle of attribution
of powers simply provides that regional organisations only have powers
explicitly or impliedly conferred on it.55 The principle of proportionality is an
enquiry into whether the means employed by regional bodies are suitable and
necessary for the attainment of the desired objectives.56 Lastly, the flexibility
principle denotes a legal arrangement under which some member states may
decide to pursue shared interest outside of the institutional framework.57

At this juncture, it is imperative to discuss the central thrust of this thesis:

supranationalism. Although supranationalism has been described as a ‘political-
descriptive’ concept,58 its operation is essentially composed of legal
components. What then are the (legal) requirements which define
supranationalism? Although this will be elaborated upon in subsequent
chapters, it is sufficient to flesh out these points. The following points can be
distilled from Hay’s analysis as the elements of supranationalism:59

• institutional autonomy of an organisation from member states

• ability of an organisation to bind its member states by a majority or
weighted majority vote
                                                            
53
Ibid, 153-168.
54
Ibid, 156-62; see also Lenaerts K & Van Nuffel P, Constitutional law of the European Union. London:
Sweet & Maxwell (2004) 100-1.
55
Dashwood et al (2000) 153; Lenaerts & Van Nuffel (2004) 90.
56
Dashwood et al (2000) 162.
57
Ibid, 164.
58
Hay (1966) 69.
59
Ibid.

23 
 
 • direct binding effect of law emanating from the organisation on natural
and legal persons
• attribution of powers which differs markedly from powers bestowed on
other organisations

Building on Hay’s analysis, Weiler makes a distinction between normative and

decisional supranationalism.60 According to his analysis, normative
supranationalism implies that the laws of an organisation:61

• have direct effect in member states

• are superior to the laws of member states
• member states are pre-empted from enacting contradictory legislation

On the other hand, decisional supranationalism ‘relates to the institutional

framework and decision-making processes by which Community policies and
measures are, in the first place, initiated, debated and formulated, then
promulgated and finally executed.’62 Pescatore63 also identified three elements
of supranationalism as: the recognition of common values and interests; the
creation of an effective power and the autonomy of these powers. The absence
of the aforementioned elements within an institutional framework simply means
that such organisation is an intergovernmental organisation.64 (See table 2.2
below).

                                                            
60
Weiler (1981) 271.
61
Ibid, 273-280.
62
Weiler (1981) 271.
63
See Pescatore P, The Law of integration. Leiden: Sijthoff (1974) 51-52.
64
Ibid; see also Weiler (1981) 305.

24 
 
Table 2.2: Differences between supranational and intergovernmental organisations

Arena International Supranational

(Intergovermental)

Disciplinary background of International relations Law (typically public law)

observers

Typical issue of Fundamental system rules; The primary legislative

governance issues with immediate agenda of the community;
political and electoral enabling legislation; principal
resonance; international ‘high harmonisation measures
politics’; issues dehors Treaty

Principal players Member states Community and Member

states

Principal actors Governments (cabinets; Governments, Community

executive branch) institutions: Commission,
Council, Parliament

Level of Low to medium High

institutionalisation

Mode of political process Diplomatic negotiation Legislative process bargaining

Type/style of intercourse Informal procedures; low Formal procedures; high level

level of process rules of process rules

Visibility/transparency High actor and event Medium to low actor and

visibility; low transparency of event visibility; low
process transparency of process

Source: Adapted from Weiler (1999) 275. 

The table above highlights the major procedural differences between

intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. Under the former, national elites
and their institutions play a central role in the formulation of policies and
initiatives while the latter shows the important part played by transnational
institutions. It also reveals that supranationalism is not a unipolar process;
rather it thrives on the interplay between member states and transnational
institutions.

25 
 
b. Political science theories of integration
The political science theories of integration can be classified under two broad
headings: intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. The supranationalist
school of thought questions the logic of nation state, especially after the chaotic
consequences of the two world wars.65 At the core of supranationalist theory is
the assignment of sovereign powers to a neutral, transnational entity, devoid of
the foibles of nation states.66

At the other end of the spectrum is the intergovernmental or state-centric school

of thought. Advocates of this ideology posit that nation states remain the
dominant players in global or regional affairs.67 Even when transnational entities
are set up, intergovermentalists point to the fact that the representatives of
nation states are the primary decision makers and essentially drive the
process.68 Below is a full analysis of the paradigms of political science.

i) Functionalism
Buoyed by the disastrous aftermath of the Second World War (economic
meltdown and absence of peace), the protagonists of this approach advocated
for the creation of technocratic institutions to handle transnational socio-
economic problems.69 Functionalists display an unyielding belief in the ability of
technocratic institutions to manage transnational human needs, peace and
public welfare.70 As Mitrany highlights, these functional bodies will differ from
traditional international organisations in the sense that they would be ‘executive
agencies with autonomous tasks and powers’.71 This approach presents an
alternative to global governance framework, an attempt to dislocate nation
                                                            
65
O’Neil (1996) 21.
66
Ibid, 21-23.
67
Ibid, 54-57.
68
Ibid, 56; see also Blokker N & Schermers H, International institutional law: Unity within diversity. The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff (1995) 40.
69
Mitrany D, The Functional theory of politics. London School of Economics and Political Science (1975)
126; see also Rosamond B, Theories of European integration. London: McMillan (2000) 33.
70
For a detailed analysis of the functionalist theory, see generally, Mitrany D, A working peace system.
Chicago: Quadrangle Books (1966) 25-99.
71
Mitrany (1975) 125.

26 
 
states from matters that border on common (transnational) interests.72
Furthermore, this idea predicts that the efficient performance of responsibilities
by transnational functional agencies would lead to the transfer of loyalty from
nation state to these agencies (attitudinal change).73

Functionalism pessimists argue that this idea ignores the highly political nature
of international relations. Mitrany’s advocacy of detached and unaffiliated
technocratic agencies disregards the state-centric posture of global politics.
According to critics, a project which excluded this reality lacked scientific and
empirical basis.74 They also questioned the functionalist assumption of human
attitudinal change by arguing that this line of thinking falls within the scope of
morality rather than politics.75 The pervasive and deep-rooted attachment to
nationality not only by political actors but individuals essentially rendered the
‘attitudinal change’ theory impractical.

ii) Neo-functionalism
Neo-functionalism was a reaction to the perceived inadequacies of
functionalism. Neo-functionalists regarded integration as a more complex
process than the apolitical method or ‘technocratic automaticity’ prescribed by
functionalism.76 Neo-functionalism, like its theoretical precursor, highlights the
irrelevance of nation states and their inability to maintain peace and security.77
It, however, acknowledged the primacy of nation states and its political elites
(including political parties and interest groups) in the integration process.78
Thus, this established the empirical foundation of neo-functionalism.

At the core of neo-functionalist agenda is the concept of ‘spillover’. This concept

refers to situations where integration in one economic sector would lead to
                                                            
72
See generally, Mitrany (1966).
73
Rosamond (2000) 33.
74
O’Neil (1996) 34.
75
Ibid, 33.
76
Rosamond (2000) 55.
77
O’Neil (1996) 37.
78
Haas (1958) 17; Rosamond (2000) 55.

27 
 
further economic integration within and beyond such sector.79 The logic behind
spillover is that once nation states agree to place the control of a certain sector
in the hands of a supranational authority, with success in such sector and with
the passage of time, there would be pressures to extend control to other related
policy areas. Supranational institutions rather than nation states are seen as the
drivers of this process.

Moravcsik, however, argued that spillover into related sectors has not being as
consistent as expected.80 He further notes that neo-functionalism fails to offer
an explanation for the domestic dynamics that shapes supranational
decisions.81 Neo-functionalism suffered its greatest setback when the then
French president, Charles de Gaulle, altered the trajectory of European
integration.82 In sharp contrast to the postulations of functionalist theorists, de
Gaulle rejected the European Commission’s (EC) modest attempt to reduce the
powers of nation states within the community.83 In reaction to the growing
influence of the EC, de Gaulle, in 1965, remarked that only existing European
states ‘had the rights to give orders and power to be obeyed’.84 This singular
event exposed the empirical limitations and the rigidities of this approach. It
brought to the fore the influence of nation states in the integration process.

iii) Realism and neo-realism

At the nucleus of the realist theory is the idea that international politics is about
the interaction of states in an essentially anarchic universe.85 States are
engaged in a game of survival-of-the-fittest and the quest for security lead to

                                                            
79
This is called ‘functional spillover’. See Rosamond (2000) 60.
80
Moravcsik A, ‘Preferences and power in the European Community: A liberal intergovernmentalist
approach’, Journal of Common Market Studies. 31/4 (1993) 476.
81
Ibid, 477.
82
Ibid, 476.
83
O’Neill (1996) 45.
84
Cited in Agyemen (1990) 19.
85
The term ‘anarchic’ implies that international politics is a system without government or a centralised
authority to forestall the threat of violence and the recurrent use of force. See Waltz K, Theories of
international politics. New York: McGraw-Hill (1979) 88, 102-3.

28 
 
interstate cooperation.86 In the pursuit of national interests (security) and
survival, states collaborate with other states which have comparative military
and economic advantages. To the realists, nation-states remain the principal
actors and the only source of legitimate authority; any attempt to replace the
nation state with supranational institutions is deemed unnatural and
misguided.87

Neo-realism builds on the theoretical foundation of realism. It shares a focus on

the anarchic nature of international system and the primacy of states in
international relations with the realism school of thought. It, however, differs on
the emphasis realism places on the inherent properties of states.88 Neo-realists
argued that the international system should be seen as a structure, composed
of units (states) with functional similarity but with varied capabilities.89 The
primary difference between states is their capabilities to perform similar tasks -
this determines the distribution of capabilities across units.90 States engage in
maximising the possibilities of survival by protecting themselves against
others.91 The pursuit of mutual gain is seen as the catalyst for cooperation
among states.92 The prospect of a skewed gain, therefore, brings about a
condition of insecurity and works against cooperation.93

Critics argue that the dynamics of European integration over the years have
rendered (neo) realism obsolete. A case in point is the increasing allocation of
powers to the community institutions. According to critics, this proves that the

                                                            
86
Rosamond (2000) 132. Huntington, however, argues that different types of states define their interests in
different ways. Such interest may include similarities in cultural values, ideologies and (democratic)
institutions. See Huntington S, The clash of civilization and the remaking of world order. The Free Press
(2002) 34.
87
Ibid; see also Godwin G, ‘The erosion of external sovereignty?’ Government and Opposition. 9/1 (1974)
63-64.
88
Ibid, 132.
89
Waltz (1979) 96-97.
90
Ibid, 97.
91
Ibid, 105; see also Rosamond (2000) 132.
92
Waltz (1979) 105.
93
Ibid.

29 
 
structural attribute of international politics is not necessarily static and
anarchic.94

iv) Liberal intergovernmental approach

Liberal intergovermantalism builds on Putnam’s idea of integration as a
metaphorical two-level game played by member states.95 According to Putnam,
office holders build coalitions among domestic groups at the national level.96 At
the international level, the same actors bargain in ways that enhance their
position at the domestic level by meeting the demands of key domestic
groups.97

Moravcsik articulates this approach by evaluating the European integration as a

two-stage approach. The first stage, called the demand side, entails the
formulation of national preferences through the influence and coordination of
various actors, such as social interest groups, within the domestic political
space.98 The second stage, called the supply side, involves interstate
bargaining of policies formulated at national level.99 The outcomes of bargaining
between states are determined by factors such as threats of exclusion,
unilateral policy alternatives and compromise agreements.100 This approach
differs from both realism and neo-realism in its assertion that domestic politics
are not insulated from international politics and vice-versa.101 Unlike realism and
neo-realism which treat states as entities with fixed preferences for wealth and
security, liberal intergovermentalism highlights the adaptive and multifarious
nature of inter-state relations in the international arena.102

                                                            
94
Rosamond (2000) 134.
95
Ibid, 136.
96
Ibid.
97
Ibid.
98
Moravcsik (1993) 481.
99
Ibid.
100
Moravcsik A, ‘Liberal inergovermentalism and integration: A rejoinder’. Journal of Common Market
Studies. 33/4 (1995) 612.
101
Rosamond (2000) 135.
102
Moravcsik (1993) 481.

30 
 
Wincott criticises liberal intergovernmentalism for being an approach rather than
a theory because it fails to state conditions under which it can be empirically
refuted.103 He further argues that liberal intergovermentalism fails to take into
account the influence of day-to-day policy decisions of the community
institutions, rather than that of member states, on the laws of the EU.104

As shown in the foregoing discussion, none of the above-described theories

solely provides a complete picture or dynamics of the integration process. As
such, the appropriate tool of analysis should be a synthesis of ideas. In this
regard, this thesis adopts a methodology that seeks to increase the powers of
the AU without necessarily discounting the relevance of member states and
also sub-regional structures. On one hand, functionalism will serve as a useful
tool in explaining the rationale behind having autonomous institutions. On the
other hand, realism and liberal integovernmentalism provides a framework for
understanding the motivation behind cooperation and the importance of
member states, especially the regional hegemons, and civil society.
 
2.2.3 Regional integration and sovereignty: Is the two mutually exclusive?
Haas’ reference to ‘a new centre’, Mitrany’s ‘technocratic automaticity’ and
Deutsch’s assertion that ‘… integration requires … some kind of organisation’105
all denote the existence of a non-state actor which possesses powers akin to
that of nation state. The implication of this is a tension between the age-long
conception of state sovereignty and the place of non-state actors within the
architecture of the international system. Traditional public international law is
premised on the theory that nation states remain the basic structure of
international order. Therefore, any assertion that non-state actors should also
share state-centric features seeks to expand the conceptual focus of the nature
of international law nay international relations. At the same time, the increasing
                                                            
103
Wincott D, ‘Institutional interaction and European integration: Towards an everyday critique of liberal
intergovermentalism’. Journal of Common Market Studies. 33 (1995) 599-600.
104
Ibid, 605; see also Caproso J & Choi Y, ‘Comparative regional integration’ in Carlsnaes W, Resse T &
Simmons B (eds), Handbook of International Relations. London: Sage (2002) 488.
105
Deutsch et al (1957) 6.

31 
 
clout of non-state actors such as international organisations is indicative of a
paradigm shift in the conceptualisation of sovereignty.

What then is this ‘intoxicant’ which emboldens states to act with impunity within
and outside their territorial entities? As Geldenhuys puts it, ‘sovereignty is the
final sanctuary of the autocrat in contemporary world politics’.106 In the name of
sovereignty, leaders continue to subjugate their citizens, mismanage state
economies and frustrate all forms of meaningful intervention (Zimbabwe,
Myanmar and North Korea spring to mind here).

Contemporary state sovereignty has its roots in the 1648 agreement to end the
discord between feuding European powers.107 The 1648 Treaty of Westphalia,
amongst other provisions, principally laid the foundation for the territorial
integrity of nation states.108 The traditional form of sovereignty can be divided
into two: internal and external sovereignty. Internal sovereignty connotes the
‘exercise of supreme authority by states within their individual territories’109 or
what Bodin described as the exclusive right ‘to give lawes unto all and everie
one of its … subjects and to receive none from them’.110 According to James, a
state’s claim of internal sovereignty is dependent on constitutional
independence.111 Thus, a state under colonial rule cannot lay any claim to
sovereignty because such right lies with the colonial administration. External
sovereignty on the other hand implies the legal independence of a sovereign
state - which can only be limited by international law - from other states.112 It
therefore implies the equality of nation states, regardless of differences in

                                                            
106
Geldenhuys D, ‘Brothers as keepers: Africa’s new sovereignty regime’, Strategic Review For Southern
Africa. XXVIII/1 (2006) 1.
107
The full text of the ‘Treaty of Westphalia’ is available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/westphal.htm (Accessed 21 0ctober 2007).
108
Ibid.
109
Goodwin (1974) 61.
110
Ibid.
111
James A, Sovereignty statehood: The basis of international society. London: Allen & Unwin (1986) 24-
25.
112
Kelsen H, ‘The principle of sovereign equality of states as a basis for international organisation’. Yale
Law Journal. 53/2 (1944) 208.

32 
 
capacities, in the international community. The inclusion of the term ‘sovereign
equality’113 in the United Nations Charter further reinforced the sanctity of
statehood in international law.114

The rise of international organisations in a post-1945 global order has, however,

spurred a re-conceptualisation of sovereignty.115 The corollary of establishing
these organisations is the transfer of sovereignty or powers necessary for the
fulfilment of tasks. While states continue to hang on to sovereignty, there is also
a realisation of the need to boost the functional abilities of these organisations.
The emphasis on the protection of human rights and global peace has raised a
general consensus that interference in the domestic affairs of a state is
justifiable under certain circumstances.116 Also, the realisation that certain
socio-economic needs requires a transcendental, global approach has
contributed significantly to the limitation of absolute sovereignty.

When the discourse of sovereignty is located within a regional integration

process, the question that arises is whether or not sovereignty is divisible. As
mentioned earlier, the effective operation of regional organisation is dependent
on the transfer of sovereignty by member states. The degree of such transfer
determines the level of integration.117 If regional integration is understood as a
process that sets in motion some form of transnational governance framework
or multi-level governance, then the notion of divisibility of sovereignty becomes
inevitable. To address the issue of divisibility, parallels have been drawn
between the devolution of powers under a federal system of government and

                                                            
113
According to the Friendly Relations Declaration of the United Nations General Assembly, the term
‘sovereign equality’, amongst other provisions, implies the jurisdictional exclusivity of states, equal rights
and duties of states and political independence of states. See GA 2625 (XXV) 1970.
114
See UN Charter, article 2(1). Article 2(7) of the Charter prohibits the UN from intervening in matters
within the domestic jurisdiction of member states.
115
Franck views the emergence of transnational institutions as one of the greatest innovations of
international law in the 20th Century. See Franck T, ‘Three major innovations of international law in the
twentieth century’, Quinnipiac Law Review. 17/1 (1997) 139.
116
See e.g. Cassese A, International law. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2005) 59; see also Brownlie I,
Principles of public international law. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2003) 293.
117
Hay (1966) 68.

33 
 
the transfer of powers to regional organisations. As Hay indicates, a state owns
the totality of sovereign powers (bundle of rights) and has the prerogative to
share it with other states or institutions.118 Hay’s formulation regards external
sovereignty as a direct function of internal sovereignty.119 What this means is
that when a state transfers part of its internal sovereignty or jurisdiction, for
example in relation to making immigration laws, to an international organisation,
there is also a corollary understanding that the organisation will have the
powers to represent such state(s) on the particular subject when dealing with
third states.120

Lauterpacht agrees that the nation states possess plenitude of powers but that
such powers terminate where international obligation begins.121 The implication
of this is that states have powers to exercise national sovereignty, for example
the enactment of legislations, as long as it does not conflict with their obligations
to the international community.122 Mitrany views that ‘it would indeed be
sounder and wiser to speak not of surrender but of a sharing of sovereignty’.123
This requires the pooling of sovereign authority for the joint performance of a
particular task.124 Mitrany sees sovereignty as a functional concept, that is, the
transferral of sovereign powers should be based on the need to execute certain
task or function.125 MacCormick’s conception of sovereignty is rather different.
He remarks that:

We must not envisage sovereignty as the object of some kind of zero sum
game, such that the moment X loses it, Y necessarily has it. Let us think of it
rather more as of virginity, which can in at least some circumstances be lost to
the general satisfaction without anybody else gaining it.126

                                                            
118
Hay (1966) 70.
119
Ibid, 71.
120
Ibid, 70-74.
121
Lauterpacht E, ‘Sovereignty – myth or reality? International Affairs. 73/1 (1997) 149.
122
Ibid.
123
Mitrany (1966) 31.
124
Ibid 31-32.
125
Ibid, 31.
126
MacCormick N, ‘Beyond the sovereign state’. The Modern Law Review. 56/1 (1993) 16.

34 
 
There is no doubt that the concept of absolute sovereignty underwent radical
reformulation over the years. The ‘global village’ narrative has ensured that
states are continuously probed about the treatment of their citizens, natural
resources and the environment. Even when states have not explicitly or
impliedly limited their sovereign powers, their actions are increasingly being
measured by a ‘universal or community values’127 barometer. The increasing
competence of the EU, the influence of the Bretton Wood institutions
(International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) on the monetary and fiscal
policies of developing countries, the UN’s and AU’s right to militarily intervene in
member states clearly indicates that the evolution of sovereignty is yet to reach
a terminal point.128

The end of the nation state is by no means near but the doctrine of sovereignty
will continue to adapt to new realities by evolving into a space big enough to
accommodate national concerns and transnational imperatives. In this era of
globalisation and technological advancement, both sceptics and optimists will
accept that the rules are changing, with no one being able to categorically
identify the terminal point of sovereignty. The realities of the twentieth century
helped to reshape the concept of sovereignty, who knows what the twenty-first
century has in stock. As Carr pointedly puts it, ‘the concept of sovereignty is
likely to become in future even more blurred and indistinct than it is at
present’.129

2.3 Regional integration in Africa: A contextual analysis

Since Africa does not exist in isolation, the trajectory of its integration process,
either at the continental or sub-regional level, relates closely to the classical
theories of regional integration discussed above. As in the case of Europe,

                                                            
127
See e.g. Werner (2007) 17; see also Olivier M, ‘International and regional requirements for good
governance and the rule of law’. South African Yearbook of International Law. 32 (2007) 52.
128
As Jackson notes, ‘… there is no teleological terminus, no determinate and final destination, and no end
of history in the evolution of sovereignty’. See Jackson R, Sovereignty: Evolution of an idea. New York:
Polity (2007) 112.
129
Carr E, The twenty years crisis 1919-1939. London: Macmillan (1978) 230-231.

35 
 
theorists and politicians are divided on the best approach to African integration.
This lack of unanimity continues to define the paradigms of African integration.
This section will thus aim to place African integration in perspective by tracing
its origins, theoretical contributions to the idea, the possible benefits of
integration, and lastly, the feasibility of continental integration.

2.3.1 The idea of ‘Africa’: Tracing the philosophical underpinning of unity

You are not a country, Africa

You are a concept
Fashioned in the minds, each to each
To hide our separate fears
To dream our separate dreams
Abioseh Nicol130

The supreme irony, according to Mazrui, is that ‘it took European colonialism to
inform Africans that they were indeed Africans’.131 The consciousness of being
an ‘African’, as distinct from being an Ashanti or Yoruba or Zulu, was a reaction
to external subjugation either in the form of colonialism or racial prejudice.132
Nyerere captures this in the following words ‘the Africans looked at themselves
and knew that vis-à-vis the Europeans, they were one’.133 Along with this racial
consciousness was also an awareness of ‘geographical contiguities’, the
realisation that Africans inhabit the same territorial space.134 The geographic
element of pan-Africanism should be understood as not only complementary to
                                                            
130
Nicol A, ‘The meaning of Africa’ in Weaver R & Bruchac J (eds) Aftermath: An anthology of poems in
english from Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean. New York: Greenfield Review Press (1977) 76.
131
Mazrui A, ‘Who are Africans: Identity in search of unity’ in Falola T, Laremont R & Seghatolislami T
(eds) African redefined: Collected essays of Ali. A. Mazrui, Vol 1. New Jersey: Africa World Press
Incorporated (2002) 37.
132
See e.g. Nyerere J, ‘A United States of Africa’. Journal of Modern African Studies. 1/1 (1963) 1; see
also Akinyemi B, ‘Nigerian foreign policy in the 21st century’. Lecture delivered at the National Institute of
Public and Strategic Studies (NIPSS) Kuru, Nigeria (17 June 2003) 7-8. Available at
http://www.profbolajiakinyemi.com/Prof%20Bolaji%20Publications/NIPS%20FINAL%20LECTURE.doc
(Accessed 20 May 2008).
133
Cited in Akinyemi B, ‘Kwame Nkrumah and pan-Africanism’. Thisday (Nigeria). Available at
http://www.thisdayonline.com/nview.php?id=125197 (Accessed 15 October 2008).
134
Mazrui A, ‘On the concept of “We are all Africans” The American Political Science Review. 57/1
(1963) 89-90.

36 
 
the racial consciousness but also an attempt to include Africa North of the
Sahara in the discourse on pan-Africanism.135 Africa is much a geographic
description as it is a racial entity.136 As the saying goes, nations can choose
their friends but not their neighbours; therefore, the geographic composition of
the continent is an inescapable reality which informs the quest for unity.
Moreover, Mazrui posits that age-long cultural ties between North and sub-
Saharan Africa cannot be discounted.137 This, he notes, is evident in the
vocabulary of some of the most widely spoken languages on the continent.138 It
is noteworthy that the debate on the racial divide between North and sub-
Saharan Africa has had little or no impact on programmes aimed at continental
integration.139 As will be argued later in this thesis, the basis of unity should
rather be based on the existence of the shared norms of rule of law and
democratic governance.

The chronological events in Africa’s history – the existence of pre-colonial

empires, slavery and the arbitrary balkanisation of its territories by European
superpowers - thus proved to be an effective emotive tool for rallying ‘Africans’
both in the Diaspora and on the continent towards a common purpose.140 As
Legum points out, Pan-Africanism is essentially ‘a movement of ideas and

                                                            
135
For example, it is on record that ex-president Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire (now Democratic Republic of
Congo) advocated the establishment of an exclusive sub-Saharan (black) African organisation. See Mazrui
(2002) 39; see also Akinyemi (2008). Also, Obafemi Awolowo, a prominent Nigerian nationalist, had this
to say: ‘The Sahara Desert is a natural line of demarcation between the Northern and Southern parts of
Africa. It is my considered view that the countries of North Africa should, as a first step, constitute a
Zone…other territories south of the Sahara…should constitute another Zone’ Cited in Legum C, Pan
Africanism: A short political guide. London: Pall Mall Press (1962) 270.
136
For a detailed discussion on the geographical dynamics of the African continent, see Mazrui A, The
Africans: A triple heritage. New York: Little, Brown & Company (1986) 23-38.
137
Mazrui (2002) 39
138
Ibid; Mazrui (1986) 243.
139
According to Akinyemi, the following factors are responsible for the little impact of North Africa versus
sub-Saharan Africa debate on African unity: the strong cooperation and friendship between Gamel Nasser
of Egypt and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana; the need to build a united front against a cold-war-ridden world
and Apartheid in South Africa. He is, however, quick to add that these factors have receded into the
background, with the resurgence of such debate among politicians and the intelligentsia alike. See
Akinyemi (2008).
140
See e.g. Thompson V, Africa and unity: The evolution of pan-Africanism. London: Longman (1969) 33.
Nyerere remarks that Africa’s pre-colonial history demanded that ‘African unity must have priority over all
other associations’. Cited in Mazrui (1963) 93.

37 
 
emotions’141 which lends itself to various manifestations. For Africans in the
Diaspora, it represented a bond to a disconnected past, a search for common
identity and the restoration of freedom and dignity in an oppressed society.142
Within the continent, Asante observes that pan-Africanism was ‘viewed both as
an integrative force and as a movement of liberation’.143

The nationalist resistance to colonialism, however, highlighted a paradox: using

the oft-derided colonial boundaries as a legitimate instrument of resistance.
While this idea may be perceived as pragmatic, it was to set the tone for a post-
colonial attachment to national sovereignty. Once African states ‘won’ their
hard-earned independence, the next agenda was to consolidate nationalism
rather than focus on integrative matters.144 As Fanon rightly puts it, ‘African
unity takes off the mask and crumbles into regionalism inside the hollow shell of
nationality itself’.145 In addition, colonial attachments (Francophone versus
Anglophone), differing political ideologies and irredentist motives146 ensured
that efforts of continental integration are consigned to the back seat.147

                                                            
141
Legum (1962) 14. Akinyemi calls Pan-Africanism an ‘experiential phenomenon (a phenomenon that
arises as a reaction to an experience) …’ See Akinyemi (2008); Murithi refers to it as ‘an invented idea’.
See Murithi T, The African Union: Pan-Africanism, peace-building and development. Hampshire, England:
Ashgate (2005) 35.
142
Ibid, 14-23; see also Thompson (1969) 3-19.
143
Asante (1997) 32; see also Legum (1962) 38.
144
Mazrui refers to this attitude as ‘the nationalism that looks inwardly territorially’. See Mazrui (1963) 92.
Ramutsindela rhetorically questioned whether post-colonial states ‘have been socialised into colonial
spaces’. See Ramutsindela M, ‘Deterritorialisation and the African superstate: Do we need a second glass
of sherry?’ in Maloka E (ed) A United States of Africa? Pretoria: African Institute of South Africa (2001)
100. The answer to this is neither yes nor no. If one was to answer this question in light of the various intra-
state conflicts in places like DRC, Nigeria, Rwanda, Burundi, Sudan and Ethiopia, the answer will be a
resounding ‘no’. However, in places like Tanzania and Zambia, one can argue that to some extent, these
countries have been able to forge a national identity, superior to ethnic interests.
145
Fanon F, Wretched of the earth. New York: Grove Press (1968) 159.
146
In a bid to forestall fratricidal border struggles between post-colonial African states, the Organisation of
African Unity (OAU) in 1964 adopted the uti possidetis rule, which mandated member states to respect
existing frontiers. This, however, failed to stem the tide of border clashes between African states – Somalia
and Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia, Libya and Chad, Nigeria and Cameroon, Morocco and Western Sahara,
just to mention a few. See e.g. Oyebode A, International law and politics: An African perspective. Lagos:
Bolabay Publications (2003) 24-25.
147
Asante (1997) 34-35.

38 
 
The earliest manifestation of pan-Africanism as an ‘integrative force’ dates back
to the 1920s.148 At that time, a group of intellectuals from the four British
dependencies of West Africa - Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Gambia and Gold Coast
(later Ghana) - called for closer cooperation and integration of West Africa.149
One of the principal initiators of this idea, Joseph Casely Hayford (Ghana),
presented a demand to the colonial office in London, asking for the
establishment of a West African Court of Appeal and a West African
University.150 Although this idea was dismissed by the colonial authorities as
‘premature’, it laid the foundation for the politically-charged activism of the
1940s, with Nkrumah as a principal player. This era witnessed a renewed focus
and an attempt to include Francophone West Africa in the ‘integrative’
agenda.151 The Nkrumah-led West African National Secretariat, an offshoot of
the 1945 Fifth Pan-African congress in Manchester, resolved in 1946 to use the
idea of ‘a West African Federation as an indispensable lever for the ultimate
achievement of a United States of Africa’.152 From this point, the consciousness
of continental integration became ingrained in the corpus of the pan-Africanism
narrative. Ironically, it also laid the foundation for the idea of integrating Africa
on a regional basis.153

The independence of Ghana in 1957 provided Nkrumah with the solid base to
vigorously pursue the African unity project.154 Nkrumah’s assertion that Ghana’s

                                                            
148
Browne argues that the origins of pan-African integrative agenda can be traced back to the ancient
kingdoms of West Africa. He writes that kingdoms such as Ghana, Mali and Songhai encompassed several
ethnic groups and ecological zones. See Browne D, ‘Pan-Africanism and the African Union’. Available at
http://www.siue.edu/~mafolay/JournalInfo/Vol-2/Issue%201%20revised.pdf (Accessed 20 October 2009).
149
See Thompson (1969) 28.
150
Ibid.
151
Nkrumah traveled to France in order to consult with Francophone West African intellectuals such as
Lamin Gueye, Léopold Senghor, Sourou-Migan Apithy and Houphöuet- Boigny. See Ibid, 90.
152
Legum (1962) 32-33; Thompson (1969) 90-91; Ajala A, Pan Africanism: Evolution, progress and
prospects. London: St. Martin Press (1973) 12.
153
In 1942, Nkrumah remarked that all West African colonies ‘must first unite and become a national unity,
absolutely free from the encumbrances of foreign rule, before they can assume the aspect of international
cooperation on a grand scale’. Cited in Asante (1997) 32.
154
Nkrumah’s critics, however, describe his pan-African project as a megalomaniac drive. Omari points out
that ‘Nkrumah sacrificed Ghana on the altar of pan-Africanism, and for his grandiose dreams of African
leadership’. See Omari T, Kwame Nkrumah: The anatomy of an African dictatorship. London: C. Hurst &
Company (1970) 2; see also Meredith (2005) 187. Mazrui also describe Nkrumah as ‘a great African but

39 
 
independence was incomplete without the total independence of other African
states not only reinforced the solidarity message inherent in the pan-Africanist
thought, it also demonstrated the readiness to give practical effect to the
integrative agenda. Building on the momentum of the 1945 Fifth Pan-African
congress in Manchester155 and the 1946 West African National congress,
Nkrumah convened the first conference of independent African states in 1958.
The conference was attended by the eight already independent African states –
Ethiopia, Libya, Liberia, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, the United Arab Republic and
Ghana. The participating states agreed to establish a Joint Economic Research
Committee, charged with the responsibility of promoting trade among African
countries, coordinate economic planning and investigate the feasibility of an
African common market.156

The Second Conference of Independent African States (CISA) was held in

Addis Ababa in 1960. In addition to the eleven African states already
independent,157 invitations were sent to yet to be independent African states
such as Nigeria, Mali Federation, Congo Kinshasa, Madagascar and
Somalia.158 The conference recommended, amongst other provisions, the
establishment of a joint African Development Bank, a joint African Commercial
Bank and a preferential trade area.159 The Ghanaian delegation, supported by
their Guinean counterpart, advocated a political union while the Nigerian (who
had not yet become independent) and Liberian delegations felt such call was
premature.160 The resultant effect of this was the emergence of two groups -

                                                                                                                                                                                                
not a great Ghanaian’. See Mazrui A, Nkrumah’s legacy and Africa’s triple heritage: Between
globalisation and counter-terrorism. Accra: Ghana University Press (2004) 4.
155
The Manchester conference marked a turning point in the history of Pan-Africanism because for the first
time, Africans took a leading part in the deliberations and the resolutions that followed. See Ajala (1973)
10-1
156
Final Communiqué of the Conference of Independent African States, 15 April to 22 April, 1958, in
Thompson (1969) 348-9.
157
Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia and the United
Arab Republic.
158
Ajala (1973) 25.
159
Resolution of the Second Conference of Independent African States, June 15-24, 1960, in Legum (1962)
158.
160
Ibid, 46-47.

40 
 
Casablanca and Monrovia - with differing views on African integration. The
Casablanca group was a juxtaposition of two elements: an immediate political
union and functional cooperation.161 As Nweke observes, the element of
political union within this group gave birth to the 1961 Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union
(Union of African States) while the functional element was reflected in the
provisions of the Casablanca Charter.162 On the other hand, the Monrovia group
was united in their call for functional cooperation at regional levels as the best
approach.163 The creation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963
was the culmination of decades of efforts aimed at giving the debate on unity a
practical effect. Although the OAU Charter represented a triumph of a state-
centric, functional cooperation, it was able to unite the differing ideologies under
the same banner.

Although the initiatives outlined above exposed the cleavage that existed, and
still exists, in relation to the modus operandi of African integration, it helped in
forging a template for the on-going debate on integration. The idea of ‘Africa’
might have started as a sentimental attachment to a common heritage; the
setting up of institutions both at the regional and continental levels have all
contributed to moving pan-Africanism from the realm of romanticism to a
realistic and practical objective. Whether through the creation of a Pan-African
Parliament (PAP) or the New Partnership on Africa’s Development (NEPAD) or
the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) or the African Charter on Human
and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), pan-Africanism continues to be expressed in
nuanced and adaptive forms.

Like any other philosophical theme, pan-Africanism is susceptible to

manipulation. When post-independent elites decided to entrench dictatorship,
especially through one-party state ideology, African values of collectivism and

                                                            
161
Nweke G, ‘The Organisation of African Unity and intra-African functionalism’. Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Sciences. 489 (1987) 136; see also Legum (1969) 56-7.
162
Nweke (1987) 136.
163
Legum (1969) 56

41 
 
consensus were erroneously brandished.164 When African dictators argue that
pre-colonial Africa knew no form of party politics and that community decisions
are arrived at through consensus, they cleverly leave out the methodology of
how such consensus was arrived at and how dissensions were handled.
Political elites conveniently ignore the traditional constitutional principle of
checks and balances. As Elias observes, pre-colonial African societies
employed some form of control over the paramount king.165 Elias’ analysis is
worth quoting:

It is fair to say that the constitutional principle has long been established that, if a
king or paramount chief abuses his power, subordinate chiefs have the right to
either depose him or to secede from the kingdom with their own people…among
the Yorubas, the King would in former times be requested by his chiefs to “open
the calabash”, that is, to commit suicide by voluntarily taking poison or to go into
voluntary exile … in chiefless societies, somewhat different principles apply: here,
the chief of the chief-in-council is invariably replaced by a council of elders.166

He further quotes the observation of a former colonial administrator in Gold

Coast (now Ghana):

The Gold Coast native is no fool…sovereignty in the Gold Coast tribe lies in the
people themselves who elect their chiefs and can, if they desire so, deprive them
of office. Each chief is, in fact, but the mouth-piece of his State (Oman) Council,

                                                            
164
Mazrui (2004) 5-6. Robert Mugabe also used the ‘traditional-Africa-logic’ to justify the imposition of a
one-party state in Zimbabwe in the mid-1980s:

You never have two chiefs in a given area. There is only one chief. And various people
meet to express their views. Some views may be critical of the chief but at the end of the
day, it is the generality of the people’s desire which becomes either the rule or the way of
life for that particular region.

Cited in Shaw W, ‘Towards one party state in Zimbabwe.’ Journal of Modern African Studies. 24/3 (1986)
377. The former Ivorien president, Houphouet-Boigny also famously proclaimed that African chief cannot
know his successor. See Adebayo W, ‘Now, the empire strikes back’. Africa Today. November 2009, 8; see
also Meredith (2005) 167-170.
165
Elias T, Africa and the development of international law. Leiden: Sijthoff (1972) 37-40; see also Elias T,
The nature of African customary law. Manchester: Manchester University Press (1965) 8-36.
166
Elias (1972) 38-39; see also Adaramola F, Basic jurisprudence. Lagos: Nayee Publishing (2002) 142-
143.

42 
 
 without whose approval no chief can perform any executive or judicial act.
Accordingly, when the Heads of Chiefs of a province are summoned to the
Provincial Council in order, say, to elect representatives of their people as
Members of the Legislative Council, each Chief carries with him instructions
which he is to pursue and the manner in which he is to record his vote…in order
to satisfy themselves that the Head Chief carries out his duties in the manner
which the State Council has prescribed, he is accompanied by eight councillors
who report the result of the mission on its return home. Could anything be more
167
democratic or more representative of the wishes of a people?

The foregoing exposition exposes the moral bankruptcy of post-colonial elites,

who in an attempt to pursue an enlightened self interest, engineered a revision
of Africa’s history. Even if one was to accept that consensus form the bedrock
of traditional African society, it is difficult to understand that people must be
intimidated or coerced in order to arrive at some form of manipulated
consensus.

The challenge, which is the main thrust of this thesis, is to translate pan-
Africanism or the idea of ‘Africa’ into a transformative agenda. Africa, in the
words of Mazrui, ‘must stand ready to selectively borrow, adapt, and creatively
formulate its strategies for planned development’.168 The ability to adapt
concepts such as regional integration and supranationalism to African realities
and to also use them as developmental tools should be the key goal.169 Beyond
the rhetoric of pan-Africanism and the ‘United States of Africa’, efforts should be
geared towards aligning the practicalities of regional cooperation with local
specificities and the developmental needs of the African populace. It should
draw from traditional African values, which ensures broad-based community
participation in matters that affect the common good.

                                                            
167
Ibid.
168
Mazrui A, ‘Africa must not just remain a learner’. Daily Monitor (Uganda). Available at
http://www.monitor.co.ug/artman/publish/opinions/Africa_must_not_just_remain_a_learner_71811.shtml
(Accessed 30 September 2008).
169
This is discussed below.

43 
 
2.3.2 Theoretical perspectives on African integration

To rule out a step by step progress towards African unity is to hope that the Almighty will one
day say, ‘Let there be unity in Africa’, and there shall be unity; or to pray for a conqueror. But
even a conqueror will have to proceed step by step.
Julius Nyerere170

Our objective is African Union now. There is no time to waste. We must unite now or perish.
Kwame Nkrumah171

One thing that African integration does not lack is a plethora of theoretical
suppositions. Since the colonial era, African intellectuals have, depending on
their ideological beliefs and location, offered their views on how to proceed with
African integration. If colonialism was the catalyst for the quest for unity, the
paradox of Africa’s underdevelopment shaped, and continues to shape, the
debate on African integration.172 The unanimity of ideas in respect of unity does
not, however, extend to the methodology of attaining such goal. Numerous
sobriquets have been used to define the differing opinions on African
integration.173 Basically, theoretical perspectives on African integration can be
classified under three schools of thought: idealists, realists and idealists-cum-
reterritorialists. This categorisation is based on the philosophical approach of
each group to the idea of African integration. While certain groups advocate the
pursuance of African integration based on the realities on ground (inherited

                                                            
170
Nyerere J, Freedom and unity uhuru na umoja: A selection from writings and speeches 1952-1965.
Oxford: Oxford University Press (1966) 302.
171
Nkrumah K, ‘Address to the conference of African heads of state and government, 1963, in
Revolutionary path. London: PANAF (1973) 233-234.
172
Writing in 1963, Nkrumah outlines the abundance of natural resources on the continent and argues that
only through ‘a gigantic self-help programme’ can Africa realise its potential. See Nkrumah (1963) 150-
151; see also New Partnership for Africa’s Development (2001) 3. The developmental feature of regional
integration is discussed below.
173
Agyeman for example use terms such as ‘militant versus gradualist’ and ‘all-out Pan-Africanist versus
the territorial Patriot-cum-Pan Africanist.’ See generally, Agyeman O, Nkrumah’s Ghana and east Africa:
Pan-Africanism and African interstate relations. Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press (1992)
78-95. Legum use terms like ‘political union (or organic union)’ and ‘functional cooperation’. See Legum
(1962) 57; Maluwa refers to ‘absolute integrationists’ versus ‘minimal integrationists’. See Maluwa T,
‘Fast-tracking African unity or making haste slowly? A note on the amendments to the constitutive act of
the African Union’. Netherlands International Law Review. 51/2 (2004) 201.

44 
 
colonial boundaries and understanding the differences that exists), others
propound either conjuring an ‘African leviathan’ or a cartographic
rearrangement of African boundaries. This section will thus chronicle selected
thoughts of Africans on the issue of integration, along the lines of the above-
mentioned schools of thought.

a) The idealists – Africa must unite now!

The idealists hinge the development and relevance of Africa on the immediate
establishment of a ‘United States of Africa’ or a ‘Union Government for
Africa’.174 Using the United States of America as a referential framework,175 this
school of thought envisages a single, ‘Cape-to-Cairo’ administration,
responsible for implementing coordinated and unified economic and political
policies. The aim is to leapfrog the continent from the nadir of
underdevelopment to a position of prosperity and relevance within the comity of
nations.176 Nkrumah avers that such union:

need not infringe the essential sovereignty of the African states. These states
would continue to exercise independent authority, except in the fields defined and
reserved for common action in the interest of the security and orderly
development of the whole continent.177

He further recommends that such Union should pursue three objectives: overall
economic planning on a continental basis; unified military and defence strategy;

                                                            
174
See e.g. Nkrumah (1963) 163-164; see also Nkrumah (1973) 277-297.
175
Nyerere points out that the fact that Nkrumah, the major proponent of this idea, went to school in the
United States of America largely influenced his ideological position on African unity. He opines: ‘Kwame
[Nkrumah] went to Lincoln University, a black college in the US. He perceived things from a US history,
where 13 colonies revolted against the British formed a union’. Cited in Mwakikagile G, Nyerere and
Africa: End of an era. Las Vegas: Protea Publishing (2002) 300.
176
Nkrumah (1963) 163-164.
177
Ibid, 218. In line with this, Nkrumah ensured that the Ghanaian constitution stipulated the partial or
wholesale surrendering of sovereignty as a contribution towards the attainment of continental unification.
See Nkrumah K, I speak of freedom. New York: Praeger (1961) 221. Guinea, Mali, Tunisia and Egypt also
provided for limitation of sovereignty in their constitutions. See Legum (1962) 66.

45 
 
and a unified foreign policy and diplomacy.178 On the institutional architecture of
such Union, Nkrumah, in 1964, suggests:

This Union of Government shall consist of an Assembly of Heads of States and

Governments headed by a President elected from among the Heads of State and
Government of the Independent African States. The Executive of the Union
Government will be a Cabinet or Council of Ministers with a Chancellor or Prime
Minister as its head, and a Federal Housing consisting of two Chambers – The
Senate and a House of Representatives.179

This school of thought rejects the regionalist or nationalist approach to African

integration. According to Nkrumah:

The idea of regional federations in Africa is fraught with many dangers. There is
the danger of the development of regional loyalties, fighting against each other. In
effect, regional federations are a form of balkanisation on a grand scale…the best
means…is to begin to create a larger and all-embracing loyalty which will hold
Africa together as a united people with one government and one destiny.180

Ghaddafi, another proponent of a continental federation, highlights the

impracticalities of regional federation. Some of the impediments include
language barrier and wars and gross underdevelopment in Africa.181 He
(Ghaddafi) remarks:

The advocates of this theory [regional federations] suggest that we have to wait
for Somalia to unite and then Eritrea and Ethiopia. We have to wait for Egypt,
Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco (which is outside the African Union) and

                                                            
178
Nkrumah (1963) 218-220.
179
Nkrumah (1973) 295-296. In his address to African leaders at the 1965 OAU Summit in Accra,
Nkrumah further proposed that in addition to a Union president, the Assembly should elect a number of
Union Vice-Presidents. See Nkrumah (1973) 309.
180
Nkrumah (1963) 214-215.
181
Ghaddafi M, ‘Address by the leader of the revolution at the opening session of the north African
popular activists’ forum’ in Tripoli, Libya (21 June, 2007) 4-8. (On file with the author).

46 
 
 Mauritania, and Sahara to become one state…it is impossible for these regions to
establish one state.182

Without offering any sound theoretical basis, he (Ghaddafi) leaps to assume

that the existence of a continental federal executive authority will ensure that
even countries in a state war will be forced to converge under the talismanic
spell of ‘African unity’.183 It is this kind of reasoning that has made some
commentators to conclude that Ghaddafi lacks the ideological coherence and
political sophistication displayed by Nkrumah’s thesis on the need for
continental unification.184

One of the fundamental flaws of this ideology is its lack of a sound theoretical
basis. Its adherents point to a shifting of loyalty without providing practicalities
or methodology for such a shift. For example, no theoretical exposition is
provided on how to measure the general acceptance of this idea by the African
populace except for anchoring it on an emotional pan-Africanist ideology.
Neither is this idea anchored to democratic values. Post-colonial African elites
like Nkrumah and Sekou Toure simply assumed position of the essential
alchemists, garbed with the superior intellectual prowess to dictate the course of
African history.185

This line of reasoning stems from the domestic credentials of its major
proponents. A roll call of the proponents of this ideology reveals a pattern of

                                                            
182
Ibid, 5.
183
Ibid, 6.
184
Maluwa (2004) 6.
185
Mazrui & Tidy put it aptly:

Paradoxically, however, Nkrumah became the main obstacle to unity in Africa. In his fanatical
adherence to idea of Union Government of all Africa and his opposition to regional grouping …
he alienated other African heads of state in the early 1960s.

See Mazrui A & Tidy M, Nationalism and new states in Africa. London: Heinemann (1985) 63. At the
1964 OAU summit in Cairo, Nyerere denounced the approach of the federalists, of which Nkrumah was an
arrowhead, as ‘propaganda’. He notes ‘Nothing could be more calculated to bring ridicule to the whole
concept of a continental Government in Africa than this incessant and oft-repeated propaganda …’ See
Nyerere (1966) 301.

47 
 
personality cults, suppression of dissension, dogmatic ideologies and a
tendency to personalise the unification discourse.186 This is not to say that other
African leaders who espouse different integration ideologies did (and do) not
have personal agendas, nevertheless, the issue of continental unification is a
sensitive matter that requires utmost exemplary qualities. When leaders operate
repressive regimes and in the same breath advocate a ‘United States of Africa’,
it is only natural that people express cynical views on how such leaders intend
to either run or fit into the administrative structure of a continental union.187

Another flaw is that this paradigm makes the assumption that Africa is
homogenous. In an attempt to present a common front, it glosses over the deep
cleavages that exist on the continent. There are vast differences - sociological,
political, economic and cultural - between countries and regions on the
continent. Despite the prescriptions of regional instruments and international
donors, democratic ideals are still an exception rather than the rule on the
continent. The unevenness of democratic practise, which is evident in the fewer
numbers of fair electoral process, the growing number of dictators and the
suppression of opposition reveals the absence of shared norms and values.
The question is whether a democratic South Africa or Mauritius would feel
comfortable to enter into any federal union with a Libya or Zimbabwe? The
impracticality of this lies in how administrative structures in the former will
interface with the ones in the latter, where institutions are either ineffectual or
non-existent.

                                                            
186
One of the accusations often leveled against Nkrumah and Ghaddafi is their ambition to become the
president of a ‘United States of Africa’. See e.g. ‘Qaddafi, ruler of Africa? The Economist, September 16-
22 (2000) 51; see also Legum (1962) 54-55. For a critical assessment of post-colonial elites, see e.g.
Meredith (2005); Omari (1970); Mazrui (2004).
187
Mazrui surmised Nkrumah’s legacy thus: ‘His dream of trying to create “one-Africa by abolishing
separate states” was an inspiration. His policy of trying to “create one Ghana by abolishing separate
political parties” was usurpation’. See Mazrui (2004) 3; see also Mazrui & Tidy (1985) 60-62.

48 
 
As will be shown below, the economies of most African countries are largely
underdeveloped.188 Suffice to add that since regional integration requires a
uniform level of sound economic development across member states, the case
for an immediate federal African state appears premature. In addition, the
disintegrative tendencies within certain African states need to be properly
addressed before any attempt to create a federal union. While it can be argued
that these conflicts are a result of the arbitrary balkanisation of the continent by
colonialists, there is no proof that replacing the fault lines of African states - with
their internal contradictions - with a single government would obliterate these
problems. Rather, African integration requires a more fundamental approach in
the form of uniform adherence to democratic norms by member states. The
evenness of democratic practise can help establish the basis for unity – shared
norms and values. This point will be further elaborated upon in subsequent
chapters.

The emotional and rhetorical appeal of a federalist ideology remains

unassailable; however, the inherent contradictions explained above makes it
hard to sell. The urgency of integration in Africa does not necessarily imply that
we ignore the core fundamentals. In fact, it, the core fundamentals, should be
the guiding philosophy of a federal African state.

b) The realists - unity through the building blocks

While the realists accept the principal goal of a ‘United States of Africa’ or
‘Union Government for Africa’, they differ with the idealists on the time frame or
modus of achieving this objective.189 The realists advocate a regional-functional
approach. What this implies is that African unity should be conceptualised
through the establishment of regional federations, which would then cede their
sovereignty to a larger continental union. The process of attaining such regional

                                                            
188
Mo Ibrahim, the Sudanese philanthropist, bluntly notes, ‘the fact is a large number of African
countries are not viable … If they were companies, they would have been declared bankrupt. You switch
off the light; you say bye-bye, it doesn’t work’. Cited in New African Magazine (February 2010) 12.
189
See e.g. Agyeman (1992) 78-95.

49 
 
federation should thus be through the orthodox functional approach. Below is an
analysis of the realist ideology.

The regional federalists are closer to the idealists in the sense that they propose
the establishment of a federated union albeit on a (sub) regional basis. As
Kenyatta succinctly puts it, ‘I want to see first East Africa united and federated,
then the whole of Africa as one’.190 The rationale behind this thesis is based on
the fact that it is easier for states that share similar cultural, administrative and
linguistic identities to form a union rather than plunging the whole of Africa, with
its internal contradictions and complexities, into a union. According to Nyerere,
the advantage(s) of a regional federation lies in the fact that it would enable the
area concerned, ‘to achieve quickly at least the benefits of greater unity and
great strength’ and, also, reduce ‘the number of states which have to sit down
together and agree on the final forms of African unification’.191 The relative
successes of sub-regional organisations in Africa in areas such as monetary
integration and the harmonisation of policies vindicate Nyerere’s sentiments.
Through regional federations, as Nyerere reckoned, the road to an ultimate
continental union will be smoothened and made less cumbersome. Nkrumah,
however, rejected this theory by arguing that regional federations will only
amount to ‘balkanisation on a grand scale’.192 He also perceived this idea as a
neo-imperialist agenda, aimed at creating division on the continent.193

Intra-African functionalism is an ideology primarily championed by regional

federalists as a strategy for ensuring unity, first at the regional level and then at
the continental level. Functionalism remains the dominant theme in intra-African
integration. The trajectory of African integration has always been defined by the
tension between the federalists and the functionalists.194 The empirical basis of

                                                            
190
Cited in Legum (1962) 65.
191
Nyerere (1966) 347.
192
Nkrumah (1963) 214-215.
193
Agyeman (1992) 82. Nyerere responded to this assertion in the following words: ‘To say that the step by
step method was invented by the imperialists is to reach the limits of absurdity’. See Nyerere (1966) 302.
194
Nye (1966) 13-17; Nweke (1987) 135-137.

50 
 
the functionalist ideology lies in the successful experiments of colonial-inspired
functional cooperation195 that existed in Africa prior to the emergence of the
OAU in 1963. The two major functional organisations were the British initiated -
East African Common Services Organisation (EACSO)196 and French inspired -
Union Africaine et Maghreb (UAM).197 Based on the prescriptions of orthodox
functionalism, intra-African functionalists stress the assignment of functional
tasks to transnational institution.198 However, intra-African functionalism differs
from orthodox functionalism in the sense that some of the functional institutions
have little or no autonomy and resources (human and material) necessary for
effective functioning.199

Functionalism has been criticised for being ill-suited to Africa. Since

functionalism thrives on the assumption that co-operating states have a
developed economy and a virile industrial base, critics argue that these
conditions are absent in Africa thus making this theory irrelevant and unsuitable
for Africa.200 As Agyeman notes, the homogeneity of institutional and industrial
development is a key feature of European functionalism.201 Even if Europe is
not culturally homogenous, Agyeman posits that similarities exist in ideological
                                                            
195
Colonial administrations in Africa established a number of monetary cooperation arrangement in East
Africa, the Federation Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Southern Africa (particularly South Africa, Lesotho,
Botswana and Swaziland) and the Franc Zone in west and central Africa. These monetary arrangements
were not necessarily to promote exchange rate management and fiscal policy rather they were designed as
an expeditious mechanism for colonial administration, especially in relation to the facilitation of
international trade and payments. See African Union & Economic Commission for Africa, Assessing
Regional Integration in Africa III: Towards Monetary and Financial Integration in Africa. Addis Ababa:
Economic Commission for Africa (2008)183-186.
196
The EACSO had functional institutions such as East African Railways and Harbours (EAR&H), East
African Posts and Telecommunications (EAP&T), and the East African Airways (EAA). See Nye J, Pan-
Africanism and east African integration. Oxford: Oxford University Press (1966) 136.
197
The UAM had functional institutions such as the Union Africaine et Malgache de cooperation
economique, Union Africaine et Malgache des postes et telecommunications and Air Afrique (These are
economic, postal and air services). As Nweke observes, the UAM contributed immensely to the charting of
a continental functionalist trajectory. See Nweke (1987) 136-137.
198
The contents and structures of regional organisations both at the continental and sub-regional levels all
contain elements of functionalism, that is, institutions charged with the responsibility of implementing
functional tasks like education, science and technology, transport and science. For an outline of functional
organisations in Africa, see http://www.issafrica.org (Accessed 1 November 2008).
199
Nweke (1987) 140-141.
200
Mutua M, ‘Why redraw the map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Enquiry’. Michigan Journal of
International Law. 16 (1995) 1168.
201
Agyeman (1990) 8.

51 
 
leanings of political parties and programmes of interest groups across European
frontiers.202
Another reason cited for the unsuitability of intra-African functionalism is the low
level of intra-African trade and investment (see table 2.3 below).203

Table 2.3: Intra-arrangement trade in Africa (Percent of total trade)

                                  1970                   1980                       1990                         1998                        2003 

Exports 

   CEMAC    4.9    1.6    2.3    2.3    1.4 

   COMESA    9.7    9.1    8.1    8.9    8.6 

   ECOWAS    3.1    10.6      8.9    11.1    10.1 

   WAEMU    7.9    12.6    15.3    13.0    16.2 

   SADC      9.4    2.7    6.9    6.0    6.0 

   Africa      8.8    5.2    7.3    10.5    9.3 

Imports 

   CEMAC    5.0    3.7    3.6    3.9    2.9 

   COMESA    6.7    2.8    3.4    3.9    5.8 

   ECOWAS    3.3    10.2    14.9    12.9    11.5 

   WAEMU    6.4    7.6    14.8    9.8    13.3 

   SADC      4.9    3.8    6.0     6.1    6.3 

   Africa      7.4    5.1    7.9    9.2    10.2 

Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of trade statistics. Available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2005/wp0536.pdf Accessed (23 June 2007). 

The conventional theory of integration holds that if countries within a particular

region remove tariffs (i.e. forming a free trade area or customs union), then
                                                            
202
Ibid, 8-9.
203
According to statistics, only 5 countries (except for South Africa) dominate intra-African trade. These
are Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Kenya, Zimbabwe and Ghana. See Naude W & Krugell W, ‘Global integration
of Africa versus regional integration’. South African Journal of Economic and Management Science. 4/3
(2001) 498.

52 
 
there will be an increment in the volume of trade among those countries (trade
creation).204 Placing this in an African context, analysts have argued that the
fact that most African countries are primary producers in the same range of
products,205 thus making their products competitive rather than complementary,
simply eliminates any prospect of trade creation.206 The externalisation of
external tariffs, that is the creation of a customs union, will result in a substantial
loss of revenue, especially in countries where customs revenue forms a chunk
of government revenue.207 If African states decide to pursue functionalism, in
spite of the above constraints, it is argued that lowest income countries within
the union will suffer real income loss due to trade diversion.208 Venables
illustrates this point in the following words:

Membership in an FTA changes the sources from which products are supplied to
member country markets, increasing supply from the partner countries as these
receives preferential treatment, but possibly also reducing supply from domestic
production and from the rest of the world. To the extent that overall supply is
increased and lower cost of imports from the partner country replace higher cost
(previously protected) domestic production.209

The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU has been cited as an example
of trade diversion.210 As Fernandez & Portes observe, the CAP entails that
certain European countries have to abandon buying cheaper agricultural
products from other parts of the world and rather purchase them from high-cost

                                                            
204
Agyeman (1990)10; see also Gambari I, Political and comparative dimensions of regional integration:
The case of Ecowas 2.London: Humanities Press (1991) 7-8.
205
Four non-manufacturing goods constitute 50% of intra-African trade: petroleum, cotton, maize and
cocoa. See Naude & Krugell (2001) 498.
206
Gambari (1991) 7-8; Agyeman (1990) 10-11.
207
ECA (2004) 12. For example, study has shown that Zambia and Zimbabwe could loose substantial
government revenue amounting to 5.6% and 9.8% respectively if free trade is introduced in the Southern
African Development Community (SADC). See Venables A, ‘Regional integration agreements: A force for
convergence or divergence?’ World Bank Policy Research Working Paper no. 2260 (1999) 6.
208
See e.g. Ibid, ii.
209
Ibid, 3-4.
210
See ECA (2004) 11-12; Fernandez R & Portes J, ‘Returns to regionalism: An analysis of nontraditional
gains from regional trade agreements’. The World Bank Economic Review. 12/2 (1998) 200-201.

53 
 
European sources.211 This results in domestic price increases for such
products.212

As a result of the foregoing analysis, some have suggested that African

countries should rather pursue a free trade agreement with higher income
regions or specific higher income nations.213 Others have also suggested either
a federal arrangement214 or, as will be discussed below, the outright
reconfiguration of African boundaries.

c) The idealists-cum-reterritorialists – Let’s redraw the map!

The thesis of this school of thought is simple yet full of complications: tear down
the colonial boundaries and replace them with pre-colonial, ethnic-sensitive
frontiers.215 The underlying veracity of this thought stems from the
fragmentation of the continent by European powers at the 1884/85 Conference
of Berlin.216 The lines drawn by these European powers were insensitive217 to

                                                            
211
Fernandez & Portes (1998) 201.
212
Ibid.
213
Naude & Krugell (2001) 501.
214
See Agyeman (1990) 27-8.
215
See generally, Mutua (1995) 1113-1176; see also Bello A, ‘The boundaries must change’. West Africa,
April (1995) 546; Gakwandi A, ‘Towards a new political map of Africa’ in Abdul-Raheem T (ed) Pan-
Africanism: Politics, economy and social change in the 21st Century .London: Pluto (1996) 87.
216
According to Dowden, ‘all but two of Africa’s concocted countries combine several ethnic groups.’ See
Dowden (2008) 3.
217
The statement by a British official who was involved in drawing boundary between Nigeria and
Cameroon aptly captures the triviality and insensitive approach of the colonial experts. He remarks:

In those days, we just took a blue pencil and a rule, and we put down at Old Calabar, and
drew that line to Yola…I recollect thinking when I was sitting having an audience with
the Emir of Yola, surrounded by his tribe, that it was a very good thing that he did not
know that I, with a blue pencil, had drawn a line through his territory.

Cited in Mutua (1995) 1135. Also, another colonial administrator, Lord Salisbury, sarcastically remarked;

We have been engaged in drawing lines upon maps where no white man’s feet have ever
trod; we have been giving away mountains and rivers and lakes to each other, only
hindered by the small impediment that we never knew exactly where the mountains and
rivers and lakes were.

Cited in Hargreaves J, ‘The making of boundaries: Focus on west Africa’ in Asiwaju A (ed) Partitioned
Africans: Ethnic relations across Africa’s international boundaries 1884-1984. Lagos: University of Lagos
Press (1985) 22.

54 
 
the extent that in some cases it separated communities that shared common
ancestry, customs and socio political and economic institutions.218 As Asiwaju
observes:

In many instances, such as the Uganda-Sudan frontier through the Kakwa

territory, the boundaries have separated communities of worshippers from age-
old sacred groves and shrines. In other instances, well exemplified by the Somali,
the water resources in a predominantly pastoral and nomadic culture area were
located in one state while the pastures were in another.219

Much has been written about the (illegal) acquisition of African territories. In an
attempt to bring the continent under the European sphere of influence,
depraved and illegal methods were employed to dispossess Africans of their
territories.220 For example, the King of Lagos, Dosumu, and his chiefs were
forced to sign a treaty of cession in 1861 which stipulates:

I, Docemo, do with the consent and advice of my Council, give transfer, and by
these presents grant and confirm unto the Queen of Great Britain, her heirs and
successors forever, the Port and Island of Lagos, with all the rights, profits,
territories and appurtenances whatsoever thereunto belonging, and as well the
profits and revenues and direct, full and absolute dominion and sovereignty of the
said port, island and premises, with all the royalties thereof, freely, fully, entirely
and absolutely. I do also covenant and grant that the quiet and peaceable
possession thereof shall, with all possible speed, be freely and effectually
delivered to the Queen of Great Britain, or such persons as Her Majesty shall
thereunto appoint, for her use in the performance of this grant; the inhabitants of
the said island and territories, as the Queen’s subjects, and under her
                                                            
218
Asiwaju A, ‘The Conceptual Framework’, in Asiwaju A (1985) 2-3. For a detailed tabulated list of
partitioned ethnic groups in Africa, see Asiwaju (1985) 256-258. Brownlie, however, argues that the
European powers did not always ignore ethnological considerations when delimiting African frontiers. See
Brownlie I, African boundaries: A legal and diplomatic encyclopaedia. Berkeley: University of California
Press (1979) 6.
219
Ibid, 3. For example, the United Kingdom and Ethiopia entered into an agreement in 1954 that nomadic
Somali would be allowed to graze their animals across the border (in Ethiopia) but upon the independence
of British Somaliland in 1960, Ethiopia decided not to honour the agreement. See Oyebode (2003) 23.
220
The British used Treaties as a pretext for acquiring territories. In most cases, the content of such treaties
were either misinterpreted to African chiefs or coercive measures were employed to make them sign. There
is no gainsaying that these measures are blatantly in violation of the principles international law, especially
rules relating to the validity of treaties. See e.g. Ibid, 90-100; Mutua (1995) 1130-1134.

55 
 
 sovereignty, crown, jurisdiction, and government, being still suffered to live
there.’221

Such was the fate of the continent under what is aptly termed ‘the scramble for
Africa’. Although some argue that partitioning is not peculiar to Africa,222 the
resultant effect of this colonial adventure is the designation of Africa as the
world’s most fragmented region.223 The presence of 15 landlocked states in
Africa, some of which are not economically viable, is evidence of the
arbitrariness of African frontiers.224

It is against this backdrop that calls have been made that ‘we should sit down
with square-rule and compass and re-design the boundaries of African
nations’.225 Mutua questions the moral and legal legitimacy of ‘colonial’ states
by arguing for a compression of the 54 states in Africa into 14 large entities.226
According to Mutua, the criteria of such cartographic exercise include factors
such as historical circumstances; population density; resources and economic
viability and ethnic, cultural and geographic variables.227 In the same vein, Bello
views that the states trapped within colonial frontiers have failed.228 Citing the
example of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Bello calls for the redrawing of
Africa’s boundaries on ‘a rational and logical basis to take cognisance of the
linguistic, cultural and ethnic diversities as is the case with most successful

                                                            
221
Oyebode (2003) 90-1.
222
Asiwaju notes that the boundaries of African countries such as Nigeria, Senegal and Mozambique are
older than the boundaries of countries like Austria, Hungary, Poland, Greece and Finland. See Asiwaju A,
‘The Global Perspective and Border Management Policy Options’ in Asiwaju (1985) 233, 248.
223
Akonnor notes that Africa has 165 demarcated borders. See Akonnor K, ‘Stuffing old wine in new
bottles: The case of the African Union’ in Mazama A (ed.) Africa in the 21st Century: Toward a new future,
London: Routledge (2007) 200.
224
Englebert A, Tarango S & Carter M, Dismemberment and suffocation: A contribution to the debate on
AfricanbBoundaries. Pomona College (2001) 4. Available at
http://www.politics.pomona.edu/penglebert/borders_FINAL.pdf (Accessed 1 November 2008). African
states, according to Agyeman, are ‘plagued by the deficiency trilogy of smallness, unnaturalness and
illegitimacy’. See Agyeman (1990) 6.
225
This statement is credited to the Nigerian Nobel laureate, Wole Soyinka. Cited in Ramutsindela (2001)
96.
226
Mutua (1995) 1117-8.
227
Ibid.
228
Bello (1995) 546.

56 
 
nations all over the world.’229 Gakwandi also suggests the redrawing of the
political map of Africa into seven states.230 The rationale, according to
Gakwandi, behind this includes the elimination of border disputes, easing of
ethnic tensions, solid economic development and the emergence of politically
and economically viable states.231

Critics have however questioned the feasibility of redrawing the boundaries of

African states. As Ramutsindela puts it, ‘[This] exhibits serious defects, not least
because they replicate the Berlin territorial fiasco and also reflects the vicious
circle of territorial trap’.232 A question that stands out is whether the regrouping
of African states along ethnic lines is an antidote to conflicts or
underdevelopment. If one was to consider the example of Somalia, a mono-
ethnic state, which nevertheless slipped into large-scale chaos, then the answer
might not necessarily lie in the reconfiguration of Africa’s boundaries. As it has
been argued, arbitrary boundaries are not the sole source of conflicts on the
continent.233 As Englebert et al note, the partitioning of homogenous groups
only leads to conflict if such groups share strong political identities and nomadic
lifestyles.234 Even where they share such a bond, the process of nation-building
in some African states has tempered claims for ethnic unification.235

Apart from the apparent logistical nightmare, the redrawing of Africa’s map
remains impossible due to the fact that African elites will never reach a
consensus on the modus vivendi of such exercise. The pragmatic approach will
be to de-emphasise the importance of these arbitrary borders by turning them

                                                            
229
Ibid.
230
Gakwandi (1996) 87.
231
Ibid.
232
Ramutsindela (2001) 98.
233
Ibid; Englebert et al (2001) 5-7; Brownlie (1979) 14-15.
234
Englebert et al (2001) 6.
235
Before independence, the Masai ethnic grouping in Kenya and Tanzania petitioned the Colonial
authorities for reunification but after independence, this claim has evaporated largely because they have
reconciled themselves to the reality of their ‘new’ homes. See e.g. Ibid. Another factor that reduces the call
for border revision is agreements which allowed frontier populations to pursue their everyday economic
and social activities without restrictions. See Brownlie (1979) 171, 246, 401, 1051-61.

57 
 
into a productive and positive ‘theatre of operations’.236 Asiwaju identifies the
three ways of doing this:

(1) Development programmes with specific reference to border areas; (2) border
areas within the wider context of bilateral relations and co-operation between the
states concerned; and (3) border areas in the still wider context of functional
international organisations aimed at regional grouping or integration of the
several states in geographically contiguous areas.237

Of main concern to this discourse is the third recommendation, which stresses

the integrative agenda of Africa’s boundaries. Like Europe, with similar
concerns of (arbitrary) partitioning,238 concerted efforts should be made at
obliterating the scars of partitioning through the establishment of regional and
continental customs union and common market. An arrangement which allows a
Somali to, without any bureaucratic encumbrance, cross the Kenya frontier to
either pay courtesy visit to relatives or trade, can only encourage harmonious
neighbourliness. As it has been rightly argued, friendly relations between and
among African states should start from cultivating conditions for development
and respect for customary laws in partitioned communities.239 As Barkindo
admonishes:

[W]e should explore the areas which unite us as Africans and one of the best
ways of achieving this must be to study and encourage cultural links across
political boundaries – which should be emphasised as points of contact and not
of separation.240

                                                            
236
Ramutsindela (2001) 100; Asiwaju (1985) 243-245.
237
Asiwaju (1985) 243-244.
238
See Ibid, 233-6; see also Asiwaju A, ‘Borderlands in Africa: A comparative research perspective with
particular reference to Western Europe’ in Asiwaju A & Nugent P (eds), African boundaries: Barriers,
conduits and opportunities. London: Pinter (1996) 254-9.
239
See e.g. Phiri S, ‘National integration, Rural development and frontier communities: The case of the
Chewa and the Ngoni astride Zambian boundaries with Malawi and Mozambique’ in Asiwaju (1985) 121-
4; Barkindo B ‘The Mandara astride the Nigeria-Cameroon boundary’ in Asiwaju (1985) 46; see also
Asiwaju (1996) 260.
240
Barkindo (1985) 46.

58 
 
2.3.3 Searching for an elixir: Is regional integration beneficial to Africa?
A post-integrative era of socio-political and economic upliftment witnessed in
Europe is an empirical proof of the development feature of integration. Apart
from the old guard (EU-15),241 new entrants into the EU,242 especially the
Central and East European Countries (CEEC) have recorded significant
economic growth. This economic effect is measured based on variables such as
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita growth, investment inflow (factor
mobility effect), single market effect and trade effects.243 Breuss observes that
the impact of elimination of trade (export) tariffs on the real GDP of CEECs,
over the period 2001-2010, was around 4.5 percent.244 Trade between the EU-
15 and the CEECs (EU-10) rose from 56% in 1993 to 62% in 1995.245 In
addition, CEECs have recorded substantial FDI inflow from EU-15. FDI flows to
the EU-10 account for about 40% of GDP.246 These empirical factors are largely
responsible for the EU’s designation as a successful regional integration
initiative.

Having outlined the foregoing, the question is this: what benefits can Africa
derive from integration? The benefits to be derived from regional integration can
be classified into two: traditional and non-traditional gains.247

                                                            
241
The EU-15 include: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
242
In 2004, 10 member states from CEEC, also known as the EU-10, joined the EU. They are Czech
Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia. In 2007, two
more member states from the CEEC joined the organisation: Bulgaria and Romania.
243
Borota T & Kutan A, ‘Regional integration and economic growth: The case of the European Union’. The
Journal of International Trade and Diplomacy. 2/1 (2008) 94; see also Breuss F, Macroeconomic effects of
EU enlargement for old and new members. (2001) 4. Available at http://fritz.breuss.wifo.ac.at//Breuss.PDF
(Accessed 30 November 2008); see also Breintenfellner A, Cuaresmer J, Mooslechner P & Ritzberger-
Grunwald D, ‘The impact of EU enlargement in 2004 and 2007 on FDI and migration flows: Gravity
analysis of factor mobility’. Monetary Policy and the Economy. Quarter 2 (2008) 102. Available at
http://www.oenb.at/en/img/mop_2008_2_analyses_5_tcm16-88559.pdf (Accessed 30 November 2008).
244
Breuss (2001) 6.
245
European Commission, ‘Enlargement, two years after: An economic evaluation’. Occasional Paper No
24 (2006). Available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/press_corner/newsletter/110506_en.htm
(Accessed 1 December 2008).
246
Ibid.
247
See e.g. Fernandez & Portes (1998).

59 
 
At the core of traditional gains from regional integration is the concept of trade
creation.248 The classical underlying logic of regional integration is that the
reduction of trade barriers between countries would enable citizens and firms to
obtain goods and services from the cheapest source of supply, thereby,
ensuring that production is located based on comparative advantage.249 To put
it simply, trade creation displaces higher cost domestic production in state A
with lower cost production from partner state B because tariffs have either been
reduced or completely eliminated.250 The result of this would be an
improvement of terms of trade among member states because the removal of
tariffs will make goods originating from an integration area less expensive than
those from non-member states.251 As earlier pointed out, this same advantage
could also lead to a welfare loss252 especially for economically weak countries
which depend heavily on tariff revenues. For example, analysts have pointed
out that the introduction of a free trade area in the Southern Africa Development
Community (SADC) would lead to substantial revenue loss for Zambia (5.6%)
and Zimbabwe (9.8%).253 It, has, however been argued that this situation could
also provide a stimulus for finding alternative ways of raising funds in such
countries.254

Another traditional benefit, which is of crucial significance in the African context,

is that regional integration brings about an increased market size.255 The

                                                            
248
Ibid, 200; Venables (2000) 3.
249
Venables (2000) 3.
250
Ibid; see also ECA (2004) 11.
251
Fernandez & Portes (1998) 221.
252
As Casella postulates

If economics of scale imply that firms located in large countries enjoy lower costs, then the gains
from enlarging the bloc will fall disproportionally on small countries, because the entrance of new
members diminishes the importance of the domestic market and improves the small countries’
relative competitiveness.

Casella A, ‘Large countries, small countries and the enlargement of trade blocks’. European Economic
Review. Vol. 40/2 (1996) 389.
253
Venables (2000) 6.
254
ECA (2004) 11. Venables observes that Cambodia introduced value added tax (VAT) after it lost
substantial tariff revenues (56%) upon its entry into ASEAN. Venables (2000) 6.
255
Venables (2000) 7; Fernandez & Portes (1998) 201-2.

60 
 
balkanisation of Africa, highlighted above, gave birth to mini-states, with small
populations and economies. Only five African countries - DRC, Ethiopia, Egypt,
Nigeria and South Africa - have a population of more than 30 million.256 It is thus
important that the continent fashion a strategy of combining its markets in order
to stimulate investment flows by domestic and foreign investors. For example,
the creation of a customs union can serve as incentive to foreign investors to
engage in tariff jumping – that is, invest in a member country in order to trade
freely with other members.257 Such investment can spur knowledge and
technology transfers and spillovers.258

In addition to traditional benefits, there are a number of non-traditional benefits

that flow from regional integration. An important benefit in this regard is the
existence of a commitment mechanism, either in form of treaties or protocols,
which binds member states to minimum standards.259 By adhering to these
standards, member states are in some cases bound to ensure continuity in
political and economic reforms, with deviation leading to swift retaliation by
partner countries.260 The condition attached to accession to EU (e.g. democratic
reforms) is claimed to be responsible for the consolidation of democracy in
former authoritarian regimes in Greece, Spain, Portugal and the CEECs.261
Where foreign investors know that a certain country is bound by commitment

                                                            
256
Asante (1997) 29.
257
Fenandez & Portes (1998) 202. Research has shown that integration initiatives such as NAFTA
substantially increased FDI in Mexico, and MERCUSOR did the same in Argentina and Brazil. See ECA
(2004) 13.
258
AU & ECA (2006) 81.
259
Fenandez & Portes (1998) 204-205.
260
Ibid, 205; Venables (2000) 10. Schmidt highlights that European integration was responsible for major
economic reforms in France from the 1960s through to the 1980s. See Schmidt V, The untold story: The
impact of European integration on France in the Mitterrand-Chirac era (1981-1997). Paper prepared for
delivery at the European Community Studies Association Fifth Biennial International Conference (Seattle,
WA, May 29-June 1 1997) 1-2. Available at http://biblioteca.universa.net/ficha.do?id=13753042-31k
(Accessed 30 November, 2008).
261
For example, the threat of economic and diplomatic isolation by MERCURSOR was responsible for the
prevention of a coup d’état in Paraguay in 1996. See Fenandez & Portes (1998) 208. Ram also observes
that European integration was the impetus for large scale political reforms witnessed in Romania in the
1990s. See generally, Ram M, Romania’s reforms through European integration: The domestic effects of
European Union law. 1-23. Available at
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/kokkalis/GSW1/GSW1/20%20Ram.pdf (Accessed 30 November 2008)

61 
 
mechanisms, they are likely to invest in such country.262 Illustratively, where
country A, widely known to be a command economy joins a regional
organisation that espouses liberal policies, such action will signal to potential
investors that country A has adopted liberal policies and thus open for
investment.263

Regional integration arrangements also enhance bargaining power of member

countries in international fora.264 When countries articulate a common agenda
through negotiation as a group, there is the possibility that countries could
obtain significant gains. Africa’s ambition to be a relevant part of global
architecture can only be achieved through multilateral negotiations, not only as
a continent but also partnering with other developing nations in the international
arena. An entity that represents over 800 million people will definitely carry
more weight than one that represents only 20 million people.

Regional integration can also promote cooperation among member states.

Regular interfacing among policy makers and other groups bolsters trust, and
can in turn minimise the incidence of conflict and instability.265 In addition, such
an arrangement provides a framework for cooperation on sharing of resources
(natural and human) and also common problems like pollution and poverty.266

The foregoing analysis shows that enhanced cooperation is a useful

development strategy. However, the next question is not so much the beneficial
nature of regional integration to Africa as it is a question of how the continent
can utilise it for its development objectives. Studies have shown both the
positive attitude of African countries to regional integration initiatives and also
the cost-benefit of regionalism to member states. According to a 2004 research
conducted by the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), over 50% of
                                                            
262
Venables (2000) 10.
263
Fenandez & Portes (1998) 208-9.
264
Ibid, 211.
265
ECA (2004) 14-15; AU & ECA (2006) 84.
266
ECA (2004) 14-15.

62 
 
countries involved in regional integration initiatives reported that coordinated
macro-economic policies helped control inflation, almost the same number
highlighted that it helped reduce budget deficit and about 44% held that it
increased the volume of investment.267 A breakdown of the sectoral impact of
regional integration reveals that 50% of member states have benefited from
trade and market integration initiatives, 47% from transport, 39% from macro-
economic policy convergence, 28% from agricultural and food policy and 26%
from energy.268

In spite of the foregoing analysis, regional integration by no means represents a

singular antidote to Africa’s plights. It should rather be viewed as part of an
overall development strategy.269 The benefits highlighted above would not come
about as a result of an elitist political resolution to conjure integration; rather it
would emerge from concerted efforts to strengthen domestic institutions
(political and economic). Only through this can any form of convergence be
achieved. Reaping the fruits of integration requires radical and focused
decisions. Over and above these sentiments, architects of African integration,
sub-regional or continental, should clearly spell out realisable goals and
objectives, condition of membership, entrance levels for new members,
enforceability mechanisms, and common standards.

2.3.4 Is African integration possible?

The question posed above strikes at the heart of the issues raised earlier: the
appropriate methodology of integrating Africa. Should there be a federal union
of African states or an EU type of integration or rather should Africans revert to
a pre-colonial frontier configuration? This question also provides the framework
for tackling subsequent chapters of this thesis. While this section is not aimed at
fully exploring this question, it will only attempt to tease out some of the salient
points to be considered later in the thesis. In order to determine the feasibility of

                                                            
267
AU & ECA (2006) 82.
268
Ibid.
269
ECA (2004) 22.

63 
 
African integration, one must consider both internal and external factors that will
influence African integration.

a) Social imperative
On the internal factors, it is pertinent to consider the sociological implication of
the integration narrative. As mentioned earlier, the term ‘Africans’ is a
constructed idea, an idea which is antedated by ethnic affiliations. Ethnic
affiliations are so strong that in some cases they transcends national
citizenship.270 Therefore, any attempt to ‘impose’271 an African identity, without
paying adequate attention to ethnic complexities and values and how these can
inform and nourish the integration debate, can only be disadvantageous.272
Dowden’s observation about Africa’s identity is worth quoting in full:

Who would dare make generalisations about Asia based on Bangladesh? Or

about Europe based on Greece? … Even if you divide Africa in three; Africa
north of the Sahara, South Africa and its orbit, and the zone in between, there
are few common factors within these regions … Africa’s social systems, beliefs
and culture are as diverse as its peoples and as disparate as its climates. West
Africa feels quite different from East Africa, and even within West Africa you
could never mistake Nigeria for Senegal. And neither of them seems on the

                                                            
270
Citing the example of the Chewa and the Ngoni of Zambia, Mozambique and Malawi, Phiri notes that
the behavioural pattern of these ethnic groups shows an overriding attachment to cultural ties as opposed to
their national domain. See Phiri in Asiwaju (1985) 105-25, 245.
271
I use this word only to refer to how some post-colonial elites skilfully gloss over ethnic cleavages in an
attempt to create a façade of unity and cohesion. As Nye aptly notes:

The choice between them - between tribalism and Pan-Africanism - was not made by any popular
plebiscite, but by the educated elite, who have generally opted for Pan-Africanism because of their
views about size and power in world politics. They believe that tribal nations would be divided
and ruled from outside, whereas a Pan-African nation would mean world power and dignity.

See Nye (1966) 9.

272
This is not to deny the existence of an attachment to a sense of similarity in values and race among
Africans, an attachment that often goes beyond national identity. However, this attachment is only
emotional and is yet to be shaped into something concrete. The deplorable state of political leadership and
gross underdevelopment on the continent are factors that militate against such goal. Being an African
should thus move beyond abstracts and should be defined by socio political and economic upliftment of the
African populace.

64 
 
 same planet as Mali. Every time you say ‘Africa is …’ the words crumble and
break. For every generalisation you must exclude at least five countries.273

As Asiwaju tellingly points out, ‘partitioned Africans … should be regarded as …

the basis for extremely valuable ethnological, social and cultural links on which
to build surer traditions of international relations on the continent.274 Europe’s
ability to forge unity amidst multiple nationalities and cultural identities should
serve as a useful lesson to Africa. As Fontaine observes, the EU has been able
to promote economic growth based on ‘regional specialities and the rich
diversity of traditions and cultures’.275 The reality of ethnic pluralism on the
continent should be channelled into an integrative agenda which promotes
diversity, celebrates the values embedded in African culture and promoting
programmes which accentuates inclusion. In respect of Association of South-
East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Narine observes that the so-called ‘ASEAN way’
of diplomacy stems from the Malay cultural practices of musjawarah and
mufukat.276 He further explains:

Musjawarah means ‘that a leader should not act arbitrarily or impose his will, but
rather make gentle suggestions of the path a community should follow, being
careful always to consult all other participants fully and to take their views and
feelings into consideration before delivering his synthesis conclusions.’ Mufukat
means consensus and is the goal toward which musjawarah is directed.277

While the EU might appear appealing as a referential framework on a

theoretical plane, the reality is that Africa will have to fashion its own approach.
Africa’s search for lessons must transcend the adoption of EU’s institutional
architecture and policies. As Olivier & Olivier points out, ‘authentic integration in
Africa seems possible, but according to architecture still to be discovered and

                                                            
273
Dowden (2008) 10.
274
Asiwaju (1985) 245-246.
275
Fontaine P, Europe in 12 lessons. Brussels: European Commission (2006) 6.
276
Narine S, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in south-east Asia. Boulder Colorado: Lynne Rienner (2002)
31.
277
Ibid.

65 
 
designed’.278 Such ‘architecture’ should be autochthonous and sensitive to local
specificities. Nevertheless, it should also include elements that have been
responsible for the success of other integration initiatives. These include
variables like peace and security, good governance and human rights.

b) Democratic imperative
Be it at the sub-regional or continental levels, architects of African integration
should make concerted efforts at fashioning a consensus on democratic values.
As Dare rhetorically intones,

As the world struggles to build new structures … isn’t it time also to reconsider a
system that subjects fragile developing countries to violent spasms every four or
five years, keeps them in suspended animation in between, and yet solves
nothing and settle nothing?279

While it is not suggested that Africa should devise a system that encourages the
ubiquitous ‘sit-tight syndrome’,280 African democracy should be adapted to
reflect what Ake calls ‘socio-cultural realities’.281 Without sacrificing the inherent
values and principles of democracy, Ake argues that the starting point of
democracy in Africa should be an emphasis on the communal over the
individual – a system which prioritises social welfare and common good.282 He,
however, admits that a unique African democracy will not emerge from a
rational blueprint but rather, from ‘practical experience and improvisation in the
course of a hard struggle’.283 The reality is that Africa cannot afford to pursue
concrete unity without some form of common grundnorm. Africa’s tapestry of
rich cultural traditions is an adequate reference point for developing such basic

                                                            
278
Olivier G & Olivier M, ‘Models of regional integration: The European Union and the African Union’,
SA Public Law. 19/1 (2004) 362.
279
Dare O, ‘Up from misbegotten orthodoxies’. The Nation (Nigeria) 4, November, 2008. Available at
http://www.thenationonlineng.com/dynamicpage.asp?id=68527 (Accessed 4 November, 2008).
280
This phrase is used to describe African leaders who have decided to rule perpetually.
281
Ake C, ‘The unique case of African democracy’ International Affairs. 69/2 (1993) 242.
282
Ibid, 242-4. Nyerere defines African democracy as ‘government by discussion’. See Nyerere (1966)
104.
283
Ibid, 244.

66 
 
norms. The challenge is thus to devise a framework for achieving this. (This
point will be fully elaborated upon in subsequent chapters).

c) Technology imperative
Envisaging an integrated Africa in the 21st century without adequate
consideration of the development of Information and Communication
Technology (ICT) simply amounts, at the very best, to a pipe dream. Africa can
safely be classified as what De Wet refers to as a ‘technology colony’.284 He
observes that although many developing countries have gained political
independence, they are yet to achieve technology independence, that is, the
technological know-how necessary for economic development.285 To put it
simply, Africa operates at the periphery of global technological innovation.
Painting the dire state of technology on the continent, a NEPAD report views:

African economic integration and participation in the global economy is

constrained by factors such as the high cost of access for end-users to foreign-
owned satellite telecommunication providers for cross-border regional and
international telecommunication traffic. In addition, high Internet access cost, low
bandwidth, poor ICT infrastructure and often unreliable communication facilities
further exacerbate the challenges the African countries face.286

The impact of technology in fostering regional integration cannot be overstated.

As Cappellin notes, technology can further integration in two ways: improve
cohesion and enhance economic development in less developed regions.287
More than political rhetoric, technology has the capacity of creating a borderless
African community. The availability of technology, especially ICT, will ease the
                                                            
284
De Wet G, Emerging from the technology colony: A view from the South. University of Pretoria (1999)
1-2.
285
Ibid.
286
‘NEPAD ICT infrastructure programme’. Available at http://event-africa-networking.web.cern.ch/event-
africa-networking/cdrom/NEPAD/NEPAD_ICT_Infrastructure_Brochure_Sept05.pdf. (Accessed 10
November, 2008). [Hereinafter referred to as NEPAD ICT Document]. Africa is the region with the lowest
internet penetration in the world. Africa’s share of global internet penetration stands at 5.3%. Available at
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats1.htm (Accessed 10 November, 2008).
287
Cappellin R, ‘International knowledge and integration networks for European integration, cohesion and
enlargement’. International Social Science Journal. 56/180 (2004) 207.

67 
 
process of collaboration on academic, leisure and business projects across the
continent. Since integration also requires cooperation of interest and voluntary
groups across frontiers, technology will help create a platform for enhancing
such initiatives. These points are not lost on architects of African integration,
hence the initiative to establish a submarine optic fibre ring around Africa
coastline.288

The various submarine fibre-optic cable initiatives, aimed at improving internet

connection speed and lowering phone call tariffs, have immense potentials.289
In addition to this is the so-called ‘African-style communication revolution’,
which reduces or eliminates roaming charges on mobile calls across specific
African countries.290 If given the necessary political backing, these private
sector initiatives are capable of translating integration objectives into realities.
For instance, the borderless network initiative, apart from being a convenient
measure, gives full meaning to the idea of free movement of persons. Cheap
and fast communication will also ease the process of business interactions
across the continent. This will further stimulate cross-border trade and
investment. In terms of economic development, the telecommunication sector in
Africa has proved to be a major magnet of FDI. The meteoric rise of mobile
phone usage has attracted major companies from Europe, Asia, Middle East
and pan-African operators.291 The huge investments made by these companies
have contributed significantly to the economy of African countries.

                                                            
288
See NEPAD ICT Document; see also ‘East African Submarine Optic Fibre Project’. Available at
http://www.icglr.org/common/docs/docs_repository/3310eassy.pdf (Accessed 30 October 2008).
289
The following are examples of such initiatives: SAT-3/SAFE; GLO-1; AWCC; SEACOM; EASSy; and
TEAMS. See African Economic Outlook (2009) 90-93; see also ‘Banding together’. BBC Focus on Africa
(April-June 2009) 44-46.
290
African Economic Outlook (2009) 101; see also
http://www.zain.com/muse/obj/lang.default/portal.view/content/About%20us/Worldwide%20Presence/Afri
ca-13%20countries (Accessed 25 November 2008).
291
See African Economic Outlook (2009) 93-95. Between 2000 and 2007, record shows that private
investment in African telecommunication rose from USD5.4 billion to USD13.5 billion. See Ibid, 96.
According to the Secretary General of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), about USD8
billion was invested in the development of ICT in Africa in 2008. Available at
http://allafrica.com/stories/200909140463.html (Accessed 1 November 2009).

68 
 
However, for ICT to efficiently play a significant role in shaping the integration
process, more needs to be done. While the harmonisation of ICT policies in
Africa remains the ultimate objective, it is essential to consider some preliminary
measures. In order to guarantee the confidence of potential and current
investors, it is essential that African governments grant more powers and
autonomy to national regulatory agencies.292 As Gasmi et al note, the
independence of regulatory institutions should not be considered in isolation but
rather as part of a broader strategy of good governance.293 The independence
of regulatory institutions cannot be gauged by merely observing a change in
structure; instead the general environment within which they operate must
conform to democratic ideals and standards.294

It is crucial that sub-regional and continental organisations partner with ICT

companies on programmes which directly impact on regional integration. Cross-
border initiatives such as the submarine optic fibre cables and borderless
networks should bear the imprints of the aspirations of African integration. In
this regard, further details should be worked out on how relevant continental
and sub-regional institutions will be brought on board as partners on these
projects. The partnership referred to here is not so much financial as it is a
political statement which confirms technology as an indispensable driver of
African integration.

While political elites and academics continue to debate endlessly on the

modalities of integrating Africa, technology, particularly the initiatives highlighted
above, will play a central role in creating a multi-layered and functional African
community, built on innovation and effective communication.

                                                            
292
See African Economic Outlook (2009) 95-96.
293
Gasmi F, Noumba Um P, Recuero Vito P, ‘Political accountability and regulatory performance in
infrastructure industries: An empirical analysis’. World Bank Economic Review (2009) 20.
294
Ibid.

69 
 
d) External imperatives
The external dimension or influence on integration cannot be understated. For
example, the European integration came about as a result of a geo-political
reaction to what De Gaulle referred to as the ‘two hegemonies’: the Soviet
Union and the United States of America.295 In the same vein, the US provided
the financial assistance for the economic reconstruction of Europe, a move
which provided a much needed fillip for the integration experiment.296 As Africa
grapples with integrative issues in the 21st century, the influence of external
actors and conditions will play a huge role in shaping this discourse. The shift in
global balance of power, or what Cilliers refers to as the ‘rise of the rest’,297 will
no doubt impact on Africa. Also, the increasing relevance of the EU, especially
as a model and as a global force, will provide useful and sober parallels for
integration initiatives across the continent.

The (economic) rise of countries like India, China and Brazil, especially in
relation to their quest for Africa’s natural resources, has key implications not

                                                            
295
See Hoffmann S, ‘Obstinate or obsolete? The fate of the nation-states and the case of Western Europe’
in Cantori & Spiegel (1970) 81.
296
The Marshall Plan (known officially as the European Recovery Programme), an initiative named after
US Secretary of State George Marshall, was a post World War II economic recovery plan for Europe. As
Hogan puts it:

The strategic assumption behind this policy held that an integrated economic order,
particularly one headed by supranational institutions, would help control German
nationalism, reconcile Germany’s recovery with France’s economic and security
concerns, and thus create a balance of power in the West sufficient to contain Soviet
power in the East. The economic assumptions grew fundamentally out of the American
experience at home, where a large internal economy integrated by free-market forces and
central institutions of coordination and control seemed to have laid a ground work for a
new era of economic and social stability. An economic United States of Europe would
bring similar benefits…and in the process would realise all of their goals on the continent.

See Hogan M, The marshall plan: America, Britain, and the reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1987) 27.
297
See Cilliers J, Africa in the new world: How global and domestic developments will impact by 2025.
Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies (2008) 18. See also Zakariah F, The post-American world. New
York: W.W Norton (2009). This reality is poignantly painted in a report published by the US National
Intelligence Council (2008) titled - Global trends 2025: A transformed world – The national intelligence
council’s 2025 project. The report, amongst other provisions, predicts that the rules of the international
system and global architecture would change as a result of the emergence of new players like Brazil, India,
Russia and China. Available at http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_2025/2025_Global_Trends_Final_Report.pdf
(Accessed 25 November 2008).

70 
 
only for individual African countries but also for the continent as a whole. The
volume of investment by the so-called ‘non-traditional financiers’, of which
China and India are key role players, illuminates the potential for infrastructure
development necessary for regional integration.298 According to a World Bank
report (2008), the sizeable investments of these Asian giants in infrastructural
projects, helps to fill the gap of annual infrastructure deficit estimated at US$22
billion.299 Analysts have viewed that this changing investment landscape
portends a replacement of the (in) famous ‘Washington consensus’ with an
equally suspicious ‘Beijing consensus’.300 While the former hinges the
deployment of aid to democratic governance, the latter accentuates non-
interference in the domestic affairs of states.301 In a continent where democratic
governance is an exception rather than the norm, the ‘Beijing consensus’
represents not only a boost for autocrats but also a de-emphasis of the
centrality of democracy and rule of law in the integration process.

e) Other imperatives
As stated previously, the foregoing discussion is not an exhaustive outline of
African integration issues, since more will be discussed in subsequent chapters;
however, it represents some of the fundamental issues that will shape this
discourse. African integration draws a lot of scepticism, notably as a result of
issues such as absence of democratic practise, levels of intra-African trade and
the smallness of African markets. The experiences of past and present
experiments should serve as a useful navigation tool (This will be discussed in
the next chapter). Obsession with theories, including debates over their
practicability in the African context, has in a way eclipsed the focus on devising
other strategies for integrating the continent. As Schoeman, for example

                                                            
298
China’s investment in Africa peaked at USD8 billion in 2006, an amount four times that of India, and
dropped to USD5 billion in 2007. See Foster V, Butterfield W, Chen C & Pushak N, Building bridges:
China’s role as infrastructure financier for Africa. World Bank (2008) 52. Available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRICA/Resources/Building_Bridges_Master_Version_wo-
Embg_with_cover.pdf (Accessed 20 November 2008); see also Cilliers (2008) 24-25.
299
Foster et al (2008) 23.
300
Alden C, ‘China in Africa’. African Security Review. 17/1 (2008) 122.
301
Ibid; see also Foster et al (2008) 6.

71 
 
observes, the emphasis should shift from the volume of intra-African
transactions (quantity) to the beneficial value of such transaction (quality).302
Illustratively, the emphasis could be on strengthening the position of Africa in
international forums by articulating a common agenda on issues concerning the
welfare of the continent.303 Also, regional powers can play an important role in
the field of human resources by sending experts to countries in shortage of
necessary skills. Such cooperation will help foster cooperation between African
states.

2.4 Summary
The search for alternatives to guarantee continental peace and economic
prosperity in Europe after the Second World War gave birth to regional
integration and its different theories. At the core of regional integration - be it in
the developed or the developing world - lies the need for peace, security and
meaningful development. The developmental feature of regional integration, as
experienced in Europe, provides a concrete proof for its adoption.

This chapter provides a critical analysis of regional integration through a

theoretical, multi-disciplinary perspective. Apart from considering the political
theories of integration, this chapter also highlights the legal theories of
integration, especially their central role in the integration process. Also, the
compatibility of sovereignty and regional integration is considered. It was
observed that the two are not mutually exclusive because the need for
addressing transnational imperatives will require some sort of balancing and
adaptation.

Furthermore, this chapter explores integration through the lens of African

politics and history. The pan-Africanism root of integration is discussed,
including how it shaped the different theoretical perspectives on the modus
                                                            
302
Schoeman M, ‘Imagining a community – The African Union as an emerging security community’.
Strategic Review for Southern Africa. XXIV/1 (2002) 13.
303
Ibid, 14.

72 
 
operandi of integration in Africa. Lastly, this chapter argues that in spite of the
utilitarian feature of integration, the continent should chart its own integration
trajectory, based on experiences and peculiarities. The next chapter will
examine some of the experiments of supranationalism within the African
context. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

73