Reference to Memorandum – Past Recollection Recorded

Canque v. CA
GR No. 96202
April 13, 1999

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner Rosella D. Canque (Canque) entered into contracts with Socor Construction
(Socor) as sub-contractor of her three (3) government projects whereby the latter agreed to supply
materials to the former. Socor later sent a bill to Canque for materials and services rendered worth
P299,717.75 + interest rate of 3%, representing the balance of Canque’s total account of
P2,098,400.25. However, Canque refused to pay the amount, claiming that Socor failed to submit
the delivery receipts showing the actual weight in metric tons of the items delivered and the
acceptance thereof by the government, as required in their contract agreement.

Socor brought suit in the RTC to recover from Canque. Canque initially admitted the
existenceof the contracts with Socor as well as the receipt of the billing. However, she disputed the
correctness of the bill, alleging that Canque has alreadu paid P1.4m but Socor has not issued any
receipt to petitioner for patments made, and that here is not agreement between with regard to
the 3% interest per month. Canque then amended her answer denying that she had made contracts
with Soroc.

During trial, Socor presented its vice-president Sofia Sanchez (Sanchez), and its bookkeeper,
Dolores Aday (Aday). In the course of Aday’s witnessing, the Book of Collectible Accounts was
presented, showing the entries (both payments and billings) recorded thereat and the court found
the same as credible

RTC order Canque to pay the sum of P299,717.75 +12% interest per anum. On appeal, the
CA affirmed the reliance made by the lower court on Socor’s Book of Collectible Accounts on the
basis of Rule 130, Sec. 43 of the Rules of Court. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there is no competent evidence of private respondent’s claim.

HELD:
NO. Aside from Exh. K, Socor was able to present various documents like contracts
agreements, computation of billings, affidavits, statement of work accomplished, certification from
the government agencies were the works were performed and other billing statements.

The court ruled in favor of Socor on the basis of Art. 1235 of the NCC wherein the failure of Canque
to protest or object to previous deliveries and paying the same without first requiring the delivery
receipts is deemed as a waiver of the said requirements. Also, it appears that petitioner was able to
collect the full amount of project costs from the government; and that Canque would be unjustly
enriched at the expense of Socor if she is not made to pay what is her just obligation the contracts.
Hence, the petition is denied.
________________________________________________________________________________
SEC. 10. When witness may refer to memorandum. A witness may be allowed to refresh his
memory respecting a fact, by anything written by himself or under his direction at the time when the
fact occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at any other time when the fact was fresh in his memory
and he knew that the same was correctly stated in the writing; but in such case the writing must be
produced and may be inspected by the adverse party, who may, if he chooses, cross-examine the
witness upon it, and may read it in evidence. So, also, a witness may testify from such a writing, though
he retain no recollection of the particular facts, if he is able to swear that the writing correctly stated
the transaction when made; but such evidence must be received with caution.

On the other hand, petitioner contends that evidence which is inadmissible for the purpose
for which it was offered cannot be admitted for another purpose. She cites the following from Chief
Justice Morans commentaries:

The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. Where the offer is general,
and the evidence is admissible for one purpose and inadmissible for another, the evidence should
be rejected. Likewise, where the offer is made for two or more purposes and the evidence is
incompetent for one of them, the evidence should be excluded. The reason for the rule is that it is
the duty of a party to select the competent from the incompetent in offering testimony, and he
cannot impose this duty upon the trial court. Where the evidence is inadmissible for the purpose
stated in the offer, it must be rejected, though the same may be admissible for another purpose.The
rule is stated thus: If a party x x x opens the particular view with which he offers any part of his
evidence, or states the object to be attained by it, he precludes himself from insisting on its
operation in any other direction, or for any other object; and the reason is, that the opposite party
is prevented from objecting to its competency in any view different from the one proposed.
It should be noted, however, that Exh. K is not really being presented for another purpose.
Private respondents counsel offered it for the purpose of showing the amount of petitioners
indebtedness. He said:

Exhibit K, your Honor - faithful reproduction of page (17) of the book on Collectible Accounts of the
plaintiff, reflecting the principal indebtedness of defendant in the amount of Two hundred ninety-nine
thousand seven hundred seventeen pesos and seventy-five centavos (P299,717.75) and reflecting as
well the accumulated interest of three percent (3%) monthly compounded such that as of December
11, 1987, the amount collectible from the defendant by the plaintiff is Six hundred sixteen thousand
four hundred thirty-five pesos and seventy-two centavos (P616,435.72);[22]

This is also the purpose for which its admission is sought as a memorandum to refresh the
memory of Dolores Aday as a witness. In other words, it is the nature of the evidence that is changed,
not the purpose for which it is offered.

Be that as it may, considered as a memorandum, Exh. K does not itself constitute evidence.
As explained in Borromeo v. Court of Appeals:[23]
Under the above provision (Rule 132, 10), the memorandum used to refresh the memory of
the witness does not constitute evidence, and may not be admitted as such, for the simple reason
that the witness has just the same to testify on the basis of refreshed memory. In other words,
where the witness has testified independently of or after his testimony has been refreshed by a
memorandum of the events in dispute, such memorandum is not admissible as corroborative
evidence. It is self-evident that a witness may not be corroborated by any written statement
prepared wholly by him. He cannot be more credible just because he supports his open-court
declaration with written statements of the same facts even if he did prepare them during the
occasion in dispute, unless the proper predicate of his failing memory is priorly laid down. What is
more, even where this requirement has been satisfied, the express injunction of the rule itself is
that such evidence must be received with caution, if only because it is not very difficult to conceive
and fabricate evidence of this nature. This is doubly true when the witness stands to gain materially
or otherwise from the admission of such evidence . . . .[24]
As the entries in question (Exh. K) were not made based on personal knowledge, they could
only corroborate Dolores Adays testimony that she made the entries as she received the bills.

Third. Does this, therefore, mean there is no competent evidence of private respondents claim as
petitioner argues?[25] The answer is in the negative. Aside from Exh. K, private respondent presented
the following documents:

1) Exhibit A - Contract Agreement dated 26 April 1985 which contract covers both the Toledo wharf
project and the Babag Road project in Lapulapu City.

2) Exhibit B - Contract Agreement dated 23 July 1985 which covers the DAS Asphalting Project.

3) Exhibit C - Revised Computation of Billings submitted on May 28, 1986.

4) Exhibit D - an affidavit executed by [petitioner] to the effect that she has no more pending or
unsettled obligations as far as Toledo Wharf Road is concerned.

5) Exhibit D-1 - Statement of Work Accomplished on the Road Restoration of Cebu-Toledo wharf
project.

6) Exhibit E - another affidavit executed by [petitioner] attesting that she has completely paid her
laborers at the project located at Babag, Lapulapu City

7) Exhibits F, G, G-1, G-2, G-3 - Premiums paid by [private respondent] together with the receipts
for filing fees.

8) Exhibits H, I, J - certifications issued by OIC, MPWH, Regional Office; Lapulapu City, City Engineer;
Toledo City Treasurers Office respectively, proving that RDC construction has no more collectibles
with all the said government offices in connection with its projects.

10) Exhibit L - Bill No. 057 under the account of RDC Construction in the amount of P153,382.75
dated August 24, 1985.
11) Exhibit M - Bill No. 069 (RDCs account), in the amount of P1,701,795.00 dated November 20,
1985.

12) Exhibit N - Bill No. 071 (RDCs account) in the amount of P47,250.00 dated November 22, 1985.

13) Exhibit O - Bill No. 079 (RDCs account) in the amount of P7,290.00 dated December 6, 1985.

As the trial court found:

The entries recorded under Exhibit K were supported by Exhibits L, M, N, O which are all
Socor Billings under the account of RDC Construction. These billings were presented and duly
received by the authorized representatives of defendant. The circumstances obtaining in the case
at bar clearly show that for a long period of time after receipt thereof, RDC never manifested its
dissatisfaction or objection to the aforestated billings submitted by plaintiff. Neither did defendant
immediately protest to plaintiffs alleged incomplete or irregular performance. In view of these facts,
we believe Art. 1235 of the New Civil Code is applicable.
Art. 1235. When the obligee accepts the performance, knowing its incompleteness and irregularity
and without expressing any protest or objection, the obligation is deemed complied with.