TERMS OF REFERRENCE FOR HAZOP STUDY

Doc. No SR-40-02-01 HAZOP ToR

REV DATE DESCRIPTION PREPARED CHECKED APPROVED

A 08/08/2018 Issued for approval SK MSA

 CONTENTS

DEFINATIONS 3

HOLDS 7

1.0 INTRODUCTION 8
1.1 Scope of work 8

2.0 METHODOLOGY 9
2.1 Selecting Nodes 9
2.2 Design intent 9
2.3 Process Parameters 9
2.4 Causes 20
2.5 Consequences 21
2.6 Safeguards 21
2.7 Risk Ranking 22
2.8 Recommendations 22
2.9 HAZOP DOCUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS 23

3.0 MEETING ARRANGEMENTS 24

APPENDICES

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 DEFINATIONS

Cause
Event, situation, or condition that results, or could result, directly or indirectly in an accident or
incident.

Consequences
Direct, undesirable result of an accident sequence usually involving a fire, explosion, or release of toxic
material. Consequence descriptions may be qualitative or quantitative estimates of the effects of an
accident in terms of factors such as health impacts, economic loss, and environmental damage.

Design intent
The way a process or system is intended to function.

Deviations
Departures from the design intent. A guideword plus a parameter equals a deviation.

Guideword
Words such as “high”, “low”, and “no” that are applied to parameters to create a potential deviation
from the design intent.

Hazard
Condition or practice with the potential to cause harm to people, the environment, property, or FFL’s
reputation.

Hazard identification (HAZID)

Brainstorming approach used to identify possible hazards. HAZID studies are very broad in their scope.
The HAZID is sometimes called a Preliminary Hazard Analysis.

Hazard and operability (HAZOP)

Systematic qualitative technique to identify and evaluate process hazards and potential operating
problems, using a series of guidewords to examine deviations from normal process conditions.

Independent protection layer (IPL)

Device, system, or action that is capable of preventing a postulated accident sequence from proceeding
to a defined, undesirable endpoint. An IPL is (1) independent of the event that initiated the accident
sequence and (2) independent of any other IPLs. IPLs are normally identified during layer of protection
analyses.

Layer of protection analysis (LOPA)

Method for evaluating the effectiveness of protection layers in reducing the frequency and/or
consequence severity of hazardous events.

Major operability problem

Operating condition that, while not presenting an immediate hazard, is not desired. “Major”
differentiates between those smaller problems that merely require parameter adjustments vs. those
bigger problems, e.g., those that could result in a significant amount of lost production or damage to
catalyst.

Modification
Changes to existing facilities.

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 Operability
Ability to operate a facility inside the design envelope and meet business expectations.

Parameters
Conditions used to define a process, including flow, pressure, temperature, and level.

Process safety information (PSI)

Compilation of chemical hazard, technology, and equipment documentation needed to manage process
safety.

Risk
A measure of loss / harm to people, the environment, compliance status, Group reputation, assets or
business performance in terms of the product of the probability of an event occurring and the
magnitude of its impact.

Safeguard
Device, system, or action that would likely interrupt the chain of events following an initiating cause or
that would mitigate loss event impacts.

Safety instrumented function (SIF)

Safety function with specified integrity level that is necessary to achieve functional safety by putting
process to a safe state or maintaining it in a safe state under predefined conditions. SIF is implemented
using SIS.

Safety instrumented system (SIS)

Instrumented system used to implement one or more SIF. SIS is composed of sensors, logic solvers, and
final control elements. An emergency shutdown system (ESD) is a specific example of an SIS.

What if analysis
Scenario based hazard evaluation procedure using a brainstorming approach in which typically a team
that includes one or more persons familiar with the subject process asks questions or voices concerns
about what could go wrong, what consequences could ensue, and whether the existing safeguards are
adequate.

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 Symbols and abbreviations
For the purpose of this SoW, the following symbols and abbreviations apply:

CHAZOP Control (or computer) HAZOP.

CV Control valve.

DCS Distributed control system.

EDP Emergency depressuring.

ESD Emergency shutdown.

FEL Front end loading.

HAZID Hazard identification.

HAZOP Hazard and operability (study).

HHC Highly hazardous chemical.

HIPO High potential (incident).

HP High pressure.

HRVOC Highly reactive volatile organic compound (VOC).

HSSE Health, safety, security, and environment.

HVAC Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning.

IM Integrity management.

IPL Independent protection layer.

LDAR Leak detection and repair.

LEL Lower explosive limit.

LOPA Layers of protection analysis.

LOTO Lockout, tagout.

LP Low pressure.

MAWP Maximum allowable working pressure.

MIA Major incident announcement.

MOC Management of change.

MSDS Material safety data sheet.

NPSH Net positive suction head.

P&ID Piping and instrumentation diagrams.

PFD Process flow diagrams.

PHA Process hazard analysis.

PHSSER Project HSSE review.

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 PLC Programmable logic controller.

PM Preventive maintenance.

PMI Positive materials identification.

PPE Personal protective equipment.

PSI Process safety information.

PSSR Pre start-up safety review.

QA/QC Quality assurance/Quality control.

QRA Quantitative Risk Assessment.

RBI Risk based inspection.

RMP Risk management programme.

RPF Rehman Production Facility

RV Relief valve.

SCBA Self contained breathing apparatus.

SIF Safety instrumented function.

SIL Safety integrity level.

SIMOP Simultaneous operation.

SIS Safety instrumented systems.

TLV Threshold limit value.

TOR Terms of reference.

VOC Volatile organic compound.

WWT Wastewater treatment.

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 HOLDS

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

Pakistan Petroleum Limited (PPL) is installing an Oil Stabilization Unit at its Gambat facility. DIPL is
carrying out the Engineering, Procurement, and Construction (EPC) work for the Oil Stabilization
unit, as part of the project, PDIL is conducting a HAZOP review. This document gives terms of
th th
reference for HAZOP which will be conducted from 15 – 17 August in PDIL office in Lahore.

1.1 Scope of work

Scope of HAZOP will be limited to Oil Stabilization Unit including tie-in points at existing lines.
Following P&IDs are included in scope:

 PJ-0984-93-PID-3000-A (Sheets 1 & 2)

 PJ-0984-93-PID-3001-A (Sheets 1 - 3)

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2.0 METHODOLOGY
HAZOP will be conducted as per IEC-61882 methodology and PPL HAZOP procedure. The
methodology consists of a systematic study of all process and equipment included in project scope
to be carried out by a suitably experienced multidisciplinary team in a set of meetings and in the
presence of independent chairman. The study will primarily be performed based on the piping and
instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs) developed for the project.

2.1 Selecting Nodes

Nodes should be selected by the HAZOP Leader, but team members may also provide their input.
The following criteria will be considered in selecting the appropriate transition to the next node:
 Change in design intent.
 Change in state (e.g., from liquid to vapour).
 Major pieces of equipment.
There could be confusion over which piece of process equipment is being discussed (e.g., if the
deviation is more flow and there are multiple lines in the node, there may be confusion over
which line is being discussed).
2.2 Design intent
PPL/PDIL Process Engineer or any knowledgeable person will explain the design intent of the
project and selected node.

Design intent defines how a component or system is expected to operate and the purpose of the
system. This includes the design flow temperature, pressure, level, and other relevant details.

2.3 Process Parameters

Process parameters will be selected and reviewed in turn for each node. Flow, temperature,
pressure, level, and reaction (if applicable) will be considered. Additional parameters will be
selected as applicable to the process.
 Figure 1 - HAZOP sequence

Select node and identify on master drawing

Define design intent

Select process parameters

Select guideword
Guideword + Parameter = Deviation

Identify possible causes

Identify consequences

Evaluate event consequence severity and cause

likelihood and determine the risk ranking

Identify safeguards provided to reduce

likelihood or severity

Make recommendation if required

Repeat for each guideword applicable to parameter

Repeat for each parameter for the node

Repeat for each node in the study scope

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2.3.1 Keywords/ Guidewords
In general for possible deviation each HAZOP item is examined by applying the following
guidewords:

 NONE
 REVERSE
 MORE OF
 LESS OF
 PART OF
 MORE THAN
 OTHER THAN
 AS WELL AS

For each line, the study will look at the appropriate process parameters and the key word as listed
on the following table, deviation and causes listed below are not absolute, if required, during
workshop, any additional guideword or deviation can be added:

Deviation Causes
More flow Bypass valve open Worn or deleted Large leak
Increased pumping restriction orifice Wrong valve open
capacity plates
Wrong lineup or misdirected flow
Operation of pumps in Cross connection of
Slug flow
parallel systems
Water hammer
Reduced delivery head Control faults
Increased flow from upstream
Change in fluid density Control valve trim
process
changed
Exchanger tube leaks
Control valve fails
open
Burst pipe
Less flow Line restriction Fouling of vessels, Inadvertently throttled valve
Filter fouled lines, valves, or Incorrect valve sizing
orifice plates
Defective pumps Wrong lineup
Density or viscosity
Surging
changes
Competing pump
heads and flows
No flow Block valve closed Equipment failure Isolation in error
Wrong lineup (control valve, Power failure
isolation valve,
Slip blind installed Plugged line
pump, vessel,
Incorrectly installed check instrumentation,
valve etc.)
Control valve fails
closed
Incorrect pressure
differential

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 Deviation Causes
Reverse flow Malfunctioning, omitted, Siphon effect Wrong lineup or misdirected flow
wrong type of check Incorrect In line spare equipment
valves (note that check differential Connections to utilities (water, N2,
valves are not usually pressure flush systems, etc.)
bubble tight or positive
Two way flow
shutoff devices)
Emergency venting
Misdirected Valve open in error or passing allowing material to be routed to an unintended location
flow
Wrong Human error Line restriction Defective pumps
percentage Malfunction of control Filter fouled Fouling of vessels, lines, valves, or
valves orifice plates
Contamination/ Leaking valves Improper mixing Wrong additives or catalysts
composition Leaking exchanger tubes Ingress of air, Catalyst poisons
Changes to feedstock water, or rust Preparation for shutdown and
Stream composition Identify nitrogen startup operations
interfaces to Solvent flushing
Stream contaminants
process
Inadequate quality Phase inversion
Inadvertent mixing
control Sphere rollover
Explosive mixtures
Process control upset Tower tray damage
reaction intermediates Interconnected
systems (especially
Byproducts
services, blanket
systems)
Wrong material Human error Leaking exchanger Stream composition
Leaking valves tubes Stream contaminants
Changes to
feedstock
High pressure Design pressures Inadequate or Failure of ejector/eductor system
Specification of pipes, defective isolation More reaction
vessels, fittings, and procedures for
Plugged pressure tap
instruments relief valves
Obstructed relief
Pressure range for Thermal
overpressure Pressure testing
abnormal operations
Positive Excessive heating
Surge problems
displacement Exchanger tube leak
Leakage from
pumps
interconnected high
pressure system (HP to LP Control valves
interface) failed (closed or
open)
Gas breakthrough
(inadequate venting) Increased
centrifugal pump
suction pressure -
startup of spare
pump
Low pressure/ Cooling Compressor suction Blockage of blanket gas
vacuum Condensation line Failure of vacuum relief
Gas dissolving in liquid Undetected leakage Inadequate NPSH
Restricted pump Vessel drainage
procedure

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 Deviation Causes
High Fire situation Heater control Decoking
temperature Ambient conditions failure Heats of reaction
Fouled or failed Internal fires Mixing, reactor hot spots,
exchanger tubes Reaction control decomposition, or runaway
Cooling water failure failures reaction, absorption, or solution.
Air cooler malfunction Heating medium Burn protection
leak into process Abnormal operations
Defective control
Heat tracing
Regeneration
Low Cold weather operations Fouled or failed Joule/Thompson effect
temperature Ambient conditions exchanger tubes Endothermic reaction
Reducing pressure Loss of heating Control failure
Depressuring
liquefied gas
High level Outlet isolated or blocked Filling operations Interface level control
Inflow greater than Liquid in vapour Phase inversion
outflow lines Slug flow
Control failure Vessel overflow Condensation
Faulty level measurement Deactivated level
Incorrect calibration alarm
Inadequate time to
respond
Low level/ Inlet flow stops Control valve Plugged instrument taps
no level Leak malfunction Inadequate residence time
Drain valve left open Faulty level Inadequate mixing, excessive
measurement heating
Outflow greater than
inflow Incorrect Gas in liquid lines
calibration
Two phase flow
High reaction Wrong reactant mix Incompatible Side reactions
(runaway High temperature chemical
reaction)
Low reaction/ Wrong reactant mix Insufficient catalyst Channelling
no reaction Low temperature
(incomplete
reaction)
Reverse Wrong reactant mix Insufficient catalyst Channelling
reaction Low temperature
Side reaction Wrong reactant mix Insufficient catalyst Channelling
Low temperature
Wrong reaction Wrong reactant mix Insufficient catalyst Channelling
Low temperature
Excessive Agitator set at wrong speed
mixing
Poor/no Mixing Agitator set at wrong Agitator blade Poor mixing
speed drops off No baffles
Drive stops Coupling failure
Relief Design basis for relief: How is overpressure protection provided?

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 Deviation Causes
Relief for process Effect of Relief composition (e.g., two phase
(normal/abnormal - fire, debottleneck on flow)
startup/shutdown relief capability Maximum liquid rate vs. design
conditions) Instrumentation/SIS capacity
What is the controlling to reduce relief Tower liquid overfill
scenario? load
Relief for reactive chemicals
Changes affecting Type of relief
Materials of construction
relieving requirements device and
(insulation removal, CV reliability Heat tracing/temperature of
change, new connections, rupture disks
Atmospheric relief
etc.) valves (discharge RV set pressure vs. MAWP
Backpressure on relief location, plume
valve vs. design path, dispersion
modelling, risk
associated with
discharge)
Path for relief protection and can it be impaired?
Blocked path/relief valves Plugging/buildup in Failure of administrative controls
Restricted inlet/outlet relief system
lines (hydrates, ice,
weep holes
plugged, liquid
buildup, loss of
heat tracing, etc.)
Preventive maintenance: inspection/testing results
Isolation philosophy Is a spare relief Location of relief device
valve needed to
achieve the testing
interval?
Other
Environmental Near miss incidents Rupture disks under RVs - Is
implications Stress on RV pressure between RV and rupture
Frequency of relief valve inlet/outlet piping disk checked to identify rupture
use disk leakage?
Vibration of
Relief device exposed to piping/headers
abnormal operating
temperature or pressure
Rupture/leak Hazards
Toxic gas Potential RMP worst case or alternate release scenario
Fire/explosion potential - impact on
personnel/community/environment/surroundings (major
High pressure
accident risk potential)
Temperature - impact on occupied buildings/nearby trailers
Local vs. offsite impact
Detection
Methods Visibility Video monitors
Time required Odour thresholds Routine checks
Fire and gas
detectors/alarms
Mitigation

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 Deviation Causes
Methods available Containment Inventory reduction
Isolation points methods Emergency shutdown
Duration of leak Emergency arrangements
operations in spill
area
Procedures/training
Protective systems
Turret coverage Firefighting strategy Emergency showers/eyewash
Fire crew Required response stations
availability/response time Alarms Location of SCBA
Deluge system Evacuation Emergency training
procedures
Prevention: See equipment integrity for root cause elimination
Instrumentation Critical Instrumentation Alarm and trip Failure mode of control valve or
Need for SIS testing final control element
SIL SIS component Out of range failure mode vs. range
testing frequencies of possible conditions
Control strategy
Confusing alarms Lack of documentation
Location of instruments
Fire protection Computer control
Lack of instrumentation
Panel arrangement Mechanical and PLC interlocks
Information/alarm
and location PLC failure mode and its effects
overload
Auto/manual Bypassed interlocks
Instrument response time
facility and human
Time available for Defeated alarms
error
operator intervention
Sample devices
Set points of alarms and
Failure mode of
trips
transmitter
Chemical Undefined chemical Chemical Chemical storage excess inventory
hazards stability/reactivity interaction matrix Different fire protection needed
Unique hazards of Inadvertent mixing for chemical
chemicals and methods of Phase change Effect of heat tracing
control, reactive Phase separation Disposal
chemicals
Flammability Phase inversion
Instability/decomposition,
Toxicity Azeotropic boundary
such as ethylene
decomposition Health effects Compatibility with chemicals in
Runaway reactions MSDS information drainage/sewer systems
Initiating mechanism Detection of leaks
Physical Properties
Vapour pressure Particle size Freezing temperature
Saturation points of Settling of solids Fouling or plating
chemicals Sublimation Viscosity
Solubility
Crystallisation
Equipment Results of equipment Temporary fixes Injection/mix points
integrity inspection and testing (clamps, plugs, etc.) Soil/air interfaces
Fitness for service Identify dead legs Buried piping
Corrosion/failure mechanisms

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 Deviation Causes
Internal/external Fluid velocities Stagnant/low points
corrosion Vibration Failure of tank or basin liners
Corrosion under Stress Integrity of flanged joints
insulation
Fatigue Structural damage
Embrittlement
Small bore pipe Abandoned or out of service
Stress corrosion cracking equipment
Equipment
Subtle composition operating outside Mothballing techniques
change acceptable limits Condition of grating and handrails
Possible contaminants Water
(chlorides, H2S, water, hammer/surging
ammonia, etc.
Erosion
Prevention
Appropriateness of Do inspection and Underground piping protection
specifications/materials test plans address Cleaning/testing/monitoring of
of construction the potential equipment, such as piping, vessels,
Compatibility with damage heat exchangers, flexible hoses
process conditions and mechanisms?
Safety critical equipment
process fluids Are
Is equipment designed for
Adequacy of inspection/testing
inspection?
inspection/testing techniques
specified likely to Testing of emergency equipment
frequency and
procedures find expected
damage?
Has all equipment been
evaluated to determine if RBI
it needs an inspection and PMI Construction
test plan? QA/QC
Cathodic protection
arrangement
Corrosion inhibitors
Ignition Static eletricity
Earthing (grounding Splash filling of Temporary earthing (grounding)
arrangements vessels for loading/unloading
Insulated Insulated strainers PM for earthing (grounding)
vessels/equipment and valve systems
Low conductance fluids components
Dust generation
and handling
Hoses
Open flames
Flares Pilot lights Fired heaters
Other sources
Location of vehicles Loss of purge to Hot work permits
Vehicle traffic panels People in area
Vehicle entry Lightning Nonintrinsically safe equipment
Electrical classifications Hot surfaces
Hot work/welding
Flammability
Auto ignition Flash point Fire triangle
Upper and lower Metal fires
flammability limits

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 Deviation Causes
Service failure Failure of
Instrument air Hydraulic power Contamination of instrument air,
Steam Water or other nitrogen
Nitrogen Power Telecommunications
Cooling water loss/blips/failure Heating and ventilating systems
modes
Trip delay for
power failure
DCS system
Failure Viruses Backup
Loss of view Reliability
Protection systems
Deluge systems Firewater Emergency dump
Hydrocarbon detectors Foam Previous failures
Abnormal What are the potential abnormal operations and is system designed for it?
operation Extended operations Fire Operation of common spares
Purging Turnarounds Loading/unloading of trucks or
Flushing Off shift operations railcars
Removal of solids Shift change Spills/spill containment
Contaminants Flaring Evacuation plans
Water or air, etc. Bypassed safety Bypassing procedures
Startup devices Workarounds
Normal shutdown Bypassed Using extraordinary effort
equipment/controls Extended shift schedules
Emergency shutdown
Time (sequence) Previous incidents and near misses
Operations under
emergency conditions Startup following Use of contractors
emergency
Severe weather Written procedures (accurate,
shutdown
conditions updated, followed)
Regeneration
Spills
Decoking
Filter changes
Sampling Is sampling required? Sampling apparatus Diagnosis of result
Online vs. manual Environmental, Industrial hygiene (personnel
sampling compliance points exposure/monitoring)
Is the sampling device Spill and leakage PPE required
and location appropriate? monitoring Sample disposal
Is sample return point Sampling procedure Operator intervention
appropriate for abnormal Time for analysis Process changes because of sample
operation? result result
Risk of sampling Calibration of Is there an inspection and test plan
(hot/cold, high/low automatic samplers to ensure the integrity of sample
pressure, toxics)
Reliability, cylinders?
Hazards of gaging accuracy, or
tanks/silos representative
Purpose of sample sample
Maintenance Preparation
Verify equipment can be properly isolated and prepared for maintenance, including:

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 Deviation Causes
Isolation philosophy Drying Hot bolting
Drainage Opening lines Equipment LOTO procedures,
Purging Blinding including isolation lists
Cleaning Risk of metal or packing fires
General issues
Work required on Procedures (verbal, Breaker identification
operating ("live", "hot", written) Vent discharges near work areas
"active") equipment Preventive Contractors
Confined space (entry maintenance
Nitrogen asphyxiation risks
into vessels with Predictive
hazardous atmosphere) Golden Rules enforcement
maintenance
Rescue plans Accessibility
Training
Control of work
permits
Equipment Installation/demolition
Hot and cold taps Pneumatic pressure Pile driving
Pressure testing testing
Overhead lifting
Sparing philosophy
Installed/noninstalled Modified Catalogue of spares
spare equipment specification Test running of spare equipment
Availability of spares Storage of spares
Equipment Access to local field Fire protection Location of occupied buildings vs.
siting instrumentation systems process hazards
Accessibility to Location of Entry into flare exclusion zone
equipment and valves breathing air Location/accessibility of
(maintenance hindered apparatus emergency isolation valves
from accessing Location of LELs Need for lifting heavy equipment
equipment (i.e., access to and/or toxic gas over process lines
valves needed to prepare detectors and
equipment for Tripping hazards
adequacy of
maintenance) coverage Placement of trailers
Equipment spacing Location of nearest
standards/codes applied emergency shower
Escape routes and eye bath
Location of vents
and emission
sources vs. people
Previous Incidences at similar processes
incidents HIPOs/MIAs
Review of any previous incident with having potential for catastrophic consequences,
including near misses
Undocumented incidents
Were hazards addressed by the incident investigation?
Were recommendations from the incident investigation
resolved/implemented?
Were root cause(s) of the incident resolved?

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 Deviation Causes
Human factors Interfaces with process
Ability to read or Auto restart Confusion over information on
confusion with local Gaging operations computer systems (e.g., too many
instrumentation alarms?, incorrect displays?)
Clarity of
Consistency (layout, signs/labelling Methods for detecting process
labelling, operation problems, failures, status
Communications
action, instrument spans, Feedback on changes made
etc) Confusion on
operation of valves
Actions during an
emergency
Automatic vs. manual
control
Human capabilities
Potentially hazardous Complex tasks Adequate tools for job
tasks Ergonomics Confined work space
Fitness for task Experience levels Inadequate lighting
Infrequent tasks Competency Night work
Opportunity for operator Unclear
errors responsibilities
Physical work
environment
Administrative controls
Changes affecting Procedures Administrative vs. engineered
procedures or safe work extending across safeguards
practices shift Training
Confusion over Variances from
procedures written procedures
Environmental Potential sources and impact of environmental incident or excursion (range of
operations, weather, etc.)
Solids
Filter elements Catalysts
Spent chemicals Residues
Liquids
Soil contamination Pickling fluids Collection/disposition of drained
Underground piping leaks Discharge and drain fluids and final destination
Failed tank or basin liners points
Air emissions: (gases and particulates)
Flaring Point source Odours
Fugitive Vents Atmospheric relief
Mitigation
Proper Reclamation Scrubbing/adsorption
disposition/treating Recycle/recovery Options for reducing greenhouse
Storage of chemicals and options gas emission
spill Methods to reduce Equipment specifications
containment/abatement flaring
requirements
Waste treatment

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 Deviation Causes
Compatibility with WWT Discharges to waste treatment (different chemicals,
or alternate treatment creation of or changes to solid waste streams, process
methods wastes, increases in loading or increases in
Excessive water usage concentrations, pH, etc.)
Surface water
Other
Contingency plans for Impact of Spill Prevention, Control, and Countermeasure
handling leaks or spills (SPCC), Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA90), Resource
from equipment Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), Comprehensive
Firewater disposal Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
[Superfund] (CERCLA)
Noise to community
Design change
What is the potential Capacity creep vs. Does equipment need to be
effect on permits for air permit limit included in VOC monitoring?
or water (i.e.,
NOx/SOx/VOC /HRVOC
generation and applicable
permit limits)?
Safety Unique situation or unrecognised hazard
Status of written operating and maintenance procedures (available, accurate, updated,
followed)
Accuracy of PSI
Hazards created by others and contingency plans - (adjacent storage areas/process
plants)
Compliance with local/national regulations and codes
Location of safety showers/eye wash (10 s access)
Housekeeping in dust environments
Industrial hygiene
PPE MSDS Antidotes/decontamination
Noise levels Health map Lifting (back injury)
TLVs of process materials First aid/medical
and methods of detection resources/ supplies
Security
Monitoring Entrance control
Vulnerability DCS security, etc.

2.4 Causes

All potential causes will be established for each deviation from intention considered. There may
be multiple causes for each deviation. In such case, each cause should be listed separately. Causes
can be due to a range of events. Some examples are human error, equipment failure, process
upset, or external event. Causes will be specifically defined using the proper equipment,
instrumentation, and piping tags.

Multiple-cause events will be considered if they are the result of a common mode failure or a
process dependency. The cause is identified within the node being studied. However, the
resulting consequence may occur throughout the process. If the node starts from a battery limit,
deviations from upstream and downstream shall also be considered.

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 There are opportunities to identify the same cause under multiple deviations. As long as the
consequences and safeguards are fully defined and documented, there is no requirement to
document details for the same cause in each of the deviations.

2.5 Consequences
The leader will challenge HAZOP team members to identify all potential practical consequences of
each cause, especially the potential for harm to people and the environment.

The discussion should consider the unmitigated consequences - those consequences without
giving any credit to the safeguards (assuming all safeguards fail). Safeguards are discussed and
documented in the next step.

Consequences shall be taken to be anything that affects:

 Health and safety of PPL workers, contractors, and offsite populations.

 The environment.

 Privilege to operate.

2.6 Safeguards

In the next step the team will identify the engineered system (as defined in the P&IDs and other
engineering information) and administrative controls (such as operator response to alarms) that
can prevent or mitigate the hazard.

The team will also consider whether operability is impaired if any deviations occur or whether
design could be improved to give the operator better information or facilities to
prevent/control/mitigate the hazard.

Principal safeguards (engineering and administrative controls) will be recorded in the HAZOP log
sheet referencing the appropriate equipment tags.

Typical safeguards (or protection layers) that prevent or minimise consequences and likelihoods
are described in Figure 2.

Relief valves will be listed as safeguards only after it has been confirmed that the relief valve size
and set pressure are sufficient for the consequence being considered.

If operating procedures are identified as the primary safeguard preventing/mitigating a safety

consequence, the HAZOP team will:

 Ensure written procedures address the cause/consequence identified and the

appropriate action described in the safeguard, and

 Determine whether the operators have time and capability to carry out the procedures,
or

 Make a recommendation in the HAZOP log sheet to conduct a review of the procedures
prior to startup.

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 Figure 2 - Examples of safeguards (protection layers)

Community emergency response

Plant emergency response

Deluge systems, Fire sprinklers,

Toxic gas detection, and Alarms

Barricades, Dikes

Pressure relief valves

Rupture disks
Critical alarms
Safety instrumental systems

Basic process control systems

Process design

2.7 Risk Ranking

PPL Risk matrix will be referred to for risk ranking of HAZOP findings.

Consequences ranking will be considered based on worst credible outcome of a deviation.

Likelihood ranking will consider likelihood of occurrence of event with all safeguards in place.

2.8 Recommendations

A recommendation will be made if the team judges that any of the following are true:,

 Engineered systems and administrative controls are unlikely to prevent or sufficiently

mitigate a consequence.

 An operability concern is sufficiently severe that it requires attention.

 There is a shortfall in compliance with a regulation or PPL standard.

Recommendations should meet the following.

o Stand alone, such that it is understandable without benefit of the log sheets.

o Be able to be accomplished - have a clear point of closure.

o Be understandable, concise, and unambiguous.

o Be clearly worded to address the identified hazard.

o Be thorough (identifying the reason for the recommendation and clearly

communicating the intentions of the HAZOP team).

22 SR-40-02-01 HAZOP TOR

 The HAZOP team will focus on addressing hazards and not try to design the solution to problems
identified. If the team is not certain how to prevent or mitigate the hazards, the team will
recommend a further study to determine the resolution.

Recommendations shall not be modified without the concurrence and authority of the HAZOP
team.

2.9 HAZOP DOCUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS

The following documents are essential at the start of a HAZOP study, with the P&ID being the
principal document:

 Process and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs)

 Cause & Effects chart
 Process flow diagrams (PFDs)
 General arrangement drawings
 Piping specifications
 Mechanical data sheets
 Safety philosophy
 Alarm and Trip set point list
 Facility plot plan
 Relief & blow-down system data sheets

Other desirable documents may include:

 Operation and maintenance instructions

 Safety procedure documents
 Vendor package information
 Piping isometrics

23 SR-40-02-01 HAZOP TOR

3.0 MEETING ARRANGEMENTS

Workshop will be held from 0900 hrs to 1700 hrs every day with appropriate breaks for
Tea/Coffee & Lunch. Total HAZOP hours per day will be 6 hours.

Required facilities are:

1- Two Over head projectors & Screens – One for display of P&IDs and documents and one for
display of HAZOP worksheet.

2- Copies of documents
a. Process and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs) – One set for each participant, A3 size
b. Cause & Effects chart - – One set for each participant, A3 size
c. Process flow diagrams (PFDs) - One set for each participant, A3 size
d. General arrangement drawings – Soft copy
e. Piping specifications – Soft Copy
f. Mechanical data sheets - One Set or soft copy shall be available
g. Safety philosophy – Soft Copy
h. Alarm and Trip set point list – Soft Copy
i. Facility plot plan - One set for each participant, A3 size
j. Relief & blow-down system data sheets – Soft Copy

3.1.1 Participants
Following disciplines are required for workshop:

PDIL/PPL
 Project Engineer – Full time
 Process Engineer – Full time
 Instruments & Controls Engineer – Full time
 Process Safety / HSE Engineer – Full time
 Mechanical Engineer – Piping & layout – Full time
 Operations Engineer – Full time

PDIL shall ensure availability of all required personnel for workshop. Workshop proceedings will
be suspended by chairman if any of the full time participant is absent from meeting room for
more than 5 minutes.

3.1.2 HAZOP Recording & Report

A HAZOP will be documented using PPL Velocity EHS software. The scribe is responsible for taking
a record of the meeting with direction from the Chairman.

24 SR-40-02-01 HAZOP TOR