[G.R. NO.

134493 : August 16, 2005] amount of Fifty Four Thousand Five Hundred Forty-Two
Pesos and 56/100 (P54,542.56), Philippine Currency,
BUENCAMINO CRUZ, Petitioners, v. THE HONORABLE despite the fact that said account had been previously paid
SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE by the Municipality, thus, causing undue injury to the
PHILIPPINES,Respondents. Government in the amount aforestated.
DECISION CONTRARY TO LAW.
GARCIA, J.: Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of "Not Guilty".
Thru this Petition for Review on Certiorariunder Rule 45 of In time, trial ensued.
the Rules of Court, petitioner Buencamino Cruz seeks to set In a decision4 dated 30 January 1998, the respondent court
aside the Decision dated 30 January 19981 of the found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Sandiganbayan in its Criminal Case No. 22830, finding him violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 and sentenced him "to
guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. serve imprisonment of Seven (7) years, and One (1), month as
3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and minimum, to Ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum,
Corrupt Practices Act, and its Resolution dated 14 July with consequent perpetual disqualification from holding
1998,2 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. public office, as provided by law."
The factual antecedents are not at all disputed: The anti-graft court predicated its judgment of conviction
Following the May 1992 local elections and his on the strength of the following main premises:
proclamation as mayor-elect of the Municipality of Bacoor, The numerous, other alleged anomalies and irregularities
Cavite, Victor Miranda sought an audit investigation of the fully detailed and outlined in said S.A.O. Report No. 93-28
municipality's 1991-1992 financial transactions. Petitioner did not appear to the Special Audit Team, as meriting
Buencamino Cruz served as municipal mayor of the town in prosecution of those who might have been guilty thereof.
1991 until his term ended in the middle of 1992. But, the same report strongly recommended prosecution as
Acting on the request, the Commission on Audit (COA) notwithstanding . . . the subsequent refund of the total
issued COA Order No. 19-1700 constituting a Special Audit amount of P54,542.56 from the supplier, Kelly Lumber . . .
Team. In the course of the investigation, the Special Audit for the alleged double payment especially due . . . to the
Team discovered that certain anomalous and irregular fact that the amount was not directly paid to the supplier
transactions transpired during the covered period, the most but the Municipal Mayor, as shown in Exh. "1" for
serious being the purchase of construction materials P150,000.00 and Exh. "H" for P20,000.00 and Exhs. "1-1"
evidenced by Sales Invoices No. 131145 and 131137 in the and "H-1' showing that the said two checks were actually
aggregate amount of P54,542.56, for which payment out of encashed by the Municipal Mayor, respondent herein ( See:
municipal funds was effected twice. The double payments p.192 of the S.A.O. Report No. 93-28). A painful examination
were made in favor of Kelly Lumber and Construction of Exhs. "B" and "B-1" to "B-11' shows that although there
Supply(Kelly Lumber, for short) and were accomplished was a total sum due of P31,198.01 and supported by
through the issuance of two (2) disbursement vouchers documents under Disbursement Voucher No. 101-9201-
(DVs), i.e., DV No. 101-92-06-1222 and DV No. 101-92-01- 194, they are really, only supported by documents showing
195. Petitioner signed the vouchers and encashed the two the statement of the account thereof and yet Sales Invoice
(2) corresponding PNB checks, both of which were payable No. 131145 was not attached to support the voucher.
to his order. Besides, said Sales Invoice No. 131145 had already been
paid previously as shown by a photocopy of PNB Check No.
The findings of the Audit Team were embodied in a 336- 214785, dated January 30, 1992 (see. Exh. "B-2-A") which
page SAO Report No. 93-28, on the basis of which petitioner proves that payment was made upon the prior request of
was charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. The the accused Buencamino M. Cruz, and that the said amount
provision reads: of P21,041.56 had already been paid under the same
Voucher No. 101-9201-194. Also Exhs. "E", "E-1" to "E-7"
Sec. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers. In addition to
show that under Disbursement Voucher No. 1163, dated
acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
June 26,1992, payment had been made together with other
existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices
invoices, per PNB Check No. 197813 in the total sum of
of any public officer and are declared to be unlawful:
P150,000.00; whereas, the same account of P33,501.00 had
xxx already been paid on January 30, 1992, thereby, showing
that there is double payment and the two checks issued in
e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the payment of these two invoices to the accused: Buencamino
government, or giving any private party any unwarranted Mallari-Cruz as payee, shows indubitably, that there was a
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his willful act, with malice aforethought, in having a second
official, administrative or judicial functions through payment made, in order that the accused may be able to
manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable pocket the money, as he in fact did by encashing the said
negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and two checks.For it is likewise evident under the
employees of offices or government corporations charged principle RES IPSA LOQUITOR (The thing speaks for itself),
with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. namely: that if the money of P54,542.56 were indeed
payment for the goods delivered by the supplier-Kelly
The Information3 against petitioner, filed before the
Lumber and Construction Supply, simple reason and well
Sandiganbayan and thereat docketed as Criminal Case No.
accepted commercial practice demand for the checks in the
22830, alleged:
first place, to made payable to the suppliers of goods sold in
That on June 26, 1992, or sometime prior or subsequent payment thereof. But, why should payment be made to
thereto, in the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, Philippines, Mayor Buencamino M. Cruz, when he ought not to derive
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the any material benefits, whatsoever, or any pecuniary
above-named accused Buencamino M. Cruz, a public officer interest from the transactions entered into by him, for and
being then the Municipal Mayor of Bacoor, Cavite and while on behalf of the Municipality, . . . .
in the performance of his official function, acting in evident
The only excuse given by the accused when he finally
bad faith, did then and there wilfully, (sic) unlawfully and
testified in his own defense, in very lame. For the excuse he
criminally pay Kelly Lumber and Construction Supply the
gave, in explaining the anomaly or irregularity is that he
was not aware of the double payment and that, he just Still, with respect to the first issue, petitioner submits that a
signed the voucher for payment, as the last officer to conviction could arise only for an inculpatory act alleged in
sign the voucher, in order to effect payment thereon, to the the information and duly established in the trial, arguing in
supplier . . ., and that it was the duty of the Municipal this regards that the information alleged that Kelly
Treasurer to verify the actual deliveries of the goods sold Lumber was paid twice for the same materials but what was
and their payment afterwards. This may be true, if found during the trial was that the said payment was given
the ensuing checks issued in payment of the goods covered to petitioner. Pressing the point, petitioner states in fine
by the voucher for payment, were made payable, indeed, to that a variance obtains between what was alleged in the
the real suppliers of the goods, and not made payable to the Information filed in this case and what was proven during
Mayor, . . ., and who in fact encashed the checks. The only trial.
real defense put up here by the accused is that: The
supplier-Kelly Lumber and Construction Supply had We are not persuaded.
subsequently reimbursed the Municipality of the amount of As held in Socrates v. Sandiganbayan and People of the
P54,542.56 thereby precluding denial of the double Philippines8 :
payment as shown in Exh. "1" of the accused, . . . .
(Underscoring in the original). xxx Evidentiary facts need not be alleged in the information
because these are matters of defense. Informations need
With his motion for reconsideration having been denied, only state the ultimate facts; the reasons therefor could be
per the graft court's resolution of 17 July 1998,5 petitioner proved during the trial. x x x (Underscoring
is now with us via the instant recourse. supplied)ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ
Petitioner acknowledges signing the DVs which paved the And what petitioner took to be a variance between the
way for the double payment situation. He also admits allegation in the information, i.e., the excess payment was
encashing the checks corresponding to the DVs in question. given to Kelly Lumber, and the acts proven, i.e., the payment
He nonetheless urges the setting aside of the assailed in excess was given to petitioner, is more apparent than
decision, anchoring his virtual plea for acquittal on four (4) real. The perceived variance cannot plausibly be taken as
basic issues, to wit: (1) the fatally flawed Information filed invalidating the information and necessarily petitioner's
against him; (2) the applicability in his favor of what he conviction. As may be noted, the information in question
tagged as the Arias Doctrine; (3) the absence of bad faith on states that "x x x accused Buencamino M. Cruz, a public
his part; and (4) the refund of the amount representing officer being then the Municipal Mayor of Bacoor, Cavite and
overpayment. while in the performance of his official function, acting in
We have carefully reviewed the records of this case and evident bad faith, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
found nothing therein to warrant a reversal of the criminally pay Kelly Lumber and Construction Supply the
challenged decision of the respondent court. amount of Fifty Four Thousand Five Hundred Forty-Two
Pesos and 56/100 (P54,542.56), Philippine Currency x x
Petitioner maintains, anent the first issue, that the x". What was found during the trial, however, was that,
Information filed against him was fatally defective in that it albeit double payment was eventually made, or appeared to
did not allege that he is an officer "charged with the grant of have been made, to Kelly Lumber, the covering checks
licenses or permits or other concessions." initially were made payable to petitioner. As a matter of
fact, Kelly Lumber was even made to appear to have
Petitioner's contention is flawed by the very premises refunded and returned the second or double payment, as
holding it together. For, it presupposes that Section 3(e) of demonstrated by a Certification to this effect issued on the
R.A. 3019 covers only public officers vested with the power 19th day of March 1997 and signed by Bacoor Municipal
of granting licenses, permits or similar privileges. Petitioner Treasurer Salome U. Esagunde, which Certification reads in
has obviously lost sight, if not altogether unaware, of our its material part, as follows:
ruling in Mejorada v. Sandiganbayan,6 where we held that a
prosecution for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft CERTIFICATION
Law will lie regardless of whether or not the accused public
officer is "charged with the grant of licenses or permits or TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
other concessions". Following is an excerpt of what we said THIS IS TO CERTIFY that as per records of this office, Kelly
in Mejorada: Hardware & Construction Supply paid this office the
Section 3 cited above enumerates in eleven subsections the following:
corrupt practices of any public officers (sic) declared 1. Refund to double payment on Voucher No. 101-92-06-
unlawful. Its reference to "any public officer" is without 1222, paid under OR#4251401 dated September 30,
distinction or qualification and it specifies the acts declared 1993 P33,500.00
unlawful. We agree with the view adopted by the Solicitor
General that the last sentence of paragraph [Section 3] (e) 2. Refund to double payment on Voucher No. 101-92-01-
is intended to make clear the inclusion of officers and 195, paid under OR No. 4251402 dated September 30,
employees of officers (sic) or government corporations 1993 21,041.56
which, under the ordinary concept of "public officers" may
Total - (posted at CBV# 101-9309-2273)' '. ..P54,542.56
not come within the term. It is a strained construction of the
provision to read it as applying exclusively to public officers Issued this 19th day of March, 1997 upon request of
charged with the duty of granting licenses or permits or other _____________ for whatsoever legal purpose this may serve.
concessions. (Emphasis and words in bracket supplied)
(Signed)
At any rate, the Local Government Code, particularly
Section 444 (b)(3)(iv and v.), Chapter 3, Title II, Book III SALOME U. ESAGUNDE
thereof,7 empowers municipal mayors to issue licenses and
Municipal Treasurer
permits. Any suggestion that a reference to such power in
the information is a condition sine qua non for a successful Moreover, petitioner even admitted in his
prosecution for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 has to memorandum that "the refund by Kelly Lumber and
9

be rejected. As the Solicitor General aptly observed, matters Construction Supply is the best proof that he did not pay
of law are deemed incorporated or read into the himself for the costs of the supply x x x."
information.
It bears stressing that an information needs only allege the should also be the payee appearing in the checks issued to
acts or omissions complained of as constituting the satisfy the same. Yet, for still unexplained reasons,
offense10, in this case, the fact that petitioner made payment petitioner chose to deviate from what to us is an ordinary
to Kelly Lumber twice, without need of going into specifics accounting procedure, doubtless for a consideration less
of how such payment was made. The accompanying details than honest.
of the process of payment can be established during trial
through evidentiary offer. Apropos the third issue, it is petitioner's submission that,
while he might have been negligent in the performance of
Invoking the lessons taught in Arias v. his duties, the prosecution had not, at its end, established
Sandiganbayan11 , petitioner next argues that he cannot be his being in bad faith.
held guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 for,
following the doctrine established in that case, he had every Whether or not petitioner acted in good or bad faith in
right to rely, to a reasonable extent, on the bona fides of his effecting what, at bottom, is an unauthorized double
subordinates, referring to the municipal treasurer and payment, addresses a question of credibility. As a general
accountant, who prepared the DVs and the checks in proposition, the determination of credibility is the domain
question. of the trial court, not this Court.12 And it cannot be
overemphasized that the respondent court has declared
Petitioner's reliance on Arias is very much misplaced. As petitioner to have acted with "malice afterthought", a
may be recalled, this Court, in acquitting the accused disposition which, in the language of that court, "is evident
in Arias, made the following pronouncements: from checks originally issued in payment for goods paid twice
made in favor of the accused himself." 13
We can, in retrospect, argue that Arias should have probed
records, inspected documents, received procedures, and Added the respondent court:
questioned persons. It is doubtful if any auditor for a fairly-
sized office could personally do all these things in all Indeed by the mere fact that the accused herein had two (2)
vouchers presented for his signature. The Court would be checks issued to him in his name, and then, collecting the
asking for the impossible. All heads of offices have to rely to money in cash without any reason therefore (sic), is evident
a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good bad faith, as against bonafides (good faith) for his very act of
faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter having these two (2) checks in his name runs against the
into negotiations. If a department secretary entertains 'gamut' of public accountability . . . .
important visitors, the auditor is not ordinarily expected to Lest it be overlooked, the offense defined under Section 3
call the restaurant about the amount of the bill, question (e) of R.A. 3019 may be committed even if bad faith is not
each guest whether he was present at the luncheon, inquire attendant, the elements of the crime being:
whether the correct amount of food was served, and
otherwise personally look into the reimbursement (1) that the accused are public officers or private persons
voucher's accuracy, propriety, and sufficiency. There has to charged in conspiracy with them;
be some added reason why he should examine each voucher
(2) that the prohibited act/s were done in the discharge of
in such detail. Any executive head of even small government
the public officer's official, administrative or judicial
agencies or commissions can attest to the volume of papers
functions;
that must be signed. There are hundreds of documents,
letters, memoranda, vouchers, and supporting papers that (3) that they cause undue injury to any party, whether
routinely pass through his hands. x x x. Government or a private person;
There should be other grounds than the mere signature or (4) that such injury is caused by giving any unwarranted
approval appearing on a voucher to sustain a conspiracy benefits, advantage or preference to such party;
charge and conviction. (Italics in the original; Underscoring andcralawlibrary
supplied).
(5) that the public officers acted with manifest partiality,
Unlike in Arias, however, there exists in the present case an evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.14
exceptional circumstance which should have prodded
petitioner, if he were out to protect the interest of the In Sistoza v. Desierto, et al.,15 we held:
municipality he swore to serve, to be curious and go beyond
xxx Evidently, mere bad faith or partiality and
what his subordinates prepared or recommended. In fine,
negligence per se are not enough for one to be held liable
the added reason contemplated in Arias which would have
under the law since the act of bad faith or partiality must in
put petitioner on his guard and examine the check/s and
the first place be evident or manifest, respectively, while the
vouchers with some degree of circumspection before
negligent deed should both be gross and inexcusable. Xxx
signing the same was obtaining in this case.
Given the above perspective, it is abundantly clear that a
We refer to the unusual fact that the checks issued as
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 may be committed
payment for construction materials purchased by the
even through negligence provided that said negligence is
municipality were not made payable to the supplier, Kelly
both gross and inexcusable.
Lumber, but to petitioner himself even as the disbursement
vouchers attached thereto were in the name of Kelly Assuming, in gratia argumenti, that petitioner did not act in
Lumber. The discrepancy between the names indicated in bad faith, he cannot plausibly deny that his negligence
the checks, on one hand, and those in the disbursement under the premises was not only gross but also inexcusable.
vouchers, on the other, should have alerted petitioner - if he For, although the checks were on their face payable to him
were conscientious of his duties as he purports to be - that even as the supporting disbursement vouchers were in the
something was definitely amiss. The fact that the checks for name of Kelly Lumber, petitioner still affixed his signature
the municipality's purchases were made payable upon his thereon. It is unthinkable that such irregularity, given his
order should, without more, have prompted petitioner to stature and the nature of his position, would have passed
examine the same further together with the supporting him unnoticed. In turn, his subordinates could not have so
documents attached to them, and not rely heavily on the easily, and with such daring, presented him with a set of
recommendations of his subordinates. questionable documents - as petitioner would want to
impress this Court - without his instructions.
It need no stretching of the mind to understand that the
person or entity in whose favor a voucher is processed
Finally, it is puerile for petitioner to contend that Kelly month, as minimum, to ten (10) years, as maximum, with
Lumber's act of refunding the amount subject of double perpetual disqualification from holding public office, as
payment argues against the idea of the government provided by law.
suffering damages. The injury suffered by the government
is beyond cavil. This conclusion was aptly explained by the SO ORDERED.
Sandiganbayan in the following wise: Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and
Damage to the government in that instance [referring to the Carpio Morales, JJ., concur.
alleged double payment] is inevitable for the simple reason Endnotes:
that money taken from the coffers was used by someone
else for about two years and without paying interest and
without authority for its use. (N.B. 19 March 1997 is only 1Penned by Associate Justice German G. Lee, Jr. with
two months short of two years from filing of this case).
Associate Justices Cipriano A. Del Rosario and Teresita
Moreover, refund of the amount subject of the prosecution Leonardo-De Castro, concurring; Rollo, p. 22 et seq.
is not one of those enumerated under Article 89 of the 2 Rollo, pp. 31 and 32.
Revised Penal Code16 which would totally extinguish
criminal liability. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code 3 Rollo, p. 33.
applies in a suppletory character as provided for under
Article 1017of the same Code.
4 See Note #2, supra.

As regards the penalty imposed by the respondent court, we

5 See Note #3, supra.
find the same to be proper in point of severity, albeit its 6 151 SCRA 399 [1987].
employment of the term "prision mayor" is inappropriate. It
is proper because Section 9 of R.A. 3019 provides: 7Section 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties,
Functions and Compensation. '
SECTION 9. Penalties for violations'
(a) The municipal mayor, as the chief executive of the
(a) Any public officer or private person committing any of
municipal government, shall exercise such powers and
the unlawful acts or omission enumerated in Sections 3, 4,
performs such duties and functions as provided by this
5 and 6 of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment for
Code and other laws.
not less than six years and one month nor more than fifteen
years, perpetual disqualification from public office, and (b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the
confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the Government of any purpose of which is the general welfare of the municipality
prohibited interest and unexplained wealth manifestly out and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the
of proportion to his salary and other lawful income. municipal mayor shall:

In the same breath, however, the useof the same termis xxx
inappropriate because the penalty of prision mayor is
imposable only for felonies punishable under the Revised (3) Initiate and maximize the generation of resources and
Penal Code or when a special law specifically provides for revenues, . . ., and relative thereto, shall:
such penalty for a given crime. As we have said in People v. (iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the
Simon:18 same for any violation of the conditions upon which said
With respect to the first example, where the penalties under licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or
the special law are different from and are without reference ordinance;
or relation to those under the Revised Penal Code, there can (v) Issue permits, without need of approval therefor from
be no suppletory effect of the rules for the application of any national agency, for the holding of activities for any
penalties under said Code or by other relevant statutory charitable or welfare purpose, excluding prohibited games
provisions based on or applicable only to said rules for of chance or shows contrary to law, public policy and public
felonies under the Code. In this type of special law, the morals; (Underscoring supplied)ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ
legislative intendment is clear.
8253 SCRA 773, 790 [1996] citing Gallego, et al. v.
The same exclusionary rule would apply to the last given Sandiganbayan, 115 SCRA 793 [1982].
example, Republic Act No. 6539. While it is true that the
penalty of 14 years and 8 months to 17 years and 4 months 9 Rollo, p. 125.
is virtually equivalent to the duration of the medium period 10 Section 9, Rule 110, Revised Rules of Court.
of reclusion temporal, such technical term under the
Revised Penal Code is not given to that penalty for 11 180 SCRA 309 [1989]
carnapping. Besides, the other penalties for carnapping
attended by the qualifying circumstances stated in the law 12Castillo v. Sandiganbayan, 151 SCRA425, [1987] citing
do not correspond to those in the Code. The rules on People v. Patog, 144 SCRA 429 [1986] and other cases.
penalties in the Code, therefore, cannot suppletorily apply 13 Page 6 of the appealed decision; Rollo, p. 27
to Republic Act No. 6539 and special laws of the same
formulation. (Italics in the original; Underscoring supplied) 14 Inigo v. Sandiganbayan, 272 SCRA 563 [1997]; Bautista v.
Sandiganbayan, et al., 332 SCRA 126 [2000], Cabrera, et al.
Republic Act 3019 under which petitioner was prosecuted
v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 441 SCRA 377 [2004] citing Jacinto
and convicted is a special law which does not provide for a
v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 178 SCRA 254 [1989], Katigbak, et
penalty of "prision mayor" for any of the acts punishable
al. v. Sandiganbayan, 405 SCRA 558 [2003].
therein. Accordingly, a modification of the decision under
review with respect to its penalty component is in order. 15 388 SCRA 307, p. 324 and 326 [2002].
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the 16ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished.
assailed decision and resolution of the 'Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
Sandiganbayan AFFIRMED, with the modification that
petitioner BUENCAMINO MALLARI-CRUZ is hereby 1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties;
sentenced to a prison term of seven (7) years and one (1) and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefore is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs 6. By prescription of the penalty.
before final judgment.
7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in
2. By service of the sentence. article 344 of this Code.

3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty 17ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code.
and all its effects. 'Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable
under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this
4. By absolute pardon. Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless
5. By prescription of the crime. the latter should specially provide the contrary.
18 234 SCRA 555, 576 [1994].